intentionality is mental, that it is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed, the distinguishing characteristic of ...... Referred to in the text as SZ. Kisiel, Theodore.
Inquiry, 41, 65±87
Getting Heidegger Off the West Coast Carleton B. Christensen Australian National University
According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Heidegger’ s central innovation is his rejection of the idea that intentional activity and directedness is always and only a matter of having representational mental states. This paper examines the central passages to which Dreyfus appeals in order to motivate this claim. It shows that Dreyfus misconstrues these passages significantly and that he has no grounds for reading Heidegger as anticipating contemporary anti-representationalism in the philosophy of mind. The misunderstanding derives from lack of sensitivity to Heidegger’ s own intellectual context. The otherwise laudable strategy of reading Heidegger as a philosopher of mind becomes an exercise in finding a niche for Heidegger in Dreyfus’ s own unquestioned present. Heidegger is thereby mapped on to an intellectual context which, given its naturalistic commitments, is foreign to him. The paper concludes by indicating the direction in which a more historically sensitive, and thus accurate, interpretation of Heidegger must move.
In the last twenty to twenty-five years, interest in the though t of Martin Heidegger has burgeoned. This is in large part due to Hubert L . Dreyfus’ s influential interpretation. Dreyfus’ s general interpretative strategy is to read Heidegger as, first and foremost, a genuin ely theoretical philosopher with im portant thing s to say in opposition to the dominant subject/object model of cognition and action. He develops this general idea into a fairly detailed interpretation of Heidegger which sits well with contemporary naturalist sensibilities, at least if these sensibilities are sufficiently laid-back and nonreductive to assuage fears of crude scientism. In this way, almost singlehandedly, he has secured for Heidegger a certain respectability even in quarters by nature and tradition hostile to such ostensibly obscurantist, `unscientific’ philoso phy. As Dreyfus reads him, Heidegger’ s central achievement lies in his anticipating contemporary anti-representationalist critiques of representational theories of mind. Heidegger’ s prime innovat ion and novelty is to challenge the subject/object model of mind which has dominated philosophy and psychology from Descartes throug h Husserl to the present. The subject/ object model construes the knowing and acting `self’ as a `subject’ which is always related intentionally to the world via `representations’ of `objects’ . Heidegger, according to Dreyfus, rejects this: `Heidegger accepts intentional directedness as essential to human activity, but he denies that [all] intentionality is mental, that it is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed, the distingu ishing characteristic of mental states’ (pp. 50Ð 51; original
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emphasis). In other words, while Heidegger concedes that intentionality is essential to being a `subject’ or `self’ , he rejects the traditional idea that it is always and only a feature of the standard folk-psychological states and experiences. Intentionality is not always and only what Dreyfus calls representational intentionality, i.e. the being in, or having of, the standard folk-psychological intentional states and experiences (pp. 72Ð 74). W hile `we sometimes experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects by way of intentional states such as desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc.’ (p. 5), Dreyfus’ s Heidegger also insists that our actually relating to objects by way of such standard folk-psychological states and experiences is `a derivative and intermittent condition’ (p. 5). Only when our normal, everyday dealings with familiar thing s become problem atic, or break down completely do psychological states and experiences with any kind of mental or representational content arise (p. 76). Speaking both for himself and for Heidegger, Dreyfus insists that when breakdow n occurs and `I start to deliberate, I do not just notice m ental states that were already there; I start to have [such mental states as] beliefs and desires’ (p. 78). Representational intentionality itself, whether cognitive or volitiv e, theoretical or practical, is thus indeed an intermittent condition founded in `a more fundamental sort of intentionality’ (p. 49) which Heidegger calls `being-in’ or `being-amidst’ (pp. 44Ð 46). In general, Heidegger maintains that `all relations of mental states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of being-with-things which does not involv e mental activity’ (p. 52). This more basic form of being-with-things is an intentional, but quite non-representational skilful engagement with everyday thing s Ð what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping’ . Such skilful coping with everyday thing s only takes place against a background familiarity with organized wholes of such things, e.g. rooms, offices, and public places furnished in their typical ways. Dreyfus claims at least at one place that such background familiarity is what Heidegger m eans `being-in-the-world’ (pp. 102Ð 4). Now the thesis that in everyday skilful engagement with familiar things no `representations’ , i.e. no standard folk-psychologic al states or experiences, are necessarily involve d is rather counterintuit ive, at least when taken literally. Surely, when I am routinely hammering away, I do see that or how the nail is going as it should , nam ely, straight, as I intend. Surely, I quite literally perceive, come the appropriate mom ent, that the nail has been hammered in as required, so that it is time to stop ham mering. So is Dreyfus right in attributing the above-m entioned thesis to Heidegg er? Does Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping ’ with everyday things there is no representational intentionality, in the quite radical sense that all, or indeed even most, of the above everyday description s are false? There are tw o ways to approach this question. One can look to the sources and ask if the passages Dreyfus adduces as evidence for his interpretation really say
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what he claims they say. Or one can attempt to draw an alternative overall picture of Heidegger from which it follows that Heidegger does not say, perhaps even contradicts, what Dreyfus puts into his mouth. (I have outlined such an alternative picture in Christensen [1997] .) Althoug h both approaches are essential for any truly com prehensive critique of Dreyfus’ s interpretation, it is clear that they cannot both be undertaken in one paper. Here I concentrate exclusively on the first. Specifically, I examine the most im portant passages to which Dreyfus appeals to see whether they really say what Dreyfus claims they do. Having shown that this is not so, I give some further reasons for rejecting any suggestion that Heidegger is saying the kinds of thing Dreyfus attributes to him. Finally, I suggest the direction to be taken by any attempt to develop a more accurate reading of Heidegger as a theoretical philoso pher with im portant things to say on `mind’ , `intentionality’ , and the like.
I. Dreyfus and Heidegger’ s Critique of the Traditional Doctrine of Intentionality Does Heidegger ever say that in so-called `absorbed coping ’ there is no representational intentionality, even in a minimal, folk-psychological sense? There are three central passages, all from GP, which, at least when taken out of context, appear more than any others to give Dreyfus the evidence he needs. I look at them in the order in which Dreyfus appeals to them. Althoug h I shall be concentrating primarily on these three passages, I will also occasionally consider passages from other Heidegger texts to which Dreyfus appeals. (i) The first passage is from 9 (b), S. 89 (Hofstadter, pp. 63Ð 64). As cited by Dreyfus (p. 51), it reads as follows: T he usual concepti on of intentio nality . . . m isconstru es the structur e of the self directed ness-to ward, the intentio n. T his m isinterp retatio n lies in an erroneou s subjectiv izin g of intentio nality . A n ego or subjec t is supposed , to whose so-calle d sphere intentio nal experie nces are then suppose d to belong . . . T he idea of a subjec t w hich has intentio nal experie nces m erely insid e its ow n spher e and is . . . encapsul ated w ithin itself is an absurdit y which m isconstr ues the basi c ontolog ical structur e of the bein g that we ourselve s are. (BP, 63Ð 64, origina l em phasis) .
Dreyfus clearly regards this passage as amongst his best evidence for the central claim that Heidegger is drawing attention to `a new kind of intentionality (absorbed coping ) which is not that of a mind with content directed toward objects’ (p. 69). For this passage is adduced precisely in suppor t of the claim that Heidegger is denyin g that, in all cases, intentionality `is . . . the disting uishing characteristic of mental states’ (p. 51; original emphasis).
