From Management to Negotiation: Technical and ... - Springer Link

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 DOI 10.1007/s00267-009-9349-x

From Management to Negotiation: Technical and Institutional Innovations for Integrated Water Resource Management in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin, Burkina Faso Carla Roncoli Æ Paul Kirshen Æ Derek Etkin Æ Moussa Sanon Æ Leópold Some´ Æ Youssouf Dembe´le´ Æ Bienvenue J. Sanfo Æ Jacqueline Zoungrana Æ Gerrit Hoogenboom

Received: 5 May 2008 / Accepted: 28 June 2009 / Published online: 26 August 2009 Ó Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract This study focuses on the potential role of technical and institutional innovations for improving water management in a multi-user context in Burkina Faso. We focus on a system centered on three reservoirs that capture the waters of the Upper Comoe´ River Basin and servicing a diversity of users, including a sugar manufacturing company, a urban water supply utility, a farmer cooperative, and other downstream users. Due to variable and declining rainfall and expanding users’ needs, drastic fluctuations in water supply and demand occur during each dry season. A decision support tool was developed through participatory research to enable users to assess the impact of alternative release and diversion schedules on deficits faced by each user. The tool is meant to be applied in the context of C. Roncoli (&) G. Hoogenboom Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering, University of Georgia, 1107 Experiment Street, Griffin, Georgia 30223-1797, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] P. Kirshen Battelle Memorial Institute, Lexington, MA 02421, USA D. Etkin Camp Dresser McKee (CDM), One Cambridge Place, 50 Hampshire Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA M. Sanon L. Some´ Y. Dembe´le´ Institut de l’Environnement et des Recherches Agricoles 01, 01 BP 7192, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso B. J. Sanfo Direction de la Me´teórologie, 01 BP 57601, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso J. Zoungrana Direction Geńe´rale des Ressources en Eau, 01 BP 7025, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

consultative planning by a local user committee that has been created by a new national integrated water management policy. We contend that both solid science and good governance are instrumental in realizing efficient and equitable water management and adaptation to climate variability and change. But, while modeling tools and negotiation platforms may assist users in managing climate risk, they also introduce additional uncertainties into the deliberative process. It is therefore imperative to understand how these technological and institutional innovations frame water use issues and decisions to ensure that such framing is consistent with the goals of integrated water resource management. Keywords Irrigated agriculture Adaptive management Climate variability and change Decision support systems Water policy Participatory research Burkina Faso

Introduction Climate change is expected to exacerbate fluctuations in water resource availability, and, therefore, competition and conflict over water, particularly in dryland Africa (Boko and others 2007; Kundzewicz and others 2007; Muller 2009). The spatial scales and temporal frames of climate variability and change impacts challenge the ability of decision makers to incorporate lessons derived from personal experience and empirical observation into adaptive management solutions. Simulation modeling and other decision support tools can enable decision makers to learn and adapt by testing how different management alternatives may perform in given climate and resource availability scenarios (Tsuji and others 1998; Hoogenboom 2000). But the ability of these tools to represent the

123

696

complexities of systems to be managed and of behavioral responses to climate risk is limited. A growing body of empirical research shows that socio-institutional factors often interact with climatic and environmental conditions in shaping adaptation options and choices (Shepherd and others 2006; Eakin and others 2007; Broad and others 2007; Ramsey 2009). This recognition has led to increasing efforts to implicate ‘‘users’’ in the development of decision support tools in order to ensure that they produce realistic and relevant information (Cabrera and others 2008; Breuer and others 2008; Crane and others 2008). Previously an exclusively scientific endeavor, modeling is now being integrated with participatory approaches to facilitate scientist-stakeholder dialogue and negotiated responses (Meinke and others 2001; Nelson and others 2002). Simulation models are used in interactive settings not only to forecast outcomes but also to elicit and explore implicit assumptions that participants have and that may affect their awareness and evaluation of different options. Social learning, based on experimentation, deliberation, reflection, and adjustment, has become a centerpiece of integrated water resource management, replacing previous ‘‘command and control’’ systems (Lal and others 2001; Pahl-Wostl and others 2007; Berkes 2009). Decision support tools can catalyze this process by fostering a shared understanding of problems, solutions, and trade-offs and by promoting transparency, thereby contributing to social capital and consensus building (Hare and others 2006; Mostert 2006; McCartney 2007; Garcia-Barrios and others 2008; Giupponi and others 2008; Kirshen and Cardwell 2008; Langsdale and others in press). However, the experience of twenty years of participatory research and development has shown that the ability of social actors to engage in consultative processes varies a great deal, based on differences in culture, language, education, politics, and other social variables (Nelson and Wright 1996; Guijt and Kaul Shah 1998; Peters 2000; Brock and McGee 2002; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). As for other forms of social participation, groups and individuals are unevenly equipped to use decision support tools and to engage in ‘‘stakeholder interactions’’ centered on them (Taddei 2005; Broad and others 2007; Lemos 2009; Roncoli and others 2009). This is particularly the case when those tools are based on scientific analyses and computer applications, and even more so when stakeholders include rural communities of developing countries. It is now widely recognized that decision support systems for adaptive management must incorporate institutional mechanisms that provide all players with opportunities to participate, to understand the options, express their opinions, and influence the outcomes (Wester and others 2003; Lemos and Farias de Oliveira 2005; Marcus 2007; Brugnach and Pahl-Wostl 2008). Without such safeguards,

123

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

socially disadvantaged groups are likely to find their interests disregarded or overruled by the most powerful stakeholders. Given its fluid nature and multiple functionalities water is subject to overlapping claims by different groups (Roth and others 2005; Orlove and Caton 2009; Whiteley and others 2009). In rural African communities, water and other natural resources are often managed according to common property regimes or customary tenure systems, which have varying degrees of formalization and recognition by the totality of users and by external actors (Meinzen-Dick and Bruns 2000; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005). Legal systems imposed by colonial administrations and post-colonial states add another layer of complexity to this framework, resulting in contradicting policies, overlapping jurisdictions, inconsistent implementation, and erratic enforcement. Development interventions, such as dams and irrigation schemes, have introduced further regulations and restrictions, increasing the ambiguities surrounding land and water rights (van Koppen 2000; Faure´ 1996, 2003; Bethemont and others 2003; Van der Schaaf 2006). Newly established decentralized and pluralistic models of environmental governance, based on partnerships of state, private sector, and local communities, are opening up opportunities for citizen participation, but also shifting responsibilities without devolving authority and resources (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Wester and others 2003; Lemos and Farias de Oliveira 2005; Lemos and Agrawal 2007; Marcus and Onjala 2008). Coupled with the economic insecurity and political instability experienced by many African communities and with the uncertainties associated with climate variability and change, these ambiguities translate into increasing levels of livelihood vulnerability and resource conflict (Larson and Ribot 2005). The extensive research and operational efforts needed to develop DSTs for climate adaptation and water resource management must, therefore, be complemented by an equally thorough analysis of the social and institutional system in which such tools are to be introduced. This paper aims to do so by examining the potential synergies of technical and institutional innovations for integrated water resource management in a context characterized by a multiplicity of users and shifting policy frameworks. In particular, we explore the implications of interactive decision support tool and participatory planning processes for efficiency and equity of water use. After describing the background and the methodology for the study, we introduce a decision support tool that has been developed by our project and policy development that are affecting water management in the study site. We then identify the main stakeholders and elucidate their water demands, their institutional linkages, and their specific position in the system. The discussion section examines how the innovations in question


articulate with local realities in framing stakeholders’ understanding of the decision situation, inquiring to what extent such framing allows for more adaptive and equitable management of water resources.

