Cogn Process (2010) 11:219–226 DOI 10.1007/s10339-009-0335-2
RESEARCH REPORT
Gender-related differences in moral judgments M. Fumagalli Æ R. Ferrucci Æ F. Mameli Æ S. Marceglia Æ S. Mrakic-Sposta Æ S. Zago Æ C. Lucchiari Æ D. Consonni Æ F. Nordio Æ G. Pravettoni Æ S. Cappa Æ A. Priori
Received: 2 April 2009 / Accepted: 10 August 2009 / Published online: 30 August 2009 Marta Olivetti Belardinelli and Springer-Verlag 2009
Abstract The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these
M. Fumagalli R. Ferrucci F. Mameli S. Marceglia S. Mrakic-Sposta S. Zago A. Priori (&) Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Fondazione IRCCS Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico, Mangiagalli e Regina Elena, Universita` di Milano, Via F. Sforza, 35, Milan 20122, Italy e-mail:
[email protected] M. Fumagalli R. Ferrucci F. Mameli S. Marceglia S. Mrakic-Sposta A. Priori Centro Clinico per le Neuronanotecnologie e la Neurostimolazione, Fondazione IRCCS Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico, Mangiagalli e Regina Elena, Milan, Italy M. Fumagalli R. Ferrucci F. Mameli S. Marceglia S. Mrakic-Sposta S. Zago A. Priori Unita` Operativa di Neurologia, Fondazione IRCCS Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico, Mangiagalli e Regina Elena, Milan, Italy
differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive–emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.
C. Lucchiari G. Pravettoni Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali e Politiche, Centro interdipartimentale di Ricerca e Intervento sui Processi Decisionali (IRIDe), Universita` di Milano, Milan, Italy
Keywords Moral judgment Morality Utilitarianism Gender differences
D. Consonni F. Nordio Unita` di Epidemiologia, Fondazione IRCCS Ospedale Maggiore Policlinico, Mangiagalli e Regina Elena, Milan, Italy
Introduction
F. Nordio Dipartimento di Clinica Medica, Nefrologia e Scienze della Prevenzione, Universita` degli Studi, Parma, Italy S. Cappa Dipartimento di Neuroscienze, Centro di Neuroscienze Cognitive, Istituto Scientifico San Raffaele, Universita` Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy
The moral sense is central to the human mind and crucial in determining human behavior. Whereas philosophers have been speculating about the origin and determinants of morality since antiquity (Thomson 1986), psychological interest began in the 1960s and scientific investigation into the neurological mechanisms underlying moral choice began only recently.
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Philosophical and psychological studies have different objectives. Whereas philosophers are interested in developing a normative theory, psychologists primarily want to describe moral development and behavior. Without pursuing philosophers’ more ambitious goal of giving a complete normative account, psychological studies aim to pinpoint the major specific factors. The groundwork of moral psychology hinges on the theories proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg. Piaget’s psychological theory assumes that moral stages are universal and their development is invariable (Piaget 1932). In addition, Kohlberg’ theory assumes that morality is universal, equal for men and women and for all cultures (Kohlberg 1964). This idea has nevertheless been repeatedly questioned; the role of factors such as gender, education and religion opens the more general question about innateness of morality (Dupoux and Jacob 2007; Hauser et al. 2007). One of the major factors considered in evaluating moral reasoning and behavior is gender. According to ‘‘common sense’’, women were described as inclined to sentimentalism, to intuition and to emotion. Terms such as ‘‘angel of the hearth’’ convey an idea of women characterized by feelings, vocation to motherhood and care and empathy. Despite this cliche´, history contradicts this motherly image. Take for example witches, prostitutes, and son-killers. Even Kohlberg himself identified a strong interpersonal bias in the women’s moral judgments. Other researchers also questioned the possibility of a sex-related bias in Kohlberg’s theory (Gilligan 1982; Haan 1975; Holstein 1976). In particular, Gilligan pointed out that the Kohlberg model considers justice as the fundamental principle for moral behavior and penalizes women, according to whom the central moral problem is the conflict between self and other. Whereas men solve moral dilemmas in a rational way, respecting law and order, women are driven by emotion, empathy and care for others. These differences led Gilligan to describe two divergent modes of moral reasoning: an ethic of care and an ethic of justice (Gump et al. 2000). Other studies confirmed these differences in various tests for evaluating moral judgment (Aldrich and Kage 2003; Bjorklund 2003; Eisenman 1967; Gump et al. 2000; Indick et al. 2000; Skoe 1995). Despite these reports, others found no gender differences (Brabeck and Shore 2003; Jaffee and Hyde 2000; Keasey 1972; Lifton 1985; McGraw and Bloomfield 1987), leaving this topic open to debate. In the neuroscience field, neuroimaging (Greene and Haidt 2002; Greene et al. 2001, 2004) and lesional studies in patients with focal brain lesions (Koenigs et al. 2007) have now documented the neurobiological determinants of moral behavior. Except for Harenski et al. (2008) who studied the neural correlates of moral sensitivity in females
