Gandhi, Secularism and Social Capital in Modern India - CiteSeerX

© National Academy of Psychology (NAOP) India Psychological Psychological Studies Studies (June (June 2009) 2009) 54:00–00 54:00–00

1

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Gandhi, Secularism and Social Capital in Modern India Ragini Sen, Wolfgang Wagner

Received: 9 February 2009 / Accepted: 5 May 2009

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 was witness to Hindu Muslim conflict at its peak. In the 1990’s, ethnic conflict was used by right wing ideologues to change the fabric of secular India. Using interview data and within a social representational framework the study demonstrates the processes whereby out-groups/in-groups are formed. Further, it is argued that religious tolerance as envisaged in Gandhian philosophy, needs to be an integral part of the debate on role of religion in the public sphere. Keywords: Gandhi, Hindutva, Ingroup, Outgrop, Politics, Representation, Secularism, Secular, Gandhi, Conflict, Religion

Secularism and Peaceful Co-existence of all Religions (Sarvadharma Sambhav) Impelled by the disastrous consequences of ethnic conflict, at the time of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, the Indian government took on the role of reforming religion in the pursuit of social justice and equality. Secularism became a political slogan to contain the growth of Hindu nationalism. The progressives believed that traditional religious strictures encompassing the entire spectrum of various religions were the major impediment to the building of modern India since at points of religious conflict or propagation, social capital nose dived, and intolerance became the predominant norm. Hence under the aegis of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, the concept of secularism was imported from the West (Chopra, 1994; Singh, 1961). But its western interpretation, which separates state politics from religion, was not followed. The word secular, itself, was inserted into the Preamble by the 42nd amendment act of 1976. It implied equality of all religions and religious tolerance. India therefore does not have an official state religion (Mahmood, 1996). R. Sen1 • W. Wagner2 Logistics, Mumbai, India 2 University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain, and Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, Austria 1

e-mail: [email protected]

Gandhi, in contrast, was not bothered by the American idea of the separation of church and state because he felt that in India religion is so powerful in the social order, that the western concept of secularism did not make much sense in the geo-cultural context. In deviance to the western concept of secularism, Gandhi suggested Sarvadharma Sambhav, to prevent conflicts caused by religious bigotry. Gandhi subscribed to the Vedantic view of unity in multiplicity and believed that God is ethics and morality; He is even the atheism of the atheist. By this approach, Gandhi had deduced a simple but significant logic: People lived by a set of beliefs whether they are rooted in atheism, secularism or spiritualism and these need to be accommodated in a secular polity. Although Gandhi believed in the fundamental truth and equality of all religions, he repeatedly told his followers that one must accept that an individual’s own religion is the truest to every man even if it stands low in the scales of philosophical comparison. But there is no denying the fact that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, implemented in 1791 was a comprehensive solution to the kinds of sectarian wars that had damaged Europe in the early modern era. According to it, people were free to follow the religion of their choice but the US government was forbidden to associate with an ‘Established’ church (Brown, E.S., 2003; Anastaplo, G., 2004). Thereby the 1791 clause helped to bring the country together at the moment of its founding. Secularism is, we believe, closely inter-twined with

2 the concept of social capital, which came into prominence with the work of Bourdieu (1983), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993; 2000). They claimed that there is increasing evidence which shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper and that a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital. According to Putnam (2000), social capital refers to connections among individuals — social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. It is in this context that secularism becomes an integral part of social capital. If secularism is challenged social capital nose dives since boundaries of the ‘Other’ become demarcated and norms of mutual respect and tolerance get challenged. Objects, events and histories get re-presented to rationalize suspicion and distrust. Using interview data we will demonstrate that through political interventions out-groups/in-groups can be created which erode the norms of a secular polity. We will also demonstrate that the process of social identification is driven by content rather than by intergroup differentiation. Further, we will argue that religious tolerance as envisaged in Gandhian philosophy, needs to be an integral part of the debate on role of religion in the public sphere.