Research Setting The study area is located in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin, one of the few permanent rivers of Burkina Faso (Fig. 1). The river originates in the Kenedougou Province and flows through the Comoe´ Province before flowing southward to cross Coˆte d’Ivoire and ending in the Gulf of Guinea. The site was selected because prior research indicated that the area is experiencing a significant decline in quantity and quality of its water resources and growing social tensions centered on water use (Painter and Sanou 1996). The water management system in question comprises three reservoirs that are used primarily for irrigation: Lobi, Toussiana, and Moussoudougou, built respectively in 1976, 1982, and 1991 (Fig. 2). Moussoudougou is the largest (with a total capacity of 38 million m3), while Lobi and Toussiana hold about 6 million m3 each. Lobi, however, is generally filled only to 4 million m3 because of the weakened state of its infrastructure. The system captures the waters of the Upper Comoe´ River Basin, feeding them into a system of pipelines that operates entirely by gravity, exploiting the natural slope in the territory (Fig. 3). The infrastructure is owned and managed by the Societe´ Sucrie`re de la Comoe´ (SOSUCO), a sugar company based

697

in Be´re´gadougou, near the town of Banfora. SOSUCO controls how much water is released from the reservoirs and into the system. Water is released from the Moussoudougou and Lobi reservoirs to serve the SOSUCO sugar cane fields and its sugar and industrial alcohol manufacturing facilities as well as the Office National de l’Eau et de l’Assainissement (ONEA), a public utility that provides piped water to the town of Banfora. A legally mandated minimum flow for environmental services (de´bit sanitaire) of 150 l/s is released into the Comoe´ after the main SOSUCO diversion; this streamflow also services an irrigated perimeter managed by the Union des Coope´ratives des E´xploitants de la Plaine Ameńageé de Karfiguela (UCEPAK) and a rapidly growing number of irrigated plots along the riverbanks. Water from the Toussiana reservoir irrigates the eastern side of the SOSUCO plantation and other farmers’ fields located downstream, and the return flow being captured into the Yannon River, a tributary which joins the Comoe´ south of Banfora. In addition to reservoir releases, the Comoe´ receives water from a network of seasonal streams and overflow from wetlands and water bodies, such as the Karfiguela, Tengre´la`, and Lemouroudougou lakes. The system’s water resources are replenished by annual precipitation, most of which falls during a single rainy season, from early May to late October. While the Southwest is the wettest part of the country (with a mean annual rainfall of 1087 mm for the period between 1954 and 2007), the area is experiencing an overall decline in annual rainfall and an increase in inter-annual variability, as is the

Fig. 1 Location of study area

123

698


Fig. 2 Study area, upper Comoe´ river basin

Fig. 3 Schematic of water management system

rest of the Sudan-Sahel region (Boko and others 2007) (Fig. 4). Climate variability and change, coupled with the expansion in population, irrigated acreages, and other

123

water uses, has resulted in a mismatch between users’ needs and available water resources. This is exemplified in Fig. 5, which compares dekadal (10-day) estimates of total


699

Fig. 4 Total annual precipitation, Banfora station (1954–2007)

reservoir inflows and precipitation volumes for an average flow year (1974) with total basin demands for each dekadal.1 During the year rainfall and flows fluctuate in ways that are not in synchrony with the demands, hence the need for the reservoirs. The problem is aggravated by the interannual variability in inflows, which range between 57.73 million m3 in the lowest rainfall year (1972) and 171 million m3 in the highest rainfall year (1966) in the unregulated streamflow data series before construction of the dams. The major challenge for SOSUCO reservoir managers is to release water during the course of the dry season without knowing when the new rainy season will begin or what amount of precipitation it will bring. Presently, operators make management decisions conservatively to minimize potential deficits later in the year. This means that downstream water shortages are experienced even after years of good rainfall, as was the case in March and April 2007 when, despite above average precipitation (1,301 mm) during the previous rainy season, the river bed downstream from the Karfiguela diversion was completely dry. Enraged farmers marched on the local government offices and the Minister of Finance, a politician native to the area, had to 1

Lacking historic gage data, historic reservoir inflows were estimated from a gage downstream of the reservoir system at Diabarakoko and factored by the respective drainage areas. Estimates are only available for those years prior to construction of the reservoirs, when streamflow was unaltered by reservoir operations. Analogue years for hydrologic conditions therefore were selected from the period between 1962 and 1976, corresponding to the available unregulated watershed streamflow data.

be dispatched to Banfora to assuage the protest. In reporting these events, the national press referred to water management in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin as a ‘‘real problem,’’ highlighting a number of causal factors, including infrastructural decay, environmental degradation, and lack of predictive information to guide reservoir management decisions (Ouattara 2007).

Research Methods This study sought to address this knowledge gap by developing a decision support tool (DST) to assess the impacts of alternative water management decisions in different climatic and hydrological conditions, including precipitation, reservoir inflows, evaporation, and unregulated flows into the river from streams (Fig. 6). The DST consists of a model that simulates reservoir releases and diversions for 10-day periods for an entire year starting with a selected date. The tool allows users to determine, by trial and error, when and how much water needs to be released into the system and diverted to users so that each user’s demands are met to an acceptable degree. Standard scenarios for low, high, and average rainfall years are built into the model, enabling users to identify a water management schedule that best fits with actual and anticipated climatic conditions. This will allow users to minimize the risk of severe deficits at times when crops are most vulnerable as well as devise ways of minimizing impacts of those deficits that cannot be prevented.

123

700


Fig. 5 Total basin hydrologic inputs for a typical year and demand estimates

Fig. 6 Decision support tool schematic

Because the DST examines the allocation of water among users as well as use over time, it is also expected to facilitate joint planning in the face of drought conditions and/or changing demands. In its effort to successfully respond to users’ needs, the project embraced an iterative, interactive approach, based on participatory research and direct involvement by users in tool development. Two fieldwork periods were conducted in January 2007 and in January 2009 to understand the water management system, to identify user groups, their water demands and decision processes, and to collect the data necessary to feed the model. In total, 24 farmers and 20 representatives of public agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private sector enterprises, and an environmental lawyer specializing in water policy were interviewed. Focus group interviews (ranging in size

123

between 3 and 16 participants) were carried out with members of 3 farmer cooperatives and other user groups (riparian farmers, pastoralists, and fishermen). In addition to these interviews, 4 consultative workshops with representatives of user groups and other stakeholders were held. These included a first meeting in the capital city, Ouagadougou, in June 2007, to present the idea to technical personnel; a workshop in Banfora in January 2008 to elicit users’ feedback on a first draft of the tool; and 2 workshops in Ouagadougou and in Banfora in January 2009 to introduce a completed version of the DST, to solicit comments for fine-tuning, and to train users in its operation. An assessment of actual uses and impacts of the DST was not feasible because the project’s limited scope, time frame, and resources only covered tool development and because the institutional framework in which the DST is to be used


was just emerging at the time of fieldwork, prompted by new policy reforms described below.

Policy Context of Water Resource Use The field assessment revealed that water resources in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin are subject to a multitude of uses and claims by a diverse set of users, with unequal clout and degree of recognition by local stakeholders and external actors. Relationships among these user groups and their abilities to benefit from the proposed DST are shaped by multiple factors, including the policy environment. Two recent legislative initiatives are especially relevant to access and use of natural resources, namely the decentralization of local governance and the integrated water resource management plan (Plan pour la Gestion Inte´greé des Ressources en Eau, known as PAGIRE), passed respectively in 2001 and 2003 and are currently under implementation (Garane´ 2007). The decentralization establishes Rural Communes and elected Commune Councils modeled upon the already existing Urban Communes, entrusting them with some local government functions. The PAGIRE mandates the creation of local water management committees (Comite´s Locaux de l’Eau, known as CLE) to bring together all participants in a water management system in a consultative setting. The territorial jurisdiction of the Upper Comoe´ River Basin CLE covers one Urban Commune (Banfora) and four Rural Communes (Be´re´gadougou, Moussoudougou, Toussiana, and Samogohiri, the latter in the Kenedougou Province where the Comoe´ originates). The President of the Regional Council (which includes representatives of each Commune in the Region) chairs the CLE, while the Vice Presidency is covered by the Chambre Re´gionale d’Agriculture, an organization representing farmers’ interests at regional level. The Mayors of the 5 Communes are charged with the task of mobilizing CLE members for meetings and activities. Besides the Mayors, the CLE membership includes Regional Directors of line ministries, agricultural and natural resource management projects, civil society organizations (women’s groups, local NGOs), customary and religious authorities, economic enterprises, and user groups. The breadth and diversity of the CLE general membership reflects the PAGIRE’s emphasis on participatory approaches, but this inclusivity and involvement by political leaders and government authorities limits the viability of the CLE as a consultative body. At the time of writing, the Upper Comoe´ CLE had been able to hold only one general meeting, in early January 2009, with most of the debate being centered on how to mobilize the necessary resources for its functioning (according to the PAGIRE, the CLE are supposed to be self-sustaining).

