Forecasts of the 2004 French European Election - Wiley Online Library

©(2005) Swiss Political Science Review 11(3): 61-78

Forecasts of the 2004 French European Election

Antoine AUBERGER1 LAEP University of Paris I Abstract The purpose of this article is to build and to estimate a model which explains and forecasts the outcomes of the French European elections by department, by electoral district and at the national level. The model is accurate in forecasting the elections of the past. Its forecasts for the 2004 French European election are satisfactory and take into account the recent changes in the voting system. Keywords: French European elections, Vote functions, Election forecasting, Economics of elections, Political economy

1. Introduction Since the end of the 1970s, numerous econometric vote models have been developed in France to explain and forecast the outcomes of national and local elections. The first models used aggregated national data. Since the beginning of the 1990s, several studies such as Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (1999, 2003) and Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005) for legislative elections, Dubois (2002), Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (2003) and Jérôme et Jérôme (2004a) for presidential elections, Jérôme and Jérôme (2000) for regional elections and Jérôme and Jérôme (2003) for municipal elections show the relevance of using national and local data (pooled time series models).2 French European elections have been relatively neglected. The small number of such elections (5) makes the use of a model based on national data only delicate. 1 The author thanks the participants of the annual conference of the European Public Choice Society (Berlin, in April 15-18th, 2004) and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 2 Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari et Lewis-Beck (1999, 2003) and Jérôme and Jérôme (2000) use regional data, Dubois (2002) and Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005) use local data.

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Rather, it is local disaggregated data (by department or region, for example) that should be used. The model developed by Fauvelle-Aymar, Lafay and Servais (2000) which integrates various types of elections can notably explain and forecast the vote for the left-wing parties in the French European elections with national and regional variables. The dependent variable is the vote obtained by the left-wing parties at the first round.3 Among the independent variables, we find the difference between the level of popularity of the left-wing parties and that of the right-wing parties, the vote obtained by the left-wing parties at the previous election of the same type, the rate of turnout at the previous election of the same type (as well as the same rate when the Left is the ruling majority) and dummy variables to take into account the specificity of every type of election. It is interesting to study the economic and political factors of the French European elections in more detail (second-order elections).4 Starting in 1979, and taking place every five years, they provide information about the electoral influence of the various political parties. For the 2004 French European election, the voting system has changed and France is now divided into eight electoral districts. The calculation of the distribution of seats is made for every district.5 In this article, we build a vote function for the French European elections which explains the vote for the majority parties (majority with the Prime Minister) in the broad sense6 over the period 1984-1999 (4 elections). We show that this vote depends on economic conditions (national and local) and political factors (results of the previous national elections, popularity of the Prime Minister, partisan orientation of some departments). This model, which uses local data, enables to make forecasts in vote for the majority parties in the broad sense at the local level and then in every electoral district and at the national level. We also build a vote function explaining the vote for the National Front over the period 1989-1999 (3 elections). We explain the vote obtained by the National Front with local economic conditions and political factors (results of the national previous elections, popularity of his leader, split of 1998). For the 2004 French European election, we rightly forecast that the majority in the broad sense (the whole Right) will obtain approximately 52% of the vote. Then, we try 3 This model contains another equation which explains the rate of turnout at the elections simultaneously to the vote. 4 The second-order elections are notably studied by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and Marsh (1998). 5 There are seven electoral districts in Metropolitan France and one in overseas territories. These electoral districts correspond to “big regions”. The distribution of seats is indicated in the appendix 1. 6 That is moderate right-wing parties plus extreme right-wing parties when the Right is ruling. The majority in “strict sense” is restricted to moderate right-wing parties when the Right is ruling.

FORECASTS OF THE 2004 FRENCH EUROPEAN ELECTION 63

to make forecasts in seats for every party in every electoral district and at the national level. After presenting both vote functions (majority parties and National Front) and the different variables used (section 2), we analyse the estimates and the ex post forecasts in vote for the French European elections of the past.7 Then, we make ex ante forecast in vote with these models for the 2004 French European election. Finally, we try to make forecasts in seats for every party in every electoral district and at the national level.