Method Participants Twenty interviews, ten each, were carried out amongst Hindu and Muslim, married males in the age group of 25 to 35 years residing in Dharavi who were semi-literate (literacy was less than nine years of education) and belonged to the lower socio-economic strata as indicated by their slum residence. Age varied from 25 to 35 years. Material and Procedure The fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 2003 when the atmosphere in India was charged with communal tension and the hawkish Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) was still in power. Given the communal surcharge and politically sensitive nature of the research, use was made of visual stimuli (Mamali, 2006). In order to elicit responses, the splinters under the skin, the respondents where shown visuals and then their reactions, which became akin to story telling, were probed. This method helped to build rapport with the respondents who were otherwise reluctant to talk on the subject of violence.

Psychological Studies (June 2009) 54:00–00

Research Locale Dharavi, the research locale, was not always a slum and it is as old as Mumbai. In the Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island (1909), Dharavi is mentioned as one of the six fishing communities (Koliwadas) of Mumbai. The original inhabitants of Dharavi were fisher folk who lived at the edge of the creek that came in from the Arabian Sea. Dharavi is located in the heart of greater Mumbai, the financial capital of India. The land value is estimated at USD $20 billion. Dharavi covers a total area of 223 hectares and has an estimated population of 700,000 people. However no recent and reliable data is available for the population. A recent survey has established that in the central area of Dharavi, the density is 336,643 people per square kilometer. Dharavi is more than 6 times denser than daytime Manhattan, which is about 50,000 people/km². Virtually all the regions of India are represented in this multi lingual slum where about a third of the total population is of native Marathi origin. Over time Dharavi has gained the distinction of being Asia’s largest slum and has become a communally sensitive area, which has on several occasions been a witness to ethnic riots (Srikrishna, 2000; Sharma, 2000). Post the communal riots in 1992, social capital, which was hitherto a driving force, was pushed aside and was replaced by discord. Since then the prevailing atmosphere has a communal surcharge. In the following, the quotes from interviewees’ statements are marked with “M” for Muslim and “H” for Hindu.

Results and Discussion Hindutva, Divisive Politics and Social Capital During the freedom struggle itself secularism was a dominant but highly debated principle. On the basis of the debates, in the constituent assembly, secular principles were enshrined in the Indian constitution. However the social dynamics was complex. Post independence the process of secularisation/industrialisation progressed at a slow pace. At this stage although the constitution was secular, the state apparatus: bureaucracy, judiciary, army and police, was infiltrated by Hindu communal elements; the government of Congress though predominantly secular had many leaders in important positions who were influenced by Hindu communal ideology. This resulted in a social development, which was mixed; on one hand secularism thrived and on the other communalism, which was hastily buried, did not die but remained dormant.


In the late 70’s and early 80’s communalism got a strong boost and the BJP took this opportunity to introduce communal rhetoric, in the social space. It openly declared its agenda of a Hindu Rashtra (Nation) and with alacrity capitalised on decades of gradual permeation of Hindutva (Jhingran, 1995). Using this as a take off point it launched an ideological, social and political onslaught on secular ethos (e.g. Basu, 1996; Brass, 1991; Lal, 2003; McGuire, et.al., 1996; Punyani, 2003; Bhargava,2002; Varshney, 2000; Wilkinson, 2004; Zakaria, 2002).These re-presentations of secular ethos, symbols and communal movements became akin to a charter(Malinowski, 1926; Liu and Hilton, 2005). The compulsions of electoral politics catalysed the Hindu ideologues to operate at multiple levels. They tried to delegitimise the concept of secularism on the grounds that it is a concept originating in the ‘Christian West’. It is important to emphasise that this is a mis-representation and demands conceptual and factual clarifications. Secularism is not rooted in the Christian West, but in, Secular West. In western societies secularism has originated and developed from diverse sources, which cannot be simplistically subsumed under one broad rubric. This is a mis-representation about a cultural system (region) expressed by BJP ideologues according to whom the West on matters related to faith and secularism, is homogenous from the viewpoint of attitudes, practices, social structures etc. This attempt of the BJP was a part of its political strategy to confuse people and create ‘psychologically primary’ (Allport, 1954) in-group feelings amidst the Hindus. And they were successful. Our respondents unanimously believed that Hindutva had become synonymous with Hindu, was dominant and was being used by the BJP to stifle Islam. “Hindu and Hindutva are same. It is connected with the BJP and is part of BJP’s agenda of Hindu Rashtra”. (M) “Hindutva is being used as a magnet to pull Hindus together and kill others. Hindutva means fighting for Hindus. Give your life for Hindus”. (H) The examples of discourse, given above, are indicative of a change in social dynamics wherein, religion as faith was taking on an ideological character and the boundaries of a focussed out group (Muslims) were beginning to be starkly demarcated and along with this the consolidation of the in-group (Hindus) was becoming pronounced. They also reflect the tendency of the majority or for that matter any dominant group, to forget that the notion of collective punishment, i.e., punishing an entire community for the crimes committed by some of its members, is anathema to modern notions of justice and democracy.

