Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893 DOI 10.1007/s00267-013-0138-1
Forest Management Devolution: Gap Between Technicians’ Design and Villagers’ Practices in Madagascar Fanny Rives • Ste´phanie M. Carrie`re • Pierre Montagne Sigrid Aubert • Nicole Sibelet
•
Received: 1 June 2012 / Accepted: 21 July 2013 / Published online: 22 August 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract In the 1980s, tropical forest-management principles underwent a shift toward approaches giving greater responsibilities to rural people. One argument for such a shift were the long-term relations established between rural people and their natural resources. In Madagascar, a new law was drawn up in 1996 (Gelose law), which sought to integrate rural people into forest management. A gap was observed between the changes foreseen by the projects implementing the Gelose law and the actual changes. In this article, we use the concept of the social-ecological system (SES) to analyze that gap. The differences existing between the planned changes set by the Gelose contract in the village of Ambatoloaka (northwest of Madagascar) and the practices observed in 2010 were conceptualized as a gap between two SESs. The first SES is the targeted one (i.e., a virtual one); it corresponds to the designed Gelose contract. The second SES is the observed one. It is characterized by the heterogeneity of forest users and uses, F. Rives (&) CIRAD, UR GREEN, TA C-47/F Campus International de Baillarguet, 34398 Montpellier, France e-mail:
[email protected] S. M. Carrie`re IRD, UMR GRED, Montpellier, France P. Montagne CIRAD, UR BSEF, Antananarivo, Madagascar S. Aubert CIRAD, UR GREEN, Antananarivo, Madagascar N. Sibelet CATIE, GSEBSA, Turrialba, Costa Rica N. Sibelet CIRAD, UMR Innovation, Montpellier, France
which have several impacts on forest management, and by very dynamic social and ecological systems. The observed SES has been reshaped contingent on the constraints and opportunities offered by the Gelose contract as well as on other ecological and social components. The consequences and opportunities that such an SES reshaping would offer to improve the implementation of the Gelose law are discussed. The main reasons explaining the gap between the two SESs are as follows: (1) the clash between static and homogeneous perceptions in the targeted SES and the dynamics and heterogeneity that characterize the observed SES; and (2) the focus on one specific use of forest ecosystems (i.e., charcoal-making) in the targeted SES. Forest management in the observed SES depends on several uses of forest ecosystems. Keywords Social–ecological system Gelose Community-based management Forest policies Local knowledge
Introduction Deforestation in tropical countries is a major concern of environmental policies regarding natural-resource management. Since the 1980s, the policy responses of international agencies have changed (Becker 2001). Forestmanagement principles have shifted from a state-centered control of forests toward approaches giving greater responsibility to rural people whose local knowledge is now recognized (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Wardell and Lund 2006). This paradigm shift has resulted in the development of multiple projects and studies on ‘‘local’’ forest management, ‘‘decentralization’’ of forest management (Larson
123
878
2005), and ‘‘community-based natural resource management’’ (CBNRM; Dressler et al. 2010). These projects are based on several hypotheses that argue for a greater involvement of rural people in forest management and conservation. Four main arguments are commonly used. The first argument is that local knowledge and practices can be used to manage forest resources efficiently and sustainably (Berkes et al. 2000; Roth 2004). To demonstrate this efficiency, some investigators have shown that areas which have a high proportion of forest cover coincide with areas with long-term human habitation (Michon et al. 2007; Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). (2) The second argument is that rural people depend directly on forest resources for their domestic consumption and income. Displacing people or refusing them access to resources is unfair given their high level of poverty (Campese 2009; Lele et al. 2010). (3) The third argument is that in several tropical countries, policies based on the exclusion of rural people have often failed to protect the forests (Larson 2005). Finally, the fourth argument is that financial and human means devoted to forest management by governments in tropical countries are too weak (Larson 2005). Madagascar is representative of the trend toward integrating rural people in forest management. The ‘‘Gelose’’1 law (law no. 96, September 25 1996) introduced the principle of devolution of forest management from the government to rural people. This law aimed to end a situation where access to natural resources was considered to be free of charge (Weber 1994). The limited financial and human resources of governments and the poverty of local populations were put forward as reasons justifying such reforms (Montagne and Rakotondrainibe 2007). The Gelose law provides for the commercial harvesting of natural resources by rural people as an incentive for the sustainable management of these resources (Maldidier 2001). This law was designed to tackle natural resource degradation, specifically in a slash-and-burn context where policies excluding rural people had failed and led to free access (Bertrand et al. 2009; Montagne and Rakotondrainibe 2007). Although the Gelose law was designed for all natural resources, Gelose contracts actually have been applied largely to forest resources (Collas de Chatelperron 2007). The establishment of Gelose contracts for forests is accompanied by projects designed to address or avoid forest degradation. The different ways in which Gelose
1 ‘‘Gelose’’ is a contraction of Gestion Locale Se´curise´e [locally secured resource management].
123
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
contracts are designed reflect the different conservation issues that are frequently blamed for forest degradation in Madagascar, e.g., bushfires (Kull 2002), charcoal production (Montagne et al. 2010b), slash-and-burn practices (Blanc-Pamard and Ramiarantsoa 2007), and logging (Andriatahiana 2010). Despite the changes in environmental policies in Madagascar, forest-management approaches are still vacillating between the exclusion and integration of rural people (Pollini 2011). Several influential conservation National Governmental Organizations (e.g., Conservation International, Wildlife Conservation Society, World Wildlife Fund), which have become official managers of new protected areas in Madagascar (Aubert 2012), are pushing to restrict the management rights of rural people (Corson 2011). Some ideas underlying the Gelose law in Madagascar have been subverted during the implementation of the law (Kull 2002). To assess and eventually improve the process of forest-management devolution, we propose to analyze in this article: (1) the reasons for the gap observed between planned changes and those that actually occur; and (2) the consequences of new practices on forest management.
Study Site Implementation of the Gelose Law in the Boeny Region In the Boeny region, the Gelose law was mainly implemented through projects aiming to reorganize the charcoal supply chain for households in the cities of Mahajanga, Marovoay, and Ambato-Boeny. The Integrated Pilot Project of Mahajanga (PPIM) (1999–2000) provided methodological tools implemented by the Household Energy Project of Mahajanga (PEDM), which was initiated in 2001, and in follow-up projects. These projects were designed to ensure a sustainable supply of charcoal for urban households while also promoting the sustainable management of forests (Montagne et al. 2010b). According to written reports of PEDM managers, it appears clearly that the Gelose law was implemented in the Boeny region to reorganize the charcoal-supply sector (Razafimahatratra et al. 2010). These projects were based on the recognition that due to the high price of gas and petroleum, charcoal would remain the main fuel source for urban households over the long term. The designers of the project argued that as the demand in fuel wood would increase with population growth, the charcoal supplychain and forest-management strategies needed to be modified.
