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PAGUYUBAN PETANI LAHAN PANTAI (PPLP) KULON PROGO Sekretariat: Bugel 2, Panjatan, Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta 55655 www.petanimerdeka.tk email: [email protected] , telp: 0819 0428 0260, 0818 0430 0811

Position Paper (Shortened Version) Coastal Inhabitants of Kulon Progo Fight Injustice. there is no peace without justice and there is no justice without conscience PPLP KP Since 2006, we, the coastal inhabitants of Kulon Progo Regency, have struggled to defend our Human Rights (as guaranteed by UU [Undang-Undang = regulation] No 39 of 1999), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (as guaranteed by UU No 11 of 2005), and Right to Land (as guaranteed by UU no 5 of 1960). The presence of these rights and the prospect that they will continue into the future are under threat, due to the policies of the Kulon Progo Regency Government to mine iron sands and build a steel factory in an area which is settled by, and provides a livelihood for, its inhabitants. Just as it was known that it would, this mine has triggered a conflict between the people and the government, with no end in sight. A. Background to the Mining Project. The Plan to mine iron sands in Kulon Progo Regency arose from the pressure put on the local government by the family of the Sultanate/ Paku Alaman (who is the legal owner of Jogja Magasa Mining). It has been easy to progress with the mining plansfor the following reasons: 1. The position of the Sultan HB X, who occupies the role of provincial Govenor and of king, as well as being a businessman. This position of sole authority brings with it the possibility of infringements of the law. Indeed the effects of the law are hardly felt as the area is so deeply entrenched in feudal culture. 2. The interests of the Kulon Progo Regency Government are convergent with those of the foreign investors and also those of local companies (the owner of PT JMM), namely the exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources. The coastal areas of Kulon Progo Regency have an environmental function and a socio-economic function. The environmental function of this area is 1) as a buffer zone for biodiversity, 2) as a natural defence against a tsunami disaster, 3) as a source of fresh water, and 4) as a rare sand dune area (one of only 14 similar areas in the world). The socio-economic functions of the area are 1) as a source of livelihood for local people, 2) as the backbone of basic foodstuffs for Java and Sumatra, 3) as an area that has created a counter-current to urbanisation since the 1990s and 4) as a place where local knowledge has been developed, such as techniques for farming on coastal lands, that have already spread to nearby areas (Samas, Trisik, Glagah etc.). Local people reject the planned mine for the following reasons: 1. The proposals for mining are based on private interests / those of the class that claim to act in the name of development. It can be shown that none of the principles of development are included in the process of producing this “policy”. For example, the interests of society, the rights of the environment, and human rights are all ignored. 2. The economic, social, cultural and environmental risks of this mining plan are greater than the benefits. In other words there will be a greater benefit for the area if there would be no mining


whatsoever1 3. This mining plan would endanger: a. The destruction of the sand dune ecosystem The coastal area of Kulon Progo Regency is part of the range of sand dunes that extends from Parangtritis beach in Bantul regency, represents one of 14 coastal sand dune environments in the world and has the environmental function of a natural defence against the threat of a tsunami disaster. The plan to mine iron sand will cause the loss of the environmental services the area provides, due to 1) the infiltration of sea water to the land, 2) the erosion of the tsunami defences, and 3) the potential disappearance of rare sand dunes (Kompas, April 2008). b. Eviction of horticultural land and settlements Part of the sand dune environment has been modified by local inhabitants to become horticultural land without reducing its function as a buffer zone (Shiddieq et al, 2008 and Iman Rejo, 1996). This productive land has brought benefits both material and immaterial (services to the environment, institutional, and the development of the local society's knowledge base2). The plan to mine iron sands will alter the function of all land within an area of 22 x 1.8km, which currently includes farmland and settlements (according to the information communicated by Mulyono, Vice Regency Leader [Wakil Bupati] of Kulon Progo 2006-2011). c. Loss of jobs This productive land provides work for local inhabitants as well as for those from other areas (such as harvest labour, traders and middlemen, suppliers of fertilizer and seeds) The planned iron mine will increase the unemployment figures of those of working age, both in the coastal zone and nearby (Kompas, April 2008). d. Disturbance to the supply of basic needs The land in question is able to provide 702 tons of chilli/ transaction which is equivalent to 17,548 tons per month (in 2008), which makes it a principal provider of chilli to Jakarta and Sumatra (Shiddieq et al, 2008). The plan to mine iron sand will disturb the economical stability of the sector of basic everyday needs, i.e. chilli. e. Marginalisation of society and environment The plan to mine iron sands will pose social risks in the form of a reversal of the progress which local people have obtained over the course of 30 years, in which local people have participated in a form of development which doesn't damage the principal function of the coastal lands, and also creates a counter-current to urbanisation. f. Deliberate attempts of mining supporters to foment horizontal conflict. Before the iron sand mining project was announced, we lived peaceably between all parties. This mining project has already produced a horizontal conflict that has been triggered by the government and PT JMI's provocations towards local people living outside the mine concession area, or those who do not understand the negative impacts the mine would have for their own livelihoods3. There is a minority of inhabitantswho appear to be inclined towards becoming tools of the mining company such