3

In Dharavi, there was a distinct difference between Hindus and Muslims in their attitude towards religion. The Muslim respondents appeared to have a welldefined concept of religion. “Religion (mazhab) is something in which a person believes (Aqida rakhta hai) and the religious person is who with his body and soul (dilo-jaan) will work for the religious body (‘majlis’), will read the namaaz with deep and true feelings. The fact is that a truly religious person will do anything for conscience (‘imaan’). A fundamentalist (katar insaan) can do anything, go to any extent”. (M) It is interesting to note that none of the Muslim respondents were critical about Islam. To talk against Islam appeared almost, forbidden, and this is one point, which we believe comes in the way of sustaining secularism. When a communicative space is sealed off ghettoisation and persecution become pre dominant. Consequently it’s not surprising that the Muslim respondents distinctly felt out-grouped. They were cynical, and in keeping with the mind set of an out-group felt persecuted and isolated by the majority community. “Any individual can get anything done against us provided they have money. Hence, riots, fights, violence are NORMAL things and this is largely directed at us. Today Hindutva dominates (bolbaala hai). In Hindustan the rule (‘hukumat’) is of Hindus. Islam has no say”. (M) This situation led to the creation of intergroup prejudice. The Muslim respondents believed that their own reference group was losing economic and/or political ground relative to the Hindus – the well defined other (Christie, Wagner & Winter, 2001) and had begun to consider their persecution as NORMAL. Simultaneously they, as mentioned before, considered Islam sacrosanct because of which Hindu respondents regarded almost all Muslims as fundamentalists and in league with Pakistan and Islamic brotherhood. “Everyone is burning inside. They are watching, asking … why are the Muslims fighting, attacking our people, blasting bombs? Even if we gave them Kashmir they will continue with their terrorist attacks. In fact these days when a fight takes place at the border, riots take place here”. (H) It is on the basis of such a divide that the right wing ideologues were able to equate Islam with fundamentalism and the effect of this rhetoric and indoctrination had a distinct effect. Communal polarisation was starkly evident: “Muslims are ready to give up their life for their religion. Basically you should keep the Muslims separately”. (H) In Dharavi, the combined effect of the psychological

4 onslaught, through metaphors, augmentation of history and rhetoric was far reaching. Once elaborated, the representations and their symbolic referent (negative characteristics attributed to the out group and consolidation of in-group around an imagined/real positive core) acquired near material reality in the discourse and interaction of the people sharing them. They began to structure and define objects populating the local worlds and this in turn became the pivot for determining their group identity (Moscovici, 2000; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Further, in order to consolidate the in-group feelings Hindutva forces spread the word that because of secularism the Muslims were being pampered although the reality is quite different. The social and economic condition of Muslim community is dismal (Sachar Committee, 2006). This rhetoric created feelings of insecurity within the respondents belonging to both communities. The feelings of relative deprivation, in comparison to another group, whether true or imagined, lead to a conflict situation (Boehnke, Hagan, & Hefler, 1998; Finchilescu & Dawes, 1998). Appeasement of Muslims a widely shared belief amidst the Hindu respondents, and feelings of persecution by the majority (Hindus) amongst the Muslim respondents, support Moscovici (1961) assertion that attitudes are embedded within a shared representation. It also raises questions regarding social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974), which suggests that our evaluation of out groups is determined by a single process such as intergroup differentiation. As the data show, the re-presentation of the other is a far more complex process (Liu & Sibley, 2006) since attitudes are not only anchored to an intrapersonal cognitive and emotional structure of concepts (Wagner, Valencia & Elejabarrieta, 1996) but also to an interpersonal and institutionalised structure through whose agency shared beliefs are circulated in the social psychological space (Castro &Gomes, 2005; Moscovici, 1988;). To further concretise the above, the BJP through the use of media, rhetoric and rallies propagated the view that India is a Hindu society. Thus the BJP created an “imagined community” of Hindu nationhood (Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Kohl & Fawcett, 1996; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As our data show this representation had acquired a social character although it is far from true since India has always followed the principles of pluralism and religious tolerance. The communal environment that consequently loomed led Hindus and Muslims to anchor their sense of identity and self esteem within their own cultural group. This perceivably gave them the twin sense of security and pride, which was stoked by demagogues to help sustain their political


