Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime

Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime

Edited by

Lorraine Elliott Professor of International Relations, The Australian National University

William H. Schaedla Managing Director of Ecolloquium

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Elgar PUBLISHING

Cheltenham, UK• Northampton, MA, USA

©Lorraine Elliott and William H. Schaedla 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA

UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. WiJJiam Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

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Lorra A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2016932479 This book is available electronically in the Elgaronline : Social and Political Science subject collection DOI 10.4337/9781783476237

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17 Reducing demand for illicit wildlife products: crafting a 'whole-of-society' response Julie Ayling

It is now being recognized at the highest levels of governance that preventing the illicit wildlife trade requires more than dealing with the illegal supply of wildlife products; it also requires measures to reduce the demand for those products. 1 For example, demand reduction is one of the three planks of the United States' 2014 National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking (United States 2014). 2 At the London Conference on the Illegal Wildlife Trade held in February 2014, states committed to '[s jupport, and where appropriate undertake, effectively targeted actions to eradicate de111a11d and supply for illegal wildlife products, including but not limited to, raising awareness and changing behaviour' (London Conference 2014, paragraph 15.1, emphasis in original). And in November 2014, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping highlighted the importance of demand reduction in the joint ministerial statement issued at its Beijing ministerial meeting and committed members to strengthening their efforts in that direction (see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2014, paragraph 57). Nevertheless, ideas for effectively decreasing demand for illicit wildlife are still in short supply. The executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Yury Fedotov, contrasting supply limitation and demand reduction, has said that curbing demand is the 'harder task' (WWF 2013). Most of the academic literature on the illicit wildlife trade has addressed the supply end of the trade, and the bulk of the literature that deals with the consumer end has not been specifically concerned with demand reduction . Schneider's (2008, 2012) work on a market reduction approach to the trade, for example, highlights the importance of consumer demand but primarily focuses on law enforcement interventions at stages prior to consumption. Strategies to control and prevent the taking and trafficking of illegal wildlife products are currently being intensively discussed and implemented. Not only states but also non-state actors, including community groups, businesses and activist organizations, are implementing supply limitation strategies. States are investing in law enforcement personnel, 346

Reducing demand for illicit wildlife products

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1ce that preith the illegal ! the demand of the three · Combating 1 Conference :ommitted to geted actions ·ts, including mr' (London in November ghlightcd the tement issued o strengthenCooperation illicit wildlife 1ited Nations rasting supply lemand is the ! on the illicit :he bulk of the ecifically con·k on a market importance of t interventions king of illegal !d and imple1g community tenting supply ent personnel,

347

trammg and operations, led, encouraged and aided by international organizations such as INTERPOL, UNODC and the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), working both independently and together., Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), businesses and community groups are not only assisting governments in these efforts, but are also experimenting with solutions of their own devising. 4 There has been much less focus on possible techniques and strategies for reducing demand. Some environmental NGOs (ENGOs) are engaged in education campaigns to convince consumers not to partake in the purchase and/or consumption of wildlife products. States too are slowly moving beyond rhetoric towards action, partnering with NGOs and/or providing moral and financial support for their efforts. Some states are taking action to improve and implement domestic laws against the purchase and consumption of wildlife products that have previously been poorly enforced. However, the scale of action on the demand front is still relatively small. This chapter argues that a 'whoJe-of-society' response, involving both states and non-state actors, is necessary to deal with demand. It considers how applying regulatory theory to the challenge of demand reduction can make this seemingly impossible task feasible. Because regulation involves any purposeful intervention to steer the flow of events (Parker and Braithwaite 2003), examining demand reduction through the lens of regulation enables us to think more broadly about potential strategies to deal with demand that go beyond the consumer education campaigns and state-imposed legal sanctions that arc currently employed. In particular, the chapter explores both current and potential roles for non-offending, non-state actors, referred to here as third parties,5 in illicit wildlife demand redttclion. The chapter proceeds as follows. It sets the scene with a brief discussion of the current activities of non-state actors in limiting the supply of illicit wildlife commodities and how this relates to demand reduction. The complex and multilayered concept of demand is then discussed. Examples are given of current demand-reduction activities by states and non-state actors, both independent and collaborative. The chapter then turns to regulatory theory and its application to demand reduction. Regulatory pluralism is shown to lend itself to thinking about an expansion of demand-reduction strategies. Third parties in prime positions to intervene in order to reduce demand are identified . Finally. the chapter discusses the diverse ways in which those third parties' capacities might be better harnessed to reduce demand . It concludes with some thoughts about the responsive application of those strategies and the urgency of acting on demand reduction.