2. The Model At first, we build a vote function explaining the vote for the majority parties (which support the Prime Minister) in the broad sense. We suppose that voters behave accordingly to the responsibility hypothesis (Paldam, 1981), that is they reward (resp. punish) the majority parties for good (resp. bad) economic performances (past and/or future). The dependent variable is the percentage of vote received by the majority parties in the broad sense.8 Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) have written that the vote in the European elections does not depend on European issues and that the effects of the economic conditions for the European elections are comparable to other elections. For France, LewisBeck and Nadeau (2000) show that the economic and political factors of the vote in European elections are similar to those of the legislative elections. We thus suppose that the percentage of vote received by the majority parties in the broad sense is explained by the economic conditions and political factors. We have the following vote-function: Vote = f (economic conditions, political factors) Economic conditions can depend on national and/or local economic conditions (past and/or future) as Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005) show it for legislative elections. We do not make a priori precise hypotheses on the behavior of voters which can be retrospective and/or prospective. We suppose that the majority An ex post forecast is calculated on the basis of the estimated coefficients for the whole sample whereas an ex ante forecast is calculated from the estimated coefficients on a reduced sample and by using only the available data when the forecast is made. 8 We clarify, that generally, the voters of the extreme right are closer to the moderate right-wing parties than to the moderate left-wing parties and that the extreme left voters are closer to the moderate left-wing parties than to the moderate right-wing parties. We would also have been able to hold as dependent variable the percentage of vote obtained by the political parties of the majority in the strict sense but the ex post forecast in vote are less good. 7

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parties in the broad sense are responsible for national and local economic conditions. The political factors notably depend on the government’s popularity, on the electoral force of the parties and on the ideology. Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005) show that the popularity of the Prime Minister plays an important role for the legislative elections because the Prime Minister is the leader of the majority. The electoral force of the parties is taken into account by the results of the previous national elections.9 Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (1999, 2003) use a dummy variable to take into account the ideology of every region in legislative elections. As Auberger and Dubois (2005), we think that this variable raises questions because the outcomes of all the elections over the period 19731993 are used to construct this variable for each election.10 We can take into account the ideology in every department for French European elections as Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005) makes it for legislative elections. We also build another vote-function explaining the vote received by the National Front (FN) at the European elections. We can then forecast the vote obtained by the majority parties in the strict sense when the Right is the parliamentary majority.11 For the French European elections, no vote function for the National Front was again built but we can suppose that we have the following vote-function: Vote = f (economic conditions, political factors) We suppose that voters vote more (resp. less) for the National Front if they are not satisfied (resp. satisfied) with economic conditions. Economic factors can also depend on the national and\or local economic conditions (past and\or future). The political factors depend on the popularity of the leader of the National Front (Jean-Marie Le Pen), on the electoral force of the National Front, that is, the results of the National Front in the previous national elections and on the split of the National Front that occurred before the 1999 French European election. We could also try to build a vote-function for the Extreme Left but it is difficult to explain the vote received by the Extreme Left satisfactorily. The construction of a seats-function is left aside because there have been only five European elections since 1979 and because it is necessary to take into account the modifications that occurred in the voting system before the 2004 French European election (and in particular in the calculation of the distribution of the seats).

As French European elections are national elections, we think that it‘s better not to take into account the local elections. 10 We can make a similar criticism for the variable instability used in this study. 11 We neglect the vote obtained by other extreme right-wing parties. 9


3. Estimates For the first vote function, our study concerns the period 1984-1999 (that is four European elections: 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999).12 For the econometric model, we have to choose between a model without effect, a model with fixed effects and a model with random effects.13 As our study concerns all the departments of Metropolitan France (exhaustiveness), a model with fixed effects is preferable to a model with random effects. Furthermore, a Fisher’s test enables us to choose between a model with fixed effects and a model without effect and we retain a model with fixed effects.14 The model with fixed effects enables us to take into account specific factors in every department (with dummy variables) which are not taken into account by the various independent variables. To explain the vote received by political parties of the ruling majority (in the strict sense) in the European elections (1984-1999), we estimate the following model:15 VOTEit = ci + 1 DGDPt + 2 UNEMit + 3 PREit + 4 POPt + 5 VPit + it The dependent variable (VOTEit) is the percentage of vote received by the majority parties in the broad sense in the department i in the elections at the date t (i varies from 1 to 96).16 For the 1984, 1989 and 1999 elections, the majority (in the broad sense) is composed by the left parties: PS, PC, Greens (moderate Left), LO and LCR (Extreme Left). For the 1994 election, the majority (in the broad sense) is composed by the right parties: UDF, RPR, diverse right (moderate Right), FN (Extreme Right). To classify the FN with the moderate right parties is handy because a majority of its voters are closer to the moderate right than to the left yet it is not truly satisfactorily since the FN does not govern with the moderate right parties. We retained five independent variables.17 The first two variables are economic variables that take into account the impact of economic conditions on the vote.

