Heritage Protection in Israel

NEW TRAJECTORIES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION: THE RISE OF BUILT-HERITAGE PROTECTION IN ISRAEL NIR Y. MUALAM Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

ABSTRACT: Current research into Israeli historic preservation policy tends to focus on the ideological

and socioeconomic factors that mold preservation of the built heritage. However, few attempts have been made to measure preservation policy, to inquire whether it is a growing phenomenon, or to clearly identify economic and political factors which may have an impact on its assimilation in the planners’ toolkit. To remedy that, this article studies preservation policies in Israel by looking at hundreds of development plans inclusive of heritage-protection mechanisms. A learning curve is identified indicating how gradually more plans were introduced through the years by localities and especially by major Israeli cities. The increase in preservation efforts clearly suggests that fiscal constraints, contested pasts, and existing heritage dissonances have not prevented continuous preservation efforts. These efforts can be explained by looking at economic boons in the form of statutory incentives, the location of protected historic properties, and the types of heritage being protected.

T

he purpose of this article is to contextualize and ground current literature with respect to historic preservation in Israel. The article aims to provide further empirical evidence on contemporary preservation efforts by looking at the statutory framework which facilitates the protection of the built heritage. This framework consists of preservation plans approved by local and regional planning authorities. Studied closely, development plans of this type, their content and rate of approval, help explain how current ideologies, narratives, and spaces are shaped. From a methodological point of view, the article’s objective is to show how statutory measures for protecting cultural heritage can provide a lucid account of the direction and components of preservation policy. Rather than employing qualitative evaluations, the quantitative data provide a fresh outlook couched in numbers which demonstrates how regulatory indicators can be used in order to measure, better explain, compare, and track changes in preservation policies.

CONTEXTUALIZING PRESERVATION POLICIES IN ISRAEL: SOCIO-POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR PRESERVING Has preservation policy become part and parcel of the toolkit of planners in Israel, and why? In recent decades scholarly works have strived to answer these questions, primarily focusing on the political and ideological factors that shape historic preservation or lack thereof. These important contributions evaluate government attitudes towards the built heritage in Israel. Such assessments oftentimes focus on the socio-political aspects of heritage policy in general and in Israel in particular. Existing literature answers the first question with a yes, noting how preservation of built heritage has become an important and well-apparent tool employed by Israeli planners, archaeologists, and Direct correspondence to: Nir Y. Mualam, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Center for Urban and& Regional Studies, The Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning, Technion City- Haifa 32000, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]. JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 00, Number 0, pages 1–23. C 2014 Urban Affairs Association Copyright All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 0735-2166.

DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12168

2 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 00/No. 0/2014

architects (e.g., Cobb, 2010; Joffe, 2010; Levine, 2001). As for the reasons behind the policy, various accounts are readily available. In the main, the literature highlights the close link between politics, power, planning and preservation. Thus Forester et al. (2001) point to power politics as one explanatory element for historic preservation policy in Israel. According to several scholarly sources, planning and preservation policy are used to exert physical, political, and territorial control over local minority populations— Palestinians living in Israel (Levine, 2001; Pullman & Gwiazda, 2008; Tung, 2001). Furthermore, preservation policy is regarded as an instrument for fueling national narratives and consolidating Israeli identity (Bauman, 2004; Kletter, 2006). The integration of archaeological sites in master plans is said to promote myth, ritual, and new traditions (Kletter, 2006). Most sources available are critical of Israeli preservation, demonstrating how it has been used to appropriate spaces and to deform the content and meaning of past memories. Nitzan-Shiftan (2006) notes how Israeli architects appropriated Palestinian aesthetics in Jerusalem and Yacobi (2007) similarly describes how preservation in the Old Quarter of Lydda amounted to a symbolic reassertion of power on the urban landscape. Yacobi (2007) succinctly describes the politically laden approaches to Arab heritage in the newly formed Zionist, modern Jewish state. According to this line of argument, historic preservation was ideologically induced in order to create new symbols, to Judaize spaces and to “domesticate” the Islamic landscape which consisted of Mamluk, Turkish-Ottoman, and Palestinian heritage. Similarly, Levine (2001) points to the subversive impact of historic preservation in the city of Jaffa, which created an imagined sense of space, sanitized and devoid of Arab presence. In similar vein, other scholars point out the role of historic preservation in constructing new places for the new Jewish state, at the expense of minority heritage and alternative interpretations. For example, Ricca (2007), in her account on the cities of Acre, Safed, and Jaffa, mentions physical erasure and lack of preservation, alongside preservation policies directed at creating new remembrances and erasing the memory of indigenous communities residing in Israel. Likewise, political philosophers document how Arab heritage has been minimized, isolated, and selectively preserved while downplaying the role of diverse interpretations of history (Said, 2000). Several journalistic reports tie historic preservation policy in Israel to the exclusion of minority groups from participating in decision making (City Mouse, 2010; Ha’aretz, 2010). Similarly, academic research points to a national struggle which helps explain why Israeli preservation policies strive to expand to the West Bank (Joffe, 2010; Pullman & Gwiazda, 2008). On the other hand, several accounts have indicated counter-initiatives to preserve Islamic heritage with the intention of preventing Judaization of spaces and including local Arab population in the process. Such initiatives are sponsored by international organizations working closely with Palestinian communities residing in mixed Israeli cities such as Jerusalem or Acre (Khamaisi, 2009; Peleg, 2008). Some studies on Israeli preservation point out other reasons for employing heritage policies: the need of the new state to bolster identity (Slae, Kark, & Noam, 2012), create a sense of belonging (Fenster, 2004), and construct a founding story which would, in turn, enable the state to assimilate new immigrants (Ben Yehuda, 2007). In similar vein, several studies link preservation policy in Israel with the consumption of places through gentrification and Disneyfication of existing historic quarters (Levine, 2001). According to these accounts, preservation policy is wedded to global consumerist culture and to the flow of capital, and is used to effectively reinvent places and to suppress memories of the past. A similar line of reasoning ties preservation policy to profit and entertainment (Killebrew, 2010) Several scholars discuss how preservation shapes local rather than national identity. These contributions underline the role of heritage assets in a globalizing world where localities struggle to attract resources, to shape a local “story” and to boost their image. In this vein, Shavit and Bigger (2002) mention preservation as a strategy employed by the city of Tel Aviv with the intention of upgrading its international profile as a “world city.” Azaryahu (2007) similarly argues that Tel Aviv strived to formulate its own distinctiveness with the aid of local Bauhaus heritage. The invigoration of local “rosy memories,” cultures, and nostalgia by utilizing the heritage industry has been documented

I Protection of Built Heritage in Israel I 3

and researched in other localities outside Tel Aviv such as Haifa (Weiss, 2011) where the City has reappraised its Ottoman and Arab heritage following a large-scale regeneration plan.

