How to support sensing capabilities in highly volatile ...

Copyright © eContent Management Pty Ltd. Journal of Management & Organization (2012) 18(6): 774–794.

How to support sensing capabilities in highly volatile situations ERIK J DE WAARD*, HENK W VOLBERDA+ AND JOSEPH SOETERS*,! *Netherlands Defense Academy, Breda, The Netherlands; +Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; !Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Abstract: In the scholarly debate on how to deal with hypercompetition, a dominant logic has become that investing in ‘sensing’, ‘seizing’, and ‘transforming’ dynamic capabilities offers organizations the potential to repetitively initiate business innovations. Actual research into the micro-foundations of these dynamic capabilities has been limited. This study explores whether modular organizing and lateral coordination are typical processes that support an organization’s sensing function. Empirically the study investigates how these two variables help The Netherlands armed forces to deal with its volatile crisis response environment. The findings show that both predictors stimulate the development of a broad knowledge base from which the organization can operationally benefit. Yet, the study has also uncovered that, when modularity’s demand of organizational autonomy is not sufficiently satisfied, the organization becomes preoccupied with its own internal functioning at the expense of its external lateral sensing capacity.

Keywords: armed forces, dynamic capabilities, lateral coordination, modular organizing, sensing function

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n the scholarly debate on dealing with hypercompetition one dominant logic to emerge is that investing in dynamic capabilities offers organizations the potential to keep coming up with business innovations (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat, 1997; Makadok, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Recently, Helfat and Peteraf (2009) have tried to organize a number of key papers of the ‘dynamic capabilities view’ into a basic chain of logic. One of their central arguments is that organizations have to look for ways of improving their ability to constantly identify new business opportunities – and that means investing in ‘sensing’ dynamic capabilities, such as external knowledge integration (Tripsas, 1997), market orientation (Menguc & Auh, 2006), strategic political management (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008), and building social networks (FernándezPérez, Del Mar Fuentes-Fuentes, & Bojica, 2012). What the chain of logic also makes clear is that these dynamic capabilities rest on changeoriented processes. More specifically, Teece (2007, p. 1323) argues that organizational processes have to be put into place ‘to garner new technical information, tap developments in exogenous science, monitor customer needs and competitor activity, and shape new products and process opportunities’. As yet, actual research in this area has hardly been undertaken (Helfat et al., 2007).

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The present study was initiated to shed more light on this blind spot in the dynamic capabilities literature by proposing that a combination of two particular design parameters – modular organizing (MO) and lateral coordination (LC) – offers firms the ability to tap into different knowledge sources, to keep sensing opportunities and threats, and to identify adequate organizational responses. Modular organizing – or modularity – can be seen as a typical reconfiguration process with major sensing advantages. In short, modularity is about creating new system configurations by recombining new or existing independent components (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Langlois, 2002; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Within an organizing context, the principle of modularity stimulates the reallocation of functional and professional expertise into changeable temporary organizational structures, which supports the acquisition, transformation, and exploitation of external knowledge (Karim, 2006; Van den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). Lateral coordination has been defined as a typical organizational learning process that facilitates intra- and inter-organizational information sharing, making it possible for organizations to develop a richer knowledge environment and reach beyond their conventional business insights (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Tsai, 2002; Van de Ven, 1986). Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

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How to support sensing capabilities in highly volatile situations

To learn more about how MO and LC affect an organization’s sensing function (SF), the study draws upon experiences of The Netherlands armed forces deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a broader sense, it uses the expeditionary crisis response task setting of many of today’s Western armed forces as a metaphor for organizations confronted with hypercompetition. Although the ultimate consequences of suffering casualties during military operations are quite different from the socio-economic losses of competitive battles, a comparison can be made on a more abstract organizational level. To be more precise, organizations operating within a hypercompetitive environment typically have to react to urgent ad hoc problems as well as to rather predictable change demands (Winter, 2003). They therefore need underlying organizational processes that can combine a systematic way of sensing threats and opportunities with an improvised learningby-doing approach. In this kind of context, knowledge from the military domain could well be beneficial. Firstly, almost all expeditionary crisis response operations are unique endeavors but are conducted by tasks forces that are grouped along very similar functional lines. This shows that the armed forces have found a way of reacting systematically to very distinctive crisis situations. Secondly, a military task force finds itself in a permanent state of flux. It needs to constantly react to changing local circumstances in order to keep or regain the initiative, it has to cope on an ongoing basis with intelligent actors actively trying to undermine its operations, and it needs to react at high speed all the time in order to stay ahead of the game. Under these constantly changing operational circumstances, ad hoc organizational sensing – or, in military terms, achieving continuous situational awareness (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 2000) – has become a critical success factor for repeatedly outsmarting the opponent and staying on top of the situation. The reasoning above has led to the following research question: To what extent do MO and LC support the SF of The Netherlands armed forces in coping with the volatility of crisis response deployment? To answer this question Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

the paper is divided in five main sections. From a theoretical perspective the first section explains the relationship between organizational sensing, MO, and LC. The second section discusses the study’s methodological foundations. It explains that empirically the study consists of two parts. First, a large-scale survey was carried out among 1,208 senior officers of The Netherlands armed forces, and, second, focused interviews were conducted with 18 representatives of the organization’s strategic apex. The actual empirical results are presented in the third section. In general, the findings show that MO and LC indeed stimulate the development of a broad knowledge base which the armed forces can benefit from operationally. However, the study has also revealed that, when modularity’s demand of near-decomposability is not sufficiently satisfied, the organization becomes preoccupied with its own internal functioning at the expense of its external sensing capacity. The fourth section discusses how organizations in general can take advantage of these domain-specific research findings and specifies avenues for further research. With an overall conclusion the fifth section ends the paper. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES Organizational sensing Organizational sensing refers to an organization’s ability to fathom its complex relationship with the outside world. Sensing depends not just on the activation of an information system that serves as a kind of antenna to pick up signals from the environment, but is perhaps even more about giving meaning to the often equivocal environmental signals that are being picked up. In this process of giving meaning, organizations have to be aware of the fact that they are constantly interacting with their environment and thus are playing an active role in how it is shaped (Hedberg, 1981; Weick, 1979). This situation makes it impossible for organizations to observe and judge their environment truly objectively. Yet being biased does not have to be problematic as long as organizations are capable of establishing a workable level of certainty and do not fall into the cognitive trap of ‘believing is seeing’ (Weick, 1979, p. 3). JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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Erik J de Waard, Henk W Volberda and Joseph Soeters