A large part of the electoral data come from the database of the CIDSP (Grenoble), the other electoral data come from the newspaper Le Monde. 13 We take back partially the method followed in Auberger and Dubois (2005). 14 The Fisher statistics indicates us that the model with fixed effects is preferable to the model without effect: F (95,283) = 1.79 and the critical value at the 5% confidence level is equal to 1.30. A presentation of the Fisher’s test can been found in Greene (2003: 289). 15 We retain the model which gives the best ex post forecasts. 16 We do not take into account overseas departments and territories because we lack information about the number of job-seekers in these departments or territories over the studied period. 17 The presentation of the various independent variables repeats partially that of Auberger and Dubois (2003, 2005). 12

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The first variable is the difference between the rate of real growth of GDP in the elections’ year and the rate of real growth of GDP in the year preceding the elections’ year (variable noted DGDP).18 This variable accounts for national economic conditions. Voters have a prospective and a retrospective behavior towards national economic conditions. When the economic growth increases, it is favourable to the majority. We are expecting a positive sign for this variable: 1 > 0. Local economic conditions are taken into account by the annual growth rate of the number of job-seekers at the departmental level, two months before the elections (variable noted UNEM).19 Voters have a retrospective behavior towards local economic conditions. When the number of job-seekers at the local level increases, it is unfavourable to the majority. We are expecting a negative sign for this variable: 2 < 0. Our third variable is a political variable based on the results of the previous national elections (variable noted PRE).20 It is defined by the percentage of the vote from the national elections preceding the European elections going to the majority parties. This variable takes into account the electoral short or middle-term factors (according to the date of the previous national elections). When the majority has obtained good results at the previous national elections, it constitutes a favorable indicator for this majority. We are thus expecting a positive sign for this variable: 3 > 0. The fourth variable is the popularity of the Prime Minister (variable noted POP). It is a variable that takes into account political factors such as for instance his personal image, and the wearing effect of being in power.21 We choose to retain the ratio: percentage of people satisfied with the performance of the Prime Minister on percentage of people not satisfied with the performance of the Prime Minister in the last survey of the polls institute IFOP published before the elections by Le Journal du Dimanche.22 When the popularity of the Prime Minister is high, it is a favourable situation for the majority and we are expecting a positive sign for this variable: 4 > 0. Our fifth and last variable is a partisan one (variable noted VP). When we study the average departmental vote for the right-wing or left-wing parties for the European elections of the past, we notice that some departments show a partisan persistence in the orientation of the vote. It is defined by the difference between the local vote and the national vote for the majority parties in the broad 18 Expected in December of the year preceding the year of the elections (source: OECD - Economic Perspectives). Other variables which integrated the real growth of GDP have been tested but they lead to less good ex post forecasts. 19 Source: DARES - Monthly Bulletin of Labour Statistics. Dubois (2002) used this variable for French presidential elections. 20 Here, it is only about legislative elections (1981, 1988, 1993 and 1997). 21 We clarify that the popularity of the Prime Minister also depends on economic factors. 22 Other variables for the popularity of the Prime Minister have been tested.


sense at the previous European elections.23 When a department votes significantly for the current majority in the previous French European election, we may think that it will vote in favour of the majority in the following French European election. We are then expecting a positive sign for this variable: 5 > 0. We use FGLSDV (feasible generalized least squares with dummy variables) with correction of the heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation of the errors: 24,25

VOTEit = 3.73 DGDPt - 0.04 UNEMit + 0.19PREit + 2.70POPt + 0.61VPit + εit (44.08)***

(-3.05)***

(7.86)***

(10.84)***

(19.56)***

N = 384; ρ = -0.44 z statistics are in parentheses Significant at: 1 %: *** All the coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1 %. The coefficients of the variables DGNP and UNEM show the influence of the economic conditions on the vote for the majority parties: an increase of the economic growth has positive consequences on the vote for the majority parties whereas an increase of the number of job-seekers has negative consequences on the vote for the majority parties. The coefficient of the variable PRE is equal to 0.19, which shows that the vote in the French European elections for the majority parties is not linked to the results these parties got in the previous national elections.26 The coefficients of the variables POP and VP show the positive influence of the popularity of the Prime Minister and of the partisan orientation of some departments on the vote for the majority parties. 23 That is for every department: local vote – national vote at the 1979 European election for the 1984 European election, local vote – national vote at the 1984 European election for the 1989 European election, local vote – national vote at the 1989 European election for the 1994 European election and local vote – national vote at the 1994 European election for the 1999 European election. Campbell (1992) uses a similar variable (for every State) for the American presidential elections. 24 The 96 values of ĉi are not reproduced here. The Breush-Pagan test for homoscedasticity indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (nR2 = 363.65 > x20.05 (100) = 124.14). The Lagrange multiplier test indicates that there is a first-order autocorrelation of the errors (LM = 86.24 > x20.05 (1) = 3.84). As the number of elections is small (T = 4), the possible non stationnarity of the data cannot be presently addressed satisfactorily (this may be a crucial question to assess the long-term viability of the model). 25 The adjusted R-squared of the LSDV estimate (least squares dummy variable) is equal to 0.91. 26 In a model without effect, the coefficient is equal to 0.20. It should be noted that, for example, Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (2003) find a coefficient equal to 0.82 for their variable “previous presidential election” in their model for legislative elections and a coefficient equal to 0.54 for their variable “previous legislative election” in their model for presidential elections.