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
879
Fig. 1 Location map of study area. a Boeny region and Tsaramandroso in Madagascar. b Ambatoloaka hamlets and VOI Mamelonarivo in Tsaramandroso
Implementation of a Gelose Contract in Ambatoloaka This study was performed in the fokontany2 of Ambatoloaka, which is located in northwestern Madagascar in the Boeny region. The fokontany of Ambatoloaka is made up of three hamlets: Ambatoloaka, Anosipaka, and Antongomavo. The main hamlet (Ambatoloaka hamlet) is located near Highway 4 connecting Antananarivo to Mahajanga 150 km before reaching Mahajanga (Fig. 1). The climate is characterized by alternation between the dry season (from April to October) and the rainy season (from November to March) with annual rainfall of *1,300 mm and average temperatures ranging between 25 and 29 C (Bloesch 1999). A Gelose contract was established with villagers from Ambatoloaka and Anosipaka hamlets3 in 2003 with the support of the Project for the Development of Ambato–Boeny Region (DREF Mahajanga 2003), a development project. The establishment of a Gelose contract requires the creation of an association that brings together rural stakeholders who are willing to collectively manage their resources. This association is defined by the Gelose law as a Communaute´ de Base in French or Vondron’Olona Ifotony (VOI) in Malagasy. In the case of Ambatoloaka, the VOI association was called Mamelonarivo. Initially, the Gelose contract was dedicated to forest conservation and the harvesting of raffia fiber; however, villagers later asked for rights to produce 2 In Madagascar, the fokontany is the smallest civil division below the level of the rural council. 3 The villagers from the third hamlet of Ambatoloaka fokontany [Antongomavo] are involved in another Gelose contract.
charcoal. In 2005, a new contract was established with the support of a project funded by the Fund on Decentralized Management of Natural Resources (Montagne 2006). It authorized the production and sale of charcoal as well as the commercialization of raffia fiber (DREF Mahajanga 2005). This contract was renewed in 2007 for 10 more years (DREF Mahajanga 2007). The Gelose contract was signed by the VOI Mamelonarivo, the rural council4 (Tsaramandroso), and the Forest Department (Regional Water and Forest Direction of Mahajanga). With the establishment of the Gelose contract, the role of each actor was modified. A new stakeholder was introduced (the VOI association), and new rules were defined for resource management. A management plan defined landscape zones according to their diverse uses by the villagers.
Methods In this article, we analyze the gap between the situation targeted by the Gelose contract and what was actually observed in 2010 in Ambatoloaka using the social-ecological system (SES) concept. This concept was developed to emphasize the need to integrate the relations established between rural people and natural resources within a single conceptual framework (Gallopı´n 1994; Berkes and Folke 1998; Ostrom 2009). It is used to analyze the coevolution of social and ecological dynamics and calling for a truly 4
The rural council is the main local level of government and is known locally under the French term commune rurale.
123
880
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Table 1 Sampling in the Ambatoloaka survey Hamlets
Total villagers
Respondents No. of men/ women
Sampling rate (%) 27.8
Ambatoloaka
158
28/16
Anosipaka
107
24/7
29.0
Total VOI Mamelonarivo
265
52/23
28.3
complex systemic approach (Gallopı´n et al. 2001; Rives et al. 2012). Under the denomination of ‘‘social system’’ Berkes and Folke (1998) included the following: ‘‘property rights, land and resource tenure system, systems of knowledge pertinent to environment and resources, and world views and ethics concerning environment and resources’’ (p. 4). They use the term ‘‘ecological system’’ to refer to the natural environment. Ostrom (2009) suggested a more detailed framework to analyze the sustainability of SES, including subsystems (resource units, resource system, governance system, users), which can be each characterized by several variables. We drew on these works to design a framework to analyze the implementation of the Gelose law in Madagascar. In our SES model, we consider land-cover and land-use systems, vegetation features, forest harvesting rules, income from natural resource, and the tax system as well as look specifically at the changes planned by the Gelose contract and actual changes observed in the field. The study consisted of comparing the original situation, i.e., the SES as represented in the Gelose contract (targeted SES) and the SES observed in Ambatoloaka after the establishment of the Gelose contract (observed SES). The comparison was performed in 2010, 7 years after the contract was signed. Cartography and Interviews to Analyze the Original Situation Land-cover maps were drawn to identify the general pattern of the landscape in Ambatoloaka area on which the Gelose contract designers based their analysis. The maps were based on a visual interpretation analysis of a raster orthophoto with a resolution of 0.5 m acquired in 2007 by the National Land Tenure Program. The information provided by this orthophoto was supplemented and verified by observations made during several field visits. We also collected ground-truth data to characterize the different classes of ecological habitats. In addition to savannas, two types of dry forest were identified in the charcoal-making zone. The first type, which we called ‘‘small valley dry forest,’’ is characteristically found in small valleys located between hills rising 100 m above sea level. The second type, which we called ‘‘foothill dry forest,’’ is characteristic
123
of denser forests found on the foothills of the plateaus, which rise 200 m above sea level; the trees in these forests are taller. The landscape history was described with key informants during semistructured interviews and field visits. The following variables (Sibelet and Mutel 2013) were addressed: village history, migration history, farming system history, land-use changes, and land-cover changes.
Project and Contract Analysis to Identify the Targeted SES The objectives and strategies of the projects that implemented the Gelose law in the Boeny region were analyzed by consulting project reports and a published book on the project’s progress and results (Montagne et al. 2010b). The analysis of these documents identified which forest perturbations had been considered by the project and which strategic choices were made to address them. This analysis was supplemented by semistructured interviews with stakeholders based in Mahajanga and Tsaramandroso who had been involved in the design of the Gelose contract in Ambatoloaka (three civil servants from the Forest Department, two from the rural council, and three project managers). The targeted SES was considered to be the forest resources, management rules, and stakeholders (i.e., those who would manage the forest and harvest forest products) as defined in the Gelose contract. The Gelose contract of the VOI Mamelonarivo (DREF Mahajanga 2007) was analyzed to identify changes in stakeholders’ roles as planned by the contract as well as the new rules and new spatial organization laid out in the contract. The villagers’ knowledge and perception of the Gelose contract were also investigated through interviews with villagers from Ambatoloaka and Anosipaka (Table 1 [variables concerned included definition of the Gelose contract, perceptions on contract setting, and VOI association role]). Global-positioning system (GPS) field data were also collected to identify the limits of each zone as specified by the Gelose contract5 in the field.
5
In the Gelose contract, zoning is described by the geographical name of each area and can be seen on the map reproduced in Fig. 4. Although the whole area covered by the Gelose contract is described by identifying its boundaries using natural and topographic limits (water canal, pathway, or forest area), the different zones within the Gelose contract are described solely by identifying each area using its local name without defining their exact boundaries.
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
881
Village Survey and Vegetation Inventories to Analyze the Observed SES The survey involved 75 villagers in the hamlets of Ambatoloaka and Anosipaka (Table 1). The sample taken was designed to be representative of different groups of stakeholders (distinguished by sex, age, origin [native or migrant], and location) because their activities and their perceptions of the Gelose contract might differ. Working from a strategic analysis (Crozier and Friedberg 1977), semistructured interviews were performed with various stakeholders about their activities and practices and about the changes they had witnessed in their lifetimes (the main variables were activities, location of activities, incomes, activity changes, resource access, resource uses, resource changes, forest product prices, and agricultural product prices). Farming and charcoal-making activities were located by taking GPS data during field visits. The VOI association ledger, in which the board members register all revenues and expenditures, also was consulted to collect data on the functioning of the VOI association, particularly regarding fines issued. Vegetation inventories were performed to estimate the wood quantities available and the main species harvested to produce charcoal in the three habitats types (woody savanna, small valley dry forest, and foothill dry forest) identified in the charcoal-making zone. Inventories were performed in harvested and non-harvested areas on 10 9 10-m plots in dry forest and on 20 9 20-m plots in woody savannas; the latter were larger because tree density in this habitat is lower (Table 2). The plots were chosen in homogeneous parts of the landscape and were located on different mountainsides and at different points up and down the slope. All individuals of woody species were inventoried whether they were felled or not. For each stem, the species and the diameter at a height of 1 m or at the level of the stump for harvested trees were noted. For inventories in harvested areas, the basal area was calculated per species by computing the basal areas of each individual of the species. When a tree had several stems, the basal area of one individual was calculated by adding up the basal areas of each stem. For inventories in non-harvested areas, the analysis was performed only on individuals whose largest stem had a diameter of[10 cm; when this was the case, all of the other stems, even those with smaller diameters, also
Table 2 Sampling for inventories
were included. This method was consistent with the practices of woodcutters who choose an individual tree according to the diameter of the largest stem (C10 cm) and then cut all of the stems.