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Even a cursory examination of this quotation within its larger context shows that Heidegger is not claim ing anythin g like this. For if this passage really were denyin g that all intentionality is representational, then it would surely have to occur within a larger discussion in which Heidegger talks precisely of `absorbed coping ’ . After all, `absorbed coping ’ is Dreyfus’ s only example of non-representational intentionality and it is hard to see what else could qualify as such. Yet through out his entire discussion in 9 (b) Heidegger does not talk, even once, of our `unthinking ’ (p. 94) skilful engagement with familiar things, but exclusively of perception! Indeed, Heidegger refers precisely to perception in what Dreyfus has om itted from the first two sentences of his quotation. Quoted fully, these sentences read: T he usual concept ion of intentio nality m isunders tand s that tow ard which Ð in the case of percepti on Ð the perceivi ng directs itself . A ccording ly, it also m isconstru es the structur e of the self-dir ectedness -tow ard, the intentio . T his m isinterpr etatio n lies 1 in an erroneou s subjecti vizing of intentio nality .
So whatever Heidegger is saying here, whatever the erroneous subjectivizing is of which he speaks, it is an erroneous subjectivizing of perception. It would, however, be absurd to say that, pace the tradition, perception is nonrepresentational Ð unless, of course, one understands by `representation’ something quite non-minim al, non-folk-psychological, non-Searlean and non-Husserlian, namely, an entity quite literally in the mind which the mind in some way manipulates, thereby achieving what is folk-psycholog ically called perceiving an object. So already there is substantial evidence against any claim that this passage underwrites the central contention of Dreyfus’ s interpretation. This becomes all the clearer when one investigates what Heidegger actually means by the erroneous subjectivizing of perception. Heidegger discusses this in 9 (b) of GP, S. 86Ð 91. There it is introdu ced as the second of two ways in which the notio n of intentionality has traditionally been misinterpreted, the first being so to speak its complement, namely, erroneous objectivizing, which apparently consists in treating intentionality as a 2 relation in a quite standard sense between a subject and an external object. It is im portant to note how Heidegger opens his discussion of this second kind of misinterpretation: he describes it as `a new kind of misinterpretation to 3 which non-ph enomenolog ical philoso phy almost universally falls victim’ . Heidegger thus clearly associates the tendency to subjectivize intentionality primarily with non-phenomenolog ical philosophy. So his very openin g words indicate that he does not wish to accuse Husserl, or for that matter Scheler, of erroneous subjectivizing. Yet it is essential to Dreyfus’ s interpretation that Heidegger should regard Husserl just as guilty of erroneous subjectivizing as either Descartes or, say, Brentano.
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That Heidegger is thinking of neither Husserl nor Scheler becomes even clearer in the course of his discussion. According to Heidegger, the tendency to subjectivize intentionality arises when, as in erroneous objectivizing, one persists in the naõ È ve assumption that intentionality is some kind of relation in the standard sense, yet unlik e the erroneous objectivizer, is sophisticated enough to appreciate that intentional phenomena such as perceivings can be in error. Appreciation of this possibility combines with the naõ È veteÂcommon to both erroneous objectivizing and erroneous subjectivizing to encourage the though t that the bearer of intentionality is related to something purely subjective, som ething which does not exist independently, but rather belong s in a subjective, im manent sphere. Intentio nal experie nces (E rlebnisse ), it is said , are qua item s w hich belon g to the subjecti ve sphere , in them selves related only to what is itself im manent to this sphere . P erceptio ns as som ethin g psychica l direct them selves towards sensation s, m ental im ages, m em ory traces and deter mination s which are added by a sim ilarly 4 im m anen t thinkin g to what is in the ® rst instanc e subjecti vely given .
Given this characterization of erroneous subjectivizing, Heidegger would perhaps regard Descartes, Locke, and Hum e as at least occasionally guilty of it. Most likely, he has Brentano in m ind since it is a common, if arguably, 5 mistaken, interpretation of the early Brentano that he was led by the possibility of error to regard the intentional object as in some way im manent 6 to the mind. It is clear, however, that Heidegger could not possibly have Husserl in his sights. For Husserl explicitly attacks and ridicules the view that intentional states and experiences are directed at anything `in the mind’ . W hen in this very subsection Heidegger insists that `[t]hat towards which 7 perception . . . is directed is the perceived itself’ , he is using, and knows himself to be using, a form of words derived from Husserl. With Husserl, and by no means against him, Heidegger says: In everyda y behavio r, say, in movin g aroun d this room, takin g a look aroun d my environ m ent, I perceiv e the wall and the windo w. T o what am I directe d in this percepti on? T o sensation s? Or, when I avoid what is perceiv ed, am I turnin g asid e from represen tationa l images and takin g care not to fall out of these represen tationa l 8 im ages and sensation s into the courtya rd of the university building ?
In no way, then, does Heidegger count Husserl amongst the erroneous subjectivizers. So whatever the critique of traditional conceptions of intentionality Heidegger is giving here, it does not touch Husserl. It is therefore mistaken to subsume Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl under this critique of the tradition. Yet this is precisely what Dreyfus does, indeed must do. If the erroneous subjectivizing m entioned in the passage he quotes in suppor t of his interpretation really did consist in failure to appreciate that not
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all intentionality is representational, then Husserl would indeed be guilty of this offence, and Heidegger would indeed accuse him of it. It is clear, however, that given what Heidegger means by erroneous subjectivizing, neither of these two thing s is true. This passage is not directed against Husserl, and thus not directed against any conception of intentionality according to which all intentionality is representational in that minimal sense to which Dreyfus himself, as he fully appreciates (p. 50), must appeal. In fact, in this whole subsection, as in the account of intentionality he gives in 5 of PGZ, Heidegger clearly sees himself as buildin g on Husserl’ s account of intentionality. T his is shown by the following passage: speaking of perceptual hallucination Heidegger says: I can only ostensibl y or apparent ly (Verm eintlic h ) grasp som ethin g if I, as the subjec t w hich grasps (als E rfassende r), inten d som ethin g at all. Only than can intendin g take on the modi® catio n of m erely ostensibl y or apparen tly intendin g. The intentio nal relatio n does not arise ® rst throug h the actua l indepen dent presenc e of the objects , but rather lies in the perceivi ng itself, whether or not this perceivi ng be free of illusio n or deluded . Perceivin g m ust be perceivi ng-of som ethin g in order for m e to be 9 able to be delude d about anythin g.
There is nothin g at all critical of Husserl in this, as the decidedly Husserlian language shows. There is no reference here to a kind of intentionality which is not a consciousness of something; indeed the only reference is to Husserl’ s own favoured case of intentionality, namely, perception. Dreyfus says that `(e)verythin g . . . turns on Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl’ s theory of intentionality’ (p. 50), and in this he is certainly right. A correct interpretation of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl’ s brand of phenomenolog y is indeed the key to understanding Heidegger himself. To suggest, however, as Dreyfus does, that the objections raised here to the traditional doctrine of intentionality constitute even part of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding both of these objections and of this critique. To fend off this criticism Dreyfus might appeal to a passage from another lecture of Heidegger’ s, namely, M AL. As cited by Dreyfus (pp. 52Ð 53), this passage reads: [Existence ] not only brings a modi® catio n of the traditio nal concep t of consciou sness and of m ind; the radica l form ulatio n of the intende d pheno menon in an ontolog y of D asein leads to a funda mental, `univers al’ overco m ing of this position . From there the previou s concep t of intentio nalit y prove s to be a restricte d concepti on . . . Because of this restricti on, intentio nality is conceive d prim arily as `to take as’ [as m eaning- giving] . . . . T hus every act of directin g onesel f toward som ethin g receive s 10 the character istic of knowing, for example, in Husserl.