701

Most discussions and deliberations, in fact, take place within a smaller Technical Committee, composed of 14 members, including the CLE leadership, the Mayors of Banfora, Be´re´gadougou, and Toussiana, the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment, and Infrastructure, the main users (SOSUCO, ONEA, and UCEPAK), and a few civil society organizations, such as the Association Eau De´ve´loppement et Environnement (AEDE), a local NGO that specializes in water resource management issues (its representative, a former SOSUCO engineer, serves as the CLE’s Secretary). As its first activity, the Committee prepared an assessment of users’ needs, finding demands to exceed supplies by approximately 5 million m3, a deficit corresponding to the amount of water needed to grow 180 ha of rice, 450 ha of vegetables, or 570 ha of sugar cane (AEDE 2008). The report does not propose how to address this gap, but Committee members expressed the hope that a widespread, prolonged rain (of 30–40 mm) over the reservoirs’ catchment and areas early in the season and the contribution of from the Comoe´ own source (estimated at an average of about 150 l/s) may help reduce the deficit. The report also proposes a reservoir release schedule, which was approved by general acclamation during the January 2009 meeting. However, it must be noted that the CLE is legally defined as a mechanism for ‘‘consultation, mobilization, and promotion’’ rather than as a decision-making body with enforcement prerogatives. To what extent the CLE can push for implementation of the agreed-upon schedule will depend on its ability to ensure SOSUCO’s cooperation and to raise the necessary resources for monitoring operations. But the desire to be perceived as a good corporate citizen and to avoid politically embarrassing social mobilization, such as the events of April 2007, could induce the company to comply, particularly in years of abundant rainfall. Providing a platform for negotiation and compromise among a multitude of users and needs is, in fact, the CLE’s mandate.

Water Users of the Upper Comoe´ River Basin In order to understand the interactions and implications of these institutional and technical innovations for deliberations and negotiations surrounding water use, it is essential to identify each user group in terms of their position in the water management system and in the related institutional context. Societe´ Sucrie`re de la Comoe´ (SOSUCO) SOSUCO was created with French capital in 1965 by a land concession by the newly independent state of Haute Volta (now called Burkina Faso), which enabled it to

123

702

expropriate village land to establish its irrigated perimeters, a loss that still troubles the relationship between the company and those communities. In the 1970s, the shareholding majority was transferred to the state, which financed the construction of the reservoirs and infrastructure. SOSUCO operated as a parastatal until 1998, when, according to the neoliberal policies embraced by the government, which favor privatization, the company was put up for sale. It was acquired by Industrial Promotion Services (IPS), an investment firm controlled by the Aga Khan, the Pakistani millionaire who is the spiritual leader of the Ismaili’ sect of Shia Muslims. IPS has been heavily investing in African enterprises as a way to promote economic development, buying several former state enterprises in Burkina Faso, including a cotton production and processing enterprise (FasoCoton), a plastic manufacturing industry (FasoPlast), and the national airline (Air Burkina). With a labor force of 2000 permanent staff and thousands of seasonal workers (and an estimated indirect employment effect of 40,000), SOSUCO is the second largest employer after the state in Burkina Faso, one of the poorest countries in the world where formal employment opportunities are few. The company’s role as a major employer in the area, coupled with the Aga Khan’s economic importance and his authority as a world leader of Islam, in a country where half of the population is Muslim, makes SOSUCO an extremely powerful actor on both the local and the national scene. The Aga Khan’s particular investment philosophy and commitment to development goals, rather than mere economic profitability, has also enabled SOSUCO to stay afloat despite severe financial problems that have plagued the company. These problems are partly attributed to a history of mismanagement when the company was a parastatal as well as to recent increases in the cost of petrol, inputs, and other materials. In January–February 2008 the situation became critical as a few powerful and politically connected businessmen illegally imported and flooded the market with cheaper sugar, leaving SOSUCO with a glut of unsold stocks, even thought its total production of about 30,000 tons per year does not meet the national demand, estimated at about 90,000 tons per year (Ouattara 2008). This crisis led to mounting anxiety among employees about the fate of the company and of their jobs, which erupted in widespread demonstrations in Be´re´gadougou in April 2008 (Traore´ 2009). SOSUCO’s ability to thrive financially and expand spatially is limited by plant capacity and land availability. SOSUCO currently operates about 4000 ha of irrigated fields, planted with sugar cane. The rest of the company’s land holdings (about 6000 ha) are non-irrigable or nonarable, including hills and rocky outcrops. Since growing cane at a distance greater than 25 km from the plant would

123


not be profitable, SOSUCO has tried to convince farmers in the surrounding areas to grow sugar cane on a contract basis. But farmers have been reluctant, suspecting that the company would eventually take over their land as it has done in the past, though this option is no longer politically feasible as Burkina Faso seeks to promote its image as a democratic country in relation to the international community. Given these obstacles to expansion, improving agricultural productivity is critical to SOSUCO’s economic viability. This will require, among other things, attaining greater efficiency in water management, as the company is often unable to satisfy all of its irrigation demands, due to insufficient supply in the water management system. To cope with water shortages, irrigation managers may decide to apply only 60% to 80% of the water requirements to older (3–5 year), less productive sugar cane fields, which results in lower yields. Productivity gains will partly depend on technological improvements: most of the SOSUCO sugar cane fields are irrigated by central pivots, which are estimated to have a 90% efficiency rate, but about 600 ha are irrigated by sprinklers that have at least a 35% loss rate. The company is planning to replace the latter with drip irrigation, although its high cost limits its ability to expand the system to the entire perimeter. Therefore, water resource management tools, such as those introduced by this project, can contribute to SOSUCO’s efforts to improve irrigation efficiency. This gain can make more water available for the company to increase its own productivity as well as to release to other users. Office Nationale de l’Eau et de l’Assainissement (ONEA) ONEA is a state owned utility under the tutelage of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Fisheries, which functions as a private enterprise under an agreement that grants it management autonomy but requires it to be financially solvent without state subsidy. The company supplies piped water to urban consumers in Burkina Faso, including the town of Banfora (population 63,300), while the Ministry of Agriculture has the mandate of providing water to rural populations. Urban use is metered and fees are charged according to a graduated fee scale based on consumption levels. ONEA receives water from one of two pipelines that capture water from the Moussoudougou and Lobi reservoirs (Fig. 3). SOSUCO currently provides ONEA with a flow of 200 l/s, an amount that far exceeds ONEA’s annual demand, estimated at 934,257 m3 (an average of 30 l/s) for 2008 (AEDE 2008). But needs are expected to increase in the future due to the growth in urban population and the planned expansion of piped water to Be´re´gadougou, an


initiative promised by the Minister of Agriculture during a recent electoral campaign visit. To prepare for expanded demand, ONEA has recently installed a new pipeline with 350 l/s capacity. Legally ONEA has priority in the water allocation from the reservoirs, but in practice, ONEA’s water demands are so small compared to those of SOSUCO that they are easily met. Actually, since urban demand fluctuates seasonally, ONEA does not always use all the water that it receives, which occasionally causes pressure problems in the piping network. Banfora residents do not usually suffer water shortages, except for occasional interruptions in the water flow when SOSUCO has to repair parts of the system. The fact that the company’s managerial and professional staff resides in company-owned housing in town also helps ensure a reliable water supply to Banfora. While there are no major conflicts between SOSUCO and ONEA over water allocation, a major confrontation did recently occur when ONEA tried to introduce a metering system to measure and charge for water consumption at the SOSUCO processing plant (which uses an estimated 2 million m3 per year), as it does for other industrial plants in Banfora. The initiative was met with strong resistance by SOSUCO, so much so that the regional government authorities had to intervene and to convince ONEA to desist from its plan. The Karfiguela Farmer Union UCEPAK, the largest organized group operating downstream of the SOSUCO system, is technically an umbrella organization composed of 5 cooperatives. The initial 75 ha were developed in 1975 with assistance from the government of Taiwan, and expanded the following year to the current perimeter of 350 ha by Chinese foreign aid. UCEPAK includes 713 farmers from 7 villages which are included, because of their proximity, within the Urban Commune of Banfora. The irrigated perimeter extends over the territory of the two dominant villages, Karfiguela and Tengre´la`. The former claims the Presidency, being the original site where the irrigated perimeter was established; the latter has the most members and political clout as the home village of two national politicians. Most of the residents of the villages included in UCEPAK belong to the Karaboro and Goin ethnic groups, which have inhabited the area since the 18th century (Oue´draogo 1997). In this area women have traditionally been involved in rice production in the wetlands, while men cultivated upland fields. The development of irrigated schemes by government and development projects, such as the UCEPAK perimeter, deprived women of their land use rights, as men took control of irrigated land (van Koppen 2000). In addition, women’s work burden increased,