CONTEXTUALIZING PRESERVATION POLICIES IN ISRAEL: ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS AND HURDLES Preservation policy in Israel was utilized in many places to rehabilitate derelict and run-down streets and neighborhoods, thereby stimulating the local economy (Kertesz, 2009; Slae et al., 2012). Rehabilitation efforts were motivated also by an urge to beautify and to facilitate the burgeoning of urban spaces (Margalit, 2012). The economic impetus underlying preservation policies in Israel is also stressed in current research. Following economic restructuring and the willingness of cities to embrace the past, preservation in Israel emerged with the intention of promoting tourism (Baram, 2007; Ricca, 2007) and commerce, while leaving aside politically sensitive issues (Kohl, 2010). With the economic impetus came a need to devise administrative and statutory instruments that could make Israeli preservation possible. In other words, another motivation for preservation hinges on the economic benefits of conserving historic assets. Current literature documents a few of the financial measures employed by cities and states. The underlying reason behind economic incentives is the need to compensate owners and developers for increased costs they incur during the conservation process. Interestingly, despite some evidence to the contrary (Cyrenne, Fenton, & Warbanski, 2006; Leichenko, Coulson, & Listokin, 2001; Noonan & Krupka 2009), preservation has often been accused of reducing property values. For instance, Asabere and Huffman (1994) assessed the influence of Philadelphia’s historic preservation policies on the sale price of historic apartment buildings and found a 24% reduction in price compared with non-designated properties. This led the authors to contend that Philadelphia’s strong regulatory framework may contribute to this phenomenon. Similarly, in Israel, Schnell and Barzilay (2008) claim that preservation is in essence a damaging practice. Reduction in sale price, they argue, is attributable to a number of factors, including lengthy permit-granting procedures, documentation expenditures, and the inability to extend building rights. In similar vein, Metrany’s extensive survey of public opinion in Israel links preservation to “extensive limitations” on property (2008, p. 224). However, when preservation does occur, it is often motivated by rent-seeking owners and individuals who manage to sustain the costs and generate profit. This usually happens in urbanized areas where land values are high enough to support the preservation project (Schnell & Barzilay, 2008). In order to alleviate some of the financial hurdles, cities and states around the globe have strived to create diverse incentives to motivate owners of historic properties to renovate and protect their assets. These benefits include, for example, additional building rights to developers (over and above ground), transfer of development rights, various easements, adaptive reuse of historic properties, and tax incentives, as well as revolving funds (Juergensmeyer & Roberts, 2003). Such tools have been employed for decades (Costonis, 1974; Pickard, 2001; Sanz Salla, 2009) and have also “trickled down” to Israel in the form of incentivized statutory plans (Dvir, 2009; Pauzner, 2011; Sasoon-Ezer, 2010). Unfortunately, although incentives are central for understanding Israeli preservation policy, no study to date has provided a full account of such mechanisms which are embedded in local Israeli regulation. At this point it is useful to note that, despite the importance of market-driven incentives, where land values in Israel are low, and when the historic property is situated in a remote unattractive site, it becomes harder to tap market-based tools in order to lure investors and developers. In those instances even the best laid plan, inclusive of economic incentives, will be hard to implement. In such cases, lack of supplementary tools, like government-based loans or subsidies, often condemns those properties to desolation and destruction (Seidler, 2013).


NEGLECT, DETERIORATION AND INSTITUTIONAL INDIFFERENCE Besides the issue of incentives or land values, several researchers investigate other reasons behind lack of preservation in Israel. Given Israel’s fast growing population,1 high density,2 real-estate pressures,3 and political contestations over space, it is not surprising that scholars and policy analysts have pointed out impediments to preservation policy. Alfasi and Fabian (2012) explain how sociopolitical intentions led to massive demolitions of historic quarters in townships like Haifa and Jaffa. Demolitions were undertaken as part of a wellcrafted policy which regarded the older vernacular architecture as backward and unsafe (Paz, 1998). Lack of preservation was also motivated by a modernist fervor which called for demolition and the construction of new public housing projects that were needed to house hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came to settle in Israel after 1948 (Arab Association for Human Rights, 2004; Weiss, 2011). The same modernistic inclination led planners to perceive the older Arab heritage as antithetical to the Zionist project of constructing a new state. Thus, new and old became rivals and the Orient was not fit for preservation (Nitzan-Shiftan, 2009). An offshoot of the modernistic perspective was the economic argument (Weiss, 2011) according to which older historic infrastructure is expensive to maintain. This internal logic was closely pegged to “rational” planning, which steered the boat away from preservation and toward urban renewal in the form of large-scale demolitions. There was also the “public security” argument made by the military and the police, which resulted in mass demolition with the intention of purging future pockets of potential violence and crime and preventing Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes (Alfasi & Fabian, 2012). To illustrate this, Paz (1998), in his interesting historiography of Arab neighborhoods, describes how the historic Quarter of Tiberias was razed to the ground by the Israeli Defense Force following the 1948 war, despite David Ben Gurion’s plea to refrain from mass demolitions. With respect to lack of concerted preservation efforts, it is important to sketch the internal Israeli debate. Somewhat in line with former research, preservation policies had been lagging behind and had not focused much “institutional” attention until 2005, when a report by Israel’s State Comptroller documented consistent neglect, and underutilization of historic properties in 229 localities (Office of the Israeli State Comptroller, 2005). The State Comptroller surveyed local and national policy and found gruesome indifference and lack of interest in preservation. The results had already been evident and pointed to massive demolitions that resulted in the permanent disappearance of cultural objects which had stood fast for hundreds of years. Only a few localities (such as Tel Aviv) were commended for their relative efforts to approve preservation plans. Other localities (including Jerusalem) were black-marked for their negligence. The State Comptroller’s report was the epitome of a much larger critique on preservation practice in Israel. The critique has been raging throughout the 1990s in the media, parliament, scholarly papers, and professional reports (Barzilay, 2004; Hefetz & Novenstern, 1996; Soloder, 1991). Critiques focused on the dearth of government-sponsored programs, insufficient loans and subsidies to localities, lack of ancillary regulatory tools (Auerbach & Sharkansky, 2007; Ministry of the Interior, 2007), and insufficient political will to preserve as a result of financial, institutional, or sociopolitical constraints (Office of the Israeli State Comptroller, 2005; Solomon-Maman, 2005). As a result, localities were faced with insurmountable financial and institutional constraints to preserving their heritage. Allegedly, the many accounts foregrounding lack of preservation are in conflict with those which explain the motivations behind preservation of heritage in Israel. This contradiction, however, is the result of different political and socioeconomic trajectories which operate differently in different locations and times. Hence, the explanations provided by scholars and analysts are not mutually exclusive or dichotomous and can explain preservation policies or lack thereof in light of a variety of historic, economic, geographic, political, and cultural variables, each with its own distinct impact on preservation policies.


STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT RESEARCH Existing literature pinpoints diverse rationales attached to preservation policy in Israel or the lack thereof. But despite the myriad explanations available, no study has actually sought to explain that policy by looking systematically at current statutory tools which facilitate heritage protection. Researchers have not investigated whether the apparent preservation phenomenon is shrinking or growing; whether it signals a continuous thrust toward heritage protection; whether policymakers utilize a range of incentives in order to enable preservation; and finally, whether the geopolitics of preservation are indeed skewed in favor of Jewish and Zionist heritage. In order to grapple with these questions researchers need to look outside the confines of a single geographic location; what is “out there” under Israeli context is a wide range of statutory documents—preservation plans—which confer special legal status on historic monuments, buildings and quarters. Unfortunately, given the magnitude of the task, research has shied away from diving into such a quagmire. Instead, existing scholarly sources focus mostly on case-study analysis. Most utilize qualitative evaluations. The “bigger” picture remains blurry. To answer the above-mentioned questions, the next section introduces the legal foundations of preservation efforts. It discusses the term historic property and introduces the tool of Israeli preservation plans. Next, I explain methodological issues, including how preservation plans were surveyed for the purposes of this research. The final section presents the findings and discusses them in context.

HISTORIC PROPERTIES AND STATUTORY PLANS UNDER THE ISRAELI PLANNING SYSTEM Historic Properties The research puts historic properties under a magnifying glass. The following definition encapsulates the types of properties which are the epicenter of the analysis: Historic properties are single structures or a group of structures or part thereof, which are recognized in statutory preservation plans as having architectural, historical, societal, cultural, local, national, or global significance and are therefore protected to a certain extent.

In other words the analysis focuses on historical man-made buildings which are of some significance. The relatively broad definition enables us to capture a wide range of properties. I also refer to buildings which are protected by law, using the mechanism of preservation plans (as explained below). Some of these structures are situated in conservation areas, while others are isolated monuments. Some of them are fully protected under law (with no changes or alterations allowed) while others are protected in a less stringent manner. The common denominator is that the said historical buildings are included in the geographic boundaries of a preservation plan which functions as a local statutory tool. The definition applies throughout the country and includes historic properties in cities, townships, and rural villages (like Kibbutzim). Although there are non-statutory historical properties in Israel, mostly protected in voluntary “preservation lists” compiled by NGOs and localities, this article does not discuss them. The reason is that these structures are harder to identify and do not enjoy the law’s “canopy” and protection.

The Preservation Plan Stronger protection of historic properties under the Israeli planning system is predicated on Statutory Development Plans which include legally binding provisions with respect to zoning, land use, and subdivision. In order to quantify preservation policies in Israel, I tracked down every statutory plan which was approved or deposited by local or regional planning agencies, and which affords


FIGURE 1 The Process of Enacting Preservation Plans in Israel

some degree of protection to historic properties. I call these plans Preservation Plans. In view of the magnitude of the task and resource limitation, the examination was confined to the years 2005 through 2010. Some preservation plans include a single plot while others cover whole conservation areas. Some designate a single structure while others a group of buildings or a whole historic neighborhood. In a way, the plan can be seen as a political document which formally designates a particular type of heritage. Former research, however, has not made available a typology of heritage being protected in Israel nor the incentives employed to promote protection.

The Process of Approving Preservation Plans Like most plans under Israeli law, the process of approving preservation plans is a three stage process4 (Figure 1). First comes a preparation stage during which a planning agency may notify that a preservation plan is under way. The second stage includes a formal deposition which enables those who have an interest in the property to object or contribute to the process.5 The final stage is plan approval, when the preservation plan becomes a mandatory enactment.6 The same process of plan approval applies to cities, townships, and smaller localities and similar procedures govern plan approval according to Israel’s Planning and Building Act of 1965. Moreover, the process hinges on plan initiation by private developers, owners, interested parties (like NGOs) or the local planning authority (Section 61A, Planning and Building Act 1965).

The Institutions in Charge of Approving Preservation Plans In Israel, preservation plans are mostly prepared and enacted by local planning authorities, or district-level commissions. “Simple” preservation plans, often site-specific, that do not involve a change in land use, additional building rights, changes in building height, or increased number of dwellings will be approved by the Local Planning Authority (the LPA) whereas more “comprehensive” preservation plans, inclusive of whole districts, streets and neighborhoods, will often be submitted to the District Planning Commission (DPC) for ratification (Alterman, 2001). Before the final approval (or rejection) of any plan, both DPCs and LPAs receive submissions from a variety of organizations such as the Israel Antiquities Authorities or the Israeli Society for Preservation of Heritage Sites. The process of consultation is mandatory according to state legislation,7 and in some cases NGOs can file an objection with respect to a development plan.8 The symbiosis between DPCs and LPAs has been the subject of much deliberation in Israeli planning. Despite the government’s willingness to devolve the planning system and to empower local planning authorities, supervision over localities is still in place. Therefore, the regulatory system allows localities to only approve “simple” preservation plans, or to prepare and recommend more complex preservation plans to district-level agencies. In the first case, localities are quite independent but the scope of the preservation plan will be rather limited—the plan will have fewer incentives


and its scope will be reduced. In the second case, the plan would be more comprehensive and may employ a larger set of fiscal incentives, but the locality will have to juggle landowners, developers, and the DPC to determine whose decision will ultimately determine whether the plan becomes enacted. Whereas local planning bodies consist of local politicians and their municipal-level planning teams, district-level agencies present a broader mixture, with eleven ministerial representatives, five representatives of localities, and two professional representatives, each member having a single vote. Thus, district-level agencies facilitate ministerial supervision over local decision making, and their institutional composition suggests that localities have to collaborate closely with broader ministerial interests in order to get things done, or specifically, get their preservation plans on the move.

The Method Employed for Analyzing Preservation Policy in Israel I examined several parameters throughout time in order to identify and categorize preservation plans. The objective was to trace the entire population of preservation-related plans that had been prepared, deposited, or approved during 2005–2010 by local or regional planning agencies. The following questions were posed before the data collection:

r r r

How many preservation plans were prepared, deposited and approved each year? Which planning agency prepared the plans? Do plans include economic incentives to encourage preservation? What is the geographic spread? What types of heritage are designated? Is the land private or public? Are neighborhood locations Jewish or non-Jewish?What is the total number of historic structures included in each plan?