With these complicated issues, the existing literature treats organizational sensing as a multidimensional construct. Kiesler and Sproull (1982) argue that organizational sensing is made up of three distinctive cognitive processes: (1) noticing, (2) interpreting, and (3) incorporating stimuli. Noticing refers to the process by which managers distinguish potentially threatening or valuable stimuli from the variety of stimuli that surround them. Environmental scanning systems and procedures are important facilitators of this process. They define interpreting as managers constructing meaning for, or assigning meaning to, the stimuli they pay particular attention to. Explicit organizational reference points, such as formulated goals, policies, and strategies, can help managers in making this kind of interpretation. Incorporating stimuli has to do with the organization’s ability to tap into relevant information sources and into its own memory base in order to associate the interpreted stimuli with other existing, or previously obtained cognitions. The size, age, form, and business group affiliation of an organization may be important factors influencing this process (e.g., Vissa, Greve, & Chen, 2010). Daft and Weick (1984) identify largely the same three cognitive processes but offer two additional insights. First, they introduce action as a crucial underlying factor. By taking concrete measures, organizations can actually learn from the things that are happening and changing around them as a result of these actions. Second, drawing on Weick’s (1979) earlier work, they emphasize that sense-discrediting plays a crucial part in all this. To be more specific, to stop themselves walking into the trap of ‘believing is seeing’, organizations should try to bring doubt into the equation by deliberately criticizing existing strategic paths, norms, and paradigms (Kramer, 2007). More recently, within the strategic management debate on hypercompetition, Cohen and Levithal (1990, p. 128) have argued that ‘the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities’. Although they use the label ‘absorptive capacity’, it could be argued that this construct 776



entails the same basic properties as organizational sensing. Since first introducing their basic idea Cohen and Levinthal have received a lot of academic support for their construct. All of their advocates subscribe to the view that it is of crucial importance for organizations to keep acquiring, integrating, and exploiting new knowledge in order to stay on top of the competitive game (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & George, 2002). Modular organizing Focusing on the underlying processes involved, strategic management theorists have hypothesized that there is a strong interrelationship between organizational sensing and organizational design. Modular project structures in particular, where available means and persons are allocated to various projects, are said to have a positive effect on an organization’s ability to integrate knowledge (Van den Bosch et al., 1999). Schilling and Steensma (2001, p. 1163) explain the advantage of a modular organizational system to be that ‘by breaking their hierarchies down into components that can be fluidly recombined in a variety of production configurations, firms can more quickly adapt to diverse customer needs and changing environments’. Modularity theorists base their thinking primarily on Simon’s (1962) work on the architecture of complexity. Simon sees all complex systems – biological, technical, or social – as hierarchically nested entities. He explains that each system is composed of interrelated finer subsystems, which in turn consist of finer subsystems, and so on, until ultimately the level of elementary particles is reached. The challenge in modular design is to find a structure that leads to the best system decomposition. In other words, the aim should be to set the boundaries in such a way that interdependencies between subsystems are minimized and the system can be almost cleanly decomposed (Langlois, 2002). This principle, known as near-decomposability, gives subsystems or modules an autonomous character. Except for the restriction that the output of any module has to comply with the general rules or specifications of the overall system, it is entirely free in Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012



its own design (Baldwin & Clark, 1997). In this respect, Brusoni (2005, p. 1886) argues that ‘each module, at the extreme, could become the sole business of a specialist firm, which would have complete design authority over the specific module on which it focuses’. In addition to the autonomy demand, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) explain that a high degree of loose coupling between the modules is intentionally created by relying on standardized interface specifications. The standardization process creates what they call ‘embedded coordination’. In essence this means that by controlling only the required standardized output of modules, effective coordination can be achieved without the continual exercise of managerial authority. Using the principle of loose coupling, an overall system is created that can offer specific advantages, such as the localization of adaptation and trouble, and reduced costs for coordination (Orton & Weick, 1990). Existing literature makes clear that the absorption of new external knowledge seems to benefit from these modular design principles. To start with, Sanchez (1995) explains that the ease of recombining independent modules into new or alternative configurations is beneficial to an organization’s scope of knowledge absorption. His argument is that modularity boosts diversification, even into markets that go beyond an organization’s own specific knowledge base. To use Sanchez’s (1995, p. 151) exact words, ‘the ability to leverage competences through resource networks gives a firm new strategic options to diversify into [ … ] final product markets it could not otherwise reach’. Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) and Karim (2006) have translated Sanchez’s insights into a more general organizational sensing assumption that the within- and across-domain connections of organizational modularity offer the potential to stimulate radical innovation. Second, Hansen (1999) has developed a twoby-two matrix, relating tie strength to knowledge complexity. His message is that loosely coupled systems that exchange codified and independent knowledge have major search benefits and few transfer problems. With this assertion he Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

implicitly suggests that modularity’s key principle of using intentionally created standardized interfaces to link independent organizational modules helps an organization to be flexible in how it absorbs knowledge. His statistical findings indeed show that weak inter-unit ties support the process of extracting useful knowledge from other organizational units as long as the knowledge flow is not too complicated. Third, Pil and Cohen (2006) address the positive influence of modularity on how efficiently knowledge is absorbed. They believe that the autonomous and specialist character of modular components facilitates the acquisition and exploitation of dedicated expertise, enhancing the speed of problem solving. To be precise, Pil and Cohen (2006, p. 1001) state that ‘since each component or subsystem maintains a consistent functional focus, developers may acquire cumulative experience with certain kinds of problems faster. This enables them to search for and evaluate alternative solutions more quickly’. Overall, it could be argued that modular design is a powerful determinant of the multifaceted concept of organizational sensing, because it boosts the acquisition, as well as the integration and exploitation, of new knowledge. From all this follows the first hypothesis: H1: Modular organizing is positively related to an organization’s sensing function.

