how do voluntary organizations foster protest ... - Wiley Online Library

The Sociological Quarterly ISSN 0038-0253

HOW DO VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS FOSTER PROTEST? THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT ON INDIVIDUAL PROTEST PARTICIPATION tsq_1178

384..407

Nicolás M. Somma* Instituto de Sociología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and University of Notre Dame

Prior research shows that members of voluntary organizations are more likely to protest than nonmembers. But why, among members, do some protest while others do not? I explore whether organizational involvement—the extent in which members engage in the “life” of their organizations—affects protest. I identify four dimensions of involvement—time and money contributions, participation in activities, psychological attachment, and embeddedness in interpersonal communication networks. Only the first dimension has robust effects on protest, and they are nonlinear: intermediate contributors have the highest protest rates. The three other dimensions substantially increase protest only under specific “involvement profiles.”

Social movement scholars agree that individuals embedded in voluntary organizations— “formally organized . . . group[s], most of whose members . . . are not financially recompensed for their participation” (Knoke 1986:2)—are more likely to participate in collective protest than those who are not (see Diani 2004). But we know less about how and why this happens. Empirically, some researchers suggest that being a member of an organization makes a difference (McVeigh and Smith 1999; Passy 2001; Martínez 2005; Lim 2008). Others focus on the number of organizations to which individuals belong (Useem 1980; McAdam 1986; Barkan, Cohn, and Whitaker 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). Some assert that the type of organization matters (for example, McAdam 1986). Other studies examine whether the activities members perform in their organizations (such as attending meetings or doing volunteer work) increase protest chances (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001; Sobieraj and White 2004; Fitzgerald and Spohn 2005). These empirical approaches, reviewed below in more detail, have advanced our understanding on this issue. However, three of them (the membership, counts, and type approaches) do not tell us what specifically matters within organizations—they stop right before the “organization’s door.” The activities approach has the advantage of “getting into” the organization, but ignores that the link between members and their organizations involves much more than just participating in activities. In order to gain a better understanding about how organization members are mobilized for protest, in this article I develop, and test using survey data, a framework *Direct all correspondence to Nicolás M. Somma, Instituto de Sociología, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul (Campus San Joaquín), Casilla 306, Correo 22, Santiago, Chile; e-mail: [email protected] 384

The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

Nicolás M. Somma

Protest and Voluntary Organizations

centered around the notion of organizational involvement. This term broadly refers to the ways in which members participate in the “life” of their organizations. Drawing on the social movement and voluntary organizations literature, I identify four dimensions of organizational involvement at the individual (member) level: commitment of time and money to the organization; psychological attachment to the organization—defined as the feelings, emotions, and beliefs that members have about the organization; participation in specific activities (as the “activities” approach does); and embeddedness in communication networks within the organization. Since organizational involvement requires membership in organizations, I focus on individuals who are members of at least one organization and ask: Why do some members protest while others do not? I show that members vary across the four dimensions of organizational involvement; that some dimensions (but not others) are associated with protest; and that the impact of involvement is not necessarily linear or positive. Because my units are individuals, I cannot examine whether variations in features of organizations foster protest. Rather, I study how differential individual involvement is associated with individual protest participation chances. Instead of just relying on associations between variables, as most research does, I illustrate my findings with the help of four ideal-typical organization members gleaned from the literature. These hypothetical members differ in the ways they get involved in their respective organizations—thus they receive different values in the involvement variables. They are the “classic joiner”—a member fully involved in a variety of ways in the organization; the “checkbook member”—who merely donates money; the “Olsonian member”—who participates in diverse ways in the organization (presumably for obtaining selective incentives) yet without getting psychologically attached to it; and the “hermit member”—who, in opposition to the “Olsonian member,” has strong subjective bonds to the organization but makes little tangible contributions. As expected, these hypothetical members show substantially different protest rates. This article contributes to the literature about organizations and protest in three ways. First, by identifying, conceptualizing, and measuring four dimensions of organizational involvement, it attempts to bring some conceptual order to a research area that has exploded in recent decades. Second, by incorporating these dimensions in multivariate models of protest participation, it disentangles some of the specific mechanisms through which organization members protest. Finally, by giving special attention to the psychological attachment to the organization, it addresses with individual-level data some of the concerns recently raised in the literature about culture, emotions, and social movements (Jasper 1998; Polletta and Jasper 2001). LITERATURE REVIEW: INDIVIDUAL PROTEST AND ORGANIZATIONS Studies repeatedly show that, after controlling for a host of variables, organizational ties and protest participation are positively associated. This finding appears in early case studies, such as McAdam’s research with applicants to the high-risk Freedom Summer Project (McAdam 1986; Fernández and McAdam 1988; McAdam and Paulsen 1993), or The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

385


Nicolás M. Somma

Useem’s (1980) research of the anti-busing movement in Boston. Recent studies representative of broader racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the United States also reach similar conclusions, for example, Fitzgerald and Spohn (2005) studying African Americans; Martínez (2005) studying Latinos; and McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) studying churchgoing Protestants. Likewise, studies using survey data representative of the adult American population also conclude that organizational ties are relevant for protest participation (McVeigh and Smith 1999; Sobieraj and White 2004; Schussman and Soule 2005; Lim 2008). Other research, although explaining differential levels of participation rather than protest participation as such, also point to the key role of organizational ties (for example, Barkan et al. 1995; Passy 2001; see Verhulst and Walgrave 2009 for references to Europe). These studies provide robust and systematic evidence about the relevance of organizations for individual protest participation, yet most of them do not tell us much about why or how organizations matter. Most studies use the “membership approach,” which resorts to dummy variables indicating whether individuals belong to organizations—sometimes stressing the relevance of the type of organization (McAdam 1986; McVeigh and Smith 1999; Passy 2001; Martínez 2005; Lim 2008). Others use the “counts approach,” which resorts to the number of organizational memberships as a predictor of activism (Useem 1980; McAdam 1986; Barkan et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005; Klandermans et al. 2008). Ascertaining that members of certain organizational types, or those with a larger number of organizational ties, are more likely to protest, seems like stopping right before the door of the organization—without “getting into the organization,” where most of the action presumably takes place. A few studies “get into the organization” by focusing on the activities performed by members—activities such as donating money to the organization, volunteering in specific programs, attending meetings, serving on boards or committees, or engaging in political conversations with other members (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001; Sobieraj and White 2004; Fitzgerald and Spohn 2005). This provides a closer look at how organizations shape individual protest than the “membership,” “counts,” and “type” approaches, yet it relies on a restrictive conception of what it means to be tied to voluntary organizations. Specifically, members not only engage in concrete activities, but also commit themselves to the organization by contributing different amounts of time and money, engaging in communications with other members, and becoming psychologically attached to it (as defined in the introduction). My argument, developed below in detail, is that all of these four dimensions could be consequential for protest. Not addressing them explicitly and systematically, as I do here, could limit our understanding of why and how organizations mobilize protestors. In particular, given the calls for more attention to culture and emotions in recent social movement research (Jasper 1998; Polletta and Jasper 2001), it is surprising that the studies reviewed above give so little attention to what I call here psychological attachment (McAdam and Paulsen 1993 is an exception). The literature on culture and emotions, however, is mostly based on qualitative research. A 386