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and males and found greater posterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula activation in females, and greater inferior parietal cortex activation in males, these studies neglected to consider the gender factor. Research, expanding gender factors to other fields of psychology, disclosed gender differences in empathic ability (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Eisenberg 2005) and in other functions having a causal role in moral judgment, such as emotions (Aleman and Swart 2008; Hareli et al. 2009). These differences correlate also with the well-documented gender differences in brain structures (Cahill 2006; Gur et al. 1999; Luders et al. 2002; Raz et al. 2004; Tranel et al. 2005), neurotransmitter systems (Cahill 2006), cognitive performance (Bolla et al. 2004; Kimura 1996; Overman et al. 2004, 2006; Overman 2004; Reavis and Overman 2001; Vecchi and Girelli 1998; Voyer and Saunders 2004) and brain activation during cognitive tasks (Bell et al. 2006; Fischer et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2005; Weiss et al. 2003). Among other factors influencing moral judgment is education. Several studies investigated its role in relation to age, specifically in college students, and to a lesser extent, graduate students (Rest et al. 1999; Thoma 1993). Studying both undergraduate and graduate students, Maeda et al. (2009) found that students in medical schools give higher average moral judgment levels than students in business and other majors. These results suggested that such schools are preparing students for a profession or calling that is essentially a moral enterprise that serves as an environmental factor that influences level of moral judgment (Bebeau and Monson 2008). Among the few studies interested in addressing the relation between religion and morality, Hauser et al. (2007) found no differences in moral judgment according to religious affiliation. Moral judgment depends also crucially on cognitive and emotional processes. In their recent research about neural basis of morality, Greene et al. (2001) investigated this topic according to the utilitarian theory stating that an action is morally right if it produces the highest utility of any available alternative action. The morality and duty of an act were irrelevant. In this perspective, Greene distinguished between ‘‘personal’’ and ‘‘impersonal’’ moral actions, on the basis of the dual-process theory (Greene 2009; Greene et al. 2001; McGuire et al. 2009). This theory distinguishes a fast, unconscious and effortless affective system and a slow, conscious and effortful cognitive system. Whereas the affective system is activated by personal moral (PM) judgments, cognitive system is preferentially activated by impersonal conflicts. The term ‘‘utilitarian responses’’ denotes the decision to perform an action directed toward achieving the greatest advantage and the minimum disadvantage for aggregate welfare. People
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usually choose this course of action when faced with a nonmoral (NM) choice (for example, choosing to take the train instead of bus to avoid arriving late at an important meeting), or an emotionally non-salient decision. Conversely, when choice involves, for example, inflicting direct harm to one person to save the lives of others (a PM dilemma), most people decide against the action or to endorse it (utilitarian response) only after a high emotional conflict. Previous research in moral judgments, therefore, leaves gender-related differences and the relation between this factor and education and religion unclear. Neither does it specify the role of reason and emotion in the complex decisional processing involved in moral judgment nor can it be modulated by gender, religion and education. Having more complete information is essential in understanding the role of culture and nature in moral thinking and behavior. We designed this study to find out whether moral judgments differ between genders and differ according to cultural factors such as religious belief and education. To do so, we evaluated moral judgments with a computercontrolled procedure, the moral judgment task, testing NM, impersonal moral (IM) and PM dilemmas (Greene et al. 2001, 2004; Koenigs et al. 2007). As dependent variables, we assessed response times (RTs) and percentage of utilitarian responses. Utilitarian responses were defined as the decision to perform an action directed toward achieving the greatest advantage and the minimum disadvantage for aggregate welfare.
