GLOBALIZATION, EMBEDDED REALISM, AND PATH ...

COMPARATIVE Hansen / THE OTHER POLITICAL IMMIGRANTS STUDIES TO / April EUROPE 2002

Long confined to historians and sociologists, the study of immigration has garnered increased interest among political scientists. Two dominant schools—the globalization and embedded realist theses—have attempted to account for the gap between restrictionist intentions of governments and continuing immigration (the gap hypothesis). The globalization thesis argues that international norms and institutions limit governments’ ability to control migration; the embedded realist thesis counters that limits on state autonomy are domestic. This article argues that although the embedded realist thesis is on stronger conceptual ground, both fail to account for two central categories of immigrants to Europe: colonial immigrants to France and Britain and asylum seekers to Germany. Drawing on historical institutionalist work, this article employs a path-dependent analysis to account for these categories. Against their own wishes, governments found themselves accepting larger migrations and naturalizations because of the path-dependent effects of their own citizenship and constitutional regimes.

GLOBALIZATION, EMBEDDED REALISM, AND PATH DEPENDENCE The Other Immigrants to Europe RANDALL HANSEN University of Oxford

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ong confined to historians and sociologists, the study of immigration has garnered increased interest among political scientists. Scholars have attended to both its central role in domestic American and European politics and its implications for globalization and the constraint of state power (Freeman, 1995, 1998; Hollifield, 1992; Joppke, 1998a; King, 2000; Messina, 1996). Within Western Europe, the study of migration is relatively new, reflecting European societies’ recent transformation from countries of emigration to countries of immigration.1 All Northwest European countries began 1. France represents something of an exception to this trend. See Weil (1995).

AUTHOR’S NOTE: For comments, my thanks to Erik Bleich, James A. Caporaso, Matthew Gibney, Ira Katznelson, Desmond King, Robert Lieberman, Iain McLean, Jeannette Money, and the journal’s three anonymous referees. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 35 No. 3, April 2002 259-283 © 2002 Sage Publications

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the postwar years with largely homogeneous populations; all enter a new century with non-European citizens and permanent residents ranging from 5% to 10% of the population. Issues linked with immigration, race, and multiculturalism have been at the center of domestic politics and policy for more than two decades.2 In France, Austria, and Switzerland, the far right has made substantial—in Austria, dramatic—gains at the local and national level; in Germany, dual citizenship and the reform of nationality law more broadly were among the most divisive issues faced by the Social Democratic (SPD)/ Green government elected in October 1998. Across Europe, a sharp increase in asylum seekers in the 1990s led to a common European Union (EU) response in the form of harmonized (and restricted) standards. The pivotal role of migration-related issues in European politics is all the more striking given that virtually no one would have predicted or wanted a multicultural Europe. No North European country sought to increase its population through permanent non-European migration, and none predicted that those workers who were encouraged to come, or who arrived without encouragement, would be anything but temporary guests. Indeed, one of the constants in Europe—and perhaps even in North America—has been public suspicion of continued immigration. As the authors of a recent study of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom concluded, The one major and consistent theme that is sharply and clearly defined in each country’s responses to national public opinion polls is that in no country— those with long histories of admitting immigrants, those with more restrictionist policies, and those who have consistently kept a lock on their doors—does a majority of citizens have positive feelings about their current cohort of immigrants. (Simon & Lynch, 1999, p. 458; also see Martin, 1997, p. 22)

Yet 25 years after immigration was officially halted, North European societies are multicultural societies facing issues of integration—the encouragement or discouragement of cultural diversity, the acceptance or prohibition of non-Christian edicts in public life, the need to extend citizenship to permanent residents—identical to those of self-avowed countries of immigration. The transformation of Europe into a continent of immigration is one of the most important sociological developments and one of the most intriguing policy puzzles in postwar European politics. This article accounts for two central aspects of postwar migration to Europe that cannot be fully explained by existing approaches: colonial immi2. Terms such as culture, race, and ethnicity are inherently ambiguous. In this article, I have opted for the term multiculturalism rather than, for example, multiracialism (which is prevalent in the British literature), and I understand it to refer to the arrival in Western Europe of migrants from non–Western European countries.

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gration to France and Britain and the migration of asylum seekers to Germany. It has three components. The first outlines the existing approaches— the globalization and embedded realist theses—offering contrasting accounts of why European states were forced to accept migrations for which they had little sympathy. Both accounts, but especially the globalization thesis, are unable to account for (certain) categories of colonial migrants to the United Kingdom and France or for the disproportionate number of asylum seekers received by Germany. The second draws on the historical institutionalist literature, particularly work on path dependence and policy feedback. The third applies this historical institutionalist framework to the French, British, and German cases.

EXISTING ACCOUNTS: LIBERAL THEORY AND THE GLOBALIZATION THESIS The puzzle of immigration to Europe is that none of the three largest receiving countries—Britain, France, and Germany—intended non-European immigration to be permanent. The United Kingdom rejected the use of colonial immigration as a solution to the country’s intense, if brief, postwar labor shortages (Hansen, 2000; Spencer, 1997), and both France and Germany planned to operate only temporary guestworker schemes.3 A large body of literature has thus attempted to answer two questions: (a) Why did “guests” become permanent residents, and (B) Why, despite the professed commitment since the early 1970s to no further primary immigration, does it continue? THE GLOBALIZATION AND EMBEDDED REALIST THESES

There are essentially two theoretical approaches attempting to account for the “gap” between restrictionist intentions and liberal outcomes:4 the globalization and the embedded realist theses. The globalization thesis, associated above all with Sassen, holds that the logic of globalization (understood as increasingly integrated international capital and service markets) renders migration controls essentially untenable. There are three elements to the argument. First, important elements of immigration policy have shifted from 3. European governments’desire to ensure that guestworker policies would be (as the name implies) temporary is well established. See Freeman (1979) and Hollifield (1992). 4. The “gap hypothesis” was first observed by Hollifield (1986). This section draws on Hansen (2000, Introduction).

