FOR THE RECORD Gough Whitlam's Mission to ... - Whitlam Institute

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FOR THE RECORD Gough Whitlam’s Mission to China, 1971

W i t h a n i n t r o d u c t i o n b y G r a h a m F r e u d e n b e r g AM

The Whitlam Institute acknowledges the generous contribution of Graham Freudenberg AM, the AustraliaChina Council, David Barnett, Dr Stephen FitzGerald AO, The Australian and Australian Associated Press to this publication. The project ‘Gough Whitlam and the road to establishing formal relations with the People’s Republic of China: the significance for contemporary Australian-Chinese relations’ is supported by the Commonwealth through the Australia-China Council of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is a part of the program to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and the People’s Republic of China.

Graham Freudenberg AM After being appointed Arthur Calwell’s press secretary in 1961, Graham Freudenberg went on to become the speechwriter to a succession of Labor leaders, including Gough Whitlam (1967-77), New South Wales Premiers Neville Wran (1976-86), Barrie Unsworth (1986-88) and Bob Carr (1991-2003), and Prime Minister Bob Hawke (1983-91). His books include A Certain Grandeur (1977), A Figure of Speech: A Political Memoir (2005) and Churchill and Australia (2008). Graham accompanied Gough Whitlam as part of the historic Labor Party delegation to China in 1971.

Editing: The Whitlam Institute Editor’s note: The older style ‘post office’ romanisation of Chinese words and names which was in use during the early 1970s has been retained in the interests of historical accuracy. For instance, Zhou Enlai is referred to as ‘Chou En-lai’ in the historical documents.

ISBN: 978-1-74108-251-7 © Copyright for each document is held by its respective owner.

The Whitlam Legacy The Whitlam Legacy is a series of occasional papers published by the Whitlam Institute offering contemporary insights on matters of public interest inspired by Gough Whitlam’s public life and the legacy of the Whitlam Government.

About the Whitlam Institute The Whitlam Institute within the University of Western Sydney at Parramatta commemorates the life and work of Gough Whitlam and pursues the causes he championed. The Institute bridges the historical legacy of Gough Whitlam’s years in public life and the contemporary relevance of the Whitlam Program to public discourse and policy. The Institute exists for all Australians who care about what matters in a fair Australia and aims to improve the quality of life for all Australians. The Institute is custodian of the Whitlam Prime Ministerial Collection housing selected books and papers donated by Mr Whitlam and providing on-line access to papers held both at the Institute and in the National Archives. The other key area of activity, the Whitlam Institute Program, includes a range of policy development and research projects, public education activities and special events. Through this work the Institute strives to be a leading national centre for public policy development and debate. For more information about the Whitlam Institute, please visit our website: www.whitlam.org

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Contents Foreword

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Introduction: Graham Freudenberg AM

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Telegram from Gough Whitlam to Zhou Enlai, 14 April 1971

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‘My Mission to China’, Gough Whitlam, The Sunday Australian

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‘Whitlam: Dateline Peking’, Gough Whitlam, The Sunday Australian

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‘China and the U.S.’, Gough Whitlam, The Sunday Australian

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Transcript of discussions between Gough Whitlam and Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1971

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China Report: Address by Mr E.G. Whitlam, QC, MP, to the National Press Club, Canberra

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Foreword The fortieth anniversary of Australia’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in December 2012 has tapped a rich vein. The important ceremonial occasions have been accompanied by an extraordinary level of commentary, seminars, forums and new publications. The paper before you, For the Record: Gough Whitlam’s Mission to China, 1971, is a companion to Dr Stephen FitzGerald’s ‘part memoir’, The Coup that Laid the Fear of China, published by the Whitlam Institute (September 2012). While FitzGerald’s beautifully crafted work reflects on the drama and significance of the Whitlam-led excursion to China in 1971, this paper returns to the source material: three articles written by Whitlam for The Sunday Australian during the course of that 1971 trip; journalist David Barnett’s extraordinary transcript of Whitlam’s meeting with Zhou Enlai on Monday 5 July; and the National Press Club Address (26 July) Whitlam delivered upon his return to Australia. All these years later, reading these documents as distinct acts within a single script is like being given a front row seat to one of the greatest dramas in Australia’s political history. Like all good theatre, at the same time as you are immersed in the world laid out on the stage before you, you are pushed to think beyond that world to reflect upon your own. Reading Whitlam’s articles and his National Press Club Address today I could not help but be struck by the respect with which he treats his audience: he speaks directly of the history, the geo-political context, the reasons not just for his policy position but for the various meetings he held; and he details his various conversations with Chinese and regional leaders with what today would appear to be remarkable frankness. You can sense the hunger of Whitlam’s intellect; a hunger that we are told was being fed throughout the visit by Stephen FitzGerald who was keeping Whitlam well stocked with a range of books and literature about Chinese history and contemporary politics. The strong impression that Whitlam’s story varied little, whether told on-stage or off, is reinforced by David Barnett’s transcript of the meeting with Zhou Enlai. Graham Freudenberg, Whitlam’s media adviser speechwriter and confidante, had secured visas for nine journalists (including an ABC cameraman) to accompany the Labor Party delegation. Their involvement proved significant not just because it allowed them to cover the visit, but because it was the first opportunity Australian journalists had had to be able to report from within China in decades – a breakthrough in itself. How extraordinary it must have been for these journalists to find themselves present and completely unrestrained in reporting that first meeting with Zhou Enlai and how powerful it is to read Barnett’s bald transcription of it. The idea for this compilation came to us from Graham Freudenberg whose introduction – as is always the case with Graham’s writings – illuminates the subject and assists us in making sense of what lies before us. As you read these documents the most sharp-eyed readers may detect the occasional error or inconsistency so I should point out that we decided that the proper course would be for all the documents, including the transcriptions, to be presented exactly as they were originally published, including typographical and transcription errors. Whilst this may alter the intended meaning, they have been retained in faithfulness to the original source material. Fortunately the errors are few and almost always of minor significance. That said, it’s the big picture and its resonance today that matters in this collection. In these times when Australia’s relationship with China is again centre stage, Whitlam’s plea that we should be able to empathise with China, rather than perceive it entirely from the perspective of our own insecurities, seems very contemporary: “One of the great troubles in relations between China and the West is that we expect China to believe the best about our statements of intention while we choose to believe the worst about hers. We expect understanding for our own fears, but we have never tried to understand hers. We have been obsessed by our own historical experience, but we scoff at China’s obsession with her own experience.” Eric Sidoti Director Whitlam Institute within the University of Western Sydney

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Introduction “I make two pleas: Go to the documents; check the chronology” Gough Whitlam addressing the National History Conference, Melbourne University, July 2001. Gough Whitlam’s advice to historians – “go to the documents; check the chronology” – was given exactly thirty years after his historic visit to China in July 1971. These articles were written during that visit for The Sunday Australian, one of the few Australian newspapers which viewed it favourably – in contrast with the working journalists who accompanied Whitlam. By publishing them 42 years on, the Whitlam Institute is following his precept and practice. They demonstrate perfectly why Whitlam placed such value on contemporary documents and correct chronology as the best basis for the making of policies, speeches – and history. These articles are the raw materials of history as it was being made. The context of these articles is all-important. They were written in total ignorance, shared by the rest of the world, of the visit to Beijing, in the same week, by President Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Dr Henry Kissinger. “Our announcement will shake the world” Kissinger had signalled to Nixon, reporting the words of the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Zhou Enlai. These articles describe a world as it was before it was shaken by Nixon’s announcement on 15 July 1971. Their insights are absolutely free of hindsight. The chronology of the lead-up to Whitlam’s visit is equally important. The dates establish how Zhou Enlai – the key figure in both the Whitlam and Kissinger visits – was able to arrange matters in order that Whitlam would precede Kissinger. But it was a close run thing. “Check the chronology”. As Leader of the Opposition, Whitlam sent a cable to Zhou Enlai on 14 April, 1971. This was done at the original suggestion of the Labor Party’s Federal Secretary, Mick Young, at a time when China was indicating that it might not renew its contract for Australian wheat sales. Whitlam’s cable to Zhou stated that the Australian Labor Party was “anxious” to send a delegation to China “to discuss the terms on which your government is interested in having diplomatic and trade relations with Australia”. In his superb account of the visit The China Breakthrough, the Sydney historian Billy Griffiths analyses why, in the atmosphere of fear and hostility to China which had prevailed for 20 years, the mere fact of sending such a message aroused the outrage of the Australian Government, led since March by William McMahon. Zhou’s response came a month later, dated 10 May. It took the form of an official invitation from the People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, the agency responsible for dealings with non-recognising countries like Australia. They said they would welcome a Labor delegation “in mid-June or the latter part of June”. Whitlam sent his acceptance on 12 May. But because the ALP National Conference was due to meet towards the end of June, he asked for a postponement to “early or mid-July”. A few days later, a second cable from the People’s Institute set the visit for “the first week of July”. The significant point here is that all the options offered by Zhou Enlai through the People’s Institute nominated dates before 15 July, rejecting Whitlam’s preference for mid-July. I myself did not realise the full significance of the dates for 40 years, until Kissinger published the details of his own negotiations in his book On China in 2011. Kissinger details the tortuous manoeuvring between Washington and Beijing (mainly through secret Pakistani channels) in early 1971. All that the public knew of it was the curious episode known as ‘ping pong diplomacy’, involving an invitation to an American table tennis team competing in Japan to play in China in April. On 21 April, Zhou Enlai, on behalf of Chairman Mao Zedong, sent a definite invitation to Nixon. On 10 May, the same date as the Chinese invitation to Whitlam, Nixon accepted in principle but requested “a preliminary secret meeting” between Zhou and Kissinger, his National Security Adviser (the US State Department was kept completely in the dark). In his book On China, Kissinger writes (p. 234): “We indicated a specific date. The reason for this date was not high policy. During the late spring and early summer, the Cabinet and White House had planned a series of travels, and it was the first time a high-level plane became available. On June 2, we received the Chinese reply. Zhou informed us that he had reported Nixon’s acceptance to Mao “with much pleasure” and that he would welcome me to Beijing for preliminary conversation on the proposed date”.

