Generalized vs. Particularized Social Capital: Social Capital and Local ...

Download PDF
5 downloads 0 Views 212KB Size Report
Comment
Social Capital and Local Self-Governance in Urban China*. Jie Chen. Huhe Narisong. Old Dominion University. Email: [email protected]. * Prepared for the 2009 ...
Generalized vs. Particularized Social Capital: Social Capital and Local Self-Governance in Urban China*

Jie Chen Huhe Narisong Old Dominion University Email: [email protected]

* Prepared for the 2009 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

2

Generalized vs. Particularized Social Capital: Social Capital and Local Governance in Urban China (Abstract) Scholars of social capital are still exploring and debating which type of social capital plays what kind of role in shaping economic development and government performance in different economic and political systems at various levels. To contribute to this important exploration and debate, this paper examines the impacts of two types of social capital— generalized and particularized—on the performance of grassroots self-government institutions in urban China based on an original survey of 144 urban neighborhood communities in China’s three major cities. The findings indicate that the generalized social capital embodied in the indiscriminative trust and inclusive social networks positively affected the performance of the self-government institutions, while the particularized social capital as manifested in discriminative trust and exclusive social networks negatively impacted such performance. These findings help clarify some theoretical issues and shed some light on the prospects of the local self-government system in China.

3

Generalized vs. Particularized Social Capital: Social Capital and Local Governance in Urban China It is not sufficient to go into a village, note the existence of networks, label it social capital, and pronounce it a good thing. Most developing countries actually have an abundance of social capital in the form of kinship groups or traditional social groups like lineages, tribes, or village associations. . . . Seen from this perspective, many traditional groups embodying one form of social capital can actually be obstacles to development, because they are too insular or resistant to change. What is often needed, therefore, is some creative destruction of social capital, and the gradual broadening of the radius of trust on the part of the more modern organizations (Fukuyama 2002, 34). Since the notion of social capital was popularized by Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993) in the early 1990s, there has been a fast growing body of literature on the economic and political consequences of social capital in both developing and developed settings. In general, this literature suggests that social capital, defined as a set of norms and informal networks among ordinary citizens, has a significant impact on economic development, social order, and government performance at various levels (e.g., Coleman 1990; Putnam 2000; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Hall 1999; Uslaner 1999 and 2002; Krishna 2002; Knack 2002; Callahan 2005). Yet scholars are still exploring and debating which type of social capital plays what kind of role in shaping economic development and government performance in different economic and political systems. To contribute to this important exploration of and debate on the consequences of various kinds and different aspects of social capital, this paper examines the impacts of two types of social capital—generalized and particularized—on the performance of grassroots selfgovernment institutions in urban China. Since studies of the impact of social capital on government performance in China are still scarce,1 the findings submitted by this study may also help us understand the important sociopolitical implications of social capital in that country. 1

A few survey-based studies of social capital in China have emerged recently. For example, the studies by Tang (2005), and Chen and Lu (2007) analyzed the effect of social capital as a whole on urban residents’ political values (e.g., democratic norms and regime support) and political behavior (e.g., voting) at the individual level. While all these studies provide important insights into the consequences of social capital in China, they do not deal with the impacts of various kinds of social capital on local government performance in urban China.

4 This study is based on the data collected from a representative survey conducted in 2007 of household residents living in 144 urban communities of three major cities in China (see Appendix). In this article, we first review the debate on the different impacts of various types and aspects of social capital in the current literature, introduce the evolution of the grassroots self-government system in urban China, and conceptualize and operationalize two kinds (generalized and particularized) of social capital along two dimensions (subjective norms and objective networks). We then present measurements of the performance of grassroots selfgovernment institutions in urban China. Finally, we explore the effects of the two kinds of social capital along the two dimensions on the performance of self-government institutions, and conclude with a discussion on the theoretical and political implications of our findings from this study.

I.

Theoretical Context: Two Kinds of Social Capital along Two Dimensions The concept of social capital originates mainly in studies of Western societies. Although

these studies emphasize various aspects of social capital and argue for different consequences of these aspects, most of them apparently agree that social capital consists of at least two major conceptual dimensions (Coleman 1990; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Newton 1997; Hall 1999; Uslaner 1999; Putnam 2000; Lin 2001; Putnam and Goss 2002; Krishna 2002; Brooks 2005; Casey and Christ 2005; Halpern 2005; Ikeda and Richey 2005; Saxton and Benson 2005; Chen and Lu 2007). These two dimensions may be best characterized by what Paxton (1999) called ‘‘objective associations’’ and ‘‘subjective type of ties’’ among individuals. The objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations, which are formed and engaged in on a voluntary base. On the other hand, the subjective ties or norms mainly stand for trust among individuals. Along these two dimensions of social networks and norms, some scholars make a distinction between two types of social capital: generalized social capital and particularized social capital (Fukuyama 1995, 2001, and 2002; Putnam 2000; Knack 2002; Uslaner 2002; Perez-Diaz 2002; Zmerli 2003; Callahan 2005). As Perez-Diaz (2002, 247) argues, social capital should be “drastically qualified” by differentiating it not just quantitatively (i.e., more or less), but also qualitatively (i.e., generalized or particularized). According to these analysts,

5 generalized social capital contains a set of inclusive social networks that tend to connect people together from different social, economic, occupational, and even political backgrounds (e.g., Knack 2002). This kind of social capital also consists of such subjective norms as indiscriminative (or generalized) trust among people, regardless of whether they know one another and whether they share similar interests or backgrounds (e.g., Uslaner 2002). This type of social capital is very similar to what Putnam (2000, 23) calls “bridging social capital,” which “can generate broader identities and reciprocity.” On the other hand, particularized social capital is composed of exclusive social networks that link people together by their shared economic, political, or demographic identity—such as class, occupation, ethnicity, lineage or religion. Such networks, therefore, tend to exclude people who do not share the identity (e.g., Fukuyama 2001, 1995). Particularized social capital also retains such norms as discriminative (or particularized) trust among individuals who are much alike in terms of their background and belief, especially among those who have known one another. This kind of social capital as a whole resembles what Putnam (2000, 23) considers “bonding social capital,” which “bolsters our narrow selves.” More importantly, social capital theorists apparently have different views on what impacts each of the two types of social capital has on government performance as well as economic development at various levels. Some suggest that both generalized and particularized social capitals should be considered necessary and integral parts of social capital. Therefore, maintaining a proper balance between both of them will produce positive consequences for government performance (Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002).2 Others argue that only generalized social capital promotes governance effectiveness and economic development (Knack 2002; Uslaner 2002), and particularized social capital either has no effects (Knack 2002) or has negative impacts (Fukuyama 2002; Zmerli 2003) on effectiveness and development. All in all, while the question of what socioeconomic and sociopolitical consequences each type of social capital can yield is critical for theoretical inquiry as well as public policy making, the answers to this question do not as yet point to a consensus. To contribute to this critical debate, this study differs from most of the earlier survey-

2

Consistent with this argument, Putnam (1993) composed an index of social capital, mixing together elements of both generalized and particularized social capitals in his study of Italian democracy.