Results Context of Implementation of the Gelose Law in Ambatoloaka General Landscape Pattern According to field observations and orthophoto analysis, the landscape can be divided into three main areas depending on the relief and the hydrography. The first area, the northern zone, is made up of plateaus lying at altitudes ranging from 150 to 200 m (Fig. 2). Vegetation on the plateaus is characterized by dry forest and woody and grassy savannas. The second area, the lowlands, begins from the dales created between these plateaus. The lowlands gradually widen as one moves from upstream to downstream areas. The upstream area is characterized by raffia palm groves and other riparian forests (all referred to as ‘‘riparian forests’’ in Fig. 2), whereas the downstream section is under cultivation. The third area is composed of hills ranging up to 100 and 150 m of altitude on the southern and eastern corners of the fokontany, respectively. The tops of the hills are characterized by woody savannas, whereas the small valleys between the hills are characterized by dry forest. A part of this area is also cultivated. The farmlands are concentrated on the lowlands and hills where rice cultivation is the main activity. Rice is grown in upland areas on the hills and in irrigated lowlands. In the hilly area, some villagers also cultivate maize, cassava, and sugar cane on the upper, medium, and lower slopes where no irrigation schemes exist. Fruit trees are cultivated on the upper and medium slopes around the villages (citrus, papaya, and mango), and on the sides of the irrigated lowlands (banana). Land-Use History Among the lands included in the Gelose contract, the plateau area in the north had never been cultivated as far as the villagers could remember. The first inhabitants began
Type of plots
No. of plots of dry forest type I (ha)
No. of plots of dry forest type II (ha)
Woody savanna (ha)
Non-harvested Harvested
10 (0.1) 15 (0.15)
7 (0.07) Not harvested yet
10 (0.4) 9 (0.36)
123
882
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Fig. 2 Land cover in the Ambatoloaka fokontany
by cultivating the lowlands around Ambatoloaka hamlet with rain-fed rice and extended the cultivated areas as the population grew. Irrigated crop cultivation began in 1973 and allowed peasants to grow rice during the dry season. The main land-use change reported by the villagers occurred in the area called Andranolava, which is located to the east of Anosipaka (Fig. 2). Some villagers in Ambatoloaka and Anosipaka reported that their parents used to cultivate rain-fed rice in Andranolava many years ago. However, after the requisitioning in 1942 of a plot that included the area by the Forest Department, they were denied farming rights there. The requisitioning aimed to protect the forest and enable reforestation activities to be performed: In 1942, the Vazahas [i.e., the foreigners] came to reforest […] The entire area was cultivated, and when
123
they marked out the boundary, people left. [The vahaza] forced the villagers out, but the latter had other areas in which to cultivate. The villagers described how Andranolava lands were colonized by Ziziphus sp. and Tamarindus indica, which eventually attained a trunk diameter of 60 cm. The descendants of the people who had cultivated these lands in the past asked for rights to clear them; however, the Forest Department refused. Charcoal production began in Ambatoloaka fokontany in the 1980s. At first, charcoal was produced near the hamlets of Ambatoloaka and Antongomavo in small valley dry forests and savannas (Figs. 2, 3). Charcoal traders acquired forest concessions from the Forest Department in those areas. Some villagers worked for the traders. In return for giving the traders one-third of the charcoal produced, the
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
883
Fig. 3 Spatial representation of land-use history in Ambatoloaka
villagers could sell the other two-thirds for *77 ariary (Ar)/kg6 (price in 2004). The old traders explained that when all of the wood was harvested, the lands were cultivated. As shown in Fig. 3, which presents the land-use history, these areas were still cultivated with maize and cassava in 2010.
to charcoal traders from Mahajanga, whereas they have been allocated to the VOI association since 2005. The following results highlight this focus on charcoal production.
The SES Targeted by the Gelose Contract
The area for which management responsibility was transferred to the VOI association was first demarcated and then divided into several zones, which are each now devoted to specific uses. At the beginning of the project, the technicians consulted the villagers about what they did and where to establish the Gelose contract. They asked them to identify areas for specific uses (forest protection, tree plantations, use rights, and charcoal-making). This landuse zoning was reported in the management plan provided in the contract (Fig. 4). The zoning was thus based on a snapshot of the ecosystems and their use in the area when the Gelose contract was established.
In Ambatoloaka, the Gelose contract provides for several uses of forest resources; however, the sustainable management of forest ecosystems is principally based on charcoal production. Compared with previous management practices, the biggest changes introduced by the Gelose contract essentially concern this specific use of forest ecosystems. In the past, harvesting permits were allocated 6
The charcoal was packed in bags that held *13 kg and were sold for 1,000 Ar (1 Euro = 2782,79 Ar on October 4, 2011).
Land Use as Planned by the Gelose Contract
123
884
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Fig. 4 Management plan of the VOI Mamelonarivo as formalized in the contract (source DREF Mahajanga 2007) (This figure is an exact copy of the management plan provided in the Gelose contract document; neither the scale nor the rivers are given in this document.)