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The “proposed date” for Kissinger’s arrival was 9 July 1971. This means that when Whitlam, on 12 May, had offered the options of early or mid-July, Zhou Enlai had received Nixon’s acceptance, and knew that Kissinger had specified 9-11 July for his secret mission. It was Zhou’s decision that Whitlam should come to China a week before Kissinger. It is not farfetched to conclude that this formidable politician saw value in such a visit at such a time from a leader of America’s ally in the Vietnam War, who was widely perceived as the next Prime Minister of Australia. Thus, by a remarkable convergence of policy, opportunity and coincidence, Whitlam entered China from Hong Kong on Friday 2 July; reached Beijing at midnight on Saturday 3 July; insisted on getting straight to work with Chinese senior officials on Sunday 4 July; had his historic meeting with Zhou Enlai in the Great Hall of the People on the night of Monday 5 July; left Beijing for Shanghai on the morning of Friday 9 July, a few hours before Kissinger arrived via Pakistan; and celebrated his 55th birthday in Shanghai with a birthday cake “with the compliments of Premier Zhou” on Sunday 11 July, the night Kissinger left Beijing after his talks with Zhou. Whitlam left China on the 14th of July for Tokyo, where, on the morning of Friday 16 July (15 July in the US) he watched Nixon on world-wide television reveal Kissinger’s secret trip and announce that he too would visit Beijing before May 1972. Thanks to the unlikely trio of Zhou Enlai, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Whitlam’s high-risk initiative was transformed to a personal and political triumph – literally overnight. The political risks certainly sprang first to my mind when Whitlam rang me at home on the morning of 11 May to tell me of the invitation. I then held the nominal title of Press Secretary, a rather leisurely job in the days before the 24/7 news cycle. That is why I developed the speech-writing role. On the way to our office in Martin Place, caution gave way to excitement as I realised the immensity of the opportunity. My doubts seemed to evaporate entirely when Whitlam said: “I want you to come too”. Unlikely as it may seem now, Whitlam did not make up his mind whether to go to China himself before the invitation actually arrived. Within his office, it was the late great Richard Victor Hall who had done the serious follow-up after 14 April. In particular, he contacted one of the few Australian academics knowledgeable about Chinese affairs, Dr Ross Terrill, then at Harvard. Terrill was able to contact France’s Ambassador to China Etienne Manac’h. Manac’h spoke to Zhou Enlai about it, and the thing was done. It is a measure of Dick Hall’s generosity – and of the spirit which prevailed in Whitlam’s office in those splendid opposition years – that he never once expressed resentment that Whitlam chose to take me to China, although I had done nothing to deserve it. The Labor Party was prepared to pay the costs of the official delegation which Whitlam decided would comprise Tom Burns, the Federal ALP President; Mick Young who had been to China in the calmer pre-Cultural Revolution days; Rex Patterson MP, the ‘shadow minister’ on trade and primary industry, and most important, not least in the drafting of these articles, Dr Stephen FitzGerald, a Mandarin speaker who had resigned from the Foreign Affairs Department in frustration with the Government’s China and Vietnam policies. Whitlam was to appoint him Australia’s first Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China in 1973. Whitlam intended to pay my fare himself; the difficulty however, was resolved when The Sunday Australian offered a return air fare for three exclusive articles by Whitlam. As with everything else in our long collaboration, my task was always to organise the vast mass of material Whitlam provided from his own writings and speeches and our constant dialogue over the years. My last contribution to an association spanning five decades was a message to a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Gillard at Parliament House, Canberra to mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations with China in December 2012. Whitlam on China was a particularly rich and ready resource. Whitlam had been advocating Australian recognition of the People’s Republic in and out of Parliament since 1954. In his first major speech on international affairs in the House of Representatives in August 1954, he said: “We have to face the fact that the countries of South-East Asia do not regard the Communist Government in China as being hostile to them. They do not wish to align themselves with either of the two power blocs, as they regard them.” Calling for recognition of the People’s Republic, he said: “A still more serious phase of our policy is that we say not only that the Communist Government of China is not, and should not be, the Government of China. We must recognise the fact that the Government installed on Formosa (Chiang Kai Shek’s regime on Taiwan) has no chance ever again of becoming the Government of China unless it is enabled to do so as a result of a third world war. When we say that the government should be the government of China, we not only take an unrealistic view, but a menacing one.”

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Readers of these articles in 2013 will be struck by the prominence given to the status of Taiwan. It was then, and remains, central to our relations with China. For China, Taiwan remains the unfinished business of the 1949 Revolution when Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists installed their regime there. For the United States, Taiwan represented the last stronghold of the China “lost to the communists” in 1949. Campaigning for Vice-President in 1952, Richard Nixon had said: “The most devastating thing against the Truman Administration is that they lost 800 million Chinese to the communists”. Until the end of 1971, the Nationalists regime purported to represent China in the United Nations General Assembly, and held China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This travesty embodied the so called ‘Two Chinas’ policy. In 1966, Prime Minister Harold Holt had needlessly made Australia’s position more difficult by opening an Embassy in Taipei, capital of Taiwan. Griffiths gives an illuminating account of the egregious decision (The China Breakthrough p.15). Paradoxically, Holt’s decision complicated matters for the McMahon Government while at the same time it simplified things for Whitlam. As Whitlam points out in the first of these articles, it made it impossible for McMahon to recognise China on terms that the Chinese could ever accept. Yet it enabled Whitlam to state his ‘One China’ policy with dramatic simplicity: “I will transfer the Australian Embassy from Taipei to Beijing”. It was this clarity of definition and intention which enabled the Whitlam Government to negotiate the terms of our diplomatic relations in a matter of days when it came to office in December 1972. Everything that needed to be said had been said in July 1971. The clarity and consistency of Whitlam’s approach laid the strongest possible foundations for the China-Australian relationship. The third article presents the fullest exposition of Whitlam’s China policy. I should explain what may seem a striking omission. While the article carries the dateline, ‘Saturday 17 July’, it contains no mention of Nixon’s announcement the previous day (Tokyo and Sydney time). The reason is simple: it was completed in Tokyo by the 14th of July, and despatched to Sydney, I think, on 15 July, well before the Nixon announcement. Whitlam, however, decided not to change or update it, preferring, as the lawyers say, to “let the thing speak for itself”. He wanted this exposition of Australian Labor policy towards China to stand independent of the American initiative, just as his visit itself had been. It is easy to imagine the kind of campaign that the coalition would have waged if Nixon had not made his announcement. McMahon himself laid it all out in his speech to the Melbourne Young Liberals at the very time Kissinger and Zhou Enlai were meeting in secret in Beijing: “It is time to expose the shams and absurdities of his excursion into instant coffee diplomacy. We must not become pawns of the giant Communist power in our region. I find it incredible that at a time when Australian soldiers are still engaged in Vietnam, the Leader of the Labor Party is becoming a spokesman for those against whom we are fighting...By accepting Peking as the sole capital of China, he is abandoning Taiwan...In no time at all, Mr Chou had Mr Whitlam on a hook and he played him as a fisherman plays a trout”. In his interview with Zhou Enlai on 5 July, Whitlam had undoubtedly provided plenty of ammunition for this type of campaign, targeting on the charge of anti-Americanism which had sustained the coalition for two decades. Especially since Menzies had justified the Australian commitment of combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 by asserting “Vietnam is part of the downward thrust of China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans”, hostility towards China had become identified with loyalty to the American alliance. The Nixon shock forced an agonising reappraisal of Liberal rhetoric. As late as 11 July, McMahon had joyfully asserted: “China has been a political asset to the Liberal Party and will continue to be an asset for some time”. As Griffiths puts it succinctly: “Whitlam had the good fortune to find himself at the epicentre of a seismic shift in AmericaChina relations. The coincidence in the words of Bill Hayden recast “a disaster in the making” into a “stroke of genius”. It transformed Whitlam’s image as a statesman and gave his candidacy for the Prime Ministership renewed momentum. But the Kissinger visit, however beneficial for Whitlam politically also tends to overshadow the substance of Whitlam’s visit. – Billy Griffiths, The China Breakthrough (p.22). These Sunday Australian articles recapture that substance. Graham Freudenberg AM

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Copy of telegram from Gough Whitlam to Zhou Enlai, April 14, 1971, Richard Hall papers, National Library of Australia, MS 8725, Series 15, Folder 2

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The following three articles and associated images are published with the permission of The Australian. Additional commentary has been provided by Graham Freudenberg.

The Sunday Australian, July 4, 1971

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The Sunday Australian, July 4, 1971

Gough Whitlam’s first exclusive report on his journey to Peking

My mission to Chi na Pe k i n g, S a t u rd a y I REALLY started on this journey to China in 1954. My purpose today is essentially what it was then, when I was the first Australian parliamentarian to call for the recognition of China and her admission to the United Nations. The purpose and my hopes for the mission are the same – that the Australian people should come to terms with the realities of our situation and our future in this region. For a generation, the great questions of China, color and colonialism – the keys to our region – have been corrupted by our hang-ups about Chinese communism. If this visit helps achieve a breakthrough to reality, I shall judge it a success. I want Australia to have a real future in this region. That is why I am here. It seems unbelievable that Australia should now be brawling about a football team and that an Australian Government should have involved our armed forces in the fracas.i In this region, it becomes stark and humiliating. It is a curious measure of our priorities and preoccupations. I expect no grand revelations. We are not a negotiating mission. We have no authority to speak for anybody except ourselves and the Labor Party. Terms It is best, therefore, to start with the small details. For instance, how unreal it is that last Monday I should have been the first senior Australian parliamentarian for 24 years to speak with a Chinese official – and then only but necessarily on purely procedural matters about our entry into China. I would certainly hope that it will be easier and simpler from now on for other Australians to enter China than it has been for me. The great diplomatic question is the terms on which we could expect to establish full proper and honorable relations between Australia and China. It is not likely that they will be established under the present Government. The blunt truth is that China will not accept the terms that a Liberal Government can offer with honor or can accept with honor. I make it quite clear that a Labor Government is not bound by the present terms of Australia’s official relationship with the Chiang-Kai-shek regime in Taiwan. More particularly as these terms were so much a personal, even private decision of Harold Holt’s. We sent an ambassador to Taipei in 1967 more as a gesture of Mr Holt’s personal friendship with certain nationalist Chinese than as a result of any public policy. It is one of the oddest episodes in our diplomatic history. We should not allow the debate on China to be distorted by hypocrisy over self-determination. The people of Taiwan have never been given any self-determination by their rulers, by the Chiang Kai-shek regime, any more than by the Japanese. Behind every diplomatic commitment there must lie the question: What military commitment could be involved? And no Australian Government – Liberal or Labor – would lift a finger for China Kai-shek or his successors.