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From this equation, we can calculate, for the 96 departments in our sample, the ex post forecasts for the 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999 elections. The national forecasts in vote are built by calculating the weighted average of the forecasts in vote at the local level.27 Table 1 gives the ex post national forecasts in vote for the majority parties in the broad sense (1984-1999): Table 1: Ex post national forecast in vote 1984-1999 Election

Predicted value

Actual value

Error

1984

43,25

42,68

0,57

1989

45,16

45,44

0,28

1994

54,99

54,7

0,29

1999

45,51

45,95

0,44

The errors are low. The average error on four elections is approximately equal to 0.40. The ex post national forecasts in vote for the majority parties in the broad sense are very satisfactorily. We also try to explain the vote obtained by the National Front at the European elections because the National Front has had an important role in the French political life since 1984 and because its propositions can be very different from those of the moderate right-wing parties. We choose the period 1989-1999 because before 1984, the percentages of vote obtained by the National Front were very low. As for the previous model, we retain a model with fixed effects.28 We estimate the following model: VOTEFNit = di + β1 DUNEMit + β2 PREFNit + β3 POPLEPENt + β4 DUM99 + uit

The dependent variable (VOTEFNit) is the percentage of vote received by the National Front in the department i in the elections at the date t (i varies from 1 to 96).29

We make a weighted average of the local vote taking into account the electoral weight of every department (number of valid votes in every department/number of valid votes at the national level). 28 We choose the model with fixed effects because the Fisher’s statistics indicates us that the model with fixed effects is preferable to the model without effect: F (95,284) = 10.28 and the critical value at the level of 5 % is equal to 1.30 and that our study concerns all the departments of Metropolitan France. 29 We do not take into account overseas departments and territories because we have not all the number of job-seekers in these departments or territories over the studied period. 27


We retain four independent variables for this vote-function. The first variable is a local economic variable that takes into account the impact of the local economic conditions on the vote for the National Front. This variable is the annual change in the number of job-seekers over one year at the local level, calculated two months before the elections (variable noted DUNEM).30 When the number of job-seekers at the local level increases in comparison with the previous year, it is favourable to the National Front. We are expecting a positive sign for this variable: β1 > 0. Our second variable is a political variable based on the results of the National Front at the previous national elections31 (variable noted PREFN). The vote for the National Front at the European elections partially depends on the vote for the National Front at the previous national elections. We are expecting a positive sign for this variable: β2 > 0. The third variable is the popularity of Jean-Marie Le Pen (variable noted POPLEPEN). We choose to retain the percentage of people who wish to see Jean-Marie Le Pen playing an important role during the months and coming years in the last survey of the polls institute SOFRES published before the elections by Le Figaro Magazine. We are expecting a positive sign for this variable: β3 > 0. Our fourth and last variable is a dummy variable taking into account the split of the National Front which took place at the end of the 1998 year (this dummy variable is noted DUM99 and is equal to 1 in 1999 and 0 otherwise). This split had negative consequences on the vote for the National Front at the 1999 European election and we are expecting a negative sign for this variable: β4 < 0. We use FGLSDV (feasible generalized least squares with dummy variables) with correction of the heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation of the errors:32,33 VOTEFNit = di+ 0.43DUNEMit+ 0.05PREFNit+ 0.43POPLEPENt - 1.89DUM99 + vit (5.62)***

(1.87)**

(7.80)***

(-8.65)***

N = 288; ρ = -0.43 z statistics are in parentheses Significant at: 1 %: *** 5 %: **

30 The use of a growth rate for the number of job-seekers (UNEM) gives less satisfactory results. 31 Here, it is only about legislative elections (1988, 1993 and 1997). 32 The 96 values of dî are not reproduced here. The Breush-Pagan test for homoscedasticity indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (nR2 = 240.94 > x20.05 (99) = 123.02). The Lagrange multiplier test shows that there is a first-order autocorrelation of the errors (LM = 10.57 > x20.05 (1) = 3.84). 33 The adjusted R-squared of the estimate LDSV (least squares dummy variable) is equal to 0.87.