The Gelose contract stipulates that charcoal-makers should work exclusively within the charcoal-making zone and within the plots defined in the permits issued by the Forest Department. Our GPS data shows that the plot identified in the 2010 permits is located in foothill dry forest. Defining Harvesting Rules According to the Vegetation Features Considered Boeny region, where Ambatoloaka is located, is known to be an expansion area for Ziziphus sp., a pioneer species that often grows on overgrazed pasture (Binggeli 2003). Given its capacity to propagate by vegetative means (Bellefontaine 1997), Ziziphus sp. has been designated for charcoalmaking in the Boeny region. The PEDM technicians undertook vegetation surveys of raffia and Ziziphus specifically to determine harvesting
123
quotas. They used previous studies that had been performed in the Boeny region to assess the productivity of Ziziphus sp. in various habitats (Razafindrianilana 1999). Afterward, they took a sample of Ziziphus sp. in woody savannas of the charcoal-making zone of the VOI Mamelonarivo and estimated the wood volume to be 16.8 m3/ha in the area. The results were extrapolated to the entire charcoal-making zone (an area estimated to cover 160 ha) as if it were ecologically homogeneous. The total wood volume was estimated to be 2,688 m3 (DREF Mahajanga 2005). By combining this result with those on the regeneration capacities of Ziziphus and the yield rates for charcoal-making, the technicians established an annual quota of 78 tons (2,600 charcoal bags of 30 g). In the contract established in 2007, Ziziphus sp. is the only species defined as a harvestable species for charcoal production. The contract specifies that it is forbidden to harvest T. indica:
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
885
‘‘The [Ziziphus sp.] is the only one tree designated for making charcoal in Ambatoloaka […] In consequence, it is forbidden to harvest [T. indica] and other trees to make charcoal.’’ (DREF Mahajanga 2007) Forest civil servants explained that this species was protected because it produces fruit, which is then harvested and sold: The [T. indica] cannot be exploited because we can sell the fruit, and it makes us a lot of money. Providing Individual and Collective Incomes Through Charcoal Production To meet the need to increase rural stakeholders’ incomes, the Gelose contract focuses on charcoal production; however, it also provides for harvesting and selling of raffia fiber and some fruit. The main changes in the stakeholders’ roles related to the economic resources occurred specifically in the charcoal-value chain with the transfer of woodharvesting benefits to rural stakeholders. At the collective level, only taxes on charcoal trade are stipulated to generate some revenue for the VOI association (340 Ar/30-kg bag) to enable it to perform sustainable forest management. These taxes also provide revenues for higher administrative levels (Rural Council 30 Ar/bag; Forest Department at district and regional levels, respectively, 150 and 180 Ar/ bag). For the other agricultural and forest products (including raffia fiber), sales fees are collected by the fokontany president. Thus, among all of the forest and agricultural products marketed, charcoal is the only one generating revenue by way of taxation for the VOI association and thus for forest management. A focus on Charcoal as Confirmed by Villager’s Perceptions The way in which the villagers consider the VOI association is in keeping with our analysis of a Gelose contract focused on a single use. Indeed, most villagers associate the Gelose contract exclusively with charcoal production (Fig. 5). This perception of the VOI association is illustrated by the following villagers’ statements: ‘‘All I know is that the VOI concerns charcoalmaking’’ or ‘‘The state gave us forest management so that we earn money with charcoal.’’ In contrast, people who consider that the VOI association was established to manage the forest as a whole are often VOI association board members or people close to them. In answer to the question, ‘‘How did the Gelose contract change your life,’’ 30 of 38 villagers interviewed mentioned
Fig. 5 Role of the VOI association as perceived by 47 villagers of Ambatoloaka
change linked to charcoal production. The main changes they associate with the Gelose contract are the right to harvest charcoal and the receiving income it provides (Fig. 6). The Observed SES Effective Land Use Since 2005 Regarding the zoning, many of the villagers equate the area devoted to charcoal-making to the area covered by the Gelose contract. They often say ‘‘We harvest wood within the Gelose,’’ and they cite the places located in the area designated for charcoal-making (Ankodoka, Ankaboka, and Ambongomarangitra). Most villagers consider Andranolava to be within the charcoal-making zone; however, according to the management plan, it is located in the tree plantation zone (Fig. 4). Andranolava was the first area to be harvested after the VOI association received permission to sell charcoal. After the charcoal was produced, the Andranolava lands were put under cultivation, and they were still being cultivated at the time of the study (Fig. 3). Maize is the main crop grown on these lands. The farmers specified that they were interested in this crop because it had become a profitable cash crop in the region in recent years. The VOI association president authorized woodcutters to produce charcoal in this area. He also authorized them to cultivate these lands after charcoal production. The VOI association members consider that they took advantage of the Gelose contract to cultivate these lands as an elder villager said: [Before the establishment of the Gelose contract], we could not clear this area, and even though our ancestors cultivated here in the past, it was forbidden
123
886
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Fig. 6 Type of changes mentioned by villagers (38 respondents)
by the State […] The descendants returned and took advantage of the Gelose contract of Mamelonarivo to cultivate these lands. Most ‘‘customary land owners’’ claimed to have a title deed on these lands since 2008. In fact, it was a book issued by the rural council of Tsaramandroso that defined the boundaries, the characteristics of the area, and the land use to establish a land farming tax rather than a real title deed. On the local tenure plan, these lands are included within the plot requisitioned by the Forest Department and for which the Forest Department has applied for a title to the land. Although the VOI association board allows natives and migrants to cultivate in Andranolava, they ban them from clearing forests in the charcoal-making zone and in the forest-protection zone. Three examples illustrate this point. In the charcoal-making zone, a villager cleared a plot a few years ago. The VOI association punished him, and he had to plant Tectona grandis to reforest the land. In the forest-protection zone, migrants attempted to clear forests to grow maize. The VOI association alerted the Forest Department and complained about them to the police. We can also mention a bushfire that burned a part of the forest-protection zone in 2008. Because it was caused by a farmer who burned his field, he was punished with a fine. The VOI association board’s commitment to protecting the forest in the forest-protection and charcoalmaking zones might be explained by the customary status of these lands, which have never been cultivated by natives of Ambatoloaka. Management of Individual and Collective Income From Charcoal The organisation of the charcoal trade and the collection of taxes have changed several times since 2005. In the beginning, charcoal-makers sold their charcoal directly to
123
wood traders from Mahajanga for *83 Ar/kg (2,500 Ar/ 30-kg bag). Since 2007, some villagers have become traders. At first, they carried their charcoal themselves to Mahajanga. With transport costs increasing, they decided to develop a roadside charcoal depot, located in Ambatoloaka hamlet, where charcoal is sold by the bag to the travellers who pass through Ambatoloaka. To sell charcoal at the depot, the villager traders must pay a one-time charge of 4,000 Ar to the VOI association. The charcoalmakers stay in the charcoal-making zone and sell charcoal in bags of 30 kg for 83 Ar/kg (2,500 Ar/bag); a carrier brings it to the depot by cart for 17 Ar/kg (500 Ar/bag); and the villager trader sell the charcoal for 167 Ar/kg (5,000 Ar/bag). Almost all villager traders are natives of Ambatoloaka hamlet (including women), whereas charcoal-makers are natives of Anosipaka hamlet or are recent migrants (almost all men). The changes in the organisation of the charcoal trade allowed villagers new to the sector to earn money. For charcoal-makers, the main change is that they can sell more charcoal compared with the situation before the Gelose contract; however, the unit price of charcoal has barely changed (from 77 to 83 Ar/kg). Since 2005, permits have been granted from September 2005 to August 2007 and from September 2008 to July 2009. The irregular granting of permits is related to organizational weaknesses within the Forest Department. In this context, taxes are levied only when the permits issued by the Forest Department are valid. Outside the permit periods, charcoal-making is tolerated by the VOI association and the Forest Department; however, no taxes are levied by the VOI association. Charcoal-makers and villager traders explained that during the period when the permits were valid, taxes were levied on only half of the bags sold to increase the income of charcoal-makers and traders. The taxes collected are divided among the VOI association, the rural council, and the Forest Department. The VOI association ledger
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Fig. 7 Share of the total basal area taken up by tree species for felled individuals by species (and number of trees felled by species) (source inventories in 0.51 ha of harvested areas)
(updated from 2006 to 2008) shows that the money from taxes is used to pay for office supplies and associationrelated travel, for the expenses of Forest Department agents when visiting on supervisory visits, and to buy trees for reforestation activities. Practices According to Vegetation Features in the Charcoal-Making Zone Tamarindus indica is the most harvested species for charcoal production even though the Gelose contract defines it as a protected species. Tamarindus indica is harvested as much as Ziziphus sp. when measures are based on stem number, and it even provides a greater volume of wood when measures are based on basal area (Fig. 7). According to woodcutters, the charcoal produced from T. indica is valued most by consumers. When charcoal-makers look for a place to make a production pile, their first criterion is the presence of a large tree. Vegetation feature also must be taken into account to explain these practices. The charcoal-making zone is divided into three main habitats. The first, in the south, is characterized by woody savannas on the hills; the second by dry forests in small valleys; and the third, in the north, by a denser dry forests on the foothills leading up to the plateaus. Dry forests as a whole cover the main part of the charcoal-making zone (Fig. 8). Within the charcoal-making zone, inventories showed that T. indica has the largest-diameter trunks. This is the case in small valley dry forests and even more so in foothill dry forests (Table 3). In woody savannas, Acacia sieberiana has the largest-diameter trunks (Table 4). The VOI association modified the rules set out in the Gelose contract regarding harvestable species in response to the ecological characteristics of the charcoal-making zone. The VOI association board authorizes the harvesting
887
Fig. 8 Area of each habitat in the charcoal-making zone
of old T. indica. According to them, old trees from this species no longer produce fruit, and this justifies the change in the rule. Moreover, if woodcutters wanted to harvest only Ziziphus sp., they would find it in woody savannas, which cover only 13 % of the charcoal-making zone, and in even smaller quantities in small valley dry forest. Because the plot defined in the 2010 permits is located in foothill dry forest, if the rules were enforced, woodcutters could not produce charcoal because almost no Ziziphus sp. grow in these forest areas. Such a change in the rules also was possible because the Forest Department did not exercise any oversight. In contrast, the VOI association strictly forbids harvesting of Dalbergia sp. Interviews and VOI association books showed that at least four woodcutters were punished for harvesting this species. The charcoal-makers’ understanding of what constitutes harvestable species is quite variable. Regarding T. indica, some charcoal-makers consider that no trees may be harvested, whereas others consider that only old trees may be harvested. The rule on Dalbergia sp. is well known, and the ban on this species is more strongly believed than the ban on T. indica. That is illustrated by the following comment by a villager: We can harvest all of the trees except [Dalbergia sp.]. It is forbidden by the Gelose contract. Last year, somebody cut down some [Dalbergia sp.] and they must reforest with [Eucalyptus sp.]. [T. indica] harvesting is also forbidden; however, we can harvest it nevertheless.