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We would be no more prepared to do that than we would be prepared to assist China militarily to extinguish the regime on Taiwan. Therefore, our present commitments only delude both the Chinese and Taiwanese as to our real intentions. The future of four million people in Hong Kong lies entirely with decisions which they will play no part in making. Hong Kong will be returned to China when China chooses. It suits Britain and China to maintain the present treaty – probably the world’s oldest operative treaty. But the political decisions about the future of these four million human beings will be made in Peking and London, not in Hong Kong. Fruit What we should be striving for is that, when the inevitable happens, relations between China and the West will be such that decolonisation should not mean disaster for the people. This should be our same aim for the people of Taiwan when a political settlement is reached there. We do not help by encouraging diplomatic and military stances so incompatible as between China and the West that confrontation and catastrophe become inevitable. This is what Canada – our Commonwealth and Pacific partner – has done.ii It may even be that as candid friends of the United States, we will be able to moderate in the next two weeks – ever so slightly – some of the unreasonable fears of China about aggressive encirclement by the West. We are in China not only as the first significant political mission from a non-recognising country. We go there as the first Pacific ally of the United States. These mutual fears have done enough harm in our region and to humanity. We should never forget that the China obsession is at the root of the Vietnam war. It is in this international context that I expect this mission to bear its fruit. I do not expect to find the Chinese exactly agog with excitement about us. I do not ever expect Australia to have very great influence with China. But we do have meaningful relations with the two other great Pacific powers – the United States and Japan. It is through the U.S. and Japan that our role lies, particularly and immediately in easing the U.S. down from her generation of over-reaction against the Chinese revolution. If an Australian political leader had been able to make this trip 10 years ago, we would not now be in Vietnam. It may even be that our influence could have been exercised with the U.S. against the disastrous escalation of the war. It is just part of the price we are all paying for 22 years of political schitzophrenia. So our visit is really no more than a modest contribution to the cause of human sanity.

Commentary from Graham Freudenberg: i Graham Freudenberg has noted that during the visit the Springbok rugby tour dominated the headlines in Australia. McMahon ordered the RAAF to fly the South African Team around Australia to avoid anti-apartheid demonstrations at airports. On 3 July, 1000 police ran riot in Sydney. On 6 July, 150 protestors were arrested. On 14 July the Premier Jo Bjelke-Petersen declared a state of emergency in Queensland. ii Graham Freudenberg has noted that due to a transmission error, this section was printed incorrectly, but was intended to read: ‘This should be our same aim for the people of Taiwan when a political settlement is reached there. This is what Canada – our Commonwealth and Pacific partner – has done. We do not help by encouraging diplomatic and military stances so incompatible as between China and the West that confrontation and catastrophe become inevitable.’

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The Sunday Australian, July 11, 1971 11

The Sunday Australian, July 11, 1971

W H I T L A M : D A T E LIN E P E KIN G Exclusive to the Sunday Australian

L a b o r’s l e a d e r r e p o rt s o n h i s t r i p t o C h i n a By E. G. W h itla m, QC, M P Peking I AM NOW convinced that Australia has it in her power to play an independent role of immense significance to our region’s welfare and our own future. I say this in no spirit of euphoria because of our reception in Peking. The visit has not changed my basic perspectives or priorities. But it has added to my perception of the initiatives open to a middle power like Australia in an area which has become the focus of competition and confrontation among the four greatest powers. From the first it was plain that the Chinese were taking this mission seriously. I suspect that from the moment we stepped into China at Shumchun, our intentions, motives and calibre were being summed up. There was warmth but there was wariness. And not surprisingly. A generation of mutual incomprehension is not to be dissipated overnight or in a visit of two weeks for that matter. But the first step has been taken. I think a decisive moment for the success of this mission came at midnight on Saturday, July 3, when we reached Peking, travel-worn after a five hour flight from Canton through a quite spectacular lightning storm. Our hosts of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs gave us the option of a break on Sunday. But from the beginning of our first meeting with the Acting Foreign Minister it was clear that the Chinese had no intention of wasting their time or ours in pointless propaganda. We had some misgivings on this score. Propaganda is pervasive here, particularly in the Canton area, which is as far as most Westerners get. The eye and the ear are under constant appeal. But very quickly it becomes just an accompaniment and not an affront. No official, high or low, has made the slightest attempt at propaganda. Chairman Mao is omnipresent. Revealingly, a guide at the Peasants’ Institute in Canton – where Mao lived and worked with his first cadres in 1926 – called it one of the sacred places of the revolution. The reverence for Mao goes well beyond the respect normally given even to so extraordinary and authentic leader of his people. Yet at our meeting with Chi Peng Fei, an extremely relaxed and assured man in his 60s, the only direct reference to Chairman Mao was my own when, at the end of our 2½-hour talk, I requested that our respects be passed on. There were routine references to United States imperialism and the harshest word for the Australian Government was that it had acted as the accomplice of the United States in Vietnam. When one realises the depth of feeling here about Vietnam, and indeed the genuine fear it has aroused, particularly in the Canton area, one must regard this as relative moderation. I have known, for example, Swedish ministers to be infinitely more severe in their strictures, though Mr Anthony’s remarks at home about selling our soul have bitten deeply with probably the proudest and most sensitive people on earth. But the crucial question in our diplomatic relations is Taiwan. The Australian Government’s position there seems to me to present insurmountable barriers against the restoration of normal relations. I think it is significant that Chinese leaders usually refer to Chiang Kai-shek when they refer to Taiwan. They refer not so much to the issue of Taiwan but to the problem of Chiang Kai-shek. I would guess that they see a political settlement after his death as a real possibility. It should be stressed here that even the present Australian Government has no military commitment to Chiang Kai-shek or his regime on Taiwan. I have been emphasising this here in all my discussions. It would be inconceivable for any Australian Government to enter into such a commitment.

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My belief that an Australian Labor Government can negotiate on the basis of the Canadian formula was confirmed by a striking omission in my long, wide-ranging and public conversation with Premier Chou En-lai. In fact he did not raise Taiwan. Yet equally, his entire conversation was based on the clear assumption that the return of a Labor Government in Australia would mean the immediate resumption of normal diplomatic relations. In all our previous talks with the Foreign and Trade ministers, Dr Patterson and I made it clear that what we proposed was the application of the Canadian formula which takes note of the Chinese position on Taiwan. I do not believe for a moment that Premier Chou’s omission was accidental. He is too skilled to make errors of that kind and he plainly had been completely briefed on what we had said to the other ministers. With a man so deliberate in his mind and clear in his purposes, one must place as much significance on what he omits to say as on what he does say. Never accept two Chinas ALL MINISTERS saw the Taiwan question as the chief stumbling block against improved relations with the United States. Mr Chi said it was the crux. “If that could be settled we would certainly consider relations with the United States” he said. There is no possibility whatsoever that China will ever accept the so-called “two Chinas.” Taiwan to them is a province of China and there is only one China. I accept this as the only view China could maintain with dignity. To them it is incidental that Chiang Kai-shek happened to make his last citadel on an island. Indeed, it is only because of that accident in military history that the Seventh Fleet has been able to shield him. Suppose a different military result in 1949 had enabled Chiang to hold out in a province on the mainland. There would then be no question of military support from the West, nor would we seriously question the basic right of the Chinese Government to assert its ultimate sovereignty over such a province. We would just shrug off his final defeat as the last act of the Chinese civil war. I would hope that the removal of Chiang Kai-shek by the processes of nature will enable the United States to take a fresh look at her position on Taiwan. The Americans are every bit as concerned with saving face as the Chinese. We call it honor. If the United States believes that it owes a debt of honor to Chiang Kai-shek – though what except harm he has done to the United States I cannot imagine – the debt will only be cancelled by Chiang’s eventual departure. The important consideration is the people of Taiwan. They have never been consulted about their future. But it would be a tragedy of grotesque proportions if the United States were to drift into the same untenable and ultimately undischargeable obligations in Taiwan as in Vietnam. Before we sloganeer ourselves into any impossible stances on Taiwan, the West should recall that already we have transferred the people without the slightest reference to their wishes. Roosevelt and Churchill decided at the Cairo conference that they should be transferred to Chiang from Japan when the war ended. The decision was justified on the ground that Taiwan was an integral part of China. How inconvenient for us that the Chinese now make this same claim. Taiwan excepted, I did not detect the depth of animosity towards the United States that I would have expected. This came out in the very persistent questioning with which Chou En-lai probed our attitude to ANZUS. I have no doubt that he would have liked a general denunciation of the United States as distinct from our particular criticism of her policies in Indo-China. But he was clearly familiar with Labor’s platform on ANZUS, and even knew the changes made in it as recently as the Launceston conference. It seemed to me that Chou En-lai was more sceptical about ANZUS than hostile towards it. He drew a parallel between ANZUS and the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, but as a lesson he thought we should learn, not as a threat: a warning from their experience, not as a menace to us. I was able to make the point that our relations with the United States had not deteriorated in the way that China’s relations with the Soviet had. He did not dissent. It is especially in China’s attitude towards the Soviet and Japan that one learns to draw the distinction between the Chinese as Chinese and as communists. The Chinese experience, more than the Chinese ideology, determines her attitudes towards her neighbours. Australia as peacemaker IN THIS, I believe, lies Australia’s real opportunity. If we can adopt a posture of influence with, but independence of Japan and the United States, we can have a positive role in improving relations between all three powers. Our relative smallness becomes a positive advantage.