1 On average the income of a farmer's household from the key farming sector only (ie. not including secondary commodities) per hectare and from one planting season is: 5000 kg x 10 harvests x Rp 10,000/kg = Rp 500,000,000 (gross), or 400,000,000 (net) (Anonymous, 2007, Laporan Baseline Survey, UGM) 2 Written documentation of Iman Rejo, 1999 3 The criminalisation of tukijo, and the attack of a group of people on our villages in October 2007 are


as 1) outsiders / not the native people who have lived for generations on the mining concession, 2) people who do not depend on the coast for their livelihood (state employees, private sector etc.), 3) people whose rationality can be toppled with simple economic logic - to be honest these are often those that are highly educated, but opportunistic at heart. B. The process of legitimising the project by means of policy and the violations of policy 1. Agrarian The mandate of UU [Undang-Undang =law] No 5 of 1960 (UUPA [=Basic Agrarian Law]) PP [peraturan pemerintah = government ordinance] No 224 of 1961, KP [Keputusan Presiden = Presidential Decision] No 22 of 1984, and I of Special Region of Yogyakarta [DIY - Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta] all make clear that the regulatory ordinence about agrarian issues in the province of Special Region of Yogyakarta, that is Rijksblad Kasultanan no 16 of 1918 (Sultanaat Ground/ SG), Rijksblad No 18 of 19184 (Pakualamanaat Ground / PAG) and Perda No 5 of 1954 are cancelled. Thus the establishment of the legality of land claims according to official Indonesian law in Special Region of Yogyakarta is quite clear, after the abolition of the de jure dualistic agrarian politics. Mine supporters state that the planned mining of iron sand will take place on the land of PAG (see document UKL and UPL of the Pilot Project page 10, document from Australia Kimberly Diamond, 3 November 20055 page 3, dated 14 December 2008). This declaration is supported politically by the

clear evidence of this. 4 In the era of the Dutch Indies Government, legal terms arose that refer to the type of control over agrarian resources such as Domein Verklaring, a clause of the agrarian order whereby land which for which there is no proof of absolute eigendom rights becomes state property, Eigendom which means the private right to land ownership as granted by the colonial government, Erfpacht which is the right to use land, granted by the colonial government to plantation companies for a period of 75 years, and Culturstelsel which was the government policy at the time of Governor General Van Den Bosh which forced farmers to plant a fifth of their land with cash crops that had been determined by the government, and the resulting harvest turned over to the colonial government. Rijksblad Kasultanan No 16/1918 and Rijksblad Paku Alaman No 18/1918 which refer to the products of colonial rule (refer to the principles of Domein Verklaring Agrarische Wet 1870) state, '‘Sakabehing bumi kang ora ana tanda yektine kadarbe ing liyan mawa wewenang eigendom, dadi bumi kagungane keraton ingsun’ ( all land for which there is no proof of ownership through eigendom rights, that land becomes the property of my kingdom) (Luthfi et. al, 2009: 157) . According to the theory of land ownership, something can be said to be properly owned by someone if there is found to be evidence of ownership of that thing (a bundle of rights), and not on the contrary, just because someone asserts ownership over it without possessing evidence of its ownership (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). These Rijksblads are a product of misguided logic. 5 “4. Indonesian Legal Structure


provincial government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta through their affirmation of the Sultanate's / Pakualaman's illegal claim to the land, and also through the embracing of a dualistic agrarian politics. This takes place via the institutions of BPN [Badan Pertanahan Nasional- National Land Body] (responsible for land certification) and Paniti Kismo (responsible for magersari - a Javan concept referring to a feudal/cultural practice of structuring land). The people have proof of their legal right to the land within the mining concession area (22km x 1.8km) because they own land certificates, letter D or Letter C. This means that PT JMI and the government have lied to the public and have infringed the regulatory ordinances about agrarian policy. The existence of the PAG's status has already been legally withdrawn, which means that all forms of industry that are established on the land of (claimed by) PAG are in violation of current legislation. 2. Contract of Work The establishment of UU no 4 of 2009 abolishes the validity of UU No 11 of 1967 as well as the ordinances for its implementation6, one of them being the removal of the mechanism for contract of work for mining, which has been replaced with an IUP [Izin Usaha Pertambangan = Permission for Mining Enterprise] that is conditional on dispute settlement and an Environmental Impact Assessment [AMDAL - Analysis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan]7 and on the resolution of land use problems8. In this way, the Contract of Work cannot be used as the base for carrying out an Environmental Impact Assessment. The Contract of Work for Mining Iron Sand that was agreed by the President through the Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources (Purnomo Yusgiantoro) on 4th November 2008 and based on UU No 27 of 2007 has been legally cancelled9 because its existence is