agendas. This in turn strengthened each group’s sense of identity, and not only promoted a negative perception of the other group (Kakar, 2000; Shankar & Gerstein, 2007; Sen, 2005; 1996) but also created hetero referential perceptions (Sen & Wagner, 2005).

Figure 1 A protest march

For instance the Muslim respondents viewed the image of the child with the placard, which said, ‘punish those who destroyed Babri Masjid’, positively: “Look at this, even a small child understands the situation, then the adults should also respond”. (M) The Hindu respondents, on the contrary viewed it as indoctrination: “What does a child understand? Why should we involve children? This is a problem for adults to handle. All this is drama, this is all propaganda. Does a child know what is Babri Masjid? He is 3-4 years old, can he read?” (H) Through such processes, ethnic identities became focussed, stereotypes heightened and a perception of each other in terms of shared category characteristics was formed. Consequently, an inevitable homogenisation and depersonalisation followed. Hindu Respondent “We worship the sun, east. The others (Muslims) worship the moon, west. We worship idols, the others do not; we believe in many Gods (devi-devtaa), they do not; we are proud Indians, they put their religion first”. (H)


Muslim Respondent “Islam is a clean religion. No idol or stone worship, peaceful. No noisy, aarti (chants sung by Hindus). With true feelings, clean heart, pray and ask for forgiveness. … Prophet Mohammed is great”. (M) As our data show, the re-presentations of the other had cognitive, affective and behavioural dimensions (Wagner, Valencia & Elejabarrieta, 1996; Wagner, 1998). Social representations began to guide interpretation at subordinate levels; the sun, the moon, idols and chants were all co-opted, to organize people’s concrete encounters with the world (Valsiner, 2003). Because of the religious divide the visual of a child became decoded as indoctrination, propaganda or a matter of support. Events (in this case rallies and chariot marches) became socially meaningful, a part of culture, when they were anchored in ‘the field of representations’ (Duveen, 2007). Overall the data reveal that even in a secular and democratic set up when social capital becomes scarce, conflict and tension take the front seat in the formation of social representations, especially in the context of majorities and minorities (Moscovici & Markova, 1998) and symbols begin to get a different signification which can be employed for bringing about social change. Conflict, Secular and the ‘Knower’ Cultural diversity and religious pluralism in India have been subjects of unending curiosity. In fact when India adopted a secular Constitution some observers apprehended the disintegration of the secular model itself. Secularism assumed a new meaning and content difficult to capture in the Occidental experience which in varying degrees has subscribed to Habermas’s view: in a secular state, government has to be placed on a non religious footing. It is perhaps time to reflect on the subject of secularism since in the twenty first century religious traditions and communities of faith have gained a new hitherto unexpected political importance (Berger, 1999). Given the global atmosphere of intolerance, it is perhaps worthwhile to examine what Gandhi and Habermas post his theological turn (Harrington, 2007) thought and wrote on the subject of role of religion in public sphere. In the Indian context the understanding of religion has been slightly different. There are contradictions and complexities in this scenario. In traditional India religion is not something that is part of life, but that, which gives meaning to all of life (Baird, 1993) and this is borne out by