703

because they are now obliged to work in men’s irrigated plots, in addition to their own fields. Currently only 18% of UCEPAK members are women: some of them obtained plots through matrilineal inheritance, which is practiced among the Karaboro, while others did so during the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara in the mid-1980s, which strongly promoted women’s emancipation. The Karfiguela plain lies downstream from the main valve whereby SOSUCO controls the level of water in the river. From the river, water is diverted to the primary canal through a gate that is operated by a technician paid by UCEPAK. This canal releases water into 4 secondary canals, which divide the territory into 5 sectors (farmers in each sector constitute a cooperative within UCEPAK). Water is then distributed from secondary canals to 36 tertiary and 170 quaternary canals. The perimeter is divided into plots ranging in size between 0.25 ha and 0.75 ha and allocated to 713 members, some of whom have multiple plots inherited from relatives or acquired directly from UCEPAK. Currently there is no more land available for further allocation unless a member leaves or loses his/her plot. UCEPAK can take plots away and reallocate them if owners fail to cultivate them for two consecutive seasons, refuse to participate in collective work, not properly maintain the adjacent canals, or block the gates or canals to divert water to their plots. Within the perimeter, plots differ in terms of land quality and water accessibility, and this variability affects the options available to each farmer. Soils quality in different sectors varies, ranging between sandy and loamy, which suit different crops. Most of the plots along the Comoe´ River have sandy soils and are typically planted with vegetables, while rice is always grown in the low-lying areas. Some fields around the Karfiguela lake are easily flooded and cannot be exploited during the rainy season. Other plots barely receive any water because of distance, elevation, or poor state of infrastructure so that they can only be planted with maize or cassava, which require less water. Having multiple plots in different sectors and locations enables farmers to exploit these variations to their benefit. Proximity to a road is also an advantage, facilitating the marketing of produce. Of 11 members interviewed in January 2007, five had one plot, four had two plots, and three had three plots with some cultivating over 1 ha of irrigated land. Farmers complain that the construction of the SOSUCO reservoirs, particularly that of Moussoudougou, and the deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure have greatly reduced the availability of water in the system. To remedy the problem, in the late 1990s, UCEPAK decided to restrict the area cultivated each dry season, alternating irrigation among sectors. According to the plan, one half of the perimeter receives water during one dry season, and the other half does so during the following dry season. During

123

704

their ‘‘on’’ season, farmers receive water every other day and grow rice, while the others get water once a week, which, in some of the areas in the perimeter, is sufficient to grow maize or vegetables. Of 11 farmers interviewed, over half (54%) did so, while about one third (36.4%) left their plots uncultivated. Farmers who are unable to grow any crops during their ‘‘off’’ season engage in off-farm activities or work in the SOSUCO sugar cane fields. During the rainy season, plots are only irrigated during prolonged dry spells, and most farmers grow rice or maize because vegetables are more susceptible to pests and disease. Rice is preferred to maize because it obtains better prices and is more productive per unit of land (average rice yields are 3.5 tons/ha versus 2.5 tons/ha for maize). Even though they are perishable, vegetables have the advantage of providing farmers with small but frequent revenues unlike income from rice or maize which is realized all at once after harvest. Vegetables, however, fetch low prices because the area produces more than the urban market of Banfora can absorb and transport to distant markets is costly. During the 2008 dry season, 65.6 % of the perimeter was planted with rice and 22.9% with vegetables, while during the rainy season, it was mostly (92.4%) planted with rice. Cumulative production for 2008 was 1840 tons of rice, 1132 tons of vegetables, 88 tons of maize, 52 tons of cassava, 3.40 tons of peanut, and 0.25 tons of cowpeas. The water that reaches the Karfiguela diversion is part of the water that flows from the Moussoudougou and Lobi reservoirs and that is released into the Comoe´ River after the SOSUCO main diversion. This flow, calculated at 150 l/s, is to serve all downstream users in addition to maintaining the environmental services flow in the Comoe´. Often, however, the flow that reaches UCEPAK is considerably diminished as riparian farmers upstream of the Karfiguela diversion withdraw water for their own plots. When water levels in the river are too low, UCEPAK has been petitioning SOSUCO through the agricultural extension service to release more water into the river, and their requests have been usually met, within limits set by the available water supply and SOSUCO’s own needs. The CLE (and the DST) are meant to replace this ad-hoc approach with more systematic consensual planning. Technical Committee’s need assessment for the 2009 season provides for the exploitation of the entire UCEPAK perimeter and estimates water demand at 570 l/s in December, 900 l/s in February, and about 700 l/s until mid-April (for a total of 8,407,584 m3, compared to an estimated 31,203,026 m3 needed by SOSUCO). For the first time in years, UCEPAK farmers were able to increase their dry season planting to about 220 ha (compared to an average of 175 ha). But the farmers did not dare expanding to the entire 350 ha perimeter, because of the uncertainty

123


that remained about the authority of the CLE’s deliberation and SOSUCO’s willingness to release enough water. Riparian Farmers Besides the Karfiguela farmer union, other farmers cultivate the riverbanks of the Comoe´ by means of wells and pumps. Some of them are organized into groups, but most operate independently. Most riparian farmers are residents of local communities, but they also include migrants returning from Cote d’Ivoire as well as Banfora residents with some income to invest. There is no land titling or land market in rural areas, as traditional land tenure regimes still prevail. According to the latter outsiders can obtain land from the elders of local kin groups who have land under their control by virtue of being descendants of the first settlers in the area. Such transaction usually involves gifts of small livestock and performance of some rituals and, rarely, cash rent. But most land along the riverbanks and around the lakes is now appropriated and it is difficult for newcomers to obtain a plot. Streambank plots range between 0.12 ha and 0.50 ha and are mostly cultivated with vegetables during the dry season and maize during the rainy season. Besides annual crops, cassava, papaya, banana and mangoes are also grown. Riparian farmers include a 55 ha French-owned commercial banana plantation, which was established of land leased from Tengre´la landowners, and several smaller plots of banana, which add up to a total estimated acreage of 150 ha of banana along the Comoe´. With about 2000 banana stands per hectare, and an average water requirement of five liters per application, this expansion of banana cultivation is further exacerbating water shortages in the system. As is the case with UCEPAK, riparian farmers use part of the water that is released into the Comoe´ after the main SOSUCO diversion to maintain the minimum environmental services flow. But at times of water scarcity, most of the water that reaches the Karfiguela diversion is channeled into the irrigated perimeter, so that only water that flows past the diversion is what leaks through the deteriorating infrastructure. Occasionally conflicts arise between UCEPAK and riparian farmers, particularly those who cultivate the Comoe´ banks south of the Karfiguela diversion and north of the confluence with the Yannon, which replenishes the river flow. It was these farmers who led the protests in April 2007, their anger being directed equally toward both SOSUCO and UCEPAK. Riparian farmers are often accused of exploiting land and water resources illegally (sometimes referred to as ‘‘pirates’’) and are blamed for the water shortages in the system by the other user groups and by government agencies. Yet their activities have been strongly encouraged by government policies and development interventions that