Lateral coordination At this point it is important to recognize that within the general discussion on how to deal with hypercompetition, collaboration plays a central role. The main contention is that successful competitive performance depends strongly on the ability of organizations, business units, subsidiaries and functional departments to co-operate, share knowledge and jointly develop and launch new products, services or technologies (Argyris, 1992; Ashkenas, Ulrich, & Kerr, 1995; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In this theoretical discussion on intra- and interorganizational networking, LC is put forward as being an organizational determinant that plays a dual role. First, LC is mobilized as a crucial design parameter for dealing with the inherent JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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task interdependencies that will occur within the modular collaboration structures discussed above. At the same time LC is used as a concrete organizational mechanism for stimulating the crossing of organizational and functional borders in order to improve the organization’s sensing capacity. This dual character of LC will be explained in more detail over the next two pages, leading to two separate hypotheses. A significant point of concern with regard to MO is that in reality Simon’s (1962) concept of near-decomposability is difficult to achieve. Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004, p. 172) have analyzed modularity and innovation in complex organizational systems, and conclude from their research findings that suitable partitions, capturing the nearly decomposable structure of complex organizational systems, are not self-evident. This leads to situations in which firms end up with an organizational system characterized either by an excessive integration or by an over-refined modularization. The fact that autonomous organizational modules are actually very difficult to create means that more emphasis is placed on the importance of interfaces. So far, modularity theory has primarily focused on the need for compatible technology which will allow synthesis between modular products or inter-organizational value networks (Langlois & Robertson, 1992). However, one can imagine that to reach a satisfactory plugand-play end-state within a social system that consists of sub-optimal organizational modules, the coupling and de-coupling processes should be based not only on technical aspects but also on organizational aspects (Hellström & Wikström, 2005). Various scholars (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Hoegl, Weinkauf, & Gemuenden, 2004; Mohrman, Cohen, & Mohrman, 1995; Sinha & Van de Ven, 2005) have argued that task interdependencies do indeed lead to situations in which teams become dependent on the input of other teams for the execution of their main tasks. Teams have therefore to coordinate laterally, to synchronize technical data and attune activities to meet their time schedules, for example, and to stay within their budgets. Moreover, they 778



stress that many complex modular projects are characterized by high levels of uncertainty, making it necessary to have LC mechanisms available that help in reacting effectively to changing or new circumstances. From this the following can be hypothesized: H2: Lateral coordination is positively related to modular organizing.

Apart from this role in streamlining collaboration within inter- and intra-organizational modular networks, LC also has a direct effect on an organization’s SF. Existing theoretical insights make clear that LC is an important driver for organizations to become multiplex. Staber and Sydow (2002, p. 414) define multiplexity as ‘the number and diversity of relations between actors in organizations or inter-organizational networks’. According to them, multiplexity is important because it makes it possible to tap into different sources of knowledge, improving the organization’s ability to respond to volatile and diverse environmental demands. Todorova and Durisin (2007) discuss the facilitating role of LC on a firm’s SF. They explain that knowledge absorption can be conceptualized as a reciprocal mix of social interactions influenced by social mechanisms. Lateral coordination is believed to be one of the most important social mechanisms involved. Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2005) have addressed this theoretical line of reasoning and hypothesized that LC is an important organizational determinant of absorptive capacity. Their research shows that cross-functional interfaces and job rotation, as manifestations of LC, serve to stimulate the acquisition and integration of external knowledge. The general idea that LC stimulates the transfer of knowledge, enhancing the organization’s SF and thereby increasing the level of innovation, is also supported by empirical studies from outside the absorptive capacity domain. For example, Tsai (2002) points to the added value of informal lateral relations in gaining access to new knowledge and information sources, while promoting the trust needed to actually share knowledge with others. Tushman (1977) discusses the effect of using Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012



liaisons as special boundary spanners to gather and diffuse information across organizational boundaries. His research indicates that information from external parties enters R&D units in an indirect, two-step way – for example, through informal contacts in the marketing, sales, and manufacturing departments. Cummings (2004) stresses the positive effect of multifunctional work groups on the acquisition and exchange of information, know-how and feedback. Cummings argues that work groups with a multifunctional character possess a broad knowledge and experience base, which is beneficial for the reception and transformation of new external stimuli; moreover, multifunctional workgroups can also offer access to a variety of social networks from which information can be drawn. Based on these insights the following hypothesis has been formulated: H3: Lateral coordination is positively related to an organization’s sensing function.

Research model The literature review has resulted in the research model presented below. The model’s main assumption is that MO and LC are important underlying processes of an organization’s SF. The model also sets out the dual role of LC. Not only does it directly influence the SF, but it also has an indirect effect, as a facilitator of MO. Because of this connection LC can be labeled as independent variable, MO as mediator variable, and the organization’s SF as dependent variable. METHOD Sampling and data collection The study’s empirical core is based on a large-scale survey. A questionnaire was distributed to a large sample population from The Netherlands armed forces. This group consisted of majors, lieutenantcolonels, and colonels from the three main services:

FIGURE 1: RESEARCH MODEL

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army, navy, and air force. The sampling deliberately concentrated on the middle and higher officer echelons as the comprehensive research required respondents who had experience and knowledge of, missions abroad, but, quite emphatically, also had an insight into all kinds of strategic and organizational aspects of The Netherlands armed forces. The study’s main concern was to gain an overall understanding of the way in which the variables MO and LC supported the SF of The Netherlands armed forces as a whole. Therefore, within the questionnaire the individual officers were explicitly asked to describe the armed forces collectively, despite their different Service backgrounds. The initial mailing consisted of 3,706 paper questionnaires sent to the officers’ home addresses. Within 5 weeks a total of 1,533 persons filled out and returned the questionnaire by mail directly to the lead author of this paper. Because of this high volume of returns no reminders were sent to increase the response rate. The dataset was cleaned up by leaving out any questionnaires with missing values on the model and control variables. Questionnaires from respondents without actual mission experience were also disregarded. Altogether, 1,208 usable questionnaires remained, leading to a response rate of 33%. An overall profile of the respondents is presented in Table 1. The sample was tested for representativeness by examining the distribution of the respondents over service and rank. There was a slight over-representation of army respondents, but an ANOVA-analysis showed no significant differences between the respondents from the different services on the model variables (see Table 2). Next, possible differences between early and late respondents were examined. For this purpose, each questionnaire was coded with the number of the week in which the questionnaire had been returned. An independent sample t-test showed no significant differences between the groups 1 and 5 (for LC t(435) = 0.944, p > 0.05; for MO t(435) = 0.843, p < 0.05; for SF t(435) = 0.673, p > 0.05). To give the statistical data more practical meaning and to reduce the empirical drawbacks of using single source data, a number of focused JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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TABLE 1: RESEARCH SAMPLE