A legal structure has been developed for AKD by solicitors Baker & McKenzie International to ensure that the Company will eventually acquire a 70% interest in the Project once it has completed all the agreed performance hurdles (resource definition & bankable feasibility) and satisfied the legal and regulatory requirements of the Indonesian Government and the Yogyakarta Special Region governed by His Excellency, the Sultan of Yogyakarta (RE: IRONSANDS - PIG IRON PROJECT: DUE DILIGENCE RESULTS & CORPORATE PLAN) ” 6 Pasal 173 UU No 4 Tahun 2009 7 Pasal 39 (1) huruf l dan n UU No 4 Tahun 2009 8 Pasal 39 (2) huruf I dan q UU No 4 Tahun 2009 9 Pasal 169 huruf a UU No 4 Tahun 2009


not protected by legislation, neither UU No 4 of 200910 nor UU No 27 of 200711 nor Perda Kabupaten Kulon Progo No 1 of 2003 as the ordinance for the implementation of the land use law which was valid at the time the Contract of Work was made. This means, although the Contract of Work de facto exists, de jure the contract of work cannot be implemented. 3. Pilot Project The Documents UKL and UPL which form the basis for the establishment of a Pilot Project to Mine Iron Sands in Kulon Progo Regency state that: 1. Land being used is owned by Pakualaman (page 10). According to valid legislative ordinances about agrarian policy, Pakualaman cannot own land because it is neither an individual nor a legal entity12, an the status of the land as an autonomous monarchy (SG and PAG) has been cancelled since 1984. 2. The Pilot Project is located at the co-ordinates of 7o58’ 00.02”S/ 110o11’14,65” E (north-west limit), 7o58’03” S/110o11” 20,17” E (north-east limit), 7o58’07.06” S/110o11’54” E (south-west limit), dan 7o58’11.01” S/110o11’16.38” E (south-east limit) . It is not mentioned how far tfrom the shoreline the pilot project is located (see page 8 and attached location map). According to the Perda No 1 of Kulon Progo Regency 2003, the function of the littoral zone is established as a protected zone13 as a minimum distance of 150 landwards from the high tide line. According to the UU no 27 of 2007, the minimum distance for the littoral zone is 100 m landwards from the high tide line. 3. Based on the land use plan of Kulon Progo Regency, the coastal area is designated as a mining area (page 22). According to Perda Kulon Progo Regency No 1 of 2003, the allocated for mining does not include Kecamatan Galur, Panjatan, Wates14 that makes up the area of an iron sands mining concession. 4. The permission for exploration of the iron sands is based on the decision of the head of the Agency for Industrial, Commercial, Cooperatives and Mining of Kulon Progo Regency No

10 Pasal 134 UU No 4 Tahun 2009 11 Pasal 22, Pasal 28, Pasal 29, dan Pasal 35 huruf I UU No 27 Tahun 2009, beserta penjelasan bagian c. Pengawasan dan Pengendalian nomor 4 huruf d, e, h, dan i. 12 Pasal 21 UU No 5 Tahun 1960 13 Pasal 16 (3) Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kulon Progo No 1 Tahun 2003 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang. 14 Pasal 35 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kulon Progo No 1 Tahun 2003 tentang Rencana Tata Ruang


15//Kpts/Ekspl/X/2007 (page 7). This permission was subsequently strengthened by the SK [Surat Keputusan = decision document] of the Bupati of Kulon Progo No 47 of 2010 which was later updated to become SK Bupati Kulon Progo No 140 of 2010. However, for a Izin Gangguan [=permission to cause disturbances] is under the framework of either the Permendagri [ Peraturan Menteri dalam Negeri =ordinance of the interior ministry] no 7 of 199315 or its replacement, the Permendagri No 27 of 200916, in which it is stated that a Izin Gangguan can only be granted to an industrial enterprise if it is accompanied by 1) valid proof of land ownership and 2) the agreement of the local people which would be affected by the disturbances. Neither of these conditions were met by PT JMI, meaning that the execution of the pilot project is in contravention of the law. UU No 32 of 2009 states that a permission to conduct business can be rescinded by a Minister, Governor or Bupati/Mayor if the requirements as set out in the request for permission contain legal irregularities, errors or misappropriations, as well as incorrect and/or falsified data, documents and/or information. The statement of PT JMI in the UKL and UPL reports, that the land in question is that of PAG, is just such a source of legal irregularities, and so should affect the establishment of a Pilot Project. The permission to establish a pilot project therefore comprises an violation of legislation, principally Perda No 1 of 2003, Permendagri No 7 of 1993 / Permendadri No 27 of 2009, and UU No 27 of 2007. For this reason any actions that the people may take against the pilot project cannot be considered simply as criminal acts because they have a legal basis. 4. AMDAL [Analysis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan = Environmenal Impact Assessment] The Environmental Impact Assessment of PT JMI, based on UU No 32 of 2009 and PP No 27 of 1999 has recently resulted in the document known as KA ANDAL [Kerangka Acuan Analisis Dampak Lingkungan = Terms of Reference of Analysis of Environmental Impacts] (agreed by the Evaluation Committee on the 15th December 2010). In PT JMI's KA ANDAL report it is stated that the compilation of the KA ANDAL is a subsequent step that follows on from the Contract of Work and the Bupati of Kulon Progo's decision No 140 of 2010 concerning the Granting of Permission to Use the Southern Coastal Land for the Mining of Iron Sands and Accompanying Minerals to PT JMI (dated 11 May 2010). UU No 32 of 200917 and PP no 27 of 200918 state that an AMDAL must accommodate the interests of

