Governmentality, Development and the Violence of Natural Resource

Ecological Economics 134 (2017) 95–103

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Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

Analysis

Governmentality, Development and the Violence of Natural Resource Extraction in Peru Diego Andreucci ⁎, Giorgos Kallis Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Edifici Z, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 28 July 2016 Received in revised form 23 December 2016 Accepted 3 January 2017 Available online xxxx

1. Introduction Since the late 1990s, resource-rich countries in the global South experienced a boom in extractive activities and their exports of primary commodities, associated with the deepening of an ‘extractivist’ or ‘resource-based’ development model (Bridge, 2008; Gudynas, 2013).1 The intensification and rapid geographical expansion of extractive activities has been a hotly contested process (e.g., Bebbington and Bury, 2013). The aggressive expansion of extractive frontiers has had profound socio-environmental impacts, and has met resistance from affected indigenous and campesino communities and movements (Conde, 2017). These local movements have occasionally succeeded in scaling-up their struggles, causing political crises and changes of national relevance. In most cases, however, opposition to extractive activities (or policies which encouraged them) has been met with violent repression from states (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011). Within ecological economics, several researchers have explored issues of ‘environmental justice’ and ‘ecological distribution conflicts’ related to resource extraction (Martínez-Alier and Walter, 2015). Ecological economists have stressed how rising global demand for raw materials and fuels—connected to growing global population and GDP and the emergence of China as an hegemonic political actor—has both increased the need for primary commodities and driven up their prices (Muradian et al., 2012). Increased profitability—coupled with the progressive depletion of high quality, easily accessible primary resources—has driven extraction to materials previously regarded as inaccessible or not cost-effective, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflicts in marginal areas (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). This has been

⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Andreucci). 1 For an alternative understanding and conceptualisation of (neo-)extractivism, see Brand et al. (2016).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.01.003 0921-8009/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

facilitated by a shift in global political economic relations brought about by globalisation, whereby emphasis on ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘export-led growth’ has resulted, for resource-rich countries in the South, in a process of ‘primarisation’, or specialisation in primary resource exports (Muradian and Martínez-Alier, 2001). Recent research as part of the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas) project has produced a bottom-up documentation and mapping of the numerous conflicts over extraction taking place in various parts of the world and have helped make visible the violence perpetrated by states and corporations against resisting populations (Martínez-Alier et al., 2016). In this ecological economic literature, the violence of extraction is observed and documented, but not analysed and explained in ways that speak to broader conceptual debates. In particular, there is little engagement with and theorisation of how violence is sanctioned, justified and legitimated by the state. How is consensus built around extractivist ‘development’, despite the violence it is predicated upon? In other words, how do states get away with exercising repression against sectors of the population, while claiming to act for the greater good of all? To address these questions we shift attention to the institutional discourses which sustain the imaginary of development, seeking to understand how they relate to the role of violence in securing natural resource extraction. Using the emblematic case of struggles over resource extractivism in Peru as an entry point, we will explore the tensionfraught relationship between the promise of inclusive, modernising development—enabled by transnationally-driven natural resource exploitation—and the repression and violence this extractive-led growth model is necessarily predicated upon. We address two specific, empirical objectives: 1. To unpack the ways in which resource-based development is discursively naturalised, through narratives of ‘improvement’ and ‘sustainability’, 2. To explain how the tension between resource-based development and the violence that sustains it is recomposed through a discursive ‘othering’, targeting those who oppose extraction. This provides the basis for a discussion on the interplay of development, repression and discourse. Through drawing insights from Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality and biopolitics, we render explicit the connections between violence and the development ‘imperative’ (Arsel et al., 2016), and make two interrelated arguments. First, the purported universality and benign character of development require substantial political work in order to elicit support and neutralise potentially destabilising

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D. Andreucci, G. Kallis / Ecological Economics 134 (2017) 95–103

critiques. Second, as extractivist development shifts costs spatially onto those who live in marginal areas, along expanding commodity frontiers, it relies on imaginaries that separate these ‘others’ from the majority of the population, justifying the exceptional use of violence against them. Foucault's work has been extensively mobilised by political ecologists to reflect on how society-nature relationships are governed through politics of knowledge and subject-making (Valdivia, 2015). However, these insights have not yet been adopted by ecological economists working on socio-environmental conflicts. We hope that our research opens an intellectual frontier for ecological economists who want to integrate the study of conflicts and their material causes with analysis of the discursive mechanisms through which the development process is sustained. The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce some insights from ‘governmentality’ studies, as mobilised by political ecologists. We argue that: a) resource-based development can be understood from a Foucauldian perspective as oriented towards ‘improving’ populations through optimising resource exploitation; and b) the discursive naturalisation of development-as-improvement is accompanied by the discursive othering of those who oppose development, presented as enemies whose elimination is necessary for the betterment of all. In sections three and four we explore these processes in the case of Peru during the presidency of Alan García (2006–2011). The politics of Peru have changed since, but García's period remains emblematic and illustrative of the broader points we want to make about the discursive framing of extractivist development and othering of those who resist. First, we look at the ways the World Bank mobilised narratives of ‘sustainability’ to sustain the remaking of the country's extractive sector and present it as both benign and necessary for the population's ‘improvement’. Second, we explore how the discursive targeting of indigenous groups opposing extraction allowed for a framing of repression as necessary for the ‘greater good’ of Peru's development. As we will show, García adopts from the World Bank a neoliberal narrative, whereby ‘improvement’ is predicated on transnational capital's ability to valorise the country's untapped natural resources—and therefore sees indigenous resistance as a barrier to development. In section five, before concluding, we draw some broader empirical patterns out of our single case-study, linking the experience of Peru to that of other countries, and reflect on the conceptual and practical implications of our findings. The empirical research for this paper consisted of a content and discourse analysis of media articles and policy documents, including public interventions by Peru's president Alan García in the context of struggles with indigenous groups over hydrocarbon development. We looked at and analysed loan agreements, policy papers and reports produced by the World Bank over a 20-year period (1992–2012), concerning Peruvian and Latin American extractive sector policies as well as related socioenvironmental and development issues. The analysis was conducted using Foucauldian discourse analysis strategies (Feindt and Oels, 2005; Wetherell et al., 2001). A short period of fieldwork was conducted by the first author in Lima, Peru in August and September 2011. This included archival research at the repository library of the World Bank's Peru headquarters in Lima, as well as nine in-depth interviews with experts of indigenous and environmental issues and state and World Bank representatives. Interviews concerned Peru's policies for the extractive sectors and development more generally, as well as the significance and implications of indigenous conflicts against hydrocarbon development in recent years. 2. Biopolitical Governmentality, Improvement and ‘Racism’ In this section, we argue that the frameworks of ‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’ offer a productive way of conceptualising the relationship between the discursive naturalisation of resource-based development and the legitimisation of repression which accompanies it.

