Goals, Strategies, and the Local Context - Springer Link

Qual Sociol (2010) 33:389–414 DOI 10.1007/s11133-010-9161-1

Understanding Mexican NGOs: Goals, Strategies, and the Local Context Krista M. Brumley

Published online: 12 June 2010 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract Research on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) largely focuses on the actions taken towards contributing to social change in communities and has characterized them into a typology of resisters or cooperators. Using extensive qualitative data, I use this case study to illustrate that NGOs use multiple repertoires of strategies that range from low to high risk. In this article, I show how and why NGO leaders in Monterrey, Mexico, choose their strategies based on their interpretation of the local sociopolitical environment and their assessment of how politically challenging a goal is within that context. By setting aside the dichotomy of NGOs as cooperators or resisters, I demonstrate the connection between strategies, goals, and the local sociopolitical context that is largely missing in our theorizing of NGOs (and other forms of collective action). These findings have implications for understanding how NGOs, as social actors, participate in an increasingly complex and interconnected global space. Keywords Nongovernmental organizations . Mexico . Social movement organizations . Strategies

Introduction There has been much enthusiasm over the potential for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote social change. The increase in scholarly interest in NGOs has produced two streams of literature. The first stream suggests that NGOs are able to enact positive social change within communities. Scholars suggest that these organizations strengthen civil society (Landim 1987; Tembo 2004), act as alternative agents to governments for development (Bratton 1989; Brett 1993; Mitlin et al. 2007), and create spaces of hope (Courville and Piper 2004). Similarly, some assess NGOs in a positive light, pointing to their role in creating transnational networks (Boli and Thomas 1997, 1999; Keck and K. M. Brumley (*) Department of Sociology, Wayne State University, 656 W. Kirby, 2265 Faculty Administration Building, Detroit, MI 48202, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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Sikkink 1998). Still, others argue that NGOs are influential by giving voice to marginalized social groups (Courville and Piper 2004; Tembo 2004) and encouraging “people-driven” development through the participation of individuals who have limited access to the power structure (Mamphiswana 2000). The second stream of literature suggests that NGOs as social actors do not always engage in activities that lead to some sort of social transformation. Studies show NGOs have limited influence on promoting social change because they are unable to alleviate poverty (Mwansa 2007; Velloso de Santisteban 2005), have less success in promoting democracy (Fowler 1996), are overly dependent on donors (Hearn 2007; Kapoor 2005; Simpson 2006), and lose their critical stance because of cooptation by governments or other, more powerful actors (Karim 2004; Klooster 2005; Limoncelli 2006; Wells 2007). Scholars shed light on the problematic nature of NGOs by illustrating how communities reframe their grievances to attract NGO support (Bob 2002), how NGOs impose a Western set of values and ideas that eclipse local knowledge (Fernando 2003; Shepherd 2006; Subramaniam 2007), or how NGOs simply co-opt the community agenda (Kapoor 2005). As a result, according to these studies, rather than contributing to social change, NGOs sometimes uphold the status quo. A critical analysis of the organizations’ actions and their impacts has lead some scholars to suggest that NGOs are just part of the “extended state” (Hirsch 2003) or are “vehicles for neoliberal governmentality” (Mitlin et al. 2007) such that their impact “never goes beyond influencing small areas of social life, with limited resources, and within the conditions permitted by the neoliberal state and macro-economy” (Petras 1997, p. 14; Veltmeyer 2005). While this perspective is an important addition to understanding the influence of NGOs on communities, it leaves us in an “either-or” dilemma that has limitations for advancing our knowledge of them as social actors. Consequently, recent scholarship suggests that the context within which NGOs operate shapes their goals and actions. In particular, scholars suggest that religion (Jafar 2007; Karim 2004), governments (Baiocchi 2002; Brittain 2007; Carmin et al. 2003; Shepherd 2006), private foundations (Bartley 2007; Phillips 2005), gender (Simpson 2006), and social processes such as democratization (Schild 1998) and globalization (Fernando 2003; Mitlin et al. 2007) influence the ways in which NGOs emerge and develop. Therefore, to identify NGOs as resisters versus cooperators (Landim 1987), activists versus service providers (Barr et al. 2005), spaces of protest versus inaction (Ruwanpura 2007), or even as radical versus moderate is problematic because NGO strategic action is dependent on the interaction of the goals and the local context. The purpose of this article is to further our knowledge about NGOs by analyzing their strategies in conjunction with the specific goals and substantive agenda of particular organizations, and the local sociopolitical arena in which they operate. Based on extensive qualitative data from 20 NGOs, I illustrate in this case study how and why NGO leaders in Monterrey, Mexico, choose their strategies based on their interpretation of the local sociopolitical environment and their assessment of how politically challenging a goal is within that context. I find that NGO leaders evaluate the local political structure as well as important actors within that structure, such as the local economic elites and the Catholic Church, and then purposively select strategies for action that include varying degrees of risk because of the different goals they pursue. My analysis of the case in Monterrey shows that there is more diversity among NGOs than commonly recognized in social science literature, due in part to the need for these organizations to respond to constraints and opportunities posed by the Monterrey sociopolitical context. Rather than analyze these organizations as a uniform group of social actors, our theorizing needs to account for the

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complexity of NGO social actions, and the diversity of goals and local contexts for NGO strategic social action.

NGO goals and actions: A brief historical overview The goals and actions of NGOs have changed throughout various historical time periods because of shifting political and economic conditions. The emergence of NGOs in the late 1800s was contextualized by economic expansion, colonialization, religion, and the development of communication systems (Boli and Thomas 1999). Working largely outside their home country, NGO goals focused on scientific/technical and economic issues whereas only a small minority of NGOs was concerned with the environment, charity, and rights-based goals (Stubbs 2003). Because government economic policies were targeted toward accelerating economic growth with the intention to overcome a country’s Third World status, NGO actions involved participation in the modernization and development process (Landim 1987). Many NGOs acted as charities or welfare agencies as they distributed food surplus from wealthier countries to the poor in other countries (Chabbott 1999; MacDonald 1994). The sociopolitical terrain that NGOs navigated underwent a dramatic change in the mid1960s. While taking on distinct characteristics, authoritarian governments ruled across Latin America and Asia. The consequent lack of space for voicing opinions or grievances influenced NGO goals whereby they redefined their actions with new forms of social intervention and alternative pathways of development. Because the context had changed, NGO goals focused on small-scale projects aimed at helping the poor resist political and economic exclusion. As Landim (1987) explains, they no longer used the “welfare” approach that denoted cooperation and instead favored “participation” that signified advocacy. NGOs were seen as a counterpart to grassroots movements that represented autonomy and independence from the government, with the objective of widening the political process (Bebbington and Thiele 1993; Petras 1997). Political and economic conditions shifted again in the mid-1980s when government-led economies were replaced with market-driven economies and countries moved away from authoritarian to democratic governments. As a result, government implementation of austerity measures in response to the external demands of structural adjustment policies had an impact on mobilization and community organizing in new and distinct ways (Auyero 2001; Shefner 2008). In this context, NGO goals increasingly focused on service provision as governments withdrew and shifted responsibility to the private sector because they were either unable or unwilling to continue their role in service provision (Arellano-López and Petras 1994; Bebbington and Thiele 1993; Broadhead 1987; Segarra 1997; Silliman 1999). Although NGOs always provided services to those not reached by the formal market, under neoliberal economic policies they became the “preferred channel for service provision in deliberate substitution for the state” (Edwards and Hulme 1996, p. 2). Responding to changes in political systems, other NGOs defined goals for strengthening civil society (Giddeon 1998; Lewis 2000; Pye 1998). NGOs worked as vehicles for democratization and as a counterweight to governments by opening up channels of communication and participation, providing a training ground for activists, and promoting pluralism. What emerges from this review of the existing literature on NGO actions is a typology that lumps them into dichotomous categories. During the period from the late 1800s through the first half of the 20th century, NGOs are characterized as cooperators. NGO actions do not challenge governments, but rather seek to play a supportive and cooperative