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This is especially true in our relations with China. There is nothing China can fear from us. We have no power as a nation to humiliate, much less harm China. Nothing in our possible trade relations could ever induce in the Chinese any uneasy sense of dependence upon us. Yet our resources and skills give us a significance and influence out of all proportion to our size. So do our trade relations with Japan and our treaty relations with the United States. Few countries can do as much to moderate hostile and counter-productive reactions in Japan and America. And I now believe that few can do as much as Australia to moderate Chinese fears if they can be shown to be unfounded. But they must be shown to be genuinely unfounded. Chou En-lai asserted that the United States and Japan were currently discussing the supply of tactical nuclear weapons to Japan. I pointed out that this would be in clear breach of Japan’s treaty undertakings. He was not impressed. But it would be impossible to conceive a more foolish and retrograde step. It would merely confirm the worst fears of the Chinese. China’s fears of Japan IT WOULD be taken as incontrovertible proof of revived militarism. It would reinforce to an unshakeable degree China’s conviction that it is being encircled by the Soviet, Japan and the United States. It would destroy any hope of a detente with China. It would revive the spectre of Dullesism. And it would be military pointless and counter-productive. I could think of no step which would take us more surely along the road to a third world war. One of the great troubles in relations between China and the West is that we expect China to believe the best about our statements of intention while we choose to believe the worst about hers. We expect understanding for our own fears, but we have never tried to understand hers. We have been obsessed by our own historical experience, but we scoff at China’s obsession with her own experience. We saw nothing strange in an American president justifying the war in Vietnam by drawing a parallel with Munich. We saw nothing strange in a British prime minister drawing the same parallel over Suez. The two greatest Western debacles since the war both originated in the conviction by statesmen that we had to learn the lesson of Munich about the consequences of appeasement. For Lyndon Johnson and Anthony Eden World War II was their central experience. We understand this type of historicism in ourselves. We can even understand it in the case of the Russians. We make proper allowance for their fear of revived German militarism. Only to the Chinese do we deny the luxury of learning by experience or of basing policy on the lessons as they see them of their own history. I hope to be able to say more in my next article about our future trade relations with China when Dr Patterson has completed detailed discussions with Chinese officials. Our central conclusion is that trade and diplomacy cannot be separated. To put it crudely, the Canadians have stolen a march on Australia. This adds point to our concern here about the curious remarks being attributed to Mr McMahon. Why he should have chosen this particular time to say that diplomatic relations with China appeared very far off is beyond our comprehension. He is reported as saying that he has been unable to get any sense from the Chinese on his expressed wish for a dialogue between the two governments. All I can say is that it is very easy to get a great deal of sense from any men here with whom one is prepared to deal frankly and seriously. The Chinese do not confuse rhetoric with negotiating. We are convinced that when normal relations are restored, Australian businessmen will be able to talk and negotiate on a completely rational basis. During a century of Western intrusion and domination, the Americans believed themselves to be the very special friends of China and they believed that this feeling was reciprocated. When China became communist at the height of the Cold War the Americans experienced all the pangs and resentments of the rejected lover. John Foster Dulles in particular felt the Chinese revolution as a personal affront and in this over-reaction lay the roots of the war in Vietnam. In fact, the Chinese have made no attempt to seduce us. As I have said, there has been great anxiety on both sides that this visit should be both pleasant and successful. But even Senator Gair may be assured that our virtue remains intact. My general impression is that the Chinese are so convinced of the logic of their position that simply for it to be stated is for it to be understood. In specifics and details I have found the Chinese as frank and realistic as any officials I have spoken to in any country in the world, and better informed about Australia than most. And, knowing our position already, they accept it as they expect us to accept the sincerity of theirs.

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The Sunday Australian, July 18, 1971

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The Sunday Australian, July 18, 1971

Exclusive report by A.L.P. leader Gough Whitlam on his visit to Peking

C h i n a a n d t h e U. S. ‘I s e e n o i r r e m ova bl e o b s t a cl e s t owa r d s i m p r ove d r el a t io n s’ To k y o, S a t u r d a y THE NEW CHINA is Chinese first, Maoist second and Communist third. The distinction is crucial. The West’s failure to accept the difference has been the major cause of misconceptions about China and the mutual hostility between us over the past 22 years. We should always remember that our post-war policies towards China developed in the atmosphere of the Cold War – the era of Stalin, Dulles and McCarthy. The West saw the victory of Chinese communism simply as a victory for Soviet communism. We saw the establishment of a communist government in China simply as an addition to Soviet global power and the extension of a monolithic communist empire stretching unbroken and united from East Germany to the China Sea. To this Western view of the post-war world Australia added her own traditional racial and geographical fears, only changing the old formula by substituting Communist China for a defeated Japan as the source of menace to our security. For a generation every event in our region has been forced into this scenario. It is not necessary to visit China to learn the basic flaws in this concept. The failure of our policies in Vietnam is ample proof of its unreality. The real insight one receives in China is how much Chinese experience – their experience in history – dominates Chinese thinking and attitudes. The Chinese experience determines her attitudes to her neighbors and her view of her place in the world. Almost the last thing any Chinese official said to me before our departure was: “To understand the Chinese you must understand their history.” He was not referring to the history of China as we would understand it. To the people of China and their rulers today history means recent history, history in the memory of men now living. The three strands of memory dominating their thinking are European imperialism, the war with Japan and the breach with the Soviet. The thing common to each of these experiences is that each represented a crushing humiliation to the Chinese. They each meant a loss of face of catastrophic proportions. We will never understand the Chinese and we will never begin to grasp their attitudes to Maoism unless we try to understand that above all they are determined never again to submit to humiliation. The corollary of this is that we will never understand China’s attitude to her neighbors and to the world unless we realise that she will not put herself in a situation where the chances of being humiliated could arise. And if anybody thinks about this for two seconds, he will realise that it is one of the most hopeful things about world affairs today. IN SHANGHAI our attention was deliberately drawn to the park in the old international commission which had displayed the notorious sign “Dogs And Chinese Prohibited.” One official commented with no sign of facetiousness that the Chinese were not allowed preference over dogs even in matters of discrimination. The same official pointed out two buildings in Shanghai which had housed respectively the Young Men’s Christian Association for Foreigners and the YMCA for Chinese. The irony was not lost upon him. One expects this kind of sensitivity in any country which has experienced colonialism, although the Chinese experience was of a special kind. We delude ourselves if we think that we shall not reap the same harvest in New Guinea. What I was not altogether prepared for was the depth of Chinese fear of Japan. It is manifest everywhere at all levels.

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The world’s largest air-raid shelter is now being built in probably the world’s largest and most vulnerable city, Shanghai. It is being built on the site of the old English racecourse. The 10 million people of Shanghai practise air-raid drill. They are being constantly reminded of the Japanese raid of 1937 – one of the first and worst examples of deliberate and indiscriminate bombing of a civilian population. The Chinese now link their fear of Japan with their distrust of the Soviet. Premier Chou En-lai himself referred in the presence of the Australian Pressmen with us to Russia’s “passionate embrace” of Japan. Chinese distrust of Russia transcends ideology. At the Great Wall of China officials repeatedly pointed out the obvious – that “the wall has lost its meaning.” They meant that it was no defence against aircraft. They were not referring to Japanese or American aircraft. This involves the deepest historical memory of the Chinese – the conquerors who came from the west. Russian contempt The Chinese attitude to Russians is symbolised by the Yangtse River bridge at Nanking. Photographs, tapestries and paintings of this bridge are everywhere. According to the propaganda, it “sings a paean of praise to the principle of maintaining independence and keeping the initiatives in our own hands and relying on our own efforts.” The point is that Russian engineers had analysed plans for the bridge and finally declared it impossible because of the great flood tides of the Yangtse. When the Russians were abruptly withdrawn by the Soviet in 1960 the Chinese determined to go ahead with their bridge. Today the bridge stands not only as an engineering triumph but as an assertion in steel of Chinese dignity against Russian contempt. Australian ministers who so glibly refer to the sale of their souls and trout fishermen might do well to consider that the modern Chinese will not be insulted for all the wheat in Australia. I AM CONVINCED that the highest challenge to western statesmanship in our region and probably in the world now involves the relations between China and Japan. Our response should lie in trying to moderate Chinese fear of Japan. We can only do this if we do in fact discourage any renewal of militarism in Japan. China has been on the receiving end since 1894. It would be folly of the highest order if we were now to force or encourage Japan into a role of appearing as our client bulwark against China. Among other consequences it would undermine democracy in Japan. It is my deep hope that the Japanese people will not allow themselves to be used in this way. Because I am trying to get Australians at least to understand if not accept the nature and basis of Chinese fears, I have stated it from their point of view. It is 22 years since Australia tried to do this. For all that time we have judged events and acted upon them only through the perspective of our own fears, obsessions and ideological preoccupations. We have to make at least some attempt to redress the balance. We are not the only people in the world with the right to our favorite prejudices and fears. I shall be talking about these Chinese fears in Japan. I wish also to obtain the Japanese assessment of their fears. I am in Japan now, not in any way as an advocate for China, but catastrophe lies ahead unless there is a moderation of fear and hostility between China and Japan. I can see no irremoveable obstacles towards improved sensible relations between China and the United States. The Chinese have not closed the door despite Vietnam, despite Taiwan. We have found little evidence that the United States inspires the same fear and mistrust which the Soviet and Japan manifestly do. If this assessment is correct, tremendous new opportunities for the United States and for the benefit of the region open up when the withdrawal from Indo same opportunities open China is completed. The for us as America’s partner in the Pacific.i One thing is certain. We are not going to be confronted with a choice between China and the United States, anymore than West Germany faces a choice between the Soviet and the United States. Objects of curiosity I find it interesting and I believe it is significant that the denunciations are always of United States “imperialism,” not of United States capitalism. The propaganda is against American activities abroad, not of her economic or social or political system at home. And whatever the content and purpose of the pervasive propaganda here it is not directed against Americans or Europeans as such.