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All the coefficients have the expected sign and are significantly different from 0 at the level of 1% except the coefficient of the variable PREFN which is significantly different from 0 at the level of 5%. The coefficient of the variable DUNEM shows the positive influence of an increase in the number of job-seekers in a department on the vote obtained by the National Front.34 The coefficient of the variable PREFN is equal to 0.05 but it is linked to the fixed effects because with a model without effect, this coefficient is equal to 0.57. The vote for the National Front at the French European elections is only average. The coefficient of the variable POPLEPEN shows the positive influence of the popularity of Jean-Marie Le Pen on the vote obtained by the National Front. The coefficient of the variable DUM99 suggests the negative effects of the split of the National Front that occurred before the 1999 French European election. Table 2 gives the ex post national forecasts in vote for the FN (1989-1999):35 Table 2: Ex post national forecast in vote 1989-1999 (FN) Election

Predicted value

Actual value

Error

1989

12,23

11,65

0,58

1994

11,06

11,35

0,29

1999

5,26

5,38

0,12

These ex post national forecasts for the FN are satisfactory: the average error on four elections is approximately equal to 0.33.

4. Forecasts For The 2004 Election We begin by making forecasts in vote for the majority parties in the broad sense (the whole Right). The forecasts were made in June 2004. To calculate the difference between the forecasted growth rate in 2004 and the forecasted growth rate in 2003, we use the OECD data available since May 2004 (2% - 0.5% = 1.5%). The annual growth rate of the number of job-seekers at the departmental level is calculated in every department on the basis of the data of April 2004 and those of April 2003. The previous national election is the 2002 The influence of the variation of the number of job-seekers over one year on the vote for the National Front is simple and does not depend on the geographic situation of some departments contrary to the Jérôme and Jérôme’s (2004b) results who find that the influence of the regional unemployment differs according to regions. 35 We make a weighted average of the local vote taking into account the electoral weight of every department (number of valid votes in every department/number of valid votes at the national level). 34


legislative election (first round). The popularity of the Prime Minister is given by the last survey of the polls institute IFOP published before the elections by Le Journal du Dimanche (30%/65% in May 2004). The partisan variable is calculated in every department from the results of the 1999 European election. Table 3 gives for 2004 the regional and national ex ante forecasts in vote for the political parties of the majority in the broad sense (the whole Right): Table 3: Ex ante regional and national forecasts in vote for the whole Right (2004) Predicted value

Actual value

Error

Nord

51,17

50,4

0,77

Ouest

53

51,21

1,79

Est

54,28

53,95

0,33

Massif Central-Centre

51,7

52,12

0,42

Sud-Ouest

50,18

49,35

0,83

Sud-Est

53,06

55.25

2,19

Ile de France

49,51

53,32

3,81

France métropolitaine

51,85

52,26

0,41

We forecast that the whole Right (moderate right-wing parties plus diverse right-wing and extreme right-wing parties) will obtain more vote than the whole Left (moderate left-wing parties plus extreme left-wing parties) in six electoral districts out of seven and in Metropolitan France. These forecasts are rather good: the majority in vote is rightly predicted in five electoral districts out of seven and the average error is equal to 1.45. At the national level, the forecast in vote is slightly inferior to the actual value. To make forecasts in seats, we have to make hypotheses on the percentage of vote received by the FN (Extreme Right), the CPNT party (Diverse Right), the UDF and the MPF (moderate Right), the Extreme Left, the PC and the Greens (moderate Left).36 Indeed, we can use the vote-function explaining the vote received by the FN to make ex ante forecast for the 2004 election but this forecast is uncertain. The predicted value is equal to 10.2% at the national level while the FN might obtain a higher percentage of vote.37 In our first hypothesis, the FN obtains the same percentage of vote as his chief Jean-Marie Le Pen at the first round of the 2002 presidential election (17.2%) and 36 We neglect the influence of the other lists (to simplify). A list of the main French political parties is given in the appendix 2. 37 This forecast is good because the National Front obtained 10% of the votes in Metropolitan France.