Discussion Explaining Similarities and Gaps Between the Targeted and the Observed SES The two main objectives of establishing Gelose contracts in the Boeny region were (1) to ensure a reliable supply of
123
888
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
Table 3 Dry forest tree species with trunk diameters [10 cm wide (share of total) Species
Families
Trees in small valley dry forest (0.1 ha)
Trees in foothill dry forest (0.07 ha)
% diameter [10 cm part (n)
% diameter [20 cm part (n)
% diameter [10 cm part (n)
% diameter [20 cm part (n) 83 (19)
T. indica L.
Leguminosae
29 (17)
39 (11)
71 (29)
Ziziphus Mill.
Rhamnaceae
24 (14)
25 (7)
2 (1)
4 (1)
Grewia L. Albizia lebbeck Benth.
Malvaceae Leguminosae
14 (8) 5 (3)
11 (3) 11 (3)
12 (5) 5 (2)
9 (2) 4 (1)
Dalbergia trichocarpa Baker
Leguminosae
5 (3)
Antidesma madagascariense Lam.
Phyllanthaceae
Commiphora pervilleana Engl.
Burseraceae
Malleastrum gracile J.F Leroy
Meliaceae
5 (3)
Erythroxylum platycladum Bojer
Erythroxylaceae
3 (2)
7 (2)
A. nilotica (L.) Delile
Leguminosae
2 (1)
4 (1)
Brandzeia filicifolia Baill.
Leguminosae
2 (1)
Cordia mixa L.
Boraginaceae
2 (1)
Diospyros sakalavarum H. Perrier
Ebenaceae
2 (1)
Homalium albiflorum O. Hoffm
Salicaceae
2 (1)
Jatropha curcas L.
Euphorbiaceae
2 (1)
Stereospermum Cham.
Bignoniaceae
2 (1)
2 (1) 2 (1)
Nonidentified species
2 (1)
Total no. of individuals
58
Table 4 Woody savanna tree species with trunk diameters [10 cm (share of total)
Species
4 (1)
28
Families
23
16
Trees in woody savanna (0.4 ha) % Diameter [ 10 cm part (n)
% Diameter [ 20 cm part (n)
A. sieberiana DC.
Leguminosae
43 (32)
73 (16)
Ziziphus Mill.
Rhamnaceae
26 (19)
9 (2)
Sclerrocarya birrea Hochst
Anacardiaceae
16 (12)
9 (2)
Cordia myxa L.
Boraginaceae
8 (6)
T. indica L.
Leguminosae
4 (3)
5 (1)
Albizia lebbeck Benth.
Leguminosae
1 (1)
5 (1)
Tectona grandis L.f. Total no. of individuals
Lamiaceae
1 (1) 74
22
charcoal for urban households and (2) to provide sustainable management of forest ecosystems. These objectives shaped the way the targeted SES was defined. In Ambatoloaka, our results show that the Gelose contract focused mainly on charcoal, the stakeholders involved in its production, and the ecosystem components used to produce it. It also focused on defining rules for charcoal-harvesting and -selling to promote the sustainable management of forests. The villagers’ perceptions of the Gelose contract confirm the degree to which the targeted SES is focused on charcoal production. The objectives of the Gelose law and the regional context provide some clues as to why the Gelose contract targeted
123
5 (2)
this specific SES in Ambatoloaka. First, an increasing demand for firewood to supply urban areas is one of the main sources of forest perturbations identified in this area (Razafimahatratra et al. 2010). Second, charcoal is a staple fuel product for urban populations (Razafimahatratra et al. 2010). Third, the Gelose law promotes the economic value of natural resources (Law number 96-025, Art. 54). Charcoal activity was already present and was highly lucrative in the region (Montagne et al. 2010a). The rural stakeholders’ incomes were supposed to increase by reorganizing the charcoal-supply chain. However, forest management involves objectives other than producing charcoal. Rural stakeholders are involved in
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
many other activities that depend on the forest ecosystem; they harvest other forest resources (fruit, lumber, and bush meat); and they define other rules for the use of these resources. Among the multiple objectives which guide forest management, we must keep in mind that agriculture has a significant weight in the creation of management strategies as shown by the adaptation of rules by VOI managers in Andranolava. Local managers in Ambatoloaka are first of all farmers as Michon et al. (2007) showed in the majority of forests in tropical countries. The observed strategies of making charcoal with an objective of clearing and cultivating lands have also been observed in other areas where Gelose contracts have been established in the Boeny region (Muttenzer 2006). However, compared with our results, in this study such strategies were developed by migrants and were not related to land-use history. To explain why the changes planned by the Gelose contract were not faithfully implemented, the first reason was that the targeted SES was defined without including the heterogeneity of forest uses. Another factor was the way in which SES changes were conceived by the managers of the projects who designed the contract. To establish the management plan, the project technicians analyzed the ecological and social situation. By comparing the management plan and the land-cover map, we can conclude that the management plan was broadly congruent with land use at the time of their study. However, such a snapshot of the SES did not consider social and ecological dynamics. This kind of static conception of communities and their environment has been reported to be frequent in CBNRM (Leach et al. 1999). In the specific case of the Andranolava area, we observed a gap between what was intended by the Gelose contract and actual land use in 2010. The project technicians did not sufficiently analyze the land history when they defined the targeted SES. The villagers considered Andranolava lands as land reserved for agriculture that had been appropriated. The SES dynamic may be explained by the fact that ‘‘[Communities] are composed of people who actively monitor, interpret and shape the world around them’’ (Leach et al. 1999). Moreover, as highlighted by Pollini and Lassoie (2011), the representation of management plans as maps in Gelose contracts is far from local forms of knowledge. More generally, this situation shows a gap between different views of the forest, which is often the case when the rules borrow from European forest managers’ view (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008). European land-use planning, based on a separation between agricultural and forest spaces, is not congruent with land use as observed in Andranolava. In addition to historical factors, SES dynamics should also be understood from the perspective of opportunities that emerged during the same period. According to
889
Agrawal and Gibson (1999) the interests of rural stakeholders in a project may change when new opportunities emerge. Along with the land history of Andranolava, four other major factors favored the clearing of this area, including the Gelose contract itself. First, by authorizing charcoal production, the Gelose contract provided the opportunity to clear new lands. Second, the Gelose contract has increased the decision-making power of rural stakeholders in forest management, and thus the VOI association president has given himself the right to deliver authorizations to clear the forest after making charcoal. Last, the development of maize as a cash crop increased the need for land. The circumventing of rules by rural people to expand agricultural lands has been shown in other cases in Madagascar (Toillier and Lardon 2009). This analysis of the SES from a dynamic perspective helps to better understand why we did not observe the SES as was foreseen by the management plan in the Gelose contract. Our last point concerns the way in which charcoal-making rules were defined. Although the quotas were defined as if the charcoal-making zone was ecologically homogeneous, our results show three different ecological habitats in which the composition of species varies significantly. At first, the assessment by forest technicians appears to be based on an assumption of ecological homogeneity. In fact, assuming that the technicians had sufficient field knowledge to be aware that heterogeneity existed, the way they assessed the quota suggest that little time was taken to establish the rules. Other studies on Gelose contracts and conservation projects raised the technical issues that occur when the institution initiating the project works with unrealistic time lines (Goedefroit 2006; Marie et al. 2009). The Gelose law provides for preliminary information and negotiation stages before the establishment of a Gelose contract. These stages are meant to enable the definition of adequate rules and appropriate management plans. However, it is a time-consuming process that often does not fit the short-term perspective of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or development organizations, which are pressured by donors and subject to fierce competition (Aubert 2002; Goedefroit 2006). The difference existing between the changes planned by the Gelose contract and the practices observed in Ambatoloaka in 2010 may be conceptualized as a gap between two SESs. The SES targeted by the Gelose contract was defined by (1) a focus on one specific use of the forest; and (2) an assumption of a certain homogeneity and stability of social and ecological systems. However, the SES observed in 2010 was characterized by a great diversity of forest uses influencing forest management and by dynamic social and ecological systems. Finally, the observed SES is a result of complex
123
890
interactions between the original situation, the constraints and opportunities offered by the Gelose contract, and changes in the social and ecological environment. Given these differences between the targeted and observed SES, the task then is to analyze their effects on forest management.
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
result in the protection of young trees. The objective behind such a rule is to take into account other uses of this species. Although the Forest Department banned charcoal production exploiting T. indica because it produces fruit that is harvested, the VOI association authorized the harvesting of old T. indica because these individuals no longer bear fruit.
Consequences of Reshaping the SES for Forest Management
Perspectives for Improving Gelose Contracts
Redefining the spatial organization and the rules that were provided for by the Gelose contract may be seen as an effort to reshape the targeted SES so that it matches the local ecological and social contexts more closely. The inapplicability of harvesting rules may explain why the Forest Department has voiced little objection to the VOI association’s redefinition of the rules as has been argued on a larger scale about the inapplicability of environmental laws in Madagascar (Karpe 2006). Concluding that rules redefined by rural stakeholders are better suited to local contexts does not necessarily mean that they will ensure sustainable management. The strategies of rule adaptation by rural stakeholders are not directly guided by forest-conservation objectives (Karsenty 2008). In contrast, concluding that rules designed by the Gelose contract are not enforced does not necessarily mean that actual practices of rural stakeholders will lead to forest degradation. As was argued concerning forest logging, the legal rules may not always result in sustainable management even when they are scrupulously followed (Larson and Ribot 2007). In the case of Andranolava, the redefinition of rules on land use resulted in forest clearance. This may raise concerns regarding the sustainability of forest management by the VOI association. However, this strategy has not been generalized to the whole forest under its management. In the charcoal-making and forest-protection zones, the VOI association board has banned forest clearing. Although the factors motivating forest conservation may diverge between the VOI association and the Forest Department, the end result is that the VOI association plays an active role in protecting their forests by preventing land clearance on lands that have never been cultivated by natives. However, we cannot state that this situation will persist. New opportunities or new needs may change the strategies of rural stakeholders. In rural firewood markets in Mali, villagers who established rural markets now view migrants as threats to their own forest-related income (Gautier et al. 2011). Regarding the redefinition of the rules for charcoalmaking, it is still too early to be able to draw conclusions about forest regeneration based on the inventories. However, the modified rule the harvesting of T. indica will
The implementation of the Gelose law in the Ambatoloaka case highlights the origins and the implications of the gaps observed between what is defined in the contract and what actually occurs in practice. However, our analysis in Ambatoloaka was based on a specific case. Other studies on forest-management devolution in Madagascar have also shown gaps between the rules defined by the contract and the local context (Blanc-Pamard and Ramiarantsoa 2007; Toillier and Lardon 2009). Blanc-Pamard and Ramiarantsoa (2007) showed that rule transgression is a strategy developed by rural stakeholders to address the constraints imposed by the contract. The investigators point out that rural stakeholders are excluded from the commercial use of the forest without compensation. In the case of Ambatoloaka, we also observed such gaps; however, rural stakeholders did not have the same perceptions of the contract. The Gelose contract is not perceived as a constraint by the villagers even for agricultural land. Ambatoloaka villagers recognize the rights to manage (or to harvest) the forest they acquired through the Gelose contract. Moreover, the VOI association board extended its rights to authorize land clearing even it was not officially permitted by the contract. In contrast, with our study, the case studied by BlancPamard and Ramiarantsoa (2007) mentioned previously featured a contract that focused on forest conservation where only use rights were issued. This contract was implemented by a conservationist NGO (Conservation International). Such pitfalls in the implementation of the Gelose law often have been described in CBNRM projects. In the process of management devolution, projects devolve ‘‘only the authority to implement rules created elsewhere’’ (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). In Ambatoloaka, the local stakeholders signing the Gelose contract (i.e. the VOI association, the rural council, and the Forest Department) were more or less involved in the rule-making process. The extent of their involvement depended on the balance of power between local stakeholders and between local stakeholders and project technicians. For example, designating Ziziphus sp. as the only harvestable species was decided only by the project technicians, and inventories were performed without consulting Ambatoloaka villagers. However, there are substantial arguments in favor of
123
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893
recognizing that actors in the local space may be the more appropriate source of rule-making for a significant range of problems because of their specialized information about the local context and resources’’ (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). If local knowledge was integrated into the rulemaking process, it would help nuance overly homogeneous analyses of ecological habitats based on technical knowledge. In a study based on 53 cases, Nagendra and Ostrom (2011) show that the direct users of forests make an evaluation of the state of forest resources that is strongly correlated with data from scientific inventories. The significant financial means required for an accurate inventory explain why project technicians only provide approximate assessments of forest resources. Incorporating assessments by local users may be a good way to assess forest resources to assist management decision-making while at the same time decreasing the costs of such a process (Nagendra and Ostrom 2011). Based on these remarks, we suggest distinguishing two stages in forest management: the stage of management design, in which rules are defined, and the stage of management implementation, in which rules are implemented. If decreasing costs is an argument for forest-management devolution, involving local stakeholders from the first stages of management design would not only decrease management-implementation costs but also managementdesign costs. Moreover, soliciting and comparing the knowledge and point of views of all of the stakeholders involved in the Gelose contract during the managementdesign stage would help to develop a common ground on which to base their relations during the managementimplementation stage (Etienne 2011; Beuret 2006). This common basis would allow counter-powers to emerge in the play of local power dynamics and favor the adaptation of rules to the local context and to the various objectives of local stakeholders signing the Gelose contract.