15 Pasal 3 dan Pasal 7 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No 7 Tahun 1993 tentang Izin Mendirikan Bangunan dan Izin Undang-Undang Gangguan bagi Perusahaan Industr 16 Pasal 2dan Pasal 5 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No 27 Tahun 2009 tentang Pedoman Penetapan Izin di Daerah. 17 Pasal 26 UU No 32 Tahun 2009 18 Pasal 16 (4) PP No 27 Tahun 1999


the affected society and also the stipulations of the Area Land Use Plan in the place where a project is to be carried out. This for this case is the Perda No 1 of 2003 because the area of the mining concession is located in Kulon Progo Regency (it does not reach the provincial level). The mining plan and all subsequent processes associated with its ratification (including the AMDAL), can be described as legally flawed. These legal defects are seen as follows: a. The changes to the Provincial Land Use Plan [Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah - RTRW] (4 March 2010) accomodates the mining interests, with the result that the AMDAL gives the impression of being in order. The AMDAL document that has already been ratified (KA ANDAL) should be legally rescinded because it is not in line with PP no 27 of 1999. b. The process of compilation of the Special Region of Yogyakarta's Perda No 2 of 2010 concerning the Area Land Use Plan was undertaken unilaterally by the provincial government (with no involvement of the DPRD [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah = Regional Council of People's Representatives] in the discussions). This represents a criminal scandal of legislation which disregards human rights and which has been intentionally permitted by the policy makers. Article 60 of this Perda regulation refers to the coastal zone of Kulon Progo is an area for allocated for the mining of iron sands. c. The involvement of members of society who will not directly be affected by the mine as members of the AMDAL's evaluation team. Because of these legal defects, we, the coastal inhabitants of Kulon Progo, refused to participate in the AMDAL process. Aside from this, AMDAL is honestly a just mechanism by which the environmental permission can be issued, which is itself a condition of the issuance of the permission to conductt business. The result of this is that, politically, to be in agreement with the AMDAL, is just the same as to be in agreement with the mining project. The main aim of the AMDAL is to safeguard investment, not to safeguard the environment. An AMDAL is merely a feasibility study of the environmental impacts, characterised by: 1) The scale of the project (temporal and spatial limits) in as far as it is connected to environmental problems, 2) The resolution of any adverse impacts is intended to occur through the use of technology or compensation. Social conflict, however, cannot be resolved through technology, and can not always be given a material value, 3) Any improprieties in the AMDAL document do not necessarily result in the cancellation of the project. The opportunity is instead given to the applicant to amend it to make it in order. 4) The final decision of whether an AMDAL is in order does not take place by the evaluation team but instead by the Governor19 (who is firmly in favour of mining). If this should be challenged by some

19 Pasal 20 PP No 27 Tahun 1999 tentang AMDAL, Pasal 20: 'The responsible body [the governor] issues the decision of environmental suitability for an enterprise and/or activity as intended by Article 19 clause (2) [based on the results of the evaluation of the AMDAL and RPL by the central evaluation commission at the central level or a regional evaluation comission], within a time-frame of at most 75 (seventy five) working days from the date of receiving the document analysing environmental impacts, the plan for environmental management and


responsible body, they would discover ample proof of the conclusions of the people's analysis, which is that this mine represents private interests / those of the class that claim to want development. 5. Land Use In the context of mining iron sands in Kulon Progo, environmental permission is one condition that has to be met in order for the permission for corporate enterprise to be issued by the Bupati. The Environmental Impact Assessment / AMDAL that the corporation compiled during 2010-2011 (feasibility study) has been evaluated as being proper. One of the criteria for the validity of an AMDAL document is the accordance of the project (mining iron sands) with the Provincial Land Use Plan (RTRWP [Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi]) and the Regency Land Use Plan (RTRWK [Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Kabupaten]). The Kulon Progo Regency Land Use Plan for 2003 -2013 does not designate the coastal area for the mining of iron sands, likewise th Proposed Regional Ordinance [Raperda = Rancangan Peraturan Daerah] for the Provincial Land Use Plan 2009-2029 that has been compiled and ratified in a plenary meeting of the DPRD and Governor of Special Region of Yogyakarta on the 22nd June 2009. On 4th March 2010 Peraturan Daerah No 2 of 2010 concerning the Provincial Land Use Plan of Yogyakarta was ratified by the Governor, and this ordinance became the legal basis for the compilation of the Regency Land Use Plan of Kulon Progo. The substance of Regional Ordinance (Perda) No 2 of 2010 differs from that contained within the Proposed Regional Ordinance (Raperda) that was agreed on 22nd June 2009. The differences are as follows: 1) The loss of certain articles: article 1 (13), 11, 37, 39, 55, 102, and 115. 2) Changes to the text of the articles of the Raperda when it became the Perda: article 32 (2) becomes article 36 (3), article 42 becomes article 39, and article 95 becomes article 97. 3) Addition of articles: article 1 (22) (27) (41) (42), 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60 and 79 4) Addition with changes of the text of articles (Perda); from article 114 until article 160. 5) An explicit statement in article 60 that the coastal zone of Kulon Progo is intended for the mining of iron sands. From March to June 2010, people residing in the mining concession area (22 x 1.8 km), through the local people's organisation (PPLP KP) investigated the documents and process of issuance of Perda No 2 of 2010. Documents used for comparison were 1) Draft Perda for the Provincial Land Use Plan that was agreed by plenary, 2) The Draft Perda for the Land Use Plan that was evaluated by the Interior Minister, 3) The results of the Interior Minister's evaluation dated 16 February 2010, and 4) Perda for the Land Use Plan No 2 of 2010. The result of the investigation revealed the following evidence: 1) The ratification of Perda No 2 of 2010 did not involve the agreement of the DPRD. Yogyakarta DPRD believes the process of compilation of this Perda represents an contravention of UU No 10 of 2004 and Interior Ministry Ordinance No 28 of 2008 which olays out the procedures for the issuing of local ordinances. 2) The Raperda for the Yogyakarta Provincial Land Use Plan which was agreed by the DPRD and the Governor on the 22nd June 2009 was not sent by the Governor to the Interior Minister for evaluation. This draft comprises 129 articles and does not include the articles which legalise the mining of iron

the plan for environmental monitoring in accordance with Article 18 clause (2). (2) If the responsible body does not issue a decsion within the time frame intended in clause (1), the business plan and/or relevant activity is to be considered environmentally suitable.


sands along the Kulon Progo Coast. 3) The Goverrnor used his authority to compile the Draft Land Use Plan unilaterally. This is the draft that was sent to the Interior Minister to obtain his evaluation and agreement with its contents. The conclusion is that Sultan HB X in his role as Governor of Yogyakarta has misused his power to legalise the mining of iron sands along the Kulon Progo Coast. This has been made possible because PT JMI, the corporation which plans to mine iron sands in Kulon Progo, is a business of Sultan HB X's family. In June 2010 PPLP KP sent a letter to the DPRD of Special Region of Yogyakarta and the Interior Ministry to request the cancellation of Perda No 2 of 2010 because it could be proved that the procedure was legally flawed. Yogyakarta DPRD was not disposed to cancel the aforementioned Perda, but instead took the option to delay its coming into effect. The options offered by the Yogyakarta DPRD were 1) A judicial review of the Perda in question. 2) A review of the articles considered to be problematic. These options were refused by the people because they would not tackle the root problem, that is the criminality of the regulations devised by the Yogyakarta Governor. The people's reasoning was that a Judicial Review would not be able to label the process as illegal, and a review of the disputed articles would not have legal authority because the ordinance had already been ratified. The Interior Ministry did not respond to the the letter local people sent on the 28th June 2010. These letters were also sent to various parties, including the President of the Republic of Indonesia, NGOs and the Media. 6. RUUK DIY [Rancangan Undang-undang Keistimewaan Distrik Istimewa Yogyakarta = Planned Law of the special Status of Special Region of Yogyakarta] Rijksblad Kasultanan and Rijksblad Pakualaman guarantee that the King (Sultan HB X and Pakualam IX) is allowed to own uncertified land throughout the province of Yogyakarta. This guarantee is currently being re-actualized through the Draft UU Keistimewaan Yogyakarta. This draft also guarantees absolute power of the Sultan in issues of governance, amongst others: 1) to continue as Governor permanently without elections, 2) Protocol rights at the level of a minister. 3) The monarchy would obtain a budget from the APBD [Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah = Budget of Local Income and Expenditure], 4) Directing executive and legislative policy, 5) legal immunity. The debate between the central government and the local government about RUUK has been limited to whether there should be an elected or fixed Governor, and has not tackled the more fundamental issues nor the implications for social justice. Politically, the special Status Law would be a guarantee of the availability of land for land-grabbing projects along the Kulon Progo coast, including, amongst others: 1) the mining of iron sand, 2) the building of an international airport (Indian investor), 3) a port, 4) Indonesian air force base, and 5) the Southern Trans-Java Highway (an ADB project from 2002 to 2050). Legally, the draft law on the Special Status of Yogyakarta contravenes UU No 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Governance (Regional Autonomy), UU No 5 of 1960 concerning Agrarian law, UU No 26 of 2007 about Land Use Planning, UU No 32 of 2009 concerning the Environment, UU No 27 of 2007 concerning coastlines and small islands, UU No 11 of 2005 concerning social, economic and cultural rights, and UU no 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights. One reason given for supportting the Special Status of Yogyakarta is its history as an autonomous area before the Republic of Indonesia's independence. Regional government is of the opinion that Sultan HB IX made an aggreement with President Soekarno in 1945 that The Special Region of Yogyakarta would recieve a special status due to the Mandate of 5th September 1945 (yielding of sovereignity to