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the Extreme Left obtains a percentage of vote equal to the sum of those obtained by the candidates of the Extreme Left, Arlette Laguiller and Olivier Besancenot, at the first round of the 2002 presidential election. In this scenario, the UDF obtains a percentage of vote equal to 1.5 times that obtained by its candidate François Bayrou at the first round of the 2002 presidential election (10.4%) and the MPF obtains a percentage of vote equal to that obtained by Philippe de Villiers at the first round of the 1995 presidential election (4.8%). The PC and the Greens obtain a percentage of vote equal respectively to those obtained by their candidates Robert Hue and Noël Mamère at the first round of the 2002 presidential election (3.4% and 5.3%). In our second hypothesis, the FN obtains a percentage of vote equal to 10.2% (ex ante forecast in vote given by the vote function of the National Front) and the Extreme Left obtains a percentage of vote equal to half of the sum of those obtained by their candidates Arlette Laguiller and Olivier Besancenot at the first round of the 2002 presidential election (5.1%). The difference of the percentage of vote between both hypotheses divides up between The UMP (1/2), the UDF (1/4) and the MPF (1/4). Half of the vote of the Extreme Left is divided between the PS (1/3), the PC (1/3) and Greens (1/3). In both hypotheses, the CPNT party (Diverse Right) is supposed to obtain a percentage of vote equal to that obtained by its candidate Jean Saint-Josse at the first round of the 2002 presidential election (appendix 3, tables 1, 2 and 3). The number of seats for every list is computed on the basis of the percentage of vote obtained by every party in every electoral district. The remaining seats are attributed according to the rule of the strongest average. Tables 4 and 5 give ex ante forecasts in seats for the 2004 election (we specify in brackets the actual values for every party):38 Table 4: Ex ante regional and national forecasts in seats for 2004 (Right-wing) UDF

MPF

UMP

Moderate Right-wing

FN

Whole Right-wing

Nord

1-1(1)

0-1(0)

2-3(2)

3-5(3)

3-1(2)

6-6(5)

Ouest

1-1(1)

1-1(1)

2-2(2)

4-4(4)

1-1(0)

5-5(4)

Est

1-1(2)

0-1(0)

2-2(2)

3-4(4)

2-1(1)

5-5(5)


1-1(1)

0-0(0)

1-2(2)

2-3(3)

1-0(1)

3-3(4)

Sud-Ouest

1-1(2)

0-0(0)

1-2(2)

2-3(4)

2-1(1)

4-4(5)

Sud-Est

1-2(2)

0-1(1)

2-2(3)

3-5(6)

4-2(2)

7-7(8)

Ile de France

2-2(2)

0-0(1)

3-3(3)

5-5(6)

2-2(1)

7-7(7)


8-9(11)

1-4(3)

13-16(16)

22-29(30)

15-8(7)

37-37(37)

38 For every political party, we present two forecasts in seats: the first one corresponds to the first hypothesis and the second one to the second hypothesis.


Table 5: Ex ante regional and national forecasts in seats for 2004 (Left-wing) Verts

PC

PS

Moderate Left-wing

Extreme Left

Whole Left-wing

Nord

0-0(1)

0-0(1)

4-5(5)

4-5(6)

2-1(0)

6-6(6)

Ouest

1-1(1)

0-0(0)

3-4(5)

4-5(6)

1-0(0)

5-5(6)

Est

0-1(1)

0-0(0)

4-4(4)

4-5(5)

1-0(0)

5-5(5)


0-0(0)

0-0(0)

2-3(3)

2-3(3)

1-0(0)

3-3(3)

Sud-Ouest

0-1(1)

0-0(0)

5-5(4)

5-6(5)

1-0(0)

6-6(5)

Sud-Est

0-1(1)

0-0(0)

5-5(5)

5-6(6)

1-0(0)

6-6(6)

Ile de France

1-1(1)

0-0(1)

5-6(5)

6-7(7)

1-0(0)

7-7(7)


2-5(6)

0-0(2)

28-32(30)

30-37(38)

8-1(0)

38-38(38)

We forecast that the moderate Right obtains a total of seats inferior to that obtained by the moderate Left (22-29 against 30-37): these forecasts are good because the moderate Right obtains 30 seats and the moderate Left obtains 38 seats. The number of seats obtained by the FN is equal to 7 seats, which corresponds to the hypothesis of an average result for the FN. It was difficult to forecast the collapse of the extreme left (no seat) after its success in the first round of the 2002 presidential election. If the voting system had not changed, the distribution of the seats would have been the following one: UDF (9-9), MPF (0-5), UMP (13-15), FN (15-8), Greens (4-5), PS (26-25), PC (0-4) and Extreme Left (8-4), that means a total of 22-29 seats for the moderate Right and 30-34 seats for the moderate Left.39 We notice that the new voting system is favourable to the big parties (UMP, PS) and thus unfavourable to other parties (MPF, FN, PC).