center on small scale irrigation as a means of achieving food security and economic growth. A number of projects, such as the Projet d’Appui au De´ve´loppement Local (PADL), and organizations, such as the Association des Professionnels de l’Irrigation Priveé et des Activite´s Connexes (APIPAC), provide farmers in the area with training, incentives, services, and credit. As a result, riparian farming has expanded dramatically in the last five years, and there are an estimated 200 motor pumps extracting water from the river downstream from the Karfiguela plain. The total acreage planted along the river is estimated at 893.5 ha, requiring approximately 9.5 million m3 to irrigate crops during the dry season, starting in January and ending in April (AEDE 2008). While promoted by national agricultural policies, small scale irrigation along the Comoe´ is at odds with the government’s environmental policies which seek to protect stream banks from erosion. Even though the 1996 Reforme Agraire et Foncie`re (RAF) mandates a 100 meter buffer between cultivated areas and streams, the clause is rarely respected or enforced (Sanou 2003). Pastoralists Farmers in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin own oxen for plowing, which are generally kept in enclosed corrals near the farmer’s homestead for the entire year, and also invest earnings in livestock, which are tended by Fulani agropastoralists. Most of them have been in the area for decades, inhabiting Fulani ‘‘camps’’ at the outskirts of villages. They maintain patron-client relationships with farmers, through whom they obtain fields to supplement their pastoral livelihood with crop production. Some of these local agro-pastoralists leave the area during the dry season to seek pasture and water elsewhere (some crossing the border into Ghana or Cote d’Ivoire) to return in April-May, when the new rains start. Transhumant pastoralists from the Sahelian zone cross the province on their way to wetter areas in the South, but they rarely linger in the province to avoid conflicts with local farmers. Even so, damage to rice nurseries and vegetable plots by vagrant cattle are frequent occurrences reported by farmers and the region has been a theater of violent confrontations between farmers and pastoralists (Oue´draogo 1997; Hagberg 2001, 2003). Access to water for animals is an enormous problem for livestock husbandry in the area. There are no reservoirs that are specifically for livestock, and among the SOSUCO reservoirs, only Toussiana can be reached by animals (but access is being restricted because continuous passage damages the earth dam). The situation is particularly serious on the western side of the Comoe´, where there are fewer water bodies. On the other hand, the lakes, ponds, and streams that exist on the eastern side of the river, cannot be accessed because they are entirely enclosed by rice and

705

vegetable plots and by mango and cashew groves. The erosion of stream banks, accelerated by riparian cultivation, creates hazards for animals, which can get injured or trapped as they try to reach water. The area also hosts some large herds of elephants, which sometimes descend on water points to bathe, stirring up mud and making the shores slippery and the water unsuitable for drinking by livestock. But, given that elephants are protected by wildlife conservation policies, herders have no recourse against them. The expansion of cultivated areas has affected pasture availability, depriving pastoralists of access to wetlands that still support grass at the end of the dry season. Furthermore, crop fields have taken over the old cattle corridors so that pastoralists have no choice but to cross planted areas to get to water and pastures, risking accusations of trespassing and damaging crops. Conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are particularly severe in some villages where passage is impeded by steep cliffs and sugar cane fields. To protect its fields, the company has also employed members of Benkadi, an association of hunters, who are traditionally responsible for defending the natural environment, cultural values, and social order. However, the group, which was composed of Karaboro farmers and animated by anti-Fulani sentiments, eventually grew into an armed militia and was disbanded by the government (Hagberg 2004, 2006). Pastoralists have used their own organizations, such as the local chapter of the national Fe´de´ration des E´leveurs du Burkina (FEB), to protect their interests. As with Benkadi, these organizations officially represent the livestock ‘‘sector’’, but are actually constituted along (Fulani) ethnic lines and have been actively defending Fulani pastoralists in conflict situations, such as in the assessment of crop damages from trespassing livestock (Hagberg 2003). Pastoralists are often not represented in these disputes, whereas farmers are always represented by agents of the Ministry of Agriculture, who conduct the damage assessments. Fulani leaders also note that the Ministry of Animal Resources, which has far less resources and leverage than the Ministry of Agriculture (Gning 2005), has difficulties in securing support from the central government and from foreign projects for the construction of more watering points for livestock in an area that is perceived as characterized by better climate conditions and agricultural potential compared to the rest of the country. The newly established Rural Communes are expected to develop Water Development Plans, including digging new wells and boreholes to serve the expanding human and animal population. But pastoralists do not expect their interests to be better served in a context of decentralized governance given that elected Councils are dominated by farmers and the Fulani are not considered ‘‘residents’’ of their communities, even if they have lived in them for decades.

123

706

Pastoralists have not been included in prior watershed management and streambank restoration efforts (Sanou 2003) and they fear that the establishment of Rural Communes may lead to new regulations and restrictions on herd movements and access to natural resources across Communes’ boundaries. Fishermen Fishing in the river and the lakes has always been a source of livelihoods for households in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin, particularly for residents of villages, such as Lemouroudougou, who lost their land and were forced to relocate when SOSUCO established its sugar cane plantation. At the same time, changes in quantity and quality of the water resources in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin are negatively affecting fishing revenues. The river has no longer enough water for fish to thrive; fishing is now limited to the wetlands and the lakes. But even there, fish supplies are shrinking because there is less water for habitats and because lower rainfall means less runoff to replenish nutrients. Market sellers and restaurant owners in Banfora complain that the variety and size of the fish has declined over the last several years, and some popular species, such as the capitaine (Nile perch), are becoming less common. People in the area also voice concerns about pollution from the agro-chemicals leaching from the SOSUCO cane fields into water sources (Painter and Sanou 1996), although Lemouroudougou fishermen equally point to the Karfiguela rice fields as a source of water contamination. Other environmental changes are also making fishing more laborious: in the last several years, an invasive weed, locally known as ngolo has proliferated in the Lemouroudougou lake, providing fish with hiding places and hindering the maneuvering of pirogues and nettings. According to the PAGIRE fishing is restricted to residents of the communities in which the water bodies they are located. Fishermen associations have been formed to control access and enforce regulations, such as minimum fish size and use of approved equipment. The Wramba association in the village of Moussoudougou obtained the first of such concessions in the country in 2001. The agreement between the association and the Ministry of Environment (which had oversight over fisheries) was established as an experiment for the transfer of jurisdiction over natural resources to local communities as mandated by the new decentralization policy (Bonnal and Rossi 2006). Similar arrangements were eventually established with other fishermen associations, including those managing the Lemouroudougou and Tengre´la lakes. Regulation of fisheries, and of water management in general, is complicated by institutional ambiguities that stem from the recent restructuring of the relevant government agencies. In 2002 the Direction des Ressources en

123


Eau (which oversees water) and the Direction des Ressources Halieutiques (which regulates fisheries) were moved from the Ministry of Environment to the politically prominent Ministry of Agriculture. The shift was rationalized in terms of increased emphasis on the role of irrigation in agricultural development, but it divorced water issues from other natural resource management concerns. This split makes it difficult to coordinate agricultural policies that support irrigation with environmental policies that promote conservation of forests, wetlands, and stream banks. In the current division of ministerial responsibilities, the only water management mandate left to the Ministry of Environment is the enforcement of environmental regulations. But its capacity to do so is curtailed by shortage of field staff and lack of resources, since revenues from fishing licenses now accrue to the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter, on the other hand, does not always have the necessary staff and data at the local level to effectively regulate the sector. These inconsistencies have allowed some violators to continue their illegal practices undisturbed. The restructuring also causes difficulties for water quality monitoring and biodiversity conservation efforts, since databases are now scattered across ministries.

Discussion and Conclusion The Upper Comoe´ River Basin water management system offers a unique opportunity to examine the potential role of a DST in a multi-user context and its articulation with a changing policy environment. The creation of the CLE is welcomed by many people in Banfora and surrounding areas as a promising development that will contribute to better comanagement and release tensions surrounding water use. There are signs of progress in this direction, such as SOSUCO’s willingness to increase UCEPAK’s allocation during the 2009 dry season (which, however, was a time of plentiful water supplies following a good rainy season). This is a significant improvement over a status quo in which SOSUCO made most management decisions, with other users having little knowledge or influence over the decisions, beyond petitions through the agricultural extension service. This primacy was rationalized by the company’s responsibility for operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. Nonetheless, the latter was built by the state on territory belonging to local communities and, according to the 1996 Reforme Agraire et Foncie`re (RAF), water is legally owned by the state on behalf of its citizenship. In addition, in lamenting the declining supply of water and their loss of control over it, residents of villages along the river invoke the customary tenure principle which entrusts jurisdiction over natural resources to the first settlers, pointing out that SOSUCO ‘‘found them’’ in the area.


