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American Association for Public Opinion Research Trends: Having It Both Ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO Author(s): Richard C. Eichenberg Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Winter, 2003), pp. 627-659 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public Opinion Research Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3521697 Accessed: 28-11-2016 16:30 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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THE POLLS-TRENDS HAVING IT BOTH WAYS: EUROPEAN DEFENSE INTEGRATION AND THE COMMITMENT TO NATO RICHARD C. EICHENBERG

After the failure to implement the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, decisions about European security occurred almost wholly within th

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance. However, since th

Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Union (EU) has made more progres

in the elaboration of a common security policy than it had made in the 5

preceding years. The Maastricht Treaty declared that the "Union shall defin

and implement a common foreign and security policy. . . . The comm

foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security

of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence."'

The "eventual" framing of a common defense policy has been both rapid and concrete. In just over 10 years, the EU elaborated a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and began deploying a military force o

50,000-60,000 persons (the so-called European Rapid Reaction Force [ERRF]). These steps were accomplished through a flurry of treaties a declarations of the European Council subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty.2

After a substantial period in which the EU had confined its integrated policy

authority to the economic field, the pace and scope of these steps in the securi

field is nothing short of astonishing. The dramatic acceleration of the EU

efforts in security policy nonetheless raises a number of questions. Perha the most important is whether the EU will outrun popular support for th integration of security policy. Public support for the more general enterpri

RICHARD C. EICHENBERG is associate professor of political science at Tufts University. The auth is grateful to Judith Walcott for research assistance and to the Office of Research, U.S. Department

of State, for responding cheerfully to persistent inquiries about European poll results. 1. Treaty on European Union, 1992, Articles J, J.1, and J.3. 2. The European Council is composed of the heads of government of member countries. Fo

detailed review of the evolution of the ESDP, see Cameron (1999), Haine (2003), and Rutte (2001, 2002).

Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 67:627-659 C 2003 by the American Association for Public Opinion Research All rights reserved. 0033-362X/2003/6704-0007$10.00


628 Richard C. Eichenberg

of European integration suffered a g

although the decline was in all like

conditions rather than security pol

tegration remains lower than it had b

Thus the question arises: Will the E meet with popular support? Second, public consensus on issues shaken during the crises of the 19 to deploy medium-range nuclear we

popular challenge that most Europ was that security policy would hen

support. A second question thus ar

of a common security policy, do

military force that could operate in

Finally, the prospect of a Europea predictably raised debates across th proper institutional framework for observers on both sides of the Atl

capability will eventually supplant N

The bitter disagreement in 2003 ab

concerns to a very public level. An i

Do European citizens seek an altern nerstone of European security for

My review of the polling data on t

Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, First, public support for European

surprisingly high. Indeed, it is high mestic policy areas. Second, suppor there are indications that support weaken support for NATO, and th EU to have a dominant decision-mak the typical opinion profile is to su integration, a stance that matches t members in 1996.4 Finally, althoug "have it both ways," the sheer nov should give us pause about making

trend of opinion. With that caution i

European leaders continue to adv

supportive public opinion in most c

3. The data are reviewed in detail in Dalto

4. At the NATO summit in Berlin in July 1 "European Defense Identity" within NATO t when NATO declines to do so. See the NATO p96-063e.htm.


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 629

Early Public Opinion on Foreign and Defense Policy Integration in Europe Students of European integration have traditionally considered foreign and security policy to be the last bastions of national sovereignty-the arena of "high politics" that would prove most resistant to arguments in favor of integration (Hoffmann 1966). It is therefore surprising that survey evidence demonstrates that, since the 1950s, Europeans have always been supportive of integration in these policy areas.

Early polls sponsored by the U.S. government investigated the level of public support for two common defense initiatives in Europe: the moribund EDC, which was proposed by treaty in 1952 but never ratified, and the West

European Union (WEU) established in 1954.5 As table 1 shows, there are three salient features to these early opinions. First, the level of nonresponses

("don't know") is very high, suggesting that these organizations remained new and unfamiliar in the early 1950s. Second, support for European defense

cooperation was nonetheless fairly high among those who did express an opinion. Strong pluralities were in favor of "taking part" in a common European

army, and a strong majority considered a European defense organization to be

"necessary" (tables la , 1c, and ld). Finally, defense cooperation appeared to be more popular than defense integration. Question lb in table 1 posed the stark alternative of maintaining a national defense or forming "a common West European army," and this question elicits the lowest levels of support for the common approach. Still, it is worth noting that a majority favored either a European army or a combination of national armies and a "common" European force, because this is the policy option most often considered then or since.

Table 2 shows that Europeans have also long been in accord with the recent European Council statement that "the European Union shall play its full role

on the international stage."6 As early as 1974 and 1975, an average of over 80 percent of respondents thought that member states should act jointly through the "Common Market" rather than through their own national governments to "make our presence felt in discussions with the Americans or the Russians." Subsequent Eurobarometer surveys reinforce this early finding. Table 3 shows responses to a question that asked European citizens from 1976 through 1985 if "decisions about [security and defense] should be taken by each country acting separately, or by the member countries of the European

5. U.S. government surveys were commissioned by the Office of Research, which was a part of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) until October 1, 1999, when it was merged with the rest of USIA into the Department of State. Thus, polls prior to October 1, 1999, are here attributed

to USIA, and after that date to the Office of Research, Department of State (ORDOS). 6. This language appears in the EU Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European

Policy on Security and Defense (Cologne, June 3-4, 1999), reprinted in Cameron (1999) and Rutten (2002).



Union acting together?" Across Eu

acting "together." Significantly, supp

citizens are generally skeptical of t An additional pattern worth notin

support from the late 1970s to the

though support had always been fair

country as the controversy within

deployments and relations with th

Europeans favored joint action on "

analysis reported elsewhere, I believ

isfaction with the perceived hardand defense policy during the earl that European citizens reacted to U. that Europe should act together to p

In any case, these early polls sugg

support for a common European sec

of no polls that show low support

although there is robust evidence of

policy or "taking part" in joint mil that support for a wholly integrate

although even this option was not w

from the 1980s suggest that dissatisf

that moves Europeans to seek comm

Recent Opinion on the Integ Security Policy

The acceleration of European integ of the Cold War in 1989 stimulated

to investigate the degree of public s

to the fields of foreign and securit sense to students of international soviet threat and the initial uncerta United States in Europe, the EU ha

maneuver that the Cold War had pr during the Persian Gulf War in 19

lent new urgency to proposals for c security policy.

Table 4 shows that such calls met

in the 1970s and 1980s, European pu

7. Eichenberg 1989, pp. 94-98, 148-50. For a

data, see Crewe 1984.