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role within the existing political and economic framework. As the political and economic landscape changes in the mid-1960s, NGO actions shift towards challenging governments so that the NGOs are characterized as resisters. The strategy of political resistance, whereby NGOs pit themselves against governments, represents a marked change from the “supportive” or “cooperative” NGOs. Even as political and economic conditions change again in the mid-1980s, this typology continues to dominate the literature on NGOs. Those NGOs with more service-provider goals are considered cooperators because their actions serve the government. Those NGOs focused on advocacy goals are considered resisters because they act as a counterweight to government. These characterizations tend to be overly general because neoliberalism and democratization have created both opportunities and challenges for NGOs that make it difficult to categorize them dichotomously. Their growth in numbers and influence at the local, national, and international levels has encouraged them to act as advocates for rights and social justice, create competition for governments and political parties, and encourage participation and activism by citizens (Bebbington and Thiele 1993; Hirsch 2003; Lehmann and Bebbington 1998; Meyer 1999; Segarra 1997). In this way, the organizations represent an alternative to traditional forms of political power by disputing the boundaries of what should be included in the political arena (Jelin 1994; Meyer 1999; Sternbach et al. 1992). The changed context also creates distinct challenges for the organizations. NGOs have found it difficult to maintain their participatory and social intervention stance. The organizations now face new challenges, including whether or not to accept government positions, issues of government financing, decisions about what level of cooperation to have with the newly elected democratic governments, and what types of activities NGOs should tackle. The continued entrenchment of neoliberal economic policies means that NGOs must develop new strategies of participation (Shefner 2008). Because neoliberalism and democratization manifest in unique ways depending on the local sociopolitical environment, the dichotomous categorization of NGO actions masks the nuances of local variety. Sociopolitical context and strategic action Recent scholarship has begun to take into account local variety by analyzing NGO actions and relationships with specific actors within distinct sociopolitical conditions. In particular, scholars analyze NGOs in relation to the state. Carmin et al. (2003) posit that NGOs always use strategies of communication, leverage, and community development, but that as political access expands or contracts, the organizations shift their specific tactics. Similarly, Gormley and Cymrot (2006) demonstrate that the presence of more political opponents leads to a greater use of “insider” lobbying strategies as well as the use of “outsider” strategies of rallies and demonstrations. Other research explores how the relationship between civil society and the state can create opportunities or barriers for civic engagement, NGO development, and a shift in NGO strategies (Baiocchi 2002; Brittain 2007; Simpson 2006). Some research goes beyond the state-civil society relationship and examines the influence of other social actors, such as foundations, international organizations, and commercial enterprises, on NGO goals and actions (Bartley 2007; Mitlin et al. 2007; Phillips 2005). Another avenue of research suggests that local cultural practices frame NGO development (Jafar 2007; Karim 2004). Within this new line of inquiry, however, there has been little analysis of NGO strategic action; this is also the case in the literature on social movements (Jasper 2004). When scholars examine collective action strategies, the research usually focuses on outcomes—

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the emergence of collective action or the successful achievement of a particular goal, rather than under what conditions some strategies are employed over others (Cress and Snow 2000; Gamson 1975; Ganz 2000; Jenkins and Perrow 1977). For instance, Piven and Cloward (1977) demonstrate persuasively that disruptive protests are the only way for the poor to obtain benefits. Gamson (1975) also suggests that groups that use unruly strategies are more successful than those that use less disruptive ones. There is some research that examines how sociopolitical conditions shape the use of certain strategies in social movements. Amenta et al. (2005) illustrate that more assertive strategies are used when there is less favorable political conditions, and Stillerman (2002) demonstrates that Chilean street vendors respond to changing political conditions by “scaling up” their strategies to the national and international level. McCammon et al. (2008) theorize strategic pathways to policy success through an analysis of state-level contexts. Nepstad and Vinthagen (2008) illustrate how the sociopolitical context influences the choice of strategies employed by activists when a social movement is adopted from another country. Just as with the literature on NGOs, the research on social movements tends to posit national-level factors rather than the particular local environment. We cannot assume that national, international, or even state-level factors outweigh local contexts in selecting some strategies over others. The local sociopolitical context shapes how NGOs perceive and interpret their strategic action in important ways. First, certainly some strategies are more disruptive than others, such as road blockades or demonstrations, whereas other strategies are more institutionalized, such as lobbying. Scholars have attempted to account for the various types of strategic action. Sharp (1973), for instance, categorizes strategies of nonviolent action into three groups: protests and persuasion (e.g., lobbying and communication), noncooperation actions (e.g., strikes and boycotts), and direct intervention strategies (e.g., sit-ins). Andrews and Edwards (2005) also use three categories of strategic action to differentiate disruption from protests. For them, disruptive strategies mean that the organization engages in “unruly or disruptive actions such as blocking roads or unauthorized sit-ins” whereas protests refer to rallies and demonstrations that are legally sanctioned and often in cooperation with authorities (Andrews and Edwards 2005, p. 226). Their third category is moderate strategies that include lobbying and education/awareness activities, but not the use of unruly strategies or protests. While categorizing strategic action is important for analysis and theory building, these typologies do not account for risk in conjunction with the sociopolitical context. Protests, lobbying, public awareness and education campaigns do not involve the same level of risk in all environments. Therefore, once the local context is taken into account, the categorization of disruptive/radical versus less disruptive/moderate may shift. Second, the substantive goals of NGOs and the target of those goals influence the choice of strategic action. NGO goals often focus on the government, but they may also target other institutions or organizations or the general public. In selecting from the repertoire of strategies they perceive as available, NGO leaders must consider the local sociopolitical environment and weigh the degree to which their goals challenge that system in order to have a favorable outcome. The activists in the Plowshares movement in Sweden, for instance, recognized they could not employ the same strategies used in the US movement to reach their goals because they faced a different political system and a predominantly secular culture (Nepstad and Vinthagen 2008). Gamson (1975) shows that there are similar favorable outcomes between groups that have single-issue goals and groups that have multi-issue goals if those goals do not impose a high risk to the system, such as the displacement of the government. These studies suggest that an analysis of strategic action

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should consider the degree to which the goal presents a political challenge and how that challenge may be interpreted by the target, such as the government or other institution. Despite increasing interest in analyzing NGO strategies within particular sociopolitical contexts, there are still gaps in our current theorizing. First, most studies analyze one type of NGO, such as women’s issues NGOs or environmental issues NGOs, or the NGOs are analyzed in aggregate form. Second, few studies examine the repertoire of strategies NGOs use under certain conditions (for exceptions, see Carmin et al. 2003; Gormley and Cymrot 2006), and little attention has been given to analyzing those strategies that NGOs employ to accomplish particular goals and agendas. Even when examining the relationship of NGOs to the sociopolitical context, the analyses remain at the national or international level rather than the local level. Third, although we know a lot about the repertoires of strategies available to NGOs or to social movements, we do not know how these organizations choose from the repertoires (Gormley and Cymrot 2006; Jasper 2004). There are few analyses of how NGO leaders interpret the local context and the strategic decision making processes for using certain strategies over others (for an exception, see Nepstad and Vinthagen 2008). By setting aside the dichotomy of NGOs as cooperators or resisters, in this article I show the connection between strategies, goals, and the local sociopolitical context that is largely missing in our theorizing on NGOs as well as other forms of collective action.