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Surely this passage shows that the traditional concept of consciousness and intentionality which Heidegger is criticizing is one that he regards Husserl as endorsing. Once again, however, it is crucial to read the passage in its entirety, i.e. without Dreyfus’ s substantial om issions, and in its context. Heidegger begins by insisting with Husserl, aga inst all erroneous subjectivizing, that intentional phenomena are related not to subjective entities in the subject’ s im m anent sphere, but rather to the very entities they purpor t to relate to, namely, ordinary things. He then says that intentional phenomena are not themselves sufficient for such intentional relatedness; they are rather founded in what he calls being-amidst entities, which is in turn grounded in existence in Heidegger’ s special sense of this word. Heidegger then continu es as follows: W ith this, the lim its of the previou s interpre tation and functio n of the concep t of intentio nality , as w ell as its funda mental signi® cance, beco m e visible . T his concep t not only bring s a m odi® catio n of the traditio nal concep t of consciou sness and of m ind; the radica l form ulatio n of the intende d phenom enon in an ontolog y of D asein lead s to a fundam ental, `univer sal’ overco ming of this position . F rom the standpoi nt of such an ontolog y, the previou s concep t of intentio nality proves to be a restricte d concepti on insofa r as it takes intentio nality to be a com portin g tow ards present- athand entitie s (ein Verhalte n zu Vorhand enem ). This explain s why one is incline d to regar d self-a warenes s (Selbsterf assun g ) as an internal ly directe d ontic intentio nality . Further m ore, because of this restricti on, intentio nality is conceiv ed prim arily as `to m ean’ (M einen ), w hereb y m eaning is underst ood as an indiffe rent characte r of know ing. T hus every act of directin g onesel f tow ard som ethin g receive s the characte risti c of kno wing, for example, in Husserl, who characte rizes the basic structur e of all intentio nal comportin g as o . In this w ay, all intentio nality is in the ® rst instanc e a know ing intendin g, on which othe r m odes of com portin g to entitie s are then built up. Scheler ® rst made clear, in particul ar in the essa y `L ove and K nowledge’ , that these intentio nal com portm ents are quit e differen t and that love and hate, for exam ple, actuall y found know ing. Schele r is appropr iatin g here m otifs 11 from Pasca l and A ugustine .
A crucial first step towards understanding what Heidegger is saying here consists in appreciating that the subject of the second sentence in this passage is not existence, as Dreyfus has it, but the concept of intentionality. This correction puts a quite different spin on the entire passage. In the first sentence Heidegger speaks amongst other thing s of the limitations of the previous interpretation of intentionality and it is clear from the rest of the passage that by this previous interpretation he means the account of intentionality given by Husserl and his disciples. At the same tim e, it becomes equally clear that in the next sentence, with which Dreyfus’ s quotation begins, it is this Husserlian account of intentionality that is said to have a fundamental critical significance for traditional notions of mind and consciousness. Not existence, but Husserl’ s concept of intentionality brings a
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modification of these traditional concepts! Indeed, it is the Husserlian concept of intentionality which, when elaborated with sufficient radicality in a Heideggerian ontolog y of Dasein, leads to an overcoming of these traditional conceptions. So here Heidegger is siding with Husserl’ s concept of intentionality against traditional notions of m ind and consciousness. Once again we see that one must not subsume Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl under his critique of the tradition. But of course Heidegger is also criticizing Husserl in this passage. He says that Husserl’ s concept of intentionality only leads to such an overcoming when the phenomenon it intends is formulated radically, i.e. in Heideggerian fashion. So according to Heidegger, Husserl’ s concept has, as it stands, certain limitations which prevent it from realizing its full promise. W hat are these limitations? The clue lies in the fact that, as the paragraph im mediately preceding this passage makes quite clear, Heidegger is focused primarily on perceptual intentionality. This focus on perception intimates what Heidegger is getting at when he says, in criticism of Husserl, that Husserl’ s concept of intentionality is restricted `insofar as it takes intentionality to be a comportin g towards present-at-hand entities (ein Verhalten zu Vorhande nem )’ . Dreyfus has omitted this crucial clause from his version of the passage, just as he has failed to note Heidegger’ s focus on perception. He thus obscures the fact that what Heidegger is alleging against Husserl is that the latter conceives intentional content, in particular, the intentional content of perception, in too restricted a way. How so? Substantiating the following account of what Heidegger is getting at here would require provid ing an alternative reading which cannot be undertaken here (see Christensen, 1997) . The general point, however, is that, as Heidegger sees things, Husserl conceives the objects of perception as if they were `contextless’ or subject-indifferent, in the sense of being given exclusively in ways which do not reflect or presuppose that the subject of perception is currently engaged in some specific goal-directed activity, with all the volition s (intentions and desires) and indeed affections (what Heidegger calls one’ s Befindlichkeit) that this entails. Thus, this concept of intentionality tends to exclude from perceptual content such subject-relative properties and relations as `being too far away to grasp with one’ s hand’ , `being too hot to drink now’ or `stepping out in front of one dangerously close, i.e. so closely that one cannot continu e with what one is currently doing ’ . Instead, it tends to construe intentional objects objectivistically, as if they were given only under such `contextless’ and subject-indifferent description s as `being approxim ately two metres away from one’ , `having a temperature lying within a range high enough to cause painful sensations of heat’ , or `stepping out in front of one between tw o to three metres away at five to eight kilometres per hour’ .