Nicolás M. Somma


contribution of this article, thus, is to operationalize and test quantitatively some statements derived from this literature regarding the role of organizations in protest mobilization. I study participation in collective protest—that is, marches or demonstrations in public places—because protest, “the classical modular form of collective action” (Tarrow [1994] 1998:100), is central for understanding contemporary movements pursuing very diverse goals and ideologies (McCarthy and McPhail 1998; Walgrave and Verhulst 2009). As Olzak and Ryo (2007:1566) assert, “Protest ensures continued public attention on issues that concern the movement’s constituents, and thus it constitutes an important indicator of movement strength.” Next I define four dimensions of organizational involvement and discuss how they could affect members’ protest participation chances. These dimensions appear in the social movement and civic engagement literature, but typically not as connected dimensions within a single framework—as I do here. FOUR DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT Commitment of Time and Money I define commitment to an organization as the extent to which a member contributes to it fungible and scarce personal resources such as money and time.1 Time and money are highly valuable for most people because they are fungible—they can yield gratifications in many areas of life outside organizations—and scarce. Nonetheless, many members decide to make a personal sacrifice (Hirsch 1990) and spend part of their time or money in the organization (Knoke 1981). Because time and money contributions have different implications (discussed below) for participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), in the empirical analysis I measure them separately. There are competing views regarding the impact of time and financial contributions on protest among members with similar time schedules and income levels, respectively. On the one hand, there are three reasons to expect a positive impact. First, those who contribute more time or money could develop higher stakes in the goals of the organization because they feel they are making a greater sacrifice and want this sacrifice to have concrete results. This could motivate them to contribute in additional ways, for instance, protesting on behalf of collective issues compatible with the goals of the organization (Cress, McPherson, and Rotolo 1997). Second, although contributing time or money is often conceptualized as a personal cost (Olson 1965), it may also provide social and emotional rewards (Rule 1988:196; Chong 1991; Snow and Oliver 1994:585; Jasper 1997). This is consistent with research showing the varied benefits of voluntary activity, from improved physical and mental health to increased socioeconomic status and social support (Wilson 2000:231–3). Such benefits and rewards could increase members’ motivation to partake in additional collective enterprises such as protests. Finally, because of the collective nature of organizations, those spending more time (but not money) in organizational activities may broaden their interpersonal networks and be exposed to bloc recruitment—that is, attempts by protest groups to recruit people already organized for other purposes (Oberschall 1973). This increases the likelihood of The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

387


Nicolás M. Somma

being invited to protest, which is a strong predictor of protest participation (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988:708; also Schussman and Soule 2005). On the other hand, larger time and financial contributions could have a negative impact on protest participation. Organization members are typically embedded in other social relationships (for example, family, work, friends, or other associations) which compete for their finite personal resources (Kitts 2000:242). Since members may try to achieve a balance among their multiple demands, those contributing larger amounts of time or money may feel that they are already doing “too much” for the organization, hence, being more reluctant to make additional contributions such as protesting on behalf of related causes (Cress et al. 1997). Participation in Activities When it comes to protest, it may be important not only the amount of time members spend in their organizations, but also the particular activities in which they do so. Two activities may require similar amounts of time yet their impact on protest may differ. Specifically, members attending meetings or doing volunteer work may be more likely to protest because these activities facilitate interaction with other members, expose them to issues and problems of the organization, and eventually prompt actions (such as protesting) for addressing them (Morris 1984; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996). Additionally, because these activities often concentrate large numbers of members and create an auspicious atmosphere for collective action, activists could choose them for implementing “bloc recruitment” strategies (Oberschall 1973; McAdam [1982] 1999). Finally, participation in these activities embeds members in reciprocal expectations for doing things positively valued within the organization, one of which could be protesting on behalf of certain issues (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1227; Chong 1991; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Klandermans 1997; Kitts 2000:245). The structural position members hold in the organization—being such positions linked to specific activities—could also affect protest chances. A first hypothesis is that activities which place members in the upper positions of the organizational hierarchy, such as participating in the organization board, could reduce protest because these members, engaged in strategic planning and execution, have less time available for activities more associated with rank-and-file members. A second hypothesis predicts the opposite. Because they oversee groups of people engaged in different tasks, board members are likely to have high centrality in the organization’s social networks. Centrality, which promoted participation in the Freedom Summer (Fernández and McAdam 1988), exposes these members to assorted personal requests and demands—including protest invitations—which may be hard to reject (Kitts 2000:247). Psychological Attachment Members relate to their organizations not only by participating in its activities or donating time and money, but also by experiencing them in certain ways. Specifically, the 388


Nicolás M. Somma


feelings, emotions, and beliefs that members develop toward the organization create different types of subjective bonds. While prior research on protest participation has given little attention to this aspect, the social movement literature suggests that three bonds—the moral, control, and cognitive bonds—could be relevant for protest participation. The moral bond refers to the perceived alignment between the moral tenets of the member—her “value identity” according to Gecas (2000)—and those supposedly upheld by the organization, for instance, as reflected in its goals, policies, and activities. In her study of commitment in utopian commitments, Kanter (1968:501) suggests that the moral bond is strong when “Demands made by the system [organization in my case] are evaluated as right, as moral, as just, as expressing one’s own values, so that obedience to these demands is a normative necessity.” Because “feelings of responsibility or moral obligation play a crucial role in determining movement participation” (Klandermans 1997:33), the stronger the moral bond between the member and the organization is, the higher the motivation for protesting should be. Specifically, members strongly attached should feel that the activities related to their organizations are more urgent, worthwhile, or necessary than members with a weak moral bond. The former should be more receptive to protest appeals displayed within the organization (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Oberschall 1973) than the latter, hence, being overall more likely to protest (see also Fireman and Gamson 1979:32; Hirsch 1990). By control bond, I refer to the extent to which members feel in control of the purposes and policies of their organization (Knoke 1981). Theorists such as Weber ([1930] 1992), Marx (Tucker 1978), and Habermas (1984) have been concerned with the theme of individuals losing control of the institutions they create collectively. Likewise, social movement scholars suggest that people feeling unable to affect their organizations—disregarding whether such feelings correspond to “reality” or not—should be scarcely motivated to participate in collective action channeled through the organization. For instance, McAdam ([1982] 1999:161) and Klandermans (1997:13) assert that mobilization requires the belief that participation will make a real change, and rational choice analysts claim that people will not invest their time and energy when the expected returns of participation are meager (Chong 1991). By inducing the belief that participation will make a difference, stronger feelings of control over the organization’s policies and activities should favor protest participation, while a weak control bond should dampen it (see also Hirsch 1990:245; Snow and Oliver 1994:578; Passy 2001:185). Finally, I consider the strength of the cognitive bond. It is weak when members view their organizations as “black boxes”—that is, lacking a clear understanding about their logic of action and internal functioning—and strong when they experience their organizations as intelligible or crystalline. (Of course, a strong cognitive bond does not mean members grasp how the organization “really” works.) Durkheim’s ([1893] 1984) description of societies glued by mechanical solidarity, in which the consciousness of each of its members somehow “contains” the way the entire society works, or Marx’s The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

389


Nicolás M. Somma

image of a communist society, where people hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and debate at night (Tucker 1978:147–200), evoke strong cognitive bonds between individuals and their groups. The literature suggests that feelings of uncertainty obstruct protest: when individuals feel unable to grasp the logic of a collective cause, they are less likely to join it, either because they are less confident about their assessments of the risks of protesting (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991) or because they are reluctant to serve a cause that may not be aligned with their interests and values (Snow et al. 1986). Thus, those not feeling well informed about the goals and functioning of their organizations (which indicate a weak cognitive bond) should be less motivated to follow protest appeals displayed in the organization than those feeling better informed (strong cognitive bond). Accordingly, the latter should be more likely to protest than the former.

Embeddedness in Interpersonal Communication Networks Interpersonal communication networks are central for collective protest (McAdam [1982] 1999:46), and they often form and develop within voluntary organizations. Members deeply embedded in the exchange of ideas, opinions, and information about organizational issues with other members should be more likely to protest than those less embedded because in these exchanges they may become aware of protest opportunities, internalize justifications for supporting movement campaigns, and learn about coordinated activities that lower the costs of protesting, for example, group attendance at events (Knoke 1981:143–4; Verba et al. 1995; Kitts 2000:244; Passy 2001; Fisher et al. 2005). Protest chances could also be affected by the position that members hold in the organization’s communication networks. Some members only voice their opinions in relatively open and horizontal settings such as meetings, while other ones only engage in more selective exchanges with staff and officers of the organization. Some refrain from both things, while others do both. The last ones, embedded in communication networks that cut across organizational hierarchies and roles, are likely to be in contact with more heterogeneous sets of members than the rest. According to network theorists (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992), individuals located in heterogeneous networks are exposed to variegated information about different aspects of the social world. Thus, organization members in structural positions like these—who communicate in meetings and also with staff and officers—should be exposed to more abundant and less redundant sources of information and rationales for protesting than the rest. This should increase their protest chances compared with members tied to more restricted networks. For instance, a member fully embedded in communication networks could learn from rank-and-file members that a bus will be hired to attend a protest event as a group, while her contacts with upper-level officers could make her aware of the strategic relevance of such event. It is less clear, however, whether each of these two types of communications—in open meetings, or in more selective exchanges with organization officers—fosters protest independently, or whether they are equally relevant. 390


Nicolás M. Somma


DATA AND METHODS Data Source The American Citizen Participation Study (ACPS), a survey of adults living in the United States in 1989 and 1990 (Verba et al. 1990, 1995), is the only nationally representative survey providing the whole array of measures of organizational involvement and protest participation needed for testing my hypotheses. It also provides information about a host of demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables that have been found to affect protest (details below). Since the survey is almost two decades old it is likely that some of my findings would not hold nowadays. In particular, the spread of new communication technologies may have altered the relevance of face-to-face contacts, which are tapped by some of my measures. Unfortunately, more recent data with comparable level of detail are lacking. Previous research generally focuses on differences in protest participation chances between members of organizations and nonmembers. Because I am interested in variations in organizational involvement, my universe consists of individuals with at least one organizational membership (N = 1,793). My hypotheses follow the most common assumption in the literature—that protest follows organizational involvement (Diani 2004 and Kitts 2000 for reviews of numerous studies based on it). However, this assumption has the limitation of focusing on only one way of a probably two-way relationship. As Diani (2004:339) asserts, “there is a dynamic, diachronic element to this process: while people often become involved in specific movements or campaigns through their preexisting links, their very participation also forges new bonds” (also Verhulst and Walgrave 2009:474). And as demonstrated by research about the individual consequences of activism (for example, McAdam 1989; Giugni 2004 for a review), protest participation may have profound effects on people’s lives, including further involvement in voluntary organizations. Longitudinal data are required to address this important question properly. In the meantime, I interpret the results with caution and try to avoid causal language. Dependent Variable The survey asks whether in the past two years the respondent has “taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue (other than a strike against your employer).” I created a variable in which “yes” = 1 and “no” = 0. Since this is a dichotomous outcome I use binary logistic regression models (Long 1997). Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain to what extent the protest was explicitly promoted by the organization. This could be seen as a limitation for testing my hypotheses, since some of the mechanisms discussed above assume that the protest is tied to the activities or goals of the organization—and this may not always be the case. The literature suggests, however, that a whole array of organizations with diverse goals and activities are structurally tied to protest movements (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; McVeigh, Neblett, and Shafiq 2006). Also, some of the key mechanisms discussed above—for instance, the broadening of interpersonal networks or the acquisition of orientations consistent with The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

391


Nicolás M. Somma

protest movements—are sufficiently general as to take place in different types of organizations. They do not assume an intimate link between the organization and the protest. Theoretical Variables The survey asks whether the respondent is a member in each of the 20 types of voluntary organizations (see details in the “control variables” subsection). If the respondent is a member of more than one type, the survey asks about the organization the respondent considers the “most important” for her, and applies the questions regarding involvement in that organization. I measure commitment of money and time to the organization with a series of dummy variables which are compared with a reference category. Regarding money, I take the amount contributed to the organization (including ordinary dues) in the last year. The reference category is “$0 to $25” and the dummy variables are “$26 to $100,” “$101 to $250,” and “$251 or more.” Regarding time, I take the number of weekly hours devoted to activities of the organization in the last year. The reference category is “0 hour.” The dummy variables represent “1 hour,” “2 to 3 hours,” and “4 hours or more.” I use two indicators of participation in activities of the organization. The first one measures participation in general activities during the last year. It has three categories: did not attend meetings nor participated in other activities such as committees, special projects, or organization of meetings; attended meetings but did not participate in other activities; did both. The first category is the reference category for the last two ones, which are included as dummy variables. Since I hypothesize that participation in activities of the organization increases protest, the coefficients should be positive, with the one representing participation in both types of activities indicating the largest contrast. Second, in order to explore the influence of participation in more restricted spheres or upper hierarchies within the organization, I use a dummy measure indicating whether the respondent served on the board of the organization in the last five years (yes = 1 no = 0). I use three dummy indicators of psychological attachment. For measuring the strength of the moral bond, I use this question: “Overall, would you say that you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly, with the organization’s policies and what it does?” “Disagree strongly,” “disagree somewhat,” and “agree somewhat” are coded as “0” and “Agree strongly” is coded as “1.” For measuring the strength of the cognitive bond, I resort to this question: “In general, how well informed do you feel about what the organization does and about its policies?” “Not well informed” and “somewhat informed” are coded as “0” and “very well informed” is coded as “1.” The third indicator measures the strength of the control bond: “How much control do you feel you have had over the purposes and policies of the organization?” (“none” and “a little” = 0, “some” and “a lot” = 1). Finally, for measuring embeddedness in interpersonal communication networks within the organization, I combine two questions. The first one—“In the last twelve months, has the organization or one of its officers or staff asked your opinion about issues 392