5

our data. In the entire discourse none of the respondents, Hindu or Muslim, were critical of religion (dharam, mazhab) per se. They have criticised the other’s religion and in the case of Hindu respondents some have criticised religion as practiced, “nobody is dharmic (religious) these days, and you will not find a single person, here, who can be called religious”, or given a different interpretation “dharma (religion) is to follow the course of justice”, or “Hindutva does not belong to any party and is part of the broad philosophy of Hinduism”. The general consensus amidst the respondents was cynical and the feeling was that religion had lost its ‘true’ meaning and had become a ploy for political expediency. But all of them have stood by religion. If that is the case, maybe its time to recognise that secularism does not mean remaining religiously illiterate, indifferent or distanced. Habermas suggests that a theory of argumentation or discourse, which he calls the “reflective form” of communicative action through which different “logics of argumentation” can be justified, is essential. By default this requires a communicative space that is free from diktats and leaves scope for ones own interpretations as exemplified by Gandhi who though a staunch Hindu believed that he was not required to accept that every word, for instance, in the Vedas is divinely inspired. On the contrary he insisted that he would decline to be bound by any genealogy of reason, however learned it may be, if it is repugnant to reason or moral sense. This is what Habermas (1990) called moral maturation— the growing ability to integrate interpersonal perspectives. Habermas argued that the, “encrypted semantic potentialities” of religion, can be if required, “yield up their content of truth for profane thinking”. The proviso being that, “religion’s cognitive contents are liberated from their original dogmatic encapsulation in the melting pot of argumentative speech” (Harrington, 2007). The endpoint of this process coincides with the capacity to engage in the mutual perspective taking required by the other. As per our data, in India during the BJP regime, instead of inter-action and “reflective form” of communicative action, the exact opposite was happening. Religious prejudices and passions were creating a social re-presentation of the other, which was leading to the quick shutting down of communicative spaces. “What Hindus say is RIGHT, what minorities think will be controlled. Do things according to the will of the Hindus”. (M) “The truth is that basically Hindu people do not like

6 Muslims. It’s a wrong thing but that's the truth. There are too many issues, Ram mandir, Babri masjid, fatwas (religious diktats). They all divide us”. (H) The data show that religion has become a central issue in identity formation but this social change is not being accepted by many. Habermas, somewhat like Gandhi believes that in modern day societies, especially in the West, there is a tendency to underestimate the existential force of religious belief—how such belief can, at least for some believers, provide the only sufficient basis for their political views. Further, social polity still appears to be blind to the fact that religion and secularism may not be an antithesis of one another. Gandhi epitomised such logic and our data supports this view. Some of our respondents demonstrated these twin characteristics. They combined deep religious beliefs with a secular perspective. “Terrorists and people who kill in the name of religion believe they are religious, but they are not. Although I am religious, I condemn them”. (M) “We do need a religion but not this kind. To be religious you don’t have to do anything different. These rules are useless. Fish live in water, if you drink this water are you not religious?” (H) The significant point is that such feelings existed in an atmosphere, which was vitiated by communal politics. These reflect important re-presentations of religion and secularism and personify the spirit on the basis of which India still remains religious but largely secular. This is a social category, which needs to be recognised and given social space. Gandhi’s philosophy regarding religion still remains largely relevant in contemporary India and to stretch a point perhaps it can be utilised in other societies as well since there is no denying the fact that schisms based on religious differences have become the bane of modern societies. There is much to learn from Gandhi in this respect while still being critical in this regard. For instance Gandhi was par excellence the ‘knower’ of social re-presentations. His astute understanding of culture, mythology, religion— the pulse of the people, not only brought women to the forefront and was used for environment protection, but revolutionised the order of prevailing beliefs and actions. The following are but a few examples of Gandhi’s use of symbols which were a part of a cultural narrative to change signification and thereby mobilise public opinion. Such generated symbols can be, and have been, used for both constructive and divisive purposes since they tend to