The data collection method included a full survey of Israel’s Gazette. The Gazette includes a periodic documentation of all statutory plans. I reviewed thousands of Gazette pages in order to identify preservation-related plans. I used a key word search in order to track preservation plans that were approved, deposited or prepared.9 Then I obtained, read, and codified the plans. The strength of a Gazette search is that it is all-encompassing and allows tracking of all preservation plans and as a consequence enabled me to identify the “heritage stock.” The importance of this method is evident in the Israeli context, which places preservation plans at its core. Unfortunately, the Israeli National Planning Board and the Ministry of the Interior have not methodically compiled national lists or registers of protected buildings, although they have intended to do so since 2007 (Preservation Task Force, 2007).10 Thus, policymakers and researchers have largely stayed in the dark, not being able to identify, record, and monitor the existing heritage. This methodological choice of mapping preservation plans is not without a few caveats. First, the investigation of preservation plans leaves aside non-statutory protection tools such as special loan mechanisms developed locally by cities (such as Tel Aviv-Jaffa). Second, some local preservation plans do not include important information such as the type of heritage being protected, and this in turn calls for additional historical and site-specific analysis (which was carried out in this research). Third, there are other methods to quantify preservation as a policy and as an urban phenomenon. For instance, it is possible to measure the number of heritage-oriented tourists (Binney & Hanna, 1978). It is also possible to measure government investment in preservation-related projects and the total funds and government coffers available for rehabilitation of historic properties (Pickard, 2009). Nevertheless, by tracking, mapping, and categorizing local regulation (in the form of statutory preservation plans), the study harnesses readily available information which can be collected and categorized in a straightforward manner. Local regulatory measures provide an extensive account of what happens (literally) “on the ground.” It also provides a direct measurement of protection of historic properties.


FIGURE 2 Total Number of Preservation Plans per Annum

FINDINGS Growing Numbers of Preservation Plans The figures in this section represent the entire population of preservation plans in 2005–2010. Because all Gazette pages were inspected, the data provide an accurate representation of every plan which was prepared, deposited, or approved. Overall, the aggregate data show that, in 2005–2010, 160 preservation plans were approved by Israeli planning authorities, 196 plans were deposited, and 58 were prepared for deposition. Figure 2 illustrates a gradual increase in statutory preservation procedures over the years. Local plan deposition and approval rose as a result of intensified efforts by localities and regional authorities to improve the standing of preservation policy within the planning system. While the number of plans fell in 2006, by 2007 the first sign of a 4-year upturn was evident. The total number of plans would culminate in a record number in 2010. Whereas 58 preservation plans were being prepared, deposited, or approved in 2005, 89 preservation plans were under way in 2010, reflecting a 53% increase. From 2006 a steady upward curve is evident. The number of approved (i.e., enacted) plans rose dramatically from 26 plans in 2005 to 38 plans in 2010 (46% increase); the total number of deposited plans almost doubled from 23 plans in 2005 to 44 plans in 2010, and the share of deposited preservation plans grew as well since 2005, from 40% to 49%, with a peak of 59% in 2009 (Figure 3). Measuring the share of approved plans against that of deposited plans, it is evident that, while in 2005–2006 the share of approvals outweighed that of depositions, by 2007 the share of deposited plans was significantly higher than the share of plans being approved (Figure 3). The increase in deposited plans suggests that more preservation plans are being prepared and negotiated before their final enactment. In sum, the data embodied in Figures 2-3 reflect a growing practice and a learning curve of localities whose efforts have increasingly focused on the preparation of a stock of preservation plans. The increase in number can shed light on the politics of preservation. As noted earlier, existing literature links preservation to political and ideological biases. Increased efforts to preserve, as


FIGURE 3 The Share of Preservation Plans per Annum

demonstrated by the aggregate analysis of preservation plans, suggest that the process has been ongoing and intensifying while producing the ideologies, spaces, and power relations described by former research. Hence, the outcomes related to preservation policy in Israel (such as social exclusion, marginalization of the “other,” economic restructuring, creation of national and local identities, gentrification, and appropriation of existing historic spaces) have had consistent institutional backing. As the next section illustrates, the statutory backing for preservation can be seen in a variety of localities and especially in the largest urban conurbations.

Preservation Plans in Different Geographic Areas What is the geographic spread of Israeli preservation plans? The data are presented in Figure 4, which portrays the leading municipal authorities whose activities shape preservation practice to a large extent. It is important to note that Tel Aviv and Jaffa are clustered together because administratively and jurisdictionally they are part of the same municipality. The gathered data single out Jerusalem as being the leading municipal authority in plan preparation (deposition and approval), with Tel Aviv and Haifa following behind (2009 is an exception as Tel Aviv’s plan approval rate surpassed Jerusalem’s). The data correspond with other statistics, namely Jerusalem being the largest municipal authority in terms of population and size, Tel Aviv second and Haifa third.11 Between 2005 and 2010 Tel Aviv and Jerusalem accounted for 61% of plan approvals and 60% of the total number of deposited preservation plans. This calls attention to an urban predominance of preservation policy and indicates stronger preservation awareness as well as resource allocation in major cities The area-based analysis of plan approval (Figure 4) also illustrates that Tel Aviv alone outweighed all smaller Israeli cities combined in approving preservation plans in the years 2006–2010. Similarly, during 2005–2010 Jerusalem alone approved more preservation plans each year relative to smaller Israeli cities combined (excluding Haifa and Tel Aviv). The increasing rate of plan preparation in Jerusalem marks a phenomenal period when, on average, by 2010 almost every 2 weeks, a new preservation plan was deposited by the Jerusalemite planning teams.


FIGURE 4 Approved and Deposited Preservation Plans by City/Region

It is possible to hypothesize that the competitiveness of the larger metropolitan cities has generated more plans relative to smaller cities.12 Additionally, more plans under way in larger cities can be a result of advantageous administrative and institutional capacities such as manpower, budget, technical knowledge, better legal advice, local tradition of strategic planning, and dedicated political elites. Further, higher land values in the urban core, and a greater willingness to indemnify and incentivize landowners (following statutory designation) can also prove decisive for expedited preservation plan approval. The next section elaborates further on this issue.

Statutory Incentives to Preserve Increased preservation initiatives, as portrayed by the process of plan approvals, raises several questions, the most interesting of which asks: what is the “engine” behind historic preservation in Israel? If the hood is lifted, what nuts and bolts of preservation policy are revealed which motivate developers, preservationists, and ideologists to implement it? This study answers this question in two ways: first, by focusing on the politics of preservation practice; and second, by concentrating on the economic side of preservation policy and the incentives given to developers and landowners. I begin with the latter. Content analysis of the entire set of approved preservation plans in 2005–2010 (N = 160) reveals one surprising aspect in this regard. The most significant finding is the extent of incentive-based mechanisms used throughout the years (Figure 5). Broadly, the 2000s pattern of plan preparation reveals one possible factor which influences the protection of historic properties: a large set of marketbased financial incentives which are designed to increase the acceptability of preservation plans. The adoption of these mechanisms helps explain how alleged financial constraints, often associated with heritage preservation and upkeep, are tackled by policy. The analysis clearly illustrates that a decisive majority of approved preservation plans (94%, or 150 plans) grant developers at least one type of economic incentive. The remaining plans (6%) are devoid of any direct incentives. Figure 5 mirrors a pragmatic approach to preservation which employs a range of incentives included in the majority of plans. This corresponds with the Israeli context which does not include expansive government subsidies or loans that enable local preservation. The relative vacuum in national-level aid has led local planning authorities to adopt plans that allow private