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states to supranational institutions, most importantly the EU but also the European Court of Human Rights and bilateral and multilateral arrangements (Sassen, 1998). Second, consistent with the arguments of postnationalism (Soysal, 1994),5 an emergent international human rights regime—channeled domestically through the judiciary—reduces the capacity of nation-states to limit immigration and refugee movements (thus restricting sovereignty) (Sassen, 1998, pp. 69-71). Finally, there is a sort of unstable tension between the increasingly free movement of services, capital, and goods, on one hand, and the maintenance of limits on the movement of laborers, on the other (Sassen, 1996). Although enjoying many adherents, the globalization thesis has come under attack from what can be called embedded realism. The thesis is realist because it recognizes an interest among (rationally motivated) nation-states in limiting certain categories of immigration; it is embedded because it attends to the role of institutional constraints in limiting this aim. Its chief point of departure from the globalization thesis is on the source of constraints on a restrictionist immigration policy. Freeman (1995, 1998), who first developed the thesis, holds that the modest expansiveness characteristic of Western immigration policies results not from international institutions but from the dynamics of the domestic political process. Applying a model of client politics developed by Wilson (1980), Freeman argues that the distributional consequences of migration policy—concentrated benefits and diffuse costs—result, in the context of information scarcity and discourse constraints on those opposed to immigration, in an incentive structure favoring a modestly expansive policy toward migrants and legal permanent residents. Public opinion, though often hostile to immigration, is constrained by incomplete information and limits on discourse, namely the risk of charges of racism and an inability to defend ethnically based migration policies. Extreme-right parties are small and weak, and they are up against a tendency among large mainstream parties to seek a consensus taking immigration off the political agenda (Messina, 1989).6 Those benefiting from immigration—businesses and families and ethnic relations of those in migrant streams—are well organized and 5. Postnationalism, to summarize briefly, holds first that universal personhood has decoupled rights from citizenship and from identity (one can enjoy many of the rights of German citizenship without being German) and second that this development resulted from the internationalization and universalization of human rights legislation and discourse. 6. Austria’s decision to bring Jorg Haider’s far-right Freheitliche Parteis Österreich (FPÖ) into the governing coalition might seem to weaken this point, but it in fact strengthens it. The condition of the FPO’s entry was its willingness to sign up—literally and metaphorically—to a whole series of consensual, liberal European commitments, although none of this saved Austria from the freezing of bilateral relations by all 14 other EU member states.

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influential; politicians, in turn, have a rational interest in satisfying them. Finally, the costs of immigration, in the short run, fall on the least-advantaged members of society with few channels for voice and, in the long run, are diffuse, falling belatedly on the society as a whole.7 The model was subsequently modified by Joppke (1998a), who draws attention to domestic courts and the legal process as separate and powerful sources of expansiveness toward migrants. Judges are shielded from popular pressure and obligated to apply universal principles with objectivity. The embedded realist thesis generates two hypotheses about the treatment of intended migrants and actual guestworkers. For the former, admission policies will be more open than the public would prefer; for the latter, their status will be more secure—free of expulsion, entitled to social rights—than either the public wants or the government intends. Applied to Europe, the thesis can be simply stated: European nation-states were opposed to the permanent settlement of guestworkers and pursued a series of strategies—limiting family reunification, blocking the renewal of work permits—designed to ensure the return of immigrants whose welcome was overstayed with the end of the postwar boom. Domestic courts, however, blocked these efforts, arguing that domestic constitutions and domestic constitutional jurisprudence implied both a right to remain and a right to family reunification (Joppke, 1999). Of the two, the embedded realist thesis clearly provides the more persuasive account. The globalization thesis suffers from a number of damaging theoretical and empirical errors. First, the opening of Europe’s internal borders has been entirely consistent with the closing of other borders to non-European and/or third world migrants (Feldblum, 1998). It is not that the EU cannot control, for reasons of logical coherence or human rights, immigration from outside its borders; it is rather that it chooses for reasons of national and European interest to tolerate and encourage migration among select and wealthy EU member states. Second, the thesis lumps together separate immigration streams: Asylum seekers cannot be compared with labor migrants, and labor migrants vary greatly in origin, qualifications, and relationship to the destination country. If globalization undermines any migration controls, these are likely controls on skilled migration.8 The imposition—again in Europe, as the United States is a more complicated case—of tight controls on non-EU migrants has been accompanied by the relative 7. Freeman (1995) specifies the model on pages 882-885; I take these arguments directly from them. 8. In the year 2000, both Germany and the United Kingdom announced schemes to welcome on a temporary basis high-skill workers to fill shortages in technology-related industries.