Conclusion Analyzing opportunities and constraints for sustainable management by rural people is a relevant issue to move forward in the process of decentralisation of forest management. Management devolution requires monitoring and clear cooperation between the different contracting parties. This article shows that allowing rural stakeholders to harvest and sell charcoal was a first step to getting them involved in forest management. However, this involvement remained limited to the implementation stage of management, thus denying the villagers access to the design stage. Nonetheless, the villagers’ association (VOI) adapted the forest-management rules to the land-use history and to the density of species harvested for charcoal in the area. The
891
rules established by the Gelose contract, a forest-management contract, were focused on charcoal. Moreover, they were based on a homogeneous and static perception of ecosystems, species, and land use. The quota of Ziziphus sp. to harvest was based on inventories made in savannas as if this habitat were widespread in the entire charcoalmaking zone. However, dry forests, in which Ziziphus sp. is scarce, cover 80 % of this zone, and they are dominated by T. indica, the harvest of which was forbidden. In contrast, given that the technicians likely were aware that heterogeneity existed, the way rules were defined suggests that they were given little time to complete this task. Recognizing the diversity of forest uses, customary rights (especially concerning land tenure), various practices, and rural stakeholders’ knowledge of forest dynamics and their history would be a second step toward the improvement of management. The experience acquired through the implementation of the Gelose law should be exploited to develop more integrated and flexible management strategies, which would define an SES that can evolve more closely with the social and ecological dynamics influencing the effective management of forests. These strategies should be applied in a process-based approach because their success depends above all on the capacity-building ability of the stakeholders. Acknowledgments We thank Aure´lie Toillier for helpful comments on the first version of this manuscript and Grace Delobel and Emilie Coudel for their assistance in improving the English style. We also thank the four anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. This work was supported by the Gesforcom project funded by the European Union and by a scholarship from the Centre de Coope´ration Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le De´veloppement (CIRAD).
References Agrawal A, Gibson CC (1999) Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of community in natural resource conservation. World Dev 27(4):629–649 Andriatahiana M (2010) Diagnostic du fonctionnement de la fillie`re illicite de bois d’oeuvre dans la Commune Rurale de Didy, District d’Ambatondrazaka. Projet Cogesfor–Cirad/WWF/ L’homme et L’environnement, Antananarivo, Madagascar Aubert S (2002) Gestion patrimoniale des resources forestie`res a` Madagascar: Limites et perspectives d’une ‘‘re´volution par le haut.’’ In: Cormier Salem M-C, Juhe´ Beaulaton D, Boutrais J, Roussel B (eds) Patrimonialiser la nature tropicale: Dynamiques locales, enjeux internationaux. IRD, Paris, pp 101–124 Aubert S (2012) Les enjeux de la se´curisation du foncier forestier a` Madagascar: E´tat des lieux et perspectives. In: L’impact environnemental de la norme en milieu contraint: Exemples de droit colonial et analogies contemporaines. Victoires, Paris, pp 41–66 Becker LC (2001) Seeing green in Mali’s woods: colonial legacy, forest use, and local control. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 91(3): 504–526. doi:10.1111/0004-5608.00256 Bellefontaine R (1997) Synthe`se des espe`ces des domaines sahe´lien et soudanien qui se multiplient naturellement par voie ve´ge´tative.
123
892 In: D’Herbe`s JM, Ambouta JMK, Peltier R (eds) Fonctionnement et gestion des e´cosyste`mes forestiers contracte´s sahe´liens. J. Libbey Eurotext, Paris, pp 95–104 Berkes F, Folke C (1998) Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability. In: Berkes F, Folke C (eds) Linking social and ecological systems. Management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–25 Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2000) Rediscovery of traditional knowledge as adaptive management. Ecol Appl 10(5): 1251–1262 Bertrand A, Rabesahala Horning N, Montagne P (2009) Gestion communautaire ou pre´servation des ressources renouvelables: Histoire inacheve´e d’une e´volution majeure de la politique environnementale a` Madagascar. Vertigo 9(3):18 Beuret J-E (2006) Dialogue et concertation dans les re´serves de biosphe`re: Proble´matique et enjeux. In: Bouamrane M (ed) Biodiversite´ et acteurs: Des itine´raires de concertation. UNESCO, Paris, pp 8–21 Binggeli P (2003) Introduced and invasive plants. In: Goodman SM, Benstead JP (eds) The natural history of Madagascar. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 257–268 Blanc-Pamard C, Ramiarantsoa HR (2007) Normes environnementales, transferts de gestion et recompositions territoriales en pays betsileo (Madagascar): La gestion contractualisee des forets. Nat Sci Socie´te´s 15(3):253–268 Bloesch U (1999) Fire as a tool in the management of a savanna/dry forest reserve in Madagascar. Appl Veg Sci 2(1):117–124. doi:10.2307/1478888 Campese J (2009) Rights-based approaches to conservation: An overview of concepts and questions. In: Campese J, Sunderland T, Greiber T, Oviedo G (eds) Rights-based approaches Exploring issues and opportunities for conservation. CIFOR–IUCN, Bogor, pp 2–45 Collas de Chatelperron P (2007) L’e´tat des lieux du transfert de gestion a` fin 2003. In: Montagne P, Razanamaharo Z, Cooke A (eds) Le transfert de gestion a` Madagascar, dix ans d’efforts: Tanteza (tantanana mba hateza: Gestion durable). Cirad, Antananarivo, pp 47–54 Corson C (2011) From rhetoric to practice: How high-profile politics impeded community consultation in Madagascar’s new protected areas. Soc Nat Res:1–16. doi:10.1080/08941920.2011.565454 Crozier M, Friedberg E (1977) L’acteur et le syste`me. Les contraintes de l’action collective. du Seuil, Paris Dressler W, Bu¨scher B, Schoon M, Brockington D, Hayes T, Kull CA et al (2010) From hope to crisis and back again? A critical history of the global CBNRM narrative. Environ Conserv 37(1):5–15. doi:10.1017/S0376892910000044 Etienne M (ed) (2011) Companion modelling. A participatory approach supporting sustainable development. Update sciences et technologies. Quae, Versailles, France Gallopı´n GC (1994) Empoverishment and sustainable development. A systems approach. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg Gallopı´n GC, Funtowicz S, O’Connor M, Ravetz J (2001) Science for the twenty-first century: from social contract to the scientific core. Int Soc Sci J 53(2):219 Gautier D, Hautdidier B, Gazull L (2011) Woodcutting and territorial claims in Mali. Geoforum 42(1):28–39 Goedefroit S (2006) La restitution du droit a` la parole. Etudes Rurales 178:39–64 Karpe P (2006) L’indispensable restructuration du droit environnemental malgache. Etudes Rurales 178:113–128 Karsenty A (2008) Des communaute´s locales proble´matiques. In: La gestion concerte´e des ressources naturelles: L’e´preuve du temps. Karthala, Paris, pp 277–287