221 Table 1 Demographic data Gender
Education
Female
Health
Religion
N
Age Mean (±SE)
Catholic
16
23.25 (0.83)
9
24.11 (0.93) 24.92 (0.82)
Non-Catholic General Male
Health General
Catholic
13
Non-Catholic
12
22.41 (0.65)
Catholic
17
26.82 (1.50)
Non-Catholic
8
24.00 (0.85)
Catholic
9
24.66 (1.04)
16
24.75 (0.80)
Non-Catholic SE standard error
Moral judgment task We used the moral judgment task proposed by Greene and colleagues (Fumagalli et al. 2009; Greene et al. 2001, 2004). We used a battery of 30 practical dilemmas randomly extracted from 60 scenarios (Greene et al. 2004) translated into Italian. The task consisted of 20 NM dilemmas and two classes of ‘‘moral’’ scenarios subdivided into IM (18 scenarios) and PM (22 scenarios) dilemmas. RTs and percentage of utilitarian responses were recorded. In agreement with the utilitarian theory, we distinguished utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses. A utilitarian response implies judging actions by their ability to maximize good consequences, so that any harm to one person can be justified by a greater gain to others: individuals’ interests can be sacrificed for the sake of the community.
Materials and methods
Procedure section
Participants
The experimental procedure took 30 min for each subject. After participants gave their informed consent, we asked about age, school and religious belief. We evaluated handedness using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield 1971) and we also ensured the absence of neurological and psychiatric diseases. Subjects were seated in a quiet room in front of a personal computer. The moral judgment task was administered in accordance with Koenigs et al. (2007). Each dilemma was presented in a series of three screens of text. The first two screens each presented a paragraph describing the context and details of the dilemma. The third screen posed a question about a hypothetical action related to the scenario (‘‘Would you…in order to…?’’). Participants were allowed to read through screens 1 and 2 at their own pace, pressing the space bar to advance to the next screen. In the third screen, participants had a maximum of 25 s to read the final question and press the left (YES) or the right (NO) mouse button (Fig. 1). Stimuli were presented on a
One hundred healthy volunteers (50 males and 50 females, aged 20–32 years; education 14–22 years; Table 1) participated in the study. Subjects were recruited from among students at the University of Milan and received no reward for taking part in the experiments. All participants spoke native Italian, were right handed and had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All participants gave their informed consent and the procedures were approved by the local ethical committee. The experimental procedure was in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. We distinguished between Catholics and non-Catholics by asking subjects about their religious belief. The nonCatholic group included both agnostics and atheists. We also distinguished between health education and general education in agreement with how the degree courses are subdivided at the Italian Department for Education, University and Research.
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Data analysis
Fig. 1 Task sequence representative of personal moral dilemma. The sequence is the same for non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas
personal computer screen using E-Prime Version 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc, Pittsburgh, USA). Impersonal moral dilemmas included the following example: You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. Would you hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen? Personal moral dilemmas included the following: A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Would you push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen? Among the non-moral dilemmas was the following example: You are a farm worker driving a turnip-harvesting machine. You are approaching two diverging paths. By choosing the path on the left you will harvest ten bushels of turnips. By choosing the path on the right you will harvest twenty bushels of turnips. If you do nothing your turnip-harvesting machine will turn to the left. Would you turn your turnip-picking machine to the right in order to harvest twenty bushels of turnips instead of ten?
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We analyzed the effect of three factors on task performance: gender, religious belief and education. Gender differences in the percentage of utilitarian responses given for each scenario type (NM, IM, PM) were tested using a four-way between subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors gender (males, females), religion (Catholic, non-Catholic), education (health, general) and type of dilemma (NM, IM, PM). Response times were collected as RTs for utilitarian responses (mean utilitarian RTs for each type of dilemmas for each subject) and non-utilitarian RTs (mean non-utilitarian RTs for each type of dilemmas for each subject). To evaluate between-group differences in utilitarian and nonutilitarian RTs we used a five-way between subjects ANOVA with gender (males, females), education (health, general), religion (Catholic, non-Catholic), utilitarian or non-utilitarian responses and type of dilemma (NM, IM, PM) as factors. Bonferroni corrected t tests were used for post hoc analysis. We checked the normality assumption for all the response variables with skewness and kurtosis test for normality. A two-tailed P value \0.05 was considered statistically significant. All statistical analyses were performed in STATISTICA (StatSoft, Inc, Tulsa, USA).
Results Gender had a highly significant effect on percentage utilitarian responses (F2,176 = 3.78, P = 0.0248). Post hoc analysis showed that despite no differences in IM and NM responses, utilitarian responses to PM dilemmas were significantly more frequent in men than in women [t(98) = -3.28, P = 0.0014; Fig. 2]. Conversely, no differences were found in RTs for utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses between the two sexes for the same class of dilemmas. Education and religious beliefs neither had significant effect on RTs for utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses or on utilitarian response percentages, nor did they significantly interact with gender (Tables 2, 3, 4).
Discussion The first finding in our study is that moral judgments differ between genders. We found that responses to PM dilemmas differ specifically and selectively in men and in women, showing that gender-related differences in moral judgment specifically influence those dilemmas involving emotionally salient actions. Under these circumstances, men more frequently make a ‘‘pragmatic’’ choice regardless of putting others at risk of danger or harm. The prevalence of
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Fig. 2 Percentage of utilitarian responses in males and females in the moral judgment task. Error bars are standard error of the mean. We used three classes of stimuli: non-moral dilemmas (NM, 20 scenarios), impersonal moral dilemmas (IM, 18 scenarios) and personal moral dilemmas (PM, 22 scenarios). Sex influenced the percentage of utilitarian responses (F2,176 = 3.78, P = 0.0248). Although ANOVA disclosed no differences between impersonal moral and non-moral responses, utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemmas were significantly more frequent in men than in women [t(98) = -3.28, P = 0.0014]
non-utilitarian responses to PM dilemmas in females supports the gender-related distinction between ethics of care and ethics of justice proposed by Gilligan (1982). These
findings may be connected to the gender-differences in empathic ability (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Eisenberg 2005) that make females more resistant to decisions that despite being rationally viable entail directly inflicting physical or moral pain to other individuals. Hence, female moral reasoning seems directed to avoid harming other people, to place high value on social relationships and to fulfill other individuals’ expectations. Conversely, male moral thought hinges on the abstract principles of justice and fairness and on an individualistic stance (Jaffee and Hyde 2000; Rest 1979). Overall, our findings support Greene’s dual-process theory, confirming that non-utilitarian choices in response to PM dilemmas are driven more by emotions than by cognition. Whether gender differences in behavioral measures arise from cultural effects or reflect innate differences remains unclear. Although the answer is probably more complex than the traditional dichotomous nature-nurture debate envisages (Lippa 2005), several observations support a possible role of neural mechanisms in clarifying this question. Unlike gender, cultural factors such as education and religious belief had no effect on how the university students we studied performed the moral judgment task. Hence, we conjecture that gender differences are probably
Table 2 Percentage of utilitarian responses as function of gender, education and religion % of Utilitarian responses
N
Personal moral
Impersonal moral
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
Gender
Education
Female
Health
Catholic
16
88.75 (1.80)
25.38 (3.51)
77.71 (3.24)
General
Non-Catholic Catholic
9 13
87.78 (3.24) 82.31 (3.43)
22.22 (5.05) 29.76 (4.83)
69.14 (3.60) 69.85 (3.43)
Non-Catholic
12
90.00 (2.75)
32.32 (5.61)
69.87 (5.65)
Catholic
17
83.53 (2.42)
37.14 (4.03)
78.02 (3.52)
Non-Catholic
8
85.00 (4.23)
39.77 (9.09)
71.84 (6.33)
Catholic
9
85.56 (3.77)
39.06 (6.28)
70.03 (5.28)
16
89.38 (1.93)
40.97 (4.48)
81.63 (3.81)
Male
Religion
Non-moral
Health General
Non-Catholic SE standard error
Table 3 Reaction times of utilitarian responses as function of gender, education and religion RTs utilitarian responses Gender
Education
Female
Health
N Religion Catholic Non-Catholic
General Male
Health General
Non-moral
Personal moral
Impersonal moral
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
16
4311.23 (249.04)
3889.62 (565.33)
3020.67 (210.55)
9
4273.68 (409.55)
4259.94 (1206.41)
3485.65 (678.61)
Catholic
13
4403.48 (421.38)
4938.99 (514.18)
3358.08 (327.24)
Non-Catholic
12
4100.29 (355.48)
3990.96 (613.28)
3334.79 (385.18)
Catholic
17
4296.30 (300.18)
3713.75 (316.05)
3490.63 (348.59)
Non-Catholic
8
5273.59 (814.23)
4001.69 (667.2)
3986.67 (420.25)
Catholic
9
3745.79 (303.87)
3592.43 (339.44)
2764.19 (166.19)
16
4274.29 (286.14)
4517.52 (711.31)
3841.40 (364.41)
Non-Catholic SE standard error, RTs reaction times
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Table 4 Reaction times of non-utilitarian responses as function of gender, education and religion RTs non-utilitarian responses Gender
Education
Female
Health
N Religion Catholic
Male
Health General
Personal moral
Impersonal moral
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
Mean (±SE)
16
5309.00 (798.53)
3250.22 (213.56)
2933.19 (301.94)
9
5492.43 (1061.65)
3364.37 (401.43)
3048.91 (351.88)
Catholic
13
5467.64 (307.36)
3395.46 (253.3)
3740.54 (357.00)
Non-Catholic
12
5613.57 (715.84)
3472.36 (281.57)
4318.49 (592.36)
Catholic
17
6683.13 (1134.21)
3531.19 (316.61)
3365.26 (381.46)
Non-Catholic
8
7177.57 (1575.71)
4023.5 (595.84)
4243.42 (988.24)
Catholic Non-Catholic
9 16
5030.64 (1296.77) 6634.75 (1303.74)
2997.88 (185.22) 3794.65 (439.23)
3574.24 (288.11) 3800.25 (468.93)
Non-Catholic General
Non-moral
SE standard error, RTs reaction times
better explained by biological than by cultural differences. In a neurophysiological perspective, Greene et al. (2004) underline that assessment of moral dilemmas involves brain areas associated with social–emotional and cognitive processes such as affect, motivation, working memory, abstract reasoning and problem solving. They also show that brain activation patterns differ in the three classes of dilemmas, and also in utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses to PM dilemmas. In discussing the findings from their lesional study, Koenigs et al. (2007) concluded that a combination of intuitive–affective and conscious–rational mechanisms operate to produce moral judgment, contributing in different proportion to moral choices. The fact that patients with bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) lesions are more utilitarian than healthy subjects in judging PM dilemmas suggests that the VMPFC is a critical area in solving moral conflict in which social emotions are relevant (Koenigs et al. 2007). This portion of the frontal cortex may be the site of sex-related differences in moral sense. In line with this conclusion, Tranel et al. (2005) found gender-related differences in the pattern of left–right asymmetry in the VMPFC. Several anatomical studies also showed gender-related differences in the frontal lobe. For example, women have a larger dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Chen et al. 2007; Schlaepfer et al. 1995; Sowell et al. 2007) and more gray matter in the orbitofrontal (Gur et al. 1999) and in the left ventral frontal cortex whereas men have thicker right orbitofrontal cortices (Sowell et al. 2007). Another factor that might explain the sex-related difference in moral sense is the specificity of neurotransmitter systems or of hormonal stimulation (Cahill 2006). Our hypothesis about gender-related differences in morality receives support also from a recent functional neuroimaging study (Harenski et al. 2008). Whatever the explanation, our new findings showing gender-related differences in moral sense suggest that previous studies need reappraising. For instance, a given
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frontal lobe lesion might induce a different moral behavior in men and women, and the pattern of functional brain changes during a moral task might differ between genders. Our findings should nevertheless offer a good starting point to explain, for example, the gender-related inclination to specific job classes, attitudes toward leadership and power management and criminal behaviors. They may also provide clues as to why men are physically and verbally more aggressive than women (Archer 2004; Buss and Perry 1992; Greenfeld and Snell 1999), and why crime statistics in several countries (Australian Institute of Criminology 2007; Home Office 2002, 2003; Sabol et al. 2007) report that the female percentage of total inmates is 6–7%, irrespective of nationality, culture, religion and age. In conclusion, our study showed the existence of genderrelated differences in moral behavior in young adults. Whether and how these differences can change at different ages should be matter of further, specifically designed studies. Acknowledgments Manuela Fumagalli was supported by University of Milan, Department of Neurological Sciences grant. Roberta Ferrucci was supported by FISM-Fondazione Italiana Sclerosi Multipla—Cod. 2007/R/13.
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