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 631 policy "should be decided jointly within the European Union" rather than by

national governments. This support appears to be largely constant over time,

with minor upward fluctuations at times of major events or external challenge

Support for policy integration is weakest (though still usually at majority levels) in Great Britain.

Notwithstanding these fluctuations, European citizens appeared quite ready

to support the aspiration to a common European foreign policy that wa announced at Maastricht in 1991, and they have remained so ever since. Of

course, the practical significance of this sentiment might be questioned. After

all, Europeans may simply be endorsing a long-known fact: that the EU has

for many years represented the member states in external relations, especially

in the fields of external trade and development, but also in the political realm

after the beginning of European Political Cooperation in 1970. However, this

endorsement of a diplomatic role for the EU begs the devilish question of details: Will Europeans also endorse the EU's subsequent decisions to proceed to a truly integrated policy on security and defense that will include a substantial military force? Table 5 provides a mixed answer. On the one hand, in France, Germany,

and Italy, there is majority support in most years for a "security and defense"

policy that would be handled by the EU rather than by national governments

acting alone. It is obviously significant that majorities support integration in

France and Germany, two member states that are truly crucial to European security. On the other hand, public support in Britain is consistently in favor of a national approach to security and defense. The level of support in France,

Germany, and Italy for defense policy integration in this particular wording

is higher than support for integrating many domestic policy domains, such as

health, social security, education, and labor-management policy (where average support levels are as low as 30 percent).8 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this question on "EU versus national" decision making in defense is a very demanding one, for it reminds citizens not just of the substance of the policy challenge (security and defense) but also of the sacrifice of national sovereignty. Indeed, it has overtones of the

"common European army" questions presented above, for it implies that

henceforth sovereignty over security policy would be a purely EU responsibility with a correlative sacrifice of national independence. Moreover, because of the evocation of the issue of sovereignty, responses to this question are likely affected by evaluations of integration more generally, and we have noted that during the 1990s these evaluations fell sharply.' Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that simply inquiring of support or opposition to a "common European defense force" results in much higher and 8. Reproduced in Dalton and Eichenberg 1998, pp. 258-59. 9. This may explain why the British responses show a mild secular decline after the Maastricht Treaty in tables 4 and 5, since British citizens are particularly sensitive to the issue of transferring sovereignty.



unequivocal support levels (tables 6

table 7) for a "common European a

the assent to the question inquiring military force." Once again, public the other three countries. In any case

levels-regardless of wording-are sub 1950s reviewed in table 1. Althoug

rich, this piece of evidence suggest forces and a fully integrated comm since the early years of European in

For proponents of defense integrat

full. There is strong support in cru

the sacrifice of sovereignty, and i

students of integration would ever h

security. Nonetheless, there are also

half empty. One obvious potential d

and to judge from table 6, that s

Second, the crises in the Balkans m

weaknesses in the defense field an the United States. It appears that i

involved in negotiations, military Bosnia, citizens concluded that suc pursue a common security policy. "security and defense" policy incre the war against Serbia in the sprin NATO and U.S. forces within NATO in Italy, support for integrating s sure, the support levels rebounded

half of 1999 and throughout 2000 to

detailed force planning required un

the short-term decline in support lends support to the hypothesis tha over Kosovo that its security comm NATO and the United States.

While one must be cautious about fluctuations in reaction to the events of

September 11 and the 2003 Iraq War, it is worth noting that change in support for integrating defense increased slightly in most states during November and December 2001. However, one should probably await future results before

assigning much significance to these fluctuations; in most states, the range of fluctuation is very much the same as in the past, so that support for integrating

defense in spring 2003 was close to the historical average in all countries. Thus, even after September 11 and the Iraq War, a summary of the data in

tables 5-7 is that 50-70 percent of Europeans support the integration of security policy and the deployment of a common European defense force.


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 633 Is NATO Essential to European Security? Political debate often frames European defense initiatives as a potential threat to NATO. Given very real differences of perspective and interests on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is the prospect that the European effort will drain resources from NATO or even lead to the establishment of a separate and competing defense organization. Given the long-standing European aspiration to global influence and the more recent aspiration to joint military capabilities,

the issue is of course very real, but the question has to be posed: How much do Europeans see their efforts in competition with the existing alliance within NATO?

Practical realities as well as long-standing transatlantic solidarity su

limits to the independent potential of European policy. Just as Europea

dependence was constrained during the Cold War by the need for the N

partnership to balance soviet geographic and military advantages, Eur

today find themselves constrained by budgetary and technological inad

cies that place limits on the missions that the EU can undertake. At l before the Iraq War in 2003, most European politicians had been quick emphasize that the EU military force is meant as a supplement to NAT missions that the alliance declines to undertake. Whether this commitment

will withstand the bitterness that accompanied the Iraq War is of course an important question.

The polls reveal support for a continuing commitment to NATO. Table 8 shows that substantial majorities in all European states considered NATO "essential" to European security even as the Cold War came to an end (the average considering NATO essential was 68 percent through 1991). Surprisingly, even the French were firmly committed to NATO. True, there was a noticeable dip in 1989 as the Cold War wound down, but it turned immediately

upward in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991."'

The high "essentiality" of NATO also appears in longer historical trends (table 9). From 1967 through 2003, the average of Europeans who considered

NATO "essential" was 65 percent. Clearly, Europeans value NATO. The downward dip at the end of the Cold War is visible once again when the data are examined in historical context, but the upward "rebound" after the Persian

Gulf War is also evident. Perhaps most interesting are the trends in the major

NATO partners. In Great Britain, estimates of NATO's value fluctuate around

a very high mean; despite occasional downward dips resulting from international conditions (the nuclear weapons issue of the early 1980s, the end of

10. USIA surveys have also pushed respondents in questions noting that, "Some people say that we do not need NATO because there is no longer a Soviet threat." Responses to this question during the 1990s reveal that 60-90 percent of respondents in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy continued to believe that "we still need NATO," even in the absence of a soviet threat. See Office of Research, United States Information Agency, Opinion Analysis M-47-97, March 20, 1997 (Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency).



the Cold War), British attachment t

development occurs at the opposite

Gaullist suspicion of NATO was ref the alliance in the 1960s and into th

of "pro-NATO" sentiment in France

NATO essential prior to 1990, duri The events of 2001 pushed French higher, while the Iraq War of 2003 again-not surprising given French allow NATO to make early preparati support for NATO remained higher

In Germany the trend appears to average of 76 percent of Germans Germany's security vulnerability a States in NATO. During the 1990s,

average of 69 percent-still quite hi but a noticeable drop nonetheless g Atlanticist opinion profile. Althoug

higher, they quickly receded and in the 1990s.

The net result of these changes somewhat shifts the contours of opinion across Europe on the issue of "Europe versus NATO." British opinion continues to reflect a solid preference for NATO, as its support levels for NATO are matched by skepticism on some of the questions concerning European defense integration reviewed above. French opinion, in contrast, has always displayed a Gaullist affinity for European independence, but the growth in the 1990s in the view that "NATO is essential" brought estimates of the value of NATO and the value of European options into approximate equivalence in public opinion. The French, it seems, want to have it both ways, although

the negative reaction to the Iraq War may yet bring a return to traditional French skepticism of NATO. The drift of German opinion produces a similar result, although it arrives from a different direction. As we have seen, Germans

are somewhat less likely to see NATO as "essential," and they are somewhat more likely to favor an integrated European defense. As a result, in 2003, 60 percent of Germans favored an integrated European defense (table 5), while 70 percent found NATO essential (table 9). In summary, the cross-national pattern of support for NATO remains largely

unchanged, although for the moment the level of support for NATO is slightly higher than before September 11, 2001. We should also keep in mind that 11. As noted in one U.S. government report, this may be because NATO represents a commitment

to multilateralism at a time of concern about U.S. unilateralism. See ORDOS, "Key Europeans Still Mostly Negative about Military Action in Iraq: Confidence in U.S. at a Decade+ Low," Opinion Analysis M-53-03, May 14, 2003 (Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency).


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 635 support for European defense initiatives also remains at approximately the average level of the 1990s. Despite the considerable turbulence of recent years,

Europeans continue to "have it both ways."

Paying the Piper and Calling the Tune Of course, the ultimate test of Europeanist versus Atlanticist sentiment comes

in survey questions that force a choice: "Do you prefer that security policy be conducted within the NATO Alliance, or that it be conducted within the EU?" Table 10 shows several variants on this question from 1989 through

2003. In 1989, the Eurobarometer asked two separate questions. The first (10a) was the familiar "NATO essential" question, but a second question (10b) asked, "Should NATO continue to be the most important forum for making decisions about the security of Western Europe in the future, or should the European Union make those decisions?""2 The results of this survey revealed two groups: a "Europeanist" group that included France and Italy, and a more

"Atlanticist" group that included Britain and Germany. Nonetheless, even within the Atlanticist group, support for NATO was considerably lower when

the EU was offered as an alternative to NATO within the same question. It appears that support for a European policy that would make "decisions about the security of Western Europe" does indeed weaken support for NATO's primacy in these matters.

The bottom half of table 10 shows that this sentiment has grown in the wake of the Iraq War in 2003. Once again I compare the "NATO essential"

question (10a) with a question that forces a choice among NATO, the EU, and-in this variant-a preference for national decision making (10c)."3 The preference for the EU to make "decisions concerning European defense" outweighs a preference for NATO primacy in all countries but Britain, although even the British are closely divided on the question. Moreover, the preference

for EU primacy clearly outweighs NATO in all but the British case, and the effect of the Iraq War was to widen the gap considerably. Clearly, Europeans

prefer that their own institutions have predominance in defense policy decisions.

Table 10 shows that this sentiment is not new-it was clear in the 1989 survey as well. But the more recent trends were doubtless affected by worries that had emerged concerning the tone and direction of the Bush administration's foreign policy. The disagreements are well known. On such issues as missile defense, global warming, and relations with North Korea, the first months

12. Eurobarometer 32, as summarized in Eichenberg 2000, p. 163. 13. It is important to emphasize that the two questions at the bottom of table 10 (tables 10a and 10c) are separate questions asked by different organizations during different months of the years

shown. The "NATO essential" question, taken directly from table 9, is repeated to facilitate comparison to the question that offers an alternative to NATO (table 10c).



of the Bush administration produc many observers began discussing a

for the first time since the Reagan (August 2001), disapproval of Presi

aged 55 percent in Britain, Italy, Ge

of September 11 did produce an ou

the "war against terror," in the spr

about U.S. policies, especially in 2002 and May 2003, the Pew Cen

partnership between the United St as close as it has been or do you th more independent approach to secur

the past?" In 2002, there were alread

approach" in all countries but Brit 47 percent of respondents. By May independence grew substantially. B Europe was at an historic low, view negative in most European countries

citizens considered it "undesirable" f

leadership-a substantial reversal of

Table 11 shows that the sentimen in security policy was also growing and Germany. When asked whethe

important decisions about the secur

and Italy preferred EU primacy (an

shown in table 11), and in Germany by 2002. The British responses are tion: the British are usually unamb ferring NATO in this question dro

is fairly strong minority sentimen and in 2002 it was the plurality vi An interesting question is whethe willingness to support the defense

plement the ESDP. During the 1990s

of questions designed to measure

more responsibility for security po

14. "Bush Unpopular in Europe: Seen as Uni the Press, Survey Reports, August 15, 2001, 15. The surveys mentioned in this paragraph Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," Pew Rese Reports, April 20, 2002, available at http://w titudes Project: Views of a Changing Worl http://www.people-press.org/reports; and G atlantic Trends: Key Findings," September surveys confirm results reported in ORDO


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 637 a consequence (table 12). The results, at least through 1995, are close to astonishing: in every country but Britain (in 1995), a majority of respondents

was willing to spend more on defense in order for Europe "to reduce the role of the U.S. in NATO and strengthen the role of western Europe." The results are astonishing because if there is one constant in historical trends in European

public opinion, it is the persistent unpopularity of defense spending. Indeed, in Britain, France, and Germany-the countries for which useful time trends

are available-the average level of support for increasing defense spending was 13 percent from the 1960s through 1998.'6 Thus, the finding that majorities

of Europeans would contemplate increases in defense spending to finance increased European responsibilities must be considered a truly significant fact.

Europeans, it seems, were reacting favorably to sentiments like those expressed by Prime Minister Tony Blair, when he said in May 1999 that "we should begin with capabilities. . . . To put it bluntly, if Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs modern forces, strategic lift, and the necessary equipment to conduct a campaign. . ... If we were in any doubts about this before, Kosovo should have removed them."" Of course, the practical question is whether the hypothetical endorsement of increased defense spending to match increased European responsibility would yield public support in the

face of real defense budget increases. The ORDOS surveys in June 2002 tested this sentiment in two separate questions: the first inquired about support

for a strengthened European role, and the second pushed respondents on the

issue of increased defense spending to finance such a role. The combined support for increased European responsibility and increased defense spending

yields lower percentages: France (42 percent), Germany (25 percent), Italy (39 percent), and Britain (17 percent).'8 Still, these levels are actually higher than comparable levels of support for increased defense spending that were evinced during the 1970s and 1980s (15 percent in Britain, France, and Germany) when real increases to defense budgets did occur in most fiscal years. A final estimate of the relative importance of NATO and the EU also comes

from ORDOS polls that have asked respondents since the early 1990s how much confidence they have in the two institutions to "deal effectively with

European problems" (table 13). Once again a fairly clear pattern emerges. Britain and Germany have higher (majority) confidence in NATO and much more closely divided opinions concerning the effectiveness of the EU. In France, opinions show a similarity to the recent evolution of polls reviewed earlier: although the French are clearly more confident in the EU than their partners, their confidence in NATO is equally high. German opinions reveal a significant change. German confidence in both

NATO and the EU began declining after 1992. Although it is surely a sig16. This is based on surveys analyzed in Eichenberg and Stoll 2003. 17. Cited in Cameron 1999, p. 79. 18. ORDOS, Opinion Analysis M-116-00, July 21, 2000, and ORDOS 2002.



nificant development that the Frenc

than do the Germans, in the end th British see NATO as far more effect

have about equal confidence in the t

of NATO, while German and French

Summary and Conclusions

Five decades of opinion polling on th

yield several important conclusions First, public support for the aspir

security and defense is long-standing.

European public opinion has suppor

the integration of policy making in se

of common defense forces. The skep

to this generalization among the fou

Second, support for the establishm

as the recently created ERRF) is very

Based on fragmentary data, there ar

are much higher than in the 1950s, seriously.

Third, Europeans have also consistently supported membership in NATO and consider it "essential" to European security. Nowhere is there significant

sentiment to end NATO membership. Although there are some signs that support for NATO has weakened recently over its historical levels (Italy, Germany), even in these countries support remains high. Europeans want it both ways, as reflected in NATO's 1996 compromise in which the European Defense Identity is acknowledged and even endorsed, but only within the context of NATO.

Fourth, the fact that public opinion matches the consensus reached within

(and between) EU and NATO decision-making councils is no guarantee that

tensions will not arise. Most important, public opinion in Europe now strongly

supports the position that the EU-rather than NATO-should have the "pri-

mary voice" in matters of European security, but this is decidedly not the view of the U.S. government. This tension has already been revealed as the

EU moves to activate the ERRF and establish decision-making procedures to govern its use, and skepticism of U.S. policy has been evident in reactions to the policies of the Bush administration. Finally, as has been true of European security policy for over 5 decades,

much depends on the actions of the United States, and on this score th

immediate short term appears to herald a continuation or-more likely-an increase in European public support for both defense policy integration an independence from NATO. As was true in the early to mid-1980s, European



opinion has reacted to the perceived unilateralism--or realpolitik--of the Bus

administration with a truly substantial decline in confidence in the Unite

States, a factor that almost certainly influences support for European ind pendence. In summary, should European leaders continue or accelerate the ESDP, it seems likely that they will find a solid basis of support in public opinion.

Appendix Abbreviations

Eurobarometer: European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communi tion, Public Opinion Analysis Sector LHF: Louis Harris France

USIA: United States Information Agency

Data Sources and Archiving Information

Data Sources. An expanded version of the tables published in this article is avai

electronically in Eichenberg (2003), which provides additional data not published h

including data for all 15 members of the EU, some cross-national surveys from re

years, and a comparison of elite and public opinion.

A substantial listing of raw historical data on Atlantic Alliance and European secu

issues can be found in the following: Eichenberg (1989, 2000), Flynn and Ratti (1985), Merritt and Puchala (1968), and Szabo (1988). Substantial listings of US

ORDOS surveys from the early to mid-1990s appear in ORDOS (2002) and

(1995, 1996). Eurobarometer reports (which include marginals and some demograp

breakdowns) are available from 1995 at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgl0/infco epo/polls.html.

Archiving. Eurobarometer is archived at the Inter-University Consortium for P

litical and Social Research at the University of Michigan. In addition, the Cen

Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne maintains a ve useful page on Eurobarometer: http://www.gesis.org/end/data_service/eurobarom

USIA surveys are archived in several locations. Through the 1980s, most surv

are archived at the National Archive and Record Service (http://www.archives.org

listing of National Archive files for several West European countries through the 1

is found in the bibliography to Eichenberg (1989). An even more accessible collect

is available through the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research: htt

www.gesis.org/en/za/index.html. The Central Archive is particularly useful for t

surveys conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, although some later surveys are

archived. Finally, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University Connecticut has some holdings of USIA surveys (http://www.ropercenter.uconn.e

Technical specifications. Eurobarometer surveys are nationally representative sa

ples of approximately one thousand respondents from the population age 15 and ol

USIA/ORDOS surveys are nationally representative samples of approximately thousand respondents from the population age 18 and older. Detailed specificat



(including survey contractors) can be f

above; for USIA/ORDOS surveys, see t Geographic units. For Britain, both "Great Britain," that is, England, Wale

reports separate results for the former

for the newly unified Germany after 1

Germany are presented to preserve h prior to 1991 are for the former West Germany.

Early Public Opinion on Foreign and Defense Policy Integration in Europe

Ila. USIA (9/52): Are you for or against [your country] taking part in a common West European army? Don't

For Against Know (%) (%) (%) N France 45 26 29 1,345

Germany 48 37 15 1,588 Italy 42 25 33 1,505 Britain 42 24 34 1,503

lb. USIA (9/52): What do you think is the best way defense; for each country to build up its own army, army?

European Own Don't Army Army Both Know (%) (%) (%) (%) N France 32 23 15 30 1,345 Germany 39 31 5 25 1,588 Italy 26 29 12 33 1,505 Britain 32 39 10 19 1,503



Ic. USIA (9/52): Here is a short description of a West European army [hand card

showing that a West European army would include participating nations West Germany

France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg]. Soldiers from all these countries will wear the same uniform and will serve in their own national divisions under an

international Supreme Command. Would you be for or against having [your country take part in such an army? Don't

For Against Know (%) (%) (%) N France 48 30 22 1,345 Germany 45 37 18 1,588 Italy 45 29 26 1,505 Britain 42 35 23 1,503

Id. USIA (2/55): In your opinion how necessary i defense organization at the present time?

Very Somewhat Not So Not at All Don't Necessary Necessary Necessary Necessary Know (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) N France

22

21

7

15

35

900

Germany 26 28 17 14 15 820 Italy 34 20 3 13 30 814 Britain

2.

48

20

7

5

20

Eurobarometer:

problems, combined

805

Would

y

can you tell me action through t

government

independently

discussions with the Americans and Russians. Common Own Market Government Total

(%) (%) (%) N Belgium:

11/74 90 10 100 1,507 5/75 91 9 100 1,554 Denmark:

11/74 73 27 100 1,100 5/75 76 24 100 1,073 France:

11/74 86 14 100 1,042 5/75 87 13 100 1,000


642 Richard C. Eichenberg Germany:

11/74 82 18 100 1,042 5/75 86 14 100 1,039 Italy: 11/74

5/75

86 14 100 1,021

83

17

100

1,043

Netherlands:

11/74 86 14 100 1,012 5/75

88

12

100

1,093

Ireland:

11/74 67 33 100 1,000 5/75

76

24

100

1,000

Great Britain:

11/74 63 37 100 1,039 5/75

3.

66

34

100

Eurobarometer:

would

you

separately

tell

or

me

by

if

1,328

Here it

the

is

are

member

defense?

Together Separately Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N France:

11/76 11/78

49 49

34 35

17 16

a

better

1,356 1,194

4/83 67 25 8 1,011 11/84 68 26 6 1,006 11/85 61 35 4 1,006 Germany:

11/76 56 29 15 1,007 11/78 54 28 18 1,006 4/83 60 29 11 1,049 11/84 60 34 6 1,053 11/85 61 32 8 1,028 Italy:

11/76 40 37 23 1,052 11/78 48 31 21 1,030 4/83 75 15 10 1,031 11/84 72 20 8 1,097 11/85 70 23 6 1,047 Great Britain:

11/76 45 46 9 1,351 11/78 49 43 8 1,339 4/83 60 33 7 1,348 11/84 57 36 7 1,405 11/85 51 44 5 1,383


num

that

count

Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 643 Recent Opinion on the Integration of European Foreign and Security Policy

4. Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided

by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the [national] government, and which should be decided jointly within the EU ... foreign policy toward countries outside the EU? National Don't EU Government Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/89 73 21 6 2,000 11/90 63 23 14 1,022 3/91 71 20 9 1,000 11/91 72 19 9 1,007 4/92 76 18 6 1,005 10/92 70 22 8 1,005 4/93 71 23 6 1,019 11/93 68 26 6 1,024 5/94 74 18 8 1,335 12/94 74 18 8 1,007

5/95 77 16 7 1,002 12/95 75 20 5 1,000 11/96 74 21 5 1,003

6/97 72 21 7 1,001 11/97 78 14 8 1,006 5/98 76 18 6 1,045 11/98 76 17 7 1,003

4/99 73 19 8 1,000 11/99 74 21 5 1,003 5/00 77 17 6 1,003

12/00 76 19 11/01 72 22 5/02 75 19 11/02 78 18 4/03 77 18

5 6 6 4 5

1,003 1,005 1,010 1,004

1,075

Germany:

11/89 67 27 6 2,217 11/90 60 32 8 1,021

3/91 69 26 11/91 67 27 4/92 69 26 10/92 75 21

5 6 5 4

1,073 1,000 1,065 1,013

4/93 72 22 6 1,036


644 Richard C. Eichenberg 11/93 68 27 5/94 68 26 12/94 72 21 5/95 73 19 12/95 71 20 11/96 73 21 6/97 71 21 11/97 72 19 5/98 73 19 11/98 74 19 4/99 72 20 11/99 75 18 5/00 74 19 12/00 72 21 11/01 75 18 5/02 75 17 11/02 75 18 4/03 75 18

5 6 7 8 9 6 8 9 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 8 7 7

1,047 1,415 1,018 1,055 1,095 1,024 1,056 1,038 1,005 1,016 1,022 1,018 1,015 1,013 1,001 1,000 1,018 1,050

Italy:

11/89 78 12 10 2,088 11/90 74 15 11 1,073 3/91 78 12 10 1,007 11/91 77 13 10 1,076 4/92 78 11 11 1,046 10/92 82 9 9 1,052 4/93 75 11 14 1,039 11/93 74 14 12 1,012 5/94 78 11 11 1,358 12/94 78 11 11 1,055 5/95 76 12 12 1,057 12/95 81 10 9 1,028 11/96 79 11 10 1,059 6/97 83 9 8 1,003 11/97

73

15

12

5/98 77 11 12 11/98 78 14 8 4/99 79 11 10 11/99 81 10 9 5/00 83 12 5

997

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000

12/00

78

13

9

987

11/01

81

12

7

999

5/02 80 10 10 1,000 11/02 82 12 6 1,043 4/03 80 12 8 1,027 Great Britain:

11/89 61 30 9 2,498 11/90 64 28 8 1,047 3/91 68 25 7 1,056


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 645 11/91 64 30 6 1,076

4/92

67 29 4 1,016 10/92 63 29 8 1,058

4/93

60

31

9

1,073

11/93 62 31 7 1,061 5/94 60 30 10 1,392

12/94 62 30 8 1,045 61 31 8 1,066 12/95 62 31 7 1,070 11/96 56 36 8 1,067 6/97 55 35 10 1,105 11/97 55 35 10 1,078 5/95

5/98 59 31 10 11/98 58 32 10 4/99 53 35 12 11/99 52 36 12 5/00 46 41 13 12/00 51 38 11 11/01 57 34 9 5/02 54 35 11 11/02 57 33 10 4/03 58 30 12

1,055 1,066 1,040 1,002 1,070 1,058 1,000 1,004 1,014 1,011

5. Eurobarometer: Some people believe

by the [nationality] government, whil

within the EU. Which of the following

by the [national] government, and whi security and defense? National Don't EU Government Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/89 51 45 11/90 42 52 3/91 47 49 11/91 44 52 4/92 53 44 10/92 53 44 4/93 43 53 11/93 40 56 5/94 48 48 12/94 53 44 5/95 59 39 12/95 53 44 11/96 52 44

4 6 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 4

2,000 1,022 1,000 1,007 1,005 1,005 1,019 1,024 1,335 1,007 1,002 1,000 1,003


646 Richard C. Eichenberg 6/97 54 40 11/97 56 40 5/98 53 43 11/98 54 41 4/99 49 44 11/99 50 47 5/00 53 43 12/00 50 47 11/01 48 48 5/02 47 50 11/02 50 48 4/03 47 50

6 4 4 5 7 3 4 3 4 3 2 4

1,001 1,006 1,045 1,003 1,000 1,003 1,003 1,003 1,005 1,010 1,004 1,075

11/89 58 39 3 11/90 50 44 6 3/91 52 44 4 11/91 54 42 4 4/92 59 37 4 10/92 55 42 3 4/93 62 35 3 11/93 53 43 4 5/94 59 37 4 12/94 58 37 5 5/95 59 36 5 12/95 58 37 5 11/96 61 34 5 6/97 60 34 6 11/97 59 35 6 5/98 61 32 7 11/98 59 35 6 4/99 52 43 5 11/99 57 37 6 5/00 60 35 5 12/00 56 39 5 11/01 58 37 5 5/02 55 40 5 11/02 52 43 5 4/03 60 35 4

2,217 1,021 1,073 1,000 1,065 1,013 1,036 1,047 1,415 1,018 1,055 1,095 1,024 1,056 1,038 1,005 1,016 1,022 1,018 1,015 1,013 1,001 1,000 1,018 1,050

Germany:

Italy:

11/89 56 40 11/90 60 34 3/91 61 34 11/91 56 41 4/92 69 27 10/92 68 28 4/93 58 35 11/93 49 45 5/94 52 43

4 6 5 3 4 4 7 6 5

2,088 1,073 1,007 1,076 1,046 1,052 1,039 1,012 1,358


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 647 12/94 38 57 5/95 66 29 12/95 61 33 11/96 60 35 6/97 64 32 11/97

59

5 5 6 5 4

34

5/98 59 35 11/98 58 38 4/99 60 35 11/99 64 32 5/00 60 37

6 4 5 4 3

1,055 1,057 1,028 1,059 1,003 7

997

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000

12/00

57

38

5

987

11/01

66

31

3

999

5/02 65 30 5 1,000 11/02 60 37 3 1,043 4/03 59 38 3 1,027 Great Britain:

11/89 39 57 11/90 42 55 3/91 44 54 11/91 39 59 4/92 45 53 10/92 37 61 4/93 44 52 11/93 34 63 5/94 37 60 12/94 41 55 5/95 45 50 12/95 39 58 11/96 37 58 6/97 35 60 11/97 33 62 5/98 34 60 11/98 30 63 4/99 27 67 11/99 27 64 5/00 28 64 12/00 32 61 11/01 38 58 5/02 36 59 11/02 34 62

4 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 4 5 3 5 5 5 6 7 6 9 8 7 4 5 4

2,498 1,047 1,056 1,076 1,016 1,058 1,073 1,061 1,392 1,045 1,066 1,070 1,067 1,105 1,078 1,055 1,066 1,040 1,002 1,070 1,058 1,000 1,004 1,014

4/03 32 63 6 1,011



6. USIA: There have been a number of p

next several years. For each of the follo in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat

heard enough about it to say: the develo Total Total Don't

Favor Oppose Know (%) (%) (%) N France:

5/92 72 19 9 3/93 84 14 2 6/95 79 15 6 6/96 74 16 10 1/97 69 23 8 4/98 70 21 9 4/99 70 20 10 11/99 80 8 10 6/00 77 19 10 5/01 64 26 10

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,002 1,003 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003

Germany:

5/92 3/93 6/95 6/96 1/97 4/98 3/99

68 69 70 66 63 68

32 0 26 5 28 2 33 1 29 8 21 11

68

22

1,000 1,000 1,189 1,200 1,045 1,148

10

948

11/99 66 24 10 1,019 6/00 57 25 10 1,055 5/01 57 27 6 1,005 Italy:

5/92 80 11 9 3/93 75 14 11 6/96 73 19 8 9/97 77 13 10 4/98 81 16 3 5/99 77 13 10 11/99 86 9 5 6/00 78 10 12 5/01 82 11 7

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

1,000 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000

Great Britain:

5/92 61 28 11 1,000 3/93 71 19 10 1,000

6/95 6/96 9/97 4/98 4/99

68 56 52 53 57

25 7 33 11 28 20 25 22 28 15

1,007 1,010 1,098 1,029 1,048


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 649 11/99

57

27

16

864

6/00 56 27 17 1,056 5/01 47 30 23 1,003

7a. Louis Harris France (12/00): Personal creation [I'instauration] of a common Eu

Favor Oppose Don't Know France

(%) (%) (%) N 69 28 3 1,000

Germany 59 36 5 945 Greece

Italy

56

65

Netherlands

36

24 59

8

1,000

11 28

800

13

603

Spain 57 31 12 812 United Kingdom 36 53 11 1,000

7b. Louis Harris France (12/00): Personally, are you in creation of a European rapid reaction military force?

Favor Oppose Don't Know (%) (%) (%) France

70

26

4

N 1,000

Germany 70 24 6 945 Greece

Italy

60

69

Netherlands

31

20 65

9

1,000

11 20

800

15

603

Spain 55 32 13 812 United Kingdom 45 38 17 1,000

7c. Eurobarometer: What is your opinion of the follow

whether you are for it or against it. One common defen the member states of the EU.

For Against Don't Know (%) (%) (%) N France:

11/02 77 19 4 1,004 4/03 77 14 9 1,075 Germany:

11/02 80 11 9 1,018 4/03 81 10 9 1,050


650 Richard C. Eichenberg Greece:

11/02 79 16 4 1,003 4/03 84 9 7 1,003 Italy:

11/02 85 8 7 1,043 4/03 86 5 8 1,027 Netherlands:

11/02 75 16 9 1,000 4/03 78 15 8 1,008 Spain: 11/02 79 9 13 1,000 4/03 76 10 14 1,000 Great Britain:

11/02 49 33 18 1,014 4/03 47 31 22 1,011

Is

NATO

Essential

to

European

8. Eurobarometer: Some people say security. Others say NATO is no lon view is closer to your own? NATO Not Essential Essential Total

(%) (%) (%) N Belgium: 10/80 74 26 100 11/88 75 25 100 11/89 64 36 100 3/91 74 26 100

1,022

1,024 1,999 1,061

Denmark:

11/88 75 25 100 1,006 11/89 74 26 100 2,000 3/91 79 21 100 1,000 France:

10/80

56

44

100

986

11/88 72 28 100 1,005 11/89 60 40 100 2,000 3/91 72 28 100 1,000 Germany:

10/80 92 8 11/88 85 15 11/89 71 29 3/91 76 24

100 100 100 100

1,008 1,061 2,217 1,073


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 651 Greece:

11/88 51 49 100 1,000 11/89 52 48 100 2,015 3/91 62 38 100 1,001 Ireland:

11/88 69 31 100 1,006 11/89 70 30 100 1,945 3/91 67 33 100 1,015 Italy:

10/80 68 32 11/88 64 36 11/89 62 38 3/91 69 31

100 100 100 100

1,108 1,022 2,088 1,007

100 100 100 100

1,114 1,025 2,036 1,035

Netherlands:

10/80 71 29 11/88 71 29 11/89 66 34 3/91 79 21 Portugal:

11/88 68 32 100 1,000 11/89 69 31 100 2,000 3/91 83 17 100 1,000 Spain: 11/88 27 73 100 1,001 11/89 34 66 100 1,996 3/91 51 49 100 1,001 Great Britain:

10/80 86 14 11/88 81 19 11/89 80 20 3/91 83 17

100 100 100 100

1,432 1,276 2,498 1,056

9. USIA: Some people say that NATO is

say NATO is no longer essential to our your own? Not Don't

Essential Essential Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

11/69 47 37 16 1,210 7/71 54 35 11 1,263 5/73 42 34 25 1,000 8/76

42

35

23

854

3/77

44

29

27

993

3/78

39

35

26

938


652 Richard C. Eichenberg 10/80 7/82

44

34

34 26

23 40

986 915

2/87

49

28

24

939

9/87

48

19

32

939

10/88 58 22 10/89 41 28 2/90 50 19 3/91 58 23 5/91 55 26 5/92 52 37

20 31 31 19 19 10

1,001 2,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

1/93 55 29 17 1,000 9/93 66 30 4 1,000 1994 58 30 12 1,000 6/95 68 25 7 1,000 6/96 1/97 9/97 4/98 4/99

54 39 7 1,002 58 29 13 1,003 49 34 17 1,016 50 37 13 1,012 66 22 12 1,003

11/99 66 29 5 1,006 5/00 54 31 15 1,015 10/00 60 35 5 1,000 5/01 53 31 17 1,000 10/01 67 28 5 1,013 7/02 61 33 6 1,001 7/02 67 24 8 1,003 4/03 56 1,003 Germany:

10/69 76 13 11 1,158 7/71 84 11 5 1,211 5/73

73

13

14

8/76

85

10

3/77

79

3/78

84

993

5

960

7

14

962

5

11

950

10/80 88 8 4 1,008 3/81 62 20 19 1,000 7/82

7/83 5/84 2/87

66

86 87 71

18

12 10 11

16

2 3

17

9/87 70 15 15 10/88 76 15 9 10/89 59 24 17 2/90 53 24 23 3/91 62 27 11

923

2,035 1,033 922

1,022 1,051 2,217 1,000 1,000

5/91 69 19 12 1,000 5/92 65 23 11 1,000 1/93 70 12 12 1,000


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 653 9/93 64 32 4 1994 76 13 5 6/95 76 21 3 6/96 69 29 2 1/97 68 21 11 9/97

68

21

1,000 1,000 1,189 1,200 1,000

11

951

4/98 60 23 17 1,148 3/99

71

12

12

948

11/99 71 20 9 1,019 6/00 66 16 18 1,055 10/00 72 24 4 1,000 5/01 62 21 16 1,000 10/01 86 12 3 1,001 7/02 74 22 4 1,000 7/02 76 18 6 1,005 4/03 73 1,003 Italy:

11/69 66 23 11 1,202 8/76

58

30

3/77 54 24 3/78 58 22 10/80 59 28 3/81 62 27 7/82 55 31 7/83 61 26 5/84 63 24 2/87

58

12

22 20 13 12 14 13 14

29

13

9/87 65 23 12 3/91 57 25 18 5/91 65 24 11 9/93 60 31 9 4/98 64 31 5 5/99 60 23 17 11/99 68 26 6 6/00 51 28 21 10/00 58 35 7 5/01 57 28 16 10/01 72 22 6

982

2,057 1,037 1,108 1,113 1,053 1,984 1,040 977

1,061 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000 1,000 1,000

7/02 68 27 5 1,000 7/02 71 22 6 1,000 4/03 64 1,000 Great Britain:

11/69 68 15 17 1,155

7/71 81 12 7 1,240 7/76 69 15 16 1,008 3/77 73 8 19 1,788 3/78

70

10

20

985

10/80 79 13 8 1,132


654 Richard C. Eichenberg 3/81 7/82

70

15

65

15

25

1,132

10

967

7/83 72 16 12 2,296 5/84 76 12 12 1,131 6/85 76 13 11 1,183 2/87

72

17

12

963

9/87

72

16

12

964

10/88 72 17 12 1,276 10/89 67 17 16 2,498

2/90 3/91 5/91 5/92 1/93 9/93 1994 6/95 6/96 1/97 9/97 4/98 4/99

70 74 68 74 69 76 77 78 71 69 66 67 77

11/99

21 9 15 12 15 17 16 10 16 15 20 4 18 6 17 5 23 5 20 12 17 17 15 19 10 13

63

15

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,007 1,010 1,000 1,098 1,029 1,048

22

864

6/00 68 16 16 1,056 10/00 70 22 8 1,000 5/01 68 12 20 1,000 10/01

79

16

6

985

7/02 76 20 4 1,000 7/02 77 13 11 1,003 4/03 64 1,005

10a.

Eurobarometer

country's

Which

security.

view

is

(11/

Others

closer

to

y

10b. Eurobarometer: In you forum for making decisio

should

the

EU

make

those

NATO Essential NATO versus the EU NATO Not

Essential Essential NATO Decides EU Decides

(%) (%) (%) (%) N France 41 28 21 46 1,000

Germany 59 24 45 31 1,136 Italy 46 28 19 60 1,032 Great

Britain

67

17

42

31

947



10c. Eurobarometer: In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defens policy be taken by national governments, by NATO, or by the EU? NATO Essential

(from table 9) NATO versus the EU NATO

National

Essential NATO EU Governments

(%) N Date (%) (%) (%) N France:

10/01 67 1,013 11/01 13 49 21 1,005 7/02 67 1,003 11/02 16 49 21 1,004 4/03 56 1,003 4/03 8 58 18 1,075 Germany:

10/01 86 1,001 11/01 30 35 21 1,001 7/02 76 1,005 11/02 30 41 17 1,018 4/03 73 1,003 4/03 17 46 21 1,050 Italy:

10/01 72 1,000 11/01 16 60 15 999 7/02 71 1,000 11/02 16 64 12 1,043 4/03 64 1,000 4/03 11 69 12 1,027 Great Britain:

10/01 79 985 11/01 29 23 30 1,000 7/02 77 1,003 11/02 33 20 26 1,014 4/03 64 1,005 4/03 22 26 30 1,011

11. USIA: In your opinion, what organization

about the security of Europe in the future: N Other/

NATO EU Don't Know

(%) (%) (%) N France:

10/89 14 59 27 2/90 14 71 15 9/97 22 53 25 4/98 27 61 12 4/99 34 51 15 11/99 16 64 20 5/00 19 63 18 7/02 16 73 11

1,000 1,000 1,016 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003

Germany:

10/89 44 24 32 1,000 2/90 17 43 40 1,000 9/97

33

35

32

951

4/98 32 49 19 1,148 3/99

32

46

22

948


656 Richard C. Eichenberg 11/99 26 52 22 1,019 6/00 30 53 17 1,055 7/02 29 57 14 1,005 Italy:

10/89 16 65 19 9/97 19 59 22 4/98 13 67 20 5/99 19 61 20 11/99 18 76 6 6/00 14 66 20 7/02 17 71 12

1,000 1,000 1,000 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000

Great Britain:

10/89 39 37 2/90 36 44 9/97 41 29 4/98 40 33 4/99 49 34 11/99

38

24 20 30 27 17

26

1,000 1,000 1,098 1,029 1,048

36

864

6/00 40 33 27 1,056 7/02 38 43 19 1,003

Paying the Piper and Calling th

12. USIA: One way some people have

issues is to reduce the role of the Uni

Western Europe. This would mean Eur

of Western security. However, Europ

and assume more of the responsibility you think would be the best for the security relationship with the United and control of our security? Assume

Same More Don't

Relationship Responsibilit (%) (%) (%) N France:

1994 25 71 4 1,000 6/95 27 70 3 1,000 6/96 37 57 6 1,002 9/97 34 53 13 1,016

4/98 38 55 7 1,012 11/99 21 77 2 1,006 Germany:

1994

38

55

7

1,000


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 657 6/95 6/96 9/97

43 44

54 52

39

3 4

42

1,189 1,200

19

951

4/98 55 31 14 1,148 11/99 32 58 10 1,019 Italy:

6/96

33

60

7

1,000

9/97

37

56

7

1,000

1994

44

48

8

1,000

6/95 6/96

46 52

51 41

3 7

1,007 1,010

16 15

1,098 1,029

Great Britain:

9/97 4/98

59 55

11/99

25 30

51

31

18

864

13. USIA: I would like to a institutions to deal effecti fair amount, not very much European problems? What NATO France 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 64 63 62 67 70 62 Not confident (%) 16 26 35 29 20 30 Don't know (%) 20 11 3 4 10 8 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,003 1,016 Germany 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 76 71 69 62 59 48 Not confident (%) 20 28 27 36 32 37 Don't know (%) 4 1 4 2 9 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,045 951 Italy 5/92 1994 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 72 74 79 66 Not confident (%) 17 23 14 28 Don't know (%) 11 3 7 6 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 951 Great Britain 5/92 3/93 1994 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 72 64 74 78 74 67 Not confident (%) 20 22 21 20 16 18 Don't know (%) 10 4 5 2 10 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000 1,098 France 4/98 4/99 11/99 5/00 7/02

Confident (%) 67 71 68 66 63 Not confident (%) 27 23 28 28 32


658 Richard C. Eichenberg Don't know (%) 6 6 4 6 5 N 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003

Germany 4/98 3/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 55 58 57 56 55 Not confident (%) 33 32 36 30 42 Don't know (%) 12 11 7 15 3 N 1,148 948 1,019 1,055 1,005

Italy 4/98 5/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 67 66 65 58 67 Not confident (%) 31 27 34 32 32 Don't know (%) 2 7 2 11 1 N 1,000 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000 Great Britain 4/98 4/99 11/99 6/00 7/02

Confident (%) 72 72 59 66 67 Not confident (%) 14 17 24 20 24 Don't know (%) 14 11 17 14 9 N 1,029 1,048 864 1,056 1,003 EU

France 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 76 65 78 66 70 Not confident(%) 14 31 21 26 24 Don't know (%) 10 4 1 8 6 N 1,000 1,000 1,002 1,003 1,016

Germany 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97 Confident (%) 63 56 55 52 41 Not confident (%) 32 38 42 42 44 Don't know (%) 4 6 3 5 15 N 1,000 1,000 1,200 1,045 951

Italy

5/92

1/97

9/97

Confident (%) 83 79 79 Not confident (%) 11 14 17 Don't know (%) 7 7 4 N

1,000

1,000

1,000

Great Britain 5/92 3/93 6/96 1/97 9/97

Confident (%) 52 49 53 53 46 Not confident (%) 40 41 43 33 37 Don't know (%) 9 10 4 15 18 N 1,000 1,000 1,010 1,000 1,098 France 4/98 4/99 11/99 5/00 7/02

Confident (%) 73 71 66 69 68 Not confident (%) 24 22 32 27 30 Don't know (%) 3 4 1 4 2 N 1,012 1,003 1,006 1,015 1,003

Germany 4/98 3/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 54 51 50 53 48 Not confident (%) 37 37 43 30 50 Don't know (%) 9 11 7 18 2 N 1,148 948 1,019 1,055 1,005


Poll Trends: European Defense Integration and NATO 659 Italy 5/99 11/99 6/00 7/02 Confident (%) 80 64 68 75 Not confident (%) 14 34 23 24 Don't know (%) 7 2 9 1 N 1,001 1,002 1,005 1,000 Great Britain 4/98 4/99 11/99 6/00 7/02

Confident (%) 52 53 33 40 43 Not confident (%) 34 33 52 45 51 Don't know (%) 14 14 16 15 6 N 1,029 1,048 864 1,056 1,003

References Cameron, Fraser. 1999. The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present, and Future. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Crewe, Ivor. 1984. "Britain Evaluates Ronald Reagan." Public Opinion 7 (October-November) 46-49.

Dalton, Russell, and Richard C. Eichenberg. 1998. "Citizen Support for Policy Integration European Integration and Supranational Governance, ed. Wayne Sandholtz and Alec St Sweet, pp. 250-82. New York: Oxford University Press. Eichenberg, Richard C. 1989. Public Opinion and National Security in Western Europe. Ith NY: Cornell University Press. --. 2000. "NATO and European Security after the Cold War: Will European Citizens Supp a Common Security Policy?" In Decision-Making in a Glass House, ed. Brigitte L. Naco Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, pp. 155-76. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

. 2003. "Public Opinion on European Defense Integration and NATO: Tables an

Analysis." Tufts University, Department of Political Science. Available at http://ase.tufts.e polsci/faculty/eichenberg/bio.asp. Eichenberg, Richard C., and Richard J. Stoll. 2003. "Representing Defense: Democratic Con of the Defense Budget in Five Western Democracies." Journal of Conflict Resolution 4 399-422.

Flynn, Gregory, and Hans Rattinger. 1985. The Public and Atlantic Defense. Totowa, NJ: Rowma & Allanheld.

Haine, Jean-Yves. 2003. From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence Core Documen

Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Hoffmann, Stanley. 1966. "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Cas

Western Europe." Daedalus 95:862-915.

Merritt, Richard L., and Donald J. Puchala. 1968. West European Perspectives on Internatio Affairs. New York: Praeger. Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (ORDOS). 2002. "Europeans and Anti-Americ ism: Fact vs. Fiction." Washington, DC: Office of Reasearch, U.S. Department of State. Rutten, Maartje. 2001. From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents. Paris: E ropean Union Institute for Security Studies. . 2002. From Nice to Laeken: European Defence Core Documents. Paris: European Uni Institute for Security Studies. Szabo, Stephen. 1988. West European Perceptions of Security Issues. Washington, DC: Of of Research (Western Europe), United States Information Agency. United States Information Agency (USIA). 1995. The New European Security Architectur Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency. . 1996. The New European Security Architecture. Vol 2. Washington, DC: Office of Research, United States Information Agency.