representatives were asked questions Respondents Number of operational deployments about the pros and cons of MO as a way of increasing the organization’s structural 1 2 3 4 5 (Sub)total flexibility (see Appendix II). Since the interviews used a set of preArmy planned semi-structured questions, the Major 138 132 59 25 16 370 676 answers were written down during the Lt Col 118 78 40 14 8 258 Col 26 16 4 2 0 48 interview process and not recorded. With the structured interview technique a large Air force amount of relevant information could be Major 76 49 20 12 12 169 296 gathered in a relatively short period of Lt Col 43 31 20 3 4 101 time. After the interviews had been comCol 14 8 2 1 1 26 pleted, the field notes for each one were Navy converted into a comprehensive text file. Major 43 29 31 11 8 122 236 These files were then sent back to the Lt Col 31 32 14 5 3 85 interviewees for confirmation, and in a few Col 13 8 3 4 1 29 cases minor adjustments had to be made Total 502 383 193 77 53 1208 to the text. When all text files were approved a TABLE 2: ONE-WAY ANOVA ON SERVICES process of first-level and pattern-coding N M SD F Df Sig. started. For this purpose a checklist matrix was developed (Miles & Huberman, 1994, LC p. 105), using Microsoft Excel. The matrix Army 676 3.16 0.44 2.27 3,1249 0.079 consists of rows and columns. The rows Navy 236 3.23 0.39 cover the interview questions; the colAir force 296 3.15 0.44 umns represent the answers given by each SF individual interviewee. Next the answers Army 676 3.08 0.61 0.74 3,1249 0.530 of the different respondents on a certain Navy 236 3.11 0.57 question were clustered. Now the actual Air force 296 3.08 0.58 process of first-level and pattern-coding MO could begin. The first step of this process Army 676 3.52 0.36 2.21 3,1249 0.085 was to group similar answers together, Navy 236 3.46 0.36 providing insights into the most imporAir force 296 3.54 0.38 tant arguments and considerations. These groups of answers were then related to the Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) underlying theoretical concepts to uncover interviews were conducted (Yin, 2003). As part relevant themes. During this coding process orgaof a larger study on the organizational changes nizational sensing surfaced as one of the key attriinitiated after the ending of the Cold War, 18 butes of MO and LC. The quotations presented high-ranking officials from the strategic apex of in this paper are derived from this coding proThe Netherlands armed forces were interviewed cess. A summary of this approach can be found (De Waard, 2010). The respondents were all rep- in Appendix III. resentatives of the policy directorates that support the commander of the armed forces – namely Measurement and validation of constructs the Directorate of Operations, Directorate Existing Likert-type scales were used to measure of Operational Readiness, Directorate of the variables LC and SF. A new scale had to be Operational Policy, Requirements, and Integral developed to measure the variable MO because no Planning. In the course of the interviews the usable alternative was available (see Appendix I 780





for the measurement scales). Regarding the use of existing scales, a general point of concern was in how best to translate the individual scale items from a commercial business context into a military crisis response context. Some of these changes were relatively straightforward, such as substituting ‘team’ for ‘unit’. Others turned out to be more fundamental, however. To give an example, competitors, suppliers, and customers are unequivocal entities within the commercial business jargon. However, applying these terms in an international crisis response setting that is politically driven would undoubtedly lead to ambiguities of interpretation. To overcome this problem, experts with knowledge of both the business and military domains were consulted to help with the translation process. The resulting draft questionnaire was then discussed with a methodologist to get feedback on the nature of the questions and on wording issues. After amendments had been made the draft questionnaire was pre-tested within a small group of 10 military experts, from different services and officer ranks. Based on their comments on wording, layout and length, the questionnaire was adjusted to its final form. To measure SF, Volberda’s (1996) sensing scale was used. This scale seeks to capture the three main cognitive processes of organizational sensing (scanning, interpreting, and learning) in concrete survey questions. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to validate Volberda’s construct within a military crisis response setting. Because the sample size exceeds 250, a combination of the Kaiser criterion and the scree plot was used to determine how many factors to extract from the factor analysis (Field, 2005). The analysis resulted in the extraction of a single factor for measuring SF. The variable received a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.74. Hoegl et al. (2004) scale on inter-team coordination was used to measure LC. Within a military setting, however, two distinct forms of cooperation between teams or units can be recognized. First, coordination takes place between units from different services. Military jargon speaks of joint cooperation. Second, crisis response operations also depend to a large extent Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

on multinational – or combined – cooperation. These two forms of cooperation were merged into one scale. Therefore, when translating Hoegl, Weinkauf and Gemuenden’s original scale to a crisis response context, their items had to be addressed twice. The result is a 10-item scale covering the same elements in both a combined and a joint context. After running a factor analysis, again using the Kaiser criterion in combination with the scree plot, a single factor was extracted. The reliability sore was 0.74, which is sufficient, yet lower than the original scale (α = 0.85). For measuring MO a new scale was developed, building on earlier work of Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) and Worren, Moore, and Cardona (2002). In short, their main assumption was that a modular organization is built upon an architectural system capable of recombining organizational elements into tailor-made configurations. In order to make this architectural system work, organizations need organizational and technological interoperability. Organizational interoperability means that by using standardized interfaces such as standardized rules, procedures, and programs a plug-and-play situation is created, in which organizational modules can be slotted together, removed, replaced, and reconnected fairly easily. This same principle applies to the organization’s technological resource base. To reach the desired plug-and-play end-state, it is equally important for an organization to have compatible technological means. Moreover, looking at the human aspects, a modular organization needs people with a broad operational knowledge base and a cooperative mindset to enable it to function properly within different operational contexts and in varying organizational constellations. A scale of 14 items, covering these various areas, was developed to measure MO. Analyzing the scree plot resulted in the extraction of a single factor. Four items had factor loadings below 0.40. For theoretical reasons, however, they were retained. To be precise, items 8 and 9 (see Appendix I) had factor loadings of 0.31 and 0.35 respectively, but because they address the important aspect of organizational connectivity they had to remain part of the scale. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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Furthermore, items 1 (loading 0.36) and 3 (loading 0.37) were not dropped as they focus on the key issue of mixing and matching units into tailor-made organizational formations. Altogether the MO scale received a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.70. In addition to the model variables, three control variables were included in the research. First, Service Background was introduced as a control variable. After all, before any clear opinions could be formed about how The Netherlands armed forces as a whole rely on LC and MO to support their SF, it was important to make sure that respondents from the army, navy, and air force also separately support the proposed model. Second, Rank Level was included, because it could be that differences in rank lead to divergent viewpoints on the influence and effect of the model variables. Third, adding Experience Level as a control variable was triggered by the existing academic debate on absorptive capacity, in which prior knowledge is presented as a key factor for acquiring, integrating, and exploiting new external knowledge. So, an interesting question to address was whether respondents with a high level of operational crisis response experience would differ significantly from those with little operational experience in attributing power to LC and MO as drivers for the organization’s SF. Another specific point of concern with regard to the model variables was the relationship between MO and LC. The literature review has made clear that LC plays a dual role. On the one hand, it serves as a mechanism to deal with unavoidable task interdependencies in modular collaboration structures. On the other hand, it can be seen as an independent organizational determinant that stimulates the sharing of knowledge across functional and organizational boundaries. Mainly


because of this first role it becomes problematic to perceive the variables MO and LC as being two completely independent constructs. Therefore, to evaluate the discriminant validity of both variables the correction for attenuation formula was used (Spearman, 1904). A result in excess of 0.85 indicates that the two variables greatly overlap and basically measure the same thing (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; John & Benet-Martinez, 2000). In this specific case, a score of 0.57 indicates that discriminant validity exists, which means that the two scales address concepts that are theoretically different. A general concern was common method bias. Harman’s one-factor test was conducted to investigate whether or not this phenomenon was present. The unrotated principal component factor analysis, principal component analysis with varimax rotation, and principal axis analysis with varimax rotation all revealed the presence of multiple factors. The first of these factors accounted for only 18% of the total variance. Thus no general factor became apparent, which seems to indicate that potential problems associated with common method bias have not negatively influenced the reliability of the research findings (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). ANALYSIS AND RESULTS Table 3 provides summary statistics and correlations for the model variables. The correlation values suggest that the model variables have a medium to large effect on one another. Table 4 presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis, in which LC and MO are entered in Model 2 as predictor variables of the organization’s SF. The results make clear that LC (β = 0.25) and MO (β = 0.36) both significantly contribute to SF. The regression analysis also indicates that none of the control

TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS (1) Lateral coordination (2) Modular organizing (3) Sensing function

N

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

(1)

(2)

(3)

1,208 1,208 1,208

3.18 3.51 3.09

0.43 0.36 0.59

1.30 1.86 1.00

4.40 4.64 5.00

– 0.41** 0.41**

– 0.47**

–

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

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TABLE 4: HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES PREDICTING AN ORGANIZATION’S SENSING FUNCTION Model 1 B

SE B

Constant

4.09

0.38

Control variables Dummy rank 1 Dummy rank 2 Dummy service 1 Dummy service 2

0.03 0.14 0.02 0.00

0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04

−0.03

0.02

Mission experience

β

Model 2 ∆R2

0.02 0.07* 0.01 0.00 −0.05

0.01

Predictor variables LC MO df Adjusted R2

β

B

SE B

0.36

0.37

0.00 0.02 0.03

−0.00 0.01 0.02

−0.01

0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04

−0.02

0.01

−0.03

0.35 0.60

0.04 0.04

∆R2

−0.01

0.25*** 0.36***

1,201 0.01

0.27 1,199 0.28

*p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001

variables significantly influenced the model variables. So, despite rank, service background and mission experience, the predictive power of MO and LC for the SF of The Netherlands armed forces remained the same. Based on these overall research findings, and with an adjusted R2 of 0.28, MO and LC together seem to form a solid and broadly shared organizational base which underlies the SF of The Netherlands armed forces. Next, the proposed mediation effect of MO was verified. There was a significant relationship between the independent variable LC and dependent variable SF (β = 0.41, p = 0.000) that declined after controlling for the mediator MO (β = 0.25, p = 0.000). However, to confirm a significant decline of LC, a separate Sobel mediation test was done (Baron & Kenny, 1985). This indeed proved to be the case. Figure 2 schematically presents the outcome of these analyses. The Sobel test also revealed a rather strong effect of LC on MO (β = 0.41). Moreover, MO’s R2 of 0.17, based on the sole contribution of LC, is also quite considerable. This outcome is in line with the ruling theoretical assumption that it is difficult to achieve near-decomposability in the context of a social system, making it necessary to invest in LC to achieve a sufficient level of system integration. Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

.41*

*p < .05

.36* .41*

(.25*)

FIGURE 2: RESEARCH MODEL OUTCOME. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between LC and The Netherlands armed forces’ SF as mediated by MO. The standardized regression coefficient between LC and The Netherlands armed forces’ SF controlling for MO is in parentheses

The statistical results corroborate with the findings from the series of semi-structured interviews. On the whole, the interviewees argue that multinational, inter-service, and civil–military cooperation has become a necessity nowadays for dealing effectively with the complexity of international crisis-response situations. Most missions can be seen as a complex mix of military, diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian problems. Under these circumstances of causal ambiguity no single player holds the key to success. Only by military and non-military partners working together, collectively sharing knowledge and generating new ideas, can progress be made. In the words of one of the respondents: JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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Erik J de Waard, Henk W Volberda and Joseph Soeters In order to deal with our complex task environment we pro-actively need to look for synergy: synergy between arms, services, ministries, countries and nongovernmental organizations. For this, wanting to learn about each other’s ideas and capabilities is absolutely a prerequisite.

At the same time what was also clear from the interviews is that a situation is gradually developing in which established bilateral relations; but also previous positive experiences of crisis response; have created preferences in how to approach multinational crisis response cooperation. Especially when there is a high level of risk involved, The Netherlands armed forces increasingly prefer to go on a mission with known partners, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries, Canada, and Australia. The key argument is that cultural, political, and organizational like-mindedness offers a shared frame of reference, which prompts mutual trust and eases cooperation. One of the respondents formulated it as follows: In Uruzgan our troops work together with troops from the UK, Canada, and Australia. Basically these countries have the same political and cultural preferences and possess the same ‘can-do’ mentality as we do. In the future this development will probably continue, creating sub-groups when it comes to international cooperation.

Focusing on the effect of MO on the organization’s SF, the interviewees point to the fact that the organization has faced substantial changes in its operational task-setting. No longer is it preparing for large-scale, predictable conflicts, as was traditionally the case. Instead, a new environment of unknown and asymmetrical threats has caused The Netherlands armed forces to start conducting crisis operations along a broad spectrum of conflict types, varying from high-intensity conflict operations to reconstruction and humanitarian aid operations. Moreover, within specific mission contexts the organization also has to be capable of switching between defense, development, and diplomacy-related tasks. To live up to this new security environment, the organization has embraced a strategy of mixing and matching different kinds of units into tailor-made task

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forces. The leading assumption is that because of the highly changeable character of crisis response missions, and the high level of task uncertainty, it is not feasible to create fixed organizational units in the permanent organization that are perfectly fit for the varied crisis response task-setting. The decision has therefore been taken that the traditional organizational building blocks of brigades, squadrons and maritime task forces should remain the operational backbone of the organization, but that when troops are needed for a particular mission they are drawn from these structures and transformed into a customized organizational solution. Again, as one of the respondents said: We need a broad toolbox with all kinds of different functionalities from which we can select and pick to deal with the changing task environment. Important for modern military operations is the bundling of different capabilities.

The interviewees explained that each tailormade crisis response task force basically serves as a specific and unique operational learning portal. After all, the temporary, ad hoc project structures that are being deployed are the organization’s primary link to the actual task environment. During the Cold War period the fit between task and organization caused organizational sensing to be an incremental process within fixed operational units, whereas the new deployment approach of customization has made it more of a process of ‘learning by doing’ in different operational settings and organizational constellations. The interviewees also explained that working in different formations increases not only the scope, flexibility and efficiency of knowledge absorption but also the depth of the new knowledge that is being acquired. In short, joint and combined cooperation makes it possible to use capabilities of other services and countries, or even to exchange them. A positive side-effect of a more intense cooperation between arms, Services and countries is that units widen their frame of reference and can learn from each other. Moreover, the cooperation that takes place between different organizational groups, over a longer period of time and under extreme circumstances, deepens understanding of each other’s ways of doing Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012



things. According to the respondents this leads to a situation in which not only is new knowledge acquired, but also more detailed insights are gathered about how to translate that new knowledge into concrete, usable routines and processes. One respondent gave the following example: During the ISAF mission in Afghanistan our organization was suddenly confronted with a new kind of threat. Within a very short time span the opposing Taliban forces changed their operating tactics from a direct assault approach to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These explosives, buried along the roadside, used simple detonation tools that could be activated from a distance by using a regular mobile phone. This new, invisible, yet devastating threat asked for immediate and effective countermeasures. In order to waste no time, our first reaction was to find out how partnering countries dealt with this threat. Based on this quick-scan a fast track procurement process was initiated to buy the technological means available that could help to trace these explosives and to jam their electromagnetic signals. Moreover, to defend our personnel against the blast of an explosion, in case an IED did go off, new Bushmaster vehicles offering better protection were also acquired within a very short time span.

When it comes to the powerful effect of LC on MO, the interviewees refer to the organization’s permanent structure not being attuned to its crisis response role. As mentioned previously, a tailormade configuration is required for each mission. The process of mixing and matching that follows cuts through all kinds of existing hierarchical and functional boundaries. As a result, the tailor-made military formations that are deployed have to deal with the problem of organizational unfamiliarity. The fact that they are formed on an ad hoc project basis, for very specific operational assignments, leads to situations in which units and individuals have to work closely together, without actually knowing each other very well. To overcome this problem the interviewees said that the organization relies on three specific forms of LC. First, before actual deployment takes place, it invests heavily in joint exercises and training programs to transform a tailor-made mixture of different functional units into a workable machine. One respondent put it like this: You will always need extra training time to give the tailor-made formation that is to be deployed the


opportunity to develop into a tightly coupled unit and to achieve the required level of competence.

The second important coordination capability relates to staff relations. Five respondents explained that the SFIR mission in Iraq has learned that for complex joint missions the organization has to deploy additional staff capacity to take on the task of coordinating the different functional organizational elements. During the SFIR mission this task was initially appointed to the battalion commander, as head of the largest unit deployed. The battalion commander, however, became so busy with this coordinating task that he was hampered in his main task of commanding his own battalion. During later rotations the organization therefore decided to also deploy a dedicated command and control element, comparable to a traditional brigade-staff, to take over this coordinating task. Based on the resulting positive experiences, The Netherlands armed forces now follow this approach in other missions as well. Third, liaison officers (LSOs) are appointed to take care of all kinds of interdepartmental boundary-spanning roles. They can play the role of linking pin between participating countries to deal with language, cultural, or procedural problems. They can also have a specific functional responsibility. This was clear from the response of one air force LSO whose function was to support and advise the task force commander on all issues relating to air operations. One of the respondents says: Liaison officers are an important aspect of the command and control process. LSOs are crucial for bridging cultural differences and for giving specialist advice.

DISCUSSION The question that remains is how other organizations can take advantage of these research findings. Before going into the details of the general organizational lessons to be drawn from this paper, it is useful to take note of critique from within the military community itself. One such example is Sir General Rupert Smith who has criticized Western expectations of the new network-based military crisis response approach. Smith (2007, p. 411) warns of the potential risk ‘of knowing more and more about oneself and proportionally less and JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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less about the enemy’. He argues that the real network challenge is to avoid an excessively internal focus and be able to gather and process relevant external information from which the military task force as a whole can benefit operationally. Although The Netherlands armed forces acknowledge that external knowledge gathering is extremely relevant for dealing with the complex task environment of contemporary crisis response missions, the research findings also reveal that much of the information gathering process is directed at making a composite task force function more effectively. The SF is to a large extent used to learn more about the way in which partnering countries and other supporting organizations deal with important operational dynamics. To a certain extent, this approach alleviates General Smith’s worries. After all, when countries are able to answer crucial questions, such as how other countries deal with the threat of IEDS, or more generally, what we can learn from other partners – military or non-military – to improve our tactics, the entire military task force can then take advantage of the cumulative learning of its individual organizational members. This knowledge transfer process can be facilitated by both MO and LC. Because military units work in different constellations they can increase their frame of reference, which helps to speed up and improve the outcome of the sequential sensing steps of knowledge acquisition, integration, and exploitation. Lateral coordination mechanisms such as combined military exercises and liaison functions can help to stimulate the flow of information and knowledge across national and functional boundaries. That said, some of the results also seem to confirm that what General Smith is conscious of does actually happen in practice. After all, the findings point out that imperfect modularization can have a negative impact on an organization’s sensing capability. To be more precise, when modularity’s demand of near-decomposability is not sufficiently satisfied, a situation may develop in which the number of task-related interdependencies between organizational modules grows too large. Consequently, the organization has to start investing heavily in all kinds of coordination mechanisms to transform the mixture of interrelated organizational components 786



into a functioning overall system. Although this seems a logical response it also leads to a situation in which the LC effort is primarily directed inwards. The risk is then that the organization becomes preoccupied with its own internal functioning at the expense of its external lateral sensing capacity. On a more abstract level, what is happening in a military crisis response setting relates strongly to the problem of ambidexterity discussed in recent strategic management literature (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). In short, ambidexterity means two-headedness in the sense that organizations should combine their striving for search and exploration with safeguarding organizational stability and exploitation (Benner & Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004; Holmqvist, 2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). On the one hand, Western military organizations know that external orientation and inter-organizational cooperation is the key to continually renewing tactics and processes, as needed to deal with the complexity of today’s military interventions. On the other hand, given the unpredictability and hostility of most operational environments, the call for a threshold level of organizational stability also cannot be ignored. After all, in circumstances where people can actually get killed, too strong a focus on learning by doing does not seem appropriate. From this latter perspective, relying on fixed organizational structures, procedures, and partners could be seen as a logical response. This paper makes clear that finding an appropriate balance between search and stability is a difficult struggle for The Netherlands armed forces. Under the adage ‘better safe than sorry’, the demand for stability seems to take precedence. A good indicator in this respect is the preference for working with established partners. In the context of modularity theory, this approach could be interpreted as an organizational example of synergistic specificity. Synergistic specificity has to do with the fact that some combinations of modules function better together than other configurations, leading the system away from modularity and towards greater integration. As a typical example of this phenomenon Schilling (2000) cites the move from stand-alone software products to integrated software packages such as Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012



Microsoft Office. Given that military task forces are most likely to operate in unpredictable, hostile environments, and that creating autonomous organizational modules is problematic, it is understandable that reliable, dedicated partners are selected to work with so as to come close to what Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) would call ‘heedful interrelating’ between individuals. Likewise, this approach can be seen as a confirmation of the threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). One important effect suggested by the threat rigidity theory is that organizations confronted with threatening situations have a tendency to restrict their information processing capacity, for example, by narrowing their scope of attention or reducing the number of information channels they use. This situation fosters rigidity because organizations revert to well-learned responses that are inappropriate for the new conditions. Constantly working with the same kind of partners during military crisis response missions can have similar results. Most crisis situations take place in far-off places where people do not live by the same democratic norms and values as the Western countries involved in the military intervention. It could be argued that a military formation that is more culturally diverse will cope better with the complex and continuously changing mixture of socio-political, ethnic, and religious factors typical of these crisis areas. A preference for cooperating with culturally and politically like-minded countries means that an opportunity is missed to take advantage of more divergent military partners (Meirovich, 2010). This outcome corresponds with Burt’s (1992) work on structural holes in organizational networks, in which he argues that organizations can improve information processing when they not only work with redundant partners but also deliberately invest in cooperating with ‘nonredundant’ partners. The ambidexterity struggle is not unique to The Netherlands armed forces. Denrell and March (2001) show that successful past experiences tend to bias organizations against novel and risky alternatives, overemphasizing the demand for exploitation and stability. Likewise, drawing on a study of more than 300 global executives, Day, Schoemaker and Snyder (2009) conclude that organizations in general should do more to increase their external Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012

knowledge absorption and not be blindsided by threats. Given this dilemma, an interesting question is what other organizations can actually learn from the operational experience of The Netherlands armed forces. This study, above all, provides some practical insights on the relationship between organization design and ambidexterity. It has been noted in the literature that design mechanisms play a central role in creating organizational ambidexterity (Hanssen-Bauer & Snow, 1996; Ilinitch, D’Aveni, & Lewin, 1996; Staber & Sydow, 2002). Structural differentiation in particular is often mentioned as an architectural principle that enables firms to combine exploration and exploitation (Gilbert, 2005; Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009). This principle relates to Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) seminal work which explains that architectural differentiation is a result of task environmental characteristics varying between different functional organizational departments. This leads to a situation in which R&D and production activities are clustered into separate departments in order to meet contradictory search and stability demands. Although structural differentiation has proven its value over the years, it ignores the important issue that within organizations the traditional horizontal and vertical divisions of work are changing. As already indicated, organizations increasingly use multidisciplinary teams or set up inter-team cooperation structures, most of the time crossing organizational boundaries, so as to combine knowledge, resources, and capabilities (Sinha & Van de Ven, 2005). Because of this development, the ambidexterity dilemma seems to be moving right down to the front line of the organization. After all, innovation is dominated less and less by a strategic apex that directs a central demand to a dedicated R&D department, but is becoming far more an emerging, joint learning-by-doing process in which different teams and functional specialists work together and share knowledge in temporary, inter-organizational project structures (Gann & Salter, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Moreover, exploitation depends more and more on the organization’s ability to develop a series of successful value networks. As a result, the streamlining of the horizontal coordination that JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION

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takes place between different network partners has become at least as important as managing the efficiencies of the organization’s own internal business processes (Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005; Grandori, 1997; Grandori & Soda, 1995). What this study makes clear is that the level of modularization is an important factor to take into account when working in team-based structures. The results indicate that fine-grained modularization leads to all kinds of task interdependencies between the different organizational parts. As a result, LC mechanisms are needed to integrate the different parts into one organizational system. At the same time the findings show that organizations cannot do without task interdependencies, because they are important for letting knowledge flow across organizational boundaries. Thus, in balancing search and stability one of the key organizational challenges seems to be deciding on how many task interdependencies to allow. In this respect the level of system decomposition is an important design parameter to consider. This outcome corroborates the findings of Fang, Lee and Schilling (2010). They have found that a semi-isolated group structure with a moderate level of task interdependency performs better than nearly decomposed or fine-grained modular organizational structures that have either hardly any cross-group linkages or a large number of such linkages. What makes their findings even more interesting is that semi-isolated structures yield the best long-term learning outcome under varying levels of problem complexity and environmental turbulence, mainly because these partly decomposed structures are best suited to transferring diverse ideas across organizational boundaries. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2009) also conclude that in order to take advantage of the search benefits of partly decomposed organizational modules, it is important to support this structure with a mechanism that creates stability, such as a general manager or lead functional specialist. Further research This trade-off between the coordination advantages of loose coupling and the search advantages of cross-group linkages is an interesting topic for further investigation. The results described above 788



can be a valuable starting point. These studies base their conclusions entirely on computer simulation models. However, so it would now be useful to verify the assumptions made in a variety of realworld empirical settings. Looking particularly at organizations that regularly participate in temporary inter-team project structures would probably add value to this theoretical debate. Organizations that work in this way can be found in both the public and commercial sector. In the public sector, for example, the increased focus of many Western governments on homeland security and disaster relief capabilities has stimulated tighter project-like cooperation between public services at the operational level (Denning, 2006). In the commercial sector the construction and entertainment industry come to mind first, because large-scale infrastructural projects or major movie productions are organized in a way that requires semi-autonomous functional groups from different organizations to work together (Ekstedt, Lundin, & Wirdenius, 1992; Genus, 1997; Hirsch, 1972). A related topic worth analyzing is the relationship between the level of task interdependency within modular value networks and the unwanted spill-over of critical knowledge and information. Fang et al. (2010) and Rivkin and Siggelkow (2009) present the transfer of knowledge across organizational boundaries predominantly as something positive. However, the darker side of it, such as industrial spying, and imitation, within modular value networks has remained largely underexposed. In this respect, drawing another analogy between a military crisis response setting and a commercial business context may be of use. One of the pillars of the ISAF reconstruction mission in Afghanistan is the professionalization of the Afghan National Army. Recently, four French soldiers were killed by one of the Afghan soldiers they had to train as part of this task. This scenario shows a dramatic turn-around in what had been a friendly collaboration, in which French and Afghan troops had worked closely together over a long period, even sharing the same barracks. The Afghan soldier was able to exploit his knowledge of daily camp routines and surprise the unarmed French during a fitness exercise. Regretfully this example cannot be considered a rare and isolated Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012



case, ‘Green-on-Blue’ fratricide has seem to become a growing problem jeopardizing the stability of the ISAF mission (Bordin, 2011). In a less extreme form, commercial organizations run a similar risk when outsourcing manufacturing, engineering, and design tasks to foreign countries to save costs. In an online interview on the decline of Kodak, Harvard Business School Professor Willy Shih explains that, when they outsource, companies potentially move expertise and new growth opportunities just out of reach (Gerdeman, 2012). The level of system decomposition can probably minimize or enhance this danger. It could be argued that with a fully decomposed organizational structure it is easier to guard against unwanted environmental influences than with medium to fine-grained modular structures that have a fair number of taskrelated interdependencies. CONCLUSION This paper has investigated to what extent MO and LC support the SF of The Netherlands armed forces. Overall it could be stated that both predictors increase the level of multiplexity, stimulating the development of a broad knowledge base from which the organization can draw useful insights, knowledge, and information. The study has also revealed that the level of system decomposition is an important factor in balancing organizational search and stability. In cases where team-based collaboration structures involve many task interdependencies, LC mechanisms are used primarily to integrate the different organizational parts into one system – in other words, to make the whole system more stable. At the same time, where there are few task-interdependencies between organizational elements, those elements become isolated and cannot learn from each other. This leads to the conclusion that the number of cross-group linkages play a significant role in encouraging or discouraging organizational ambidexterity. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors greatly appreciate the support of the Netherlands armed forces in conducting this study. The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.


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Accepted 05 June 2012

APPENDIX I: Measurement scales Modular organizing (MO) 1. To execute crisis response operations The Netherlands armed forces merge units, parts of units, and individuals into tailor-made formations 2. The composition of Dutch crisis response formations depends primarily upon the task that has to be executed 3. Dutch crisis response formations mostly participate in larger multinational task forces 4. During crisis response operations the composition of a Dutch formation can be altered if the operational circumstances require this 5. During crisis response operations standardized work processes, such as doctrines, SOP’s, and drills make it possible to co-operate with units from other services and countries 6. During crisis response operations our Dutch tailor-made formations rely on structured systems for planning and command and control 7. During crisis response operations the division of work within our Dutch tailor-made formations is α = 0.70 defined in detailed descriptions of jobs and tasks 8. During crisis response operations everything in our Dutch tailor-made formations has been laid down in rules (Continued)

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APPENDIX I: CONTINUED Modular organizing (MO) 9. During crisis response operations consulting takes place between different organizational levels within The Netherlands armed forces 10. Dutch servicemen and women master multiple tasks, SOP’s, drills, skills, and techniques 11. Dutch servicemen and women are up-to-date regarding technology and necessary know-how 12. Dutch technological assets can be used for different types of missions and tasks 13. The technological assets of The Netherlands armed forces are to a large extent compatible 14. Dutch technological assets are to a large extent compatible with the equipment of partnering countries Lateral coordination (LC) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

During crisis response operations interrelated processes, tasks, and activities are well coordinated with units from other services During crisis response operations interrelated processes, tasks, and activities are well coordinated with units from other countries During crisis response operations duplicated and overlapping activities amongst our own participating services are avoided During crisis response operations duplicated and overlapping activities amongst participating countries are avoided α = 0.74 During crisis response operations Dutch units have no problems in coordinating with each other During crisis response operations Dutch units have no problems in coordinating with units from other countries During crisis response operations conflicts between our own Dutch units are settled quickly During crisis response operations conflicts between Dutch units and units of participating countries are settled quickly During crisis response operations discussions between our own Dutch units are conducted constructively During crisis response operations discussions between Dutch units and units of participating countries are conducted constructively

Sensing function (SF) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The Netherlands armed forces regularly analyze how partnering countries conduct crisis response operations Armed forces from partnering countries have no major secrets for The Netherlands armed forces regarding their organizational strengths and weaknesses The Netherlands armed forces systematically keep track of technological developments that could α = 0.74 influence operational tasks and performance The lessons learned during actual deployment are systematically being registered within The Netherlands armed forces The lessons learned during actual deployed are systematically being internalized by The Netherlands armed forces The Netherlands armed forces belong to the trendsetters in the international military sector

APPENDIX II: Interview questions 1. Do you think it is a wise strategy of The Netherlands armed forces to pick organizational units from the parent organization and form them into tailor-made constellations? 2. On which architectural principles are Dutch crisis response formations built? 3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach? 4. Which role does LC play in transforming a Dutch crisis response formation into a well-working system? 5. Has The Netherlands armed forces’ crisis response effort been successful so far? Volume 18, Issue 6, November 2012


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APPENDIX III: Checklist matrix

N O W AVA I L A B L E CONTEMPORARY AND EMERGENT METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN VET RESEARCH: DYNAMIC BOUNDARIES AND DIVERSE APPROACHES A special issue of International Journal of Training Research – Volume 10 Issue 3 – ii + 110 pages ISBN 978-1-921729-88-1 – December 2012 Editors: Roslyn Cameron and Bobby Harreveld (Central Queensland University) http://jtr.e-contentmanagement.com/archives/vol/10/issue/3/marketing/

MIXED METHODS RESEARCH IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT A special issue of Multiple Research Approaches – Volume 5 Issue 3 – ii+110 pages ISBN 978-1-921348-95-2 – December 2011 Editors: Roslyn Cameron (Central Queensland University) and José F Molina-Azorín (University of Alicante, Spain) http://mra.e-contentmanagement.com/archives/vol/5/issue/3/marketing/

www.e-contentmanagement.com

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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