FIGURE 5 Incentive-Based Preservation Plans 2005–2010

market agents (developers and owners) certain compensation for incurring higher maintenance and refurbishment costs. With respect to the types of incentive embedded in Israeli preservation plans, the analysis points to an extensive range of benefits which aid localities in “convincing” owners and developers to take preservation tasks on board. The rationale behind such mechanisms, as in other places around the world (Leoni, 2008), is that incentives add value to existing historic properties or at least enable developers to make use of existing value without incurring additional costs. Incentives include adding building rights over and above ground to existing historic properties (78% and 31% of Israeli plans, respectively), allowing transfer of development rights (7% of plans), extra floors (44%), a wider array of permitted uses (32%), and additional residential units within existing buildings (35%). Some plans motivate preservation by adding to the pool of building rights in a given street, quarter, or neighborhood (26%), while other plans allow the developer to add a high-rise next to the historic property (11% of plans). The above-mentioned boons enable developers to maximize the economic potential of the property while keeping in mind preservation objectives. Preservation plans allow such incentives on condition that preservation is strictly followed in the manner prescribed by the plans. Table 1 provides a full account of the arsenal of incentives. At first blush, it is quite evident that most plans enable alterations and modifications to existing historic properties, including modifications in their vicinity. When alterations to historic properties are allowed, they include external and internal reconfiguration, reconstruction, partial demolitions, fac¸ade renovations, and the relocation of entire historic properties. This non-stringent preservation policy could be criticized or commended for its liberal approach. Arguably the lenient approach provides a glimpse into a world of opportunities but also of associated risks. Falsification of history, excessive changes to historic structures, and matters of authenticity have been recurrent themes in preservationists’ arguments in favor of “freezing” heritage assets. However, the data imply that Israeli planning authorities have consistently allowed changes to be made to historic properties in order to facilitate preservation. The long list of incentives can help explain heightened efforts to preserve, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Moreover, in the context of Israeli planning, incentives can be seen as a manifestation of power relations and as tools used to cement current ideological biases or regressive socioeconomic objectives. This idea, derived from “dark-side” theories, suggests that planning policies and tools reflect and expand the powers of those already in power (Yiftachel, 1998). Taken to the realm of

12 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 00/No. 0/2014 TABLE 1 A Typology of Economic Incentives in Israeli Preservation Plans The type of incentive to owners/developers

No. of approved preservation plans which include the incentive (N = 160)

Percentage

Additional building rights Additional floors (above) Additional residential units (flats, single dwelling houses, etc.) in or around the historic property Adaptive reuse, change of use, additional uses in existing historic area Additional basement/underground building rights Additional building rights which are distributed in a larger conservation area, a compound, or a whole neighborhood Enabling other modifications to be made in the historic property (keeping only the facades, partial demolitions, etc.) Change to building lines Adding a new building or a wing to existing plot Adding a high-rise tower above or near the historic property (the new high-rise is at least 9 floors high). Enlarging existing residential units in the historic property Reconstruction or relocation after the dismantling of existing historic property or part thereof Adding balconies to existing historic structures Transfer of development rights Legalizing extensions or floor space which had been formerly built or added to the historic property without an appropriate planning permission

125 70 56

78% 44% 35%

51

32%

49 41

31% 26%

38

24%

24 19 17

15% 12% 11%

14 14

9% 9%

9 11 5

6% 7% 3%

Other incentives No incentives

44 10

28% 6%

preservation policy, the cascade of financial incentives found in Israeli statutory plans reaffirms the increasingly prominent role of private interests in planning and the way in which “planners chart a course of development focused on middle and upper class Israelis implemented through private developers” (Levine, 2001, p. 250). A breakdown of ownership patterns reinforces this argument. As illustrated in Figure 6, 61% of Israeli preservation plans apply to privately owned parcels and historic properties, whereas only 26% are owned by public authorities (the State, local municipalities, etc.). This finding suggests that preservation is not only market-driven, but also establishes a unique symbiosis between private owners and the government which eventually approves preservation plans. The ownership pattern is also interesting because, statistically speaking, about 90% of land in Israel is owned by the State (Alterman, 2001) whereas the share of publicly owned parcels in the total “pool” of preservation plans is significantly less than that. These numbers could be explained by the fact the preservation in Israel has developed into an urban phenomenon (urban parcels and structures are often in private hands), where private owners and developers constantly seek ways of boosting their investment in historic properties.

The Politics of Preservation Practice The growing phenomenon of preservation can also be explained by referring to the types of heritage being preserved and protected. Indeed, economic incentives foreground the growth of preservation policy, but as documented by the literature (e.g., Paz, 1998) the political motivation is also evident. This raises a few questions. What kind of heritage is being preserved? What types of historic properties are protected? Is there bias in favor of particular types of historic properties—namely,


FIGURE 6 A Breakdown of Approved Preservation Plans (N = 160) Sorted by Ownership

Jewish, National, or Zionist? Given former accounts in the literature the answer to the latter question is yes. But can this answer be supported by existing data? In order to answer this question, the analysis focuses on several data sets which can be gleaned from existing preservation plans. I focused, again, on approved preservation plans (N = 160) which, after approval by planning authorities, became part and parcel of local regulation. In this respect a few sub-questions were posed:

r r r r r

How many preservation plans were approved in predominantly Jewish or non-Jewish townships? (For the purposes of this study, a predominantly Jewish locality has more than 50% Jewish residents.) How many preservation plans were approved in predominantly Jewish or non-Jewish neighborhoods? In Jerusalem, how many preservation plans were approved in East or West Jerusalem? What type of heritage is being protected? Aggregately, how many buildings were designated in each “category” of heritage?

These questions demand further elaboration. First, in order to determine whether a particular property is located in a Jewish or non-Jewish neighborhood or township, I used data gathered by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2010). In order to do so, the data elicited from each preservation plan with respect to the geographical location of the property was cross-compared with data from the CBS census. Second, the raw data consist of statutory preservation plans which are not always ideal for analyzing the type of heritage being preserved. Oftentimes the plan itself only indicates the number of a parcel, or the coordinates of the historic property without additional information. As a result, I had to conduct a thorough analysis of the historic property in each plan using additional sources (history books, architecture guides, archive search in major municipal archives, design annexes, and maps) as well as photographs obtained using a thorough web search. Additional information was collected by searching documentation files13 and by contacting several architects involved in preservation projects.14 Third, even after the identity of the historic property was uncovered, it was hard to categorize certain properties owing to multiple layers of history which had accumulated through the years. Thus, the types of heritage included in the survey are not mutually exclusive. This is particularly true


FIGURE 7 A Breakdown of Approved Preservation Plans (N = 160) in Predominantly Jewish/Non-Jewish Neighborhoods

in Israel where rich and thick layers of history are in place. Take, for example, the historic property known as Lorentz House in Jaffa, which is currently protected under Plan No. 3516 (enacted in 2007). The property had been built in the late 19th century by a local Arab-Palestinian family but it was later acquired by the German Templars who came to Palestine in a messianic mission to cultivate the Holy Land. After the deportation of the Germans during World War Two, the British used the building as a military headquarters. Then, post-1948, it became derelict and was used as a brothel. So how can one define Lorentz House? As an Arab-Palestinian heritage? As German Templar heritage? Or perhaps as colonial inheritance? Nevertheless, I identified each property according to its underlying historical significance and, when in doubt, a single property was fitted into several categories. With respect to the location of newly designated historic properties, the analysis suggests that the majority of properties are situated in predominantly Jewish localities. The findings tell a story of stark contrasts: more than 99% of approved preservation plans are located in predominantly Jewish localities (such as Tel Aviv, Ramat-Gan, Zichron Ya’acob), and less than 1% are approved in nonJewish townships (such as the Arab city of Jasser A-Zarka). This divide is not coincidental and, on its face, accentuates the accounts in existing literature with respect to alleged discrimination, narrative shaping, and neglect of the non-Jewish (mostly Palestinian) heritage. However, when the unit of geographic inquiry narrows down to neighborhoods, the picture changes somewhat, as shown by Figure 7. The analysis of neighborhoods according to the CBS statistical areas indicates whether the historic property is located in a predominantly Jewish or non-Jewish neighborhood within each locality. In this way, it is possible to identify the exact location of historic properties and also to better reveal what is actually happening in mixed Arab-Israeli cities like Jerusalem and Haifa. With respect to Jerusalem, the data clearly show that historic properties are mostly designated and protected in the western parts of the city. The Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem do not “enjoy” the same amount of preservation initiatives in the form of approved preservation plans (Figure 8). Figures 7 and 8 reaffirm a cleavage in preservation practice in Jewish and non-Jewish localities. Sociopolitical considerations could be at play here, as depicted by the extensive literature available to us. According to this line of argument, Israeli planning is skewed towards one group, enables betterment of certain neighborhoods only, and generally benefits the lives of Jewish Israelis. This explanation is mainstream and it is indeed supported by the findings.


FIGURE 8 A Breakdown of Approved Preservation Plans (N = 60) in Jerusalem

The findings also reaffirm the unwillingness of Israeli officials to engage in planning activities in predominantly Arab neighborhoods in Israel. It reinforces former accounts that show how Israeli planning has de facto been stalled in many Arab (or other non-Jewish) areas of the country (Crisis Group, 2012). Having said all that, I would like to offer an additional explanation that should also be considered. The above-mentioned cleavage could also be interpreted by looking at land values, and the issue of regulatory indemnification. First, historic preservation in Israel occurs where property values are enough to generate income and to support the preservation project (Schnell & Barzilay, 2008); that is, where there is a market demand for preservation, which is motivated by tourism, image generation, and fast-paced development. In peripheral townships, smaller townships, and Arab neighborhoods, economic incentives alone may not be sufficient to finance and negate increased costs incurred by a developer of a historic property. In contrast, in inner cities (where nowadays most Jewish gentrifiers live) land values are high enough to enable preservation projects. This is well supported by the findings, which demonstrate that preservation policy is a key ingredient in urbanized areas like Tel Aviv, Haifa, or Jerusalem. A second element that could explain the gap between Jewish and non-Jewish neighborhoods relates to the issue of regulatory indemnification for the takings of property. Landowners, including minority landowners, are often against preservation of historic properties (see, e.g, Gabizon, 2004). When a rezoning occurs in the form of a preservation overlay, Israeli cities might be required to compensate landowners for significant devaluation of their property (Alterman, 2010). Thus, in many localities expensive lawsuits are often lodged by owners who argue that their historic property is worth less owing to its inclusion in a preservation plan and the inability of few financial incentives to alleviate the entire costs of conservation. Under these circumstances, and all the more so when land values are low, preservation plans could antagonize the local citizenry and expose localities to the risk of being sued. According to this line of argument, the absence of preservation plans in Arab neighborhoods and localities can also be explained by the reluctance of planners to irk the citizens living in those areas, and concurrently to expose the local townships to the risk of being sued by landowners. Whether the explanation for the existing “preservation gap” is sociopolitical or economic is unclear. The findings, however, provide substantial evidence and a roadmap for future exploration of this issue. At this stage, the sociopolitical aspects of preservation practice in Israel are only partially uncovered.


FIGURE 9 A Breakdown of Approved Preservation Plans Sorted by Type of Heritage Being Preserved (N = 160)

Grouping together existing historic properties is a complex task owing to the multifaceted character of history itself. I therefore used broad and indicative categories that allow a preliminary overview of existing types of heritage (see Table 2). Future research may refine the said categorization. The analysis also mapped the type of heritage being preserved and the number of structures protected in each preservation plan. Table 2 and Figure 9 elaborate further. The findings in Figure 9 are interesting because they clearly demonstrate that although preservation plans apply to mostly Jewish neighborhoods, and mostly preserve Zionist, Israeli, or Jewish heritage (42% of plans), architects, planners, public officials, developers, and conservationists have uncovered the value of Arab-Palestinian, Ottoman, and Muslim heritage (19% of plans). Furthermore, Christian and Bahaii heritage are also represented (10% of plans). These numbers may challenge—to a certain extent— existing “radical” and post-Zionist accounts, according to which Israeli planning policy marginalizes certain narratives. On the other hand, it is still quite clear that the majority of plans focus on Jewish, Zionist, and nationalist heritage, including that of the bourgeoisie in the form of “international-style,” modern, or eclectic architecture (35% of plans). With respect to the type of heritage protected, a few points are in order. First, given the quintessential Jewish identity of the state of Israel, the predominance of preservation plans that designate Jewish, Zionist, and other nationalist heritage comes as no surprise. It is even anticipated in light of preservation theory and the issue of the historiography of “winners.” Second, the data suggest that the preservation of Ottoman, Palestinian, and Islamic architecture, as well as the local “oriental” vernacular, occurred in gentrified Jewish neighborhoods where not only Jewish heritage is celebrated. The question stemming from this is whether the act of preservation itself is carried out with the clear intention to remember former Arab, Islamic, non Jewish-Palestinian spaces, or whether the said minority heritage is rediscovered with the intention of boosting sales and creating new stylish and gentrified Disneylands. In this respect, and as noted by former research (Levine, 2001; Ricca, 2007), the inclination to preserve may be attributed to a divorce of politics from the architectural preservation and it could also be the result of a new emphasis on marketing, aesthetics, and image creation, devoid of alternative interpretations. Third, given Israel’s complicated history, the choice of preserving several heritage types is not an obvious one. Dissonant heritage is often neglected and shoved under the carpet, yet it appears that Israeli preservation practice is slowly maturing, with a few instances where whole Palestinian

68

56

31

17

16

12

22

35%

19%

11%

10%

8%

14%

Number of plans

42%

% out of 160 plans

Industrial or commercial heritage. e.g., historic bakeries or shops.

Templar villages (e.g., Sarona).

Police stations built by the British Army (e.g., in Ramat Gan). The Anglican Church in East Jerusalem; the Bahaji grave near Acre.

The Palestinian village of Lifta; urban villas in East Jerusalem; other residential buildings in gentrified neighborhoods.

International/ modern heritage in Tel Aviv (the White City).

Historic structures in Kibbutz Shoval; structures built by settlers in Jerusalem’s city center; the old synagogue in Beit Shemesh.

Example

The Type of Heritage Designated in Israeli Preservation Plans (N = 160)

TABLE 2

Zionist or Israeli or Jewish heritage.

Under this broad category, the underlying characteristic of the historic property is its connection to the Jewish majority. In particular, properties which are related to the settlement movement in Anglo-Palestine (late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century) or the Zionist enterprise at large including heritage sites which relate to the establishment of the State of Israel. The underlying feature of the historic property (and the main reason for its designation) is its belonging to a significant architectural style; namely, the heritage of the bourgeoisie (Jewish or non-Jewish) living mostly in cities; the heritage of the modern movement, international, Bauhaus, or local eclectic styles. Mosques and Ottoman structures built mostly in the 17th to 20th centuries. Also included are Palestinian villages, Arab neighborhoods, or single structures built by Palestinians before 1948. Structures built by the British Empire, its officials and personnel during the 20th century. The underlying characteristic of this type of heritage is its religious affiliation. Included in this category: churches, monasteries, Christian or other non-Islamic heritage. Structures built by the German Templars who came to settle and cultivate the Holy Land during the late 19th century. Other miscellaneous heritage structures that do not fit the aforementioned categories. Other.

German Templar.

Christian or Bahaii.

Colonial; British Mandate.

Islamic, Palestinian, or Ottoman.

Modern movement architecture/eclectic structures.

Type of Heritage

Category description



villages and neighborhoods were designated as historic (such as the village of Lifta, or the old walled city of Acre). Finally, with respect to modern heritage, it is plausible to link some of the findings to Tel Aviv’s World Heritage status conferred by UNESCO in July 2003. Indeed, former accounts argue that UNESCO’s international recognition increased public interest in cultural heritage, and impacted local policy (Tel Aviv Municipality. 2009). This is confirmed by the impressive thrust toward the preservation of modern structures (35% of statutory preservation plans). LESSONS, FUTURE QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION Methodological Thoughts Current research into preservation policy in Israel tends to focus on the ideological, political, and socioeconomic factors that mold preservation of the built heritage. However, few attempts have been made to measure preservation policy and to inquire whether it is a growing phenomenon in the Israeli context. Put differently, policy analysts have identified the elephant in the room, but not the size of the room. This article has attempted to remedy that by looking at a vast, often untapped, source of information. The focus on statutory measures helps contextualize preservation policies in Israel, expound on the reasons given in the literature for preservation (or lack thereof), and suggests a new approach for studying heritage policies. The examination of the legal processes associated with heritage policy enables us to pinpoint a growth in preservation efforts. Indeed, other indicators can be applied to quantify and measure heritage protection. However, methodologically speaking, statutory protection is an easy-to-track and quite straightforward indicator to use in policy analysis. The novelty here is that instead of case study evaluations or qualitative impressions, the growth in preservation efforts can be measured objectively. I am convinced that this method may illuminate the way preservation policies are shaped in other planning systems around the globe and can complement other methods of inquiry. This methodology can be employed by international scholarship to better the understanding of heritage policies. A Thrust Toward Preservation of the Built Heritage Given the extreme weakness of national legislation, local plans approved by Israeli planning authorities are the centerpiece of Israeli preservation. The increase in preservation efforts clearly suggests that fiscal constraints, institutional hurdles, contested pasts, and existing heritage dissonances have not prevented continuous preservation efforts throughout the country. A learning curve can be pointed out during 2005–2010, when gradually more plans were introduced by planning agencies with an emphasis on major Israeli cities: Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and (to a certain extent) Haifa. This is a testimony to the increasing importance of urban heritage and the growing institutional capacity and willingness to incorporate heritage into local and regional plans. More plans being approved by planning agencies suggests that the outcomes and processes associated with preservation policy in Israel—such as social exclusion, marginalization of the ‘other,” economic restructuring, creation of national and local identities, gentrification and appropriation of existing historic spaces—have had consistent institutional backing. The support for preservation can be seen in a variety of localities and especially in the largest urban conurbations where the dearth of preservation has been replaced by a renewed interest in urban heritage as a catalyst for socioeconomic change. The breakdown of ownership patterns also underscores the fact that preservation of historic properties is mostly carried out in privately owned properties, where owners and developers can internalize the costs associated with preservation. Overall, the aggregate analysis provides an initial if not major indicator for heightened regulatory efforts to preserve. One hundred and sixty plans were approved and 196 deposited during 2005–2010, thereby providing a crucial “regulatory bandage” for many threatened heritage properties. This kind of heritage protection is key for their survival and for future deliberation on whose heritage is being preserved and how it should be presented. The evidence is limited to a short timeframe owing to


the magnitude of the task of surveying hundreds of development plans. Thus, future research should expand the scope of the analysis in order to gain better understanding of preservation processes. For the time being the preservation machine has been activated, yet it is by no means a deus ex machina. In the long run it is possible that the growth in preservation efforts, as measured by statutory plans, could dwindle owing to a few possible reasons. First, efforts to preserve require resource investment by local and regional governments: experienced personnel, dedicated planners, and a willingness to invest time in putting together preservation plans. Second, preservation exposes public authorities to risks associated with devaluation of property and ensuing lawsuits. Third, plan preparation under the Israeli context requires political capital and close cooperation between local and regional planning authorities. Cross-institutional suspicion, bureaucracy, and disagreement can block preservation plans altogether. Fourth, ideological and political tensions between Israel and its Arab-Palestinian minorities continue to loom over preservation policies and continuously challenge policy-makers. The issue of “what to preserve” and which memories are worthy of protecting may lead to a dead end and could potentially undermine the legitimacy of heritage protection. Moreover, the use of heritage as a new type of commodity which can be privatized might strip it of its associated memories and could therefore create further tensions between private stakeholders and existing communities. Finally, heritage resources are finite and therefore it is plausible that the initial thrust toward legal protection will be followed by a transition period during which fewer plans will be conceived and fewer heritage properties will be identified as warranting legal protection. Incentive-Based Policy The incentive-based approach to preservation, so evident in Israel, is a key element facilitating the growth in preservation policy. Flexible measures and built-in compensation granted to owners and developers of heritage properties enable this growth. These measures protect cultural built heritage while providing, when possible, compensation in the form of added building rights, more residential units, a variety of permitted uses, and transfer of development rights. Notably, incentive-based preservation plans provide an alternative, market-led, mechanism to boost heritage protection. These plans suggest that local and district planning agencies have adopted a realist approach to preservation policy. By preparing incentive-based preservation plans, planning authorities have put on their “entrepreneurial glasses” which allow them to see more clearly the financial constraints and caveats associated with preservation. The Israeli case therefore reaffirms current ideas of planning as an entrepreneurial agent (Harvey, 2002; Yiftachel, 2009) seeking to maximize growth. The Israeli example also illustrates that, where market-driven instruments are called to the fore, they can be correlated with increased plan approval rates. On the one hand, incentive-based measures have de facto enlarged the stock of historic properties while adopting flexible preservation methods. On the other hand, however, incentives could become the driving force behind the ideological and political processes of exclusion, appropriation, and geographic and ideological expansion as documented by former research. In addition, incentives that allow changes to existing properties might result in unwanted historicism, Disneyfication, and loss of authenticity owing to large-scale alterations of historic properties. The Politics of Israeli Preservation The growth of incentivized preservation policies can also point to the hidden, less obvious, forces at work here. The data with respect to Israeli preservation plans and their geographic distribution reinforce former research by pointing out where the processes of gentrification, commodification, appropriation of spaces (and heritage), exclusion and spatial expansion have been extensively invoked. The data also show a clear “preservation gap” between Jewish and non-Jewish neighborhoods but, as noted earlier, this gap may be attributable to other factors such as land values, the willingness of public authorities to expose themselves to lawsuits, and the availability of dedicated personnel, resources, and know-how.


Having said all that, the typology of historic properties shows some signs of “awakening” and portrays a greater willingness to embrace, rediscover, and utilize the heritage of the “other.” As shown above, a significant share of preservation plans protects a multitude of heritage types including Ottoman, Islamic, and Palestinian heritage. Thus, the pieces of evidence may support but also challenge the common notion which declares Israeli planning as utterly discriminatory. Planning authorities in Israel (some more than others) have prevented demolitions and loss of many endangered built-heritage assets. These structures have been preserved for future generations and can therefore facilitate future debate and deliberation about their origins, rightful owners, and embedded values. Although preservation can be analyzed along geopolitical lines, the political aspect of preservation is not its only motivation, nor does it explain an interest in a variety of heritage types. Concurrently, the findings suggest that economic boons have contributed to the process of protection of different kinds of historic structures, yet these incentives have not managed to facilitate the process in places where minority groups reside. Moreover, the findings suggest that the bundle of incentives might also bring about exclusionary outcomes because of its intention to create fashionable new places for gentrifiers to live in, while leaving aside the heritage situated in less desirable or peripheral locations. Whether these processes will persevere is unknown. After all, the future is a tricky business in the Middle East. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to thank the Shlomo Glass and Penny Balaban foundation for its support

which made possible the final stages of this project. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Professor Rachelle Alterman, Architect Efrat Vertes, the editor of the Journal of Urban Affairs, and the reviewers for their thoughtful comments. Last but not least, thanks are due to the Gruss-Lipper foundation for its generous support.

ENDNOTES 1 Israel’s population growth rate reached 1.68% in 2009 compared with 0.31% in Greece, 0.23% in Slovenia, and 0.04% in Germany. In 2010, life expectancy in Israel reached an average of 80.7 years, compared with 79.5 in Greece, 78.3 in Slovenia, and 80 years in Germany (OECD, 2010). 2 In 2010 population density in Israel was among the highest in the world: approximately 335 persons per sq/km, compared with 69 persons per sq/km in Jordan, 86 persons per sq/km in Greece, 373 in India, and 406 in Lebanon (United Nations, 2010). 3 Compared with 2008 data, in 2010 prices for three-bedroom apartments in Tel Aviv rose by 46.4%. Prices in the periphery demonstrated a similar rise in real prices. The domestic Israeli phenomenon signals real estate pressures owing to multifarious factors: 93% of land is owned by the State, which has been unsuccessful in releasing more land into the market to answer increasing demand; low interest rates led to a growing host of second-home buyers; in-migration to urban metropolitan areas; strict greenbelt policies and unsuccessful government subsidy policy (Israeli Parliament, 2010). 4 When a national-level plan is an issue, it is ultimately adopted by the Cabinet rather than by government appointed planning agencies. 5 According to section 85 of the Planning and Building Act 1965. 6 Plan approval is governed by Sections 117 and 53 of the Planning and Building Act 1965. 7 Section 93, The Planning and Building Act 1965. 8 According to Ministerial Orders, several NGOs have been recognized a “Public Objectors.” These organizations can submit objections to LPAs and DPCs in which they ask the said planning authorities to refrain from plan approval or to amend proposed development plans. 9 The following key words (in Hebrew) have been used for the purpose of plan identification: preservation, heritage, built heritage, to preserve, history, historical, 4th Annex (the latter relating to specific provisions relating to the preparation of preservation plans under Israeli law). 10 With respect to data about preservation plans, personal communication with NGO executives and government officials also points to the unavailability of coherent documentation. There is no all-exhaustive documentation


of all legally binding preservation plans and there are no official numbers (Omri Shalmon, CEO of The Israeli Council for the Preservation of Buildings and Historic Sites, personal communication, February 9, 2011). In a letter to me from Doron Drukman, the Head of the National Planning Department, February 13, 2011, the Ministry of the Interior mentioned a partial and uncompleted survey of the entire stock of preservation properties which had been initiated in 2008. 11 According to 2010 census data by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 266,500 residents lived in Haifa in 2010, 404,400 resided in Tel Aviv and 780,200 in Jerusalem. 12 For the purpose of categorization, “smaller cities” are defined as cities inhabited by less than 266,500 residents according to 2010 census data by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 13 On September 30, 2013, I visited the archives of the Preservation Team of Jerusalem. In addition, several architects were contacted via phone or email in order to supplement existing information. 14 For example, I contacted architect Samuel Groag in order to collect more information about the preservation plan for the Palestinian village of Lifta. I also contacted architect Aviad Moore of Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality in order to ascertain the type of heritage protected under a few plans.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Nir Y. Mualam is an attorney and planner. A former Gruss-Lipper fellow in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, he now teaches at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology and conducts research on historic preservation, the built heritage, international comparative studies on conflict resolution, and the institutional aspects of planning appeals.