The case study: Data and methods The data presented in this article are from a case study of 20 NGOs that involved field work conducted between 2000 and 2003 in Monterrey, Mexico. Case studies are appropriate when the research focuses on the interpretive understandings of social processes. My research objective in this study was to analyze how NGOs engage in political participation through an examination of the organizations’ goals and strategies. My recruitment of the NGOs for this case study was influenced by a variation-finding strategy (Tilly 1984) because I was interested in analyzing and comparing NGOs in Monterrey to elucidate differences and similarities among them. As data collection and analysis began to take shape, I realized that while my case study was a group of NGOs that would allow for a comparative analysis among the organizations, I also began to understand how these organizations challenged existing theoretical models. The group of NGOs represented a strategic case study whereby it provided the empirical data with which to refine theoretical understandings of social processes (Walton 1992). Moreover, case studies are important when the case is rare or unique and the social phenomenon observed was previously inaccessible to investigation (Yin 1994). The case study of NGOs in Monterrey is unique and offers both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. First, there is an empirical gap in our knowledge of Monterrey compared with an enormous amount of research on other parts of Mexico. When I began my research in 2000, there were no published accounts of NGOs in Monterrey and only a few studies that focus on Monterrey society in general (Pozas Garza 1989, 1995; Zúñiga and Ribeiro 1990). Most research on the city focuses on labor and industrialization (Pozas Garza 1993, 2002; Saragoza 1988; Snodgrass 2003; Vellinga 1979; Walton 1977). Second, the fewer number of social movements in Monterrey in comparison with Mexico City or Guadalajara, combined with the city’s distinct sociopolitical context, led me to rethink how existing theoretical models of collective action do not adequately explain NGO strategic decision making. In this way, this research is a strategic case study because it

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expands our theoretical knowledge of how NGOs engage in strategic action and why we need to account for local conditions to understand the available repertoire of strategies. Data sources My field work consisted of collecting data from three sources: (1) in-depth interviews of 20 NGO leaders and 34 members, (2) participant observation of NGO activities, and (3) archival research on the NGOs. Scholars argue that a case study should rely “on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” because social reality is too complex (Yin 1994, p. 13). Multiple sources of data help to offset the deficiencies embedded in every type of data collection (Snow and Anderson 1991; Williams 1991). My entry and access to the NGO community, as well as my recruitment of interview respondents for this research, involved a series of steps. When I first entered the field towards the end of 2000, my research consisted of informal conversations with local NGO activists and the monitoring of mainstream media outlets, such as newspapers, television, radio, and the Internet, in order to draft a list of possible local organizations to be included in my research. As the list developed, I categorized the NGOs based on the stated primary objective of the organization, such as women’s issues or human rights. I selected the top five most common themes of these NGOs and contacted the organizations’ leaders for possible interviews. Once I began the formal interviews with NGO leaders, I refined the list of possible organizations through snowball sampling techniques by asking NGO leaders to recommend other organizations and leaders that fit with my top five schemata. Access to the NGOs was also aided by my position as a professor at one of the private universities in the city between 2000 and 2007. I learned about several of the organizations through my colleagues or students, and my academic position offered me credibility with the study participants in terms of who I was and why I was in Mexico. The important reputation of the university in the city, combined with the recommendations by colleagues and students, provided me access much faster than if I had been an “independent” researcher. Throughout my research in Mexico, I also found that my nationality, more often than not, gave me access in ways that a native researcher might not have had. I was told on various occasions that my status as an “American” meant that I had no personal, hidden agenda that could create competition or difficulty for the NGO leaders. Only in one case did an NGO leader refuse a formal interview. Several years later, our paths crossed and she apologized for not agreeing to the interview and explained that she thought I might be a foreign spy. The NGO was involved in defending the human rights of several individuals with possible connections to narco-trafficking, an allegation by the local government that has gone completely unfounded. The final sample for this case study consisted of 20 NGOs. In 2002, I began to conduct in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the leaders of the 20 NGOs. Interviews with the leaders were conducted in Spanish and were between one and a half and two hours in length. The interviews took place at the location of the participant’s choice, such as the organization’s office, the participant’s home, or a coffee shop. The interviews were then transcribed by a native Spanish speaker prior to my exit from the field. All translations of the interviews from the original Spanish to English, here, are mine. In addition to NGO leader interviews, I collected data from other sources. Specifically, I conducted numerous observations at NGO activities, such as conferences, meetings, and protests. I gathered written information from the organizations, including newsletters and pamphlets, as well as media accounts of the NGO activities. I also selected two NGOs in which I conducted

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further interviews with members so that I could analyze in more depth the work of these organizations and the members’ experiences. I conducted a total of 34 member interviews. The analysis for this article relies on the 20 leader interviews where the focus was on organizational strategies and goals. Using focused coding techniques, I looked for conversations in the interview transcripts that discussed the overall substantive agenda of the NGO, their goals (e.g., policy change), and the strategies (e.g., protests) used to enact those goals (Emerson et al. 1995). I also looked for discussions of the NGO leaders’ interpretation of the sociopolitical context of Monterrey. I then analyzed the data by matching the NGO goals described by the leaders with the specific strategies they used for each goal in order to determine how the NGO leaders’ interpretation of the sociopolitical context of Monterrey shaped their use of particular strategies to obtain their organization’s goals and agenda. I also draw on my field notes from my informal conversations with NGO leaders and field observations whereby I also coded those notes based on the substantive NGO agenda, the specific goals, and strategies employed by the organization. I use pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of individual leaders as well as particular organizations and I indicate the overall type of organization (e.g., “Women in Movement, family violence NGO,” or “Justice for All, human rights NGO”). It is not possible to provide quotations and detailed examples from all 20 NGOs in the analysis of one article. Therefore, at the beginning of each analysis section, I include those NGOs engaged in a particular issue as well as a general description of those organizations. I provide quotations from some of the NGO leaders that illustrate the purposeful selection of strategies employed to obtain the diverse goals orienting the NGOs that are active in the sociopolitical context of the city. NGO characteristics The NGOs in this study focus on urban development (n=5), such as housing, the environment, and public services, health and sexuality (n=4), human rights (n=5), family violence/women’s issues (n=3), and culture (n=3). The majority of the organizations were created in the mid-1990s (n=13) or the early 2000s (n=4). Two of the NGOs were founded in 1989 and one emerged in the mid-1970s. The organizations range in size from one primary leader to a staff of about 15. The majority are staffed by three or four individuals and do not have a membership base, but have a specific target group they claim to represent. Three of the NGOs include community members in addition to the staff. The leaders of the NGOs are mostly from the middle class; all but three have at least a bachelor’s degree. About half of the leaders have paid employment outside of their work with the NGO, in part, because their NGO work is unpaid. In these cases, their work with the NGO is driven by their desire to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the target group. Thirteen of the NGO leaders are women and seven are men, with an average age of 47 (age range is 22 to 57 years). Most of the NGOs have legal standing (n=17). Legal standing in Mexico only means that they have officially registered with the government. This legal recognition enables them to compete for national, local, and international funding. Some of the organizations have a small level of state government financial support (n=6). In the case of four NGOs, the financial support is international but it has been funneled through the state-level government. Other types of support include private donations, personal funds from the leaders, and membership dues. Knowledge and information is acquired from other organizations through loose national and international ties. For example, the family violence NGO receives programmatic and logistical recommendations from an organization

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in the United States. Regardless of support, all the NGOs are operating on a shoe-string budget that, combined with the size of the organizations, severely limits their activities, including programs targeting a specific social group. Some of the NGOs have loose ties to other organizations located elsewhere in the country or outside of Mexico, but the NGO actions are confined to the local context.