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In the middle of this passage, Heidegger begins to intimate what is responsible for this restricted view of intentionality and its content. Traditional, non-Husserlian notion s of consciousness and mind embraced the metaphysical attitude. That is, they all assumed that theoretical activity is the business of discovering what all phenomena `truly’ or `really’ are. Consequently, they felt compelled to construe intentional relatedness to the world as in principle explicable in terms of the `contextless’ , subjectindifferent entities, properties and relations of which theoretical activity gives us knowledge. With this, however, the tradition has encumbered itself with the falsely objectivizing picture of everyday perceptual content outlined above. Relatedly, the tradition is now able to conceive cognition as if it were a `faculty’ separable from the non-cognitiv e `faculties’ of volution and affection. The tradition now takes a fateful step: on the basis of its restricted view of perceptual content and perceiving it assumes that cognizing and perceiving are the same across the board, whether one is talking about whatever cognizing and perceiving goes on in theoretical activity or about everyday cognition and perception. Everywhere cognition and perception are as they are in theoretical activity, namely a disinterested, volitiv ely and affectively uncond itioned notin g (M einen) of how thing s are to which all volitio ns and affections are conting ent accretions. Now Heidegger believes that Husserl, as much as he rejects the idea of thing s as they `truly’ are, and a special discipline called metaphysics which establishes that such and such a level of description gets at thing s as they `really’ are, retains a residual allegiance to some consequences of the metaphysical attitude underlying traditional notion s of mind and consciousness. In particular, because he retains the idea of perception as an intentional relation to a subject-indifferent, present-at-hand entity (Vorhandenes), he shares in the traditional prejudice that everyday cognizing and perceiving are but unsystematic forms of theoretical cognizing and perceiving. So for Husserl, too, all forms of cognition and perception, even the non-th eoretical kinds, are disinterested, colourless noting s of how thing s are upon which all volitio ns and affections are founded. This is why Husserl conceives intentionality primarily as `meaning something’ , i.e. M einen `whereby 12 meaning is understood as an indifferent character of knowing’ . According to Heidegger, the only significant thinker within the phenomenolog ical tradition not to have succumbed to this residual prejudice is Max Scheler. So what Heidegger is doing in this passage, first and foremost, is criticizing the traditional conception of intentionality for a number of faults only some of which are shared by Husserl. To do this is obvious ly not to convict Husserl of endorsing the traditional conception itself. In fact, the objection that Heidegger is voicing here against Husserl is that he retains a residual allegiance to an aspect of the traditional conception of intentionality, even thoug h in other respects he has done so much to overcome it. That
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this is Heidegger’ s positio n is made quite clear in the basically similar passages of 5 in PGZ. This section of Heidegger’ s lecture contains his most detailed presentation of Husserl’ s theory of intentionality and phenomenology . And here, too, am idst a basically Husserl-inspired account of intentionality, we find Heidegger registering a similar dissatisfaction with the way Husserl takes knowing, indeed, theoretical knowing, as exemplary. Speaking of Husserl, Heidegger says: Intentio is underst ood in pheno menolog y also as the act of m eanin g [Verm einen ]. T here is a connecti on betw een m eanin g and the m eant, or noesis and noem a. No m eans to perceiv e [vernehm en ] or com e to awareness , to apprehe nd sim ply, the perceivi ng itself and the perceive d in the way it is perceive d. I refer to these term s becaus e they constitu te not m erely a terminology , but also a certain interpre tation of w hat it is to be directe d intentio nally at som ething . E very directed ness towards something , fear , hope, love, has the characte r of directed ness which Husserl calls noesis . Inasm uch as o is take n from the spher e of theoreti cal kno wing, one give s 13 an accoun t of the practica l sphere as base d in the theoreti cal.
Note two thing s about this passage: first, it shows quite clearly what was said above, namely, that what Heidegger objects to about Husserl’ s terminology of noesis and noem a is that it reflects the traditional assumption that the intentionality of everyday life can be best understood as an unsystematic form of what goes on in theoretical activity. Heidegger thus does not reject Husserl’ s terminology because it m isconstrues an allegedly non-representational intentionality as if it were representational. Heidegger here is not interested in defending the non-representational against the representational, but rather the non-cognitiv e against the cognitive, and the non-th eoretical against the theoretical. It hardly needs to be said that these three distinctions are not the same, thoug h Dreyfus tends to link them together, e.g., in the way he binds Heidegger’ s account of how the theoretical arises out of the nontheoretical into a larger account of how, in so-called breakdow n, the representational arises out of the non-representational (pp. 69Ð 84). Second, while Heidegger rejects the specifically Husserlian terminolog y of noesis and noema, he nevertheless fully endorses its general spirit and character. For he adopts what he regards as a less tendentious version of Husserl’ s notions for all intentional comportments. In so doing , he uses language adapted straight from Husserl: in all intentional comportments [w]e . . . have an inheren t af® nity between the w ay something is intende d, the intentio , and the intentum , whereby intentum , the intended , is to be underst ood in the sense just develop ed, not the perceive d as entity , but the entit y in the how of its being-p erceived , the intentum in the how of its being-i ntended . Only with the how of the being-i ntende d belongi ng to every intentio as such does the basic constitu tion of 14 intentio nality com e into view at all, even thoug h only provisio nally.
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W e find Heidegger here committed to what is basically the standard Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involv e Husserlian intentional content. T o all intents and purpos es, then, Heidegger is endorsing the claim that everything intentional is representational in the sense defined above, namely, satisfaction of some folk-psychological predicate which articulates what is misleadingly called a `propositional attitude’ . Thus nothin g is achieved by appeal to the passage from M AL which Dreyfus quotes in truncated form on pages 52Ð 53. When we look at this passage in its entirety, restore it to its context and compare it with similar passages in PGZ, we see that it lends no suppor t to Dreyfus at all. It should in any case be obviou s that this passage and its cousins in PGZ could not be criticizing Husserl for failing to appreciate that not all forms of intentionality are representational. For in this and the other passages Heidegger, while referring to Scheler, does not criticize him. Yet Scheler, no less than Husserl, overlooks Dreyfus’ s non-representational `absorbed coping ’ . In fact, Heidegger, unlik e Dreyfus, does not lump Husserl and Scheler indiscrim inately together with modern philoso phers from Descartes to Brentano Ð as if first there was darkness, then there was Heidegger and all was light. As we have already seen, Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl is by no means just a variation on his critique of the tradition and of pre-Husserlian, pre-phenomenolog ical conceptions of intentionality in particular. A careful reading of 11Ð 13 of PGZ, where Heidegger elaborates in some detail a critique of Husserl and previous phenomenolog y, makes it clear that Heidegger objects not primarily to Husserl’ s theory of intentionality but to the latter’ s methodological attitud e. W hat Heidegger prim arily objects to about Husserl is the way he unwittingly retains the assumption that phenomenologic al reflection on consciousness and intentional phenomena can achieve its goals by idealizing these entities, i.e. by abstracting from their specificity and individuality. (ii) W e come now to Dreyfus’ s second central passage from GP. This is taken from 21, S. 439Ð 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309), and, as cited by Dreyfus (p. 65), reads as follows: W e do not always and continu ally have explici t percepti on of the thing s surroun ding us in a fam iliar environ m ent, certainl y not in such a way that w e would be aware of them as expressl y availabl e . . . In the indiffer ent im perturb ability of our custo m ary com m erce w ith them, they beco m e accessibl e precisel y w ith regar d to their unobtru sive presence . T he presupp ositio n for the possibl e equani m ity of our dealin g w ith thing s is, am ong others , the uninterr upted quality of that com merce. It must not be held up in its progress .
Dreyfus takes this passage to show that, according to Heidegger, when skilfully using hammer and nail, `I am not aware of any determinate
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characteristics of the hammer or of the nail. All I am aware of is the task, or perhaps what I need to do when I finish’ (p. 65). But once again it is crucial both to restore this passage to its context and to include that part of it which Dreyfus has excised. Some corrections of the translation are also useful: W e do not continu ally and explicit ly perceiv e each one of the thing s surroun ding us in a fam iliar environ m ent, certainl y not in such a way that we would be aware of them as expressl y available . Precisel y by not explicit ly ascertain ing and con® rm ing their presenc e at hand w e have them aroun d us in their own distincti ve w ay, just as they are in them selves . In the indiffe rent equani m ity of our custom ary com m erce w ith them, they beco m e accessibl e precisel y in their unobtru sive presence . The presupp ositio n for the possibl e equani m ity of our dealin g with thing s is, am ong others, the uninterr upted quality of that comm erce . It must not be held up in its 15 progres s.