The notion of governmentality was introduced by Foucault in the lecture given on February 1st 1978 at the Collège the France. In this lecture, he provided a broad definition of the term, giving three alternatives, though partly overlapping meanings (Foucault, 2007, pp. 108– 109): First, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we can call ‘government’ and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by ‘governmentality’ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘governmentalized.’ In short, for Foucault, governmentality refers to a) a set of tactics and knowledges for the exercise of a type of power targeting the population; b) a historical tendency which led to the development of this type of power; and c) the process through which the above-mentioned tactics and knowledges are adopted by the state (how the state was ‘governmentalized’). Most commonly, the notion of governmentality is used to signal a shift from authoritarian, direct forms of rule—what Foucault calls ‘sovereign power’—to “a more diffuse form of power through which an increasingly administrative, bureaucratic state came to manage its population and resources by employing a new set of savoirs or rationalities (such as statistics), which enabled an unprecedented degree of control and surveillance over individual lives” (Bakker and Bridge, 2008, p. 225). Importantly, while sovereign power, which remained dominant at least until the seventeenth century, was centred on the protection and expansion of territory, with the emergence of modern forms of governmental rationality, the main target of control shifts towards the population. In order to signal this shift, Foucault (2003) had earlier introduced the notion of ‘biopower’ (or biopolitics); that is, a power focusing on the population understood as a biological and statistical unit (Lemke, 2011). To a large extent, biopolitics is synonymous with the first of the three meanings of ‘governmentality’ described above; in this sense, it is possible to refer to the latter as a ‘biopolitical governmentality’ (Oksala, 2013). Biopolitical governmentality emerges from the seventeenth century to gradually replace ‘sovereignty’. Sovereign power refers to the traditional power of the monarch to ‘make die’—to kill—those who threaten his territory; or alternatively, to ‘let live’ those that protect it. With the emergence of biopolitical governmentality, and the consequent shift in focus from territory to the population, power is no longer simply repressive, but works thorough securing and promoting the health, productivity, reproduction and wellbeing of the population (Foucault, 2003; Lekme, 2011). In this new model, expressed best in the historical emergence of the science of ‘political economy’, the state is expected to take care of the people (not for the sake of their lives per se, but for the sake of their role in the economy). Under biopolitics, rather than exercising its prerogative to take lives, state power ‘makes live’ or, in its extreme, ‘lets die’ (Foucault, 2003, pp. 240–241; Turhan et al., 2015, p. 297). Note that, according to Foucault, biopolitical governmentality did not fully replace sovereignty; a biopolitical rationality continues to be complemented by a sovereign one (the importance of this point will be made clear later in this section and the rest of the paper).


2.1. Natural Resources and the ‘Will to Improve’ The notion of biopolitical governmentality allows us to capture the naturalisation of resource-based development as a form of optimisation of population's relationships with the environment. Biopolitical governmentality seeks to enhance the productivity and controllability of the population through improving its overall wellbeing. The tactics described by Foucault under the label of governmentality signal an attempt to exercise power from a distance, through shaping human conduct (hence the definition of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’). As Li (2007, p. 4) summarises, “[a]t the level of population, it is not possible to coerce every individual and regulate their actions in minute detail. Rather, government operates by educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs”. Here, power operates through calculated means that seek to “to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health” (Foucault, 2007, p. 105). This is an essential feature of government functioning in ‘biopower mode’: “Now that power is decreasingly the power of the right to take life, and increasingly the right to intervene to make live, … power begins to intervene mainly … in order to improve life” (Foucault, 2003, p. 248). Such a will to improve the population also mobilises nature. One of the main targets of government intervention, for Foucault (2007, p. 97), is “men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility, and so on.” Political ecologists have rendered explicit the way that biopolitical governmentality, and its logic of improvement, works through managing and optimising relationships between society and the environment, populations and resources (Bakker and Bridge, 2008; Valdivia, 2008). The label of ‘green’- or ‘eco-governmentality’ is often used to refer to work mobilising Foucauldian categories for the study of how society-nature relations are governed (Rutherford, 2007; Valdivia, 2015). This framework is mobilised to analyse how certain knowledges about nature are produced as ‘true’, in order to shape the ways people interact with and use resources and the environment, as well as to explore how these knowledges are interiorised through process of education and subject-making. The insight that biopolitical governmentality operates through the purported goal of population ‘improvement’, and that it mobilises ‘nature’ discursively and materially to this end, makes this framework particularly apt for political ecology approaches to analysing colonial and development politics (e.g., Li, 2007). It is important to note here that ‘development’ does not just refer to small-scale, targeted interventions, typically carried out by NGOs or aid agencies ostensibly aiming to rationalise resource use by local communities (Bryant, 2002). Development also signifies broader, structural policies and actions aimed at remaking state institutions and policies and remodelling the way state actors see and manage environments and populations through national-scale interventions (Goldman, 2001). This point is of particular relevance for the analysis we carry out in section three. As Michael Goldman (2001, 2005) has argued most convincingly, in resource-rich, peripheral states, policies for the improvement of populations via the optimisation of relationships with nature are primarily directed through macro-scale, transnationally-led ‘development’. First, efforts by states to optimise resource exploitation are increasingly directed by international institutions and actors, such as ‘northern’ conservation agencies with direction and funding from the World Bank. Second, and relatedly, the optimal relationship between populations and the environment which leads to a purported improvement is understood as taking place through export-oriented exploitation of natural resources, often mediated by transnational capital. 2.2. Sovereign Power and ‘Othering’ This presents us with something of a paradox. The notion of biopolitical (eco-)governmentality as described above—as a form of indirect rule that exercises control through ‘improving’ society-

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environment relationships—does not seem to capture adequately the reality of the world's commodity frontiers. Here, the exercise of ‘sovereign’ power often appears to prevail. As the example of African petrodevelopment shows perhaps most clearly, in the extractive periphery a biopolitical will to improve can hardly be seen at work. Indeed, extractive regimes often operate according to radically different logic, which generates fragmentary spaces, ecological disasters and authoritarian rule (Ferguson, 2005; Holterman, 2014; Watts, 2003). It is important here to avoid presenting a clear-cut dichotomy between biopolitical governmentality and sovereignty. As mentioned above, the two rationalities are necessarily interrelated and complementary (Foucault, 2003). What needs to be accounted for, therefore, is not the incompatibility of authoritarianism with a ‘will to improve’, but rather how these two contradictory logics are made to coexist, so as to guarantee that the developmental promise of biopolitics is not undermined by the necessity of violence. As Foucault (2003, p. 257) asked in relation to colonialism, “if you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, to kill civilisations?”. In other words, how to explain that a developmental project, ostensibly centred on improving population wellbeing, is predicated on violence, on the sovereign's right to make die, rather than on a biopolitical duty to promote life? As Foucault (2003, pp. 254–255) explains, the key to understanding this is racism. In biopolitical terms, racism for Foucault has two functions. First, it is “a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die”. Second, it allows “the establishment of a positive relation of this type: ... ‘The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more’”. Thus, racism allows both the suspension of the state's duty to promote life, upon which its legitimacy depends; and the representation of its need to ‘make die’ as necessary for the greater good of the population (Dean, 2010, pp. 163–173; Lemke, 2011, pp. 40–44). Here, ‘to die’ is not meant in a strictly literal sense. Similarly, ‘racism’ does not necessarily refer to race in biological or ethnic terms, but it could be any reified division inscribed into the population (Foucault, 2003, p. 261) and a characteristic ascribed to a segment of it. Foucault uses the word ‘racism’ to emphasise the origin of this form of thinking in evolutionary biology. The relevance of this for contemporary development conflicts should not be underestimated (aren't ‘development’ and ‘growth’ too, after all, biological metaphors?). Yet, it is perhaps less ambiguous and less confusing to refer to this broader process as ‘othering’ (Carabine, 2001, p. 302). Othering allows the state to frame parts of the population as different and exclude them from the domain of responsibility of the ruler. To the extent that this other is also an enemy which blocks ‘improvement’ for the rest of the population, this legitimises his or her repression. In the rest of the paper, we will show how these discursive strategies are mobilised to legitimise repression in the case of resistance to oil development in the Peruvian Amazon. First, however, we'll discuss how an eco-governmentality logic is at play in the naturalisation of resourcebased development as the ‘greater good’. 3. ‘Improving’ Through Resource Extraction in Peru Between 2002 and 2013, Peru underwent a period of sustained GDP growth, emerging as one of the fastest-growing economies in Latin America. Primary commodity exports were pivotal to achieving such a strong performance (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008). In this period, thanks to high international prices for primary commodities, the country experienced an extractive ‘boom’ which helped reduce debts and contributed to reducing poverty and inequality rates (CEPAL, 2013). While both the country's resource wealth and favourable international conditions were necessary conditions for Peru's economic success, the expansion of resource exports was enabled through a profound, and transnationally-led, political economic restructuring, started in the 1990s.

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The reforms promoted under the authoritarian governments of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) entailed a series of aggressive liberalisation and privatisation policies for the promotion of foreign direct investment. These were enshrined in a new constitution approved in 1992 and protected by shutting down the parliament in Fujimori's (in)famous ‘auto-golpe’—self-inflicted coup—the same year (Bury, 2005). This economic approach posed the bases for Peru's integration in the global economy as a neoliberal poster-child and an ideal target for transnational extractive investment. By dismantling the inward-oriented model started in the late 1960s, this reform process remade Peru into an export-led, extractivist economy (Bury, 2005). The country's extractive sector underwent a profound process of economic liberalisation. In line with global developments (Bridge, 2004), Peru changed its mining and hydrocarbon laws in order to facilitate foreign investment in extractives (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008). At the same time, aggressive privatisation was carried out, justified as necessary to generate revenues and promote the country's image and competitiveness (Bury, 2005). These reforms prepared the ground for the expansion of primary exports in the following decade. The way that the World Bank framed and justified such reforms offers an example of the effort and political work that went into presenting transnationally-led resource exploitation as the key to the country's ‘development’. We do not mean to imply that there is a complete coincidence between the Bank's policy discourse and goals and those of the government of Peru; there are, however, “striking commonalities” between the two, recognised by both parts (World Bank, 2006, p. 1; interview with World Bank representative, 06/09/2011), which justify our attention to the Bank's approach and discourse—to which we now turn. 3.1. World Bank's Involvement and Approach The World Bank proactively endorsed, guided and funded the restructuring of Peru's extractive sector. This restructuring entailed the privatisation of previously state-owned mining and hydrocarbon firms as well as the reorganisation of related legal frameworks so as to foster foreign direct investment (World Bank, 1999, 1993). Through its corporate arm, moreover—the International Financial Corporation (IFC)—the Bank entered in direct partnerships as investor in some of the largest and most controversial extractive projects in the country, such as the Camisea gas field and open-pit mines in Yanacocha and Conga (EJAtlas, 2016; Hallman and Olivera, 2015; Oxfam America, 2008; World Bank, 2011a, 1994). Beyond restructuring, the Bank increasingly invested in the ‘stabilisation’ of Peru's model of resource-based development (see Himley, 2013). ‘Sustainability’ was one of the main keywords behind this stabilisation effort, which tried to recompose the fundamental fracture between its (and the Peruvian state's) version of a biopolitical ‘will to improve’ and the negative socio-environmental implications of natural resource extraction. Starting in the 1990s, ‘sustainability’ has been at the centre of a shift in global discourse and policy (Bernstein, 2001), observed in the extractive industries as well (Himley, 2010). As a response to criticism for the negative socio-environmental impacts of its large infrastructural projects and ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, the World Bank also underwent a process of internal reform which gave sustainability increased centrality (Goldman, 2005). The Bank took a leading role in institutionalising the ‘mantra’ of sustainability and placing it at the centre of the global development agenda (World Bank, 1992). Thus, if at the beginning of the reform process environmental concerns were expected to limit significantly the Bank's activity, the opposite actually happened: the Bank found itself “in the enviable position of having an expanding loan portfolio and a globally adopted environmental agenda, which it calls environmentally sustainable development” (Goldman 2005, p. 154, original emphasis). Adopted from the second half of the 1990s, the revised World Bank agenda—called ‘comprehensive development framework’—was based on substitution of ‘structural adjustment’ with ‘poverty reduction

strategies’, and favoured the adoption of principles such ‘civil society participation’, ‘transparency’, ‘country ownership’, and the like (Cammack, 2004; Goldman, 2005; Peet, 2009). Sustainability was central to this turn. The reform process also involved the Bank's approach to resource extraction, particularly with the launch of a broad ‘Extractive Industries Review’ in the early 2000s. A central achievement of reform was to allow the World Bank to deepen its intervention into the affairs of borrowing countries (Cammack, 2004, p. 197). This entailed a much more proactive role in managing how states and populations think and act vis-à-vis resources and the environment (Goldman, 2001). In other words, by concerning itself with people's welfare and environmental issues—by infusing its approach with a biopolitical ‘will to improve’—the Bank transformed itself into a much more proactive agent of (eco)governmentality. 3.2. Rendering Extraction ‘Sustainable’ This new approach is at work in the World Bank's involvement in Peru. Poverty reduction and, later, inclusiveness and equality occupied an increasingly central place in the Bank's development agenda for the country (World Bank, 2011b). Sustainability was also central to the Bank's strategy for Peru (World Bank, 2007, 2005). Emphasis on ‘making growth sustainable’ is present as a concern in all the ‘Country Assistance Strategy’ papers since the early 1990s, and increasingly from the 2000s on (World Bank, 2006, 2002, 1997, 1994). In 2007, following a two-year-long process of ‘Country Environmental Analysis’, the Bank published a long report called Environmental Sustainability: Key to Poverty Reduction in Peru. Here, the Bank's concern for the environment is justified on two grounds. First, natural resources are economically important: “if managed sustainably, Peru's profuse endowment of natural resources could become a pillar of an increasingly diversified and robust economy” (World Bank, 2007, p. 2). Second, the Bank is aware that an economy based on resource extraction is likely to create environmental destruction and conflicts. Therefore, it proposes a set of guidelines to help design and implement policies to (a) improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Peru's environmental management system; and (b) integrate principles of sustainable development into key sector policies, with an emphasis on protecting the most vulnerable groups (World Bank, 2007, p. 2). Following the report, a series of three ‘environmental development policy loans’ (one of which specifically dedicated to mining), for a total disbursement of $425 million, was approved in 2009. This project helped to finance and organise Peru's first Ministry of the Environment, as well as other environmental development projects and institutional changes (World Bank, 2009). In the Bank's policy agenda for remaking the Peruvian extractive sector, it is possible to detect a tension between the need to support continued expansion of the extractive sector and a degree of awareness of the environmental and social risks associated with such a strategy. The Bank staff were at pains to present extractivism and sustainability not only as compatible, but indeed as mutually reinforcing. First, sustainability is presented as necessary for extractive sector expansion, as “those countries with competent environmental management have an advantage in the attraction of new investment” (World Bank, 1996, p. 63). Second, and most interesting, extractive industries are presented as key to promoting sustainability (Liebenthal et al., 2005, p. x): Sustainable development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Given that fiscal revenues constitute a major source of net benefits... obtained from the extraction of mineral resources, the interests of future generations can be protected through the efficient utilization of these revenues for people in the host country.


In this imaginative rephrasing of the classic, Rio Declaration definition of sustainability (see Bernstein, 2001), the Bank operates a conflation of profitability and environmental sustainable development. Population ‘improvement’, in other words, is expected to take place through transnationally-driven, export-oriented nature's capitalisation. While this strategy partly paid off in economic terms, it did not come without contradictions. 4. Oil, Violence and ‘Othering’ in the Peruvian Amazon The aggressive promotion of resource extraction in Peru has been a hotly contested process. Perhaps most significant in this sense are the years of the government of Alan García Pérez (2006–2011), at once the most economically successful period and the one which registered the highest levels of conflictuality in the country's recent history. Much of the extraction-driven ‘development’ did not reach significant parts of Peru's population, most notably highland and rainforest communities that are most affected by the negative socio-environmental impacts of extraction (Bebbington and Bury, 2009; Drinot, 2011, pp. 184–185). As several scholars and activists, drawing on data of Peru's Ombudsman for Human Rights, have pointed out, during Garcia's administration there was a surge in socio-environmental conflicts, a large percentage of which related to extractive projects (Merino-Acuña, 2015; Orta-Martínez and Finer, 2010). A large share of these conflicts took place—in this conjuncture—in the rainforest regions east of the Andes, where a large number of indigenous peoples live, but which also contains vast untapped oil and gas reserves. Since the mid-2000s, the Peruvian Amazon experienced a boom in hydrocarbon activities (Finer and Orta-Martínez, 2010). Between 2004 and 2006, the surface of the region zoned for oil and gas explorations grew from about 13% to a staggering 72%. As (Finer et al., 2008, p. 2932) explain, “at least 58 of the 64 zoning blocks created overlay lands titled to Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, 17 blocks overlap areas that have proposed or created reserves for Indigenous groups in voluntary isolation”. The surge of conflicts which ensued was therefore highly predictable. The hydrocarbon boom resulted from a combination of a sharp rise in oil prices and the Peruvian state's efforts to open the sector to foreign direct investment. As the already favourable terms provided by neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s proved insufficient to foster significant hydrocarbon discoveries, in 2003, the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) further lowered royalties on new contracts (from 30% to 13.8%) and introduced a series of other incentives (Mayorga-Alva, 2006, pp. 387–389). According to a 2007 World Bank report, the key to Peru's hydrocarbon boom was in “the high prices and the incoming risk capital investments attracted by both geological potential and a secure legal framework” (Mayorga-Alva, 2006, p. 391)—secure, of course, for foreign capital. Two recommendations follow in the report. First, to further “tailor incentives to the challenge of exploring frontier areas”; second, to resist “the regional populist political wage and the temptation of contesting contracts [so as to] preserve Peru's competitive position”. (We will show later why this latter point is important). 4.1. From Resistance to Repression The promotion of extractive investment in the Amazon continued during the García administration. In 2008, following the ratification of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, the Peruvian government issued a legislative package aimed at further liberalising investment, referred to by critics as the ‘Law of the Jungle’ (Ley de la Selva). The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP)—the main network of Amazonian indigenous organisations—denounced that some of these decrees were particularly harmful for local populations. Specifically, they a) facilitated private investors' acquisition of land and resources titled to native communities; b) allowed the state to control indigenous territory deemed idle or

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unproductive; c) suspended, in case of lands for mining use and the exploitation of oil and gas, indigenous peoples' constitutional rights to ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (Alimonda et al., 2009, pp. 148–150; Merino-Acuña, 2015, p. 90). This created an unprecedented wave of protests and conflicts, culminating in what has come to be known as the Bagua massacre (or Baguazo). The indigenous revolt of 2008–2009—a ten-month long series of demonstrations, including road and river blockades and occupation of oil company facilities—was the most important instance of pan-Amazonian indigenous struggle in Peru's recent history (Alimonda et al., 2009, p. 25). It was the culmination of a long trajectory of indigenous organisation in the Amazon region (Greene, 2009). Significantly, indigenous resistance opposed not a single extractive project, but resource-based development more broadly. The movement had a tragic end. In April 2009, pushing for the repeal of some of the decrees, hundreds of protestors blockaded a motorway, in a stretch of road known as the ‘devil's curve’ (curva del diablo), near Bagua, in the departamento (district) of Amazonas. On 5th of June, with negotiations between indigenous organisations and the parliament still ongoing, the military police were sent in to disperse the blockade—an operation which resulted in 33 deaths and over 200 injured (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 7).2 The clashes in Bagua were the result of a double suspension of democratic rule. The first was a three-month period of special powers given to García in December 2007 in order to pass laws by decree—that is, without the parliament's approval—related the with provisions of the FTA with the US (Alimonda et al., 2009, p. 85). The second was the declaring of a 60-day state of emergency in the Amazon, in May-June 2009, to contain the increasing indigenous mobilisation (Amnesty International, 2009, n. 24).3 The Bagua massacre was not an isolated case. Between 2009 and 2010 only, the government recurred six times to declaring the state of emergency and to deploying armed forces, two of which were for cases of extraction conflict (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2011, pp. 34–37). In terms of state violence, the record of the García administration is particularly grim, having resulted in 191 deaths related to social and ecological conflicts (El Comercio, 2011). This hardly fits with declared ambitions of sustainability and inclusiveness. 4.2. The ‘Internal Enemy’ García's attempt to recompose the contradiction between development and violence at the centre of Peru's growth strategy was predicated on depicting indigenous groups resisting extraction as enemies of ‘the people’ (Drinot, 2011). In a series of notorious editorials, García used the image of the ‘dog in the manger’ to target indigenous groups (García-Pérez, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). Like the dog in Aesop's fable—who can't eat from the manger, yet doesn't let other animals eat either—the indigenous have no use for the Amazon's abundant natural resources, yet they don't let anyone else exploit them. “[They are] opposed to investment, and incapable of explaining how, with a poor agriculture, it is possible to make a leap towards greater levels of development” (García-Pérez, 2007a; all translations are by the authors). By hindering development, indigenous peoples condemn themselves and the rest of the country to poverty and backwardness. These “artificial communities”, as García calls them, “own 200,000 hectares on paper but only farm 10,000 hectares, while the rest is idle property, unused”. They 2 Severe violations of human rights occurred during and after the police operation. This included the use of firearms against protestors and bystanders, including children; denial of access to legal and medical aid and illegal detention, ill-treatment and torture of protesters. Indigenous leaders not present in Bagua were also detained illegally, charged with “apology of crimes against the public order”. These accusations targeted especially Alberto Pizango, leader of AIDESEP, who was also accused of rebellion, sedition and conspiracy against the state and the constitutional order (Amnesty International 2009). 3 Under the state of emergency, the rights to freedom and free movement, inviolability of the home and freedom of assembly were suspended, while the armed forces took responsibility for maintaining public order (Amnesty International 2009).

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have invented the “figure of the uncontacted tribe”, so that “millions of hectares cannot be explored, and Peru's petroleum must remain underground while the world is paying $US 90 per barrel” (García-Pérez, 2007a). García's is, in its way, a development discourse, of (eco)governmentality as ‘will to improve’ based on correctly managing relations between ‘people and things’. His narrative is first and foremost one of ‘underutilised resources’, which Peru is unable to mobilise due to ‘irrational’ social opposition. It is clear that, for García, putting natural resources to profitable use means rendering them amenable to capitalist valorisation, “because if the land is unproductive for [indigenous communities] it could be productive with a high level of investment or know-how brought in by a new buyer” (García-Pérez, 2007a). Especially for larger-scale projects—García mentions oil, mining and large dams among other examples—this “has to be done by large private or international capital that needs very long-term security to invest billions and to be able to recover the investment” (García-Pérez, 2007a). In relation to mining, the reference to an understanding of ‘sustainability’ similar to that of the World Bank is clear. Despite the country's large mineral endowment, he argues, “only one tenth of these resources are being developed, because we are still arguing over whether mining technologies destroy the environment” (García-Pérez, 2007a). However, for García, This is an issue of the past century. Of course, mining did once destroy it and today's environmental problems are basically due to yesterday's mines, but today mines live alongside cities without any problems; and, in any case, it all depends on how strict the State is in its technology demands of mining companies and in negotiating a greater financial and employment share for the departments where the mines are located (García-Pérez, 2007a). We see here a similar conflation of sustainability and profitability to that discussed above, in relation to the Bank's eco-governmentality approach (Section 3.2; World Bank, 2005). This is a discourse of neoliberal, ‘sustainable development’, whereby the main agent of supposed ‘improvement’ is private property and investment, particularly by transnational capital, capable of valorising the country's untapped resources. The other side of this narrative is García's conflating of socio-environmental opposition with socialist ‘statism’. Resources are left unutilised because [of] the old anti-capitalist communist of the nineteenth century dressed up as the protectionist in the twentieth century and changes his colours again in the twenty-first century to that of an environmentalist. But it is always anticapitalist, against investment, without explaining how, with poor farming, the leap can be made to greater development (García-Pérez, 2007a). In a later intervention, García draws an interesting association between indigenous protesters and environmentalists with a wider network of ‘antisystemic’ movements aligned with the (then ascendant) Latin American left. While these opponents of ‘modernity’ and ‘prosperity’ do not have sufficient force to oppose development, they are favouring the penetration of foreign forces, of dictatorial statism. The reference to Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales is clear here: “we live a cold war in which foreign rulers participate. For now, those who represent external penetration are losing” (García-Pérez, 2009). In this context, the conflict in Bagua is presented as a deliberate and premeditated attempt by antisystemic movements to destabilise the country and undermine its achievements. Lastly, García's is equally, and without contradiction, a racist discourse, in Foucault's sense described above: a discourse of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, those who want development against those who block it. In an editorial entitled A la fe de la inmensa mayoría—‘To the faith of the vast majority’—García-Pérez (2009) opposes the silent majority of good, working people who benefit from the government's project and support

its defence of ‘democracy’ and ‘openness’, with a minority of anti-systemic, green, indigenous and anticapitalist movements. They are a minority, and the only way they have to gain visibility is to block roads, create instability. But they are wrong because the immense majority thinks differently from them […] So all they can do is present 50,000 people protesting in different places as if it was the whole country. […] But they shall not pass. Because the democratic and rational majority is immense even though it is silent (García-Pérez, 2009). The othering of indigenous peoples, and those who support them, is thus coterminous with García's depiction of them as ‘enemies of the people’.4 The violence which sustains extraction is therefore implicitly justified as the necessary condition of possibility of the country's development. 5. Governmentality, Extraction and Conflicts The two stories above—about the World Bank's development and sustainability narrative and García's discursive othering of indigenous movements and their supporters—reveal an uneasy relationship between two governmental rationalities, biopolitics and sovereignty. On the one hand, there is a logic of eco-governmentality as ‘will to improve’, understood as a way of managing the population centred on optimising society-environment relations. On the other hand, we have a territorial and developmental logic which runs in the opposite direction, one which produces fragmentary, conflictual and highly unequal spaces, and is conducive of forms of rule based on violence, racism and authoritarianism. While these rationalities appear as antithetic, they should be considered not only as coexisting, but indeed as complementary. The very logic of development—or biopolitical ‘improvement’, via the optimisation of society-nature relations—generates the need for ‘sovereign’ violence. No matter how green-washed, the extractive development of Peru's hydrocarbons requires monumental material transformations of territories, and inevitably meets resistance from those who suffer its impacts. Violence to repress those who stand in the way of extraction is therefore rendered necessary for the purported ‘improvement’ to take place. Hence the importance of ‘racism’ or othering, as a discursive strategy whose deployment is key to recomposing the contradiction between the two logics. 5.1. Taking Discourse Seriously Seeing extractivism through a ‘governmentality’ lens allows us to expand the conceptualisation of environmental conflicts, beyond the ‘materialist’ approach of ecological economics. Ecological economists tend to see these conflicts through the lens of distributional (in)justice in the context of a demand-driven expansion of commodity frontiers (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). However, we argue that recognising the significance of governmentality as ‘will to improve’—in its interplay with sovereignty and ‘othering’—provides an important complement to this framework. First, a governmentality approach allows us to take seriously the ‘positive’ element of (market-mediated) ‘will to improve’ at the heart of extractivism. Extractivism contains a ‘utopian’ aspect (cf. Harvey, 2005, p. 18). It is not just a political economic and ecological project for supplying industrial centres with raw materials (and rent) extracted in the world's periphery; it is also, significantly, a developmental vision based on unleashing society's and nature's potential through the market. In García's Peru we see a project and discourse of neoliberal development, presented as modernising, just and inclusive—a vision which 4 There are clear parallels here, which we cannot develop in this paper, with Laclau's (2005) theory of ‘populism’.


the World Bank has helped to frame in terms of ‘sustainability’. This is of course extremely problematic, as it assumes that only nature's capitalisation—the much-contested politics of resource exploitation and communities' dispossession—can lead to sustainability, development and improvement. Yet, this positive or utopian element should not be dismissed as rhetorical. Taking it seriously can perhaps help us to account for the incredible ‘resilience’ of extractivism in the face of the tensions and contradictions which necessarily accompany its unfolding. Second, and relatedly, it allows us to capture the ways that states can legitimise the objective and subjective violence suffered by communities that oppose this development model. As we demonstrated in the case of Peru, not only does ‘racism’ or othering suspend the state's duty to promote life, thus allowing it to ‘let die’ a part of the population with no contradiction; it also justifies such a violence as necessary for the greater good of the population: the need to sacrifice the internal other/enemy for the benefit of the majority's development (Drinot, 2011). In this way, the state can maintain, in most cases, a degree of legitimacy and support which seems inexplicable when seen from the point of view of those who resist. Writing on the ‘global environmental justice movement’, MartínezAlier et al. (2016, p. 15) argue that what Naomi Klein (2014, chap. 9) called the ‘blockadia’ movement—the movement that struggles to stop fossil fuel (and other mineral) extraction projects—is a key actor in a transition to a more socially and environmentally just world. Ecological economists working on ‘ecological distribution conflicts’ have long focused their attention onto the ‘material’ causes of conflicts, their roots in the social metabolism of the global economy. Their proposed solutions have also been primarily centred on this natural-material base: a more just distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, recognition of ecological debts and unequal exchange, reduction of the social metabolism through leaving oil (and other minerals) ‘in the soil’ and, more broadly, through promoting ‘post-extractivism’ and ‘degrowth’5 (Martínez-Alier, 2012). While there is value in these proposals, we hope to have shown the importance of focusing on the discursive strategies that are mobilised by states and international organisations with the aim of depoliticising resource-based development as ‘the greater good’, despite the enormous impacts and conflicts it generates. As it emerges clearly from the emblematic case presented in our article, as in many others across the globe, those who oppose extraction and related forms of dispossession are likely to meet state (or state-sanctioned) violence and repression. This, most strikingly, and despite notable exceptions, happens with the support of the ‘silent majorities’ praised by the likes of Alan García. This contributes to delegitimising and politically isolating socio-environmental movements, whose achievements seldom go beyond ‘resistance’ to the expansion of capitalist relations and commodity frontiers. Whether blockadia and the global environmental justice movement will succeed, therefore, depends on how well these struggles manage to articulate into a broader project of emancipatory socio-environmental transformation that concerns not only affected territories, but a broader bloc of eco-territorial, class and popular-democratic struggles (Calvário and Kallis, 2016). To this end, it is important to take seriously the political work of discourse in naturalising capitalist development and legitimising the violence which sustains it. 5.2. Extractivism and Othering Our empirical exploration of the interplay of improvement and violence in ‘resource-based development’ enables us to add to current conceptualisations of governmentality in political ecology. The complementarily between biopolitics and sovereignty is not of course specific to the extractivist projects. Yet, there are some specificities in the 5 On degrowth as an emerging political paradigm, see D'Alisa et al. (2014); on degrowth-related debates in ecological economics, see Kallis (2011).

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mode of articulation between the two in the extractive ‘periphery’, which deserve further research and theorisation. First, this dialectics of improvement and violence expresses itself, to an important extent, in spatial terms. The uneven development patterns resulting from the political economy of extractivism become inscribed in, and reproduced by, the type of imaginaries mobilised in Alan García's discourse. Geographies of resource extraction, therefore, interplay with the state's ‘imaginative geographies’ (Said, 2003), or processes of discursive production of certain spaces as ‘other’. Commodity frontiers, as any frontier, are distant and far-way, spatially the ‘other’ of the centres where urban populations reside. As exceptional spaces are produced, where the expectation of ‘improvement’ is suspended, the people who reside there are reframed as recalcitrant ‘others’, as a different part of the population, which is not like ‘us’, the silent, democratic majority, and which does not deserve the same treatment. In this way, Foucault's notion of racism-as-othering takes on a geographical dimension: spaces of extraction come to shape, or become intertwined with, the very limits of the life-promoting duties of the state, defining affected communities as populations which can be ‘left to die’ (or even ‘made to die’) in the name of development (Banerjee, 2008). Second, in resource-rich, post-colonial contexts such as Peru, ‘othering’ does often assume a biological-racial dimension, whereby features such as backwardness, inability to develop and make use of resources are inscribed into an essentialised image of indigenous populations, drawing on deep-seated cultural perceptions. Here racism can be partly be understood in a literal sense (even though, as we have seen in García's discourse, othering is much broader and conflates political with ethnic referents). Indeed, For Drinot (2011, p. 190), through racism, García operates a conflation of the political adversary with the biopolitical enemy: what García invokes when he refers to communists, protectionists and environmentalists, that is when he refers to a recalcitrant anticapitalist Other, is Peru's indigenous population, or, more precisely, that which the indigenous population is seen to represent in the project of rule: “backwardness”. What the fear expresses is the belief that indigeneity is a block to national advancement (Drinot, 2011, p. 183). The same association between ethic and political ‘architectures of enmity’ (Gregory, 2004, p. 20) can take place in contexts with different political conditions. In Bolivia, for instance, despite a progressive and ostensibly pro-indigenous presidency, indigenous organisations opposing natural resource extraction have been targeted, using a very similar discursive logic to that of Alan García's (Andreucci and Radhuber, 2015). Though with different political referents—no longer communists in disguise but ‘agents of imperialism’ and ‘green Trotskyists’—indigenous groups are similarly associated with backwardness and accused of blocking development for the ‘rest of us’ (e.g., Laing, 2012; Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012). This is of course a much broader dynamic and a strikingly common discursive logic, which is systematically mobilised in instances of socio-environmental conflicts, without necessarily drawing on racial content in a strict sense. The third and last specificity of governmentality in the resource-rich ‘periphery’, and in the ‘global south’ more generally, is that the processes of state remaking of the type described in this paper are transnationally-directed. When we introduced the definition of governmentality in section two, we noted that one of the meanings of the term proposed by Foucault is the “process by which the state … was gradually ‘governmentalized” (2007, pp. 108–109); that is, the historical process through which biopolitical knowledges and technologies of rule have been appropriated by states. For Foucault, whose focus was on Western Europe, this is was more or less ‘endogenous' process, a historical co-evolution of the state form and biopower. As we have shown, however, the governmentalisation of the Peruvian state—the way it

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assimilated green-neoliberal rationalities of ‘improvement’—happened through the active intervention of the World Bank and other transnational actors6 (cf. Goldman, 2001). Above and beyond attention to micro-processes of ‘subject-making’, therefore, Foucauldian insights could be further mobilised in political ecology for analysing the genealogy of environmental states in the ‘global north’ as well as for understanding the transnationally-led production of ‘extractivist’ states in the ‘periphery’. 6. Conclusions This paper contributed to ecological economic literatures on ecological distribution conflicts in context of expansion of resource extraction activities, by analysing and theorising the interplay of development and violence with narratives of ‘sustainability’ and processes of discursive ‘othering’. We argued that while, in ecological economics, the violence of extraction is observed and documented, and related to increases in the global ‘social metabolism’, it is not analysed and explained in ways that speak to broader conceptual debates. In particular, there is little engagement with and theorisation of how violence is sanctioned, justified and legitimated by the state. In this paper, through mobilising an analytical framework drawn from a ‘governmentality’ approach, and using the emblematic case of struggles over resource-based development in Peru under Alan García (2006–2011) as an entry point, we explored the tension-fraught relationship between the promise of inclusive, modernising development—enabled by transnationally-driven natural resource exploitation—and the repression and violence this extractiveled growth model is necessarily predicated upon. We showed that a discourse of ‘improvement’ fuelled by extractionbased development is necessarily in contradiction with the negative socio-environmental impacts it inflicts on those who live along the extractive frontiers. Such unevenness is an intrinsic feature of capitalist development, and generates resistance and reaction, which threatens to destabilise and hinder the unfolding of extractivism. This shows that the purported benign character of development requires substantial ‘political work’ in order to elicit support and neutralise potentially destabilising critiques. At the same time, as extractivist development shifts costs spatially onto those who live in marginal areas, along expanding commodity frontiers, it relies on imaginaries that separate these ‘others’ from the majority of the population, justifying the exceptional use of violence against them. We claimed, therefore, that taking seriously the workings of institutional discourses of ‘improvement’, and the governmental rationalities that underpin them, can help to account for the paradoxical resilience and broad acceptance of resourcebased development, despite its severe socio-environmental impacts and the widespread conflicts it generates. Acknowledgement Fieldwork in Peru was funded through a Research Travel Bursary of the National University of Ireland, Galway (2010−2011). We wish to acknowledge funding from the Galway Doctoral Scholarship scheme of the National University of Ireland, Galway and from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union Seventh Framework Programme, under REA agreement No. 289374 – “ENTITLE”. Were indebted to Juli Hazlewood, Stefano Varese and all those who participated in and supported our research in Peru. Thanks also to Terrence McDonough, Federico Demaria, Gavin Bridge, Maura Benegiamo and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.

6 For reason of space, we have not discussed the role of the US government in shaping these policies, for instance through environmental provisions included in the Peru Free Trade Agreement (Barandiarán, 2008). On trade agreements as an emerging form of neoliberal environmental governance, see McCarthy (2004).

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