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It is just not true that Chinese children are being brought up to hate foreigners or foreign nations with different systems. In any of our walks or drives through Peking, Shanghai and Canton we were certainly the object of frank and open curiosity. But in Shanghai especially the warmth was overwhelming. And to the hundreds upon hundreds of children who seemed to materialise wherever we went, we might well have been Americans or any other foreigner. All they knew was that we were white foreigners and they reacted with anything but hatred. Our own fears of China in Australia, and I assume Japanese fear of China, are based on the potential strength of a highly organised and disciplined nation of 700 million inspired by a militant doctrine of international revolution. Only a fool would dismiss these fears out of hand, just as only a fool would ignore the existence of a quarter of the earth’s people. But our great mistake in western policy since the war has been to base all our policies on fear unqualified by knowledge. Thus we have created the very conditions by which our worst fears are realised. MacArthur nearly did it in Korea. It has certainly -occurred in that way in Vietnam. I have said that the second thing to understand about the Chinese is that they are Maoists before they are communists. The cult of Chairman Mao embodies all that we as Australians and Westerners would find most repellent in Chinese society. Beyond politics, ideology It is something almost beyond our comprehension, particularly if we view it only as a political phenomenon. It goes beyond politics. It goes beyond ideology. It is something that has taken deep hold upon the Chinese spirit. It is of the very essence of what is happening – the good and the bad – in China today. The religious element is unmistakeable. I confess that when one sees a group of beautiful children lustily performing a scene from the repertoire of so-called revolutionary opera and ballet, one is torn between admiration for the charm and vigor with which it is done and apprehension about the meaning of it all. Yet in the international context, the apotheosis of Chairman Mao has its advantages. Communism under Mao is becoming more distinctively Chinese and less and less international. The appeal of communism is its alleged universality. The appeal of Mao is to the Chinese. And the system he has built in China is for the Chinese. It is a complex organisation with deep roots in Chinese history, Chinese methods, the Chinese character an dthe Chinese mind. Had it not been, its success could not have been so quick and so complete. And the only country in the world where all the necessary conditions apply is China. Maoism is not really exportable. Nor does Chinese pride – this great, if not the greatest, motivating force in China today – require that it should be exported. Chinese pride absolutely requires that the revolution China has created should succeed in China. Yet equally Chinese pride inhibits her courting failures in other countries of great dissimilarity. There is good reason to believe that this realisation is behind the statements of Premier Chou En-lai about peaceful co-existence with countries of “different political and social systems.” All the talks – private and public – I have had convince me that this is a genuine and deliberate policy on the part of the Chinese. They are deliberately placing limits on their world role. I BELIEVE two factors are at work behind the desire of China for an opening to the West of which our invitation was one sign. There is a greater self-confidence in the results of the Revolution, yet a greater awareness of China’s actual limitations. The realisation that the Chinese system is unacceptable and unattractive tonalised into a view that pending the ultimate verdict of history, China will let all countries work out their own destiny and concentrate on perfecting her own revolution. This amounts to a virtual abdication of any role as the leader of international communism at least in the developed countries. In such countries, the appeal of the Chinese system developed countries is ratiofails at the most fundamental level – the trade unions.ii The Cultural Revolution destroyed any vestige of trade unionism in China. A strike is inconceivable. It is plain that trade unions as we know them have ceased to exist. There are no national trade union organisations in China. The Chinese Government now speaks of appealing to the people over their national governments. I do not believe that this means an appeal to revolution. The Chinese know that such an appeal is doomed to fail. It is really an appeal for understanding.

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Hence the concept of “people’s diplomacy”. Undoubtedly our invitation to go to Peking was part of that diplomacy. So was the admission of a very representative group of Australian journalists. So I suppose was the public meeting with Premier Chou En-lai. If this is what Mr McMahon was referring to in his spiteful little outburst last week he is welcome to his satisfaction. Of course Chou En-Lai was trying to advance the interests of China, just as we are trying to advance the interests of our country. We are politicians and we each knew exactly where the other stood. I regard our mission as successful. To put it at its lowest, it achieved everything possible for a group with our status – an opposition from a non-recognising country. Dr Patterson brings home information that, given the slightest degree of common sense on the part of the Australian Government, should prove valuable to our exports, and not only our wheat farmers. However, the real test of the success of our mission lies not with us but with the Australian people. It all depends upon whether Australia is mature enough and self-confident enough to face squarely the facts of life in our region. The really serious aspect of Mr McMahon’s outburst is that it rehashes all the old slogans which passed for foreign policy in the fifties and sixties. We must either grow up or fossilise, and Mr McMahon last week spoke for the fossils. There is nothing within my power I would not do to help reduce the risks of war between China, Japan or the United States. The prevention of such a war – needless, inconceivable, cataclysmic – is the central taks of statesmanship in our region. The associated task is to reaise the living standards in the region. They are interwoven issues. There is no issue involving China, Japan and the United States which is incapable of settlement given a minimum of common sense and goodwill. This mission was an exercise in common sense. I hope it has been some contribution towards goodwill.

Commentary from Graham Freudenberg: i Graham Freudenberg has noted that there was a transmission error that led to the incorrect printing of the first two sentences of this paragraph. ii Graham Freudenberg has noted that there was a transmission error that led to the incorrect printing of this sentence which should read ‘In such countries, the appeal of the Chinese system developed countries fails at the most fundamental level – the trade unions’.

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T r a n s c r i pt o f d i s c u s s i o n s b e tw e e n Gough W hitla m a n d Zhou En la i, 5 J u ly 1 9 7 1

The following is an exact transcription of the discussions between Gough Whitlam and Zhou Enlai as recorded by AAP’s special correspondent, David Barnett. Additional commentary was provided by Dr Stephen FitzGerald, who accompanied the delegation. China Talk With Chou Peking, July 5 AAP – Special – Australian Associated Press. Special Correspondent David Barnett who is accompanying the Australian Labor Party delegation to China recorded the following extracts from the meeting between Premier Chou En Lai and ALP Leader Gough Whitlam

Chou:

“When your Party was in office we had not yet completed the liberation of our country and when the Chinese liberation was complete you were no longer in office. You were out of office”.

Chou recalled a recent meeting with leaders of Japan’s Komeito Party: Chou:

“Some of their proposals are similar to the Japan Socialist Party. I think Your Excellencies are planning to go to Japan?”

Whitlam:

“Yes. On the 14th”.

Chou confirmed that Mr Whitlam would have talks with leaders of the Japan Socialist Party He said:

“You have frequent contacts with them?”

Whitlam:

“Not frequent but regular. We have closer contacts with other Social Democratic Parties like (Harold) Wilson’s British Labour Party and Willie Brandt’s Social Democratic Party.”

Chou:

“I’ve heard that your Party advocates the withdrawal of all United States forces from Vietnam and that your Party of course advocates complete withdrawal of all forces sent to Vietnam by the Australian Government.”

Whitlam:

“Every two years we have a Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party and right from the first year in 1965 and again in 1967 and 1969 and last month we have consistently advocated the withdrawal of Australian troops in South Vietnam. We have said that everything should be done to end that war and Australian participation in it”.

Chou:

“That is quite right. Does your Party have this general proposition that foreign troops should be withdrawn from other countries?”

Whitlam:

“Yes we have. And at our Federal Conference last month we once again stated that foreign troops should not be stationed in (indistinct), Czechoslovakia, Korea, Vietnam.”

To a further question he added “we did not indicate Japan”. Questioned further on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Taiwan Mr Whitlam said: “We certainly agree. But we omitted these two subjects” (Japan and Taiwan). Chou:

“It is also a correct proposition that the people of all countries should be allowed to solve their problems themselves and foreign interference should not be permitted. That is why we are in favour of the withdrawal of all United States forces, first of all from Far East and then from all those places where they committed aggression – South Korea, Japan, China’s Taiwan Province, the Philippines, the three countries of Indo China, Thailand and so on. Of course when we say that we do not mean to limit it only to American forces, but all foreign forces”.

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Mr Whitlam seemed from time to time to have trouble getting points in. He paused for interpretation and Chou would go on to elaborate further. At this point Mr Whitlam put in “Your position is very well known – that you believe the Soviet Union should not station troops outside its border”. Mr Whitlam continued: “We have been impressed, particularly at the meeting yesterday with the Acting Foreign Minister, that you’ve resolutely followed the policy of having no troops outside your own country. May I add that we were very impressed today following our request to our Acting Foreign Minister that we be given a copy of Chairman Mao’s Eight Principles for extending Assistance to other Countries. In particular we were impressed by the principle that you do not seek to dominate any country to which you extend aid and that your citizens who are rendering assistance do so under conditions approximating those of that country and that they are living among the people.” Chou:

“You have a very correct understanding of our principles”.

Whitlam:

“We’ve been assisted by long meetings not only yesterday morning with your Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs but this morning with your Minister for Foreign Trade and with representatives of the Peoples Institute for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon and this afternoon. On each occasion every question which we asked was promptly and frankly answered. All the further information we sought has been given.”

Chou:

“Although this is the first visit to China of such a delegation yet we are answering every question clearly that you put forward.”

Whitlam:

“We found that the attitudes of the Australian Labor Party were well known and understood and neither of your Ministers and none of your officials questioned our right to have different assessments from those of the China Government. In our exchange of view when there were differences they were understood and respected.”

Chou:

“It is quite obvious there are bound to be different views between us. We have just passed our fiftieth anniversary of the founding of our Party and the article (carried in Chinese papers) put forward the situation in the struggle over the past fifty years.”

Chou then commended the article to an Australian member of the press party covering the tour as a reporter but normally a resident at Harvard where he is an academic, Dr Ross Tirrell. Whitlam:

“I suppose I can be indiscreet enough to say that when we were hoping that you would receive a delegation we telephoned him at Harvard.”

Chou:

“He came first as your vanguard officer.”

Whitlam:

“We knew that he had a visa before we knew through the People’s Institute that there was favourable response to my cable to you, sir. So this gave us hope that we would be visiting your country.”