5. Conclusion The model developed here explains and forecasts the local and national outcomes of the French European elections (percentage of vote received by the majority parties). The variables which play a role on the percentage of vote received by the ruling majority in the broad sense at the European elections are a national economic variable (annual real growth of GDP) and a local economic variable (annual growth rate of the number of job-seekers) and political variables (popularity of the Prime Minister, results of the previous national elections, a partisan

39 In the former voting system, the distribution of seats was calculated at the national level and a list had to obtain at least 5% of the valid votes to can obtain seats.

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ANTOINE AUBERGER

variable). The variables which play a role on the percentage of vote obtained by the National Front at the European elections are a local economic variable (annual change in the number of job-seekers) and political variables (popularity of the leader of the National Front, results of the previous national elections, split of the National Front before the 1999 European election). Globally, we can say that the quality of the estimates is good and that the ex post national forecasts in vote for the elections of the past are satisfactory. For the 2004 European election, we rightly forecast that the whole Right is majority in vote. The forecasts in seats are more delicate because we make hypotheses on the vote obtained by the various political parties but our forecasts are rather close to the electoral results. Future research may further compare the votes in the different elections (European, presidential and legislative) in France and focus on the votes obtained by every party (as we do in this paper for the FN). It would be interesting to study the vote for the small parties and to explain why the vote for the small parties is often higher in European elections (second-order elections) than in first-order elections.40

Appendix A 1: Electoral districts Nord: Ouest: Est: Centre-Massif Central: Sud-Ouest: Sud-Est:

Basse-Normandie, Haute-Normandie, Nord, Pasde-Calais, Picardie (12 elected members) Bretagne, Pays de Loire, Poitou-Charentes (10 elected members) Alsace, Bourgogne, Champagne-Ardenne, Franche-Comté, Lorraine (10 elected members) Auvergne, Centre, Limousin (6 elected members) Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées (10 elected mem-bers) Corse, Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, RhônesAlpes (13 elected mem-bers)

Ile de France (14 elected members) Outre-Mer (not taken into account in this article) (3 elected members)

40

It is one of the results of the Reif and Schmitt (1980) and Marsh (1998) papers.


A 2: List of the main French political parties (2004) LO PS PC Les Verts UDF UMP MPF CPNT FN

(Lutte Ouvrière) + LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire): Extrême gauche (Extreme Left) Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party) Parti Communiste (Communist Party) (The Greens) Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for French Democracy) Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement) Mouvement pour la France (Movement for France) Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions (Hunt, Fish, Nature, Traditions) Front National (National Front)

A 3: Hypotheses on the percentage of vote received by the political parties Table 1: Percentage of vote received by the moderate right-wing parties for 2004 UDF

MPF

UMP

CPNT

Nord

9,2-11,1

4,5-6,3

14-17,7

5,3

Ouest

11,2-12,5

7,2-8,5

17,6-20,2

5

Est

11-13,3

4,7-6,9

14,9-19,3

3,1

Massif Cental-Centre

9,6-11,1

5-6,6

16,6-19,7

5,4

Sud-Ouest

11,1-11,9

4,4-6,2

11,9-15,5

7,4

Sud-Est

10,4-12,4

4,6-6,6

13-17,1

3,8

Ile de France

11,2-11,8

3,6-4,4

19-20,3

1,2


10,4-12,1

4,8-6,4

15,1-18,4

4,3

Table 2: Percentage of vote received by the moderate left-wing parties for 2004 PC