Research context: NGOs in Monterrey, Mexico As I describe in the brief historical overview of NGOs, their goals and actions have been influenced by the larger international and national sociopolitical context that, in recent decades, has been (re)shaped by neoliberalism and democratization. Neoliberalism, with its focus on free markets and trade, open competition and privatization, created a decade-long period of austerity in the 1980s. In Mexico, as elsewhere in Latin America, real wages declined, the number of households in poverty increased, income distribution widened, and unemployment steadily rose (Portes and Hoffman 2003). As socioeconomic conditions deteriorated rapidly, many engaged in various forms of mobilization (Shefner 2008). Coinciding with neoliberalism, Mexico was experiencing democratization that also created new opportunities for collective action. NGOs, for instance, began to emerge in greater numbers. Importantly, this development was also bolstered by the position of the United Nations that this form of organizing represented a new way for marginalized groups to have their voices heard (Brumley 2010a; Shefner 2008). Although neoliberalism and democratization created opportunities, NGO development in Mexico has not been without problems. While other countries experienced a rise in the number of NGOs and an expansion of their goals in the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico’s unique national political context has limited NGO action in the country. It was not until the economic crisis of the 1980s and the 1985 earthquake that political space was created for international NGOs to move into Mexico and for domestic NGOs to emerge. These events broke down “old assumptions in Mexico that all political activity must be channeled through the state and created new confidence in the capacity of the NGO sector” (Sikkink 1993, p. 431). NGOs began to engage in social action from service provision to advocacy. As they began to make inroads into communities, the government passed legislation to treat NGOs as private, profit-making corporations which thwarted the development of these organizations. NGOs began to expand again after the 1994 Zapatista uprising and the 1995 economic crisis that called into question the legitimacy of the political system to manage social inequality. Their development was aided by the opening of the economic system and the need for Mexico to demonstrate to the outside world that the country was on its way to First-World status. While international and national characteristics have influenced NGOs in Monterrey, the local context has shaped the actions that differentiate them from other NGOs elsewhere in the country. This variation stems from the city’s historical patterns of collective action in general. In Monterrey, labor movements were active and defiant in the 1920s and 1930s, but by 1940 they were mostly non-confrontational and cooperated with the business owners. Student movements were present in the early 1970s, but co-optation of movement leaders by the ruling political party and threats to close the private university by business leaders diminished their presence. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were also urban popular movements, but they too became more and more docile as movements fragmented (Bennett 1992, 1995; Pozas Garza 1995). Over time in the city, there was a steady decline of different forms of collective action, particularly large-scale protests, whereas other parts

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of the country saw an increase in collective action. In fact, since the early 1980s, the only visible organizing in Monterrey was by El Barzón, a nationally-based middle-class social movement that responded to the 1995 economic crisis. The local environment explains the elimination of labor, student, and urban popular movements. Monterrey has always been characterized by industrialization, capitalism, and pro-neoliberal policies, particularly with respect to international investment and trade. This is reflected in the co-optation of union organizers in favor of working with the business owners in cooperatives rather than in opposition in unions (Snodgrass 2003). A work culture of deference and cooperation, rather than defiance and opposition, ostensibly leads to a tranquil business environment that becomes increasingly attractive to international business and investors. NGO leaders interpret the priorities of this economic context. For instance, Ana, the leader of The Social Justice Front, emphasizes the focus of the business community: “The middle classes and the poor are outside of this [economic] project…. [T]he priorities are the interests of finance capital and speculators and not of productive capital, of work, or a generation of employees.” Sustaining this economic environment also means the support of the local political structure. Where leftist parties are present in many parts of Mexico, they are basically absent in Monterrey. In the 2006 presidential election, only three percent of the population voted for the leftist party candidate. And, while the Institutional Revolutionary Party represents the center-moderate elsewhere in the country, locally there is little difference from the conservative National Action Party. NGO leaders attribute this dynamic to the sociopolitical context of the city. Ricardo, the leader of Project Democracy, explained to me that “there has never been a presence of the left, and despite important moments there has never been a presence because of the hegemony of economic power.” This environment creates little space for NGOs to challenge the political system even through more institutionalized means, such as political parties or lobbying. Moreover, Mexico’s semi-authoritarian political system has tightly controlled the media. This only began to change after the 2000 election. In the case of Monterrey, the media is still greatly influenced by the conservative economic elites (Smith 2008). In fact, NGO leaders interpret the media as a “tool in the hands of the powerful and those that have the economic power to pay” (Ricardo, Project Democracy). Carmen, from the NGO, Media for Women, says that the media in Monterrey has a peculiar characteristic in that “they do not permit journalists to join groups or extra activities; this kind of activism is seen as problematic.” Unlike Mexico City, where the media is relatively liberal and sympathetic to activism, the media in Monterrey is largely conservative and has not been sympathetic to activism, particularly when NGOs focus on sensitive issues like abortion or family violence. This is reflected in the fact that there are fewer alternative media outlets in Monterrey than there are in Mexico City, for example. The sociocultural context of Monterrey is characterized by Catholicism, machismo, and traditional family roles for women that, while present elsewhere in the country, are pervasive in Monterrey because of its idiosyncratic political and economic structure (Saragoza 1988; Vellinga 1979; Walton 1977). NGO leaders recognize this context: “[T]he organizations working on issues of gender, women’s rights, and sexuality have faced difficulties because the region is extremely conservative—it is the united strength of the economic power combined with the religious power; they have a lot of money and they come at us strong and attack us for thinking differently” (Carmen, Media for Women). In this way, economic elites support and promote what Melgar Palacios (1992) calls a “Catholic political economy” that embeds Catholic values into the work environment. Because of their close ties with the Church, the Monterrey elites go beyond providing

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employment to promoting their business as a “social function” that is characterized by good Catholic values and morals, the family, and community participation (Vellinga 1979, p. 102). There remains a strong expectation that the woman’s role is in the home and the man’s role is to economically provide for the family. This was reinforced for more than a century by an informal policy in the major Monterrey businesses where working women were required to resign upon marriage (Brumley 2010b). Finally, religious organizations in some parts of Mexico play a role in challenges to the government by offering a new way to frame citizen demands (Gonzalez Casanova 1994; Shefner 1999, 2008). In contrast, because of the intricate connection between the economic elites and the Catholic Church, religious organizations’ encouragement of community participation in Monterrey mostly focuses on charity or other philanthropic activities that fit with the goals of economic elites rather than focusing on community organizing to identify social justice issues. There are a few clergymen that follow more liberal beliefs and assist NGOs in their activities, but they do not take a role in organizing (personal communication with local Catholic priest, summer 2002). Given this sociopolitical context, what type of social action can we expect of the Monterrey NGOs in this study? The historic nature of collective action over the past three decades in the city suggests that the NGOs are more likely to play a cooperative role and engage in primarily low risk strategies, such as social assistance and workshops rather than high risk strategies. This type of social action would be reinforced by the conservative cultural environment, and encouraged by the Church that primarily engages in charity and philanthropy. In contrast, because of the lack of space to have their voices heard, NGOs could take a more critical advocacy role. If so, then we would expect that the NGOs would engage in strategies of a higher risk level, such as protests, marches, and road blockades. My analysis demonstrates that the Monterrey NGO strategies do not fit into only the low or high risk category. Rather, the interaction of the local context and the organizational agenda and goals shapes NGO actions that include strategies of varying degrees of risk ranging from low to high. Based on this setting, I present the repertoires of NGO strategies according to risk level in the table below (Table 1). By high risk strategies, I refer to strategies that visibly confront and challenge the government or other institutions or groups, and result in the disruption of everyday Table 1 NGO strategy repertoires by risk level Strategy Repertoires

Number of NGOs (n=20)

High risk Protests Media communication Medium risk Lobbying/negotiation with target Legal Action NGO alliances Political party alliances

5 11 9 4 11 6

Low risk Consciousness-raising workshops/conferences

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NGO alliances with government

6

Social assistance programs

5

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activities of all or parts of the general society and the day-to-day business of the targets of the demand (e.g., protests). Medium risk strategies challenge a target, but the confrontation is not visible to the public. In addition, medium risk strategies do not result in the disruption of everyday activities of the general society, but does so for the targets (e.g., lobbying). Low risk strategies do not confront the target directly, and do not disrupt everyday activities of general society, nor do they have much effect on the day-to-day business of the targets (e.g., workshops). I will now discuss each substantive NGO agenda and illustrate the choice of strategies for a goal given the NGO leaders’ interpretation of the sociopolitical context.

NGO goals and strategies The Monterrey NGOs in this study participate in social action within three substantive agendas: as policy influencers (n=9), as educators (n=18), and as social service providers (n=10). These categories are not mutually exclusive in that many of the NGOs engage in more than one agenda at any given moment. As public policy influencers, NGOs demand that government officials enact or change some law. When NGOs engage as educators, they provide information on a particular topic to influence the general public or some other specific set of actors, such as government officials, business leaders, or other community leaders. NGOs as service providers offer assistance to vulnerable social groups where the government falls short. Within each of these agendas, the organizations use multiple strategies that vary by risk level and the particular goal. NGOs as policy influencers Almost half of the NGOs in this study (n=9) have a substantive agenda of influencing public policy. Those NGOs that act as policy influencers include organizations that focus on human rights (n=2), domestic violence (n=1), health and sexuality (n=2), and urban development (n=4). NGOs with these foci have immediate goals of improving and/or facilitating transportation, the environment, domestic violence, women’s reproductive health, and urban renewal. To work towards these goals, the NGOs tend to primarily rely on a repertoire of medium risk strategies, including lobbying, negotiating directly with adversaries, and forming alliances with other civil society groups. In some cases, the NGOs combine these strategies with higher risk strategies. Examples of high risk strategies for public policy NGOs are protests, rallies and marches as well as communication of their message through media outlets, particularly television and radio. The decision to employ one strategy over another is not only dependent on the sociopolitical context and the specific goals of the NGOs, but also how politically challenging the goal is within that context. Two cases are illustrative of how NGOs act as policy influencers within the context of their goals and the sociopolitical atmosphere of Monterrey. The first case occurred in the late 1990s when the wives of some of the local elite conservative businessmen put forth a policy initiative to make abortions illegal under any circumstances. Current law in Mexico allows for an abortion only in the case of rape, risk of death, and genetic deformities. The local political context provided favorable conditions for the policy initiative because the conservative right party (National Action Party) occupied the majority of the seats for the first time in the state level congress. Congress responded to the pressure and began the process to make abortions illegal in all cases. Some NGOs, focused on issues of gender, health, and sexuality, responded by employing a combination of high and medium risk

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strategies, such as the media and civil society alliances to oppose the proposed policy initiative. The choice for higher risk strategies was contingent upon NGO leaders’ interpretation of the sociopolitical context and their understanding of how politically challenging the issue of women’s reproductive rights issues was, given this context. Jennifer, of Project Health, a health and sexuality NGO focused on HIV/AIDS, explains that the local environment makes the defense of women’s reproductive rights particularly controversial: We have a government that at times seems very fundamentalist; they block the rights of citizens by pushing their criteria and giving space to the Catholic Church which does not favor the right to decide freely. The truth is that we have dealt with closed and conservative positions that have prohibited or limited the promotion of condom use, for example. There are not sufficient campaigns in the media to promote the protection of safe sex…there are just many problems, particularly at the state level of government. The “right to life” debate meant a step backwards. For Jennifer, the “right to life” policy initiative meant further restrictions on women’s reproductive health. Towards the goal of preventing the passage of the initiative, this NGO mobilized to form an alliance with other NGOs. The strategic action of the alliance involved influencing public opinion and generating pressure on policy makers. Working in an alliance gave the NGOs greater strength to block the initiative in this conservative context. The alliance used media outlets, a high risk strategy, to communicate their message in an attempt to garner public support. Veronica, the director of Youth Liberty House, an NGO focused on health and sexuality issues, tells me that the “right to life” campaign started in the media so the NGOs felt their best strategy was to also use the media outlets with a message that would counter the proposed initiative to completely ban abortions: During this period, there were television programs against women congressmembers, particularly against a local congresswoman who opposed the initiative. There were terrible confrontations on television to discredit her. So, we worked with the media, wrote press releases, held workshops, submitted counterproposals, spoke with journalists, were on the radio, and wrote articles [to support her and counter the proposed initiative]. Because the NGO alliance engaged with the media, they were able to garner public support for those in Congress trying to prevent the passage of the new restrictions. By moving the debate out of the walls of Congress, the NGOs showed the public that there was a difference of opinion on women’s reproductive health. The goal to prevent passage of the initiative was a long and difficult road for the alliance because of the conservative sociopolitical structure; however, the “right to life” initiative was never formalized as a law. The choice of higher risk strategies made sense in this case because the goal was politically challenging and NGO leaders understood that their position against the policy was more of a challenge to the government. Higher risk strategies were also appropriate because the policy, according to the NGOs in the alliance, was yet another example of the government giving more space to conservative, religious views. As Jennifer explains, “the position of the government has cost us so much to maintain the character of our state; we have laws that gave us our precious liberties and we don’t want to lose them.” Even though NGO actions against this initiative directly confronted dominant perceptions of women and reproductive rights in Monterrey, the NGOs had nothing to lose by employing high risk strategies to obtain their goal.

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The second case occurred during the same period of time as the campaign against the “right to life” policy, but it differed from the previous one in that the creation of a policy emerged from an NGO rather than NGOs fighting against a policy introduced by a group of elites. The goal of the NGO was to create a policy against family violence. While this goal also challenged traditional notions regarding the role of women, the employment of medium risk strategies, rather than higher risk ones, allowed the NGO leaders to navigate the political terrain largely outside of the public view, thereby reducing the level of political confrontation. Towards their goal, Women in Movement used a combination of medium risk strategies, including lobbying, direct negotiation, and creating alliances with other NGOs. Because of the sensitive nature of the policy, Maria, the president, explains that they first used the strategy of direct negotiation: “We began to talk with the Governor and his wife, who was very conscious of the problem in the state.” Following these discussions, the NGO continued to express their challenge in the form of lobbying with governmental officials through an ad hoc civil society alliance. When I asked why they chose this repertoire of strategies, Maria tells me that many of the organizations that work on family issues have been marginalized because of their public declaration of feminism or the use of feminist language when conveying the problem to the public or government officials. Because of the conservativeness in Monterrey, Maria says that they employed a different strategy on purpose: Before only radical feminists had worked on this issue and the men in power did not want to listen to them because they said they were violent women…so, we began with a different strategy. We did not begin with a proposal of a feminist movement, nor did we form part of any feminist group. We began to work with the judges, the police, and public officials. Some of them did not receive us well, some of them wanted to arrest us, but with time, when they saw that we were not going to quit, and we wanted to collaborate, the doors started to open. She further explains that framing the topic as an issue of social justice and human rights, rather than a feminist issue, opened doors at all levels of the government. Then, Maria says, the government “stopped seeing us as a threat, but as an organization that could complement and facilitate their work, and at this moment we gained credibility.” Although they began with an agenda of cooperation, this does not mean that they were co-opted or not critical of the government. Given the socially conservative environment of Monterrey, this NGO selected strategies that allowed them to advance their goals. Because they advocated for the creation of a policy in a conservative, anti-feminist climate, they had to recast their goal and only use medium risk strategies, or risk jeopardizing their credibility and support for their goal. Because the family violence policy made public a culture of machismo, confrontational strategies such as protests would not have been an effective strategy to yield favorable outcomes. The family violence law was put into effect in 2000, making the state one of the only states in Mexico to enact such a law, and the organization established the first domestic violence shelter in the state as well. The use of high risk strategies may have jeopardized the successful outcome they were ultimately able to achieve. Maria and the other leaders understood they had to vary their strategies otherwise they would not have reached their goal given the sociopolitical context. She made a clear assessment to engage in a certain way to obtain the goal, and by staying out of the public eye they were able to effectively influence the public policy agenda.

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When NGOs in this study act as public policy influencers, they engage in a medium risk repertoire of strategies, including lobbying, direct negotiations, and civil society alliances. In the campaign against the “right to life” initiative, NGOs also used the high risk strategy of communicating their message through the media because their goal was to stop a policy initiative and therefore had to act faster and more publicly. Engagement with the media, such as the television or radio, made the social issue visible to the government, but it also brought the debate into the public, which thereby increased the level of political challenge. In contrast, the family violence policy began from NGOs; while they could have selected higher risk strategies, the NGO leaders interpreted the context in conjunction with the goal that, for them, indicated that medium risk strategies, rather than high risk ones, were more appropriate. Their use of a social justice frame also reduced the political challenge of their goal of creating a family violence policy. Therefore, the choice of strategies for NGOs’ goals of policy change must be analyzed within a conservative local environment. In this local context, certain high risk strategies may impede goals whereas other high risk strategies may help some of the time. NGO leaders are savvy in recognizing when and how to employ a combination of mostly medium risk and some high risk strategies to obtain the desired goal. By recognizing the degree to which a goal challenges the sociopolitical environment, NGOs adopt strategies to fit with the goal. And, in both cases, the NGOs attained their goals because they understood the need for certain strategies over others. Absent from the repertoires of strategies in both cases is protest. This does not mean that the NGOs in this study never use protest to make their voices heard; instead, protests are employed when the goal focuses on educating the general public, rather than on public policy. NGOs as educators Almost all the NGOs in this study (n=18) have a substantive agenda for education, including those focused on human rights (n=4), urban development (n=4), gender (n=3), health and sexuality (n=4), and culture (n=3). The goals of these agendas are to transmit information on topics that range from everyday struggles, such as family violence and sexuality, to larger structural issues, such as national economic policy and the environment. These NGOs share the common goals of shedding light on some issue that they evaluate as unjust, but they make different choices for how they engage as educators. That is, depending on the specific education goal, they may use not only high risk strategies of protests and the media campaigns, but also low risk strategies, such as consciousnessraising workshops and conferences. Based on data collected in this study, NGOs’ use of higher or lower risk strategies is shaped by the degree to which the NGO goal represents a political challenge within the sociopolitical context of Monterrey. When the goal of the NGOs is to educate and raise awareness within society, it represents less of a challenge and enables that NGO to use higher risk strategies. Most often, the NGOs engage in media communication to educate the general public, including newspaper articles, radio programs, and appearances on news programs. For some of the NGOs in this study, educating the public by media communication has been a principle strategy and focus of the organization’s goals. Josie, the director of Association for Equality, a health and sexuality NGO, argues that portraying HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue and raising awareness of environmental concerns “empowers them [women] to make decisions and to take control of their body.” Carmen, the leader of Media for Women, a women’s issues NGO, suggests these strategies of educating the public are akin to

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“campaigns of diffusion.” By this, she is referring to the use of various outlets, such as print media and the radio, to communicate their educational message. Sometimes NGOs combine media communication with the other higher risk strategy of protest. When they adopt both high risk strategies, NGOs frame their goals to diminish the differences between those for whom they are advocating and others in society. This allows NGOs to engage in higher risk strategies even when the goal is an education campaign on sexuality, a more politically charged issue. Veronica, of Youth Liberty House, explains that when speaking to the media about the purpose of their annual protest, she strategically talks about regiomontanos, a local term used to refer to people from Monterrey: Our march, the Gay-Lesbian Pride March, is about presence, we are regiomontanos, and we are here. We demand an end to arbitrary detentions by local police in the street and discrimination in the family, in the schools, and at work, but the main purpose [of this march] is to call attention to the presence of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender persons in Monterrey. In this way, Veronica tells me that by using the term regiomontanos, she is saying that the LGBT individuals “are part of the community.” The marches are comprised not only of adults of various ages, but families. There are couples walking with children of all ages. They carry signs that state, “we are a family too” or “Jesus says that some are gay.” Because there is little space in everyday life where gays and lesbians in Monterrey are in a position to be visible to the public without fear of reprisals, the march gives the LGBT community a space to make their issues known to the public. It offers a space, albeit limited, within which the message conveyed is that families take many different forms and that all families are part of the regiomontano community. NGOs sometimes form civil society alliances when they engage in protest and media communication. Working within an alliance enables them to garner greater strength for their public awareness campaigns and allows them to engage in higher risk strategies. Grupo Nuevo León is an alliance of nine NGOs in Monterrey formed with the goal of presenting a united, public opinion, focused primarily on economic conditions. The alliance name is a play on the local economic context dominated by a conglomerate of wealthy industrial families referred to as Grupo Monterrey. The name also demonstrates a willingness to focus on goals that are more politically charged and engage in riskier strategies that set them up for opposition from the government and business community. When the NGOs first formed the alliance they were put on a government watch list. Rafael, the leader of an environment NGO in the alliance, explains that politicians, business leaders, and society in general are wary of groups that resist: The people of Nuevo Leon are afraid of activists; they panic because they think we [the alliance] want to impose a system like Thailand or China, or Russia or Cuba. What we want to change is how politics are managed, how politicians steal from the country. We want to change the reign of the PRI and the PAN in power because corruption needs two sides: one gives, and the other takes. We want to change the mentality of the politicians so they don’t forget that they work for us; that is what we want to change. (Rafael, Green Monterrey) There is little tolerance for such displays of criticism, even if people privately agree with the underlying critique. It is the visibility of the grievances that remind the people of a time when there was collective action oriented towards communism; there is also a widely-held view that “communist agitators” are responsible for the kidnapping and murder of an important Monterrey business entrepreneur in the early 1970s (Hellman 1988). This

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perception dates back to when union activity was quashed by the Monterrey business elites in the 1930s. During this time, there were several large-scale protests by workers in support of the “independent” unions established by the industrialists and against former President Lázaro Cárdenas’ labor agenda which they perceived as a communist threat to Mexico (Snodgrass 2003). Given the pro-capitalist stance in Monterrey, the alliance frames their education campaigns as important for all Mexican families, and not just for a specific social group. Therefore, the alliance makes national and global economics relevant to society in general by framing them as family issues. Ana, the director of The Social Justice Front, an urban development NGO, and the leader of Grupo Nuevo León, explains that an important goal of the NGO alliance is to raise awareness among society of how larger economic policies impact the everyday lives of Mexicans. She explains that, “these protests represent family movements…children always participate; in this way our movements are family-driven.” The strategic use of the family frame in protests allows the NGOs to diminish the differences among social groups by emphasizing family, rather than accentuating class differences, for example. Because the family frame reduces the politically charged nature of the goal, it also makes it more difficult for politicians and business leaders to come out in opposition and easier for NGOs to use higher risk strategies. In contrast, if the NGO goal is to educate through the empowerment of a specific social group (e.g., women, people living in poverty), the goal represents a greater political challenge because it seeks to disrupt power relations in Monterrey. In these cases, the NGOs rely mostly on low risk strategies of consciousness-raising workshops and conferences to educate through empowerment. Project Health, a health and sexuality NGO, focuses on poorer communities. Jennifer, the leader of Project Health, explains that an important strategy is “to provide information about sexuality” as well as HIV/AIDS by holding “talks” or “chats” with the young people to educate them. Association for Equality also offers sexuality workshops to give information and contribute to women’s empowerment, whereas Dignity in Health provides workshops on HIV/AIDS in high schools. Women in Movement, a domestic violence NGO, targets the police and the state judicial system in order to sensitize them towards recognizing family violence and orientating them in the interpretation of the penal and civil code. They also organize consciousness-raising workshops to provide battered women with a skill, such as hair styling, to help the women find employment and to give them the economic empowerment needed so that they can care of themselves and their children. Barbara, from Justice for All, a human rights NGO, facilitates workshops as a way to educate political party members on human rights. The use of lower risk strategies in these cases is influenced by the challenge the goal represents because NGO actions seek to shift power relations by empowering specific groups. That is, NGO workshop activities encourage individuals to engage in everyday actions that can both empower them economically and emotionally and challenge the system of machismo and heteronormativity. Workshops may provide a space for the NGOs to engage in social change. Veronica, of Youth Liberty House, a health and sexuality NGO, focuses on youth ranging from age 13 to about 25 that are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. The goal of the meetings is to train social leaders: Accepting different forms of sexuality is a fight that requires everyday work, so we want to educate youth to make change. There is so much work to do, but our objective is to create leaders among youth who can make change in society. Our NGO is a safe place for these discussions.

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Veronica explains that through these meetings they seek to “empower young people to recognize their right to exercise their sexuality” by strategically providing them with information on sexuality. Their use of workshops to focus on empowerment of a particular social group contrasts with their other strategic action of protest and media communication to focus on public awareness. That is, the selection of strategies by the NGO is different depending on the goal. Workshops and conferences are low risk strategies because they are not as visible as protests and media communication. These low risk strategies may facilitate the NGOs’ goals and help them to work towards social change within the local sociopolitical context. For instance, Jorge, the director of Peace in Families that works with male aggressors of family violence, tells me that when they first began the organization they were using a model from a Mexico City NGO. He explains that to achieve their education goals they modified their activities to better fit with the Monterrey cultural context: There is a cultural difference between Mexico City and Monterrey. The “regio” man is more characteristic of the macho Mexican as portrayed in the cinema. The northeast of the country has a special kind of machismo, so we try to appeal to these men using cultural symbols that make sense to them. The conservative local context influences the decision to use either higher or lower risk strategies to obtain their education goals. Because Monterrey is a socially conservative city, highly sensitive issues such as sexuality are opposed by government and conservative groups, such as the Catholic Church or the local business community, and are thus more politically charged. Moreover, visible social action such as protests does not fit with the image of a modern, pro-capitalist city that is trying to become part of the developed, Western world. Therefore, when NGOs use high risk strategies of protest and media communication, they strategically frame their economic policy and sexuality messages to accentuate commonalities among society in general. In particular, they use a family frame to convey their messages that helps to reduce the political challenge of the goal that, in turn, allows them to use the more visible, higher risk strategies. Conversely, NGOs use low risk strategies of conferences and workshops if the goal is to educate specific social groups, such as women and gay and lesbian youth. The use of low risk strategies allows the NGOs to work independently rather than coordinate their activities in alliances as with their protest activity. It also keeps the everyday NGO work less visible so that they may make progress towards their goals within a context where sexuality and domestic violence are more politically challenging issues given the culture of machismo and traditional family roles for women. In sum, NGO leaders consider the specific goal before selecting the strategies which illustrates their understanding of the local sociopolitical context. NGOs as service providers Half of the NGOs in this study have a substantive agenda for service provision (n=10), including organizations focused on human rights (n=3), urban issues (n=3), gender (n=2), and health and sexuality (n=2). The goals of NGOs engaged in service provision center on legal, food, and health care issues, for example. Unlike NGOs where policy influence or education are the goals, NGOs as service providers rely solely on a repertoire of low risk strategies, such as social assistance programs and alliances with the government (e.g., Department of Health). Often, the NGO social assistance programs operate in lieu of the government because the government is no longer able to do so as a result of financial constraints or is simply unwilling to continue some programs.

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Therefore, when NGOs engage in service provision as their goal, their strategic action can be interpreted as serving the government rather than challenging it. For instance, some NGOs coordinate the delivery of food and other supplies to areas affected by natural disasters or by violence, as was the case of Chiapas in the mid-1990s. Victor, of People First, a human rights NGO, provides legal services to individuals who believe they have had their human rights violated. Jose, the leader of Mission of Hope, an urban development NGO, offers a soup kitchen primarily for poor people and the elderly. NGO leaders do not interpret this strategic action as complicit with the government. Rather, they see their social assistance work as advocacy because they offer an alternative form of social development to the government. Victor explains that their work “is not just about helping to feed people or find somewhere to sleep,” but rather, their “commitment goes beyond by showing citizens that democracy is a way of life, not just at election time.” Through its legal services, People First draws attention to unfair legal practices that target vulnerable social groups and redefines human rights as more inclusive. Or, by providing food and supplies, Mission of Hope promotes self-sufficiency for communities so that they can avoid engaging in dependent relationships with the government. While most of the NGOs in this sample that focus on service provision combine this with education or public policy goals, there are a few NGOs that increasingly shifted their goals to only include service provision. In some cases, individual NGOs realize that they are most effective and efficient in delivering social services to marginalized social groups. Over time, as the NGOs focus more on services and programs, they may diminish their public policy and education advocacy goals. Yet, this is a conscious choice and the change in goals would be based on an understanding of the need for services. This was the case for Women in Movement, the NGO that led the campaign to create a family violence law. While they began with the goal of public policy change, Maria explains that their work changed over time: “We have become so overwhelmed with our work attending to women and their children, we have little time to do anything else except to provide services.” Because their work shifts to improving individual lives rather than broad social change, the low risk strategy of social assistance fits with this goal. Likewise, Jennifer and Ivan originally worked together in one NGO but, over time the organization split into two NGOs where some of the activists chose to maintain their activist roots and others wanted to focus on service delivery to those affected by HIV/AIDS. Jennifer, of Project Health, an NGO with goals of public policy change and education, explains: We have our roots in activism, not just as public assistance or welfare, which is a characteristic of many NGOs working in the field of HIV/AIDS. We began working with marginalized groups in terms of social discrimination and to inform them about their rights, to help them to confront the social services bureaucracy and medical services because of discrimination and bad service. She further argues that she thinks many of the NGOs in the city only seem to be able to offer services to communities, such as distributing medicine, rather than public policy and education advocacy. For instance, Ivan, the leader of Dignity in Health, the NGO formed after splitting away from Project Health, says they formed the new organization with the principal goal of service provision to reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS towards a better quality of life. If another NGO organizes a protest or some event, they will attend, but their agenda of service provision remains the most important: Maybe we could become more politically active, but it takes a lot of time and I think that the organization has an important role in attending to the people and just

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supporting the initiatives of the other more activist organizations. Each [NGO leader] has to find their own way and principal capability; our strength is very focused on obtaining medicine. This case illustrates that NGOs make a conscious choice of certain goals over others that then drives the selection of strategic action. Dignity in Health detected a void in services provided to individuals infected and affected by HIV/AIDS and thus decided to position the organization as the NGO for obtaining medicine as its primary strategy in pursuit of its agenda. In contrast, Project Health sees public policy and education advocacy as the most important goals and thus intentionally maintains this direction. When NGOs act as service providers they use a low risk repertoire of strategies that does not confront the government or other targets directly. The lower risk strategy of social assistance does not seem to challenge the government because these NGO actions fit with the government’s conservative ideology that promotes charitable goals, and with their stance on the economy that promotes privatization of social services. Therefore, this type of NGO action appears complementary to the government and NGOs appear as one more social actor, along with the government, local businesses, and other community organizations that participate in economic and social development. This is particularly the case for NGOs that engage in social assistance in conjunction with the government, most notably the health department. Certainly the goal of service provision is a result of government reductions, but the NGOs interpret this work as engaging in social change. They view their strategic action as advocacy because NGOs offer services as an alternative form of social intervention. These two perspectives of NGO actions raise questions of how higher or lower risk strategies can promote more social change and may suggest that the conceptualization of social change shifts as NGOs redefine their goals.

Discussion and conclusion In this article, I show that NGOs are purposeful in their selection of strategies based not only on their specific goals, but also the local sociopolitical arena. The setting for my case study is a pro-capitalist city that is dominated by a few economic elites and is a city with little space for progressive politics. Monterrey, Mexico, is also a socially and culturally conservative city influenced by the Catholic Church that primarily promotes charity-like activism, and encourages traditional family roles for women. The NGOs in this study respond to the context by adjusting their strategies to fit with specific goals and the sociopolitical environment. In the three substantive agendas of public policy influence, education, and service provision, the NGOs in this research employ multiple repertoires of strategies that range from low to high risk. The decision to choose one strategy over another reflects the perceived level of risk of each strategy and how politically challenging the goal in this environment. When the goal involves influencing public policy, the NGOs respond to the conservative cultural and political environment and engage primarily in medium risk strategies, such as lobbying, and sometimes in high risk strategies, such as media communication. In the case of the “right to life” campaign, the NGO alliance chose a higher risk strategy to obtain their goal of blocking the initiative to reduce women’s reproductive rights. Conversely, NGOs in the family violence case use of only medium risk strategies because the goal of the organizations was to create a policy. This finding supports, in part, other research that shows that the presence of more opponents encourages lobbying, but my findings do not

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show that more opponents also promotes higher risk strategies, such as rallies and demonstrations (Gormley and Cymrot 2006). Rather, NGO leaders interpret the antifeminist setting as not conducive for protests as a way to obtain their goal of creating a family violence policy. Conversely, in the face of strong opponents, the NGOs fighting against the “right to life” initiative, introduced by a group of elites, are willing to engage in the high risk strategy of media communication to garner greater public support. When NGO goals focus on education, they use strategies from all three risk levels that again respond to the interaction of the local setting and the specific goal. If the goal is to educate the society in general, NGOs engage in high risk strategies of protest and involve the media, but when the goal is to educate through empowerment of specific social groups, the organizations use low risk strategies, such as consciousness-raising workshops. NGO leaders recognize that protest would not yield productive results by drawing attention to specific social groups (e.g., bisexual youth) in a sociopolitical context that does not recognize the rights of these groups; low risk strategies allow NGOs to stay under the radar and avoid potential challenges while still advocating for these groups. NGOs are willing to engage in protests and media communication to work towards broader education goals focused on sexuality and economic conditions, but the NGO leaders frame the messages as “family” issues to appeal to a larger audience and diminish perceived differences among the protesters and the rest of Monterrey society. NGOs with goals of service provision rely solely on a repertoire of low risk strategies, such as social assistance programs and alliances with the government. The NGO leaders purposively choose strategies for service provision that fit within this framework rather than visibly challenging specific government programs or calling attention to the lack of programs for certain social groups through protest and media communication. In this way, NGO strategic action seems to support the literature that suggests the organizations are acting as cooperators because their service provision serves the government (Hirsch 2003; Petras 1997). The NGO leaders interpret their actions as advocacy rather than an extension of the government because they offer an alternative social intervention. The perspective of NGO leaders challenges the literature by conceptualizing social change in a different way for issues on HIV/AIDS or family violence, for example. For these NGOs, social change at the individual level is as important as broad social change, and thus they shift their goals and strategies to fit with this perspective. My findings support previous research that shows that NGOs shift strategies. However, I argue that this shift is not because of changes in the sociopolitical environment (Carmin et al. 2003), but rather because of shifting NGO goals and the way NGO leaders interpret the sociopolitical environment within the context of their own specific goals. Flexibility in choosing strategies works in favor of an organization’s ability to influence policies, structures, and ideas because it allows them to evaluate their specific goal, and then to select strategies that are more likely to yield a successful outcome. That same flexibility may suggest to outsiders that NGOs do not openly challenge social structures because they tend to employ strategies that are less visible, less risky, and more cooperative with other powerful social actors (i.e., governments and the private sector). However, the use of low risk strategies does not lessen the importance of an NGO’s work; rather, low risk work might be some of the most important work these organizations can do because they are working directly with marginalized social groups, such as in the case of HIV/AIDS patients and battered women. Likewise, some of the Monterrey NGOs in this study rely more often on moderate to low risk strategies than high risk strategies because they see improved results and successes through their use of these less risky repertoires. For instance, NGOs were successful in both cases of blocking the “right to life” policy as well as in creating a

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family violence policy despite the use of different strategies. The choice of strategic action illustrates the NGO leaders’ understanding of their goals and the sociopolitical context surrounding a particular goal that may dictate the use of one strategy over another in order to engage in social change. Through an analysis of strategies, I show how NGOs perceive and interpret strategic action in their setting, suggesting a different picture than the one often described in the NGO literature characterizing an organization as a resister or cooperator. Similarly, there is an implicit, if not explicit, view in the social movement literature that more radical, visible strategies tend to be more successful than moderate or reform strategies (Piven and Cloward 1977). Further, scholars suggest that the organizational form of social action shapes their goals and strategies, such as when social movements become part of the NGO world (Cress 1997; McCarthy et al. 1991). They argue that this organizational form requires goals that are “more in line with what is defined by the state as charitable ends” and thus “are prohibited from engaging in certain forms of resource aggregation and political advocacy and are more conservative in their tactical repertoires” (Cress 1997, p. 344). The suggestion is that more moderate goals and strategies lead to minimal social change. My analysis of the Monterrey NGOs in this study highlights two key factors that are largely ignored in both the NGO and social movement literature. First, evaluating the degree of risk of strategies requires an analysis of the local environment. Some strategies viewed by outsiders as moderate (i.e., lobbying and media communication) may in actuality be more risky given the local sociopolitical context. This finding extends the literature that calls for a more nuanced analysis of strategic action (Andrews and Edwards 2005; Fitzgerald and Rodgers 2000; Sharp 1973). By situating the NGOs in their sociopolitical context, what may be seen as moderate or non-transformative social action may vary from setting to setting. Second, NGO moderation of goals and strategies does not mean that organizations no longer engage in change—which suggests that we should re-conceptualize what social change means given a particular setting. It may be that less risky strategies allow NGOs to obtain their goals because they are “off” the radar screen. Studies that treat NGOs as a uniform group of social actors without taking into account the larger sociopolitical arena may obscure NGO activism and their influence in communities. Based on my findings of the NGOs in their local context, I suggest that the scholarship on NGOs needs to move beyond the two-sided debate—NGOs as positive advocators or NGOs as negative cooperators—to illustrate that these organizations are not monolithic and that there is more diversity among NGOs than previously recognized in the literature. My analysis reveals some interesting patterns that I would not have seen had I treated the Monterrey NGOs in this study as either resisters or cooperators or as a uniform group. By distinguishing among the different goals of the organizations combined with an analysis of the distinctive sociopolitical context within which they operate, my findings illustrate the strategic action of these organizations. Drawing on extensive qualitative data, a case study approach allows me to see the process by which NGO leaders select some strategies over others and shows that the NGOs represent a mosaic of organizations with different goals, ideas, and interests. NGOs are important social actors that are worthy of analysis so that we can better elaborate theories of how NGOs participate in politics and economic development in an increasingly complex and interconnected global space. This article also helps to fill the gap in the literature on social movements that has yet to pay sufficient attention to the link between goals and strategies in local arenas. I encourage researchers to delve deeper in their exploration of social movement and NGO activity to reveal the decision making processes of activists and how they choose from the repertoires of strategies available in that local sociopolitical environment.

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Acknowledgments A very special thanks to Heather Dillaway for her support and ongoing feedback on this article. Many thanks to Javier Auyero and the anonymous reviewers at Qualitative Sociology who greatly strengthened this article with their insightful comments. I also wish to thank David Fasenfest, Monica White, and Nicole Trujillo-Pagan for their comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thank you to the NGO leaders in Monterrey who shared their experiences with me. The research for this project was supported by the National Science Foundation (Dissertation Enhancement Grant, SES-0302192).

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