Chou:

“There was just that gap in dates so that you stayed in Hong Kong.” Chou went on: “We are very sorry we put you to that extra expense. However Hong Kong has plenty of material on Hong Kong (sic). There are so many matters from Hong Kong reported from different angles. Those who are able to differentiate between angles, those who are able to differentiate between what is true and false do so.”

Whitlam:

“We kept an open mind and we knew the only place to learn was in China herself.”

Whitlam:

“Your China travel Service and China Resources Company (in Hong Kong) were very helpful.”

Chou said the Chinese had adopted the same attitude as Australians in asking questions directly Chou:

“There was one question. You mentioned in your discussions that you looked upon the ANZUS treaty as preventing restoration of Japanese militarism. That is a fresh approach to us. I would like to ask you to inform us as to what points of that treaty are directed against militarism.”

Whitlam:

“That treaty was made in 1951 by the Truman Government.”

Chou:

“In the Truman Government Dulles was already responsible for some parts of the work.”

Whitlam:

“He was an officer of the State Department. Australia has only been attacked by one country in her history – Japan. Two of our cities were bombed. Territories for which we were responsible and still are were invaded. We fought the Japanese through the islands for three and a half years. So Australians at that time had a fear of the Japanese. They have the same fear of Japanese as I believe your people have now.”

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Chou:

“Both of our peoples have similar sentiments.”

Whitlam:

“You have had a longer struggle”.

Chou:

“For half a century”.

Whitlam:

“Australia had always had a peaceful life until the Japanese attacked. The Americans were much more anxious to sign a peace treaty with Japan than were Australia or New Zealand, and to reassure Australians and New Zealanders the Americans entered into obligations of the ANZUS treaty. All political parties in Australia support the conclusion of that treaty. The only criticisms that were made at that time were (by) some members of the Labor Party who said the British should be in too but that criticism lost its force very soon. I told your Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that we in Australia regard the ANZUS treaty as entirely defensive. It has never been used as justification for operating in Vietnam.” Mr Whitlam continued: “The formula that has been used about Vietnam by the Australian Government for our participation in that war is sustained under the provisions of SEATO and great emphasis was placed, as has now been disclosed in ‘The New York Times’ McNamara papers, on a request having (been) contrived from the current regime in Saigon before we committed troops.”

Chou:

“You are also a member of SEATO. You cannot call SEATO a defensive treaty (laughter). This time it is not a good treaty. General De Gaulle has said that.”

Whitlam:

“It is moribund. I do not think anybody places much reliance on the treaty where Britain has so clearly determined never to undertake any military operations again, where France never turns up at the meetings, where Pakistan is quite obviously an embarrassment. Of the other members, Philippines and Thailand are try desperately to insinuate themselves into your Government’s good graces.”

Chou:

“But in linking up the ANZUS treaty with SEATO we can learn this lesson. That is both of them have the United States as a principal member. That was the policy of John Foster Dulles at that time. You may say it was his soul. As exposed in those papers by the ‘New York Times’ we can see at the start, first of all in 1951, when Truman went into the Indochina war in aid of France. John Foster Dulles served both the Democratic President and Republican President for the purpose of carrying out his policy. Immediately following the conclusion of the SEATO treaty came the so called treaty between the United States and Chiang Kai Shek for defence of Taiwan and Quemoy. That is to say his policy was by whole a series of alliances to encircle China.”

Whitlam commented: “Yes”. Chou went on:

“Now he has a successor to the north”.

Whitlam: “Japan”. Chou, to laughter from the Chinese side: “Japan is to east. We say to north.” Chou continued: “We too had a defensive treaty concluded in 1950 between China and the Soviet Union. That treaty was called the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Aid. The first article of that treaty was that the aim of this treaty was to prevent resurgence of Japanese militarism. It may have been put in even more clear terms than the ANZUS treaty. It was made clear in the treaty that if Japanese militarism is reviving or some other nation helps Japan to revive militarism then the two countries help each other. Now United States-Japanese reactionaries together are reviving Japanese militarism. The most concrete manifestation was a joint statement by Nixon and Sato in November 1969.” Whitlam:

“On Okinawa?”

Chou:

“Including that. Including the question of Okinawa. It meant in actuality to prolong indefinitely the Japanese American security treaty maintaining military operations on Okinawa and at the same time military bases and some naval bases on Japan proper.”

Chou said that the Japanese Government had now announced its fourth defence plan. The total amount used on this plan which amounts to more than 16 thousand million U.S. dollars (14.29 thousand million dollars)… the total amount spent on the previous three plans. Chou said the equipment envisaged for this fourth plan can be all produced and completed within two and a half years having regard for the present industrial capacity of Japan. The United States also agreed to military needs to Japan. “It has become one of the principal components of the Nixon doctrine to turn Japan into a vanguard in the Far East,” Chou said. “That is in the spirit of using Asians to fight Asians or Austrasians to fight Austrasians” he said. Japanese militarism would serve as a vanguard in this. “The Japan socialist party fully agrees to this analysis. When you

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go to Japan you can discuss this matter with the President of the Japan Socialist Party. Just one year ago we had this matter discussed with him in Peking and a joint communique was issued. And what about our so-called Ally. They are in very warm discussions with the SATO government and also engage in very warm discussions with the Nixon government on so-called nuclear disarmament while we, their ally, are being threatened by them together. So we feel that our ally is not very reliable. Is your ally very reliable?” Chou continued: “That is a matter for your consideration, a matter for your reference. You see they have succeeded in dragging you into the Vietnam battle field. How is that defensive? That is aggression,” Chou said. Whitlam:

“This is a very powerful indictment of the American-Japanese policy. None of us has any doubt about the seriousness of these fears towards reviving Japanese Militarism. I must say with respect I see no parallel in the Sino Soviet pact and ANZUS treaty. There has been no similar deterioration between Australia, New Zealand and the US as there has been between the People’s Republic of China and Soviet Union.”

Chou continued: “They all want to control the other. We did not want to be controlled by them. Because we did not want to be controlled by them they withdrew all their exports from us. In those years of our greatest difficulty we paid back all of our debts.” Whitlam:

“This sudden termination at that time was abominable. Your Government has always kept its word, always paid its debts.”

Chou:

“Also the fact that we always paid for the grain we bought from you is proof of that. (To laughter) do we still owe you anything?”

Chou went on:

“Now not only does the United States want to control everybody but Japan wants to expand outwards. Economic expansion will shortly bring with it Military expansion. Why is it that there is a lack of amiability in the Eastern part of Europe. Because the biggest country there wants to control the others,” he said.

Chou continued: “Let our socialist countries just refuse to be controlled by others regardless of what they are, Imperialists, Militarists or Socialist Imperialists. That is our experience which we supply you for your reference”. Whitlam:

“Yours has been a bitter experience and I understand your feeling. May I put this qualifying argument on behalf of America. I still deplore the destructive style of John Foster Dulles but his soul does not keep marching on today. American people have broken President Lyndon Baines Johnson and if Richard Milhous Nixon does not continue to withdraw his forces from Vietnam they will destroy him similarly, and the Australian people have had a bitter experience in going “all the way with LBJ.” They know America made him change his policy and they will never again allow American President to send troops to another country.”

Chou:

“I have similar sentiments with you. Such a very good appraisal of the American people. This was the same with you. We also think that people of all countries should be friendly towards each other not only with regard to American people but also people of the Soviet Union. This time we invited some of the American people to visit. That started with the Table Tennis Team. We had a friendly chat as well in this room. I do believe that one day American people will rise up and restrict the policies of the American President and overthrow him. Manifestations and demonstrations of the American masses in the past two years have been unprecedented, from East Coast to West and from South to North.”

Chou said that even masses in Washington itself had risen in great upheaval. Even Military men on active service and veterans had gone to Washington to demonstrate, not only youth but also office workers, black people and minority nationalities. Whitlam recalled that Senator Mansfield assued him half Senate did not support President Johnson on Vietnam and since then consensus had gone up very steeply. Whitlam said:

“Throughout the North East, the part I know best, there is no support among opinion makers for what has gone on. The American people will force the American President to change the policy”.i

Whitlam said it was much easier to follow American newspapers than those of Japan and still more difficult in the case of China because of the language barriers. Whitlam added: “There is one thing about Japan that we do appreciate. It is the most wealthy and developed country which will not have anything to do with Nuclear Weapons. We think that is reassuring.”

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Chou:

“No. All Japanese people of course do not want Nuclear Weapons. But I cannot say of those in power now in Japan there are not a proportion of them who want Nuclear Weapons.”

Whitlam: “Nakasone?” Chou:

“Nakasone is one of them but it also includes Sato and not only him but also some others. What is more, the American Department of Defence is considering whether to give them tactical Nuclear Weapons or something more powerful.”



“In their propaganda they say they do not want them,” Chou said.

Whitlam:

“It would be in breach of their treaties.”

Chou:

“At behind all treaties there are secret treaties. Otherwise why is it that many secret documents are being published. There are even more secret documents that are not being published. That is why the world is not tranquil”, Chou said. When capitalist economies developed to a certain point they sought to expand outwards.

He said: “The Japanese economy has already exceeded saturation point. They are extending their hands into Australia. They started that long ago. The United States was there long before them. Shortly they will want to get in and then what? Then once they expand they will insist on their so called sense of security.” Chou continued: “We advocate that all foreign troops from foreign countries should go back to their homes and allow people to settle their problems on their own”. Chou said if foreign forces stayed on to the end they would lose face. He said: “If they want to save face then they should leave earlier. President Ho Chi-Minh said if the American people were willing to withdraw from Vietnam he will lay down the red carpet. That is precisely what was meant in Paris when it was said if you withdraw we will cease fire.” Whitlam:

“And the prisoners of war will be released?”

Chou:

“At the same time.”

Chou said Japans’s so-called ‘life-line’ extended all the way from their north-east to the Straits of Malacca. Japan, Korea, Taiwan were all part of this life-line.ii Whitlam:

“What do you think the attitude of Indonesia and Malaysia would be towards any Japanese military interest in the Straits of Malacca?”