Verts

PS

Nord

4,1-6,2

4,4-6,4

28,2-30,2

Ouest

2,7-4,7

6,1-8

26,6-28,5

Est

2,4-4,2

5-6,7

27,9-29,6


4,2-6,1

4,4-6,2

28,7-30,6

4-5,6

5,3-7

30,6-32,3

Sud-Est

3,3-4,8

5,5-6,9

29,6-31,1

Ile de France

3,6-4,9

6,2-7,5

32,7-34,1


3,4-5,1

5,3-7

29,3-30,9

Sud-Ouest

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ANTOINE AUBERGER

Table 3: Percentage of vote received by the FN and the Extreme Left for 2004

Nord Ouest

FN

Extreme Left

18,2-10,8

12,1-6

12-6,8

11,6-5,8

Est

20,9-12.1

10,5-5,2


15,2-8,8

11-5,5

Sud-Ouest

16,6-9,3

9,9-4,9

Sud-Est

21,3-13,3

8,5-4,2

14,6-12

8,1-4

17,2-10,7

10,1-5,1

Ile de France France métropolitaine

References Auberger, Antoine et Eric Dubois (2003). “Situation politico-économique et résultats des élections législatives françaises”, Revue Économique 54(3): 551-560. Auberger, Antoine and Eric Dubois (2005). “The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections”, Public Choice, forthcoming. Campbell, James E. (1992). “Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States”, American Journal of Political Science 36(2): 386-407. Dubois, Eric (2002). “Un modèle de prévision par département pour les élections présidentielles françaises”, Working Paper LAEP, University of Paris I. Fauvelle-Aymar, Christine, Jean-Dominique Lafay and Marie Servais (2000). “The Impact of Turnout on Electoral Choices: An Econometric Analysis of the French Case”, Electoral Studies 19(2-3): 393-412. Greene, William H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Fifth edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Jérôme, Bruno and Véronique Jérôme (2000). “The 1998 French regional elections: why so much political instability ?”, Electoral Studies 19(2-3): 219-236. Jérôme, Bruno et Véronique Jérôme (2003). “Les municipales de mars 2001: vote récompense ou vote sanction”, Revue française de science politique 52(2-3): 251-272. Jérôme, Bruno and Véronique Jérôme-Speziari (2004a). “Forecasting the 2002 elections: Lessons from a political economy model”, in Lewis-Beck M.S. (ed.), The French voter. New York: Palgrave, pp. 178-204. Jérôme, Bruno and Véronique Jérôme-Speziari (2004b). “A Le Pen vote function for the 2002 presidential election: a way to reduce uncertainty”, French Politics 1(2): 247-251. Jérôme, Bruno, Véronique Jérôme-Speziari and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (1999). “Polls Fails in France: Forecasts of the 1997 Legislative Election”, International Journal of Forecasting 15(2): 163-174.

FORECASTS OF THE 2004 FRENCH EUROPEAN ELECTION 77 Jérôme, Bruno, Véronique Jérôme-Speziari and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (2003). “Reordering the French election calendar: Forecasting the consequences for 2002”, European Journal of Political Research 42(3): 425-440. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Richard Nadeau (2000). “French electoral institutions and the economic vote”, Electoral Studies 19(2-3): 171-182. Marsh, Michael (1998). “Testing the second-order election model after four European elections”, British Journal of Political Science 28(4): 591-607. Paldam, Martin (1981). “A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote and Popularity Functions”, European Journal of Political Research 9(2): 181-199. Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt (1980). “Nine second order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political Research 8(1): 3-44. Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin (1996). Choosing Europe? The European electoral and national politics in the face of Union. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Prévisions pour les élections européennes de 2004 en France Cet article a pour objet la construction et l’estimation d’un modèle permettant d’expliquer et de prévoir le résultat des élections européennes françaises par département, par circonscription électorale et au niveau national. Ce modèle met en évidence le rôle des facteurs économiques et politiques dans l‘explication du vote aux élections européennes françaises. Ses performances pour les élections passées sont bonnes et ses prévisions pour l’élection de juin 2004 qui tiennent compte des changements intervenus dans le mode de scrutin sont satisfaisantes.

Vorhersagen für die französischen Europa-Wahlen 2004 Der Zweck dieses Artikels ist die Entwicklung und Schätzung eines Modells, das die Resultate der französischen Europa-Wahlen auf Departementsebene, auf Ebene der Wahlkreise und auf nationaler Ebene erklären und vorhersagen kann. Das Modell liefert korrekte Vorhersagen für vergangene EuropaWahlen. Die Vorhersagen für die französischen Europa-Wahlen 2004 sind befriedigend und berücksichtigen die kürzlich erfolgten Veränderungen im Wahlsystem.

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ANTOINE AUBERGER

Antoine Auberger received his Ph.D. in economics from the University Paris II, and is a researcher at LAEP (University Paris I). His research mainly concerns vote functions and election forecasting, popularity functions and political cycles (an article published in the Revue Économique and an article published in l’Actualité Économique – Revue d’Analyse Économique and one forthcoming article in Public Choice). Address for correspondence: Antoine Auberger, LAEP, University of Paris I, Maison des sciences économiques, 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75647 – Paris cedex 13, France; E-Mail: [email protected]