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relaxation of controls on skilled migration.9 In this case, however, globalization becomes a code word for national self-interest: Skilled migration is the sort that every nation has a prima facie interest in attracting. Third, the thesis is unable to account for the example of the United Kingdom, referred to by Freeman (1994) as a “deviant case” in its ability to curtail immigration. The United Kingdom successfully combines highly open capital and service markets with one of the most restrictive immigration regimes in the world (Hansen, 2000, chap. 10; also Joppke, 1998b). Finally, the embedded realists, attending to the micro level of analysis ignored by globalization and postnationalist theorists, have demonstrated that the major judicial decisions securing immigrants’ right to remain within Europe were taken by domestic courts with reference to domestic constitutions. Human rights treaties of course exist, but some states sign the treaties without incorporating them into domestic legislation, some incorporate them with severely restraining caveats, and some ignore them altogether. The result is that, lacking incorporation guarantees and enforcement mechanisms, they remain nonbinding public international law, often little more than a statement of normative intent. Although a significant advance on the inadequate globalization account, the embedded realist thesis falls short in that it cannot fully explain some of the largest and/or most politically explosive postwar migrations to Europe. If the thesis is to offer an account of why a temporary migration became permanent, it must explain why all categories of immigrants—though not all immigrants within a given category—were able to evade policy makers’ restrictionist intentions. Although the embedded realist thesis does a good job of explaining continuing migration in the form of family reunification, it is less successful in accounting for colonial immigrants to Britain and France and the movement of asylum seekers to Germany; collectively, these migrants constitute a large proportion of total population flows. This can easily be seen in data from the three countries. Before examining these data, a word should be said about case selection. The cases below were chosen for two reasons. First, in all cases the concern is population movement and/or naturalization. Unlike other aspects of immigration—such as multiculturalism, identity, and conceptions of citizenship—data, in the form of numbers, are available on both. Second, all three cases below are widely recognized within the immigration literature as central issues in the postwar politics of immigration.

9. This was witnessed most recently in a spring 2000 call by Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for 20,000 high-tech guestworkers to address sectoral shortages in this area (Klingst, 2000). A few months later, Britain followed suit.

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COLONIAL IMMIGRATION TO FRANCE

Table 1 presents data on France for the period up to early 1975, before or as efforts were made to end primary and limit secondary immigration. The important figures in the table are those on Algerians and French Muslims (mostly from Algeria). Because French Muslims born in France were French citizens at birth, they were free from deportation or any other repressive government measure aimed at immigrants and resident aliens. The fact that they were citizens at birth, however, was an anomaly placing them in a category distinct from all other migrants; one of the foundations of French nationality law is double ius soli; citizenship should only “kick in” at the third generation, not the second. Why did Algerian immigrants find themselves in this privileged position? COLONIAL IMMIGRATION TO BRITAIN

Broadly speaking, the British case presents a far greater difficulty for the embedded realist thesis, because all of its colonial migrants entering the United Kingdom before 1962 enjoyed free entry and full citizenship on arrival. Pre-1962 British experience was nonetheless in some measure unique, and post-1962 policy has conformed to the logic of the embedded realist thesis. In a manner opposite to that of France, Germany, and the United States, the absence of institutional constraints on the executive—no bill of rights, a weak legislature, and a timid judiciary—has (a) allowed British policy makers to translate public preferences into public policy more directly than in any other liberal democracy and (b) resulted today in one of the tightest immigration control regimes in the Western world (Freeman, 1994; Hansen, 2000). The thesis nonetheless ignores a significant—numerically and even more so politically—category of migrants: East African Asians. From 1962 until 1968, some 200,000 Asians (broadly, those of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi descent) in East Africa continued to enjoy a right to enter the United Kingdom against the wishes of the U.K. government. They did so in ever-larger numbers: from approximately 2,000 per year in the early to mid-1960s to 13,600 in 1967 alone.10 The British government, with an eye on the potential global total of 200,000, closed the door on March 1, 1968. The decision created the most divisive immigration crisis of postwar British history. It was bitterly opposed by Labour’s most important supporters, it divided both the 10. Statistics on the movement of East African Asians are difficult to obtain, as they entered with British passports and were thus poorly recorded by immigration officers. I have taken these from Home Office (interior ministry) pronouncements at the time and the diaries of cabinet ministers. See Home Office statistics cited in The Times, “Citizens From Kenya” (1968); also see Callaghan (1987, pp. 222-225) and Castle (1984, p. 378).

266 Table 1 Immigrants in France, 1975 Current or Former Citizenship

Migrants Naturalized French Citizens Total

Italian

Spanish

Algerian

363,300 351,350

403,235 206,280

448,175 4,400

714,650

609,515

452,575

Source: Tribalat, Garson, Moulier-Boutang, and Silberman (p. 32).

French Muslim

83,350 (French at birth) 83,350

Portuguese

Moroccan

Tunisian

Turkish

632,170 27,630

225,925 19,020

114,990 36,135

48,145 11,370

659,800

244,945

151,125

59,515

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Liberal and Conservative parties, and it fatally undermined the United Kingdom’s credibility in the eyes of the Commonwealth (Hansen, 1999). What is of interest here is not only the crisis itself but the fact that it should not have happened at all: The British Government explicitly applied 1962 immigration controls—the Commonwealth Immigrants Act—to the East African Asians. They, like all other Commonwealth citizens, were to have no right to enter the United Kingdom. Yet some 200,000 had done exactly that. Why did this happen? To summarize, two aspects of postwar immigration to France and Britain cannot be accounted for by embedded realism: the exceptional grant of citizenship (and thus protection from reprisal) to some 83,000 Algerians at birth in France and the continued enjoyment, post–immigration control, of a right of entry by East African Asians—one that led to the most divisive immigration-related crisis in postwar British politics. ASYLUM SEEKERS IN GERMANY

Yet there is another way in which the embedded realist thesis falls short. Although it convincingly accounts for why family members and asylum seekers could not be driven out, it says little about why their movements vary so much. Until the late 1990s, when the number of asylum figures began to converge across Europe (largely in response to EU efforts at harmonization), these figures varied widely. Table 2 provides an overview of asylum applications across the EU. Thus, the preferred destination by far was Germany. It is a quantitative difference that embedded realism cannot account for, as both Germany and other major European receiving countries (notably France) have entrenched bills of rights and activist domestic judiciaries.11 A further factor, familiar to students of migration, might be the solution to the puzzle. We know from studies of immigration patterns that migrants prefer countries (a) in which their language is spoken, (b) that already host migrants with the same nationality, and/or (c) that are otherwise viewed as culturally similar (Loescher, 1993, pp. 17-18). No one speaks German but the Germans, Austrians, and 11. There is, to be sure, a gap between those seeking asylum and those granted it. The number of applications is nonetheless still the greatest predictor of the number remaining: The percentage of those accepted is no lower in Germany than in France and Britain (and is often higher), leading to larger acceptances; many of those denied end up with the right to remain (Duldung, or tolerated status, in Germany; or permanent leave to remain in Britain); and some simply remain in the country illegally. Deportation is unpopular, expensive, subject to constant delay and appeal, and as a result is an ineffective tool for controlling immigration to Europe. On the normative issues raised by asylum seekers, see Gibney (1999); on deportation, see Gibney & Hansen (2001).