Now this passage is located in a very long paragraph in which Heidegger claims that `(b)ecause everything positiv e becomes particularly clear when 16 seen from the side of the privative’ , we must orient ourselves on how thing s show themselves in breakdown if we wish to understand the particular temporal character of equipment. This indicates that Heidegger’ s use of the adverbs `explicitly’ and `expressly’ are to be taken seriously: Heidegger is saying that, when operating in a familiar environm ent, we have no explicit awareness of the things we are dealing with. Heidegger’ s real positio n thus could be, and I think is in fact, the following: in any familiar environm ent we are always seeing the familiar thing s around us as a group , as a diffuse and inexplicit totality, i.e. precisely in their unobtru sive presence as the thing s in the room. Precisely because we have this background awareness we are able to see what is relevant, and able not to see what is not Ð `see’ here taken in the sense of what Heidegger calls natural perception of individual things, e.g. of the chair we need to avoid, in contrast to the picture on the wall, whose presence is irrelevant to what we are currently doing . W e are aware of the totality and it is for this reason that we are able to see some thing s (the relevant things) in their relevance, while not having to see other things. The passage quoted above from GP is clearly com patible with this positio n and thus in no way says what Dreyfus think s it does, namely, that we have no awareness of individ ual things and their determinate characteristics. But surely, one might object, Heidegger cannot be simply making the point that when dealing with familiar things we have no explicit awareness of these things. The point is so obviou s as not to be worth making. But once again the appropriate response lies in taking seriously the sentence om itted by Dreyfus, namely, `Precisely by not explicitly ascertaining and confirming their presence at hand we have them around us in their own distinctive way, just as they are in themselves’ . For this sentence indicates why it is indeed
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worth Heidegger’ s while to make an otherwise insigni ficant point : hovering in the background here is Heidegger’ s desire to counter the traditional metaphysical notio n that the being of thing s as they appear to us in our unprob lem atic dealings with them is somehow subjective, less `real’ and `in itself’ , than how they appear in theoretical observing and examining . W hat and how thing s are at the level of practical dealing with them, their everyday identity and appearance, is just as real as the identity they have under theoretical description and explanation. If, however, we wish to get at this everyday being, we must recognize that because we are not expressly or explicitly aware of fam iliar thing s in our dealings with them , we must access this being via its privative form, that is, by examining how these thing s show themselves when there is a hitch or, to use Dreyfus’ s word, a breakdown. (iii) T he third of Dreyfus’ s three central passages from GP is taken from 15, S. 232 (Hofstadter, p. 163); it is quoted by Dreyfus (p. 66; original emphasis) as follows: T he equipm enta l nexu s of things , for exam ple, the nexus of things as they surroun d us here, stand s in view , but not for the contem plato r as though w e were sitting here in order to describ e the things . . . . The view in which the equip mental nexu s stand s at ® rst, com pletely unobtru sive and unthoug ht, is the view and sight of practica l circum spectio n , of our practica l everyda y orientat ion. `U nthough t’ means that it is not them aticall y apprehe nded for delibera te thinkin g abou t things; instead , in circu m spection , we ® nd our bearing s in regard to them . . . . W hen we enter here throug h the door , we do not apprehe nd the seats, and the sam e hold s for the doorkn ob. N everthel ess, they are ther e in this peculia r way: w e go by them circu m spectly , avoid them circu mspectly , . . . and the like .
The crucial words and phrases here are `unthought’ (unbeda cht) and `deliberate thinking about things’ (ein Bedenken der Dinge). Heidegger says that `untho ught’ means here not `thematically apprehended’ ; as he says in the sentence im m ediately following the quoted passage, `[t]he stairs, the corridors, windows, chair and set, board and the other thing s are not 17 thematically given’ . As elsewhere, so, too, here, thematic apprehension means explicit, deliberate awareness in the sense of deliberately thinkin g to oneself, e.g. `That red chair there is broken, so I had better avoid it’ , `T hat book which someone has dropped on the floor in front of me’ , and so on. It is obvious that, all else being equal, we are not aware of thing s in the room in this sense; if we were, there would be a combinatorial explosion of thing s we apprehended upon entering the room. It is equally obvious, however, that to say this is not to say that we have no awareness of individ ual things, and thus of these thing s as thus and so. That Heidegger fully appreciates this obviou s point, and is thus not saying what Dreyfus im putes to him, becom es even clearer once a crucial mistranslation of this passage is corrected. T he last sentence of the quoted passage reads in
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Hofstadter’ s translation as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly, 18 stumble against them, and the like.’ The German, however, reads as follows: `Gleichwohl sind sie da in dieser eigentuÈ mlichen W eise, daû wir um sichtig an ihnen vorbeigehen, um sichtig vermeiden, daû wir uns stoû en 19 und dergleichen.’ Notice that the verb `vermeiden’ in this sentence does not have the accusative plural pronou n `sie’ as its object. This m eans that the nominal clause `daû wir uns stoû en’ is its true object. So the sentence must be translated as follows: `Nevertheless, they are there for us in this peculiar way: we go by them circum spectly, we circum spectly avoid stumbling against them and the like.’ So translated, this sentence intimates that our skilfully avoiding the thing s in the room is not at all as `extensional’ as Dreyfus would have it. It is not just a matter of automatically responding to the presence of such thing s as chairs by going around rather than runnin g into them. Rather, our everyday dealings with the thing s in a room are quite `intensional’ Ð `intensional’ in the sense that they essentially involv e seeing things in their specificity as chairs to be avoided, and so on. It is a matter of circumspectly behaving with regard to, or even with care tow ards, them . This intimates the im portance of taking seriously the preposition `zu’ in Heidegger’ s notion of `Sichverhalten-zu’ (self-com portment towards). Pace Dreyfus, there is something subjectively circum spect and purpos eful about Umgang mit innerweltlichem Seienden. This suggests something already hinted at in the discussion of the previous passage: Heidegger’ s practical circumspection, while not explicit, i.e. selfconscious, is certainly an ever-present seeing of the individ ual things relevant to what one is doing in their relevance for what one is doing against a backgroun d awareness of a diffusely present totality of thing s Ð what Heidegger calls the equipmental nexus (Zeugzusammenhang). It is, as 20 Heidegger himself says, a sight which guides: the individ ual entities seen, because seen in their relevance, are seen as internally related to this background nexus against which they so to speak stand out. L et us note that just as awareness of these individ uals is embedded in the background awareness, so, too, the background awareness of the equipmental nexus only occurs with this foreground-seeing embedded in it. Practical circumspection is a foreground seeing of relevance moving around within this background awareness.