Chou:

“We know through some of their friends that they are somewhat tense on this matter. They want to maintain neutrality. The question is whether United States imperialism will allow them to remain neutral. That is Asia’s question. When the Japanese economy expands outwards it will expand its hands into those weak places. Once they expand economically then the next moment there will be military protection. For instance, now they are planning to take over two years hence by 1973 all Okinawa and the area now patrolled by the Americans. This extends in the north to reach the southern part of Korea and in the west to reach the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and south to Taiwan. That is the radius of American air patrols at present. Under the Treaty by which Okinawa will revert to Japan, Japan will maintain this radius of control. How is that permissible? If you are allowed to patrol there equally, should we make similar patrols close to their territory? Would not that make trouble?”

Whitlam:

“Oh yes.”

Chou:

“So we see the United States imperialists are training their successors to continue to raise provocations.” Chou said China saw eye to eye on this with two Japanese parties, the Japan Socialist Party and Komeito.

Whitlam:

“This present Australian Government has never had any defence arrangements with Japan and has never had any defence arrangements with Chiang Kai-shek.” Mr Whitlam said there is no military commitment by Australia to the Province of Taiwan.

Chou continued: “But you are clear that the position of your present Australian Government is not friendly to China. That you are clear about. Probably because your excellencies are here the Australian Prime Minister declared yesterday that the establishment of diplomatic relations with China is far off now.” Here followed an interjection from other members of the Australian delegation: “He will not be there next election.”

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Whitlam:

“There are elections in November next year. If there are no proper relations by the time of these elections there will be as soon as we can achieve it soon afterwards.”

Chou:

“They do not want to establish diplomatic relations. He seems to be quite confident. It is probably because your party is in China.”

Whitlam:

“This may be. I must say even to the credit of my opponents, they are catching up with the realities of life on China to a certain extent. They know Dulles’ polices have failed dismally and if President Nixon says he wants to visit China, can Mr McMahon be far behind?”iii

Chou said Mr Whitlam wished to convey greeting to Prince Sihanouk (former Cambodian Head of Government). Chou:

“That is very fine sentiment. He is a very fine man.”

Whitlam:

“Yes he is and it is tragic for his people that his Government was subverted in this clandestine, this evil way.”

Chou:

“The Cambodian people have stood up now. The Cambodian people are awakening. Precisely because of Nixon’s policies the Cambodian people, who used to live peacefully, most of them are now rising up in battle.”

Chou continued: “The prince, who believes in Buddhism and persists in pacifism, has now become a fighter. Who created this: Nixon.” Whitlam:

“Until he was overthrown, Cambodia at least was in peace.”

Chou:

“General de Gaulle visited Cambodia and in such state General de Gaulle advised the Americans it would be best for them to withdraw their troops. Of course the United States did not listen.”

Whitlam:

“Is it possible that if an ALP Prime Minister had visited China twenty years ago all destruction and slaughter in Vietnam could have been avoided. At least there would have been no Australian troops there for the past six years.”

Chou:

“What is past is past and we look forward to when you can take office and put into effect your promises.”

Whitlam:

“If my party wins the next elections you will be able to see the first visit by Australian Prime Minister to the Chinese People’s Republic and its sole capital Peking.

Chou:

“We will welcome it. All things develop from small beginnings. After these twenty years or more of struggle we believe you will shortly be able to rise up again.”

©1971 Australian Associated Press. AAP Disclaimer and Copyright Notice: AAP content is owned by or licensed to Australian Associated Press Pty Limited and is copyright protected. AAP content is published on an “as is” basis for personal use only and must not be copied, republished, rewritten, resold or redistributed, whether by caching, framing or similar means, without AAP’s prior written permission. AAP and its licensors are not liable for any loss, through negligence or otherwise, resulting from errors or omissions in or reliance on AAP content. The globe symbol and “AAP” are registered trademarks.

Commentary from Dr Stephen FitzGerald: i Dr FitzGerald notes that the last sentence of this dialogue sentence was spoken by Zhou Enlai, not Gough Whitlam. ii Dr FitzGerald notes that this line was intended to read ‘...all the way from north-east China to the Straits of Malacca.’ iIi At this point, Dr FitzGerald recorded additional dialogue; ‘Chou: “In coming here you have given voice to the wishes of the Australian people – not only the six members of the delegation but 10 correspondents representing not all but different points of view. They can serve as witnesses to the fact that the Chinese people are willing to be friendly to the Aust. people. From this point on, we can say that relations between our two countries will develop. Both have suffered from Japanese militarism, China the more deeply. Here is a state of affairs where America has stepped up the revival of Japanese militarism. It cannot last because the peoples of our countries don’t want war to break out again. When a country wants independences, how can you make it submit by armed force? People of the three Indo-China states have set an example to the whole world”. Whitlam: “Yes”.’

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Ch i na R eport A d d r e s s b y M r E . G . W h i t l a m , Q C , M P, to the National Press Club Luncheon, Ca nberra, M o n d a y 2 6 Ju l y 19 71 The most important achievement of our mission is that it has given Australia another chance for a constructive and forward-looking role in our region. Whatever may be the position of the Australian Government, Australia as a nation looks less flat-footed, less ignorant, less obscurantist, less imitative in the light of the United States initiative than she would otherwise have done. We have a chance to avoid the mistakes made in 1954; we can make the most of opportunities again offered after Vietnam which we lost after Korea for national relations in our region. President Nixon has given the West a second chance; in a small way, our visit helped Australia to share in that opportunity. My own visit to Japan and the Philippines after the China mission confirms me in my belief that Australia is uniquely well placed to improve relations between China, the United States, Japan and Indonesia. It is open to any Australian government, even the McMahon Government, to normalise relations with China. We do not have to wait till after the elections; but it can be done only if the McMahon Government is willing to put our national interests above what the Prime Minister believes to be smart, short-term political ploys. The choice before any Australian government is whether it adds to the embarrassments of its neighbours and allies or seeks to reduce those embarrassments. If we seek to strengthen the artificial and untenable position of the Chiang Kaishek regime, we add to the difficulties and embarrassments of the United States and Japan, without in any way helping the people of Taiwan. By obstructing the inevitable we only make the ultimate acceptance of the inevitable more humiliating. The Australian Labor Party supports the formula agreed on between China and Canada and shortly afterwards agreed on between China and Italy and several other nations. It is well that I should recall the terms of the formula. On 13 October last year, the governments of Canada and China announced that they were going to exchange diplomatic representatives and their joint communiqué proceeded in these words: “The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government. The Canadian Government recognises the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.” At the same time the Canadian Government issued a unilateral statement which included these words: “The Canadian Government doesn’t consider it appropriate either to endorse or to change the Chinese Government’s position on the status of Taiwan. This has been our position and continues to be our position.” On 6 November the Italian and Chinese Governments announced that they were going to establish diplomatic relations and their joint communiqué proceeded in these terms: “The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Italian Government takes note of this statement of the Chinese Government. The Italian Government recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.” The Italian Government issued, at the same time, this comment on the joint communiqué: “The negotiations took place over a long period of time and it is known that the greatest difficulty met in the talks was represented by the problem of the status of Taiwan. The Government of the People’s Republic of China has always insisted on the concept that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory while the Italian Government has always stated that it doesn’t consider itself competent to define the territorial limits of another State. The Italian side took note in the joint communiqué of the statement of the Chinese Government about the status of Taiwan and understands the importance that the Peking Government attaches to its statement. The Italian Government reiterates that it is not up to it to express any opinion on this subject.”

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Canada has shown herself to be a true friend of the United States. The best friends of Japan will be those who encourage and assist her to solve her special difficulty of the peace treaty with Taiwan in the most honourable and least embarrassing way. We should be the first to point out to Japan that she is not in honour or reason irrevocably tied to a treaty forced on her at a time when she was weak and dependent, especially when that treaty is an expression of attitudes of 20 years ago which the United States herself now repudiates. It would be grotesque for us to bind Japan to the spirit of Dulles, when Dulles’s own Vice-President, Mr Nixon, is foremost in striving to lay his ghost. We should say to Japan that we accept her commitment was a personal one to Chiang Kai-shek and that she has fully and honorably discharged whatever obligation she may have felt in that quarter. Japan is now entitled to pursue her own interests, which require a restoration of relations between her and China. Perhaps because of the high level talks proceeding in Canberra at this moment, between Australia and Japan, I should say further about the attitudes of Japan and the respective regimes in Peking and Taipeh. To understand them, one has got to go back to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. China is still extremely suspicious of any interest that Japan takes in Korea which was detached from Chinese suzerainty in that war and Taiwan which was taken from Chinese sovereignty in that war. Furthermore, any continuing economic interest which Japan shows in Taiwan arouses Chinese suspicions that Japan wants to continue to regard Taiwan as her colleague. More recently, more technically, the situation is that in 1952 Japan made a treaty of peace with Chiang Kai-shek. It will be noted that this was well over 2 years after he had taken refuge in Taiwan. The history is that the peace treaty between Japan and the other nations was concluded in San Francisco in 1951. The treaty was signed on 8 September 1951. Australians will remember that this was just a week after the ANZUS treaty was signed in the same city. China was not represented at San Francisco. The reason was that the other participants in San Francisco differed on the question of recognition of China. Some recognised Peking already, some still recognised Chiang Kai-shek who was by then resident in Taipeh. In December 1951 there was an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Yoshida and Secretary of State Dulles. It is interesting to note the three reasons that Prime Minister Yoshida gave for Japan’s willingness to make a treaty of peace with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek when she achieved her sovereignty again. The first reason was that the Chiang Kai-shek regime was in the United Nations and was recognised by most members of the United Nations. This reason clearly has diminished in importance when there are as many members of the United Nations now recognising the government in Peking as recognising the government in Taipeh. The second reason given was that the Chinese communist regime had been branded by the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea. This too, clearly, is a diminishing reason because the last Chinese soldiers were withdrawn from Korea in 1958. The third reason is that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, concluded in Moscow in 1950, is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. Nobody would now so regard it. The Chinese themselves now speak much more of an alliance between the Soviet and Japan, as appears from the transcript of the conversation between Premier Chou En-lai and myself. And the concluding reason given by Prime Minister Yoshida was that his government believed that the communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present government of Japan. Here again the reason has no substance today whatever. In fact, the Japan Communist Party is a consistent critic of the government of China. It is constantly said that China’s four enemies are American imperialism, Soviet revisionism, Japanese militarism and the Japan Communist Party. I have gone into some details as to the reasons for Japan making a treaty back in 1952 with the Chiang Kai-shek regime because the reasons are there set out and one sees how little substance they now have. Because of the strength of the feelings expressed in Peking against Japan, I was particularly intent on finding why it was that Japan felt so honour-bound to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The reason seemed to be that, first of all, the Chiang Kaishek regime had been generous to Japanese civilians and military at the conclusion of the war in 1945. It facilitated their repatriation; it did not victimise Japan. The Generalissimo’s phrase at the time seems to be best translated into English by saying “Return good for evil”. Secondly, the Chiang Kai-shek regime did not exercise any rights as a victor to occupy Japan. That was left to America and the British Commonwealth. If China had exercised her rights, then the Soviet Union would have also exercised hers. That means that there would have been a four power occupation of Japan as there was of Germany. The third reason is that in this peace treaty of 1952 Chiang Kai-shek gave away any claims of reparations against Japan. The Communist government would now make no claims for reparations at all. There are, perhaps, other reasons that are not so overt. One is that it would be rather more unpalatable for Japan to have Peking holding a permanent seat in the Security Council when Japan does not yet have one, whereas, of course, nobody takes it seriously that Taipeh has a permanent seat in the Security Council. Again, many small Japanese businessmen find it easier to trade with Taiwan than with any other country in the world because people of 35 or 40 and above in Taiwan still speak Japanese. The technical situation is that even though one accepts the validity of the treaty, and this is a matter of contention in Japan itself, many political parties there and some factions in the ruling party have declared that the treaty with Chiang Kai-shek is illegal and should be abrogated. But on its face it does not cover China. It is applicable to all the Territories which are now, and which may hereafter be, under the control of Chiang Kai-shek’s government. So, therefore, on the face of the treaty there is still a state of war between Japan and the whole of the mainland. Therefore if one is to understand Japan’s attitude towards China—and China’s attitude towards Japan—one must understand not only the history but the treaty relationship. The fact is that technically there is still a state of war between China and Japan or, even if one accepts the treaty as valid, between most of China—all except one province—and Japan.