123
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893 Kull CA (2002) Empowering pyromaniacs in Madagascar: ideology and legitimacy in community-based natural resource management. Dev Change 33(1):57–78 Larson AM (2005) Democratic decentralization in the forestry sector: Lessons Learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Earthscan, London Larson A, Ribot J (2007) The poverty of forestry policy: double standards on an uneven playing field. Sustain Sci 2(2):189–204 Leach M, Mearns R, Scoones I (1999) Environmental entitlements: dynamics and institutions in community-based natural resource management. World Dev 27(2):225–247 Lele S, Wilshusen P, Brockington D, Seidler R, Bawa K (2010) Beyond exclusion: alternative approaches to biodiversity conservation in the developing tropics. Curr Opin Environ Sustain 2(1–2):94–100. doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2010.03.006 Mahajanga DREF (2003) Antonta-taratasy mikasika famindrampitantanana loharanon-karena voajanahary mety havaozina amin’ny vondron’olona ifontony Mamelonarivo Ao. Ambatoloaka, Madagascar Mahajanga DREF (2005) Antonta-taratasy tovana mikasika ny famokarana arina ao amin’ny sehatry ny famindram-pitantanana ny loharanon-karena voajanahary azo havaozina hoan’ny vondron’olona ifontony ‘‘Mamelonarivo’’ Ao. Ambatoloaka, Madagascar, O8/05/MINENVEF/DIREEF04/CIREEF404 Mahajanga DREF (2007) ARINA. Arina Raitra Ifontoran’ny aramaso. Antonta-taratasy mikasika ny famindram-pitantanana ny loharanon-karena voajanahary azo havaozina hoan’ny vondron’olona ifontony ‘‘Mamelonarivo’’ Ao. Ambatoloaka, Madagascar, 12/07/MINENVEF/DIREEF04/CIREEF404 Maldidier C (2001) La de´centralisation de la gestion des ressources renouvelables a` Madagascar. Les premiers enseignements sur les processus en cours et les me´thodes d’intervention. Madagascar Marie C, Sibelet N, Dulcire M, Rafalimaro M, Danthu P, Carrie`re S (2009) Taking into account local practices and indigenous knowledge in an emergency conservation context in Madagascar. Biodivers Conserv 18(10):2759–2777. doi:10.1007/s10531009-9672-9 Michon G, Foresta H, Levang P, Verdeaux F (2007) Domestic forests: a new paradigm for integrating local communities ‘ forestry into tropical forest science. Ecol Soc 12(2):24 Montagne P (2006) Inte´gration « bois-e´nergie/raphia » dans huit contrats de transfert de gestion de la commune d’Ambondromamy et fonctionnement de la filie`re raphia entre les provinces de Mahajanga et d’Antananarivo. Cirad-Fofifa-Mem-Pedm-Diref, Antananarivo Montagne P, Rakotondrainibe P (2007) Les politiques forestie`res et environnementales: Bre`ve revue historique. In: Montagne P, Razanamaharo Z, Cooke A (eds) Le transfert de gestion a` Madagascar, dix ans d’efforts: Tanteza (tantanana mba hateza: Gestion durable). Cirad, Montpellier, pp 39–46 Montagne P, Andriatsimisetra D, Razafimahatratra S (2010a) Dans la re´gion Boeny: Du PEDM a` CARAMCODEC, dix ans d’efforts pour la mise en place d’un approvisionnement durable en bois e´nergie de la ville de Mahajanga. In: Montagne P, Razafimahatratra S, Rasamindisa A, Crehay R (eds) Arina, le charbon de bois a` Madagascar: Entre demande urbaine et gestion durable. CITE, Antananarivo, pp 63–77 Montagne P, Razafimahatratra S, Rasamindisa A, Crehay R (2010b) Arina, le charbon de bois a` Madagascar: Entre demande urbaine et gestion durable. CITE, Antananarivo Muttenzer F (2006) De´forestation et droit coutumier a` Madagascar. L’historicite´ d’une politique foncie`re. Universite´ de Gene`ve. Faculte´ des Sciences E´conomiques et Sociales, Gene`ve Nagendra H, Gokhale Y (2008) Management regimes, property rights, and forest biodiversity in Nepal and India. Environ Manag 41(5):719–733. doi:10.1007/s00267-008-9073-y
Environmental Management (2013) 52:877–893 Nagendra H, Ostrom E (2011) The challenge of forest diagnostics. Ecol Soc 16(2):20 Ostrom E (2009) A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science 325(5939):419–422 Pollini J (2011) The difficult reconciliation of conservation and development objectives: the case of the Malagasy environmental action plan. Human Organ 70(1):74–87 Pollini J, Lassoie JP (2011) Trapping farmer communities within global environmental regimes: the case of the GELOSE legislation in Madagascar. Soc Nat Res 24(8):814–830. doi:10.1080/ 08941921003782218 Porter-Bolland L, Ellis EA, Guariguata MR, Ruiz-Mallen I, NegreteYankelevich S, Reyes-Garcia V (2012) Community managed forests and forest protected areas: an assessment of their conservation effectiveness across the tropics. Forest Ecol Manag 268:6–17 Razafimahatratra S, Andriamahady H, Razanavahy A (2010) Transfert de gestion bois e´nergie: Processus, de´veloppement, re´sultats et suivi-accompagnement. In: Montagne P, Razafimahatratra S, Rasamindisa A, Crehay R (eds) Arina, le charbon de bois a` Madagascar: Entre demande urbaine et gestion durable. CITECirad, Antananarivo, pp 101–117 Razafindrianilana N (1999) Evaluation de la quantite´ et de la production annuelle de bois e´nergie des trois bassins d’approvisionnement
893 urbain de Mahajanga. Programme Pilote Inte´gre´ de Mahajanga (PPIM), Antananarivo, Madagascar Rives F, Antona M, Aubert S (2012) Social-ecological functions and vulnerability framework to analyze forest policy reforms. Ecol Soc 17(4). doi:10.5751/es-05182-170421 Roth R (2004) Spatial organization of environmental knowledge: Conservation conflicts in the inhabited forest of northern Thailand. Ecol Soc 9(3):5 Sibelet N, Mutel M (2013) Module 2 selecting the survey method and preparing the semi-structured interview: From hypotheses to variables to investigate. In: Sibelet N, Mutel M, Arragon P, Luye M (eds) Qualitative survey methods applied to natural resource management. Available at: https://enquetes-cirad.iamm.fr/ course/view.php?id=3. Accessed 14 Aug 2013 Toillier A, Lardon S (2009) Farmers’ adaptation capacities in the eastern rainforest of Madagascar: From forest-clearers to environmental managers. Outlook Agric 38:119–126 Wardell DA, Lund C (2006) Governing access to forests in northern Ghana: micro-politics and the rents of non-enforcement. World Dev 34(11):1887–1906 Weber J (1994) L’occupation humaine des aires prote´ge´es a` Madagascar. Diagnostic et e´le´ments pour une gestion viable: Colloque international ‘‘Occupation humaine des aires prote´ge´es’’ Mahajunga, November 12–25. CIRAD-GREEN, Montpellier
123