have strong evocative power due to their iconic form and affective charge (Fernandez, 1991). For instance, as we have shown in an earlier paper, the BJP exploited mythology—Ram, for divisive politics whereas Gandhi used mythology—Sita (consort of the Hindu God, Ram, worshipped in millions of households) to promote secularism and the struggle for India’s freedom. Like the Hindutva ideologues, Gandhi also frequently made use of traditional Indian symbols but to convey a constructive, secular, socio political message. For instance, Sita, generally portrayed as a lifeless stereotype of subservient (and therefore, ideal) womanhood, was re-presented by Gandhi as a symbol of self sufficient, independent India. She only wore ‘Khadi’ (homespun cloth). The symbol of Sita was re-presented to convey an anti imperialist message and to inspire women to join in the struggle for freedom. In one masterstroke, the medium carried the message to millions. It was more effective than many other esoteric symbols. The concept and the intention are more startling if viewed in its historical context. When Gandhi came into the forefront the average life span of Indian women was only 27 years. Maternal mortality rate, was high, child marriage prevalent and only 2 per cent of women were literate. The ‘purdah’ (segregation of women from men) was the norm and commonly practised. Yet he brought hundreds of women on to the streets in his civil disobedience movement without a single word of social censure. Gandhi had astutely realised the power of myth, which is a concoction of truth and falsity both, and used it to catalyse people to join the struggle for independent India. If such non violent and subversive tactics were successful during the independence movement, they also showed a result in the 70’s when the now famous Chipko (Cling) movement was sparked (Weber, 2005, 1990; Rangan, 2001; Guha, 2000; Shiva, 1991). While the concept of saving trees by embracing them is old in Indian culture, in the 70's it was re-presented to stop the commercial exploitation of Himalayan forests (Shiva & Bandyopadhyay, 1986). This just goes to show that when a set of beliefs begins to be socially represented it can usher in long lasting social change. Thus the significance imparted to trees became the basis of a social movement. Just in the same way as Moscovici (1976) pointed out that there were trees in the world before Green Parties gave them significance. Further, they show the processes whereby the unfamiliar becomes familiar by utilising the existing, `field of representations' as super-ordinate meanings to (re)situate and therefore, understand, an object, activity or event (Wagoner, 2008).

7


The above examples of efficacy of non violent processes and movements show that a common cause enables people to build communities, to commit themselves to each other, and to knit the social fabric. This still appears a distinct possibility. These linkages both disambiguate the world for a group and enable straightforward communication among its members. This is social capital. Throughout history it is small powerful groups that have changed the course of history and who have with their ingenuous ways altered the age old practice which has generally been witness to the victory of monetary capital over social capital.

Conclusions Post the cold war era it is increasingly evident that violence is not only between nation states engaged in power plays; it is increasingly between ethnic or religious groups, often within nation-states. The case of Hindu Muslim conflict in India (Sen & Wagner, forthcoming; Khan & Liu, 2008; Tripathi, 2005; Hutnik, 2004; Nandy, 2000, 1995; Kakar, 1996; Ghosh & Kumar, 1991; Ghosh, Kumar & Tripathi, 1992; Singh, 1989) with which we have dealt is a small step towards understanding inter ethnic conflict within nation states. To move a little closer to the resolution of this conflict, besides “moral maturation”, operationalised by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and discussed by him and Habermas, there is a need to evolve a shared trajectory and a sensible identification of points of anchoring which by assimilation on either side help blur the lines of demarcation between the traditionalist, religious and the secularists. This may in the long run catalyse an integrative process. New meanings can be produced, not only, through messages coming from outside a group (e.g. other cultures, experts and active minorities), but can also be created by innovative use of social tools which already exist in a society. Through discourse representations can be schematized within a context, in such a way that both the representation and the context are transformed (Wagoner, 2008). With the creative use of discourse Gandhi created linkages between concept (independence of India, struggle against British imperialism) and representations (Sita), in order to generate new perspectives, such as involvement of women in the freedom struggle. It was a novel combination and made the unfamiliar, familiar. Similar processes worked during the Chipko movement. Such referential points of anchoring and the use of collective symbolic coping (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002) can help to overcome inter ethnic divide. As

discussed, Gandhi defied the logic of the divide between religion and secularism and used a diverse collection of referential points, symbols and myths as mechanisms of collective symbolic coping, to unify Indians against British imperialism. He broke through well defined boundaries. In fact it will be difficult to find a man who was as deeply religious as Gandhi yet most secular. This is a social category, which needs to be recognised and given social space. Religious tolerance (Sarvadharma Sambhav) as envisaged in Gandhian philosophy, perhaps, needs to be accommodated within the framework of secularism as defined constitutionally. This combined with the logic of theories of argumentation (Habermas, 2005; Harrington, 2007) may help in the augmentation of social capital and creation of a mature democracy. As argued earlier a “moral maturation” is required both in academic scholarship and the social polity. Whether we choose to keep our distance or not, the fact remains that in a democracy people will bring their cultural baggage—myths, beliefs, values and common sense into the political arena. There is no ignoring the fact that this is a fundamental reality in Asian societies, particularly so in the Indian context and to an increasing degree in Western societies as well.

References Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley. Anastaplo, G. (2004). The Constitutionalist. Notes on the First Amendment. London, Lexington Books. Anderson, (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Baird, R.D. (1993). Religion and law in Independent India. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors. Basu, A. (1996). Mass movement or elite conspiracy? The puzzle of Hindu nationalism. In D. Ludden (Ed.) Making India Hindu. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Berger, P.L. (Ed., 1999). The Decentralisation of the World. Washington. Bhargava R. (2002). Liberal, Secular Democracy and Explanations of Hindu Nationalism. Oxford: Routledge. Boehnke, K., Hagan, J, & Hefler, G. (1998). On the develop-ment of xenophobia in Germany: The adolescent years. Journal of Social Issues, 54, 585–602. Bourdieu, P. (1983). Forms of capital. In Richards, J.C. (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood Press. Brass, P. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. Delhi: Sage, 1991. Brown, E.S. (2003). Ratification of the Twenty first Amendment to

8


the constitution of the United States: State Convention Records and laws. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Limited.

attribution error revisited. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 39, pp 16–36.

Castro & Gomes, 2005. Genetically modified organisms in the Portuguese press: thematization and anchoring. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (1), 121–123.

Kohl, P. and Fawcett, C. (Eds.) (1996). Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of. Archaeology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Christie, D.J., Wagner, R.V., & Winter, D.A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lal, V. (2003). The History of History: Politics and Scholarship in Modern India. New Delhi: OUP.

Coleman, J.C. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology 94: S95–S120. Coleman, J.C. (1994). Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chopra, V.D. (1994). Religious Fundamentalism in Asia. New Delhi: Gyan. Duveen, G. (2007). Culture and social representations. In J. Valsiner & A. Rosa (Eds.), Handbook of sociocultural psychology (pp. 543–559). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Finchilescu, G., & Dawes, A. (1998). Catapulted into democracy: South African adolescents’ socio-political orientations following rapid social change. Journal of Social Issues, 54, 563–583. Ghosh, E.S.K., Kumar, R., & Tripathi, R.C. (1992). The communal cauldron: Relations between Hindus and Muslims in India and their reactions to norm violations. In R. deRidder & R. Tripathi (Eds.), Norm violation and intergroup relations, 70–89. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press. Ghosh, E.S., & Kumar, R. (1991). Hindu-Muslim intergroup relations in India: Applying socio-psychological perspectives. Psychology and Developing Societies, Special Issue: Conflict and Harmony in Pluralistic Societies, 3, 93–112. Guha, R. (2000). Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change & Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hutnik, N. (2004). An intergroup perspective on ethnic minority identity. In J. Pandey (Ed.), Psychology in India revisited: Developments in the discipline, Vol. 3: Applied social and organisational psychology, 216–260. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Habermas, Jurgen (1990): Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, C. Lenhardt and S.W. Nicholsen (trans). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, Jurgen (2005): Religion in Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy,14: 1–25. Harrington, A. (2007). Habermas’s theological turn? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37:1, 44–61. Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Liu and Sibley (2006). Differential effects of societal anchoring and attitude certainity in determining support or opposition to (bi)cultural diversity in New Zealand. Papers on Social Representations, 15, 1.1–1.15. Retrieved March, 2007, from http://www.psr.jku.at/ Liu, J.H. & Hilton, D. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: social representations of history and their role in identity politics. British Journal of Social Psychology, 44:1–21 Mahmood, T. (1996). ‘Hindutva’, Constitution and Legislation. Religion and Law Review, Vol.V, 1–2. Malinowski, B. (1926). Myth in Primitive Psychology. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Mamali, C. (2006). The value of images for exploring the functions of social representations: toward self-generated pictorial social representations. A Comment on “History, emotions and hetero-referential representations” by Sen and Wagner (2005). Papers on Social Representations, 15, 3.1–3.9. Retrieved December 11, 2006, from http://www.psr.jku.at/ Mead, G.H. (1962). Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McGuire, John et. al. (Eds.) (1996): Politics of Violence; From Ayodhya to Behrampada. Delhi: Sage. Moscovici, S. (1961). La Psychoanalyse: Son image et Son Public. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Moscovici, S. (1976). Society Against Nature: The Emergence of Human Societies. Sussex, Brighton: The Harvester Press. Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes toward a description of social representations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 211–250. Moscovici, S. and Markova, I. (1998). Presenting social representations: a conversation. Culture & Society, 4, 371-410. Nandy, A. (1990). The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance. In Das, V. ( Ed.): Mirrors of Violence. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nandy, A., Trivedi, S., Mayaram,S. & Yagnik, A. (1995). Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and the Fear of Self. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Jhingran, S. (1995). Secularism in India. New Delhi: Manohar.