the Repuplic of Indonesia) and UU No 3 of 1950 (establishes that the office of the Governor is to be held by the King), and Perda No 5 of 1954 (the existance of SG and PAG is acknowledged by the government). Based on historical facts and legal dynamics, society has also developed arguments concerning the Special Status of Yogyakarta, a summary follows: The loss of the Diponegoro war (national heroes, the Sultanate's nobility) during the war against the VOC in 1830 had the following outcomes 1) The VOC reduced the size of the Sultanate to the current size of Yogyakarta province, 2) the policy of forced cultivation (Culturstelsel), 3) validation of the political contract between the Dutch Crown and the reigning sultan, 4) the yielding of the sovereignity of the sultanate to the Dutch Crown, through the application of colonial law to the structure of governance of the Yogyakarta monarchy (Rijksblads). This means that both the Sultanate and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) were similarly under Dutch control. On the 17th August 1945, Indonesia achieved its independence. At that time Sultan HB IX took the initiative to proclaim the independence of the Sultantate from the Dutch Crown (thus freeing itself from the political contract of 1940) through the 5th September 1945 Mandate. This Mandate simultaneously surrendered sovereignity to the new nation of Indonesia. The political dynamics which show RUUK to be illegitimate are as follows: 1) UUD 1945 article 18, where, with respect to the autonomy of customary systems of governance, the authority of autonomous kingdoms become a part of the Republic of Indonesia. 2) The Charter referring to the status of the Sultan and Paku Alam of Ir. Soekarno on the 19th August 1945, that makes clear that the Sultan and Pakualaman are the administrative power of Yogyakarta 3) The Mandate of the 5th September 1945 which states that the head of the authorities of the Yogyakarta Region is directly responsible to the President of the Republic of Indonesia. 4) The Mandate of the 30th October 1945 which explains how the governance of Special Region of Yogyakarta is to be adjusted to comply with UUD 1945. 5) UU no 22 of 1948 about local governance, which was later reinforced by the UU No3 of 1950 concerning the establishment of the Special Region of Yogyakarta. UU No 22 of 1948 has already been rescinded with the issuance of UU no 1 of 1957 (Parliamentery Democracy Era). UU No 1 of !957 was subsequently rescinded as UU No 18 of 1965 (Guided Democracy Era). was issued. UU No 18 of 1965 was rescinded with the issuance of UU No 5 of 1974 (New Order Era) and UU No 5 of 1974 rescinded with the issuance of UU No 22 of 1999 (Reform Era) that ordains that the Regional Heads of all Indonesia are to be directly elected by the people. The proposed UU for the Special Staus of Yogyakarta not only has the potential to create absolute power (authoritarian) within a state system that maintains a high regard for democracy, but also potentially causes: 1. The expropriation of state land (that for which no right of ownership has been granted) to become private land (whether individual or institutional), if ta return to the Rijksblad system is authorised. 2. The disintegration of the nation and the state because of it will provide impetus for the various monarchies and remnants of monarchies across the territory of the Repuplic of Indonesia to attempt to reclaim their assets. 3 A threat to the sovereignity of nation and state (state within a state) that is clearly forbidden by the Pancasila Ideology and UUD 1945. In this regard it becomes a key responsibility of the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia to safeguard its integrity, and not to undermine it because they have consumed a false version of history that has been pushed by separatist movements. C. The process of legitimising the project amongst society and associated breaches.


1. Promotion to the Elite Information about and promotion of the mining project has been directed to outsiders and to those who do not really have a direct connection to the effects of the mining project, such as the local elite, teachers, mass organisations, perpetrators of violence, and local people living outside the mining concession area. Such communication does not imply agreement (those who have been consulted are not automatically in agreement) because communication about the project take the form of an announcement. If promotions such as these are regarded as a valid mechanism for negotiation, then the mining lobby has effectively been able to impose its own wishes whilst claiming to be acting in the name of the democratic process. 2. Horizontal Conflict The chronology of conflict (attached) shows that socio-political conflicts associated with iron sand mining have the potential to introduce violations of human rights. This is in accordance with the conclusion of Komnas HAM [National Human Rights Commission] which has already made three visits to the coastal communities to carry out investigations (the latest being on the 9th February 2011). 3. Utilization of armed agents. The Indonesian National Military and Police are state apparatus, not thugs paid by a company or by irresponsible authority figures to disturb the social peace. This is important to state clearly because in the name of “upholding the law” it is not impossible that mining interests utilize armed agents to confront the people, and military and police become caught up in serious infractions. The principal responsibility of the Military and Police is to protect society because the people comprise the highest sovereignity of the Unitary State of the Repuplic of Indonesia (NKRI) according to UUD 1945, and maintain the integrity of the Republic from separatist movements, albeit under the pretext of claiming a 'special status'. 4. Criminalisation of the people It is only natural that the mine lobby will manipulate the issue, taking it from the social-political domain into the criminal domain, because actually each of the actions that they have undertaken to bring about the project constitute an utter violation of the law whenever a case is made. In 2009-2010 a farmer (Tujiko) became the target for criminalisation on a trivial matter only because he raised questions about his rights to the land which should be guaranteed by law. It is not impossible that any individual who is not in agreement with the mining of iron sand could become the target of criminalisation. The fundamental problem of PT JMI's plan to mine iron sands is about land; land as both a living space and a provider of livelihood to the coastal inhabitants of Kulon Progo. The legal establishment of land rights in the mining concession area has already been clarified because the land rights of monarchies and remnants of monarchies (PAG and SG) have been withdrawn and have been replaced by the state. This legal determination is further strengthened due to the local people possessing proof of land ownership. The people's reaction to Government an d PT JMI's claim that the land in the mining concession area (including the location of the pilot project) belongs to PAG has already triggered acts of criminalisation from mine supporters to the local people, in the instances of Tukijo's use of his right to question the state apparatus as to the aim of magersari, and the people's own


initiative to close down the pilot project on the 17th December 2010. 5. Acts of Terrorism directed at the people Any person who deliberately uses violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear, or brings about a large number of victims, can be categorised as committing the criminal offence of terrorism20. Such criminal offences have been repeatedly been carried out by irresponsible parties towards the coastal inhabitants of Kulon Progo, such as the burning of outposts and damage to houses on the 27th October 2008, or the provocation of public officials to mobilise perpetrators of violence (and intimidate state apparatus) to oversee the progress of the AMDAL through the constitutional obstacles (the newspapers Meteor from the 21st February 2011, and Tempo and Republika from the 22nd February 2011 are full of provocative statements from Sultan HB X that he will employ hired thugs if the iron sands mine should continue to encounter obstacles). D. The people's attempts to settle the matter. At the local level, the source of conflict is the plan to mine iron sands, meaning that the cancellation of the project is the only way to achieve a peaceful solution to the matter. If the government is intelligent, wise and with the people, then it should be able to find a development agenda that is in line with the development process that the coastal inhabitants of Kulon Progo have carried out over the last 30 years, namely development of agriculture on the coastal land so that it becomes the cornerstone of the local economy, and not land-grabbing projects. The people have sent letters to various interested parties such as: 1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia, asking to cancel the contract of work 2. The Ministry of the Environment, concerning the environmental problems (citing contraventions of UU No 23 of 1997, UU no 27 of 2007, UU No 32 of 2009, PP No 27 of 1999) 3 The Interior Minister, to withdraw Perda DIY No 2 of 2010 concerning the RTRWP DIY 2009-2029 (rather than public officials would commit crinimal offences) 4. The Regional and Provincial DPRDs, concerning land use planning (citing contraventions of UU No 10 of 2004, Interior Minister''s Ordinance No 28 of 2008, UU No 26 of 2007) 5. The People's Representative Council (DPR) of the Republic of Indonesia, to reject the mining project (citing contraventions of UU No 5 of 1960, UU No 39 of 1999, UU No 11 of 2005) 6. Komnas HAM [National Human Rights Commission] about the threat of human rights violations. To many parties it may seem that we are coming from a (fundamental) standpoint of total rejection, as we have rejected several different attempts to reach out to our interests. However it is vital to understand that mining and agriculture along the coast are mutually contradictory to each other. If mining should take place then agriculture will be lost, and vice versa. Therefore to find convergence between the interests of the different parties (the people, government and the corporation) is an attempt to go through with the mining plans whilst at the same time not going through with them, something that common sense would tell us is impossible to occur. NGOs would be better off studying some logic first, before acting to their own ends, and trying to become brokers of the dispute. Whichever term is used: mediation, negotiation, compromise, win-win solution, we reject anything that is designed to result in the mining of iron sands. A win-win solution

20 UU No 15 Tahun 2003


could only occur if the plan to mine iron sands is permanently cancelled by law, because there are many other options available to plan an agenda for development that is truly mutually beneficial. E. Direction, degree and landscape of conflict. Arising from government's reluctance to be open with the people, and the shortfall of communication when dealing with the people (it should be dialogue, not monologue), this conflict has sharpened and spread as those who have an interest in mining the people's land have carried out a series of excessive actions. The conflict has been triggered by government violence, whether physical violence (such as the clashes with the police that occurred on 20 October 2009), or violence which takes the form of the deception of the people through the engineering of law/policy. If the government permits or even nutures this conflict, it is not impossible to imagine that the next step will be a massacre of the people by armed agents. If the governement continues to impose its will, so we will fight the injustice, in whatever form that may take. By continuing to live as farmers we ensure a continuity for all concerned, as we represent the key to humanity's food needs. The weapons of the state can only wound and kill, but let us use our own weapons to bring life to the government, the people, the forces, corporations, thugs, even Pakualam / Sultan, by farming, of course! To Farm or to Die, Resist the Iron Mine! 22 Februari 2011 References Anon ymous, 2007. Laporan Baseline Survey: Optimalisasi Lahan Pasir Pantai Bugel Kulon Progo untuk Pengembagan Tanaman Hortikultura dengan Teknologi Inovatif Berwawasan Agribisnis. Fakultas Pertanian UGM, Yogyakarta _______, 1940. Surat Perjanjian antara Pemerintah Hindia Belanda dan Kesultanan Yogyakarta dated 18 March 1940 _______.2008. Application for Contract of Works from The Government of the Republic of Indonesia by PT JM and IM Limited. ________, 2008. Industri Baja Terpadu Kulon Progo Jogyakarta: Aktivitas Pertambangan Berwawasan Lingkungan, dari Pasir Besi ke Pig Iron. Presentation Material Iman Rejo, 1996. Laporan Perintis Lingkungan Hidup Gisik Wana Tara Dusun Bugel Kecamatan Panjatan Kabupaten Kulon Progo Propinsi DI Yogyakarta. No publisher .


_________, 1999.Teknologi Pertanian dan Agroindustri: Sumur Renteng. no publisher, Yogyakarta. Keputusan Presiden No 33 Tahun 1984 Tentang Pemberlakuan Sepenuhnya UU No 5 Tahun 1960 di Propinsi DIY Kontan Weekly (2008). No 10 XIII. Amri, Asnil Bambani. “Pembayun: Itu Bukan Tanah Warga”. Week of 14 December 2008. Kompas (2008a). Arif, A., Sri Hartati Samhadi, Maria Hartiningsih. “Yang Muda, Yang Bertani” Friday, 11 April 2008 __________ (2008b). Arif, A., Sri Hartati Samhadi, Maria Hartiningsih. “Berguru Hidup pada Gumuk Pasir”. Friday, 11 April 2008 ___________ (2008c). Arif,A., Sri Hartati Samhadi, Maria Hartiningsih. “Petani Berhadapan dengan Kekuasaan” Friday, 11 April 2008 ___________ (2008d). Arif,A., Sri Hartati Samhadi, Maria Hartiningsih. “Ancaman Kehancuran Pesisir Selatan Kulon Progo” Friday, 11 April 2008

Luthfi, A.N., M. Nazir S., A. Tohari, Dian A.W., and Diar Candra T. 2009. Keistimewaan Yogyakarta: Yang Diingat dan Yang Dilupakan. STPN. Yogyakarta 13 Mulyono, 2006. Rencana Pembangunan Pabrik Pengolahan Pasir Besi di Kulon Progo. Public Discussion:”Pertambangan Pasir Besi Kulon Progo dan Masa Depan Aset Bangsa”, di UMY Saturday, 28 June 2008 Yogyakarta Menteri Dalam Negeri, 2010. Hasil Evaluasi Rancangan Peraturan Daerah Tentang Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Propinsi DIY 2009-2029, dated 16 February 2010. Poerwokoesoemo, S. 1985. Kadipaten Paku Alaman, Gadjah Mada Univerity Press, Yogyakarta


Peraturan Pemerintah No 27 Tahun 1999 concerning AMDAL Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No 7 Tahun 1993 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No 27 Tahun 2009 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No 28 Tahun 2008 Peraturan Daerah Propinsi DIY No 5 Tahun 1954 Concerning Land Rights in DIY Peraturan Daerah Propinsi DIY No 3 Tahun 1984 Pelaksanaan Berlaku Sepenuhnya UU No 5 Tahun 1960 Di Propinsi DIY Peraturan Daerah Propinsi DIY No 2 Tahun 2010 Concerning Land Use Planning in DIY 2009-2010 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kulon Progo No 1 Tahun 2003 concerning Land Use Planning in Kabupaten Kulon Progo 2003-2013 Rancangan Peraturan Daerah concerning Land Use Planning in DIY 2009-2029 Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom. 1992. Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conseptual Analysis, Land Economics 68(3), p 249-262 Soemarjan, S. 1986. Perubahan Sosial di Yogyakarta. Gadjah Mada University Press. Yogyakarta Shiddieq, D., Tohari, B. Djadmo, D. Kastono, Saparso, Sulakhudin, dan Y.G. Bulu. 2008. Pertanian Berkelanjutan di Lahan Pasir Pantai Selatan DIY. Fakultas Pertanian UGM, Yogyakarta Suryo, D. 2004. Penduduk dan Perkembangan Kota Yogyakarta 1900-1990. The 1st International Conference on Urban History Surabaya, August 23-25 2004.


Surjomihardjo, A. 1989. Penelitian Kota Yogyakarta 1880-1930 Suatu Tinjauan Historis Perkembangan Sosial. Berita Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi tahun ke-3 No 1.p 17-27. 14

UU No 22 Tahun 1948 concerning the establishment of Key Procedures concerning the SelfGovernance of areas with the Right to Arrange and Run their own Households UU No 3 Tahun 1950 concerning the Establishment of Special Region of Yogyakarta UU No 5 Tahun 1960 concerning the Establishment of Agrarian Fundamentals UU No 11 Tahun 1967 concerning the Establishment of Mining Fundamentals UU No 23 Tahun 1997 concerning the Management of the Environment UU No 22 Tahun 1999 concerning Local Governance UU No 10 Tahun 2004 concerning the Establishment of Regulations for Legislation UU No 32 Tahun 2004 concerning Local Government UU No 26 Tahun 2007 concerning Land Use UU No 27 Tahun 2007 concerning Coastlines and Small Islands UU No 4 Tahun 2009 concerning Coal Mining UU No 32 Tahun 2009 concerning Protecting and Managing the Environment.

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