6 based studies in at least two important ways. Unlike those studies which focus on the consequences of only one of the two dimensions of social capital—either subjective norms (e.g., Breham and Rahn 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Uslaner 2002) or objective social networks (e.g., Putnam 1993; Schneider et al. 1997; Portney and Berry 1997)3—this study analyzes the effects of both subjective norms and objective networks simultaneously. Moreover, instead of looking at only one type of social capital, it examines the impacts of both types of social capital—generalized and particularized social capitals—on local government performance. In sum, we explore a more comprehensive conceptual framework to operationalize social capital, which distinguishes the two types of social capital along the two dimensions, and we apply this framework to our analysis of consequences of both types of social capital.

II.

Grassroots Self-Government in Urban China and the Measurement of Its Performance In order to better understand the impacts of the two types of social capital (along the two

dimensions) on the performance of grassroots self-government in urban China, in this section we provide an overview of the development of this local system. Then, we explain how the performance of grassroots government is measured in this analysis. A. Evolution of Local Self-Government The urban “self-government” system and its “self-governing” body in urban China, the Residents’ Committee (RC, jumin weiyuanhui), was established in the 1950s. Before the postMao reform, the central government used this system, particularly RCs, to assist work units4 at the grassroots level to implement Party and government policies, monitor/control the population, and provide residents with some basic social welfare services (Choate 1998; Read 2000; Wang 2003). In effect, the central government treated the RCs as its administrative extensions in urban

3

There are some exceptions to these earlier studies. For examples, the works by Hall (1997), Krishna (2002), and Knack (2002) dealt with both norms and networks. 4 Before the post-Mao reform, virtually all urban residents were assigned to a work unit (danwei). The work unit not only fulfilled its own production goal, but also took lots of social responsibilities, including providing its employees with housing, education, welfare, and even social order in neighborhood (Tang and Parish 2000).

7 areas before the post-Mao reform. It is worth noting that before the reform, urban residents relied more on their work units than on the RCs for their everyday needs. Therefore, the RCs “were seen to be performing trivial and routine tasks” in assisting work units (Zhang and Yang 2001). However, since the outset of the Post-Mao reform, the importance of the work unit in residents’ everyday life has gradually declined. This is mainly because most work units no longer provide social services such as housing, childcare, medical care and other social welfare services, which they did in the pre-reform era (Choate 1998; Zhang and Yang 2001; Wang 2003). Moreover, many urban residents now do not belong to any government-run work units at all, because some residents are laid off from their work units and many others are employed in private, foreign or joint-venture enterprises. In response to the conspicuous void in urban community services due to the decline of the work unit, the central government initiated a series of reforms aimed at the revitalization and redefinition of RCs. The 1982 Chinese Constitution provided that the RCs serve as mass organizations of selfmanagement at the grassroots level. In November 1989, the Chinese National People’s Congress promulgated the Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees of the PRC, which became effective in January 1990. According to the Organic Law, these RCs were supposed to be elected and regularly held to account by the residents of urban neighborhoods, and were responsible for administering local socioeconomic and political affairs. However, in practice, the RCs were not autonomous residents’ organizations. Rather, they acted mostly as “nasty and meddlesome agents of the government” (Derleth and Koldyk 2004, 752). In addition, the RCs were by and large inefficient in fulfilling some critical functions that the central government expected them to perform, such as maintaining community order, delivering social services, and meeting residents’ everyday needs in a timely way (Wang 2003). In order to deal with these problems in the RCs, the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the early 1990s launched a campaign known as “community construction” (shequ jianshe). This campaign was designed to create a new urban self-government system, which was supposed to be more autonomous (if not fully independent) from the central government, more responsive to residents’ needs, and more effective in managing community affairs. After a series of experiments in 26 municipal districts, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued its decree, “Views for Advancing the Construction of Urban Residential Communities,” or Central Document 23, in

8 2000. This document called for the establishment of a new grassroots self-governing organization, the Community Residents’ Committee (CRC, shequ jumin weiyuanhui), in place of the old Residents’ Committee. This new organization was expected to accomplish two important goals, as follows. First, the CRCs were expected to serve as the foundation of a new community-service system. As mentioned above, the role of the work unit in meeting residents’ everyday life needs declined after reform. As a result, the newly-established CRCs were to assume the following social functions at the local level (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2000): 1. Strengthening community security. 2. Expanding welfare services5 3. Improving community sanitation 4. Enriching community cultural life (e.g., sports and recreation) 5. Beautifying the environment Second, the CRC was expected to become the linchpin upon which a more autonomous system of self-government was to be established in the urban areas, based on the pattern of its rural counterpart, the Village Committee.6 According to the central government’s decree (i.e., Central Document 23), the CRCs as self-governing organizations of urban residents are formed for the purposes of “self-management, self-education and self-service,” and they are supposed to be popularly elected and democratically managed by the community residents. In other words, the central government expected urban residents to manage their own local and everyday affairs with more autonomy. In fact, some recent field observations have suggested that many urban residents have begun to consider the CRCs as organizations of their own self-governance (Yang 2002), and hence they have increasingly participated in community affairs under this selfgovernment system (e.g., Chen 2003; Zhou 2003). In sum, in response to sociopolitical changes in urban communities brought about by the post-Mao reform, the central government has made genuine efforts to make the grassroots selfgovernment system more effective in governing local communities and more responsive in 5

Welfare services here include: 1) special services to the elderly, disabled persons, and the poor; 2) basic everyday-life services to community residents in general; and 3) skill training and job fairs for recently laid-off residents. 6 It should be noted that in effect, the Village Committee has more substantive functions in managing local affairs than does the CRC.

9 meeting residents’ daily needs. While such efforts are not aimed at establishing a democratic political system at the national level, they do set the governing criteria for local self-government, which entail the effectiveness and responsiveness of the CRCs. B. Measurement of Self-Government Performance In his classic study of regional governments in Italy, Putnam (1993, 63) suggests that the performance of a representative government can be measured in two key dimensions: “its responsiveness to its constituent” and “its effectiveness in conducting the public’s business.” The national government in China, as mentioned above, has called on the representative governing institution (the CRCs) at the grassroots level to be effective in conducting community affairs and responsive to residents within the community, although it has not intended to extend this kind of self-government system beyond the local levels and has limited such a system to less politically-sensitive issues. Since the grassroots self-government system in urban China may operate according to the criteria similar to those described by Putnam for a local (or regional) government, we adopt the two dimensions designed by Putnam to measure the performance of local self-governing institutions (CRCs) in urban China: that is, their responsiveness to its constituents and their effectiveness in managing community affairs. In this study, we use the evaluations of residents living in each of surveyed neighborhood communities as the indicators for the performance of CRCs, in terms of their responsiveness and effectiveness. The use of residents’ evaluations as indicators is due to two important reasons. One is that the CRCs, the institutional core of the self-government system, are supposed to be formed based on popular consent among community residents and should be representative of them. It is consistent with this fundamental principle to adopt residents’ evaluations as the indicators for CRCs’ performance. The other reason is that there have thus far been no so-called “objective” assessments systematically done by any experts or the government for CRCs’ performance. Thus, the residents’ evaluations have been considered the best indictors available of such performance. To have an overall picture of the residents’ evaluations of CRC’s performance in each surveyed neighborhood community, we computed the average score for each of the questionnaire items (reported below) for each community in two dimensions. First, to measure the responsiveness of the CRCs, we used a direct statement in our survey as follows:

10 “In general, our CRC represents the interests of the residents within our community, and manages community affairs based on our interests.” We asked our respondents to rate this statement according to a 5-point scale, where 1 stands for strong disagreement and 5 refers to strong agreement with it. The mean of the average scores for the responsiveness of CRCs in each of the 144 neighborhood communities was 3.6—which was above the mid-point of the 5-point scale—ranging from a low of 2.6 to a high of 4.8 (Table 1). Table 1 is about here. Second, to gauge the governing effectiveness of the CRCs, we asked our respondents to evaluate the performance of incumbent CRCs in five community-service areas: maintaining community security, expanding welfare services, improving community sanitation, enriching community cultural life, and beautifying the environment. Respondents were asked to grade the CRC’s performance in each of the five service areas in their own community according to a 5point scale, where 1 stands for failure and 5 refers to excellence. These five areas have been specified by the central government as the major governing requirements for CRCs. More importantly, the results from our pre-survey interviews of urban residents indicated widespread interest in each of these five performance areas for their CRCs. These results were also confirmed by some earlier studies of urban self-government in China (Zhang and Yang 2001; Wang 2003). As Table 1 shows, the means of average community scores for the five service areas were all above the mid point (3 or “so so”) of the 5-point grading scheme, with a low of 3.15 for strengthening community security and a high of 3.39 for improving community sanitation. In addition, as shown in the same table (Table 1), each of the six questionnaire items of the two dimensions (i.e., responsiveness and effectiveness) loaded strongly on the single factor that emerged from the factor analysis.7 These results confirm that all these items together measure the performance of CRCs. In the later part of this article, we will develop a latent construct to capture CRC’s performance as the dependent variable based on these six items.

7

The single common factor accounts for about 78 percent of the combined variance of the six individual items. The reliability analysis of these six items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of .83.

11 III.

Measurement of the Two Types of Social Capital along the Two Dimensions In this study, as discussed above, we make a conceptual distinction between two types of

social capital: generalized and particularized. Moreover, we operationalize each of these two types of social capital along two dimensions, subjective norms and objective networks. To have a collective profile of each type of social capital in each surveyed neighborhood community, we computed the community-average score for each of the questionnaire items (reported below) used to measure the level of each type of social capital along the two dimensions. A. Measuring Generalized Social Capital First, to operationalize the subjective norms of generalized social capital, we focus on the level of indiscriminative (or generalized) trust among individuals. As Uslaner (2002, 15) describes, general trust is “trust in people whom we don’t know and who are likely to be different from ourselves.” This kind of trust may be also considered as “individuals’ estimate of the trustworthiness of generalized others, or abstract trust” (Paxton 1999, 98-99). Accordingly, we measure this kind of indiscriminative trust by asking our respondents three questions as follows: 1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to

be very careful in dealing with people?8 2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or

would they try to be fair?9 3. Do you agree that most people, regardless of whether known or unknown, can be

trusted or cannot be trusted?10 As Table 2 shows, the means of average community scores for the three items of the subjective

8

Respondents were asked to answer this question on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “need to be very careful,” 2 indicating “either way,” and 3 indicating “most people can be trusted.” This question is very similar to the question (i.e., “most people can be trusted”), which has been typically asked to measure general trust in other survey studies, such as the World Value Surveys (e.g., Inglehart 2004) and the 1999 Six-City Survey in China (Tang 200, Chapter 5). 9 Respondents were asked to answer this question on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “would take advantage,” 2 indicating “50-50 chance,” and 3 indicating “would try to be fair.” 10 Respondents were asked to answer this question on a 3-point scale, with 1 indicating “cannot be trusted,” 2 indicating “50-50 chance,” and 3 indicating “most people can be trusted.”

12 norms of generalized social capital were all above the mid point (2 or “50-50 chance”) of the 3point scale, with a low of 2.14 for trust vs. caution and a high of 2.57 for being fair vs. taking advantage. These three items are combined to form an additive index for indiscriminative trust, which is used in the multivariate analysis that follows.11 Table 2 is about here. Second, to operationalize the objective networks of generalized social capital, we tap into people’s participation in the inclusive (or universal) non-governmental organizations or groups. Formed among equal members on a voluntary base, these organizations/groups are what Fukuyama (2002, 34) calls “broad radius organizations,” which tend to connect people together from different social, economic, occupational, and even political backgrounds (see, also, Knack 2002). As a result, they tend to be heterogeneous in membership and broad in purpose. To measure participation in this kind of network, we asked our respondents whether they ever joined in activities of any organizations/groups of two categories within the past two years: nongovernmental citizen-rights protection groups and non-governmental charity groups.12 Both categories of groups in China are more likely to have diverse memberships, since the goals of these organizations/groups (i.e., citizen rights and charities for all) tend to have a strong appeal to people from all walks of life (Wang, Yang, and Chen 2006). In our survey, respondents were asked to register their responses on a dichotomous, 0-1 scale, where 0 stands for “didn’t participate” and 1 refers to “participated.” The means of average community scores indicate that 2.5 % (.025 x 100%) and 3.6 % (.036 x 100%) of respondents participated, respectively, in nongovernmental citizen-rights protection groups and in non-governmental charity groups across all sampled communities (Table 2). These two items are combined to form an additive index of participation in inclusive non-governmental organizations or groups,13 which is used in the multivariate analysis that follows. B. Measuring Particularized Social Capital First of all, to operationalize the subjective norms of particularized social capital, we investigate the level of discriminative (or parochial) trust among individuals. According to some 11

The reliability analysis of these three items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of .78. Uslaner (2002, 133) found that there was a strong correlation between generalized trust and charitable contribution. 13 The correlation (Pearson r) between these two items is .68. 12

13 scholars of social capital (Fukuyama 2002; Uslaner 2002), this kind of trust can be defined as faith particularly among individuals who know one another. Based on this definition, we measure parochial trust by asking our respondents to respond to the following statements: 1. I rely on personal connections (guanxi) as the most helpful means to achieve my goals. 2. I believe that personal connections (guanxi) are more important than legal contract (hetong). 3. I should help only those people whom I know, and I do not have to help those people whom I do not know. Respondents were asked to register their response to each of these questions on a 5-point scale, where 1 stands for a strong disagreement and 5 refers to a strong agreement.14 As Table 3 shows, the means of the average community scores are all well above the mid point (“ambivalent”) of the 1-5 scale, with a low of 3.7 for relying on personal connections to a high of 4.18 for helping only known persons. These three items are combined to form an index of the discriminative trust,15 which is used in the multivariate analysis that follows. Table 3 is about here. Second, to operationalize the objective networks of particularized social capital, we turn our attention to people’s participation in exclusive non-governmental organizations or groups. While these organizations/groups are exclusive relative to those inclusive ones in generalized social capital as described above, they do exclude people according to such identities as profession, occupation, specialized interests, acquaintance, and even economic status. In these organizations/groups, participants “congregate with people like ourselves” (Uslaner 2002, 5).16 Knack (2002, 773) suggests, therefore, that associations of this sort “worked to reinforce rather than overcome narrow particularized interests.” Based on this conceptualization, we measured respondents’ participation in these kinds of networks by asking whether they ever joined in activities of any organizations/groups of three categories within the past two years: business-

14

1 = “strongly disagree”; 2 = “disagree”; 3 = “ambivalent”; 4 = “agree”; 5 = “strongly agree.” The reliability analysis of these three items yields a reliability coefficient (alpha) of .72. 16 The quote is italicized in the original text. 15

14 oriented groups, fraternities within friends, and specialized (fee paying) hobby clubs.17 According to some field studies of social networks in China (e.g., Wang, Yang, and Chen 2006), these categories of organizations/groups in China are more likely to have compartmentalized memberships, since each of them is designed to promote particular interests of a particular group. Respondents were asked to respond to each of the categories on a dichotomous, 0-1 scale, where 0 stands for “didn’t participate” and 1 refers to “participated.” The means of average community scores for these three categories of organizations/groups indicate a low of 2.2 % (.022 x 100%) participating in business-oriented clubs and a high of 6.1 % (.061 x 100%) participating in specialized hobby clubs across all sampled communities (Table 3). These three categories are combined to form an additive index of participation in exclusive non-governmental organizations/groups,18 which is used in the multivariate analysis that follows. In summary, each of the two types of social capital—generalized and particularized—are operationalized along two dimensions: subjective norms and objective networks. Together, four collective variables are formed, each of which is derived from an additive index of multiple questionnaire items at the community level. As summarized in Table 4, these collective variables are: two for generalized social capital (indiscriminative trust and inclusive networks) and two for particularized social capital (discriminative trust and exclusive networks). While the intensity and sources of each type of social capital along the two dimensions are beyond the scope of this article, all four collective variables will be used in the structural equation model that follows to analyze the impact of the two types of social capital on CRC’s performance. Table 4 is about here.

IV.

Impacts of Two Types of Social Capitals along the Two Dimensions In this study, we expect that the types of social capital, defined and operatonalized above,

have different impacts on the performance of the CRCs in urban China, which is measured by the residents’ evaluations of CRC’s responsiveness and effectiveness in each neighborhood 17

In his study of social capital’s impact on the performance of state governments in the United States, Knack (2002) used similar kinds of associations (e.g., attendance at club meetings) to measure particularized social networks. 18 The reliability analysis of these three items yield reliability coefficient (alpha) of .76.

15 community. The explanations of this general expectation can be derived from earlier studies of social capital and our field observations. A. Impact of Generalized Social Capital We expect that the two dimensions of generalized social capital—indiscriminative trust and inclusive social networks—have a positive impact on the performance of grassroots selfgovernment institutions in urban China. There are at least two major reasons for this expectation. First, in general, both the indiscriminative trust and inclusive social networks of generalized social capital encourage individuals across social, economic, and ethnic divides to compromise and cooperate (Fukuyama 1995, 2002; Knack 2002). As Uslaner (2002, 249) points out, generalized trust “can lead us to civic engagement with people who are different from ourselves.” As a result, this kind of generalized cooperative spirit creates a desirable environment for a representative government to function effectively and responsively. It follows that such a generalized social capital may also have a direct, positive impact on the performance of a representative government. As Knack (2002, 773) contends, generalized social capital “can broaden governmental accountability, so that government must be responsive to citizens at large rather than to narrow interests.” All in all, most empirical studies of social capital agree that generalized social capital positively impacts the performance of a representative government, although they may disagree, as mentioned above, on the consequences of particularized social capital. A second reason for the expected positive impact of generalized social capital on the performance of self-government in urban China is that China’s urban neighborhoods have become increasingly diverse and their residents have become more mobile since the onset of the post-Mao reform. With the drastic decline of government-run work units (danwei)—which used to build and/or manage their own separate housing units—and rapid housing commercialization, as mentioned above, the composition of urban neighborhoods has become a function of individual choice (or ability). Moreover, as China’s urban areas have become more cosmopolitan, its urban population in general has become increasingly diverse socially, culturally and economically, and increasingly mobile spatially. As a result, compared to urban neighborhoods in the Mao era where residents either came from single work unit or/and lived there for a long time due to the lack of social mobility, the current urban neighborhoods have

16 become much more diverse in terms of their residents’ socioeconomic and sociodemographic backgrounds (Li 2003 3-9; Chen 2004, Chapter 3; Zhang 2006, 14-15). In order to perform well to satisfy such a diverse and ever changing urban population, the CRC as the core of the selfgovernment system needs effectively to represent the broad interests of a diverse population. Since generalized social capital, as mentioned above, nurtures government’s responsiveness to citizens at large rather than to narrow interests, a higher level of such a social capital in a neighborhood is likely to facilitate better performance of the CRC in that community. B. Impact of Particularized Social Capital We expect that the two dimensions of particularized social capital—discriminative trust and exclusive social networks—may have a negative impact on the performance of grassroots self-government in urban China. First of all, some early studies (Fukuyama 2002; Knack 2002; Zmerli 2003) have cogently argued that both the discriminative trust and exclusive social networks of particularized social capital in general tend to encourage the government and its officials to take care of the narrow interests of one group or another. This tendency could jeopardize the responsiveness of a local government to the broad constituency in a community. In addition, such a social capital might not promote trust and cooperation between and among groups or individuals with various backgrounds, since both discriminative trust and exclusive networks tend to emphasize the division and distinction between “us” (those whom we know and are like us) and “them” (those whom we don’t know and aren’t like us). Still, as Knack (2002, 773-774) and Uslaner (2002, 34) suggest, particularized social capital, especially discriminative trust, is very likely to discourage individuals from engaging in collective actions on behalf of the community’s interests but will encourage them to free-ride on the efforts of others, since such a social capital may generate distrust in and suspicion of people from outside of a group.19 As a result, particularized social capital is more likely to have a negative impact on the performance of CRCs in terms of their responsiveness and effectiveness. Second, as discussed above, the socioeconomic and socio-demographic diversity of 19

In his study of Italian democracy, Putnam (1993) mixed various aspects of social capital together (forming an index) and looked mainly at the positive impact of social capital on government performance. It is worth noting, however, that in his later works, Putnam (1995, 665; 2000, 22-24) did pay attention to the potentially negative effects of some social networks (defined as “particularized” in this study) for the wider community.

17 China’s current urban neighborhoods require CRCs to represent diverse interests of residents across large segments of residents. Meanwhile, the willingness to cooperate among the residents as a whole—rather than within any segmented group—has become more and more important for CRCs if they are to function effectively in increasingly diverse urban communities. Yet particularized social capital in general, as mentioned earlier, has the tendency to “bolster our narrower selves” rather than to encourage a broad representation of and cooperation among people who do not know one another and who are not alike. Thus, it may have a negative impact on the performance of CRCs in today’s diverse urban communities.20 C. Control Variables Do the two types of social capital along the two dimensions, as specified above, influence the performance of urban grassroots self-government institutions independently of some other factors that may also significantly affect such performance? To answer this question, we control in this analysis for two important variables: the democratic quality of CRC elections, and the average household income of the neighborhood. First, there is a large body of literature arguing that the democratic quality of elections for officials of a representative government at various levels, which is usually measured by the electorate’s evaluation of the democratic quality of the election, may have a large impact on the performance of the government (e.g. Pitkin 1967; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Cox 1987; Manion 1996, 2006). While scholars of electoral politics explain the impact of election on government performance from different perspectives, they all seem to agree that free and competitive elections are more likely to produce governments that represent the broad interests of the constituents. As Manion suggests (2006, 305), “democratic elections align interests of leaders with interests of voters.” As a result, a government established by such democratic elections is

20

Tsai (2007) found that some exclusive networks (or “solidary groups” in her term), such as village temple and village-wide lineages, played a positive role in making the rural grassroots governments provide public goods. According to her, a necessary condition for this positive relationship between the existence of particularized networks and the effectiveness of village government in providing public goods was the overlapping of “the administrative boundaries of the local government” and “the boundaries of a solidary group” (Tsai 2007, 356). Because there is hardly any overlapping of this sort in urban neighborhoods, exclusive networks in urban areas cannot play the same positive role in influencing government performance as their counterparts in rural areas.

18 more likely to be responsive to the broad interests of citizens at large and hence to be effective in conducting public affairs. Based on this theory, one can reasonably speculate that the democratic quality of elections may have a significant impact on CRC’s performance: that is, the more free and democratic the elections for CRCs, the better CRCs will perform. To measure the democratic quality of elections, we asked our respondents to evaluate both competitiveness and the degree of electoral freedom of the most recent election for the CRC in their own neighborhood.21 Second, the average household income of each neighborhood may also have a direct effect on the performance of CRCs. In a wealthier neighborhood, more families might be able to use their own financial resources to compensate for the potential inadequacy of public services. As Knack (2002, 777) points out, therefore, the pressures on the local governing bodies in wealthier communities to operate efficiently may be significantly reduced, and hence these governing bodies could satisfy their residents much easier than could their counterparts in poorer communities. To support this argument, for example, our field observations in this survey indicated that most families in wealthy neighborhoods had purchased various memberships with recreational clubs and entertainment facilities, and therefore were less likely to demand that CRCs organize recreational and exercise activities in their neighborhoods. In short, therefore, it is quite conceivable to speculate that the CRCs in wealthier neighborhoods may perform better than do those in poorer neighborhoods, since the former tend to have the advantage of having less pressure to do more. D. Multivariate Analysis Since CRC’s performance (the dependent variable) in this study is a latent variable (not directly observed) and is measured indirectly through its effect on manifest indicators (i.e., residents’ evaluations of the two performance dimensions), we use Structural Equation Modeling 21

For electoral competitiveness, we asked respondents whether the most recent election allowed multiple candidates for each post; for electoral freedom, we asked them whether individual residents (vs. local Party and government leaders) were allowed and encouraged to nominate and vote for candidates of their own choice during the most recent election. The responses for each of the two questionnaire items were aggregated for all individuals surveyed in each neighborhood. The resulting neighborhood averages for the two items were then combined to form an additive index of the electoral quality for each neighborhood. The correlation (Pearson r) between these two items is .76.

19 (SEM) to detect the latent construct of such performance and to analyze its relationships with the two types of social capital (the independent variables). In addition, this model also controls for the other variables specified above, such as the democratic quality of CRC elections, and the average household income of the neighborhood. Figure 1 graphically demonstrates the results of the SEM. Figure 1 is about here. Overall, the results indicate that the model fitness is satisfactory, and confirm our expectations regarding the relationships between the two types of social capital and the latent construct of CRC’s performance. As demonstrated at the bottom of Figure 1, the overall χ2 (CMIN) is 128.49 with 51 degrees of freedom. 22 Meanwhile, the χ2/d.f. ratio of 2.519 is well within the desirable range (1-3) of model fitness.23 Both the Incremental Fit Index (IFI) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI)—two other popular indices used to measure the model fitness— exceed the 0.90 level, which is the acceptable level of model fitness. These results indicate that the model fits the data well. Concerning the relationship between the two types of social capital and CRC performance, Figure 1 shows the path coefficients. First, the results indicate that both subjective norms and objective networks of generalized social capital—indiscriminative trust and participation in inclusive social networks—had a significant and positive impact on CRCs performance even after controlling for the democratic quality of CRC elections, and the average household income. In other words, as we expected, the CRCs in the neighborhoods that are endowed with abundant generalized social capital (i.e., prevalence of indiscriminative trust and inclusive social networks) tend to perform better than those in the neighborhoods that lack this kind of social capital. These results, by and large, are consistent with the findings in Knack’s (2002, 778-780) study of generalized social capital’s impact on regional government performance, suggesting that governments perform better in places where “generalized reciprocity prevails.”

22

This statistic translates into a p-value of 0.000. As many researchers noted, the model chisquare is a conservative indicator, which is very sensitive to sample size and normality. Thus, it is recommended that researchers should not consider the chi-square as the sole criterion of goodness-of-fit when other indicators are acceptable (Wagle, 2006: 320; Nyhan, 2000: 99-100). 23 For detailed discussion on the χ2/d.f. ratio in SEM, see, for example, the works by Kiline (1998) and Schumacker and Lomax (2004).

20 Second, as expected, the results from the structural equation model show that both the subjective norms and objective networks of particularized social capital—discriminative trust (or trust and faith only in known people) and participation in exclusive networks—had a significant and negative impact on CRCs’ performance. These results suggest that CRCs tend to perform poorly in communities where discriminative or parochial trust and exclusive social networks run rampant. These results by and large support one of the competing arguments mentioned at the beginning of this article: that is, particularized (or “bounding”) social capital does not have positive effects on the performance of a representative government (e.g., Zmerli 2003). Finally, the results from Figure 1 about the potential impacts of the two control variables on CRCs’ performance are consistent with our expectations. Specifically, CRCs tended to perform better in the communities where CRC elections were conducted democratically (i.e., competitively and freely), and where households were wealthier. In addition, the Structural Equation Modeling enables us to explore the relationship between generalized and particularized social capital. The finding shows that these two constructs are very weakly yet positively correlated. This finding seems to confirm, at least partially, what has been found in an early study of trust in the United States: that is, the correlation between generalized trust and particularized trust is positive but moderate (Uslaner 2002).24

V.

Conclusion and Implications We have established that there is a theoretical and conceptual distinction between the two

types of social capital—generalized and particularized—along its two dimensions (i.e., subjective norms and objective networks). We have further argued that the two types of social capital along the two dimensions variably influence the performance of grassroots governing institutions, such as the CRCs, in urban China. In general, this argument has been supported by the empirical evidence from our survey of 144 urban neighborhood communities in China’s three major cities. That is, the generalized social capital embodied in the indiscriminative trust and 24

To explain this finding from his study of trust in the United States, Eric Uslaner suggests that “the difference between the two dimensions [i.e., generalized trust and particularized trust] is that the gaps are much greater between trusters and mistrusters for strangers than for friends and family. Generalized trusters place confidence in everyone, and particularized trusters only in people they know well” (Uslaner 2002, 54).

21 inclusive social networks positively affected CRCs’ performance, as measured by their responsiveness to the interests of residents at large and their effectiveness in conducting public affairs. The particularized social capital as manifested in discriminative trust and exclusive social networks negatively impacted such performance. These findings may have at least two important implications: one is theoretical and the other, political. Theoretically, the findings support the argument from some earlier studies (e.g., Knack 2002; Fukuyama 2002; Uslaner 2002; Callahan 2005) that social capital is a multifaceted concept, and various types and dimensions of social capital may have different, rather than only positive, impacts on socioeconomic development and government performance. As Knack (2002, 783) has shown, “social capital is a heterogeneous concept, and its various dimensions do not all necessarily affect government performance or other outcomes in the same way.” Furthermore, in this study we have explored a more comprehensive conceptual framework to operationalize social capital, which distinguishes two types of social capital along the two dimensions (i.e., subjective norms and objective networks). The empirical findings (that the two types of social capital along the two dimensions variably influence the performance of urban self-governing institutions in China) has confirmed that this comprehensive conceptual framework is useful for detecting different impacts of various types of social capital. Politically, the findings from this study suggest that under a non-democratic political system such as the one in China, the performance of grassroots self-government institutions such as CRCs in urban areas, along with their rural counterparts, Village Committees (VCs), may be significantly improved by increasing the right kind of social capital along the two dimensions. In the case of urban China, generalized social capital can contribute to good performance of grassroots self-government institutions, CRCs. In other words, the performance of grassroots self-government institutions as measured by responsiveness and effectiveness may be improved substantially by increasing the right kind of social capital along the two dimensions, even though the political system remains non-democratic at the national level.