Nandy. A. (2002). Time Warps : The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Kakar, Sudhir (1996). The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Punyani, R. (2003). Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths. New Delhi: Sage.

Kakar, S. (2000). The time of Kali: Violence between religious groups in India. Social Research, 67, 877–899.

Putnam, R.D. (1993) Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Khan, S.S., & Liu, J.H. (2008). Intergroup attributions and ethnocentrism in the Indian Subcontinent: The ultimate

Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.


9

Rangan, H. (2001). Of Myth and Movements: Rewriting Chipko into Himalayan History. U.K.: Verso.

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. Social Science Information, 13, 65–93.

Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (2001). Self and nation. London: Sage.

Tripathi, R.C. (2005). Hindu social identities and imagined past: The faceoff between Ram temple and "martyred” mosque at Ayodhya. Psychological Studies, 50, 102–110.

Sachar, R. (2006). Sachar Committee Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community in India. New Delhi: Government of India. Sen, R. (2005). Us vs. them and Gandhi: Case of Hindu Muslim conflict in India. Psychological Studies, October Edition. Sen, R. & Wagner, W. (2005). History, emotions and heteroreferential representations in inter-group conflict: The example of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Papers on Social Representations, 16, 2.1–2.23. Retrieved September 6, 2007, from http://www.psr.jku.at/ Sen, R. and Wagner, W. (forthcoming). Cultural mechanics of fundamentalism: Religion as ideology, violence and divided identities in post Gandhi India. Culture and Psychology. Shankar, J., & Gerstein, L.H. (2007). The Hindu-Muslim conflict: A pilot study of peace building in Gujarat, India. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 13, 365-379. Sharma, K. (2000). Dharavi. New Delhi: Penguin Books Shiva, V. and Bandyopadhyay, J. (1986). The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of the Chipko Movement. Mountain Research and Development, Vol. 6, No. 2, 133–142. Shiva, V. (1991). Ecology and the Politics of Survival: Conflicts Over Natural Resources in India. New Delhi: Sage. Singh, A.K. (1989). Intergroup relations and social tensions. In J. Pandey (Ed.), Psychology in India: The state-of-the-art, Vol. 2: Basic and applied social psychology,159–223. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Valsiner, J. (2003). Beyond social representations: A theory of enablement. Papers on Social Representations, 12, 6.1–6.16 (http://www.psr.jku.at/) Varshney, A. (2000). Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Wagner, W., Valencia, J. & Elejabarrieta, F. (1996). Relevance, discourse and the ‘hot’ stable core of social representations: A structural analysis of word associations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 331–352. Wagner, W. (1998). Social representations and beyond – brute facts, symbolic coping and domesticated worlds. Culture and Psychology, 4, 297–329. Wagner, W., Kronberger, N., & Seifert, F. (2002). Collective symbolic coping with new technology: Knowledge, images and public discourse. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 323–343. Wagner, W., & Hayes, N. (2005). Everyday Discourse and Common Sense - The Theory of Social Representations. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. Wagoner, B. (2008). Commentary: Making the familiar unfamiliar. Culture & 72. Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 467–474 Weber, T. (1990). Hugging the Trees: The Story of the Chipko Movement. New Delhi: Penguin. Weber, T. (2005). Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor. U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Singh, R. (1961). Dharm Nirpeksha Raj. New Delhi.

Wilkinson, S.I. (2004). Votes and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Srikrishna (2000). Srikrishna Commission Report, Vol. 2. New Delhi: Government of India.

Zakaria, R. (2002). Communal Rage in Secular India. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan.