Global Social Policy Forum and Policy Brief - SAGE Journals

GSP FORUM AND POLICY BRIEF

Global Social Policy Forum and Policy Brief

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The Global Development Network: Five Years On: Editor’s Introduction In this issue of GSP we combine the forum section with a policy brief examining the development of the Global Development Network (GDN) and reporting on its most recent conference in Cairo on Globalization and Equity. DIANE STONE

‘Better Knowledge, Better Policy, Better World’: The Grand Ambitions of a Global Research Institution (diane stone is a Professor at the Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest. She is a member of the Governing Body of the GDN. The views outlined below are a personal perspective.

There are many research networks in existence but few so grand in design as the Global Development Network (GDN). The Network was designed to allow greater scope for ‘home-grown’ policy, information-sharing and enhanced research capacity in and between developing countries for the co-production of local, regional and global knowledge. One aspect of this is an interactive website and resource bank of policy research papers (http://www.gdnet.org). Another feature of research collaboration and information-sharing are the annual conferences, regular workshops and longer-term ‘global research projects’ of the GDN. By stimulating the supply of both the quantity and quality of policy-relevant research in knowledge organizations such as think tanks, research institutes and universities, the idea is to enable developing and transition societies to build their own research capacity and adapt or synthesize global forms of knowledge to suit local circumstances. Such laudable aspirations have been welcomed within the development studies community. The GDN is seen as aiding the provision of a global public good – knowledge for development. Yet, there are also concerns about the uncritical view of how that knowledge is utilized. There is a rationalist tendency within the GDN that portrays (scientific) research as independent from its social context. Knowledge is represented as an intellectual tool that helps rational policy actors to reduce and control uncertainty in decision-making and advance social progress. This is best captured in the GDN motto: ‘better research, better policy, better world’.

Global Social Policy Copyright © 2004 1468-0181 vol. 4(1): 5–26; 040982 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, ca and New Delhi) DOI: 10.1177/1468018104040982

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Global Social Policy 4(1)

The GDN is symptomatic of multilateral efforts to operationalize the contemporary policy fashion among development agencies that regard knowledge – its creation, sharing and application – as one of the solutions to ameliorating poverty and improving the prospects for social and economic development (see Gmelin et al., 2001). Although there are many sponsor agencies for this Network, at the time of its creation, the GDN was an example of how the World Bank was recreating itself as the ‘Knowledge Bank’ (see World Bank, 1999). The GDN was a World Bank initiative, in part to help coordinate the activities of seven older regional research networks (again sponsored by the World Bank) and promote synergies.1 But there were other more substantive ambitions. At the 1999 launch of the Network, then World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz exhorted the GDN partner institutes to reinvent successful policy innovations and international ‘best practice’ suitable to their national context. ‘The Knowledge Bank can “scan globally”; the GDN partners have to “reinvent locally”’ (Stiglitz, 2000). In this statement is one of the clearest global policy aspirations for the GDN whereby the research community has the intellectual infrastructure to construct channels of communication between the political and the research worlds thus facilitating the flow of knowledge into policy. In other words, the transfer of knowledge itself is equated as a mode of development. Placing ‘knowledge’ central to the development process is a profound reconceptualization of development not only in the World Bank, but in other multilateral aid agencies that adopt a similar development discourse. One implication is that the creation, management and transfer of knowledge can become a primary axis for international cooperation on development. The importance of knowledge in development is not to be denied. But at the same time, it is necessary to ask: Whose knowledge? This is a question that had significant ramifications for the early development of the GDN (see Stone, 2000). In the wake of a high profile international launch of the Network in late 1999 that brought together leading representatives of the donor and research community, sustained criticism emerged. First, the GDN was viewed as a creature of the World Bank and lacking independence (Page, 2000). Second, the interests of development economists were seen to dominate research agendas. Third, the Network was seen by some as too scholarly and insufficiently policy focused. Fourth, some critics were disdainful of the technocratic impulses within the design of the Network whereby research in the form of data, theories and models is presented as neutral and independent from its social context. To quell disquiet among donors, and to enlist their support, an early decision was taken to divorce the GDN from the World Bank. In 2001, it was constituted as an international non-governmental organization with additional plans set in motion to relocate its headquarters from Washington,

GSP Forum and Policy Brief

DC to a developing country. New Delhi was chosen as the location. A more gradual process has been to reorient GDN structures and activities to a multi-disciplinary social scientific basis in the conferences, Global Research Projects and the regional networks and especially the new hubs. As Natalia Dinello discusses in the following forum article, the ‘Bridging Research and Policy’ project is a serious effort to better understand the manner in which knowledge does (or does not) shape and influence political decision-making and policy practice. However, the nature of knowledge produced by the network and its role in society is a more intractable issue. The GDN has presented itself as a technical and politically neutral, nonstate actor. However, the knowledge that is generated and transferred – research results, data, information about ‘best practice’, etc. – is considered by some to be flavoured by the values of the post Washington Consensus. This policy paradigm involves political choices in favour of certain policies such as privatization, liberalization, deregulation and public sector reform overlain with new concerns about transparency, engagement with civil society and local ownership of development policy. The GDN rhetoric of science, ‘best practice’ and knowledge sharing, and its portrayal as a global partnership to produce public goods de-emphasizes the ideological character of the Network. What is ‘shared’ indeed, disseminated and broadcast globally via the GDN are broadly similar sets of policy paradigms or development discourse. A further cause for qualm is the elite orientation of the Network. The dominant conceptualization of what constitutes knowledge is research undertaken by social scientists and other suitably qualified experts in recognized institutional contexts; that is, research institutes. It is a ‘codified’ form of knowledge that results in ‘sharing’ almost exclusively between intellectual, political and economic elites who converse in a common professional language. Those in the Secretariat and the Governing Body are not insensitive to these issues. Members of the wider community of the Global Development Network do grapple with these questions of ideology. Through the electronic discussions and the exchanges in workshops and conferences, critical perspectives on the role and status of the Network are voiced. Notwithstanding the title of the following article, it is no contradiction to state that the GDN conference in Cairo was characterized by diverse perspectives and critical thinking about the so-called Washington Consensus. Knowledge is contested within the Network. It is a research community driven by scientific competition as much as any other motive to produce neo-liberal global public goods. However, while these debates are important in shaping the identity of the Network, they do not present the greatest challenge to the GDN. The GDN is still evolving. Once independent of the World Bank, it became increasingly subject to pressures from a more diverse range of

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stakeholders. Yet, change comes about slowly in large, federal global networks and potentially not as fast as the waxing and waning interest of some donor groups might dictate. The GDN is not the only research network and faces competition for resources from other knowledge organizations and networks. The ongoing interest and financial support of government and private donors is unpredictable. The World Bank remains its main sponsor but its financial support is to be phased down. Survival is not guaranteed in a very competitive funding environment. Although it is barely five years old, a fundamental departure in GDN development is underway. The GDN is recreating itself as an international organization. In part, this is to make a stake as a distinctive entity among the plethora of NGOs and other civil society actors promoting knowledge for development. It is also a strategy to secure certain tax privileges that international status confers. Nevertheless, this transmogrification from a civil society NGO into an intergovernmental body under the patronage and sponsorship of governments and other international organizations like the IMF and World Bank is bound to raise some further debate about the scholarly independence of the GDN and the potential politicization of knowledge. note 1. The original seven research networks created up to a decade prior to the GDN are: Africa Economic Research Consortium; Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education; East Asian Development Network; Economic Education and Research Consortium (Russia); Economic Research Forum (Middle East and North Africa); Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA); South Asian Network of Economic Institutes. At a later date, these regional networks were complemented by European, North American and North Asian hubs of OECD researchers. An Austral-Pacific network is nascent. references Gmelin, W., King, K. and McGrath, S. (2001) (eds) Development Knowledge, National Research and International Cooperation. Edinburgh, Bonn and Geneva: CAS-DSENORRAG. Page, S. (2000, 9 February) GDN Governance e-discussion, accessed 1 November 2003, http://www2.worldbank.org/hm/hmgdnet Stiglitz, J. (2000) ‘Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally: Knowledge Infrastructure and the Localization of Knowledge’, in D. Stone (ed.) Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global Development Network (pp. 24–43). London: Routledge. Stone, D. (2000) (ed.) Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global Development Network. London: Routledge. World Bank (1999) Knowledge for Development: World Development Report 1998/99. New York: Oxford University Press.

GSP Forum and Policy Brief N ATA L I A D I N E L L O Global Development Network (http://www.gdnet.org)

Cairo Consensus: Reforms as a Path to Equitable Globalization (natalia dinello is a Senior Political Scientist in the Secretariat of the Global Development Network)

The beginning of the 21st century has been marked by a broad consensus that globalization is remaking the world. However, the discussion of forces behind globalization and its effects revealed a sharp polarization of views. How extensive is contemporary globalization? Does it on balance do more ‘bad’ than ‘good?’ Which countries are integrated in the global economy and which are left out? What has globalization achieved and what has it failed to do? In heated debate centered on these questions, advocates and detractors of globalization invoke value imperatives and appeal to rationality, enter into theoretical discourse and present empirical evidence, and express their either deeply personal or deliberately detached, academic-like, stance. And always issues of fairness and justice are a focus of the arguments for and against globalization and interpretations of its past and future. The Fourth Annual Global Development Conference, whose theme was ‘Globalization and Equity,’ added a chorus of opinions to this debate. Held in Cairo 18–21 January, 2003, by the Global Development Network (GDN) – an organization with the dual mission of building research capacity and bridging research and policy – this international conference attracted almost 600 participants, including such prominent leaders as Benjamin Mkapa, president of Tanzania, Ernesto Zedillo, former president of Mexico, and Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, assistant secretary-general of the United Nations. The conference was hosted by the Government of Egypt, and its highlights included an opening address by Atef Ebeid, prime minister of Egypt, and presentations by Suzanne Mubarak, the first lady of Egypt, Abdelatif AlHamad, director general of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and Gamal Mubarak, head of the Policy Secretariat of the National Democratic Party of Egypt. Policy makers mingled with researchers, particularly researchers from developing and transition economies, who represent the major constituency of GDN, primary beneficiaries of its activities, and main contributors to the conference. The Cairo forum reflected a range of views – both pessimistic and optimistic. Although a discussion of the status quo revealed a considerable controversy, many participants lamented the existence of ‘blank spots’ on the map of the globalizing world – due to either weak integration of some regions into the global economy or their outright exclusion. Others drew a dark picture of a lopsided and ineffective dialogue between the developed and developing worlds, pressures experienced by developing countries, and their ensuing marginalization. At the same time, in a bewildering contrast to the assessment of the present-day realities, the prevailing expectations of the

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future were positive and constructive. Most researchers and policy makers highlighted the potential of globalization to improve the human condition and attempted to define the paths toward a more equitable world. What emerged as the Cairo consensus emphasized the importance of human intervention as a means of increasing the benefits of globalization and mitigating its negative effects. The consensus favored intervention grounded in local experience – not advice imposed from outside. And it endorsed a measured entry of peripheral countries into the global world – to be tempered by safeguards for the most vulnerable groups and compensation for losers from globalization. Reform was the key word in discussions at the conference. Participants referred to reform of both national and international institutions and stressed its significance for making globalization more inclusive and balanced, creating opportunities for all. By emphasizing reform, the Cairo conference built a conceptual bridge to the next GDN’s 2004 conference to be held in New Delhi, whose theme will be ‘Understanding Reform.’ The Delhi forum will further the exchanges held in Cairo to specify the design, timing, and pace of reforms conducive to both socio-economic development and alleviation of poverty. Not attempting to summarize all views expressed at the Cairo conference, we will pinpoint here the prevailing observations. We will also intentionally disregard variations within the regions to sketch the overall images of different parts of the world, as they were perceived by presenters at the Cairo conference. The core papers selected for this review are those prepared for plenary sessions, including a policy makers’ roundtable, and break-out sessions on regional perspectives on globalization and equity. We will particularly highlight research and development projects that were chosen as the finalists and winners of the GDN Global Development Awards Competition – the largest international contest for researchers from developing and transition economies working on development issues. Most of the reviewed papers are available on GDN’s website; presentations of several policy makers whose papers are unavailable have been excerpted from the notes taken during the conference. PLOTTING POSITIONS ON THE WORLD MAP: WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT

GDN’s focus is on developing and transition economies. Its goal is to develop expertise and social science knowledge in the developing world. Launched in December 1999 as a network of research and policy institutes working together to address problems of national and regional development, it has network partners in seven developing regions – the Commonwealth of Independent States, East Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and SubSaharan Africa. To complement these networks and assist researchers in the


developing and transition world, GDN has established networks in developed countries with offices in Bonn, Tokyo, and Washington. An additional network that covers both developed and developing areas – Australia, New Zealand, and the South Pacific – will begin activities in late 2003. Its office will be located in Suva, Fiji. Considering GDN’s global outlook and its agenda of promoting policyrelevant research to ensure sustainable development and alleviate poverty, the conference participants were eager to plot positions of the various developing regions on the world map – in terms of who is in and who is out of the globalization game. The picture that has been drawn was far from clear-cut, but a rough outline revealed more woes than joys. Latin America is in but often discontent. East Asia is also in but has mixed feelings about its global involvement, demonstrating temporal ups and downs in its sentiment. South Asia is only recently and partly in and is yet to reap the benefits of its global engagement. Central and Eastern Europe aggressively pursues being accepted by global players, but local sentiment about this trend is uneven, to say the least. The Commonwealth of Independent States displays signs of being integrated in the global economy, but this process is very slow and hesitant. The Middle East and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa are marginalized, if not altogether out of the globalization game. According to Roberto Bouzas and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, researchers from Chile, Latin America experienced deepening integration into the world economy during the last two decades, which were marked by liberalization and structural reforms. But the prevailing mood on the continent is that of discontent due to the perceived effect of globalization on inequality. Income distribution in Latin America remains the most unequal in the world. Since the 1960s the continent has displayed the highest Gini coefficient in the world, followed closely by Sub-Saharan Africa.1 Similarly, East Asia is one of the most globalized regions in the world, with high levels of international trade and investment. However, as acknowledged by Chia Siow Yue, a researcher from Singapore, a general perception of globalization’s positive role in generating growth and employment has been questioned with the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, when the East Asian economic miracle revealed the high costs of globalization.2 Compared to East Asia, South Asia has had a brief and rather limited experience with globalization. According to Sisira Jayasuriya, a Sri Lankan researcher, South Asian economies have yet to be exposed to the broader currents of globalization through international capital flows of similar magnitude to those of East Asian countries, and the short horizon of their global engagement complicates an assessment of its effect.3 Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are the newcomers in the globalization game. As indicated by Boyan Belev, a Bulgarian researcher, countries of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate an intention of or an aspiration for globalization.

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However, their benefits from globalization are meagre to date. Moreover, the closer these countries come to the real breakthrough into the larger world in terms of joining the European Union, the sourer the debate on the implications of globalization becomes, with anti-globalizers strengthening their voices.4 Similar to Central and Eastern Europe, integration of the CIS countries into the world economy has been part of a more complex process of transition from a state-planned to a market economy, which makes it difficult to separate the effects of globalization from those of transition. However, as demonstrated by a Russian researcher, Ksenia Yudaeva, even the countries that pursued active globalization had problems enforcing this policy, and the integration proceeded slowly. ‘Passive globalizers’ with weak governments achieved much worse results in terms of the output decline and increase in poverty and inequality, while countries cut off from international trade, because of being landlocked or at war or bad relations with the neighboring countries, came to the brink of disaster.5 It was depressing for the conference hosts to hear mostly pessimistic observations of the position of the Middle East in the world. Based on several measures of globalization, such as the increase of trade/GDP ratio, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP, and the rate of immigration, Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, a researcher from Kuwait, came to the disappointing conclusion that the Arab region has been left out of the process of globalization.6 Although the degree of marginalization of the Middle East is debatable, its weak integration into the global economy was not seriously contested at the conference. Atef Ebeid, prime minister of Egypt, acknowledged a tremendous task ahead of his country in regard to becoming a significant global player.7 Abdelatif Al-Hamad, director general of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, indicated that the fears of weakening Arab and Islamic cultural identity contributed to the region’s insulation and isolation, citing the historical example of the printing press, which was banished by the rulers of the Ottoman Empire for centuries to protect Islam from foreign influences.8 Some of these fears continue to haunt the Middle East. The most pessimistic assessment was, however, reserved for the African continent. According to the Nigerian researcher, S. Ibi Ajayi, in 1980 Africa’s share of world exports stood at 5%, while that of Asia and the Middle East accounted for 8% and 11%, respectively. Since then Africa’s share of world exports declined, while the share of other regions increased, and the continent’s unfortunate reputation as a pariah of the world became firmly established.9 Benjamin Mkapa, president of Tanzania, reminded the conference participants that 40% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa – the poorest region of the world – are classified as income poor.10 The mapping of the globalizing world has reflected drastic variations in the degree of different countries’ involvement in globalization. Developed countries are actively engaged as leaders and the main beneficiaries, joined


by a select number of pioneering regions from the developing and transition worlds. Presence of many other regions on this map is cursory, while some are hardly noticeable. These variations may indicate divergent aspirations to integrate into the global economy and society. They may also signal an existence of the easy passage for some but lack of access for others. A combination of national (and regional) interests and internal and external conditions of their pursuit may also be behind the countries’ involvement/non-involvement in globalization. Understanding the reasons is, however, impossible without a thorough exploration of the perceived costs and benefits of globalization. I S G L O B A L I Z AT I O N A B L E S S I N G O R A C U R S E ?

Reflecting the theme of the Cairo conference, responses to this question focused on the effects of globalization and globalization-induced growth on inequality. Probably the most cited findings in this respect were those of David Dollar and Aart Kraay, who showed that globalization and economic growth raised the incomes of the poor in 18 Asian countries by about as much as they raised the incomes of the non-poor.11 Yue’s review of the studies on East Asia – one of the most globalized regions of the world – highlighted research by Barry Eichengreen, which demonstrated that poverty in East Asia declined sharply between 1975 and 1995,12 and by Yunling Zhang and coauthors, which showed China’s great benefits from opening up to the outside world, including a pronounced poverty reduction.13 This reduction was complemented, however, by sharply rising inequality as an inevitable result of the collapse of the egalitarian communist-style society.14 On the other side of the spectrum are the studies that concluded the opposite – that current patterns of growth and globalization increase income disparities and hinder poverty reduction. Oxfam – an international organization dedicated to fighting poverty worldwide – characterized globalization as generally anti-poor and anti-growth. According to Oxfam, East Asia is the only developing region where high growth rates have been accompanied by high poverty reduction, with each percentage point of growth producing a four times greater impact on poverty reduction than in Latin America.15 But even in East Asia the 1997 financial crisis worsened poverty and contributed to resentment toward the globalization process. In his presentation on the former Communist-bloc countries, Belev cited striking statistics from the 1999 report of the United Nations Development Programme on a sharp 10-fold rise in the level of poverty from 1989 to 1999, which often went together with a dramatic increase in unemployment, a decline of life expectancy, and a remarkable upsurge in suicide rates and criminality. Although it would be wrong to interpret these trends as a result of globalization rather than economic and political transformation, the combined negative effects of the former communist societies’ liberalization

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and globalization are nevertheless striking. As indicated by Jayasuriya, the experience of South Asia reiterated some of the patterns of the former centrally planned economies, including China, where rampant corruption was aggravating social dissatisfaction with rising inequality.16 In an intermediate position, the series of OECD 2001 studies showed that globalization is not the major cause of income inequality and poverty, although it contributed to the poor performance of a number of developing economies. Wherever inequalities are acute, globalization tends to make them worse, which suggests two-fold implications for development policy: first, globalization should be complemented by policies that create a more equitable distribution of human capital and assets, particularly for vulnerable groups, and, second, the speed and sequencing of external and domestic liberalization should take into account the institutional capacity to undertake economic transformation and manage its risks.17 In addition to exploring macroeconomic relationships between globalization, growth, and poverty, the Cairo conference also raised more subtle issues of factors and dynamics of persistent inequities in a globalizing society. Research by Peruvians Jaime Saavedra, Maximo Torero, and Hugo Ñopo, titled ‘The Economics of Social Exclusion in Peru: An Invisible Wall,’ can serve as an example.18 Interested in the plight of the mestizos – the largest Peruvian urban group with a mixed background, Saavedra, Torero, and Ñopo characterized it as highly heterogeneous, with different racial backgrounds having important implications for socio-economic outcomes, particularly earnings. To study the specific exclusion mechanisms, they will analyze the relation between ethnic and racial heterogeneity, on the one hand, and occupational segregation, access to education and to social networks, and chances of being hired in the urban labor market, on the other hand. When completed, this study should reveal more than a mere association among various factors. It should demonstrate how and why differences in the conventional ‘ascriptive’ characteristics affect one’s achievement despite the liberalizing forces of modernization and globalization. ‘ I H AV E A D R E A M ’ : G L O B A L I Z AT I O N W I T H A H U M A N FA C E

To evaluate the status of globalization and participation in it of various regions of the world, it is important to note the attained benchmarks, identify the remaining challenges, and understand the prevailing trends. The questions of ‘who we are,’ ‘what we have achieved,’ and ‘where we are going’ should be, however, complemented by more contemplative and open-ended questions about the parameters of a desirable world. Reflecting aspirations of Africa – the poorest continent dependent on the export of natural resources – Mkapa, a participant of the policy makers’ roundtable, spoke about ‘globalization with a human face, globalization that cares for the globe.’19 To Mkapa, such globalization connotes giving a voice


to developing countries in their relations with developed economies. Addressing the current situation under which norms and rules of global behavior are designed by major powers and then imposed on the rest of the world, Mkapa insisted on the greater involvement of developing countries in decision-making within the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other multilateral and bilateral development organizations. Mkapa called upon the developed world to be ‘less condescending’ and to ‘live up to its accepted aid responsibilities,’ that is, the previously agreed target of official development assistance at the level of 0.7% of gross national income.20 Having stressed that ‘sustainable prosperity is a shared prosperity,’ he also cautioned against practicing absorption instead of integration of the developing world, and against condemning Sub-Saharan Africa to a peripheral role in the world community, which can lead to greater human suffering and endanger stability in the world. Similar to Mkapa, Gamal Mubarak, head of the Policy Secretariat of the National Democratic Party of Egypt, addressed the quality of the dialogue between developing countries and developed countries and international financial institutions (IFIs). He referred to the ‘corners [in Washington] that listen and hear, corners that listen and don’t hear, and those that neither listen nor hear,’ indicating that the ‘developed world cannot ask the developing world to open up’ unless it becomes less protectionist. A conversation from the position of power cannot produce a humane world and secure globalization for the good of all. Raising his voice against the major powers’ arrogance, Ernesto Zedillo, former president of Mexico, asked them to ‘stop teaching us [developing countries] lessons’ but instead honor the signed agreements, including the 2001 Doha commitment to eventually eliminate agricultural export subsidies. All three panelists at the policy makers’ roundtable – Mkapa, Mubarak, and Zedillo – agreed on at least two points: globalization with a human face means respect and reciprocity between the developing and developed worlds, and an improvement of the human condition is beneficial for all parties involved in globalization. Going beyond the policy makers’ conclusions, Suzanne Mubarak, the first lady of Egypt, defined a humane globalization more broadly, endorsing ‘global values that emphasize peace, generosity, tolerance, and justice’ and the ‘adoption of a global public ethic.’21 In her keynote address, Saskia Sassen, Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, stretched this definition even further, stressing the importance of freedom, human rights, voluntary action, and participation of citizen networks in the globalization process.22 These views run counter to the ‘real politik’ attitudes that celebrate military and economic might and build on supremacy to further advance benefits enjoyed by the powerful. An imperative of ‘giving and sharing,’ which reflects the ‘wisdom of tradition’ in many developing countries and

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which, according to Suzanne Mubarak, constitutes the core of the Middle Eastern identity,23 also runs counter to more individualistic and libertarian leanings of the West. However, the current state of affairs, when, in the words of Atef Ebeid, prime minister of Egypt, the developing countries bear ‘the heaviest burden of adapting to globalization ... [because] they have less influence on the rules of the game,’ is hardly tolerable and is destructive in the long run.24 Despite the difference in values in various parts of the world, visions of a more level playing field are no longer a reflection of idealism. They gain acceptance as a practical requirement of a mutually beneficial globalization. FA L S E D I C H O T O M Y: M A R K E T A N D S TAT E

A dramatic abandoning of the communist-style state planning of economies coincided with the extraordinary exuberance of stock markets at the end of the last century. This conjunction has strengthened market fundamentalism – a desire to rely on unfettered markets for solving all world problems. The 1990s sounded a death knell to statist orthodoxy founded on the belief in the state as a supreme agent of social and economic change. Bashing state intervention in any shape or form went together with ascribing transcendental powers to the markets with their alleged ability to right all wrongs. Many of the Cairo conference participants rejected, however, a mutually exclusive dichotomy of market and state as false and counter-productive. The dominant sentiment was that promotion of market principles does not mean that the state should leave the scene or relinquish its responsibility for equity in the human condition. To the contrary, the state should be more activist and even pre-emptive to reinforce successes and prevent failures of the market. State intervention is advisable, particularly in cases of power abuse and drastic disparities attributed to the precarious markets. Markets do not have a will or brain – state leaders do. Along these lines, Ebeid acknowledged negative experience of Egypt with 20 years of public sector domination of the manufacturing industry and central planning in the 1960s and 1970s, indicating that ‘state-led industrial development and state-owned enterprises are a recipe for eventual failure.’ He also denounced an ‘excessive bureaucracy and an inadequate institutional framework [as] a serious deterrent to increasing investment and boosting exports.’ At the same time, he rebuffed the idea that the markets are automatically fair and effective and sent a powerful message in favor of a strong state.25 According to Ebeid, the state holds an important role: it should ‘act as a service and incentive provider for key market players, while maintaining its regulatory and supervisory authority to maximize efficiency and correct market failures.’ To enhance competitiveness and reduce the probability of market failure, the state should invest in social and physical infrastructure and improve information intended to guide economic development. To


ensure equity and stability on the national level, the state should offer ‘social protection schemes for the vulnerable segments’ of the population, while also helping ‘create channels for productive employment in the private sector.’ Finally, the nation states should invest in peace as a precondition of dynamic development and address problems associated with the movement toward globalization, for example, by ‘compensat[ing] the losers from globalization under the aegis of corporate governance, public goods, global taxes, or a review of the WTO rules.’26 Many of Ebeid’s theses were reiterated in the presentations of researchers. Although the conference participants largely recognized that globalization can and does reduce the ability of the national governments to monitor and control development, they also insisted that the state should still fulfill its obligations. In her review of the studies on globalization, Yue stated that, ‘countries need to pursue a strategy of balanced growth to achieve sustainable growth with less [economic] volatility and more equitable outcomes.’ To maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of globalization, nation states can negotiate more favorable terms of international trade through various forms of regional cooperation and assistance. To secure growth with equity, they can provide education and infrastructure, promote technological upgrading and development, and even regulate the financial sector. In reference to East Asia, Yue indicated two areas in which governments can promote more equitable growth – rural development and human resource development – and advocated ‘more proactive action.’27 As an example of an emergency action, Malaysia’s move to impose controls on short-term outflows of capital at the height of the 1997–98 financial crisis caused an outcry and ignited a long-standing controversy, but many believe that this policy proved effective. Similarly, the review of literature on changes in poverty and distribution in South Asia conducted by Jayasuriya pointed to ‘the beneficial impact of welldirected public action to improve access to human capital and physical infrastructure.’28 A researcher from Senegal, Adebayo Olukoshi, made a particularly strong emphasis on the ‘developmental state’ as a vehicle of fair integration of developing countries into the global economy.29 In the global market the strongest players build on their earlier attained benefits, while the weakest are significantly disadvantaged by their adverse legacy. The bargaining power of developing countries in exchanges with developed countries is feeble, and the playing field is tilted. Under these conditions, leaders of the developing states do not have the right to relinquish their brainpower and pass their authority to the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. The involvement of the state in the economy – as both a promoter and a monitor of the market – remains both justifiable and necessary.

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Global Social Policy 4(1) S P I R I T O F R E F O R M : G L O B A L I Z AT I O N , L I B E R A L I Z AT I O N , R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y, A N D G R A D U A L I S M

Despite a variety of opinions expressed at the conference, the four themes kept recurring, forming the basis of the Cairo conference consensus. Both researchers and policy makers raised them, although the voices of policy makers were particularly strong and clear. Participation in Globalization is not a Matter of Choice but a Vital Necessity The conference participants shared a view that deeper integration in the world economy raises the growth potential, even if it does not always immediately lead to greater equality and an improvement in equity. Bouzas and FfrenchDavis referred to the studies indicating a causal relationship between openness and growth.30 Underlining the importance of openness, Jayasuriya affirmed: ‘More open economies appear to have more, rather than less, propoor growth.’31 Policy makers were in tune with researchers on this subject. Gamal Mubarak spoke with distress about the perception that the Middle East remains on the sidelines of globalization and about the need for an open society and social inclusion. To integrate Egypt into the global economy, he considered it important that young Egyptian professionals educated abroad return home, bringing back their newly acquired skills and knowledge. Abdelatif Al-Hamad, director general of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, acknowledged ‘no reversal of the basic trend ... [toward] world integration,’ assessed it as generally ‘beneficial to all participants – small and large,’ and appealed to the leadership of the Arab world to meet the challenges of globalization. According to Al-Hamad, to avoid becoming a loser in the race between nations in a global world, Arab countries ‘need to change their attitudes dramatically and accept greater competition at the national and international levels.’32 Similarly, Ebeid stated that ‘it is our [meaning Egypt and other developing countries] responsibility to shape our future in globalization.’33 Summarizing his interpretation of the attitudes toward globalization, Mkapa exclaimed: ‘If the embrace of globalization were identical to religious devotion, virtually all Africans would have a secure place in the Earthly Kingdom!’34 Equitable Globalization is Consistent with Liberal Reforms Sharing a positive account of the link between liberalization and a decrease in inequality, Jayasuriya indicated that, ‘the evidence seems strong that growth associated with liberalization has been poverty-reducing.’35 Moreover, he connected effectiveness of liberalization in reducing poverty to its extent, with more restrictive policies suppressing the positive impact. This positive account has been, however, complemented by other negative accounts showing that the record of the impact of liberalization on income distribution is mixed.


Despite the lack of agreement on this matter, most of the conference participants did not see any viable alternative to decreasing the share of state ownership, invigorating the private sector, creating and/or maintaining democratic institutions, and opening national markets and societies to the world. Describing a consensus on liberalization in Africa, Mkapa indicated that, ‘there is hardly any African government or political leader who would today take issue seriously with the fundamental tenets of market-oriented economics.’36 Focusing on the Middle East, Al-Hamad claimed that ‘Arab culture and traditions are not opposed to liberal systems and private property,’ referring to Islam’s 7th-century legacy of systematizing modern principles of individualism, rationalism, and universalism.37 According to AlHamad, effective functioning of free markets and private initiative requires the respect of individual rights, the rule of law, transparency of institutions, and accountability of decision makers. As a strong proponent of liberal reform, Zedillo maintained that the troubles experienced by Latin America were due not to reform but to the ‘unfinished business’ of reform, that is, inconsistency and incompleteness in its implementation. He acknowledged that the population of Latin America became ‘reform-fatigued.’ But he placed responsibility for the disillusionment in reform on leaders who made a mistake by ‘promising and promising [their constituencies] and never saying that the people have to work hard and sacrifice [during the lifetime of] several generations.’ Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, assistant secretary-general of the United Nations, indicated inconsistency of some governments that encourage an ‘inflow of investment, but not ideas,’ alluding to the need for liberalization in broader terms. Developing Countries must assume Primary Responsibility for their Destinies In Mkapa’s interpretation, this principle connotes ‘home-driven reforms’ and ‘local policy innovation and flexibility,’ as opposed to externally driven reforms forced on the developing world by the IFIs.38 It also connotes effective government policies and state intervention in the operation of the global market forces, including reforms in the international and regional financial infrastructures. Ebeid joined Mkapa in supporting developing countries’ reforms on their own terms. Realizing the inequitable nature of globalization as a market-driven process, he suggested ‘introduc[ing] a dose of global intervention to regulate markets and ensure a fair distribution of the gains.’39 Consistent with both Mkapa and Ebeid, Zedillo maintained that the primary responsibility for the troubles of the developing world lies with the developing countries themselves, their ‘inability to put their house in order.’ But inviting developing countries to take the ‘driver’s seat’ requires more than declarations on the part of developed countries: honoring prior trade agreements to enforce fair play is highly desirable.

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Success in Reforms depends on their Correct Order (Sequencing) and Pace Liberalization when institutions are weak may be disastrous. As shown by Yudaeva in her analysis of globalization and liberalization policies in the CIS countries, the existence of intact institutions decreases the negative consequences of reform, while implementation of the reform by weak governments, particularly those cut off from the outside world by war or bad economic relations with neighbors, produces devastating results.40 Many policy makers emphasized the importance of gradualism in reform. Arguing in favor of a measured approach to reform and structural adjustment to reflect the existing realities, Ebeid argued for a slow pace and a cautious attitude toward economic transition and even more so toward political and social reform in Egypt. He insisted that his country ‘has adopted a gradual but steady approach to ... reform, with the purpose of not hurting ... vulnerable groups in society.’41 In addition to open society and social inclusion, Gamal Mubarak’s view of ‘properly conceived’ liberal reforms included preservation of a social safety net as a safeguard for the people who ‘cannot shoulder the costs of reform.’ Mubarak supported gradualism as a means to style reform as an ‘Egyptian program,’ not one imposed from outside. In their discussion of sequencing and pace of reform, many researchers and policy makers referred to the conference theme, equity, arguing that correct ordering and gradualism of reform is fair, while haste and abruptness in its implementation can benefit only elite groups in society. These four themes are surprisingly consistent with the findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which included the two surveys of tens of thousands of people around the world conducted in 2002 and 2003.42 The surveys demonstrated a striking acceptance of the increased interconnectedness that defines globalization and an endorsement of democratic principles and free market model. The world public sees globalization as a fact of life and does not blame it for the rich–poor divide. At the same time, most people seek a compassionate global capitalism that entails social safety and security nets. They also express their dislike of the pace of modern life and support balancing the demands of modern life with traditions that give a sense of security.43 These findings suggest that the Cairo consensus may be grounded in deep aspirations and concerns of the global public, which underlies its significance and potential effect. SELF-HELP PERSPECTIVE

Consistent with premises of liberal and gradual reforms conducted by developing countries on their own terms, many conference participants and particularly finalists in the Global Development Awards Competition endorsed a self-help perspective. On the macro level, self-help is a proactive strategy that rejects succumbing to globalization but instead attempts to influence it. ‘It is clear to us as a developing country that globalization is not


simply an autonomous force that is shaping our future, but that it is our responsibility to shape our future in globalization,’ said Prime Minister Ebeid.44 On the micro level, self-help connotes individual and group action, regardless of existing institutional arrangements. The followers of this perspective do not ‘wait and see;’ they ‘do and overcome.’ A move toward self-help in developing countries is natural – considering that many promises given by the developed world to the developing world have been broken and more and more people realize the indignity of waiting for a hand-out. Indicating the developing countries’ gradual departure from the dependency perspective, the Indian anthropologist, Dipankar Gupta, intuitively described it as a transformation of ‘dependent recipients’ of aid and relief interested in ‘meeting felt needs’ into ‘independent consumers’ motivated by ‘felt aspirations.’ According to Gupta, this transformation suggests a shift from a pre-globalization to a post-globalization development model.45 It is symptomatic that several presentations at the conference addressed the plight of waste-pickers – the lowest of the lowest in status and the poorest of the poorest in terms of income. For this group, self-help is a common strategy, and self-organization is a means to advance their business, sustain lives of their families, and even improve environmental conditions in the cities of developing countries. As highlighted by the Mexican researcher, Martin Medina–Martinez, a finalist in the Outstanding Research category of the Awards Competition, conventional approaches to municipal solid waste management often fail in developing countries because they are too centralized, bureaucratic, ignore the potential contribution of the informal sector, involve little public participation in the decision-making process, and often use prohibitively expensive imported technology. A promising alternative is a decentralized model for waste management that considers specific needs of low-income areas, promotes community participation, and incorporates informal refuse collectors and scavengers into public–private partnerships, micro-enterprises, or scavenger cooperatives. More appropriate for the conditions prevalent in the developing world, this model could help solve the problem of waste in a socially desirable, economically viable, and environmentally sound manner.46 Another finalist of the Awards Competition – in the Most Innovative Development Project category – Poornima Chikarmane described her development venture to assist waste-pickers and itinerant buyers of scrap from the erstwhile ‘untouchable’ castes in the Indian city of Pune. These scrap collectors earn US$1 to US$1.50 as a result of a 10 to 12-hour working day. To help them help themselves, Chikarmane’s project involves the establishment of an independent association of scrap collectors; integration of waste-pickers into urban solid waste management; assertion of the waste-pickers’ rights over recyclable scrap; elimination of child labor in scrap collection; development of self-supporting sustainable institutional

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mechanisms for social security for scrap collectors; and legislative protection for waste-pickers.47 The mutual help foundation ‘Barka’ created by yet another finalist in the Most Innovative Development Project category, Tomasz Sadowski, was a response to the deterioration of the economic and social conditions during shock-therapy reforms in Poland. Based on the ideas of voluntarism and mutual help, Sadowski created social support structures for those who emerged as the losers of the country’s transition to the market-style economy – unemployed, homeless, and former drug addicts and convicts. As the first step, ‘Barka’ offered the most disadvantaged groups a home in refurbished rural houses and work in agricultural cooperatives. This was followed by the establishment of a comprehensive support system, including training and vocational workshops; basic health and dental care; child care; legal, psychological, and family counseling; and provision of food, clothing, furniture, and appliances for poorest families. Launched in 1990, the ‘Barka’ foundation currently manages 20 centers (community houses, hostels, socio-educational centers, and a social cooperative), gives a home or shelter to more than 650 people, and overall helps approximately 5,000 persons per year. Most importantly, this project does not merely rescue the most destitute persons; it gives them the tools to fight poverty and prevent their social exclusion.48 The self-help perspective also inspired the winner of the Most Innovative Development Project, Vera Cordeiro, a physician from Brazil. Her 20-year practice at a public hospital in Rio de Janeiro convinced her that children’s illnesses are caused not only by biological elements but also by social factors. She realized that hospital-based treatment of children from poor families would not fully cure them unless their home environment changes. To break the vicious cycle of poverty and suffering, when children are readmitted to the hospital because of unhealthy family environment, Dr Cordeiro established an association that interprets healing in broad terms and offers instruction to poor families on how to meet their basic needs, psychological and psychiatric counseling, health care, and vocational training. The project’s main goals are to empower the targeted families, help them become self-sufficient, and thus contribute to the well-being of their children.49 BRIDGING RESEARCH AND POLICY

GDN’s motto is ‘better research, better policy, better world.’ The organization strives to advance policy-relevant research that should eventually translate into better decision-making and a better world. Consistent with this mission, the Cairo conference program reads as an intention to bridge research and policy. Finalists in the Outstanding Research category in the Awards Competition presented their research, while finalists in the Most Innovative Development Project category shared their practical experiences. Addresses from government leaders and a policy makers’ roundtable balanced sessions dominated by researchers.


One of the plenary sessions demonstrated GDN’s Global Research Project titled ‘Bridging Research and Policy,’ whose specific goal is to strengthen cooperation between researchers and policy makers and facilitate translation of high-quality research results into sound policies. The thrust of this project is to increase awareness among policy makers of the value of research; establish an international coalition interested in collaborating to improve linkages between research and policy; enhance understanding of how to improve the impact of research; and generate lessons, recommendations, and practical tools and produce a range of information materials for use in guidelines and training. The US President Woodrow Wilson wrote, ‘The man who has the time, the discrimination, and the sagacity to collect and comprehend the principal facts, and the man who must act upon them, must draw near to one another and feel that they are engaged in a common enterprise.’ GDN brings researchers, policy makers, and development practitioners together through its conferences, competitions, and Global Research Projects. Networking opportunities mean extensive learning opportunities. Frequent and intense interaction between researchers and policy makers, their participation in the same policy-relevant research projects, and promotion of focused specialized research are expected to increase their mutual awareness and understanding, which is the first step to cooperation. Each field has its own rules, jargon, and goals. Cooperation and understanding are imperative for breaking the barriers between disciplines and areas of practice and improving decision-making based on research. GDN cannot yet claim that it has managed to bridge the research–policy divide, but it is determined to narrow this divide. Its efforts should contribute to making a path from academic ideas to policy design and implementation less meandering and tortuous. The transfer of knowledge into practice is never going to be an easy walk, but it should become increasingly feasible and productive. Suzanne Mubarak admitted that ‘globalization is sweeping across our nations like a storm.’ This storm can be devastating if it multiplies inequities and makes them more obstinate. But it can also50 be refreshing if it brings a reform of outdated institutions in the interests of a more balanced, fair, and humane world. To bridle the willful forces of globalization, tame its negative effects, and steer globalization into a positive and equitable course, a dialogue between researchers, policy makers, and development practitioners is essential. Another element of GDN’s mission – generation of local socioeconomic knowledge, with the focus on developing and transition economies – is also crucial to make this dialogue effective, enhance the negotiating power of the developing world, and allow developing and transition countries to help themselves. The Cairo consensus has not addressed all problems or defined all aspects of a pro-equity reform. But it has clarified positions of the parties involved in globalization, cleared up

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some misunderstandings, and reconciled seemingly conflicting views. From Cairo to New Delhi and beyond, the strengthening of this consensus, its public support and extension into new issues could calm down passions, decrease polarization in the globalization debate, and make this dialogue constructively serve people worldwide. a c k n ow l e d g e m e n t s The author would like to thank Lyn Squire, the GDN Director, Gary McMahon, Principal Economist at the GDN Secretariat, and William Dinelloof of the Marymount University for their review and feedback. notes 1. Roberto Bouzas and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, ‘Globalization and Equity: A Latin American Perspective’, p. 4, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_ Conference/Parallels1/LatinAmerica/Bouzas_paper.pdf 2. Chia Siow Yue, ‘Economic Globalisation and Equity in East Asia’, p. 1, http:// www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Parallels1/EastAsia/Yue_paper. pdf 3. Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Equity and Poverty: The South Asian Experience’, p. 7, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/ Parallels1/SouthAsia/jayasuriya_paper.pdf 4. Boyan Belev, ‘Back to the Future: The Meaning of Globalization for Central and Eastern Europe’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/ Parallels2/EasternEurope/belev_paper.pdf 5. Ksenia Yudaeva, ‘Globalization and Inequality in CIS Countries: Role of Institutions’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Parallels2/ CIS/Yudaeva_paper.pdf 6. Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, ‘Globalization and Inequality in the Arab Region’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Parallels1/MENA/ali_ paper.pdf 7. Atef Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_ Annual_Conference/Plenary1/Ebeid_speech.pdf 8. Abdelatif Al-Hamad, ‘Globalization: Challenges and Responses in the Arab World’, p. 9, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Dinner GuestSpeaker/Abdelatif_Al-Hamad_speech_english.pdf 9. S. Ibi Ajayi, ‘Globalization and Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa’, p. 12, http:// www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Parallels1/SubSaharanAfrica/ ajayi_paper.pdf 10. Benjamin Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation and Equity: Sub-Saharan African Experience and Perspective’, p. 4, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_ Conference/Plenary6/Mkapa_%20speech.pdf 11. David Dollar and Aart Kraay (2001) Growth is Good for the Poor. Washington, DC: Policy Research Department of the World Bank. 12. Barry Eichengreen, ‘Capitalizing on Globalization’, ERD Working Paper Series No. 1, Asian Development Bank.

GSP Forum and Policy Brief 13. Zhang Yunling, Shao Zhiqing, and Su Zuegong (2002) Impact of Globalization on Economic Disparity: Comparing Southeast Asia and China. Beijing, China: Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 14. The term ‘communist economy/society/system’ is used here in reference to the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which were incorporated into the Soviet bloc in the aftermath of World War II, as well as countries that attempted to emulate the Soviet model, such as China. 15. Oxfam (2000) Growth with Equity is Good for the Poor, accessed 3 November 2003, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/debt_aid/growth_equity.htm 16. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Equity, and Poverty’, p. 14. 17. Jorge Braga de Macedo (2001) ‘Preface [to the series]’, The Social Impact of Globalization in Southeast Asia, Technical Paper No. 187, pp. 6–7. Paris: OECD Development Centre. 18. This research won the 2003 Global Development Awards Competition in the Outstanding Research category. The winners received a US$100,000 grant to advance their research. 19. Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation and Equity’, p. 9. 20. Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation and Equity’, p. 7. 21. Suzanne Mubarak, ‘Globalization, Gender and Development’, p. 3, http://www. gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/WelcomingDinner/Suzanne_Mubar ak_speech.pdf 22. Saskia Sassen, ‘States and Citizens in a Context of Globalization’, http://www. gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_Conference/Plenary2/Sassen_paper.pdf 23. Suzanne Mubarak, ‘Globalization, Gender and Development’, p. 6. 24. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 1. 25. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 3. 26. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 2. 27. Yue, ‘Economic Globalisation’, pp. 17, 18, 21. 28. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Equity and Poverty’, p. 14. 29. Adebayo Olukoshi, ‘Globalisation, Equity and Development: Some Reflections on the African Experience’, p. 10, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_ Conference/Parallels1/SubSaharanAfrica/olukoshi_paper.pdf 30. Bouzas and Ffrench-Davis, ‘Globalization and Equity’, pp. 11–12. 31. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Equity and Poverty’, p. 10. 32. Al-Hamad, ‘Globalization: Challenges’, pp. 2, 3, 5–6. 33. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 3. 34. Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation’, p. 2. 35. Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Equity and Poverty’, p. 10. 36. Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation and Equity’, p. 2. 37. Al-Hamad, ‘Globalization: Challenges’, p. 4. 38. Mkapa, ‘Challenges of Globalisation and Equity’, p. 5 39. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 1. 40. Yudaeva, ‘Globalization and Inequality in CIS Countries’. 41. Ebeid, ‘Egypt in a Globalizing World’, p. 5. 42. During the first survey conducted in October 2002, more than 38,000 people from 44 countries were interviewed. The second survey conducted in May 2003 involved interviews with 16,000 people in 20 countries and the Palestinian Authority.

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Global Social Policy 4(1) 43. Views of a Changing World, 2003, report of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, http://www.people-press.org/reports/display.php3? ReportID=185. 44. Views of a Changing World, 2003, p. 4. 45. Dipankar Gupta, ‘Meeting “Felt Aspirations”: Globalization and Equity from an Anthropological Perspective’, p. 25, www.gdnet.org/pdf/Fourth_Annual_ Conference/Parallels1/SouthAsia/Gupta_paper.pdf 46. Martin Medina-Martinez, ‘Globalization, Development, and Municipal Solid Waste Management in Third World Countries’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/ 2002AwardsMedalsWinners/OutstandingResearchDevelopment/martin_medina _martinez_paper.pdf 47. Poornima Chikarmane, ‘Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat’, http://www.gdnet.org/pdf/2002AwardsMedalsWinners/MostInnovativeDevelop mentProject/chikarmane_poornima_paper.pdf 48. Tomasz Sadowski, ‘Barka Foundation of Mutual Help’, http://www.gdnet.org/ pdf/2002AwardsMedalsWinners/MostInnovativeDevelopmentProject/tomasz_ sadowski_paper.pdf 49. Vera Cordeiro, ‘Associacao Saude Crianca Renascer’, http://www.gdnet.org/ pdf/2002AwardsMedalsWinners/MostInnovativeDevelopmentProject/vera_cord eiro_paper.pdf 50. Suzanne Mubarak, ‘Globalization, Gender and Development’, p. 1.