268 Table 2 Asylum Seekers in Select European Countries, 1985-1997 (in thousands) Country

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Totals

6.7 5.3 8.7 — 25.8 73.9 1.4 — 5.4 — 5.7 0.9 0.1 2.3 14.5 9.7 6.2 —

8.7 7.7 9.3 — 23.4 99.7 4.3 — 6.5 — 5.9 2.7 0.3 2.3 14.6 8.6 5.7 —

11.4 6.0 2.8 — 24.8 57.4 6.3 — 11.0 — 13.5 8.6 0.5 2.5 18.1 10.9 5.9 —

15.8 5.1 4.7 — 31.6 103.1 9.3 — 1.3 — 7.5 6.6 0.4 3.3 19.6 16.7 5.7 —

21.9 8.1 4.6 0.2 60.0 121.0 6.5 — 2.2 — 14.0 4.4 0.2 4.0 32.0 24.4 16.8 —

22.8 13.0 5.3 2.5 56.0 193.0 4.1 0.1 4.7 0.1 21.2 4.0 0.1 8.6 29.0 36.0 38.2 438.7

27.3 15.2 4.6 2.1 46.5 256.0 2.7 0.0 31.7 0.2 21.6 4.6 0.3 8.1 27.3 41.6 73.4 563.2

16.2 17.8 13.9 3.6 28.9 438.2 2.0 0.0 2.6 0.1 20.3 5.2 0.7 11.7 84.0 18.0 32.3 695.5

4.7 26.9 14.4 2.0 27.6 322.6 0.8 0.1 1.6 0.2 35.4 12.9 2.1 12.6 37.6 24.7 28.0 554.2

5.1 14.3 6.7 0.8 26.0 127.2 1.3 0.4 1.8 0.1 52.5 3.4 0.6 12.0 18.6 16.1 42.2 329.1

5.9 11.4 5.1 0.8 20.2 127.9 1.4 0.4 1.7 0.2 29.3 1.5 0.5 5.7 9.0 17.0 55.0 293.1

7.0 12.4 5.9 0.7 17.2 116.4 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 22.9 1.8 0.3 4.7 5.8 18.0 27.9 244.5

6.7 11.8 5.1 — 21 151.7 — — — — 34.4 — — — — 24 32.5 —

13.8 22 5.7 — 22.4 98.6 — — — — 45.2 — — — — 41.3 46 —

Source: Salt (1999), U.S. Committee for Refugees (1999).

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some of the Swiss, but factors (b) and perhaps (c) are clearly important. Germany has a large Turkish and Yugoslavian community—the latter made up a large percentage of 1990s entrants—and the country has long historical ties to Eastern Europe (Ash, 1993, Introduction and Conclusion). But this accounts for only part of the movement and in some measure restates the question: How did these individuals, if they entered as asylum seekers, get into Germany in the first place? In sum, whatever the analytical power of the embedded realist thesis—and it is in migration studies the most sophisticated explanatory framework going— it fails to account for both particular categories of immigrants (colonial immigrants to France and Britain) and variations within one category it delineates (the massive arrival of asylum seekers in Germany). Quantitatively, this amounts to literally hundreds of thousands of individuals; qualitatively, these numbers represent—in addition to obvious personal histories and life chances—numerous political issues (housing, social services, public opposition, support for the extreme right, race, and integration policy) spinning off from them. Algerians’ easy access to French citizenship became a national political issue in the 1980s, and the racist Front National placed it at the center of its campaigns. The ultimate withdrawal of the East Africans’ exemption was the most divisive immigration legislation in postwar British history. In Germany, asylum became one of the most explosive issues of the early 1990s, fueling public opposition and, in 1992, racist attacks that shocked the nation and raised (unrealized) fears of a return to significant far right politics.

COLONIAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SEEKERS: A PATH-DEPENDENT ACCOUNT In the past decade, political scientists have accorded growing attention to the role of path dependence in politics (Pierson, 1996, p. 131, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Thelen, 1999).12 When clearly defined, path dependence does not merely mean that decisions and events today are in some general sense the product of earlier decisions and events. A path-dependent effect can be said to occur only when a previous decision reinforces itself, when it determines in part the future development of events. Levi (1997), who brings a healthy skepticism to path dependence, puts it this way:

12. For classic applications in economic history, see Arthur (1989). For a critique of path dependence (and especially Paul David’s work), see Liebowitz and Margolis (1990).

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Path dependence does not simply mean that “history matters.” This is both true and trivial. Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other—and essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow. (p. 27)

The important point is that it has to be more than “history matters.” Path dependence has to be more than the claim that “what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, pp. 262-263). This is simply to say that any given constellation of events, interests, and actors is determined by multiple events in the past, from the micro-personal—Bill Clinton went into public life, rather than remaining a lawyer, which made 1990s’ U.S. politics different from what it might have been—to the macro-historical—the fact that Wall Street crashed in 1929 and not 1939 (when the German economy might have been on a solid footing), positively affected the Nazi rise to power. It is a claim that (a) would make most historians’ eyes glaze over in its obviousness and (b) says nothing about “exit” capabilities from a given historical track (Pierson, 1998).13 So why, then, does the original entrenchment create a limiting effect? There is no consensus in the literature on this point, but Krasner (1988), who popularized the logic behind path dependence among political scientists, suggests a useful standard: “The basic characteristic of an institutional argument is that prior institutional choices limit available future options.” The range of options available at any point in time is constrained by extant institutional capabilities, and these capabilities are themselves a product of choices made during some earlier period (pp. 71-72). To put it another way, path dependence occurs when a decision limits the range of available options at subsequent points and, in so doing, encourages continuity in the form of a retention of the original choice. Political scientists are divided about whether path dependence predicts and identifies causal mechanisms or, most skeptically, is little more than a rich metaphor for policy continuity.14 This debate will continue (Thelen, 1999), and it suffices to note that there are at least two prerequisites to speaking coherently, as distinct from merely fashionably, about path dependence: the delineation of moments at which a path-dependent effect is exhibited and 13. My thanks to Paul Pierson for sending me a copy of this paper. 14. I owe my thanks to Ira Katznelson and Robert Lieberman for comments on this point.

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the specification of the mechanisms channeling it. In the former, this involves proving causal effect at the choice points; path dependence is established only when it can be shown that policy change was considered and rejected for reasons that cannot be explained without reference to the structure of costs and incentives created by the original policy choice.15 If at least a residue of path dependence—in addition to the better known factors of interest group lobbying, public opinion, incrementalism, and so forth—cannot be isolated, then there was no effect. In politics, two mechanisms engender a pathdependent effect: “lock-in,” when certain options are rendered wholly unattainable by original choices, and still more so, “disincentive effects,” when original choices make future options not impossible but deeply unattractive to policy makers.16 The relationship between path dependence and policy feedback (and, one could add, related and equally fashionable if imprecise terms such as contingency, punctuated equilibrium, and critical junctures) is often unclear. To begin with a definition of the latter, feedback effects are independent variables generated when public policies adopted at one point in time have a causal influence on political actors and political options at a later time; public policies are both a dependent variable at time t and an independent variable at time t + 1 (Krasner, 1988, p. 72).17 In this vein, Pierson (1993) has identified feedback effects as instances in which “policies produce politics,” when they “themselves [are] politically consequential structures” (p. 597). For the purposes of analytical clarity, it is useful to view path dependence as a particular type of positive feedback effect. When policy at one point limits choice points at subsequent points, it engenders feedback in the form of path dependence; to explain how, it is necessary to turn to the cases themselves. POLICY FEEDBACK AND COLONIAL IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE

With this framework in mind, what I want to argue is that large patterns of colonial immigration—a significant part of overall immigration to Europe 15. In qualitative social science, as Berman (1998) argues, determining causality involves meeting two conditions: “first, establishing a connection between the proposed independent and dependent variables, and, second, explaining why this connection exists—showing precisely how the independent variables influence the dependent one” (p. 18). Also see Hansen and King (2001, p. 242). 16. See Arthur (1988) on lock-in as a particular time of self-reinforcing, or path-dependent, effect; and David (1985) on how QWERTY locked in as the standard keyboard over other, more efficient, keyboards. 17. The particular interest in public policies as causal variables is one of the features distinguishing it from the broader school of historical institutionalism, which examines a wider range

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and thus the development of multicultural Europe—and migration-related issues were engendered by path dependence and policy feedback. Particular immigration streams, the size of the overall stream, and particular policy issues linked with them cannot be understood without reference to loops of policy feedback engendered by policy decisions taken early in postwar Britain, France, and Germany. The next section discusses these instances. POLICY FEEDBACK IN FRANCE: THE ALGERIAN NATURALIZATION CRISIS

At the outset of this article, I highlighted a category of French Muslims who possessed citizenship at birth; there were approximately 83,000 in 1975, a figure that grew to some 244,850 by 1986. In the United States, such incidents would be unremarkable, as U.S. nationality law is based on ius soli, or citizenship at birth. France, by contrast, has based its nationality law since 1889 on double ius soli, or citizenship at the third generation (a child born of an alien born in France is French at birth). In light of the French policy’s expressed aims, this numerical outcome is alone puzzling. It also had other direct consequences, of which three are relevant. First, as Algerian independence was only gained relatively recently and through military conflict, many Algerians, and above all their parents, viewed the attribution of French citizenship as an offense against their identity (Sayad, 1987). The offense was exacerbated by the inability of the immigrants or their parents to decline French citizenship (Weil, 1995, pp. 164-167, 1997, p. 11). Second, the attribution of French citizenship to Algerians created a crisis of competing loyalties. Because Algeria subscribes to the doctrine of perpetual allegiance (Algerian citizenship cannot be renounced), third-generation Algerians born in France were dual nationals obligated to fulfill military service in both countries. The military service exigency, and the attribution of French citizenship more generally, led to Algerian accusations of neocolonialism. The issue was not resolved until France and Algeria negotiated an accord in 1983 allowing dual nationals to complete their military service in either country (Sayad & Gillette, 1976, pp. 111-112). Finally, and most important, the issue was fodder for Jean Marie Le Pen’s Front National, an openly racist party18 proposing the expulsion of all non-European immi-

of institutions—according to the most influential definition, “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall, 1986, p. 19). 18. In the summer of 1996, Le Pen stated during an interview that Blacks were inferior to Whites, and that most of the French believed this. See Le Monde, September 17, 1996.

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grants from France.19 Easier access to French nationality and exceptions on military service (considered until recently as central to republican citizenship) would have been the seeds of nationalist and ultranationalist outrage in themselves, but the issue was all the more emotional because some Algerians made no secret of the fact that French citizenship was of purely instrumental value, a means to avoiding expulsion (Sayad, 1987, p. 172).20 To further incite ultranationalist anger, Algerians came from the country that was an integral part of France and had torn itself from the national womb, and the majority of them were Muslim, which is viewed by many on the Right as incompatible with the obligations of republican citizenship. Although one cannot know the degree to which this increased support for the Front National (which peaked at around 15% nationally),21 the party put the issue at the center of its campaign, adopting the slogan “Être français, cela se mérite” (To be French, you have to deserve it) (Brubaker, 1992, chap. 7).22 The Algerians’ grant of citizenship a generation early, and the consequences it engendered, resulted from a feedback effect created by the intersection of two unrelated laws: the 1851 law on double ius soli and the status attributed by French law to Algeria. Since 1851, double ius soli has been a foundation of French nationality law;23 since 1889, the automatic attribution of citizenship could not be declined (Brubaker, 1992, p. 140). After 1830, when the French acquired Algeria, it was defined not as a colony (such as India for the United Kingdom) but as a constituent part of the French nation; as Martinique is a part of France today, so was Algeria until 1962. Before Algerian independence in 1962, this meant nothing. Following independence, it became a powerful triggering mechanism. In the years after independence, a large number—some 500,000 between 1962 and 1965 alone—of Algerian migrants arrived in France. French law continued to view Algeria as a constituent part of the French nation until 1962, an opinion that was both 19. On Le Front National, see Mayer and Perrineau (1989) and Schain (1994). It is something of an irony that the issue was first taken up by the Left and extreme Left and then later by the extreme Right. For the Left, the issue was partly one of allegiance but really one of military service; for the Right, the reverse was true. 20. Such individuals are referred to as français de papier or français sur le papier. 21. To be clear, I am of course not arguing that the whole phenomenon of the Front National can be explained with reference to path dependence; it is rather that the path-dependent effect of nationality law—leading to the automatic attribution of citizenship at the first rather than second generation—handed the racist Front a further stick with which to beat ethnic minorities in France. 22. On the Front National’s support in the 1980s, see Schain (1987). 23. The Article was 19.3 of the Code Civil (Code de la Nationalité) but is now Article 23. Article 24 gives the child who is born of only one French parent the right to repudiate French nationality. See Code (1993, p. 13). On the 1851 reform, see Brubaker (1992, pp. 93-94).

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legally correct and passionately held, especially on the Right. The result was that the children born in France of parents themselves born in Algeria essentially skipped a generation; they were French at birth (Lagarde, 1996, p. 314).24 As a result, they were insulated from the (unsuccessful) repressive measures enacted by France in the early 1970s and were the source of the three crises— of loyalty, dual citizenship, and the far right—that emerged in the 1980s. The Algerian issue in French politics was thus a function of the legal status of Algeria, following the triggering mechanism of Algerian independence, feeding back onto the 1889 nationality law. PATH DEPENDENCE AND POLICY FEEDBACK IN BRITAIN: THE KENYAN ASIANS’ CRISIS

In 1968, the United Kingdom faced the most divisive immigration crisis since the war. Asians, the victim of Africanization policies that swept East Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, were being driven out of Kenya.25 They arrived in the United Kingdom in ever-larger numbers, and, under massive criticism, the British government introduced legislation blocking their arrival. The decision was considered the basest, most racist taken by any British government (Steel, 1969, Preface). It was bitterly attacked by migrant organizations in the United Kingdom (“Hasty Law Makes Bad Cases,” 1968; “A Shameful and Unnecessary Act,” 1968). The European Commission on Human Rights condemned it as a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights; Anthony Lester, a human rights lawyer involved in the drafting of U.K. legislation against racial discrimination, claims to this day that the legislation was the most shameful ever passed by a British government (private correspondence). If there was a moment when British migration policy appeared to be trapped in a downward spiral of racism and populist appeasement, it was 1968. Except, as the British government argued (Callaghan, 1987, pp. 214215),26 the Asians were not supposed to have had the right to enter the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which ended all free entry from the Commonwealth, was meant to apply to Asians as to all colonial/ 24. Algerians were automatically French at birth from 1962 to January 1, 1994, and have been again since March 4, 1998. Between 1993 and 1998, following the Pasqua law, they were French at birth if their parents had lived in France for 5 years. The pre-1993 provisions have been restored by the socialist/communist/green coalition, elected in 1997, through the Guigou law. 25. I use the term Asian as it is used in the British literature: to refer to individuals from the Indian subcontinent. 26. Callaghan was the Home Secretary who enacted the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, blocking the Asians’ entry.

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Commonwealth immigrants (who had had free entry until then). Their exemption reflected the path-dependent consequences of legislation adopted in 1948 combined with the feedback effects of 1962 legislation. In 1948, the British government adopted a definition of citizenship encompassing “colonial subjects” and Britons under the same scheme: Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC). Colonial migrants could enter the United Kingdom freely until 1962 and did so as CUKCs. In that year, the British government, following a popular reaction against colonial immigrants, ended the right of entry. Given that CUKC had outlived its usefulness, the logical thing to do would have been to replace this citizenship with a British citizenship for Britons and some other legal status for colonial migrants. The British government appointed a committee to examine this option, but the committee rejected it for two reasons. First, reforming the 1948 scheme, which linked the still-substantial empire, would be too complicated. Second, it would have been resisted by the colonies themselves, which believed CUKC to be a superior, or at least less patronizing, status than colonial subjecthood. Deciding, on the basis of this sort of cost-benefit analysis, that the 1948 law was too complicated to overhaul—that is, following path dependence exercised through incentive effects—the government instead based immigration control on the issue of passports. If a passport was issued under London’s authority, it was free from immigration control; if it was issued under the authority of a colonial governor—in Jamaica, Hong Kong, or Uganda—it was subject to control. This fateful decision, determined by the path-dependent consequences, led in conjunction with the independence of African states to the Asians’ release from immigration control. At independence, some 200,000 Asians, fearing African reprisal,27 did not take or were denied local Kenyan citizenship, remaining CUKCs. Under normal circumstances, this would have meant nothing. In the context of the 1962 immigration control scheme (conditioned by the 1948 law), its consequences were profound. Passports issued pre-independence under the authority of the colonial governor in Kenya were issued post-independence under London’s authority (as the colonial governor was no more). As a result, they were immediately and unintentionally free from the 1962 controls; the conditions for the 1968 crisis were in place. Had the United Kingdom not passed the 1948 act, the control of immigration would not have required a mechanism based on the authority with which passports were issued (rather than the possession of a passport itself); had the United Kingdom not adopted this mechanism, the Asians would have had no 27. Many Africans bitterly resented the Asians because they were wealthy middlemen whom the former believed to be exploiters and authors of their relative poverty.

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right to enter the United Kingdom.28 In the first instance, the 1948 act engendered a path-dependent effect by narrowing the range of policy options available in 1962. In the second instance, policy feedback exacerbated the crisis, as the Asians would have had no right to enter the United Kingdom on the basis of any other mechanism. PATH DEPENDENCE IN GERMANY: ASYLUM SEEKERS

In the 1980s, German asylum policy was in crisis. Until the 1970s, refugees were largely Vertriebene (expellees from Eastern Europe) and Übersiedler (Germans who crossed the frontier between the two states), with a smaller number of Aussiedler—“ethnic” Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Halfmann, 1997, p. 260). These individuals were not considered refugees at all, but Germans claiming a right to their citizenship; in the decade after 1951, approximately 3.5 million arrived in West Germany (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1978, p. 89).29 Other asylum seekers (mostly from Eastern Europe) were welcomed—as they were across Europe and the United States—as refugees from Communism. In the 1980s, the situation reversed itself. With the most liberal asylum laws in the Western world, Germany became a magnet for refugees and economic migrants from all corners of the poverty-stricken and war-torn globe. The number of arrivals surpassed 100,000 in 1980 and was double that figure by 1990. By 1985, 45% of all asylum applications in Europe were made in West Germany (Joly, Kelly, & Nettleton, 1997). By 1990, a united Germany received more than 50% of the applications: 193,000 people in that year (Ausländerpolitik, 2000, p. 89). In 1992, the country processed 438,000 asylum seekers. By the mid-1980s, the asylum issue became a political time bomb. Severe pressures at the Länder and local level, where the asylum seekers were integrated, led to regional calls for an end to the historical right. The government first responded to these pressures through bureaucratic fine tuning: Germany expanded detention of those awaiting decisions, implemented “fast-track” procedures from countries deemed safe, sped up procedures leading to refusals of entry and expulsions, and imposed sanctions on airlines carrying asy28. Kenya might have attempted to drive the Asians out in any case, and the United Kingdom would have faced strong pressure to grant them entry; but the Asians would have had no right to enter the United Kingdom, and the country would not have been forced to confront the singularly divisive decision of stripping its citizens of an extant right in the full gaze of international opinion. 29. The Aussiedler’s relatively warm welcome ended in the late 1980s, when the number of arrivals skyrocketed, reaching more than 200,000 per year after 1989. Today, their claim to citizenship is viewed with suspicion by a majority of Germans. See Ohliger and Münz (1997).

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lum seekers without proper documentation (Collinson, 1993, p. 131). In 1991, the Minister of the Interior issued a public call for change: In the past few years, asylum was invoked not only by politically persecuted individuals, but to an increasing extent also by aliens who do not qualify for the status of a person entitled to asylum; they start an asylum procedure only for the purpose of staying in the Federal Republic of Germany and taking up gainful employment. (Germany: Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1991, pp. 61-62)

Yet the minister’s hands were tied, and the law was not changed until 1993. Why? The answer lies in a minor (at the time) decision taken after the war. In 1948, Article 16 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz, or basic law) included a clause granting the right of asylum to anyone claiming political persecution.30 At the time, the clause was innocuous. It was part of a postwar revulsion against the Nazi treatment of minorities and a recognition that Germans persecuted by the regime had been granted asylum elsewhere in Europe (Ash, 1993, p. 241; Gibney, 1993, p. 375). It was added at a time when the German economy (and Germany itself) was only beginning to recover from total devastation. Most European refugees at the time (displaced persons) were either Germans themselves31 or direct or indirect victims of Nazi crimes against Europe; for the latter, Germany would not have been a preferred choice. Indeed, many Germans themselves tried to claim asylum status to escape their razed and impoverished country, although their deliberate exclusion from early postwar asylum measures made this extremely difficult (Cohen, 2000). Few would have predicted that Germany would ever be a destination for asylum seekers. The fact that the right of asylum was in the German constitution alone would have militated against its abandonment.32 Amending the German con30. “Politisch Verfolgte geniessen Asylrecht.” The official German translation is, “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum” (see The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1977). It should be noted that the right to asylum in domestic law differs from the right to asylum in international law. In the former, it is a right to receive asylum; in the latter, it is the right of the state to grant asylum. My thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing attention to this. 31. That is, the some 14 million Germans expelled, in the greatest example of ethnic cleansing in human history, from Germany’s 1937 borders and from elsewhere in Eastern Europe. 32. The German constitutionalization of asylum differed from other countries’, such as France’s, in a notable respect. Whereas the German provision effectively secured a right of entry for asylum seekers reaching German territory, France extended the equivalent right only to one category of individuals: those deemed to have fought for liberty. As it was interpreted, very few individuals secured asylum through this procedure: journalists in Colombia and Algerians who

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stitution requires two-thirds support in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, a threshold that discourages all but those convinced that they will secure bipartisan support for change.33 But the issue also became a cause célèbre for the Left in Germany—known semipejoratively as Linksliberalen—who are identified by uncompromising views on military service, Germany’s Nazi past, the peace and environmental movement, the integration of immigrants, and a number of other issues over which Germans tear themselves apart every few years. The result of both was an institutional constraint on Germany’s ability to operate an asylum policy in line with the rest of Europe and domestic public opinion. In limiting the German state’s ability to restrict asylum, and in engendering an unexpected and unwanted policy result—the acceptance of hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers in the 1980s alone—the 1948 basic law engendered path dependence.

CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS In sum, a path-dependent account explains both particular categories of immigration (colonial) and the variance within one category (asylum seekers). In the German case, literally hundreds of thousands of individuals— who are now permanent residents, active participants in economic and political life, and the source of both political opportunity and opposition—were able to immigrate to Europe because of the path-dependent consequences of an early postwar choice. In the French case, two 19th-century laws—on nationality and the status of Algeria—triggered, following independence and postwar immigration, a series of domestic political crises. In Britain, the Kenyan Asians would have had no legal right of entry without the combined feedback effects of 1948 and 1962 legislation, the former of which had little if anything to do with immigration. These feedback loops (1948 with 1962 in Britain; 1832 with 1889 in France) engendered crises that would not otherwise have materialized. Somewhat more formally, the British/French citizenship regimes and the German constitution, because of their rigidity, served as fell outside the Geneva Convention because they were persecuted by nonstate actors. See Weil (1997, pp. 51-56). 33. A similar structural disincentive exists in the United States. The fact that ius soli, citizenship by birth, is entrenched in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution renders it extremely difficult to end, despite widespread opposition against the automatic grant of citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants to the United States. As in Germany, the constitutional provision was unrelated to migration; it was instituted to ensure that the children of freed slaves automatically acquired U.S. citizenship. On this, see Schuck and Smith (1985).

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independent variables that led to easier access to citizenship (France) and unexpected or unintentionally generous rights of entry (the United Kingdom, Germany) (the dependent variables). The process was path dependent in that the original policies proved difficult to reverse or modify, leading to these policy results. The results—greater access to citizenship and to the countries themselves—in turn triggered a series of secondary results (in order of severity): the destabilization of the Labour Government in the United Kingdom; severe local pressures and far-right opposition in Germany; and crises of loyalty, military service, and the far right in France. In all cases, however, the feedback/path-dependent effects were nested in a larger causal story—which cannot be developed here—about decolonization, European reconstruction, and postwar labor shortages; they were thus powerful intervening variables. Another way of putting this is to suggest that citizenship and constitutional regimes displayed—as predicted by path dependence—a stickiness that left them unprepared for rapidly changing postwar population movements. This stickiness led directly to larger population movements than would otherwise have been possible (the United Kingdom, Germany) and/or higher naturalization rates than would have otherwise been possible (France, the United Kingdom) and, in turn, to migration-related political crises (the Algerian naturalization crisis, the Kenyan Asians’ crisis, and the German asylum crisis). This stickiness might have affected other immigration schemes; governments’ failures to rotate workers before the 1970s decisions granting them residency rights meant that missed (expulsion or rotation) policies had feedbacks as well. But the feedback effect in these three cases was especially strong. Without attending to the path-dependent effects of citizenship/constitutional regimes, these fundamental features of postwar European politics remain unexplained. The account offered here has implications for the dominant globalization and embedded realist theses. It creates serious difficulties for the former. It is true, as globalization theorists argue, that all three nation-states have had difficulty satisfying their—and their publics’—desire to reduce immigration and to avoid particular patterns of migration. Yet these limits had nothing to do with an emergent human rights regime or international economic integration. They rather reflected the domestic structure in which politics occurs: the rules governing citizenship and the constitution demarcating power and responsibility in a democratic polity. As such, the account draws on a decade of insights realized in the historical institutionalist literature and incorporates them into the study of immigration, an area in which political scientists express verbal interest but, with few exceptions, do little work. The account is broadly consistent with the insights of the embedded realist thesis, in that it highlights the central importance of domestic institutions in

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limiting sovereignty. The argument should thus be viewed as a supplement, not a direct challenge, to embedded realism, although the account has implications for it. Embedded realists have explained “self-limited sovereignty,” as Joppke (1999) calls it, with reference to the dynamic variables of judicial politics and the political process. The incentive structure faced by politicians—concentrated benefits and diffuse costs—biases them in favor of open admissions policies despite public opposition. Once individuals enter the country, even in a temporary status, the courts intervene to make the status more secure. These are, to be sure, essential elements of the immigration politics and public policy. Yet a complete understanding requires attending to more stable, but equally influential, structures that have engaged the interest of students of politics from the discipline’s foundation over a century ago: the rules of citizenship and the nation’s constitution itself. Through a complex interaction, they contribute independently to admissions levels, to the ease of imposing restrictions, and to the politics of immigration itself. Although this might appear at first blush unremarkable, the cases above illustrate how these effects are often realized against the preferences of publics and governments. Politics and policy are not only structured by institutions, as historical institutionalists argue, but constrained by them. The distinction is a fine one, but it suggests that the development of politics and policy is paradoxically frustrated by the very institutions constructed to sustain the political process.

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Randall Hansen is a tutor and fellow in politics at Merton College, University of Oxford. He has published on citizenship, forced and voluntary migration, and asylum. He worked with Patrick Weil on a 2-year German Marshall Fund project resulting in two volumes. He is currently working with Desmond King on a history of eugenics and with Matthew Gibney on an encyclopaedia of migration in the 20th century.