22

Appendix: Survey and Sample The data used in this study came from a public opinion survey conducted in three Chinese cities, Beijing, Chengdu’ and Xi’an, from December 2006 to January 2007. The three cities were selected to present approximately three distinct levels of economic development in urban China. Beijing represents the most developed major urban areas in China, with per capita GDP over $7,000; Chengdu represents less developed major cities with per capita GDP of around $4,000; Xi’an is indicative of the least developed major cities with per capita GDP of about $2,000. The design of the questionnaire and the sample, and the implementation of the actual survey were done in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The survey was based on a probability sample of the general urban residents of Chinese cities, aged 18 years and older. This probability sample was derived from a multistage sampling strategy. Three urban districts (qu) were randomly chosen at the first sampling stage in each city.25 At the second sampling stage, twelve streets (jiedao) were randomly selected from the three districts in each city, with four streets being selected from each district.26 From each of the twelve streets in each city, four residents’ communities were randomly chosen at the third stage of sampling, yielding a total of 48 residents’ communities in each city. Then 1200 households were randomly chosen from 48 residents’ communities in each city by using the technique of probability proportionate to size (PPS), with large-size communities having over 30 households, and smallsize communities having only about 10 households.27 This process yielded a total of 3600 households in three cities. At the final stage, one individual was chosen randomly from each of the 3600 households as the interviewee. The adjusted response rate of this survey was 88 percent (3166). Base on this survey, we computed the community average score for each of the questionnaire items (reported earlier) used in this article. 25

In Beijing, the three districts were Dongcheng, Haidian, and Chaoyang. In Chengdu, the three districts were Qingyang, Chenghua, and Wuhou. In Xi’an, the three districts were Lianhu, Xincheng, and Beilin. 26 According to our agreement with the officials of the streets selected in the sample, the names of these streets must remain confidential. 27 At this stage, we obtained the household registration list of each community from the street office in which the community was located. From the household registration list, we chose the households to interview, using a random start, fixed interval system.

23 Care was taken to minimize linguistic misinterpretations and respondent effects. The original wording of our questionnaire (which was first designed in the United States) was reviewed by researchers from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to fit the Chinese social and cultural context and to provide for seamless translation from English to Chinese. College students of sociology were employed as field interviewers, who had been trained by the project members in field interviewing techniques before the actual survey was carried out. Respondents were offered confidentiality and encouraged to provide answers that best captured their true feelings. In general, circumstantial evidence suggests that Chinese respondents feel free to express their views in a public opinion survey such as ours.

24

References: Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. “Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 999-1023. Brooks, Arthur C. 2005. “Does Social Capital Make You Generous?” Social Science Quarterly 86 (1): 1-15. Callahan, William A. 2005. “Social Capital and Corruption: Vote Buying and the Politics of Reform in Thailand.” Perspectives on Politics 3 (3): 495-508. Casey, Terrence, and Kevin Christ. 2005. “Social Capital and Economic Performance in the American States,” Social Science Quarterly 86 (4): 826-845. Chen, Chao. 2003. “Democratic Electoral Reform for Communities in China.” http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Apr/62725.htm (accessed on October 14, 2007). Chen, Jie and Chunlong Lu. 2007. “Social Capital in Urban China: Attitudinal and Behavioral Effects on Grassroots Self-Government.” Social Science Quarterly 88 (2): 422–442. Chen, Weidong. 2004. Shequ zizhi: zizuzhi wangluo yu zhidu shezhi (Community Selfgovernment: Self-organized Networks and Institutional Establishments). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe. Choate, Allen C. 1998. “Local Governance in China, Part II: An Assessment of Urban Residents Committees Municipal Community Development.” Asian Foundation Working Paper, No. 10. San Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation. Coleman, James. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cox, Gary W. 1987. “Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 31 (1): 82-108. Derleth, James and Daniel R. Koldyk. 2004. “The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban China.” Journal of Contemporary China 13 (41): 747-777. Fukuyma, Francis. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: The Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” Third World Quarterly 22 (1): 7-20. Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. “Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda.” SAIS Review 22 (1): 23-37. Hall, Peter A. 1999. “Social Capital in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science 29: 417-461. Halpern, David. 2005. Social Capital. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Ikeda, Ken’ichi and Sean E. Richey. 2005. “Japanese Network Capital: The Impact of Social Networks on Japanese Political Participation.” Political Behavior 27 (3): 239-260. Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kline, Rex B. 1998. Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York: Guilford Press. Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1251-88. Knack, Stephen. 2002. “Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (4): 772-785.

25 Krishna, Anirudh. 2002. Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Li, Fan. 2003. Zhongguo chengshi shequ zhijie xuanju gaige (Electoral Reform of Urban Community in China). Xi’an, China: Xibei daxue chubanshe. Lin, Nan, 2001. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Manion, Melanie. 1996. “The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside.” American Political Science Review 90 (4): 736-748. Manion, Melanie. 2006. “Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China.” Comparative Political Studies 39 (3): 301-324. Ministry of Civil Affairs. 2000. “Minzhengbu guanyu zai quanguo tuijin chengshi shequ jianshe de yijian” (Views for Advancing the Construction of Urban Residential Communities). http://www.mca.gov.cn/ artical/content/WJYL_SQJS/200491101216.html (accessed on October 11, 2007). Newton, Kenneth. 1997. “Social Capital and Democracy.” American Behavioral Scientist 40 (5): 575-586. Nyhan, Ronald C. 2000. “Changing the Paradigm: Trust and its Role in Public Sector Organizations,” The American Review of Public Administration 30(1): 87-109. Paxton, Pamela. 1999. “Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment.” American Journal of Sociology 105 (1): 88-127. Perez-Diaz, Victor. 2002. “From Civil War to Civil Society: Social Capital in Spain from the 1930s to the 1990s.” In Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, ed., Robert Putnam, pp. 245-87. New York: Oxford University Press. Pitkin, Hannah F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California. Portney, Kent E. and Jeffrey M. Berry. 1997. “Mobilizing Minority Communities: Social Capital and Participation in Urban Neighborhoods.” American Behavioral Scientist 40 (5): 632644. Putnam, Robert, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert and Kristin A. Goss. 2002. “Introduction.” In Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, ed., Robert Putnam, pp. 3-19. New York: Oxford University Press. Putnam, Robert. 1995. “Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America.” PS: Political Science and Politics 27 (4): 664-83. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Read, Benjamin L. 2000. “Revitalizing the State’s Urban ‘Nerve Tips’.” The China Quarterly 163: 806-820. Saxton, Gregory, and Michelle A. Benson. 2005. “Social Capital and the Growth of the Nonprofit Sector,” Social Science Quarterly 86 (1): 16-35. Schneider, Mark, Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, Michael Mintrom, and Christine Roch. 1997. “Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice.” American Political Science Review 91 (1): 82-93. Schumacker, Randall E. and Richard G. Lomax. 2004. A Beginner's Guide to Structural Equation Modeling, 2nd. edition. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

26 Standing Committee of National People’s Congress of the PRC. 1989. Organic Law of the Urban Residents Committees of the PRC. http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=10121 (access on October 19, 2007). Tang, Wenfang. 2005. Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Uslaner, Eric. 1999. “Democracy and Social Capital.” In Democracy and Trust, ed., Mark Warren, pp. 121-150, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Uslaner, Eric. 2002. The Moral Foundations of Trust. New York: Cambridge University Press. Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1978. Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wang, Bangzuo. ed. 2003. Juweihui yu shequ zhili (Residents’ Committee and Community Governance). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Wang, Junxiu, Yang Yiyin, and Chen Wujing. 2006. “A Report on Socio-psychological Research in China in 2006.” In 2007 nian: zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce (Analysis and Forecast on China’s Social Development 2007), eds., Ru Xin, Lu Xeuyi, and Li Peilin. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe. Wagle, Udaya R. 2006. “Political Participation and Civic Engagement in Kathmandu: An Empirical Analysis with Structural Equations,” International Political Science Review 27(3): 301-22. Yang, Kaifeng. 2002. “From Danwei Society to New Community Buildings: Opportunities and Challenges for Citizen Participation in Chinese Cities.” Chinese Public Administration Review 1 (1): 65-82. Zhang, Baofeng. 2006. Shuxu guanli (Residential Community Management). Zhengzhou, China: Zhengzhou daxue chubanshe. Zhang, Zhirong and Yang Haijiao. eds. 2001. Jiceng minzhu yu shehui fazhan (Grass-Roots Democracy and Social Development). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Zhou, Jiawang. 2003. “Juweihui zhixuan bili gao, Beijing shequ minzhu zhengzhi da jinbu” (The Percent of Direct Election of Residents’ Committees is Increasing, Beijing’s Community Democracy is Making Progress). Beijing wanbao, October 22, page 1. Zmerli, Sonja. 2003. “Applying the Concepts of Bonding and Bridging Social Capital to Empirical Research.” European Political Science 2 (3): 68-75.

27

Table 1 Average Scores for the Performance of CRCs in 144 Sampled Communities Item Responsiveness: In general, I believe that the administration of my community affairs has been fair and transparent to all residents. Effectiveness: Expanding welfare services Improving community sanitation Enriching community cultural life Beautifying the environment Strengthening community security

Minimum

Maximum

Mean of Average Community Scores

Factor Loading

2.55

4.79

3.64

.744

2.33 2.00 2.13 2.13 1.67

4.04 4.29 4.24 4.19 4.10

3.34

.924

3.39 3.25 3.28 3.15

.927 .941 .856 .891

28

Table 2 Average Scores for Generalized Social Capital in 144 Sampled Communities: Subjective Norms and Objective Networks Item Subjective Norms: Indiscriminative Trust Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Do you agree that most people, regardless of whether known or unknown, can be trusted or cannot be trusted? Objective Networks: Inclusive Organizations Join and participate in non-governmental citizen-rights protection groups/activities (yes = 1; no = 0). Join and participate in non-governmental charity groups/activities (yes = 1; no = 0).

Minimum

Maximum

Mean of Average Community Scores

1.00

3.00

2.14

1.76

3.00

2.57

1.30

3.00

2.34

.02

.30

.025

.03

.40

.036

29

Table 3 Average Scores for Particularized Social Capital in 144 Sampled Communities: Subjective Norms and Objective Networks Item Subjective Norms: Discriminative Trust I rely on personal connections (guanxi) as the most helpful means to achieve my goals. I believe that personal connections (guanxi) are more important than legal contract (hetong). I should help only those people whom I know, and I do not have to help those people whom I do not know. Objective Networks: Exclusive Organizations Join and participate in business-oriented groups/activities (yes = 1; no = 0) Join and participate in fraternities among friends and alumni (yes = 1; no = 0) Join and participate in specialized hobby clubs (yes = 1; no = 0)

Minimum

Maximum

Mean of Average Community Scores

1.86

4.64

3.37

2.25

4.73

3.67

3.17

5.00

4.18

.02

.17

.022

.01.

.25

.026

.03

.31

.061

30 Table 4 Summary of the Independent Variables Particularized social capital

Generalized social capital

Networks

Inclusive networks

Exclusive networks

Norms

Indiscriminative trust

Discriminative trust

31 Figure 1 The Relationship between Two Types of Social Capital and Latent Construct of Community Governance

Income .56

GT

1

GN

GSC

Pf2

.84 

.78 

.91 

CRCPf

.92 

‐.76

.83  1

PN

1 .66 

.85 

.12

PT

Pf1

.73 

Pf3 Pf4

.94  .82 

PSC

Pf5

.59

.74 

Pf6

QE

Notes: χ2 (CMIN) 128.49; d.f. 51; χ2/d.f. 2.519; N 144; IFI 0.921; CFI 0.919. The small, blank circles represent measurement errors or errors in estimation. GSC = the latent variable of Generalized Social Capital; PSC = the latent variable of Particularized Social Capital; CRCPf = the latent variable of CRC’s Performance; GT = an additive index of the three questions for Indiscriminative Trust; GN = an additive index of the two questions for Inclusive Networks; PT = an additive index of the three questions for Discriminative Trust; PN = an additive index of the three questions for Exclusive Networks; QE = an additive index of the two questions for Democratic Quality of Election. While the Pf1 is the question for CRC’s responsiveness, Pf2 through Pf6 are the questions for CRC’s effective.