The state was instrumental in transferring rights over land and water resources from these local communities to private enterprise. This move might have been partly motivated by the prospect of development benefits, which, however, have largely eluded rural populations. The CLE represents an attempt to redress some of these imbalances by providing a mechanism for negotiated water management, but, as in other sites where implementation of the PAGIRE is more advanced, the process in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin remains orchestrated by the state. For example, the composition and organization of the CLE is determined by a decree of the regional government authority (the Governor) and its Technical Committee is largely composed of local government elected officials and technical services personnel in addition to the main users, some of which (ONEA and UCEPAK) are formally under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. State approval is also essential to sanctioning the role of the user associations and civil society organizations that make up the CLE membership at large. Despite the official representation of the CLE as fully inclusive of all users in the system, there are different gradients of participation, based on degrees of social recognition of each group and of the legitimacy and priority of its claims. For example, one FEB representative is included in the membership at large, but not in the Technical Committee, to represent all pastoralists. This fails to account for the diversity of interests in the sector and to provide direct access to information and influence in deliberations. Likewise, fishermen have just one representative in the general assembly. Even among farmers, there are differences: UCEPAK has greater clout by virtue of its institutional history, territorial claims, numerous membership, links with the Ministry of Agriculture, and participation in the Technical Committee, while riparian farmers are represented by individual villagers (rather than by a officially recognized organizations) and only as members of the general assembly. In fact, in the course of focus groups, other users complained that discussions during the CLE meetings tend to be monopolized by exchanges between UCEPAK and SOSUCO and framed in ways that favor the interests of organized, irrigated farmers over those of other users in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin. This is not only due to an agricultural bias within the CLE leadership and membership, but also to the fact that the decision process is largely expressed in terms of quantities of water released and allocated within the system, a perspective that foregrounds the needs of agriculture and obscures others’ understandings of water resource management. For example, in developing the release schedule for the upcoming year, the Technical Committee adjusted their amount for the environmental services flow

707

requirement by 5% to cover for unplanned needs, including those of pastoralists (AEDE 2008). But the main problem faced by pastoralists is not amounts of water but access to water and how it fits within the overall landscape in which herds must move daily as well as seasonally, including access to grazing areas and migration routes. Likewise, for fishermen, concerns over water quality, species habitat, and ecosystem stability are as crucial as issues of water scarcity. Furthermore, downstream communities, whose very origins and livelihoods are bound to the presence of the river, need a reliable source of water for household use. But this supply is increasingly threatened by upstream extractions and diversions, which in turn are encouraged by contrasting national policies. These changes have consequences that go beyond utility considerations, as certain water bodies, such as Lemouroudougou and Tengre´la lakes and the Karfiguela waterfalls are invested with profound cultural and spiritual meanings. The latter are embedded in mysticism, enveloped by secrecy, and impervious to scrutiny by outsiders, their investigation requiring long-term ethnographic fieldwork, which was beyond the scope of this study. But, it is safe to assume that fluctuations in water quantity and quality, and the relative alteration of water bodies and biodiversity have had momentous implications for local lifeways and cultural identities. These landscape transformations compound a sense of ‘‘loss of place’’ for communities that suffered relocations and expropriations of their territories for the creation of the SOSUCO perimeter, experiences that continue to affect their relationship with the company and with the state. By emphasizing reservoir releases as the primary decision arena and quantitative parameters as the salient information base, the CLE agenda overlooks how water resources fit within landscape interactions, livelihood strategies, and knowledge systems at the local level. It also favors a narrowly technical perspective, over a consideration of the synergies and conflicts between water management decisions and agricultural and development policies (some of which are put into practice by some of the line ministries in the CLE’s Technical Committee). This approach belies PAGIRE’s vision of ‘‘integrated’’ water resource management and reaffirms the managerial dominance of SOSUCO. The latter is further reinforced by public discourses that shape common understandings of the water management issues in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin. For example, local officials, agencies’ reports, and the media tend to depict downstream farmers (including UCEPAK) in terms of lack of coordination, inadequate production practices, poor maintenance of infrastructure, and abusive water withdrawals, blaming them for the occasional water shortages (Ouattara 2007). Similarly, in their official remarks at the onset of the project workshops,

123

708

local authorities, commended to DST for its ability to curb ‘‘irrational’’ water use. This view implicitly validates the established arrangement whereby SOSUCO is entrusted with the responsibility over the water management system, while downstream farmers and communities are reduced to being receivers of a resource that, prior to the construction of the reservoirs and establishment of the SOSUCO perimeter, was openly accessed and only subject only to the ebbs and flows of nature. Like the CLE, the DST developed by this project intends to provide a planning mechanism that seeks to promote more efficient water resource management and more equitable water distribution among multiple users. It does so by enabling users to objectively represent and analyze water demands, supplies, and uses in different climatic and hydrological conditions. This will allow them to develop a consensual release schedule by reallocating water throughout the dry season and among diverse users. As with the CLE, the tool’s core variables are the amounts of water released from each reservoir and diverted to each user. The DST fully models the impacts of alternative management decisions for the three main users (SOSUCO, UCEPAK, and ONEA), but also computes the needs of downstream users (riparian farmers, pastoralists, etc.) into environmental services flow, in ways that mirrors the CLE’s way of addressing this issue. By providing a visual schematic of the system, the tool will facilitate comprehension and communication among users, some of whom remain unfamiliar with the spatial and structural layout of the system (in recognition of the importance of a shared experiential understanding of the water management system one of the first organized CLE activities was a reconnaissance visit to the reservoirs and infrastructure). Public access to advance information about the release and diversion schedule will also facilitate drought preparedness among UCEPAK and downstream farmers, who have been so far uninformed about the timing and amounts of water coming their way. The DST was envisioned to be operated in a consultative setting, ideally during the CLE meetings, and therefore much effort has been devoted to making it relatively easy to understand and operate even by users without strong background in modeling, engineering, statistics, or computer technology. In line with the PAGIRE’s mandate and the CLE’s inclusive scope, the project shifted its DST design from a prescriptive to an exploratory approach, moving from a more complex stochastic, multi-stage, linear programming optimization model, which requires a higher level of expertise of operate (Etkin and others 2008), to a simpler simulation tool that allows lay users to learn hands-on and to adjust their decisions by trial and error. By virtue of its greater flexibility, the simulation tool makes it possible for users to propose modifications to the

123


status quo. For example, while the tool’s starting configuration establishes the given order of priority in reservoir releases (from Lobi, to Moussoudougou, to Toussiana) and in user diversions (starting with ONEA, then SOSUCO, then UCEPAK, to end with the downstream users’ needs and the environmental services flow), the sequence can be manually rearranged by users. In addition, the set of initial reservoir parameters can be customized to examine the implications of prospected interventions, such as rumors circulating at the time of writing about a plan by the Millennium Challenge Account to raise the Toussiana dam. Most of all, the simulation tool’s simplicity promotes greater transparency, an important feature in consultative negotiations, particularly where there are substantial differences in technical ability and a history of mistrust among users. Its more intuitive, user-friendly interface enables less experienced users to acquire capacity and confidence in applying DSTs to water resource management decisions. Despite the DST’s accessibility and versatility, it still requires management by one of the institutions or user groups for periodic updating of its datasets. The identification of which institution is better suited to do so has been subject of debate. Even though SOSUCO may be in the best position to operate the model on the CLE’s behalf, given that it has access to the essential data and technical expertise, the company demurred taking up such role to avoid being accused of biasing the process to its own advantage. Yet, the model’s operation will still depend on data that is collected by SOSUCO, which may not be provided if the company perceives it to be used in ways that do not fit its interests. More likely candidates are the Ministry of Agriculture and/or the national agricultural research institute (which is under the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research). The former participates in the CLE and has official linkages with ONEA and with UCEPAK and other producers groups; the latter has a research station in Banfora, but is not involved in the CLE and does not do research for SOSUCO, which has its own research unit. As public agencies with technical competences and a developmentoriented mandate, both institutions have legitimacy among users, but their respective abilities to act as tool managers and conflict mediators may hinge on whether their different degrees of involvement with the CLE and with users are perceived as ensuring impartiality or lessening accountability. Both the CLE being established by the PAGIRE and the DST being introduced by the project are still at an inception stage: an evaluation of their impacts will require a few more years of closely monitoring their performance and the dynamics they set in motion, a follow up that the project is committed to. This paper provides a head start on this


process by highlighting the centrality of social processes and institutions in shaping the playing field of water resource decisions in the Upper Comoe´ River Basin. It contends that sound science and good governance are needed to address current conflicts over scarce resources and future challenges of climate change. However, it should not be assumed that the provision of improved information and negotiation platforms will necessarily resolve all uncertainties. Rather, the probabilities inherent in simulation and forecasting tools may amplify the uncertainties linked to climate (in fact, the predictive accuracy of the DST was among the questions most often raised during the workshops). The DST’s trial and error approach facilitates adaptive learning but may also foster indecision and delay action. Uncertainties are also inherent in a process of negotiation among users with diverging priorities and different understandings of water issues. Additional ambiguities are introduced by discordant policies and regulatory regimes. The precarious financial viability of SOSUCO and the associated potential for social unrest introduces yet another layer of insecurity. The introduction of technical and institutional innovations must therefore be grounded in an in-depth analysis how such tools interact with a context defined by these multiple uncertainties. To do this water resource management approaches need to go beyond mere calculations of supply and demand and catalyze a discussion on the entitlements, investments, responsibilities, and accountabilities of all stakeholders, including scientists and policy-makers. Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge helpful input by Kate Dunbar, Carrie Furman, Richard Marcus, Don Nelson, Joel Paz, Ben Orlove, Michael Paolisso, and Renzo Taddei; and also the constructive comments of three anonymous reviewers. We thank Joel Paz, Latosha Clark, Patrick Florence and Michael Gove for help with the images. We are grateful to Thomas Painter and Saı¨dou Sanou who did the preliminary study on which this project was subsequently built. This study was supported by a grant from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Sectoral Applications Research Program as a continuation of the Climate Forecasting and Agricultural Resources (CFAR) Project.

References AEDE—Association Eau De´ve´loppement et Environnement (2008) Programme des lachuˆres d’eau, campagne 2008–2009. Comite´ Local de l’Eau – Haute Comoe´, Banfora, Burkina Faso Agrawal A, Ribot J (1999) Accountability in decentralization: a framework with South Asian and West African cases. Journal of Developing Areas 33:473–502 Berkes F (2009) Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and social learning. Journal of Environmental Management 90:1692–1702 Bethemont J, Faggi P, Zoungrana TP (2003) La valleé du Sourou: gene`se d’un territoire hydraulique dans l’Afrique soudanosahe´lienne. L’Harmattan, Paris

709 Boko M, Niang I, Nyong A, Vogel C, Githeko A, Medany M, OsmanElasha O, Tabo B, Yanda P (2007) Africa: climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry M, Canziani O, Palutikof J, van der Linden P, Hanson C (eds) Contribution of working Group II to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 433–467 Bonnal J, Rossi M (2006) Les communaute´s de peˆche face a` la decentralization. Organisation des nations Unies pour l’Alimentation et l’Agriculture, Rome Breuer NE, Cabrera V, Ingram K, Broad K, Hildebrand P (2008) AgClimate: a case study in participatory decision support system development. Climatic Change 87:385–403 Broad K, Pfaff A, Taddei R, Sankarasubramanian A, Lall U, de Souza Filho F (2007) Climate, stream flow prediction and water management in northeast Brazil: societal trends and forecast value. Climatic Change 84:217–239 Brock K, McGee R (eds) (2002) Knowing poverty: critical reflections on participatory development. ITDG Publishing, London Brugnach M, Pahl-Wostl C (2008) A broadened view on the role of models in natural resource management: implications for model development. In: Pahl-Wostl C, Kaval P, Maltgen J (eds) Adaptive and integrated water management: coping with complexity and uncertainty. Springer, Berlin, pp 189–203 Cabrera V, Breuer NE, Hildebrand P (2008) Participatory modeling in dairy farm systems: a method for building consensual environmental sustainability using seasonal climate forecasts. Climatic Change 89:395–409 Cleaver F (2000) Moral ecological rationality, institutions, and the management of common property resources. Development and Change 31:361–383 Cornwall A, Coelho VS (eds) (2007) Spaces for change? The politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas. Zed Books, London Crane T, Roncoli C, Breuer NE, Broad K, Paz J, Fraisse C, Ingram K, Zierden D, Hoogenboom G, O’Brien J (2008) Collaborative approaches to the development of climate-based decision support systems: what role for social sciences? Proceedings of the 88th American Meteorological Society annual meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana, 20–24 Jan 2008 Eakin H, Magana V, Smith J, Moreno JL, Martıńez JM, Landavazo O (2007) A stakeholder driven process to reduce vulnerability to climate change in Hermosillo Sonora Mexico. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 12:935–955 Etkin D, Kirshen P, Watkins D, Diallo AA, Hoogenboom G, Roncoli C, Sanfo BJ, Sanon M, Some´ L, Zoungrana J (2008) Stochastic linear programming for improved reservoir operations for multiple objectives in Burkina Faso, West Africa. Paper presented at American Society of Civil Engineers Conference (ASCE) World Environmental and Water Resource Congress, Honolulu, Hawaii, 13–16 May 2008 Faure´ A (1996) Le pays Bissa avant le barrage de Bagre´: anthropologie de l’espace rural. Se´pia, ADDB, Paris Faure´ A (2003) Improving public information about large hydroelectric dams: case studies in France and West Africa. Natural Resource Forum 27(1):32–41 Garcia-Barrios LE, Speelman EN, Pimm MS (2008) An educational simulation tool for negotiating sustainable natural resource management strategies among stakeholders with conflicting interests. Ecological Modeling 210:115–126 Garane´ A (2007) Sche´ma analytique de la legislation nationale des ressources en eau du Burkina Faso. Etudes juridiques de la FAO en ligne. www.fao.org/legal/prs-ol/paper-e.htm Giupponi C, Mysiak J, Sgobbi A (2008) Participatory modeling and decision support for natural resource management in climate

123

710 change research. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working paper 39/WP/2008 Gning M (2005) Navigating the livestock sector: the political economy of livestock policy in Burkina Faso. Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) Working paper no. 28, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, Italy http://www.fao.org/ag/ againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/docarc/wp28.pdf Guijt I, Kaul Shah M (1998) The myth of community: gender in the participatory process. ITDG Publishing, London Hagberg S (2004) Political decentralization and traditional leadership in the Benkadi Hunters’ Association in Western Burkina Faso. Africa Today 50(4):51–70 Hagberg S (2006) ‘‘It was Satan that took the people’’: the making of public authority in Burkina Faso. Development and Change 37 (4):779–797 ` l’ombre du conflit violent: re`glement et gestion Hagberg S (2001) A des conflit entre agriculteurs karaboro et agro-pasteurs Peul au Burkina Faso. Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 41(1):45–72 Hagberg S (2003) Mobilization of rights through organizational structures. In: Young T (ed) Readings in African politics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, pp 127–138 Hare M, Barreteau O, Beck MB, Letcher R, Mostert E, Ta`bara J, Ridder D, Cogan V, Pahl-Wostl C (2006) Methods for stakeholder participation in water management. In: Giupponi C, Jakeman A, Karssenberg D, Hare M (eds) Sustainable management of water resources: An integrated approach. Edward Elgar, Northampton, Massachussetts, pp 177–225 Hoogenboom G (2000) Contribution of agrometeorology to the simulation of crop production and its applications. Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 103(1–2):137–157 Kirshen P, Cardwell H (2008) The role of shared vision planning/ participatory modeling in integrated water resources management. Proceedings ASCE World Environmental and Water Resources Congress, Honolulu, Hawaii, 13–16 May 2008 Kundzewicz ZW, Mata LJ, Arnell NW, Do¨ll P, Kabat P, Jimeńez B, Miller KA, Oki T, Sen Z, Shiklomanov IA (2007) Freshwater resources and their management. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Climate Change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, pp 173–210 Lal P, Lim-Applegate H, Scoccimarro M (2001) The adaptive decision-making process as a tool for integrated natural resource management: focus, attitudes and approach. Conservation Ecology 5(2):11, http://www.consecol.org/vol5/iss2/art11/ Langsdale SM, Beall A, Carmichael J, Cohen SJ, Forster CB, Neale T (in press) Exploring the implications of climate change on water resources through participatory modeling: case studies of the Okanagan Basin, British Columbia. Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management Larson A, Ribot J (2005) Democratic decentralization through a natural resource lens: an introduction. In: Ribot J, Larson A (eds) Democratic decentralization through a natural resource lens. Routledge, New York, pp 1–25 Lemos MC (2009) Whose water is it anyway? Water management, knowledge, and equity in northeast Brazil. In: Whiteley JM, Ingram H, Perry RW (eds) Water, place and equity. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 249–270 Lemos MC, Agrawal A (2007) A greener revolution in the making? Environmental governance in the 21st century. Environment 49(5):37–46 Lemos MC, Farias de Oliveira JL (2005) Water reform across the state/society divide: the case of Ceara´, Brazil. Water Resources Development 21(1):133–147

123

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 Marcus R (2007) Where community-based water resource management has gone too far: Poverty and disempowerment in Southern Madagascar. Conservation and Society 5(2):202–231 Marcus R, Onjala J (2008) Exit the state: decentralization and the need for local, social, political, and economic considerations in water resource allocation in Madagascar and Kenya. Journal of Human Development 9(1):23–45 McCartney MP (2007) Decision support systems for large dam planning and operation in Africa. Working paper no. 119, International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka Meinke H, Baethgen WE, Carberry PS, Donatelli M, Hammer GL, Selvaraju R, Stockle C (2001) Increasing profits and reducing risks in crop production using participatory systems simulation approaches. Agricultural Systems 70:493–513 Meinzen-Dick R, Bruns BR (2000) Negotiating water rights: Introduction. In: Meinzen-Dick R, Bruns BR (eds) Negotiating water rights. ITDC Publishing, London, pp 23–44 Meinzen-Dick R, Nkonya L (2005) Understanding legal pluralism in water rights: lessons from Africa and Asia. Paper presented at an International Workshop on African Water Laws: plural legislative frameworks for rural water management in Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26–28 Jan 2005 Mostert E (2006) Participation for sustainable water management. In: Giupponi G, Jakeman A, Karssenberg D, Hare M (eds) Sustainable management of water resources: an integrated approach. Edward Elgar, Northampton, Massachussetts, pp 153–176 Muller C (2009) Climate change impact on Sub-Saharan Africa: an overview and analysis of scenarios and models. Discussion Paper, German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany Nelson N, Wright S (eds) (1996) Power and participatory development: theory and practice. ITDG Publishing, London Nelson RA, Holzworth DP, Hammer GL, Hayman PT (2002) Infusing the use of seasonal climate forecasting into crop management practice in North East Australia using discussion support software. Agricultural Systems 74:393–414 Orlove BS, Caton SC (2009) Water as an object of anthropological inquiry. Keynote lecture at the Waterworlds Conference, Danish Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters, Copenhagen, 7–9 Feb 2009 Ouattara L (2007) Une crise d’eau fait des de´gaˆts. L’Observateur Paalga (Burkina Faso), 5 Avril 2007 Ouattara L (2008) Me´vente a` la SN-SOSUCO: les sucriers noye´s par le ‘‘deal’’ du sucre? L’Observateur Paalga (Burkina Faso), 20 Fe´vrier 2008 Oue´draogo JB (1997) Violences et communaute´s en Afrique Noire: la region Comoe´ entre re`gles de concurrence et logiques de destruction (Burkina Faso). L’Harmattan, Paris Pahl-Wostl C, Sendzimir J, Jeffrey P, Aerts J, Berkamp G, Cross K (2007) Managing change toward adaptive water management through social learning. Ecology and Society 12(2):30. http://www. ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art30/ Painter T, Sanou S (1996) La protection des berges de la Be´re´ga et du Yannon: une initiative locale conduite par la Societe´ Cooperative Agricole de Be´re´gadougou (SOCABE). In: Painter T, Sanou S (eds) La gestion dećentraliseé des ressources naturelles au Burkina Faso: quatre e´tudes de cas. Comite´ Permanent InterEtats de Lutte contre la Sećheresse dans le Sahel, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso Peters P (2000) Encountering participation and knowledge in development sites. In: Peters P (ed) Development encounters: sites of participation and knowledge. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 3–14 Ramsey K (2009) GIS, modeling, and politics: on the tensions of collaborative decision support. Journal of Environmental Management 90(6):1972–1980

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 Roncoli C, Jost C, Kirshen P, Sanon M, Ingram K, Woodin M, Some´ L, Ouattara F, Sanfo BJ, Sia C, Yaka P, Hoogenboom G (2009) From accessing to assessing forecasts: an end-to-end study of participatory forecast dissemination in Burkina Faso (West Africa). Climatic Change 92:433–460 Roth D, Boelens R, Zwarteveen M (eds) (2005) Liquid relations: contested water rights and legal complexity. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ Sanou S (2003) Gestion locale des berges et des ressources en eau et e´volution du cadre legislatif et re´glementaire: Leçons apprises de l’expe´rience de Beregadougou. Group de Recherche et d’Action sur le Foncier (GRAF), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. http://graf. zcp.bf/nimda/pubier/doc/Doc_23.pdf Shepherd P, Tansey J, Dawlatabadi H (2006) Context matters: what shapes adaptation to water stress in the Okanagan? Climatic Change 78:31–62 Taddei R (2005) Of clouds and streams, prophets and profits: the political semiotics of climate and water in the Brazilian Northeast. PhD dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York

711 Traore´ M (2009) Tous les proble`mes disparaissent, sauf la fraude. Le Pays, No 4297, 3 Fe´vrier 2009 Tsuji GY, Hoogenboom G, Thornton PK (eds) (1998) Understanding options for agricultural production: systems approaches for sustainable agricultural development. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands Van der Schaaf C (2006) The making of a land ‘‘market’’ in Tenso irrigation system, Eastern Burkina Faso. Paper presented at the Colloquium ‘‘At the Frontier of Land Issues’’, Montpellier, France Van Koppen B (2000) Gendered water and land rights in rice valley improvement, Burkina Faso. In: Meinken-Dick R, Bruns BR (eds) Negotiating water rights. ITDC Publishing, London, pp 83–111 Wester P, Merrey D, De Lange M (2003) Boundaries of consent: stakeholder representation in river basin management in Mexico and South Africa. World Development 31(5):797–801 Whiteley JM, Ingram H, Perry RW (eds) (2009) Water, place, and equity. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

123

From Management to Negotiation: Technical and ... - Springer Link

From Management to Negotiation: Technical and ... - Springer Link

Suggest Documents

From Stakeholder Management to Stakeholder ... - Springer Link

A User Interface to Support Dialogue and Negotiation ... - Springer Link

A User Interface to Support Dialogue and Negotiation ... - Springer Link

Technical reviews - Springer Link

Negotiation Outcome Classification Using Language ... - Springer Link

Implicit Negotiation in Repeated Games - Springer Link

Free medical and technical books online from the ... - Springer Link

An Experimental Design to Exercise Negotiation in ... - Springer Link

Using Policy Modeling to Describe the Negotiation ... - Springer Link

Applying Agent Negotiation to Enhance Instructor ... - Springer Link

An Experimental Design to Exercise Negotiation in ... - Springer Link

From Personal Task Management to End-User Driven ... - Springer Link

From Personal Task Management to End-User Driven ... - Springer Link

From Management Systems to Corporate Social ... - Springer Link

From yield management to price optimization: Lessons ... - Springer Link

Ethical and Technical Aspects of Emotions to Create ... - Springer Link

Characterizing Managerial Skill and Technical ... - Springer Link

Characterizing Managerial Skill and Technical ... - Springer Link

Nash Equilibrium and Decentralized Negotiation in ... - Springer Link

Applying Agent-Based System and Negotiation ... - Springer Link

Negotiation and Assessment as Tools for Tailoring ... - Springer Link

Special issue: Negotiation modeling and support - Springer Link

Technical efficiency analysis correcting for biases from ... - Springer Link

Workshop on Technical Feasibility: Initial Lessons from ... - Springer Link