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Japanese honor is a genuine factor in this situation, and her special difficulties have to be appreciated. It is more difficult for Japan to come to diplomatic terms with China than for any other nation, including the United States. In Australia, to say the least, it is more flexible. Now I put these propositions to you. All that is required of Australia I suggest: 1. Firstly, we should accept the view of Chiang Kai-shek, and of all other Chinese of whom I have ever heard, that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. I have been astonished to see from the writings of many pundits, even some university people in Canberra who take a belated interest in this subject, that to refer to the province of Taiwan is somehow to take sides in this argument. I received from the Chinese Embassy in Canberra, the Embassy of the Chiang Kai-shek government, this attractive publication “Taiwan”. It comes to me with the compliments of the Chinese Information Service at the Chinese Embassy. It is an official publication as one can see from every page. I invite you to look at the wording on it—”Taiwan, a province of the Republic of China”. I do wish people would realise that there is no difference of opinion on this or on any other substantial territorial matter (except Mongolia) between the governments of Taipeh and Peking. On all territorial matters, including off-shore islands and fishing rights and the subsoil and the continental shelf, Tibet, the China-India border—all these matters which no doubt our Ministers will be urging President Nixon to take up—in all these matters there is no difference of opinion between the two governments which each insist on its explicit right to be the government of China. 2. The second proposition I put is that we should accept the view of President Nixon that diplomatic relations with China must be normalised as speedily as possible. Now is the time to do it. We missed out at the end of the Korean war and after the end of the civil war in Vietnam. 3. Thirdly, we should accept the view of Sir Robert Menzies which he maintained throughout his 16 years as Prime Minister that there should be no Australian Ambassador in Taipeh. 4. Lastly, we should make explicit the simple truth about our relations with Chiang Kai-shek over the last 22 years— that we have never had, and never will have, any military commitment to the preservation of his regime. Recognition of these simple facts, these four propositions, cuts through all the hypocritical nonsense about dumping Taiwan. Who accuses Canada of dishonour? The policy there is bipartisan. The Leader of the Opposition from Canada— the Conservative Leader—is in China at this moment. There is no disagreement between him and Mr Trudeau on this question. There is no disagreement between the Democrats and President Nixon on his proposed visit. And there is no disagreement between the Opposition in Britain—the Labour Party—and Mr Heath, when he takes what some people here would allege to be the dishonourable course of withdrawing Britain’s consul from Taiwan. The last time the people of Taiwan tried to have any say in their future was in 1947 when Chiang Kai-shek brutally suppressed a revolt against his Nationalist regime. Perhaps I should go into greater detail as to these claims. Some people talk about two Chinas. Some people talk about one China and one Taiwan. These might be credible arguments if any government in the world had ever put them up. No government in the world ever has. There has never been any motion dealing with these matters in the United Nations, although there have been debates on this subject every year since 1950 and votes in nearly all those years. Least of all do the governments in Taipeh and Peking ever acknowledge the possibility of two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan. People sometimes draw the parallel between two Chinas and three Russia’s, pointing to the fact that in the United Nations there are three seats for Russia. There is the Soviet proper and there is White Russia and there is Ukraine. But more often people say that China is divided. In this case they have to fall back on the argument that there should be two Germanies, two Koreas, because at least there is a division of those two countries dating from the Potsdam Agreement, or two Vietnams because there is a division dating from the Geneva Agreement of 1954. It is true that the Potsdam and Geneva Agreements were meant to be temporary but at least they were multilateral agreements. There have never been any international agreements dividing China into two—dividing the province of Taiwan from the rest of China. There are only two agreements bearing upon the subject—one is that which I have already quoted, 1952, the Peace Treaty between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, and the other is the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China which was signed on 2 December 1954. It covers Taiwan and the Pescadores and such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement. No international multilateral agreement has ever been made—not even covering Quemoy and Matsu. The whole question has been very well covered in a number of editorials by a newspaper which would certainly claim to be the most responsible, the most prestigious in Australia, the “Sydney Morning Herald”, and since its views coincide so closely with my own I will quote from these editorials. “There is no alternative but to reach agreement with China

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by negotiation. That is the task of diplomacy, a task made infinitely harder by refusing to recognise her government.” Secondly; “The argument logically resolves itself to the question whether the Chiang Kai-shek rump on Formosa or the Mao administration in Peking is to be acknowledged as the legitimate government of China”. Third one: “Clearly enough, there can be no permanent solution of the Formosan problem while America and other powers continue to recognise the Chiang regime as the legitimate government of China. Whatever may be felt about according recognition to the Peking Government, the time has surely come when the fiction that the rump administration in Taipeh is the Government of China should be abandoned.” And a fourth: “It is this reality which makes continued recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as the true government of China a dangerous anachronism.” And the fifth editorial from the “Sydney Morning Herald” is in many ways the best and the most timely: “But the climate of opinion on the China question in America has recently undergone a startling thorough change. The influence of the notorious ‘China Lobby’ which backs Chiang Kai-shek has waned and support for a more realistic diplomacy has correspondingly waxed. There is very little doubt that the Washington Administration is searching for a means of extricating itself from a dilemma posed by its commitments to a Nationalist rump on Formosa. That is to say, the situation in America which has exercised the strongest influence on Australia’s China policy has radically changed. It may, in fact, fairly be supposed that an Australian decision to recognise Red China would now be welcomed in Washington as a further argument for a realignment of American Far Eastern policy. Moreover, an Australian gesture at this delicate stage in Asia could carry considerable weight, not only in Peking but also in the capitals of those Asian powers which, while friendly towards this country, have been bewildered by our continued refusal to face facts on China. It is surely plain that there can be no satisfactory or lasting settlement in the Far East while an émigré government of China enjoys Western support.” Now you will notice the references to the “time of change”, “the anachronisms”. Perhaps I should point out, about these editorials, the first was in 1953, the next three in 1954 and the last in 1955. None of us know anything about the substance of the discussions between Premier Chou En-lai and Dr Kissinger. But the Chinese would never have invited President Nixon if he had excluded absolutely the principle that there is one China and Peking is its capital. Everything else is negotiable, but that is not. The visit itself is de facto recognition of this principle. President Nixon cannot afford to let his visit fail, but clearly the whole region has as deep a vested interest in his success as he himself. The nations in the region, especially Australia, would endanger its success should they strive to put obstacles in its path such as insisting that Taiwan is an independent nation. There is no basis in law, morality, history or humanity for such a claim. To make it now is an act of sabotage against the United States and the hopes of the world. There was some reference to “isolation” when we were away. The real risk Australia runs of isolating herself is through a failure of her policies and attitudes to catch up with events. We are being isolated through our government’s ignorance and arrogance. Nobody who was remotely in tune with trends in the United States—official and public trends—should have been taken so utterly by surprise by the Nixon initiative. In Japan only the Communist Party is consistently critical of China; business with all its commanding influence on the ruling party is pressing for a detente. Indonesia maintains the diplomatic machinery for the resumption of normal relations, and very shortly may seek to reactivate it. Malaysia is publicly discussing recognition. The highest Philippine circles are discussing recognition. Unless the Australian Government returns at least to the position of May, and rejects the new McMahon line of July, Australia will be left out on a limb. The McMahon and Chiang Kai-shek governments are the only governments in the world which have attacked the Peking Government in the last three weeks. We have to realise how rapidly events can move. It took 6 years for the Labor Party to be vindicated on Vietnam. It took 6 months last year on New Guinea. It has taken 6 days on China this month. It may suit some Australian politicians to remain frozen in the postures of the ‘50s and ‘60s. If their position should be accepted by the Australian people, this country is doomed to a generation of international irrelevance and impotence.

Whitlam Prime Ministerial Collection, EGW12865:0000

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TWI3876 07/2013

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