II. Som e Ancillary Objections Given the disparity which the previous section has shown to exist between how Dreyfus interprets Heidegger’ s critique of traditional intentionality and what Heidegger appears to intend, one must expect to find other mismatches
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between Dreyfus’ s interpretation and Heidegger’ s texts. There are in fact at least three ways in which Dreyfus’ s Heidegger seems not to be present in the texts: (i) C learly, both in the account of the proper role of so-called representational intentionality, which emerges at the level of deliberate coping , and in the account of originary transcendence, which consists in an ostensibly completely general, always activated skill of knowing how to bring one’ s specific skills to bear in familiar situations, the notio n of `absorbed coping ’ has a lot of work to do. Yet Heidegger himself, who is notorious for thinkin g up distinctions, real or otherwise, and givin g them neolog istic titles, has no term for what on Dreyfus’ s account must be one of his most central concepts. Absorbed coping is certainly not what Heidegger 21 calls `Umgang in der Welt und mit dem innerweltichen Seienden’ , i.e. dealing within the world with entities in the world. For Heidegger explicitly introdu ces this term as another name for our everyday being-in-the-world; it therefore encompasses at least both absorbed coping and deliberate coping . Furthermore, some kinds of Umgang can have a theoretical rather than a practical point, since that kind of Umgang which Heidegger calls B esorgen, i.e. concern, our dealings with entities as non-`selves’ , includes the everyday 22 practice of science. Yet Dreyfus contrasts `coping ’ , both absorbed and deliberate, with so-called detached, objectifying theoretical reflection (pp. 70Ð 83). Finally, while Dreyfus’ s notio n of `absorbed coping ’ is in one way too narrow to encompass all of what Heidegger regards as Besorgen, in another, it is too broad. For Dreyfus uses the notio n as encompassing not merely Besorgen, i.e. our dealings with entities as non-selves, but also what 23 Heidegger calls FuÈ rsorge, i.e. solicitude, or dealings with entities as other`selves’ . Thus, Dreyfus speaks of `our shared transparent activity of coping with equipment (concern) and coping with people (solicitude)’ (p. 150). Not merely does Heidegger, however, not bother to disting uish what on Dreyfus’ s interpretation one must surely expect him to disting uish. Dreyfus’ s notio n of coping , whether absorbed or deliberate, fails to map in any easy way onto certain very im portant distinctions Heidegger does make. Consequently, it threatens to obliterate these genuinely Heideggerian distinctions, or at least obscure their significance. Heidegger distingu ishes in the first instance concern (Besorgen), solicitude (FuÈ rsorge), and care itself (Sorge ). Besorgen comprises all our dealings and interactions, whether theoretical or practical, with entities in their capacity as non-`selves’ . FuÈ rsorge comprises all our dealings with others in their capacity as such other `selves’ or `subjects’ . Heidegger’ s central concept of Sorge or care is, in the first instance, the `genus’ of the first two; this is intimated by the way Heidegger deliberately exploits the fact that the first two terms have the noun Sorge and the verb sorgen as their root. In the second instance, however,
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Sorge is not just what is common to Besorgen and FuÈ rsorge , it is also one’ s relation to self, a relation which is realized only in and throug h one’ s relation to entities as such (Besorgen) and one’ s relation to others (F uÈ rsorge) and which can be either authentic or inauthentic. The crucial thing to note here is that Besorgen is distinct from F uÈ rsorge in virtue of what it, so to speak, operates on: it operates on entities as non-selves. Dreyfus’ s coping , on the other hand, is much m ore diffuse; it seems we are coping absorbedly, whether we are working with wood or playing in a basketball team or teaching a class. Yet it would be clearly wrong to regard such `coping’ as what is common to Besorgen and FuÈ rsorge . Certainly, if such `coping’ is in any way com mon to these two, it is not so in the way in which Heidegger holds Sorge to be comm on to both. So Dreyfus’ s notion cuts completely across Heidegger’ s distinctions between B esorgen and FuÈ rsorge . It maps in no straightforward way on to distinctions and concepts in Heidegger’ s own texts; the claim that it is to be found in Heidegger, that indeed it constitutes the heart of Heidegger’ s critique of Husserl, intentionality, and the tradition, and is the core notion in Heidegger’ s account of everydayness, must constitute at best an extremely radical reconstruction of Heidegger.
(ii) Dreyfus insists that, according to Heidegger, traditional representational intentionality Ð beliefs, intentions, desires, and so on Ð only arises at the level of deliberate coping , when some kind of hitch forces one to deliberate about what one is doing and what one is operating with (p. 78; cited above). If this is right, then Heidegger cannot maintain that deliberation (UÈ berlegung ) is a feature of all kinds of Besorgen as such. For if it were, then representational intentionality would be im plicated in all kinds of practical Besorgen; not merely would there, there could be, no distinction in Heidegger between absorbed and deliberate coping . This would im mediately falsify Dreyfus’ s central contention that Heidegger wants to draw our attention to a nonrepresentational form of intentionality. Unfortunately for Dreyfus’ s interpretation, Heidegger does indeed allow deliberation as just such a general feature. He says: In any particul ar usin g or m anipulat ing of entitie s the synopti c circum spectio n (`»uÈ bersichtl iche« Um sicht’ ) of concer n (Besorgen ) brings the ready-t o-han d closer to Dasei n in that it lays out (A uslegung ) what has been sighted . This speci® c, circu m spectly interpr etiv e bringin g-close r of what is to be taken care of we call delibera tion. The schem e peculia r to delibera tion is the `if-the n’ ; for exam ple, if this or that is to be made, put to use, or averted , then these or those m eans, circu m stance s or opport unities are require d. Circu m spect delibera tion illuminates the particul ar given situatio n of D asein in the practica l settin g (U mwelt) with w hich it is concern ed. . . . D eliberati on can be perfor m ed even when that which in delibera tion is circu m spectly brough t closer is not palpabl y ready-t o-han d and within imm ediate
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sight . T he bringin g-close r of the surroun ding practica l settin g in circu mspect delibera tion has the existenti al sense of being a makin g presen t. For envisagi ng is only a m ode of makin g present . In envisagi ng, delibera tion sees directl y w hat is needed but unavaila ble. E nvisagin g circu mspectio n does not relate itself to `m ere 24 represen tations ’ .
It is clear enough from this passage, murky as it is, that Heidegger is talking 25 about the practical circumspection which guides all concern, all taking care of things (Besorgen). But if this should be doubted , one need only note the very last sentence on the previous page, where Heidegger speaks of exhibiting the genesis of science by characterizing the circumspection 26 `which guides ``practical’ ’ concern (``das »praktische« Besorgen’ ’ ).’ So the deliberation of which Heidegger speaks here is not at all something that comes only with a hitch in so-called absorbed coping ; it is an integral feature and character of the practical circumspection which guides all engaged activity with entities. Interestingly, on page 73 of his book Dreyfus himself uses elements of the passage just quoted. Using a slightly altered version of the Macquarrie and Robinso n translation, he has Heidegger say: D eliberati on can be perfor m ed even when that w hich is brough t close in it circu m spectivel y is not palpabl y availabl e and does not have presenc e within the closes t range . . . . In envisagi ng, one’ s delibera tion catche s sigh t directl y of that w hich is needed but which is unavaila ble.
W hat is interesting about this passage, apart from the unnecessarily obscure translation of `in der naÈ chsten Sichtweite anwesend ist’ as `have presence within the closest range’ , is a rather surprising om ission. Right in its middle, Dreyfus has left out tw o sentences which make it clear that deliberation is associated quite generally with what Heidegger calls `making-present’ (Gegenw aÈ rtigen), and not just with envisaging (VergegenwaÈ rtigen). In other words, deliberation consists in a quite general seeing of needed means, relevant circumstances or opportunities to be exploited, whether or not these means, circumstances or opportunities are actually given in the context of practical activity. It is thus not exclusively associated with the long-ra nge planning (pp. 72Ð 73) and anticipation of means, relevant circum stances, or op portun ities which according to Dreyfus is what Heidegger means by envisaging, and which Dreyfus clearly regards as involving representational intentionality (pp. 73Ð 74). Given this generality, what Heidegger means by deliberation is precisely an anticipation of relevant means, circumstances, and opportunities which may well be quite context-boun d and thus the kind of making-present to be found even in engaged practical activity which is going smoothly, i.e. in what Dreyfus calls `absorbed coping ’ .
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(iii) Dreyfus’ s Heidegger is out to attack the identification of intentionality with representational intentionality. Dreyfus says, as we saw earlier, that while `Heidegger does not deny that we sometimes experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects by way of intentional states such as desires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, etc., . . . he thinks of this as a derivative and intermittent condition that presupposes a more fundamental way of being-in-the-world that cannot be understood in subject/object terms’ (p. 5). In such everyday intentional behaviour as my hammering a nail, provid ed everything is going well, I have no representational states or experiences at all. So where Heidegger talks about such activity, we must expect to find him not describing such activity in any representational ways at all. This, however, is precisely what Heidegger does. In 5 of PGZ Heidegger speaks precisely of `a concrete and natural perception, the perception of a chair which I find upon entering a room and push aside, since it stands in my 27 way’ . Here Heidegger is speaking of a perceiving which is embedded in what Dreyfus would surely have to regard as a paradigm case of allegedly representationless `absorbed coping ’ , namely, everyday dealing with household objects in the organized totality of equipment which constitutes a room full of furniture and other accoutrements. Indeed, Dreyfus himself appeals to this case as a prime example of `absorbed coping ’ , speaking extremely vaguely of my `set’ or `readiness’ to cope with chairs, which is nothing representational but rather a skill for dealing with them (p. 103). It is true that Heidegger, having spoken of the concrete, natural perception we have when dealing with everyday things, goes on to say that he is talking here of `the m ost common kind of everyday perception and not perception in the 28 emphatic sense, in which we observe only for the sake of observing’ . But this harms rather than helps Dreyfus’ s cause because it intimates fairly directly that Heidegger is not at all pleading the case of the nonrepresentational against the (minimally) representational, but rather defending the non-theoretical against the primacy of the theoretical and the noncognitive against the primacy of the cognitive. In fact, the whole account of intentionality which Heidegger gives here is perfectly compatible with, is indeed an endorsement of, Husserl’ s account of intentionality. Heidegger says, for example, that in his lecture he `will attempt to show that intentionality is a structure of lived experiences 29 (Erlebnisse ) as such’ . So, for Heidegger as for Husserl, intentionality is a structure of lived experience, just as the word `E rlebnis’ is, pace Dreyfus (p. 68), just as much Heidegger’ s term as Husserl’ s. Adm ittedly, Heidegger does say that intentionality, being a structure of lived experience as such, is `not a coordination relative to other realities, something added to the 30 experiences taken as psychic states’ . But this is hardly un-Husserlian; in fact, at this point Heidegger is attacking the conception of intentionality he
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attributes, rightly or wrongly, to thinkers other than Husserl, in particular, to Brentano. In the meantime, let us note how Heidegger uses the word `Verhaltung’ in 5 of P GZ. Dreyfus m akes much of the fact that Heidegger uses the term `Verhaltung’ (compo rtment) to designate wha t has the structure of intentionality. According to Dreyfus, Heidegger does this because the word `comportment’ has no mentalistic, representational connot ations, unlik e the more traditional terminolog y of `lived experience’ (Erlebnis) and the more Husserlian terminology of `acts’ . In this way, think s Dreyfus, Heidegger intimates that what has intentionality need not be psychologic al, hence representational in any standard sense, and thus need not have any representational content, any noema, in Husserl’ s sense. As we have seen, however, while Heidegger does reject Husserl’ s terminolog y of noesis and noema, he does not do so for the reasons Dreyfus claims. Indeed, Heidegger remains, as we have seen, fundamentally committed to the standard Husserlian line that to be intentional is to have or involv e Husserlian intentional content. Precisely in this section, where he uses the word `Verhaltung’ repeatedly, he adopts the positio n that everything intentional is representational in a minimal sense that is perfectly Husserlian. So Heidegger’ s actual use of the word `Verhaltung’ in this section simply does not bear Dreyfus out. W hy, then, does Heidegger speak of `Verhaltungen’ , i.e. comportments? Dreyfus is right to say that Heidegger chooses this word because it does not have certain traditional connotations to which he objects. But these connot ations, and Heidegger’ s objections to them, are not what Dreyfus claims they are. Before one can truly understand Heidegger’ s preference for the word `Verhaltung’ , however, one must first understand what Heidegger really objects to about the subject/object model of the `subject’ , `self’ , or `mind’ . This brings us back to the need for a positiv e alternative to complement a purely negative critique. I will thus conclude by indicating the general form and desiderata of an alternative interpretation.
III. Retrieving Heidegger In order to identify Heidegger’ s real innovat ion and novelty regarding the concepts of `self’ and of intentionality, one must understand what he m eans by Dasein. In particular, one must determine what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is the entity `which, in its very Being, comports itself 31 understanding ly towards that Being’ . That this is Heidegger’ s most fundamental preliminary characterization of Dasein is shown by his 32 description of it as indicating `the formal concept of existence’ . It is thus
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that characterization the unpacking of which brings one to the most fundamental understanding of what it is to be a `subject’ or `self’ . Curiously, Dreyfus does not appreciate the architectonic significance of this fundamental initial characterization. A remarkable feature of Dreyfus’ s account is just how cursory his interpretation of this is; in his hands, it plays no structuring, unifying role at all. T his is perhaps not surprising, since Dreyfus seems not to appreciate Heidegger’ s methodo logical notio n of 33 formal indication. At no point, for example, does he consider the significance of Heidegger’ s remark that `[i]n our preparatory discussions (Section 9) we have brough t out some characteristics of [Dasein’ s Ð C.B.C.] Being which will provid e us with a steady light for our further investigation, but which will at the same time become structurally concrete as the 34 investigation continu es’ . Because he fails to see that the enterprise of Being and Time consists precisely in unpacking such formal indications, Dreyfus sees no need to show how the various insights and novelties he attributes to Heidegger, in particular the latter’ s alleged insight into nonrepresentational `absorbed coping ’ , flow from the abstract structure which formal indications such as this most fundamental one mark. True, on page 52 he does quote Heidegger as saying that `[t]o exist . . . means, among other 35 things, to be as relating to oneself by comportin g with beings’ . He also begins his fourth chapter by recalling how an essential feature of Dasein’ s ontolog ical make-up is that it takes a stand on itself and its existence (p. 61). Even so, no real effort is made to explain how Heidegger’ s initial characterizations lead, when elaborated, to Dreyfus’ s `absorbed coping ’ as an essential ontolog ical feature of Dasein. This general failure to understand how Heidegger proceeds in Being and Time also explains Dreyfus’ s even more remarkable insensitivity to the special significance Heidegger gives to the notio n of understanding . For Dreyfus, understanding is just one more `Existential’ alongside others. Indeed, when Dreyfus roundly declares that for Heidegger `primordial understanding is know-how’ (p. 184), thereby acquiescing in the fashionable assimilation of Heidegger to Ryle and Dewey, he reduces the significance of Heidegger’ s concept of understanding to zero. Any truly adequate account of the early Heidegger will consciously reverse this reduction of central concepts to a number of details listed alongside many. It will read him in a way which brings out the essentially systematic thrust of his earlier work. And it will achieve this by reading Heidegger in a far more historically oriented way than Dreyfus does. For Dreyfus simply does not read Heidegger in context; this is presumably what 36 Haberm as was getting at when he remarked that Dreyfus treats Being and Time as if it had just washed up as flotsam on the shores of some Californian beach. In the otherwise commendable effort to make Heidegger intelligible, Dreyfus one-sidedly maps him on to debates and problems within contemporary cognitive science and North American philoso phy of psychology.