Nicolás M. Somma


confronting the organization?”—indicates communications with members in higher positions (officers) or presumably formal or more stable positions (staff). The second question—“In the last twelve months, have you volunteered your opinion about issues confronting the organization at a meeting?”—taps communications with the broader rank-and-file membership. I created four categories by combining the dichotomous answers (yes/no) to these questions. Respondents who answer negatively to both of them form the reference group, while the three other groups are indicated by dummy variables. I expect the largest difference in terms of protest chances to be observed in the contrast between the reference category and the fully embedded members (with positive answers to both questions) because the latter should have access to more diverse and less redundant information and rationales for protesting. Control Variables I include control variables that, according to past research, could affect protest (see, for instance, McAdam 1986; Verba et al. 1995; McVeigh and Sikkink 2001; Schussman and Soule 2005). Demographic controls include gender (male = 1, female = 0), age (number of years), and race/ethnicity (African American = 1, other = 0). SES measures include the number of years of formal education (from 1 = 1 year to 17 = 17 or more years of education) and family income (midpoint of 16 income categories divided by 1,000). Because the time and energy required for taking care of children could reduce protest, a variable indicates the presence of children living in the home of the respondent (yes = 1, no = 0). Self-reported political ideology ranges from 1 = extremely liberal to 7 = extremely conservative. Following the “counts” approach in past research, I include the number of memberships (excluding the “most important” organization) for capturing the influence of organizations for which involvement measures are not available.And following the“type” approach, which suggests that different types of organizations could vary in their capacity for mobilizing protestors, I use dummy measures for the type of the main organization. Based on previous classifications (Pollock 1982; Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch 2005), I identify four broad types according to explicit goals and areas of action:“social movement organizations” (SMOs), which include organizations advancing the rights of racial or ethnic minorities, nationalities, and women, as well as single-issue organizations; “mainstream political organization” (unions, political parties, and professional organizations); “community service organization” (religious groups besides churches, charitable, and school service organizations); and “recreational organization” (youth, hobby, artistic, sports, and fraternal organizations). Membership in an SMO is the reference category. The three other types are represented by dummy variables. Since SMOs are the locus of protest, I obviously expect their members to be more likely to protest than members of the other types. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. RESULTS Table 2 presents six logistic regression models with protest participation as the dependent variable. The first model only includes the control variables. Models 2 to 5 add one The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

393


Nicolás M. Somma

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics

Dependent and control variables Protested Male Age African American Education Family income Kids at home Conservative Number org. memberships Member of SMO Member of traditional political org. Member of recreational org. Member of community service org. Commitment Up to $25 $26 to $100 $101 to $250 $251 or more 0 hour 1 hour 2 to 3 hours 4 hours or more Participation in activities No meetings nor other activities Only meetings Meetings plus other activities Board member Psychological attachment Strong cognitive bond Strong moral bond Strong control bond Embeddedness in interpersonal communication networks No communication Communication with org. officers/staff but not at meetings Communication at meetings but not with officers/staff Both types of communication

Mean

SD

Range

.14 .50 42.83 .17 14.03 48.23 .48 4.02 2.86 .11 .27 .29 .33

.35 .50 15.53 .38 2.42 38.32 .49 1.42 2.03 .31 .44 .45 .47

0–1 0–1 17–90 0–1 2–17 2.5–200 0–1 1–7 1–14 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

.26 .29 .20 .24 .16 .46 .19 .19

.44 .46 .39 .43 .37 .49 .39 .39

0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

.33 .20 .47 .29

.47 .40 .49 .45

0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

.65 .65 .49

.48 .48 .50

0–1 0–1 0–1

.38 .10 .09 .43

.49 .30 .29 .50

0–1 0–1 0–1 0–1

by one the dimensions of organizational involvement. Model 6 includes all the variables from previous models. The table shows the factor by which the odds of protesting are multiplied as a result of a unit change in each independent variable (odds ratio). To facilitate the reading of the associations, next to each variable, I add the sign of its 394


Nicolás M. Somma


TABLE 2. Effects of Organizational Involvement on Protest Participation (Logistic Models)

Control variables Male (-) Age (-) African American (+) Education (+) Family income (-) Kids at home (-) Conservative (-) Number org. memberships (+) Member traditional pol. org. (-) Member recreational org. (-) Member community serv. org. (-) Commitment $26 to $100 (+) $101 to $250 (+) $251 or more (+) 1 hour (+) 2 to 3 hours (+) 4 hours or more (+) Participation in activities Only meetings (+/-) Meetings plus other activities (+) Board member (-)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

.911 (.131) .964*** (.005) 1.347 (.245) 1.099* (.040) .999 (.001) .593*** (.086) .923† (.044) 1.177*** (.044) .365*** (.080) .274*** (.059) .344*** (.070)

.909 (.133) .962*** (.005) 1.355† (.249) 1.091* (.040) .995 (.002) .574*** (.085) .929 (.044) 1.132** (.045) .359*** (.080) .229*** (.051) .339*** (.070)

.934 (.135) .964*** (.005) 1.303 (.239) 1091* (.040) .995 (.001) .577*** (.085) .923† (.044) 1.136** (.046) .350*** (.078) .256*** (.056) .333*** (.069)

.893 (.129) .962*** (.005) 1.358† (.248) 1.095* (.039) .999 (.001) .594*** (.087) .925 (.044) 1.139** (.044) .400*** (.090) .262*** (.057) .349*** (.072)

.927 (.134) .963*** (.005) 1.346 (.246) 1.095* (.040) .999 (.001) .579*** (.085) .925 (.044) 1.129** (.045) .350*** (.077) .252*** (.055) .336*** (.069)

.896 (.133) .962*** (.005) 1.353 (.251) 1.085* (.040) .999 (.002) .570*** (.085) .929 (.044) 1.110* (.047) .393*** (.092) .244*** (.056) .350*** (.074)

1.566* (.325) 1.876** (.416) 1.519† (.351) 1.755* (.459) 3.212*** (.916) 2.050* (.613)

1.522* (.319) 1.800** (.405) 1.448 (.339) 1.437 (.402) 2.310** (.738) 1.457 (.482) 1.142 (.263) 1.877** (.365) .927 (.165)


.896 (.230) 1.272 (.300) .777 (.149)

395


Nicolás M. Somma

TABLE 2. Continued Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Psychological attachment Strong cognitive bond (+) Strong moral bond (+) Strong control bond (+) Embeddedness in interpersonal communic. networks Communic. w/org. officers/staff but not at meetings (+/-) Communic. at meetings but not with officers/staff (+) Both types of communication (+) Pseudo-R2

Model 4

Model 5

1.425† (.259) 1.259 (.219) 1.374* (.217)

.1090

.1311

.1186

.1178

Model 6 1.245 (.237) 1.249 (.222) 1.209 (.220)

1.083

.952

(.285)

(.258)

1.717*

1.274

(.454)

(.374)

1.787** (.320) .1188

1.120 (.270) .1419

Notes: The table presents the odds ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 1,793 in all models. Next to each variable appears the sign of the association across models. “(+/-)” means that the sign changes across models. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, †p < 0.10.

association with protest across the models (disregarding significance levels, which are presented with the conventional asterisks). No collinearity problems were detected—all variables have variance inflation factors (VIFs) below 3.0. Because only 1,382 of the 1,793 members have complete information on all variables, I employ multiple imputation using Stata’s ICE and MIM commands (Royston 2004, 2005). Multiple imputation is generally superior to conventional methods (for example, listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, dummy variable adjustment, or single imputation) for several reasons: it does not require dropping observations (as in listwise deletion); it assumes that the data are missing at random rather than missing completely at random—a stronger assumption required by the other methods; and it produces approximately unbiased and efficient estimates, as well as appropriate standard errors—which is not the case for single imputation (Schafer 1999; Allison 2002; Cohen et al. 2003; also see Allison 2000; Newman 2003 for simulations demonstrating some of these claims). Results in model 1 are consistent with prior research on protest participation. Older organization members, those having children at home, and to a lesser extent more conservative members, are significantly less likely to protest. More educated members, and to a lesser extent African-American members, are more likely to do so. Consistent 396


Nicolás M. Somma


with the “count” and “type” approaches in past research, being tied to a larger number of organizations, and being member of an SMO (compared with other organizational types), increases protest chances. Model 2 includes the indicators of commitment to the organization, as indicated by contributions of money and time. Regarding money, those contributing any of the three amounts included as dummy variables ($26 to $100, $101 to $250, and $251 or more) are more likely to protest than those who contribute up to $25. Interestingly, the relationship does not seem to be linear. The sharper contrast occurs between small or noncontributors (up to $25) and those contributing between $101 and $250: the latter are about 88 percent more likely to protest than the former (p < 0.001). However, those contributing between $26 and $100 are (only) about 57 percent more likely to protest than small or noncontributors (p < 0.05). And the largest contributors—those who give $251 or more yearly to the organization—are about 52 percent more likely to protest than the reference group—but the association is significant only at the 0.10 level. Thus, although moderate to large financial contributors are more likely to protest than nonand small contributors, the contrast is stronger for intermediate contributors ($101 to $250). A similar finding holds for time contributions. Those spending some weekly time in the organization (be it 1, 2 to 3, or 4 or more hours) are significantly more likely to protest than those who do not spend time at all (reference category). However, the sharpest difference occurs between noncontributors and those who spend from 2 to 3 hours in activities, with the latter being more than three times more likely to protest than the former (b = 3.21, p < 0.001). Small (1 hour) and large (4 hours or more) time contributors are more likely to protest than noncontributors, but the odds ratio are smaller (b = 1.75 and b = 2.05, respectively) and the associations less significant (p < 0.05) than for intermediate contributors. In sum, although more commitment of time and money to the organization is generally associated with higher chances of protesting, those at intermediate levels of commitment (in both resources) are especially prone to do so. In the next section I provide a possible interpretation of this unexpected pattern. Model 3 includes the indicators of participation in activities of the organization. Those only attending meetings are more likely to protest than those who do not participate at all, but the association is not significant. However, those who not only attend meetings but also participate in other types of activities such as committees, special projects, or meetings organization are 88 percent more likely to protest than nonparticipants (p < 0.01). Meetings, by themselves, seem insufficient for creating and sustaining the type of interpersonal ties that facilitate mobilization. It is only when members engage in additional organizational activities that they become significantly more likely to protest than nonparticipants. Finally, participation in the board of the organization is negatively associated with protest, but the relationship is not significant. Model 4 includes the indicators of psychological attachment to the organization. Although the three of them are positively associated with protest, as expected, only two The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

397


Nicolás M. Somma

are significant—and one of them marginally. Members with a strong control bond— that is, feeling one has a lot of control over the purposes and policies of the organization—are more likely to protest than members who do not (b = 1.37, p < 0.05). Those with a strong cognitive bond—that is, feeling very well informed about the actions and policies of the organization—are more likely to protest than those feeling less knowledgeable, but this is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). Finally, against my expectations, a stronger moral bond—strongly agreeing with the organization’s goals and policies—is not significantly associated with protest. Model 5 includes the three indicators of embeddedness in interpersonal communication networks within the organization. As expected, as the size of the coefficients and significance of the associations (all of them positive) increase, the more embedded members are in communication networks. Those who not only communicate in open and presumably horizontal organizational spaces such as meetings, but also have regular contacts with officers and staff members, are about 1.79 times more likely to protest than those who do not engage in either form of communication (p < 0.01). Considering separately each form of embeddedness, communication in meetings is significantly associated with protest (b = 1.71, p < 0.05) but communication with staff and officers is not. This suggests that the information and rationales for protesting that circulate in broader organizational spaces could be more consequential for protest than those obtained in more circumscribed contacts with organization leaders. Because prior research suggests that the contributions of different dimensions of involvement to protest may be intertwined, model 6 includes all the variables in previous models. The first remarkable finding is that, excepting the indicators of commitment, all the variables of involvement are now insignificant. The second noticeable finding is that the indicators of commitment, although less significant than in model 2, are still systematically associated with protest. Thus, regarding money, moderate ($26 to $100) and intermediate ($101 to $250) contributors are, respectively, 52 percent and 80 percent more likely to protest than small and noncontributors (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively). Likewise, intermediate time contributors (2 to 3 hours) are 2.3 times more likely to protest than those who do not contribute time to the organization (p < 0.01). Since the associations between organizational involvement and protest could vary across organizational contexts, I also carried out model 6 for the members of each organizational type separately. Partially because such operation reduces too much the sample size, it becomes harder to detect significant associations. Yet the results (available upon request) are consistent with model 6 in that all significant associations except one involve commitment measures. In order to assess the substantive (and not only statistical) significance of organizational involvement, Table 3 presents the estimated probabilities of protesting for idealtypical members that differ in the ways they get involved in their organizations. These ideal types aim at illustrating some stereotypes gleaned from the literature on civic engagement and collective action in the United States. Of course, many other types could be built. The estimations are based on model 6 (Table 2), with control variables set to their means (if interval or ordinal) or modal values (if nominal). 398


Nicolás M. Somma


TABLE 3. Estimated Probability of Protesting for Four Ideal-Typical Organization Members Ideal-typical member

P (protest)

“Classic joiner” “Checkbook member” “Olsonian member” “Hermit”

0.15 0.06 0.11 0.07

Our first ideal type is the “classic joiner”—a member fully involved in a variety of ways in the organization. Its long pedigree can be traced from the surprisingly gregarious people that de Tocqueville ([1835] 1947) intuited in the early 1830s, and that Schlesinger (1944) portrayed with greater historical rigor much later to Putnam’s (2000) civically engaged American presumably in decline nowadays. The organization in question may indistinctly be a religious congregation, an artistic group, a charity institution, a union, or a parent–teacher association: the common thread is that this classic American joiner is deeply involved in it in a variety of ways. I try to capture the essence of this member with the following “involvement profile”: she makes yearly contributions of $251 or more to the organization, spends four or more weekly hours in its activities, participates in meetings and other activities, is a board member, has strong moral, cognitive, and control bonds with the organization, and communicates her opinions both at meetings and with staff and officers. According to my estimation using model 6, this member has about a 15 percent chance of protesting. The second ideal type is the “checkbook member,” whose organizational involvement “consists in writing a check for dues or perhaps occasionally reading a newsletter. Few ever attend any meetings of such organizations . . . and most members are unlikely ever knowingly to encounter any other member” (Putnam 2000:52). It is important to consider this type of member because as a result of complex technological, demographic, and institutional changes in recent decades, it could be replacing the “classic joiner” in America’s civic landscape (Skocpol 2003). In my simulation, this hypothetical member contributes yearly between $26 and $100 to the organization, does not participate in activities nor contributes time, has weak moral, cognitive, and control bonds to the organization, and does not engage in any type of communications with other members. Not surprisingly, this member has about a 6 percent chance of protesting— two and a half times less than the classic joiner. The third ideal type is the Olsonian seeker of selective incentives (Olson 1965), which has inspired recent developments in the collective action literature (Chong 1991; Marwell and Oliver 1993). This member gets involved in the organization with the only purpose of obtaining selective incentives—that is, benefits provided only to those who participate—or avoiding punishments for inaction, both of which can be material or social. For instance, he participates in activities or donates time in order to make new friends, gain social approval, or have free lunches; he talks to other members in order to take advantage of employment opportunities; and he donates money to avoid being seen as avaricious. To reflect these features, I assume that this member makes high The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

399


Nicolás M. Somma

contributions in time (4 weekly hours or more) and money ($251 a year or more), participates in meetings and other activities, is a board member, and is fully embedded in communication networks. So far, it looks identical to the classic joiner. The big difference, though, concerns the subjective bonds to the organization. As the classic joiner, the Olsonian member has a strong cognitive bond to the organization—a reasonable assumption given her high levels of activity. But her moral bond is weak—there is little room in Olson’s theory for strong moral attachments—and the same happens with the control bond—Olson’s theory deals mainly with large groups, hard to influence by individual members. Leaving aside the complex discussion about the best way of operationalizing Olson, this member has about an 11 percent chance of protesting, which puts it in an intermediate position between the classic joiner (15 percent) and the checkbook member (6 percent). The fourth and last ideal type is almost the opposite of the Olsonian member: it displays strong subjective bonds to the organization but little activity in or tangible contributions to it. Sociologists of religion differentiate between private and public or institutional religiosity—the first referring to personal beliefs and private rituals, the second referring to engagement in religious organizations and collective rituals. They suggest that some individuals may have a strong private religiosity but a weak institutional religiosity (for example, Cornwall et al. 1986; Ellison, Gay, and Glass 1989). Likewise, resource mobilization theorists (McCarthy and Zald 1977) identify the category of “adherents,” or individuals who share the goals and moral tenets of a social movement without actively contributing to it. Both strands of research suggest that some individuals may strongly identify with the philosophy and goals of a group or organization, and perhaps even feel knowledgeable about it, but for whatever reason be unable or unwilling to participate and contribute intensely. This “hermit” member— labeled as such to denote her strong beliefs but scarce participation in “mundane” organizational affairs—is operationalized as follows: he contributes no more than $25 a year, spends less than one weekly hour in the organization, has only attended meetings last year (without participating in additional activities), is not a board member, and does not engage in communications with other members, but has strong moral, knowledge, and control bonds. Hermits have about a 7 percent chance of protesting, slightly above checkbook members (6 percent), and way below Olsonians and especially classic joiners. This simulation exercise suggests at least two things. First, organizational involvement is not a silver bullet for mobilization. Only one in about six or seven “classic joiners”—the archetype of the involved member—protested in the last two years. Second, organizational involvement still does matter substantively: “classic joiners” are between two and three times more likely to protest than hermits and checkbook members, and Olsonians are almost two times more likely to do so than the latter. Speculating at the organizational rather than individual level of analysis, these results suggest that the mobilization capacity of organizations could be greatly affected by the way in which their members are distributed across these four ideal types. For instance, an organization with 100 members, 70 of which are “classic joiners” and 10 of which belong to each of the three remaining types, would have almost 13 protestors. However, 400


Nicolás M. Somma


an organization of the same size with a different distribution—for instance, 70 “checkbook members” and 10 members in each of the remaining types—would only yield between 7 and 8 protestors. CONCLUSIONS Extensive research shows that members of organizations are more likely to protest than nonmembers, but this leaves open the question of why and how organizations matter. Since not all organization members protest, it is clear that organizations do not mobilize their members automatically or inevitably. So why do some members protest while others do not? In this article, I have focused on the extent and ways in which members get involved. What do members do in, and for, their organizations? What do they think and feel about them? And how do these actions, thoughts, and feelings affect their protest chances? By addressing these questions, this article advances our understanding of the role of organizations in protest mobilization in three ways: (1) conceptualizing and measuring a broader range of dimensions of organizational involvement than in past research, including the often ignored psychological attachment; (2) providing a systematic assessment of their associations with protest participation (net of other factors); and (3) examining the substantive significance of these associations using four theoretically grounded ideal types of organization members. Three conclusions emerge. First, the independent contribution of three of the four dimensions of organizational involvement—psychological attachment, participation in activities, and embeddedness in communication networks—is meager. Only when members have specific “involvement profiles” that combine these dimensions in different ways do we see considerable variation in protest chances. Second, not all dimensions of organizational involvement matter the same for protest mobilization. Commitment—as expressed in time and money contributions—seems to be the most relevant one. Finally, the impact of involvement is not necessarily linear or positive. Regarding this last point, it is surprising that intermediate—rather than the heaviest—contributors are the ones more likely to protest. It is hard with these data to make sense of this unexpected finding, but here I sketch a provisional interpretation resorting to the mechanisms presented in the corresponding section. At low levels of time and money contributions, additional contributions boost a desire for seeing the organization thriving, provide “consumatory” benefits—derived from the intrinsic pleasure of contributing—or more tangible ones, enlarge interpersonal networks and, especially for time contributions, expose members to bloc recruitment attempts. These processes make members more likely to contribute in additional ways, such as protesting for causes somehow related to—or at least compatible with—the organization. However, after a certain threshold, members become reluctant to continue contributing in other ways, because large contributions of personal resources generate tensions with competing social relationships (work, family, and so on) and may lead to burnout. Of course, this is not the only possible interpretation of these findings. Members’ The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

401


Nicolás M. Somma

worldviews, values, and identities may also change as a result of increased time or money contributions, and this—rather than incentives and opportunities—could also shape their subsequent chances of protesting. Because this study looks at variations among individuals rather than among organizations, its findings cannot be automatically extrapolated across these levels. However, these findings may inform strategies for organizations interested in mobilizing protestors—a small but growing sector according to the “movement society thesis” (McCarthy and McPhail 1998; Soule and Earl 2005). For instance, “extracting” moderate amounts of time and money from members could increase protest, but doing so excessively could actually make members less available for protest. Likewise, organizations willing to increase their mobilization capacity could try to change the distribution of their members across the four ideal types presented above—for instance, by focusing on recruiting “classic joiners” instead of “hermits” and “checkbook members,” or by trying to “transform” the latter two into the former. Future research on protest and organizational involvement could go beyond this article in many ways, such as using better measures and adding new dimensions of organizational involvement; using longitudinal data to disentangle the reciprocal influences between protest and organizational involvement; focusing on particular organizational types; using more recent data; incorporating information about characteristics of the organizations (and not only their members); exploring whether the organization explicitly supported the protests; and examining a more varied array of activist outcomes besides protest participation. Finally, the Citizen Participation Study, impressive as it is for building measures of organizational involvement, does not provide information about all variables potentially relevant for protest participation. For instance, it lacks information about cultural tastes and moral schemas—variables that, by shaping the composition of people’s social networks, could indirectly influence protest (Lizardo 2006; Vaisey and Lizardo Forthcoming; Vaisey 2009). Measures of value orientations that could affect protest participation, such as materialism-postmaterialism (Inglehart 1990), are also absent. The same happens with genetic variables, which according to recent research (Bearman 2008) may affect assorted individual-level outcomes—and eventually protest, too.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Rosina González, John McCarthy, Rory McVeigh, Dan Myers, Jackie Smith, Florencia Torche, the members of the Notre Dame Working Group on Politics and Movements, three anonymous reviewers, and the editors of The Sociological Quarterly for excellent comments and suggestions. Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2007 Joint Meeting of the North Central Sociological Association and Midwest Sociological Society (Chicago) and the 2007 Workshop of the Collective Behavior and Social Movements section of the American Sociological Association (New York). 402


Nicolás M. Somma


NOTE 1

Sociologists conceptualize “commitment” to a group or organization in several ways: as the continued belonging to the group across time (Taylor 1989:766; Cress et al. 1997:63; Klandermans 1997:29; Vaisey 2007: 856); as the affective bonds linking the individual to the group (Kanter 1968:500; Snow and Oliver 1994:58; Klandermans 1997:30); as the propensity to follow group norms and obey its authorities (Kanter 1968:501); and as the contribution of personal resources to a specific group (Cress et al. 1997:63) instead of other ones (Becker 1960:33; see also Wiltfang and McAdam’s (1991:989) conceptualization of “cost”). I follow the last conceptualization because other ones—for example, commitment as affective bonds—are partially considered in my other dimensions of involvement, and because of data availability—I have information about resources (money and time) contributed to the organization.

REFERENCES Allison, Paul D. 2000. “Multiple Imputation for Missing Data—A Cautionary Tale.” Sociological Methods & Research 28:301–9. ——. 2002. Missing Data. Sage University Papers Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-136. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Barkan, Steven E., Steven F. Cohn, and William H. Whitaker. 1995. “Beyond Recruitment: Predictors of Differential Participation in a National Anti-Hunger Organization.” Sociological Forum 10:113–34. Bearman, P. 2008. “Exploring Genetics and Social Structure. Introduction.” American Journal of Sociology 114:I–VI. Becker, H. S. 1960. “Notes on the Concept of Commitment.” American Journal of Sociology 66:32–40. Burt, Ronald S. 1992. Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chong, Dennis. 1991. Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken. 2003. Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. 3rd ed. London, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cornwall, M., S. L. Albrecht, P. H. Cunningham, and B. L. Pitcher. 1986. “The Dimensions of Religiosity. A Conceptual Model with an Empirical Test.” Review of Religious Research 27:226– 44. Cress, Daniel M., J. Miller McPherson, and Thomas Rotolo. 1997.“Competition and Commitment in Voluntary Memberships: The Paradox of Persistence and Participation.” Sociological Perspectives 40:61–79. Curtis, Russell and Louis Zurcher. 1973. “Stable Resources of Protest Movements: The Multiorganizational Field.” Social Forces 52:53–61. Diani, Mario. 2004. “Networks and Participation.” Pp. 339–59 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Durkheim, Emile. [1893] 1984. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press. Ellison, C. G., D. A. Gay, and T. A. Glass. 1989. “Does Religious Commitment Contribute to Individual Life Satisfaction?” Social Forces 68:100–23. The Sociological Quarterly 51 (2010) 384–407 © 2010 Midwest Sociological Society

403


Nicolás M. Somma

Fernández, R. and D. McAdam 1988. “Social Networks and Social Movements. Multiorganizational Fields and Recruitment to Mississippi Freedom Summer” Sociological Forum 3:357–82. Fireman, Bruce and William Gamson. 1979. “Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective.” Pp. 8–44 in The Dynamics of Social Movements, edited by Mayer Zald and John McCarthy. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop. Fisher, Dana R., Kevin Stanley, David Berman, and Gina Neff. 2005. “How Do Organizations Matter? Mobilization and Support for Participants at Five Globalization Protests.” Social Problems 52:102–21. Fitzgerald, S. T. and R. E. Spohn. 2005. “Pulpits and Platforms: The Role of the Church in Determining Protest among Black Americans.” Social Forces 84(2):1015–48. Gecas, Viktor. 2000. “Value Identities, Self-Motives, and Social Movements.” Pp. 93–109 in Self, Identity, and Social Movements, edited by Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Giugni, Marco G. 2004. “Personal and Biographical Consequences.” Pp. 489–507 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David Snow, Sarah Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American Journal of Sociology 78(6):1360– 80. Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Hirsch, Eric. 1990. “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and Commitment in a Student Social Movement.” American Sociological Review 55:243–54. Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jasper, James M. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. ——. 1998. “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements.” Sociological Forum 13:397–424. Kanter, R. M. 1968. “Commitment and Social Organization. A Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities.” American Sociological Review 33:499–517. Kitts, James A. 2000. “Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and Participation in Social Movement Organizations.” Mobilization: An International Journal 5:241–57. Klandermans, B., J. van der Toorn, and J. van Stekelenburg. 2008. “Embeddedness and Identity: How Immigrants Turn Grievances into Action.” American Sociological Review 73:992–1012. Klandermans, Bert. 1997. The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Knoke, David. 1981. “Commitment and Detachment in Voluntary Associations.” American Sociological Review 46:141–58. ——. 1986. “Associations and Interest Groups” Annual Review of Sociology 12:1–21. Lim, C. 2008. “Social Networks and Political Participation: How Do Networks Matter?” Social Forces 87:961–82. Lizardo, O. 2006. “How Cultural Tastes Shape Personal Networks.” American Sociological Review 71:778–807. Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. McAdam, D. 1986. “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism—The Case of Freedom Summer.” American Journal of Sociology 92:64–90. ——. 1989. “The Biographical Consequences of Activism.” American Sociological Review 54:744– 60.

404


Nicolás M. Somma


——. [1982] 1999. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D. and R. Paulsen. 1993.“Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism.” American Journal of Sociology 99(3):640–67. McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. 1988. “Social Movements.” Pp. 695–737 in Handbook of Sociology, edited by Neil Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. McCarthy, John D. and Clark McPhail. 1998. “The Institutionalization of Protest in the United States.” Pp. 83–110 in The Social Movement Society. Contentious Politics for a New Century, edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. McCarthy, John D. and Mark Wolfson. 1996. “Resource Mobilization by Local Social Movement Organizations: The Role of Agency, Strategy and Structure.” American Sociological Review 61:1070–88. McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social-Movements— Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82(6):1212–41. McVeigh, Rory, Carl Neblett, and Sarah Shafiq. 2006. “Explaining Social Movement Outcomes: Multiorganizational Fields and Hate Crime Reporting.” Mobilization 11:23–49. McVeigh, Rory and David Sikkink. 2001. “God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the Legitimation of Contentious Tactics.” Social Forces 79(4):1425–58. McVeigh, Rory and Christian Smith. 1999. “Who Protests in America: An Analysis of Three Political Alternatives—Inaction, Institutionalized Politics, or Protest.” Sociological Forum 14(4):685–702. Martínez, L. 2005. “Yes We Can: Latino Participation in Unconventional Politics” Social Forces 84:135–55. Marwell, Gerald and Pamela Oliver. 1993. The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Morris, Aldon. 1984. Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change. New York: Free Press. Newman, Daniel A. 2003. “Longitudinal Modeling with Randomly and Systematically Missing Data: A Simulation of ad hoc, Maximum Likelihood, and Multiple Imputation Techniques.” Organizational Research Methods 6:328–62. Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Olzak, S. and E. Ryo. 2007. “Organizational Diversity, Vitality and Outcomes in the Civil Rights Movement.” Social Forces 85:1561–91. Passy, Florence. 2001. “Socialization, Connection, and the Structure/Agency Gap: A Specification of the Impact of Networks on Participation in Social Movements.” Mobilization: An International Journal 6:173–92. Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper. 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 27:283–305. Pollock, Philip H. 1982. “Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does Group Activity Affect Political Participation?” American Journal of Political Science 26:485–503. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Royston, Patrick. 2004. “Multiple Imputation of Missing Values.” The Stata Journal 4:227–41.


405


Nicolás M. Somma

——. 2005. “Multiple Imputation of Missing Values: Update.” The Stata Journal 5:188–201. Rule, James. 1988. Theories of Civil Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. Schafer, Joseph L. 1999. “Multiple Imputation: A Primer.” Statistical Methods in Medical Research 8:3–15. Schussman, Alan and Sarah A. Soule. 2005. “Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation.” Social Forces 84(2):1083–108. Schlesinger, Arthur M. 1944. “Biography of a Nation of Joiners.” The American Historical Review 50(1):1–25. Skocpol, Theda. 2003. Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Snow, David A. and Pamela E. Oliver. 1994. “Social Movements and Collective Behavior: Social Psychological Dimensions and Considerations.” Pp. 571–99 in Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology edited by Karen S. Cook, Gary A. Fine, and James House. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51:464–81. Snow, David A., Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson. 1980. “Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment.” American Sociological Review 45:787–801. Sobieraj, Sarah and Deborah White. 2004. “Taxing Political Life: Reevaluating the Relationship between Voluntary Association Membership, Political Engagement, and the State.” The Sociological Quarterly 45:739–64. Soule, Sarah A. and Jennifer Earl. 2005. “A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States, 1960–1986.” Mobilization: An International Journal 10:345–64. Tarrow, Sidney. [1994] 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Verta. 1989. “Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance.” American Sociological Review 54:761–75. de Tocqueville, Alexis. [1835] 1947. Democracy in America. New York: Oxford University Press. Tucker, Robert C., ed. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader. New York: W.W. Norton. Useem, Bert. 1980. “Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement” American Sociological Review 45:357–69. Vaisey, S. 2007. “Structure, Culture, and Community: The Search for Belonging in 50 Urban Communes.” American Sociological Review 72:851–73. ——. 2009. “Motivation and Justification: A Dual-Process Model of Culture in Action.” American Journal of Sociology 114:1675–715. Vaisey, S. and Omar Lizardo. Forthcoming. “Can Cultural Worldviews Influence Network Composition?” Social Forces N.d. Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman, Henry E. Brady, and Norman Nie. 1990. American Citizen Participation Study, [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center (NORC) [producer], 1995. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1995. Retrieved in January 2005.

406


Nicolás M. Somma


Verhulst, J. and S. Walgrave. 2009. “The First Time Is the Hardest? A Cross-National and CrossIssue Comparison of First-Time Protest Participants.” Political Behavior 31:455–84. Walgrave, S. and J. Verhulst. 2009. “Government Stance and Internal Diversity of Protest: A Comparative Study of Protest against the War in Iraq in Eight Countries.” Social Forces 87:1355–87. Weber, Max. [1930] 1992. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London, UK: Routledge Classics. Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart, and Franziska Deutsch. 2005. “Social Capital, Voluntary Associations and Collective Action: Which Aspects of Social Capital Have the Greatest ‘Civic’ Payoff?” Journal of Civil Society 1:121–46. Wilson, John. 2000. “Volunteering.” Annual Review of Sociology 26:215–40. Wiltfang, Greg and Doug McAdam. 1991. “Distinguishing Cost and Risk in Sanctuary Activism.” Social Forces 69:987–1010.


407