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Handbook of transnational environmental crime

LIMITING SUPPLY: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS NGOS and other non-state actors working in the area of supply limitation play an important role in exposing the existence and extent of the illegal wildlife trade. This is a vital precursor to educating and persuading consumers not to partake in it. ENGOs have been active in raising funds for wildlife research and in responses to wildlife trafficking, providing information to the public on the implications of wildlife crimes for biodiversity and human wellbeing, lobbying governments for better laws and policies to address these crimes, providing mechanisms for the reporting of wildlife poaching and illegal logging, providing training to government officials on how to detect wildlife crimes, assisting states with criminal investigations and prosecutions and, in some cases, conducting independent investigations and prosecutions. Members of ENGOs occasionally go beyond the limits of the law when seeking to limit the trade (White 2012).6 Nurse (2013, p. 307) notes that '[fjar from there being one coherent "green movement", environmental NGOs (both within a nation state and in different jurisdictions) occupy a range of different disciplines and policy perspectives and seek to achieve a range of different objectives'. Many of the ENGOs involved in wildlife conservation and protection possess significant economic and political influence (Nurse 2013; Duffy 2010). 1 From the perspective of crime prevention, the diversity of NGO objectives and ideologies makes reaching agreement on appropriate strategies for controlling and preventing the wildlife trade difficult (Ayling 2013). However, when it comes to demand-reduction strategies, a wide variety of perspectives and organizational strategies may be beneficial, given that there are diverse types of demand and consumer attitudes (discussed below).

UNPACKING DEMAND There has been slow progress on demand reduction, but perhaps this is understandable. Demand is complex and hence its reduction takes time (Felbab-Brown 2011).' There are many types of demand, the motivations of consumers and the influences on them are diverse and, in addition, demand and supply have a complicated relationship. The following paragraphs explore these complexities. The types of demand include: • •

subsistence (food or other necessities); good health (for instance, using traditional medicines);

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o social status (through, for example, clothing, decorative items, jewellery, furniture, items that are given as gifts, special foods); o personal pleasure (for example, through eating wildlife, having pets or collecting); o cultural or traditional purposes (for example, through using wildlife as religious, spiritual or magical objects, such as icons or charms, or in ceremonial practices); 9 o immediate income (for example, through using poached animals for entertainment or display); and • future profit (through market speculation by stockpiling wildlife products, such as ivory or rhino hom). 10 As can be seen, different types of demand are specific to particular types of illicit wildlife products. Only some products are useful as medicine, food or decoration, for example. The actions that could be effective in curbing demand are therefore contingent on the type of demand in any particular case. Not only do types of demand vary but also consumers are not all the same. As a result, demand-reduction efforts require proper targeting and detailed research about the target audience. In the absence of such research, cfforts to reduce demand may prove both ineffective and a waste of the limited resources available. For instance, exposing myths about the health benefits of consuming a particular product will be of little use if consumption occurs for other reasons (for example, a liking for the taste or a desire for peer approval). An individual's motivations for consumption behaviour (for example, the desire to be different from, or the same as, one's peers) and their values, prevailing social norms and the cultural beliefs and practices of the particular group of consumers to which an individual belongs, all need to be understood. Effectively addressing those motivations as well as any incentives that are driving consumption behaviour (for example, hunger, poverty, social status, and so on) is essential to demand-reduction efforts (sec Figure 17. l ). Levels of awareness about the trade and its impacts may also be significant; some consumers display ignorance about the devastating consequences of their behaviour for both individual animals and for the species as a whole (WildAid no date a; IFAW 2013). In addition, a consumer's attitude to authority and its directives, that is. one's 'motivational posture' (Braithwaite 2014), inOuences one's compliance with regulation. Many consumers are indifferent to the illegality of their actions; some are positively defianl. 11 In a study of behaviour and attitudes to wildlife consumption in southwest China, Li Zhang et al. (2008) reported that knowledge of the laws protecting wildlife did not directly influence consumers'

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Handbook of transnational environmental crime

Motivations

Motivational postures

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Types ofdemand for illicit wildlife products (inner hexagon) and the drivers of demand (outer hexagon)

behaviour. Alternatives to legal sanctions might need to be considered where consumers show motivational postures of defiance. Demand reduction is also complicated because the relationship between the demand and the supply for various wildlife products is intricate and idiosyncratic. Demand often drives supply. The demand for pangolins and rosewood (Hongmu) are good examples. Demand can also be created and manipulated by suppliers, as the example of the medicinal use of rhino horn in cancer treatment illustrates. This makes it difficult to pinpoint the origin of demand. For the purpose of this chapter, then, the definition of consumer adopted is broader than simply 'the ultimate user of a wildlife commodity'. For instance, a person's demand for exotic meats may encourage the restaurant to supply them, or the restaurant itself may create the consumer demand through marketing, or both. Because of this malleability of demand, it may be just as important to target the restaurateur's demand for the meat as the customer's. The restaurateur is also a 'consumer'. Similarly, practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and their professional organizations are important consumers, as are their patients; manufacturers sourcing illegal wildlife skins and furs to

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Reducing demand for illicit wildl(fe products 351 process into clothing are consumers, as are their clients. The line between supply and demand is blurred. Moreover, price is only one variable affecting demand. Different commodities show different supply-demand relationships. For instance, where the 'Veblen effect' (otherwise known as the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption) is at work, demand relics on the price of the luxury in question remaining high (Liebcnslein 1950). The strategies to reduce demand for a Veblen good effectively are therefore likely to differ from those appropriate to the classic supply demand relatiomhip where demand falls as prices rise (and vice versa). Similarly, reducing demand for a luxury food may require different strategies compared to reducing demand for the same product used for subsistence purposes. For some products, speculative behaviour could increase demand and change the supply dynamic (Moyle 2003). The existence of a parallel legal market in a wildlife commodity will also affect the supply-demand relationship (see Wyatt, Chapter 7 in this volume).

CURRENT ACTIONS FOR DEMAND REDUCTION gon)

Although demand reduction has not as yet received the close attention and research that is needed if the illicit wildlife trade is to be curtailed effectively, actions to reduce demand arc increasingly being taken by both slate and non-state actors. An illustrative selection is set out below.

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State action that furthers a demand-reduction agenda has tended to focus on legislative and other formal regulatory measures. Two significant examples are that of the Lacey Act in the United States (16 USC 33713378) and China's 2014 clarification of the criminal law relating lo consumption of endangered wildlife. The Lacey Act tackles demand for illegal wildlife and timber by penalizing trafficking in the US of animals (dead or alive) or plants (including wood) that have been taken (captured, killed, collected, harvested, removed, and so on) in violation of a foreign law. Deeds that can fall foul of the Act's trafficking offence include import, export, transport, selling, receiving, acquiring, purchasing or possessing. The legislation also prohibits the falsification of documents and the failure to mark wildlife shipments. Significant civil or criminal sanctions may be imposed, depending on the circumstances. The Lacey Act has been described as 'one of the broadest and most comprehensive forces in the federal arsenal to combat

352 Handbook of transnational environmental crime wildlife crime' (Wisch 2003), and has been credited with bringing about a transformation in the timber and wood products market both in the US and around the world (EIA 2014). It effectively requires importers and other buyers to exercise due diligence with respect to the integrity of all participants in their supply chains. Chinese law imposes harsh fines and jail sentences for people who catch, kill, traffic, buy and sell endangered species such as pangolin, giant pandas, golden monkeys and Asian black bears. China has had in place laws relating to endangered wildlife since 1988 when it adopted the Law on Wild Animal Protection (Li Zhang et al. 2008), but enforcement has generally been lax and trading in both CITES-protected and non-CITES species has escalated as China's economy has grown and opened up (Li 2014). Motives related to health benefits and social prestige, in particular, have driven increasing consumption. In the last few years the Chinese authorities have engaged in enforcement crackdowns, such as one across nine provinces in March 2014 that resulted in the arrest of 24 people for trafficking in wild animal parts and the confiscation of 4500 products (Kaiman 2014). However, the scale of the trading and the infrequency of these enforcement efforts have meant that the crackdowns have been of limited deterrent value. In May 2014, under increasing pressure from the international community and local NGOs, China issued an interpretation of its criminal law that clarified that both the purchase and eating of endangered species are illegal. Sanctions range from three to ten years' imprisonment depending on the circumstances. The deputy head of the parliament's Legislative Affairs Commission that issued the interpretation blamed demand from consumers for the continuation of illegal hunting (Kaiman 2014). States can also work together through multilateral organizations to contribute to demand reduction. For example, in March 2014 UNODC, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United Nations World Tourism Organization jointly launched a campaign - 'Your actions count - be a responsible traveller' to help travellers make ethical choices about the purchase and use of wild animals, exotic plants and endangered wood products as well as cultural artefacts (UN News Centre 2014). Non-state Actors Non-state actors active in the area of demand reduction include epistemic communities, ENGOs and businesses. Such groups are often, although not exclusively, single species-focused. Several examples are provided below.

In July 201 (IUCN) Speci1 posed of tech1 a scientific ad plan for pang strategy is the pangolins' (Ch proposed to cc China and Vie to increase ur develop a dem also intended approaches tc funding and '1 measures have The NGO with respect marine specie multi-media :i: ties, includin~ actors (for ex as Prince Wi that the cons WildAid ofte African Wild as businesses example, the interviews to WildAid has partially attri ments aired o media pledge campaign to horn as a pa reach 1 billio Business ir One example action that d; In Septembe cargoes, exce related prodt lines' practic
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Jn July 2014, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Species Survival Commission Pangolin Specialist Group, composed of technical experts from around the world who together act as a scientific advisory body to the IUCN, released a conservation action plan for pangolins that states that ' implementing a demand-reduction strategy is the single most important activity to address the decline in pangolins' (Challender et al. 2014, p. 20). Accordingly, the specialist group proposed to conduct a series of surveys of consumers in Asia (particularly China and Vietnam) and Africa. The results of the surveys were intended to increase understanding of demand demographics and attitudes and develop a demand-reduction strategy for both meat and scales. They were also intended to raise the profile of pangolins using digital media and approaches to arts communities for assistance, major foundations for funding and 'opinion formers' in consumer countries for support. These measures have top priority in the plan. The NGO WildAid focuses its campaigning on demand reduction with respect to elephants, rhinos, tigers, sharks, mantas and other marine species (WildAid no date b). It concentrates its resources on multi-media public awareness campaigns that enlist high-profile celebrities, including sportspeople (such as Yao Ming and David Beckham), actors (for example, Li Bing Bing and Jackie Chan) and royalty (such as Prince William, the Duke of Cambridge) to convey the message that the consumption and the killing of wildlife are intimately related. WildAid often partners with other activist organizations (such as the African Wildlife Foundation, Save the Elephants and Freeland) as well as businesses (such as Sina Weibo, China's Twitter) and think-tanks (for example, the Clinton Global Initiative). It uses surveys and qualitative interviews to gauge its impact and to design appropriate campaigns . WildAid has claimed that a recent reduction in the trade in shark fins is partially attributable to its shark fin awareness public service announcements aired on Chinese television and its 'I'm FINished with Fins' social media pledge campaign (WildAid 2014). In 2013 it launched an education campaign to target youth in Vietnam and China about the use of rhino horn as a party drug (Smith 2013). WildAid claims that its campaigns reach l billion people every week. Business involvement in demand reduction has not been widespread. One example is the decision by several airlines not to carry shark fins, an action that disrupts the supply chain but that could also affect demand. 12 In September 2012, Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific banned shark fin cargoes, except for independently verified sustainable shark and sharkrelated products. Following exposure in the media by NGOs of the airlines' practice, in June 2013, Air Pacific (now Fiji Airways), Korean Air,

354 Handbook of transnational environmental crime Asiana Airlines and Air New Zealand banned carriage of shark fins (the details vary as to whether the airlines in question will still carry 'sustamably-sourced' fins) (Johanson 2013). Other airlines, as well as three shipping lines, soon followed their lead (WildAid 2014).

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you State/Non-state Collaboration States and non-state actors are increasingly collaborating in demand. reduction activities. Like the demand·reduction measures taken by non. state actors independently, these efforts are often directed at the trade in a single species. Sometimes they are pitched at a national or even a sub·national level, and sometimes at a global level, as the examples below illustrate. The Vietnam CITES office and the NGO Humane Society International launched a three-year campaign in 2013 focused on Hanoi that aimed to correct the misconception that rhino horn has medicinal value. Together with local groups they targeted the general public and specific sub-groups such as women, business, university students and school-aged children, some of whom were not necessarily consumers themselves but were regarded as capable of exercising an influence on consumers (for example, children influencing their parents). A Nielsen poll conducted one year after the launch showed a reduction in rhino horn consumption of 38 per cent from the preceding year. Humane Society International claimed that this decrease was a result of the campaign (Humane Society International/Viet Nam CITES Management Authority 2014), although some others, including several large NGOs, were not convinced of either the survey result's validity or this attribution (An Dien 2014; Roberton 2014). Perhaps the most deliberative and detailed demand-reduction strategy yet has been envisaged for tigers and tiger products (TRAFFIC 2012; Zain 2012). Tiger range states (13 in all) agreed in the 2010 St Petersburg Declaration on Tiger Conservation, which endorsed the Global Tiger Recovery Program 2010- 2022, that reducing illicit demand for tiger products requires long-term national and global programmes to create awareness of the value of wild tigers and their ecosystems. In November 2011, TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, convened a two-day meeting of 'creative experts' in Hong Kong. The aim of the workshop was to draw on their expertise - in advertising and marketing, social research, behavioural economics, public health and the wildlife trade - to create templates for new strategies to increase the effectiveness of demand-reduction messages in the main consumer states, China and Vietnam. While tigers were the main focus, it was also acknowledged that other endangered species such as elephants, sharks, rhinos and pan-

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golins would benefit from a similar approach to demand reduction. The experts' report (TRAFFIC 2012) emphasized the need to determine the various motivations for demand and to craft specific strategies that would target the groups with those motivations ('new' and 'old' millionaires, vouth, and so on). The need to monitor closely the impact of both past ;nd planned demand-reduction efforts, assess them in terms of behavioural change and adapt those efforts accordingly was also stressed. The meeting's findings were translated and expanded into the incipient Global Support Programme on Demand R eduction (Zain 2012). Officials attending the second Stocktaking Conference to Review Implementation of the Global Tiger Recovery Program in Dhaka in September 2014 agreed that there is an urgent need to focus on demand through development of the Global Support Programme and that support should be given to demandreduction campaigns by tiger range countries and their partners," and laws and policies reviewed for this purpose. Outcomes from the creative experts' meeting were a lso presented to the CITES Standing Committee Working Group on Rhinoceroses at the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) held 3-14 March 2013 in Bangkok (sec CITES 2013), in the form of a dra ft demand-reduction strategy developed by TRAF FIC. After the Working Group's report on this issue, CoP decided (Decision 16.85) that range and consumer ~tale Parties should develop and implement both long-term and immediate demandreduction and community awareness-raising strategies or programmes and report back on their effectiveness to the Working Group by the end of January 2015. The Working Group would then identify best practices and the challenges involved, with the aim of 'developing ideas to further enhance the effectiveness of demand-reduction strategies' (16.85(c)).

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APPLYING A REGULATORY LENS

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The Regulatory Pyramid

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Having outlined the variety of actors who engage in demand-reduction activities, I now turn to considering these activities from a regulatory point of view. Regulation is much broader than simple rule-making. It includes any deliberate intervention to steer the flow of events (Parker and Braithwaite 2003). That intervention could be a legal one, but equally it could be political, economic, social or psychological. Regulatory scholars have mainly focused on legal markets, in particular participants' compliance (or lack thereof) with state controls. Regulatory theory has not been applied systematically in the literature to the issue of

356 Handbook of transnational environmental crime demand reduction for illicit environmental commodities. The benefit of applying a regulatory lens is that it fosters not only a broader view of the possible actors who can contribute to bringing about compliance (regulatory p/11ralism, see below), but also consideration of a wider range of regulatory strategies than those apparent when regulation is viewed only as rule-making. It also brings into focus ways to implement such strategies effectively (that is, responsively to the particular situation of non-compliance). These three facets of the regulation of markets - actors, strategies and implementation - are brought together in the regulatory pyramid as first proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and later expanded by Gunningham and Grabosky (1998) and Drahos (2004). Two demand-reduction strategies predominate with respect to the illicit wildlife trade: campaigns designed to persuade consumers not to consume (using a variety of techniques including education and guilt-creation), and the application of the criminal justice system through legal prohibitions on consumption. Both are examples ofregulation. In terms of the regulatory pyramid, public education campaigns are situated at the base (as an effort to generate compliance through persuasion and dialogue), while prohi· bitions imposed through law are situated at its peak (the most coercive strategies). Between the two, there can be a range of regulatory strategies that increase in the level of coerciveness as one escalates up the pyramid in response to the regulatee's unwillingness to comply. In other areas of regulation these 'in-between' strategies have included shaming, enforced self-regulation, monitoring, reporting and auditing requirements, and administrative and civil penalties of varying severity. Such strategies, and who might be able to implement them, have not really been explored in the context of demand reduction. As already indicated, the kinds of strategies that would be appropriate for demand-reduction purposes would, of course, vary according to the commodity in question and the context.

Regulatory Pluralism for Demand Reduction Who is in a position to implement demand-reduction strategies? The regulatory role of steering the flow of events is not confined to the state. The regulatory pyramid may usefully be thought of as three-dimensional or networked (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Drahos 2004), with nonstate actors having a role alongside governments in wielding regulatory power. Indeed, we have already seen that third parties such as NGOs and epistemic communities are generally taking primary responsibility for the demand-reducing strategies of persuasion and education at the bottom of the regulatory pyramid. This is fully consistent with the idea of third parties as potential participants in crafting and implementing strategies to

prevent tra reduction i rect and re tion (Aylin A situati parties can criminolog manipulati the offend• for crime t reducing t' preventive 'pinch-poi where opi: law enfor< interventic ties for cri1 approach regulatory case that, are weak which case designed f endangerc the crime• reduction

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prevent transnational environmental crimes (see Ayling 2013). 14 Demand reduction is of course one technique of prevention, albeit one that is indirect and reflexive. Like supply limitation, it is open to third party regulation (Ayling 2013). A situational approach may be useful in identifying the roles that third parties can play in demand reduction along the wildlife crime script. 1' In criminological theory, a situational crime prevention approach focuses on manipulating a crime's social and physical settings rather than focusing on the offender. Situational crime prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for crime by increasing the efforts and risks, diminishing the rewards and reducing the provocations and excuses associated with the crime. These preventive actions are best taken at what Bullock ct al. (2010, p. 2) call 'pinch-points for intervention' - that is, at points along the crime script where opportunities to disrupt or derail the crime occur. Traditionally, law enforcement agencies have carried the main responsibility for such interventions, but third parties too can play a role in reducing opportunities for crime when they are positioned at those pinch-points. A situational approach therefore allows us to perceive a range of regulatory actors and regulatory st rategies with respect to particular crime scripts. It may be the case that, in some jurisdictions, laws in relation to the illicit wildlife trade are weak or non-existent and consumption itself is not criminalized, in which case it may appear inappropriate to be talking about an approach designed for crime prevention. H owever, whether or not consumption of endangered species is technically a crime, consumption is the endpoint of the crime of illegal taking and trafficking. As already pointed out, demand reduction is a technique that contributes to prevention of that crime. Third Parties and Illicit Wildlife Demand Reduction Elsewhere, in writing about the supply rather than demand end of the illicit wildlife trade and other transnational environmental. crimes, I have explored the role of third parties as handlers of offenders, guardians of victims and managers of places where the crimes of taking and trafficking occur (Ayling 2013).U' I have also argued that third parties can play other roles that have a preventive effect in terms of dealing with the social causes of crime. It is clear that victim guardianship (protection of wildlife from crime) is not relevant at the demand end of the wildlife crime script by then the animal or plant has been taken and trafficked. However. there arc webs of influence that could be activated to reduce demand. These go beyond the NGOs and states that are now the most heavily involved in demand reduction. Third parties may be physically or functionally situated where they can influence consumers either directly or indirectly, on their

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Handbook of transnational environmental crime

values, beliefs, knowledge and motivational postures, as well as the norms and practices of the societies in which they live. Additionally, third parties could potentially play the role of place managers in relation to marketplaces of various kinds, including urban retail spaces, open air markets, restaurants, online auction sites, medical practitioner workplaces, entertainment venues and even homes. They might also be able to help address the root causes of demand behaviour (poverty, hunger, health, and so on). Some of the third parties in a position to intervene to effect illicit wildlife demand reduction are discussed in the following paragraphs. Wildlife NGOs are already active in demand reduction and often partner with others, as described above. Third parties may also be private businesses or other commercial entities. For example, online trading companies such as eBay are clearly in a position to influence demand. Chinese authorities held two workshops in 2014 for e-commerce company representatives and government officials about the illicit wildlife market, one in June with the support of TRAFFIC (TRAFFIC 2014), and the other in October with the support of the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW 2014). Both workshops resulted in commitments from e-commerce sellers such as Alibaba and Sina to a zero-tolerance approach to illegal wildlife trading on their sites and pledges to work closely with authorities to control the problem. Alibaba, which runs the websites Alibaba and Taobao, already educates its staff about wildlife conservation and regulation, employs filters using key words, regularly double-checks its online materials, and has established a reporting and quick response system supported by volunteers and NGOs (TRAFFIC 2014). Similarly, workers' groups (for example, unions) and professional bodies (for example, peak industry groups and registration bodies) are able to direct and guide their members through the messages they give, the standards they promulgate, and the actions they take to enforce those standards. Bodies such as the China Fur Commission and the China Animal Products Marketing Association, for example, are in a position to spread illegal wildlife demand-reduction messages. Both of these bodies are members of the International Fur Federation, which has been a member of the IUCN since 1985 and expresses its support for CITES on its website (see International Fur Federation 2015). The federation also engages in a self-administered labelling scheme (Origin Assured) that is independently monitored. Similarly, the Chinese Society of Traditional Chinese Medicine can influence its members through standard-setting, the provision of advice services, staff training, trade shows and enforcement of its conduct code (see China Association of Traditional Chinese Methods no date). Both the UK's Register of Chinese Herbal Medicine (2012) and the American College of Traditional Chinese Medicine (no

date) have< that cancer other prodt Commun ence demat both public been worki bile farmin presentatio the Tam C teachers in pupils were Religiou the Indone duces fatw; announced under Islar ing in wild iour. At a Christians, Religions . the illicit ~ China Dae ing a publ demand fo promoting Mappin and act as for any p< demand-n

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and often ) be private ine trading ;e demand. :e company ife market, 4), and the for A nimal nents from e approach losely with e websites nserva ti on 1ble-chccks k response rofessiona( >Odies) are they give, orcc those the China in a posih of these i llas been CITES on ation also !d) that is raditional ·d-setting, 1 enforced Chinese Medicine Heine (no

359

date) have condemned the illegal trade in endangered species, made clear that cancer is not treatable with rhino horn, and pointed out that there are other products that can substitute for rhino horn's traditional uses. Community organizations and groups are also in a position to influence demand. These include schools and other educational institutions, both public and private. For instance, the Animals Asia Foundation has been working with schools in Vietnam to spread the message that bear bile farming is unnecessary and cruel. Over one thousand pupils heard presentations on this topic in 2014 after the foundation negotiated with the Tam Dao district Depa rtment of Education, the principals and the teachers in five participating schools (Animals Asia 2014). In this way the pupils were empowered to educate and persuade their families and friends. Religious organizations, too, can influence demand. In March 2014, the Indonesian Council of Ulema, a body of Muslim clerics which produces fatwas and advises the Muslim community on contemporary issues, announced a fatwa against the illegal wildlife trade, declaring it forbidden under Islamic law (Parker 2014). The fatwa relates to 'all activilies resulting in wildlife extinction', which inevitably includes consumption behaviour. At a n international level, religious groups (Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Daoists, and so on) involved in the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (2013) have also issued statements against the illicit wildlife trade and asked the faithful not to participate in it. The China Daoist Association has collaborated with the Alliance in conducting a public awareness campaign to reduce the production and market demand for TCM products using threatened animal and plant species and promoting the use of sustainable wild plants and alternatives. Mapping the third pa rties that arc in a position to influence consumers and act as place managers at sites of demand in any particular context and for any particular commodity would be a useful first step in furthering demand-reduction activities. Harnessing Third Party Capacities Not all third parties in the wildlife trade regulatory space arc willing or able to undertake demand-reduction activities. Some will feel it involves too much lime, effort or expense. Furthermore, not all of the third parties who are willing and able will necessarily carry out demand-reduction activities in an appropriate o r effective ma nner. For instance, the identity of the messenger carrying a demand-reduction message may make a difference to consumer attitudes and hence to the message' s effectiveness. Felbab-Brown (20 J I) refers to the risk that non-Western consumers may dismiss public campaigns by Westerners (including Western NGOs) as

360 Handbook of transnational environmental crime imperialist, in which case the campaign may do more harm than good; local messengers may be more successful. Similarly, there may be risks to campaigns which do not tailor demand-reduction messages appropriately for their audience or which do a poor job of communicating the problem. Those risks could range from wasting limited resources to actually harming the message. Arguably, then, there is a need for better coordination of demandreduction efforts. Not only are states in the best position to take on this role of coordination, having at their disposal the greatest array of regulatory tools (including coercion), but they also have the responsibility to do so. Having recognized the importance of maintaining biodiversity for sustained national and international environmental and economic health (London Conference 2014), it falls to states to do their best to shape the societal norms and values that will ensure that happens. Weaker states can be supported by others more capable, through bilateral and multilateral partnerships and the agency of international organizations. 17 The potential role of the state can be described generally as interacting with non-state actors to 'responsibilize' them, encouraging or requiring them to use their abilities and opportunities to reduce the demand for the products of the illicit wildlife trade. 1 ~ The mechanisms that states can and do use for the coproduction of security generally have been explored by Grabosky and his colleagues (Grabosky 1995; Cherney et al. 2006). They range along a continuum from coercive to non-coercive, allowing the state to choose one that is responsive to the seriousness of the situation and to a particular third party's willingness to contribute its own capacities. In other words, they represent some of the potential regulatory strategies available between the base and the peak of the regulatory pyramid (referred to earlier) that could be directed towards third parties rather than offenders themselves. In order to reduce demand in a way that harnesses the individual and joint capacities of third parties and produces a co-productive outcome that contributes to a whole-of-society response, states could take any of the measures outlined in the following paragraphs. Third parties could be conscripted, by way of mandatory legislative obligations, to carry out certain actions or to obtain and report certain information, with penalties for non-compliance. For example, an obligation could be imposed on TCM professional bodies, medical associations, doctors and hospitals to report any suspicion that endangered species' products are being sold or recommended as treatments by medical practitioners. The state could require targets of regulation to interface with private institutions. Requiring potential offenders to 'use the machinery of private institutions' allows those institutions (third parties) to act as gatekeepers at

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Reducing demand for illicit wildlife products 361 n than good; ay be risks to lppropriately the problem. : to actually of demand. take on this ·ay of regula'onsibility to >diversity for 1omic health to shape the ~er stales can multilateral s interacting or requiring nand for the ates can and explored by 2006). They ing the state tualion and 1 capacities. ttory stratclfY pyramid .rather than fividual and

ve outcome take any of lftics could o carry out with pcnalimposcd on 1ospitals to :ing sold or iith private y of private ekcepers at

the legal/illegal interface. For example, governments could require private businesses involved in acquisition of animals or plants for collectors, the pet trade or scientific institutions to have their import, purchase and financial records audited by formally accredited professional institutions. Third parties could be required to keep records and disclose them to authorities. This would have the effect of enhancing their vigilance in policing demand. For instance, online and other auction houses could be required to record and disclose (to police, customs or other state agencies) details of any attempts to sell illicit wildlife products using their services and/or of any approaches from potential sellers or buyers of those products. Another possible state measure is to co-opt external interests, that is, to enter into formal or informal partnerships or other relationships with third parties for demand-reduction action. Partnerships between states and NGOs are common in the environmental area and increasingly used for demand reduction as we have seen above. Governments could concentrate on partnering with local NGOs and community groups instead of global ones to conduct public education campaigns designed to reduce consumption of illegal wildlife. This would make it more likely that the demand-reduction message would be both culturally appropriate and delivered through local channels. Governments could also confer entitlements on third parties, that is, create rights for third parties and the ability to enforce them. For example, individuals or groups could be provided with enforcement rights with respect to legislative prohibitions on buying, selling or even consuming illicit wildlife prodm:ts. Standing rules would need careful consideration. According to Burbank ct al. (2011), private enforcement regimes can multiply the resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions, shift costs from the government to the private sector, take advantage of private information to detect violations and clearly signal that violations will be prosecuted. Qui tam actions, used in the United States to enable whistleblowers to take action either independently or with the government in relation to false claims (frauds against the government), arc a potential model for such a scheme and would help address chronic undcrenforccmcnl of laws (Braithwaite 2008). OITering direct or indirect incentives to third parties, such as rewards, privileges and prizes, is also a very powerful tool for harnessing their capacities for demand-reduction purposes. States could offer tax deductions or other incentives to NGOs and community associations that can prove that demand-reduction efforts in which they are engaged have been designed and will be evaluated according to particular standards set by the state or by an approved organizalion. 1 ~ One of the biggest problems with

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Handbook of transnational environmental crime

current wildlife demand-reduction efforts is a lack of robust evaluation using credible standards that have been tested in other fields (Verissimo 2014). In addition, government hotlines could be set up to encourage third parties to report instances of retailing and purchase of illicit wildlife products, on the guarantee of anonymity and with rewards for information that leads to arrests and/or exposure of criminal networks. 20 Governments could also offer prizes for potentially effective demand-reduction ideas or for successful demand-reduction programmes. Finally, governments could engage in education, capacity-building and other facilitative measures to enable third parties to make better use of their capacities. They could, for instance, play a big part in building the capacities of non-state actors in best-practice demandreduction techniques, funding information gathering, providing organizational and financial resources for training sessions, and establishing physical and online forums for the exchange of views and reporting of successes and failures.

CONCLUSION Although reducing demand for illicit wildlife products appears to be an intractable problem, a variety of state and non-state actors are increasingly engaging in initiatives for demand reduction. Without doubt some of these will be effective, but others may not. This chapter calls for a more systematic approach to demand reduction. It recognizes that demand comes in many forms, and that diverse motivations, values, beliefs and attitudes of consumers and norms of societies underlie that demand. To deal with demand effectively, then, these influences on demand need to be thoroughly researched and strategies need to be designed that are tailored to the varied groups of consumers and motivations involved. It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that demand reduction requires more than the enforcement of laws. A whole-of-society response is needed, of the kind we are seeing increasingly in relation to taking and trafficking at the supply end of the illicit wildlife trade. Both states and a wide array of non-state actors must be involved. A networked response requires drawing together the good work already being done by non-state actors, including NGOs, businesses and epistemic communities, both individually and together with states. There is also a need to think about new strategies that sit between the bottom and the peak of the regulatory pyramid that can be used to direct and encourage those actors, and to identify other potential third parties who may be in a position to intervene

to reduce c and contex Further party regu place man illicit wild unwillingn the state < encourage positions< use of sue turn their (WWF20 demand-r state resi: non-hum
.1·earcl1. 21 (3), 303-20. Moyle, Brendan (2003), 'Regulation, conservation and incentives', in Sara Oldfield (ed.). 1i'l11/e i11 Wildlife: Re~11/atio11 for Cm1sen ·111i1111, Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, pp.41-51. Nurse. Angus (2013). 'Privatising the green police: The role of NGOs in wildlife Jaw enforcement'. Crime f..ttw am/ Social Clum}!c. 59 (3). 305-18. O'Mallcy. Pat and Darren Palmer (1996). ·Post-Keynesian policing·. E c11110111y am/ Society. 25 (2). 137-55. P