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In so doing , he misconstrues Heidegger’ s undoub ted opposition to the traditional subject/object model as an anticipation of contemporary antirepresentationalist positio ns, which attack computationalism and classical AI for using computational analogues of Cartesian representations in their psychological theories and m odels. Once he has in this way been brough t up to speed with Dreyfus’ s own unquestioned present, Heidegger now appears as a proto-p articipant in contemporary North American debates, hence as someone who accepts the almost universal naturalist consensus which governs such debates. Greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, Heidegger’ s ow n intellectual background would guard against such aberrations. Only it would allow one genuin ely to realize Dreyfus’ s guidin g exegetical idea that Heidegger is to be read first and foremost as a theoretical philoso pher. At the very least, such sensitivity would preclude the, at times, quite surprising scholarly defects of Dreyfus’ s account, for example, his reading of a passage quoted from 38 Dilthey as a comment on Dilthey (p. 69). More im portantly, however, greater awareness of context would allow one to see that Heidegger’ s views on `mind’ are not pale shadows of contemporary views about intentionality and the `self’ which, for all their anti-representationalism, are nevertheless trenchantly naturalist. It would also allow one to see that Heidegger is not at all concerned to reject, even in part, the idea of representation as such. Rather, his concern is to show that much early modern philoso phy dramatically fails to understand the true nature of `representations’ , that is, of intentionality. Heidegger’ s critique of the subject/object model actually runs tangentially to the concerns of contemporary anti-representationalism. Unlike Rorty and so many others, he correctly sees that the distinctive character of the subject/object model lies not in any appeal to `representation’ as such, but rather in its distinctive interpretation of `representation’ , and thus of the subject of `representation’ . W hat distinguishes the subject/ object model and gives it its genuinely `Cartesian’ character is its interpretation of `representation’ as a psycho-physical transaction taking place within a psycho-physical unity which can be modelled in a unified, natural scientific psycho-physical theory. Heidegger is thus not out to eliminate `representations’ , not even from a mere portion of the self’ s intentional activity. Rather, he seeks to understand what it is to be a representation, and in pa rticular wha t it is to be som ething with representations. Nor is this endeavour driven by some facile desire to liberate culture, and in particular science, from the yoke of first philosophy. Rather, it is driven by a concern to `destroy’ the metaphysical tradition so as to liberate human though t from this tradition’ s currently hegemonic form. This currently hegemonic form is precisely the metaphysics of naturalism so rampant in contemporary North America. Heidegger joins with Husserl and Dilthey in anti-naturalist opposition to the likes of Ernst Haeckel; for this
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reason, what he has to say constitutes a much more radical challenge to contemporary orthod oxies than Dreyfus either appreciates or desires. For Dreyfus would not himself reject the very idea of psycho-physics and the contemporary naturalist consensus.
NOTES 1 GP, 9, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63). 2 Heidegger ® rst uses the term `erroneous objectivising’ on S. 91 (Hofstadter, p. 65), 9 b) of GP. His discussion of it, however, occurs much earlier in this subsection, namely, on S. 83Ð 85. 3 GP, 9 b, S. 86 (Hofstadter, p. 61). 4 GP, 9 b, S. 87 (Hofstadter, p. 62); trans. modi® ed. 5 That this interpretation is mistaken has been ably argued by Andrew Gardiner, `Keeping Consciousness in Mind’ (MA thesis, Department of Philosophy, Australian National University, 1997). 6 In a similar sounding passage in M AL Heidegger explicitly mentions Brentano Ð see 9, S. 168 (K isiel, p. 134). He also mentions Brentano in 5 c . of PGZ, S. 61Ð 62 (K isiel, p. 46). 7 GP, 9 b, S. 89 (Hofstadter, p. 63). 8 GP, 9 b, S. 88 (Hofstadter, p. 63). 9 GP, 9, S. 85 (Hofstadter, p. 60); trans. modi® ed. 10 M AL, 9, S. 168Ð 9 (Kisiel, p. 134); Dreyfus’ s italics and gloss in the second brackets. 11 M AL, 9, S. 168Ð 9; my trans. 12 M AL, 9, S. 168Ð 9; my trans. 13 PGZ, 5 c. ., S. 60Ð 61. 14 PGZ, 5 c. ., S. 61. 15 GP, 21, S. 439Ð 40 (Hofstadter, p. 309); trans. modi® ed. 16 GP, 21, S. 439 (Hofstadter, p. 309). 17 GP, 15, S. 232Ð 3 (H ofstadter, p. 163); trans. modi® ed. 18 GP, 15, p. 163. 19 GP, 15, S. 232. 20 See SZ, 15, S. 69. 21 SZ, 15, S. 66. 22 See SZ, 69 b, S. 358 and S. 364. 23 See SZ, 26, S. 121. 24 SZ, 69 a, S. 359; p. 410; trans. modi® ed. 25 See SZ, 15, S. 69. 26 SZ, 69 a, S. 358. 27 PGZ, 5 a, S. 37. 28 PGZ, 5 a, S. 37. 29 PGZ, 5 a, S. 36. 30 PGZ, 5 a, S. 36. 31 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78; see also GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157). 32 SZ, 12, S. 53; p. 78. See also SZ, 9, S. 41; p. 67. 33 A formal indication (formale Anzeige) is an abstract characterization drawn from the preceding tradition which both guides explication and is ¯ eshed out in this explication at the same time. See, e.g., GP, , S. (Hofstadter, p.). For a brief exposition, see Kisiel (1993), pp. 164 and 178. 34 SZ, 12, S. 52; p. 78. 35 GP, 15, S. 224 (Hofstadter, p. 157). 36 In Frankfurt in 1989, at a joint seminar on Heidegger held by Apel, Dreyfus, and Habermas. 37 See, e.g., van Gelder (1991), esp. p. 380. 38 See Sein und Zeit, 43 b, S. 209.
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REFERENCES Christensen, Carleton B. 1997. `H eidegger’ s Representationalism’ , Review of M etaphysics 51, 77±104. Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1991. Being-in-the-W orld (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Referred to in the text simply by page number. Hannay, Alastair. 1990. Human Consciousness (London: Routledge). Heidegger, Martin. 1989. Grundprobleme der PhaÈ nomenologie (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2.te Au¯ age). Trans. A. Hofstadter (1988) as Basic P roblems of Phenomenology (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as GP. Heidegger, Martin. 1978. M etaphysische AnfangsgruÈ nde der Logik (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1980) as M etaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington, IN . Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as M AL. Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann). Trans. T. Kisiel, (1985) as History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press). Referred to in the text as PGZ. Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Sein und Zeit, 15.te Au¯ age, (TuÈ bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag). Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (1962) as B eing and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). Referred to in the text as SZ. Kisiel, T heodore. 1993. The Genesis of Heidegger’ s Being and Time (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Olafson, Frederick. `H eidegger aÁ la Wittgenstein or ``Coping’’ with Professor Dreyfus’ . Inquiry 37, 45Ð 64. Scharff, Robert C. 1992. `Rorty and Analytic Heideggerian Epistemology Ð and Heidegger’ . M an and World 25, 483Ð 504. Received 23 June 1997 Carleton B. Christensen, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia