Identity across Time and Stories Francesco Orilia 1. Introduction There are sentences that assert that a certain object that exists at a given time t is identical with another object that exists at another time t'. For example, let us suppose that at time t' Tom finishes painting with red his only car, which had been white up to t, and sells it to Mary. It is legitimate in this case to assert: (1) the white car owned by Tom at time t is the red car owned by Mary at time t'. In making this assertion, we seem to presuppose that the very same ordinary object “survives” in time, in some objective sense, despite the change in its properties. In current terminology, this can be expressed by saying that an object1 persists in time, where this persistence can be understood in two ways, as either an endurance or a perdurance, as we shall see. I shall call sentences like (1) sentences of diachronic identi ty (or of reidentification across time, or the like). The truth of many such sentences is presupposed in much, perhaps most, of what we say about ordinary objects. For instance, when we say that Botticelli’s Primavera was a dingy painting (at time t), before restoration (completed at a time t'), we presuppose that Botticelli’s Primavera before restoration (at time t) is Botticelli’s Primavera after restoration (at time t'). And examples of this kind could be multiplied ad nauseam. There are also sentences which are very similar in structure to diachronic reidentification sentences, but which seem to assert not so much that an object “survives” in time but that a fictional character “survives”, as we “move” from a story to another. Here is an example, which intuitively is about Ulysses: (2) The Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan horse, according to the Odyssey, is the Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules, according to Dante’s Inferno. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the word “object” is used here and in the following
to talk about ordinary objects such as tables, chairs, stones, trees, cats, people.
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Let us call such sentences sentences of intertextual identity or of reidentification across stories or the like. Clearly, there is a structural similarity between these two kinds of sentence, which suggests an Analogy Constraint (AC), as we may call it. AC demands, as far as possible, a similar ontological analysis for both diachronic and intertextual reidentification sentences. Ontological analysis is, in the tradition of Russell 1905, a paraphrase and/or translation in a canonical formal language, which aims at depicting the truth conditions of philosophically notable sentences in a way that perspicuously presents their ontological commitments. I shall use ambiguously “ontological analysis” (or “analysis”, for brevity's sake) to indicate any such paraphrase or translation, the proposition expressed by it, or even the process of providing such a paraphrase or translation. The context will disambiguate, when important. Note that an ontological analysis need not be what we may call a semantic analysis. This is an analysis that aims at showing, as in Montague grammar, how the various meanings of the constituents of a sentence are compositionally combined so as to constitute the meaning of the sentence. Arguably, however, the legitimacy of an ontological analysis depends in part on how plausibly it can be connected to a semantic analysis. There will be an opportunity below to clarify this distinction and the relevance of the latter for the former, by means of a particular example. Clearly, ontological analysis is a tool for ontology (or metaphysics)2. But one may ask: which ontology? Indeed, as is well known, Strawson 1959 distinguished descriptive and prescriptive metaphysics. The former aims at revealing something about our conceptual scheme and the latter something about very general features of the real world. I take it for granted that ontological analysis is a tool for descriptive ontology. But I also think that it is relevant for prescriptive ontology. For after all our conceptual scheme serves us rather well in our survival in a hostile world and therefore we have default reasons to think that some part of our conceptual scheme may embed a (by and large) correct theory about the world (Castañeda 1980). These reasons can however be overcome by more empirical and scientific considerations and thus the extent to which ontological analysis reveals something about the world 2 For present purposes, I make no significant distinction between ontology and
metaphysics.
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and conversely the extent to which it must be superseded and/or supplemented by empirical/scientific investigation must be decided on a case by case basis. Here, in the light of AC, I want to pursue a parallel ontological analysis of both diachronic and intertextual reidentification sentences. I shall then briefly consider what we can learn from this analysis from the standpoint of prescriptive metaphysics. 2. Some preliminaries In the light of what we saw above, we can assume that certain sentences of philosophical interest have a superficial grammatical form, to which one can associate a formula and/or paraphrase constituting a corresponding analysis (with an explanation of how the symbols in the formula or paraphrase are to be understood). For example, sentences of identity through time are superficially of the form (ITT) The F at time t is the G at time t'. Moreover, sentences of identity across stories are of this superficial form: (ITS) The F in story s is the G in story s'. (“In story s”, “according to story s” and the like will be regarded as synonymous.) These sentences crucially involve definite descriptions. They may of course also involve proper names and (at least in the case of diachronic reidentification) indexicals and demonstratives. I argued elsewhere (Orilia 2000a, 2003), however, that, contrary to widespread referentialist opinions, by combining semantic and pragmatic considerations, such singular terms can ultimately be viewed as definite descriptions. Thus, roughly, we can view proper names such as “Ulysses” and “Socrates” as, respectively, “the fictional character called Ulysses” and “the philosopher called Socrates” and for present purposes I shall assume this in the following. And I shall also take for granted that definite descriptions should be understood à la Russell, in the sense that, roughly, a sentence of form (DD) The P is Q should be given the following ontological analysis: (DDa) ∃x(∀y(Px → x = y) & Qy),
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which we abbreviate as (DDb) ∃1x(Px & Qy). In saying this, I mean simply that the use of the definite article in (DD) commits us to just one entity that exemplifies property P, where this entity could be abstract or concrete, particular or universal, etc. Thus, in taking advantage of analysis (DDa), I use variables of quantification as in principle unrestricted, although I may use letters (such as “t”, “s” or “E”) that are meant to suggest certain classes of entities as domains of intended values (e.g., times, stories and properties that function, in a sense that we shall see, as essences). In particular, I am not committed to the Russellian idea that definite descriptions are incomplete symbols which cannot be assigned a meaning when taken apart from a sentential context. Following Montague 1974 and Cocchiarella 1982, I take them to mean properties (of properties), which I call definite denoting concepts, and which can be represented by lambda abstracts. For example, “the P” can be taken to mean the definite denoting concept [λf ∃1x(Px & fy)], which I abbreviate as [THE P]. Consequently, (DD) should be given an “intermediate” analysis such as (DDc) [THE P]Q, wherein the denoting concept [THE P] is predicated of the property Q. (DDc) is, by λ-conversion3 , logically equivalent to the “final” Russellian analysis (DDa). This intermediate analysis can be considered a semantic one, for it provides a meaning for the constituent “the P” (i.e., [THE P]), another meaning for the constituent “Q” (i.e., Q) and tells us that their syntactic concatenation in (DD) corresponds to the composition of such meanings by means of the predication relation (in such a way that [THE P] is the predicated entity and Q the argu3 The logical principle of λ-conversion asserts, for the monadic case, that [λx A]d
↔ Ax/d, where Ax/d is the formula that results from A by replacing each free occurrence of x in A with d (provided d is free for x in A). For more details on λconversion and the use of λ-abstracts in representing the meaning of definite descriptions and other noun phrases, cf. Partee et al. 1990. As I see it, λ-conversion and λ-abstracts should be deployed in the context of a type-free logic that avoids Russell's paradox and related problems without type restrictions at the grammatical level (Orilia 2000, 2003).
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ment of the predication). The ontological analysis (DDa) follows from (DDc) by laws of logic, which shows that in this case the ontological analysis is well-connected to the semantic one. Although the emphasis here is on ontology rather than on semantics (and thus I shall ignore analysis (DDc) as far as possible), I dwell on this point here, because there will be reasons to appeal to definite denoting concepts. With these reasons in mind, let me point out that it is appropriate to say that a definite description “the P” (singularly) refers to an entity x (or denotes x, if you wish), when the meaning, [THE P], of the description is such that it determines x, that is, it is such that P is univocally exemplified by x4. 3. The endurantist analysis Turning again to reidentification across time, the most natural option is of course to read sentences of form (ITT) at face value, which means that the “is” connecting the definite descriptions should be seen as expressing identity, an identity which links to itself one single object that happens to exemplify F with respect to a time t, and G with respect to another time t'. By following this line, we come to this ontological analysis: (ITTa) ∃1x(at-t(x exemplifies F) & ∃1y(at-t'(x exemplifies G) & x = y)5. This analysis can aptly be called endurantist. For, from its standpoint, our conceptual scheme appears to be committed to endurantism, according to which objects are three-dimensional continuants that “move” through time while remaining self-identical, i.e., endure in time, in spite of changing their properties. This view is naturally associated with presentism6, according to which to exist is to presently 4 P is univocally exemplified by x when ∃1y(Py & x = y). 5 Here we treat “at-t(x exemplifies F)” and similar expressions as the combination
of “at-t”, understood as a modal operator, and a sentence (possibly open). We could alternatively write “at(t, [x exemplifies F])”, where “at” is a predicate that connects a term t and a nominalised sentence purporting to denote a proposition (similar considerations apply to (ITSb), below). We need not be fussy about these distinctions for present purposes, but, as I see it, whatever format one chooses, we give expression to relations between a time and the proposition that x exemplifies property F. 6 See, for instance, Loux 1998, ch. 6. The thesis that endurantism and presentism
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exist. It is compatible with presentism to admit that there are (now) past and future times, for times (values of variables t, t', etc.) can be understood as abstract entities at which propositions can be true or false (where truth simpliciter is truth at the present moment)7. And it is also compatible with this doctrine that there is an ordinary object x that existed at some past time and/or will exist at some future time, as long as x also exists at the present moment. But it is not compatible with it to say that x fails to exist at the present moment, although x existed or will exist at some past or future moment or that x exists eternally8, rather than at a specific (present) time. That is, as we may put it, it is not compatible with presentism that there is an entity that fails to exemplify all existence-entailing properties9 of ordinary objects at the present moment (it is neither a chair, nor a rock, nor has it a certain color or shape and so on and so forth), while it exemplifies some such properties at some past or future time, i.e., ∃x∃t∃t'(x exists at t & x does not exist at t' and t is past or future and t' is present). Moreover, it is not compatible with presentism that that there is an entity (a “time slice”, as we shall see) that has existence-entailing properties of ordinary objects, but that has such properties eternally rather than at a specific time. In the light of AC, the endurantist analysis (ITTa) invites us to a similarly endurantist analysis for sentences of form (ITS), which views them as saying that one single fictional character is F with respect to a given story and G with respect to another, thereby “enduring” from one story to another just as an ordinary object endures from a time to another: (ITSa) ∃1x(according-to-story-s(x exemplifies F)) & ∃1y(accordingto-story-s'(x exemplifies F)) & x = y).
are mutually independent has been defended (cf. Loux 1998, pp. 207-209, and Varzi 2001, pp. 122-123), but has not gained much favour. 7 In Prior’s presentism, times ultimately are propositions (cf. Prior and Fine 1977), but other presentists reject this reduction (Craig 2000, p. 213). 8 Following current usage in discussion of these topics, I use “eternally” as synonymous with “atemporally”, although, more precisely, “eternally” should mean “at all times”. 9 In the terminology of Cocchiarella 1982.
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Accordingly, (2) receives the following analysis: (2a) ∃1x ((according-to-the-Odyssey (x exemplifies Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan horse)) & ∃1y (according-tothe-Inferno (y exemplifies Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules)) & x = y). 4. The perdurantist analysis There are however considerations that militate against the correctness of endurantism and the idea that our conceptual scheme is committed to it. It has been argued in fact that relativity theory suggests a rather different ontological picture, perdurantism, a doctrine that is however also defended on more a priori grounds, independently of scientific considerations10. According to this view, reality is four-dimensional in that it is extended in time as well as in space. Consequently, objects themselves are four-dimensional and thus perdure through time, inasmuch as they are constituted by “temporal parts” or “slices”, ordered by temporal relations such as after or before, and objectively linked to each other by what has been called genidentity11. For example, the Eiffel Tower (qua four-dimensional ordinary object) is constituted by a sequence of (three-dimensional) temporal parts or slices that starts when the Eiffel Tower was built, goes on to encompass various slices that come after the Eiffel Tower at birth, e.g., the Eiffel Tower at the present moment, and ends with a slice that comes after all other members of the series, i.e., the Eiffel Tower at the last moment of its existence. The idea is that all these parts or slices, though numerically different, are (objectively) genidentical. On this view, a temporal part that is not in the present, say the original manuscript of the Phaedo at a past time t, exists (eternally) just as much as those that are in the present, for being present is a relative notion, which depends on the choice of an observer. Similarly, New York cannot be declared nonexistent, just because we focus on an observer situated in Rome. Perdurantism thus implies that there are entities, time slices, that exemplify existence-entailing properties of ordinary objects but not at a time, let alone the present time, but eter10 See, e.g. Quine 1960, § 36, and Loux 1998, ch. 6. 11 See for example Chisholm 1971, note 9, p. 17.
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nally. Clearly, then, according to perdurantism, presentism is false and its opposite, eternalism, is true (Loux 1988, pp. 208-209). Given AC, Perdurantism suggests a different, perdurantist, analysis for both kinds of reidentification sentences: (ITTb) ∃1x(x-at-time-t exemplifies F) & ∃ 1y(y-at-time-t'exemplifies G) & and x = y)12. (ITSb) ∃1x(x-according-to-story-s exemplifies F) & ∃1 y(y-according-to-story-s exemplifies G) & x = y)). In particular, (2) comes out as follows: (2b) ∃1x((x-according-to-the-Odyssey exemplifies Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan horse) & ∃1 y(y-accordingto-the-Inferno exemplifies Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules) & x = y). From this perspective, we should say that (2b) is true in virtue of the fact that there are two “character slices”, x-according-to-the-Odyssey and y-according-to-the-Inferno, which are fictionally genidentical, i.e., are connected by a relation that links different “parts” of fictional characters that appear in different stories. Thus, the fictional Ulysses would be made up of several parts, the Ulysses of the Iliad, the one of the Odissey, the one of the Inferno, and so on. Castañeda (1974, 1979) is rather close to viewing fictional characters in this way, when he postulates a relation of “transconsociation” that can link “guises” occurring in different stories. 5. The Generalised Russellian Robust Sense of Reality According to the well-known “Russellian Robust Sense of Reality” (RRSR), (merely) fictional characters such Ulysses and Pinocchio (and more generally “nonexistent objects”) do not really exist and thus they must be “paraphrased away” somehow. RRSR seems embedded in our 12 “x-at-time-t” (and similar expressions) can be understood as singular terms that
result from two terms x and t, as combined by a special operator “-at-time-”, and denote a certain time slice of x occurring at t, provided x is an object and t a time. Mutatis mutandis, “x-according-to-story-s”, as used in (ITSb) below, must be understood analogously.
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conceptual scheme, for we all agree, in ordinary non-philosophical discourse, on claims such as (3) (the fictional character called) Ulysses does not exist. Yet, both the endurantist and the perdurantist analyses generate a conflict with RRSR. For example, it seems appropriate to identify the fictional Ulysses with the Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan horse, according to the Odyssey, as well as with the Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules, according to Dante’s Inferno. Hence, once we accept (ITSa) and thus (2a), we should also accept: (ITS2a) ∃1z(z is fictional and called Ulysses & (∃1 x(according-tothe-Odyssey (x exemplifies Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan) & ∃1y(according-to-the-Inferno (y exemplifies Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules) & x = y & z = x & z = y). From which it follows that, for some property F, ∃1 z(z is fictional and called Ulysses & Fx), which can naturally be taken to contradict (3) and thus RRSR. In sum, we end up accepting that Ulysses exists, in contrast with (3). Mutatis mutandis, we get to the same conclusion from (ITSb). As a matter of fact, Castañeda (1974, 1979) has appealed to reidentification sentences precisely as one of the arguments that can be used to question RRSR and promote a Meinongian ontology wherein, by a being/existence distinction, there are fictional characters that do not exist. In addition to RRSR, there is also what we may call the “Generalised Russellian Robust Sense of Reality” (GRRSR),13 according to which past and future objects do not exist. GRRSR seems part of our conceptual scheme just like RRSR, for we make claims such as (4) Socrates does not exist (any longer). Yet, by an argument analogous to the one we just saw for fictional characters and endurantism, it can be shown that the perdurantist analysis is at odds with GRRSR. It is doubtful that the endurantist and perdurantist analyses can be reconciled with RRSR and GRRSR, respectively, which suggests that 13 Not endorsed by Russell, who was rather consistently and explicitly a perdurantist.
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we should look for an alternative to both. This search must not forget that GRRSR is in tension with what we may call the Intentionality Datum (ID), especially appealed to by Castañeda and other contemporary philosophers hostile to RRSR14. ID tells us that we seem to talk and think about such items as fictional characters and past or future objects, as shown, e.g., by our acceptance of (5) Van Inwagen admires Ulysses; (6) Van Inwagen admires Socrates. One should try to resolve this conflict, because, by a principle of charity, we should not assume, as far as possible, that our conceptual scheme is incoherent. Perhaps, an alternative account of reidentification sentences may indicate a way to do this without sacrificing GRRSR. But in order to see how to shape this alternative, we must consider other reasons against the endurantist and perdurantist analyses. 6. Search for neutrality Once we consider the perdurantist option, it is problematic to claim that sentences of identity through time must be interpreted according to the endurantist analysis, for this seems to imply that our conceptual scheme is committed to endurantism (and thus to presentism). But this is not the case, for we are somehow able coherently to entertain perdurantism (and eternalism with it) or even to accept it (say, once we become convinced by relativity theory). It is of no avail to say that we had a conceptual scheme committed to endurantism and to some sort of pre-relativistic physics and that we changed it in favour of a different scheme committed to relativity theory and perdurantism. For we seem to be able to reason coherently from a vantage point from within which we can entertain and evaluate the two options in play and decide one way or another. It is this vantage point of view which deserves to be called our conceptual scheme. And given the possibility of switching from one option to the other, that is, from one theory 14 They may be neo-Meinongians, such as Parsons and Zalta, or philosophers who
reject RRSR on behalf of ficta, without viewing them as Meinongian nonexistent objects (Van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999; Voltolini forthcoming seems to take a middle road).
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to the other, this scheme appears to be committed to neither. This suggests that neither the endurantist nor the perdurantist ontological analyses are the right ones15, if an ontological analysis is meant to tell us something about our conceptual scheme. Perhaps we need a more neutral analysis. 7. Theseus’ ship The need for an alternative analysis can be supported by further considerations. In the situation described above, (1) is obviously true. But there are problematic cases where it is not clear whether and, if so, in what sense it is legitimate to assert sentences of this kind. The famous story of Theseus’ ship probably provides the most well-known example of such a problematic case. According to Plutarch16, the ship, preserved by the Athenians, starts undergoing at a certain time, t, a step by step replacement of its planks, which culminates at a later time, t', in a ship with none of the original parts. To make things more complicated, Hobbes asks us to imagine that some man 17, call him Reassemblarius, gathers the old planks and puts them together at t', so that we have at that point two ships, the ship preserved by the Athenians at time t' and the ship owned by Reassemblarius at time t'. Accordingly, the following classical problem arises: is Theseus’ ship at time t identical to the ship preserved by the Athenians at time t', or to Reassemblarius’ ship at time t'? As is well known, there are reasons that militate in favour of both options18 and thus we should accept: (7) The ship owned by Theseus at time t is the ship preserved by the Athenians at time t'; (8)
The ship owned by Theseus at time t is the ship owned by Reassemblarius at time t'. But clearly
15 Quine’s (1969) doctrine of ontological relativity leads to a similar conclusion,
but in the light of dubious behavioristic assumptions. 16 Plutarch’s Lives, Theseus, 23, I. 17 De Corpore, XI, 7. 18 See for example Coburn 1971, p. 93, and Swartz 1991, ch. 11.
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(9)
The ship preserved by the Athenians at time t' is not the ship owned by Reassemblarius at time t', despite the fact that (7) and (8) seem to imply the opposite of (9). Prima facie, then, our conceptual scheme is incoherent. Now, in contrast with the above-mentioned principle of charity, the endurantist analysis must subscribe this conclusion. For such an analysis leads us to accept these counterparts of (7)-(9): (7a) ∃1x(at-t(x exemplifies ship owned by Theseus) & ∃1 y(at-t'(y exemplifies ship preserved by the Athenians) & x = y); (8a)
∃1x(at-t(x exemplifies ship owned by Theseus) & ∃1 y(at-t'(y exemplifies ship owned by Reassemblarius) & x = y).
∃1 x(at-t'(x exemplifies ship preserved by the Athenians) & ∃ 1 y(at-t'(y exemplifies ship owned by Reassemblarius) & x ≠ y). Yet, it follows from (7a) and (8a), by the laws of first-order logic with identity, that (9a') ∃1 x(at-t'(x exemplifies ship preserved by the Athenians) & ∃ 1 y(at-t'(y exemplifies ship owned by Reassemblarius) & x = y). But (9a) and (9a') are in direct conflict and thus, given the endurantist analysis, we are trapped in an inconsistency. The perdurantist analysis, however, does not fare much better. It could perhaps question the fact that (7)-(9) are jointly true, but only under the unreasonable assumption that an ordinary object can undergo fission by having one temporal part genidentical with two distinct temporal parts that occur at the same time. To the extent that genidentity is taken to be natural and objective, perhaps something like that can be accepted, e.g., for an amoeba that splits by a biological process. In this case, there are exactly the same (natural, objective) reasons to claim, for each new amoeba, that it is genidentical with the original amoeba. But in the ship case, the reasons for (7) and those for (8) are (as we shall see) of very different kinds, which suggests that they cannot support the subsistence of one and the same natural and objective genidentity. Once (7)-(9) are taken for granted, as they should be, the perdurantist should analyse them as: (9a)
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(7b)
∃1 x(x-at-t exemplifies owned by Theseus) & ∃ 1y(y-at-t' exemplifies preserved by the Athenians) & x = y);
(8b)
∃1 x(x-at-t exemplifies owned by Theseus) & ∃ 1y(y-at-t' exemplifies owned by Reassemblarius) & x = y);
∃1x(x-at-t' exemplifies preserved by the Athenians) & ∃1 y(yat-t' exemplifies owned by Reassemblarius) & x ≠ y). And thus again we get an inconsistent triad, for from (7b) and (8b) we can formally derive: (9b') ∃1x(x-at-t' exemplifies preserved by the Athenians) & ∃1 y(yat-t' exemplifies owned by Reassemblarius) & x = y). By the principle of charity mentioned above, we must look for an alternative analysis of reidentification sentences, one that does not generate an inconsistency such as that inherent in the triads (7a)-(9a) and (7b)(9b). In searching for this alternative, we may note that the joint acceptability of (7)-(9) suggests the existence of a hidden parameter, a reidentification criterion, somehow linked to such sentences. The idea is that there are various such criteria and that (i) we implicitly appeal to them in asserting or presupposing sentences of identity across time to describe what goes on in situations spanning a certain amount of time; (ii) they are coherent with each other when these situations are typical, as when we assert (1); (iii) they pull in opposite directions in peculiar situations, such as that recounted by Plutarch and Hobbes. We are thus in the dark as to the truth value to be assigned to reidentification sentences relating to these situations, if we try to assign one, independently of the hidden parameter. (9b)
8. Sequentialism Chisholm 1970 comes to a similar conclusion. In his view, two ordinary objects x and y (other than persons), which exist at two different times, can be considered as identical only in a “loose and popular sense”, in the terminology of Bishop Butler, which Chisholm reproposes. As I understand him, he presupposes a four-dimensional view of reality, within which two temporal slices x-at-t and y-at-t' can be viewed as if they were genidentical (and thus as if they contributed to constitute an object extended in time as well as in space) in virtue of a
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criterion of reidentification of a conventional nature. Accordingly, it is only because we have conventionally chosen some such reidentification criterion that sentences such as (1), (7) or (8) are true, understood as asserting that two temporal parts belong in one object extended in time. And Chisholm (1970, p. 28) suggests that even a property like having such and such sailing schedule can be used to provide a reidentification criterion. That is, Chisholm 1970 avoids the inconsistency I have noted by appealing to reidentification criteria, just as I have suggested. However, he does more than that. He proposes an ontological picture, which we may call sequentialism (following Varzi 2001), distinct from both endurantism and perdurantism. He presents it in a fourdimensionalist version that makes it closer to perdurantism, but we can also have a three-dimensionalist version of it, closer to endurantism, which in fact is preferred in Chisholm 1971. According to the former version, there are temporal parts ordered by temporal relations like before and after, but there is no objective relation of genidentity that relates some of these parts in such a way that they come to constitute one ordinary object that perdures in time. We can however speak of some sequences of these temporal parts as if they were objects perduring in time, given the choice of a reidentification criterion. According to the latter version, at each time new ordinary objects supersede those of the previous time (which have ceased to exist) in a continuous process of birth and death (due, say, to the different ways in which the indivisible particles that constitute ordinary objects are assembled). There are then no objects that (objectively) persist in time (except perhaps in some cases and/or for brief intervals of time). Nevertheless, once we presuppose a reidentification criterion, we can speak as if some objects endure in time even though there are in fact no such persisting objects. Although four-dimensional sequentialism does not recognize the existence of an objective relation of genidentity, it is still committed to a world consisting of a four-dimensional manifold in line with relativity theory. But we have already noted that it would be wrong to conceive of our conceptual scheme as committed to this. Accordingly, it would be wrong to embed four-dimensional sequentialism in a semantic analysis of temporal reidentification sentences that is meant to reveal something about our conceptual scheme. On the other hand, three-dimensional sequentialism follows from mereological essential -
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ism (which in fact Chisholm accepts; see his 1989), according to which an ordinary object x that loses whatever part cannot be strictly identical to the object y that results from this mereological change. It may be added that this form of sequentialism also appears to follow from the bundle theory, according to which an ordinary object at a given time t is a bundle of properties, [P 1, ..., P n]. For in this view, if an object [P1, ..., Pn] changes a property at time t, say P1, it is superseded at a successive moment t' by a different object, say [F, P2 , ..., Pn ]. Moreover, it seems to me that three-dimensional sequentialism can hardly be motivated apart from one of these views. At the same time, it is far from clear that our conceptual scheme is committed to them. For arguably it offers a vantage point from within which different philosophers can rationally dispute in favour of or against such doctrines. In sum, I think that the idea of reidentification criteria should be exploited to provide an analysis of reidentification sentences which is neutral not only with respect to endurantism and perdurantism, but with respect to sequentialism (in either version) as well. Accordingly, I shall first provide an account of reidentification criteria compatible with this goal and then proceed to propose one such analysis. 9. Conventional essences Call sequentialist proposition for a time t the proposition, P, that holds at time t and provides the most complete information about which properties and relations of ordinary objects are exemplified at t as well as about the numbers of individuals that exemplify such properties at t (and similarly about relations)19. The intuitive idea is that the sequentialist propositions for the various times provide all the information about what happens at the various times, provided this information is compatible with sequentialism, whether in its three-dimensionalist or four-dimensionalist version. For example, the truth at t of sequentialist proposition P for t may imply that a certain property Q is univocally exemplified at t and the truth at t' of the sequentialist proposition P' for t' that Q is also univocally exemplified at t', without implying that there is one enduring or perduring object that exemplifies Q both at t and at t'. More generally, the sequentialist propositions for the various times, 19 There may be various logically equivalent propositions of this kind. In which
case, assume we pick one somehow.
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taken jointly, imply nothing about whether or not time is a fourth dimension or whether there are objects that objectively persist in time. A reidentification criterion, C, can be viewed as an ideal procedure, which our conceptual scheme somehow presupposes in our use of natural language and in our reasoning practices. Given as input a time t and a property F, exemplified by n distinct objects in t, C yields as output, on the basis of the sequentialist proposition for t and for all (relevant) subsequent or following times, properties E1 ,...., En , corresponding to the n objects exemplifying F in t20. We assume that at t each Ei in the output is univocally exemplified and is coexemplified with F (i.e., it holds at t that ∃1 x(Ei x & Fx). Intuitively, each Ei should be considered the essence of one of the objects exemplifying F at t. In fact, the idea is that each property in the output should allow us to view reality as if one object persisted in time as long as this property is exemplified (whether or not such a persistence actually takes place in an objective sense). Let us write “C(t, F, E)” to mean that given as inputs time t and property F, C provides E in its output. Moreover, let us say that a property is an essence according to criterion C, if, for some F and t, C(t, F, E). It might be the case that C(t, F, E) is false for any choice of t and F, although it might have been true for some t and F, had the sequentialist information about t and the other relevant times been different. In such a circumstance, let us call E a merely possible essence, according to criterion C. In contrast, a property E such that, for some t and F, C(t, F, E) actually holds may be called a real essence, according to criterion C. This distinction should prove useful in dealing with counterfactuals, but I shall not pursue that topic here. More pressing for present purposes is the distinction between real and fictional essences. We shall see that a criterion C can also take as input a property and a story (rather than a time). The properties provided as outputs in this case are what I call fictional essences, according to criterion C. For reasons we hinted at and that I shall further clarify, I assume that there are different but equally legitimate reidentification criteria. In connection with this point, we may want to call a property which is an 20 For reasons having to do with relations and to which we shall return, C may
also take in input a sequence of n times and an n-adic relation and provide as output sequences of n properties.
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essence according to a certain criterion a conventional essence. The fact that I am postulating conventional essences makes my view rather different from Plantinga’s (1974) essentialism, according to which each object has with metaphysical objective necessity, so to speak, one essence distinguishing the object from anything else. It would be very moot to claim that this doctrine is embedded in our conceptual scheme (it is widely disputed by many respectable philosophers) and thus as long as we are doing descriptive ontology, we should be neutral with respect to it, just as with respect to endurantism, perdurantism and sequentialism. Conventional essentialism, as we could call my view, does indeed have this neutrality. Here are some examples of temporal reidentification criteria and corresponding essences. We can envisage, to begin with, a criterion, CSP, which privileges spatio-temporal continuity, as this notion is understood along the lines, e.g., of Hirsh 1971 or Coburn 1971. In its output, CSP typically provides properties such as being spatio-temporally continuous with place p at time t, where a place is here conceived as an abstract volume of space, and, intuitively at t in p there occurs the birth of an object. Roughly, such a property is exemplified by an object at a time t', if at t' this object is in a place p' such that there is a continuous spatio-temporal path connecting the time-place pairs and , and, for any two contiguous time-place pairs in the path, there is an appropriate “qualitative similarity” of the two pairs21. Another criterion, CP, privileges what we may call parts continuity (see, e.g., Swartz 1991, p. 348). This is based on the intuition that (usually) objects preserve in time most of their parts22. In its output, CP typically provides properties like having most of the parts such that at time t' 21 A pair is qualitatively similar to another pair , if at t there is in
place p an object exemplifying exactly the properties in the set of properties S; at t' there is in place p' an object exemplifying exactly the properties in the set of properties S' and S and S' are very similar in that if P is a member of S, then P or a property qualitatively similar to P is in S' (e.g., weighing 10 pounds is in S and the same property or the qualitatively similar weighing 10+δ pounds is in S'). This criterion is not circular, as is often claimed, if places are viewed as abstract volumes of space existing apart from ordinary objects, rather than as themselves ordinary objects in need of being reidentified. 22 Or at least most of their parts result from a gradual change dictated by microphysical and/or biological laws.
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and place p there was an object constituted by such parts (or microphysical/biological “ancestors” thereof). Again, intuitively, at t' in p there occurs the birth of a certain object. Yet another criterion, CFC, privileges functional continuity. It is in play, it would seem, when we assert something like “the lizard’s tail fell off, but then it grew back”, which appears to presuppose a reidentification sentence such as “the lizard’s tail at time t (before the fall) is the lizard’s tail at time t' (after the fall and the re-growth)”. As I see it, reidentification criteria differ in that they tend to privilege one of these notions (spatiotemporal continuity, parts continuity, etc.) over the others, when a conflict among them arises, but otherwise they try to combine these various aspects. Each of these notions provide, we may say, a partial reidentification criterion and the various reidentification criteria that I am postulating differ in how they combine and rank these partial criteria (which in themselves are inherently defeasible; Swartz 1991, p. 349). 10. Diachronic identity and real essences Once we grant reidentification criteria and corresponding conventional essences, we can provide an ontological analysis of reidentification sentences of form (ITT), which is ontologically neutral in the sense explained above: (ITT_M) ∃1 E(C(t, F, E) & ∃1 E'(C '(t', G, E') & E = E'), where C and C ' are typically (though not always) the same reidentification criterion. According to this analysis, (ITT) says that, upon presupposing reidentification criteria C and C', there is just one essence which is assigned to F at t by C (which implies that F is univocally exemplified at t) and to G at t' by C' (which implies that G is univocally exemplified at t'). Intuitively (when C and C' are the same), this essence corresponds to one object that persists as we “move” from t to t'. Now, by presupposing the criterion based on spatio-temporal continuity, CSP, (7) can be paraphrased in the light of this analysis as follows: (7c)
∃1P(CSP(t, ship owned by Theseus, P)) & ∃1 Q (CSP(t', ship preserved by the Athenians, Q)) & P = Q).
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Similarly, by presupposing the criterion based on part continuity CP, (8) can be paraphrased as follows: (8c) ∃1P(CP(t, ship owned by Theseus, P)) & ∃1 Q (CP (t', ship owned by Reassemblarius, Q)) & P = Q). Clearly, (7c) and (8c) can be simultaneously true, in line with our tendency to see good arguments in favour of both (7) and (8). Moreover, (7c) and (8c) are compatible with whatever analysis of (9) is appropriate in the present perspective, e.g., (9c) ∃1P(CSP(t', ship preserved by the Athenians, P)) & ∃ 1Q(CP(t', ship owned by Reassemblarius, Q)) & P ≠ Q). This way of proceeding brings with it some controversial assumptions at the semantic level. It proposes in fact that a predicate for ordinary objects can be used in natural language in a “metaessential” way (relative to a time) to say that the property expressed by the predicate is linked, so to speak, to a certain essence, on the basis of a presupposed reidentification criterion. At the same time, in this approach it is not denied that the very same predicate can also be used in a “standard” way to say that at a given time the property in question is exemplified. It may then be worth underlining that these complications could be seen as worth paying, since they prevent us from conceiving of natural language, and the conceptual scheme behind it, as necessarily linked to ontological presuppositions such as those we have seen above, which can hardly be attributed to the typical speaker. On the other hand, the attribution to a typical speaker of implicit reidentification criteria (which may vary with the context) is justified by the examination of the way in which we use sentences of diachronic reidentification and in particular by the puzzles raised by controversial examples, such as that of Theseus’ ship. And once we admit these reidentification criteria, the acceptance of conventional essences and the double use of predicates that we just noted naturally goes with them. 11. Intertextual identity and fictional essences Given the Analogy Constraint AC, we should at this juncture provide a similar treatment of sentences of form (ITS). This can be done by assuming that a reidentification criterion C may take in input a proper-
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ty and a story in order to yield as output one or more fictional essences. If s is a story, we should assume the following, by analogy with what we said about times: when F is exemplified by n distinct objects in the story, then there should be n distinct fictional essences E1,...,En such that C(s, F, E1), ...,C(s, F, En ). For, intuitively, if F is exemplified by n distinct objects in the story, each of them should have its own distinguishing essence. However, for reasons that we shall see below, we should not assume that whenever C(s, F, E) is the case, E is exemplified in s. But how should we understand the locution “F is exemplified by n objects in a certain story”? To answer this, let us first note that it is appropriate to take stories to be (usually very complicated) propositions23 that result from an in-depth, ideal interpretation of a concretely existing text generated by a certain author, an interpretation which may take into account the time and cultural environment in which it was written, the author’s intentions and whatever factors are deemed important in literary criticism. In this perspective, to say that a proposition P holds with respect to (in, according to) a certain story s means that s entails P, where the entailment in question is arguably of a nonclassical, indeed paraconsistent, nature (for we must allow for the fact that a story can contain contradictions and informational gaps; see, e.g., Deutsch 1985). Note also that a story is expressed in natural language in a way that typically involves, whether explicitly or implicitly, many sentences of identity across time. Thus, if my approach is correct, a story involves properties that are predicated in a metaessential way with respect to a time. Accordingly, that a property F is exemplified by n objects in a story s should be understood (at least by default) as the assertion that s entails the proposition that there are n real essences linked to property F through metaessential predication with respect to a time. Coexemplification in a story should be understood in the same vein. With this in mind, sentences of form (ITS) should be analyzed as follows: (ITSc)∃ 1E(C(s, F, E) & (∃1 E'(C'(s', F, E') & E = E')),
23 See, e.g., Plantinga’s (1974, p. 159) notion of story line.
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where C and C' are (typically) the same criterion24. Thus, for example, (2) can be paraphrased in this way: (2c) ∃1E(C(Odyssey, Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan horse, E) & (∃1 E'(C(Inferno, Achaean who guided the expedition past the Pillars of Hercules, E') & E = E')). At least in typical cases, a fictional essence could be characterized as a salient character property, i.e., intuitively, something that allows one to keep track of the same character within a story. In relation to a story s, a property F of this kind is such that: (i) s entails (paraconsistently) 24 I have provided an analysis analogous to (ITSc) in Orilia 2002. Let me reply
here to some criticisms that have been put forward against it, since this might be useful for a better appreciation of my proposal. Frigerio 2004 argues that in many cases we are quite certain of the truth of intertextual reidentification sentences, whereas, if we should rely on reidentification criteria in the way I suggest, we should typically be uncertain (undecided between a judgement of similarity and one of identity). I don’t see how this can be the case, for the reidentification criteria I postulate are meant to be precisely the criteria we use when we claim that certain reidentification sentences are true. Frigerio also points out that, when E is an essence from the point of view of story s and thus, roughly put, corresponds to a character c of s, we could imagine a story s' where E is exemplified by a different character c'. He is right in this, but errs, when he thinks that this is at odds with my approach. His intuition seems to be that, if E is essential to c and c' exemplifies E, then c should be equal to c', contrary to the assumption that c and c' are different. But in fact my approach can very well account for what Frigerio is pointing at, for it allows for a story s' where a fictional essence E is exemplified (and thus, so to speak, there is a character in s' with that property), although E is not an essence from the point of view of s'. Let us turn now to Voltolini (2004), who argues against my use of identity in the counterpart of (ITSc) in Orilia 2002. For, he claims, most of the so-called judgements of identity across stories in fact assert a fusion of two characters and only seldom are two characters really claimed to be identical. To illustrate, he mentions that both the Berget and the Vington of the 1912 version of the Recherche are said to be the Vinteuil of the final version of Proust’s masterpiece. It seems to me questionable that such fusion claims are many and the identity claims rare. But even if the latter were so, we should account for them any way and thus I think that the use of identity in (ITSc) is as it should be. Needless to say, however, fusion claims such as the ones about Vinteuil must also be accounted for. This can be done, I think, in terms of a conjunction of essences or something like that: ∃1 E(C(s, F, E) & (∃1E'(C(s', G, E') & (∃1E'(C(s", F, E") & E" = [E & E'])).
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that there are various times at which F is exemplified, but it is false that s entails that there is a time at which F is exemplified by more than one object; (i) s entails (paraconsistently) that there is a real essence with which F is coexemplified at each time at which F is exemplified. For example, in Sherlock Holmes stories, a salient character property (intuitively corresponding to the character Sherlock Holmes) is something like: being an entity exemplifying most of these properties: being called Sherlock Holmes, being very clever, being a detective, living in London, dressing in such and such a way, etc. In describing how reidentification criteria behave with respect to stories, we can distinguish, I think, two main kinds of them. Criteria of the first kind tend to privilege a partial (defeasible) reidentification criterion that yields as essences salient character properties that are exemplified in the story in input and possibly in other stories. A criterion of this kind can be considered at play in our judgement that one Sherlock Homes character appears in A.C. Doyle’s stories as well as in the wellknown movie The 7% Solution, where Holmes meets Freud. Criteria of the second kind, on the other hand, tend to yield essences, by favouring a partial (defeasible) reidentification criterion that relies on the fact that, roughly put, an author A takes another author A' as a source. In such a situation, when A views a property P as exemplified from the point of view of the story she is putting together, A is appropriately connected (by her beliefs and intentions) to a story s' previously conceived by A' (via one of its concrete linguistic realisations) in a way that can be described as “imagining that P is exemplified by (some sort of literary reincarnation) of such and such a character in s'”. In this case, the essence could be a fictional essence of the previous story s' (e.g., a salient character property exemplified in s), which may very well be a property that is not a salient character property in s or is not even exemplified in s. By relying on the existence of partial reidentification criteria of this kind, we can account for the fact that, e.g., we may judge that Joyce’s Ulysses is the Ulysses of the Odyssey25 (in spite of the fact that, roughly put, the salient character property linked to 25 Voltolini 2004 relies on this judgment to criticise the previous version of the
present approach in Orilia 2003. Although I do not agree with some details of his criticism (inspired, he says, by Thomasson 1999), I was at least in part motivated by it in putting forward this second criterion.
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Ulysses in the Odyssey is arguably different from that linked to Joyce’s Ulysses). In this way, we can account for the fact, emphasised by Thomasson 1999, that literary critics take into account, in judging whether a character c in story s is the same as a character c' in story s', whether s' is a source (possibly indirect) for the author of s. Thomasson argues that there should always be such a link between s and s' for c to be judged identical to c' (p. 67), for this is the way literary critics see the matter (p. 6). Literary critics would say, according to Thomasson, that, if there is no such link, c and c' can at most be “analogs”. But I doubt that this is correct. Even assuming that literary critics consistently judge in this way, which is moot, this might be explained by their (typically Western) interest in giving a prominent role to the creative capabilities of individual authors and thus to “copyright issues”. By following this interest, we may be tempted to give identity conditions for stories like those Thomasson suggests for “literary works” (p. 64), according to which there could be two stories which differ simply because they were invented independently by two different authors, but are identical as far as their content goes. From this point of view, it might seem sensible to consider as conceptually impossible (rather than simply very unlikely) that two authors may independently write the very same story with the very same characters. But if we take this line, we forget that language is an instrument that allows different people to express the same meaning with different tokens (perhaps even tokens of different languages). If we recall this, it is preferable to say that two authors may in principle express the same story (a proposition) just as two people express the same proposition by uttering two tokens of “snow is white”. It is worth noting that in my approach we can account for the intuition that a real object can be a character in a story (Castañeda 1977), for, as I see it, nothing prevents a real essence from being a fictional essences as well26. It is always an option in fact that a criterion C takes a story s to be “talking about a real object”, or perhaps more precisely, in the present perspective, as “talking about a real essence”. In this case, for some property F, we would have that C(s, F, E), where E is a real essence. For example, in Sherlock Holmes stories, A. C. Doyle can
26 See Orilia 2000b for more details on this.
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be assumed to talk about the real London. Thus, if we assume that being spatially continuous with is a real essence, according to a criterion C, an essence intuitively corresponding to London, we may say that this property is not only a real essence but also a fictional essence for it is the case that, say, C(The Sign of Four, called London, being spatially continuous with ). 12. GRRSR and ID reconciled Let us see where the approach I am proposing drives us, once we reconsider GRRSR and its apparent tension with ID. In the present perspective, there are fictional characters in the sense that singular terms that we prima facie take to be referring to them, typically refer to something. They refer to fictional essences. For example, “the Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan Horse” expresses the denoting concept [THE Achaean who devised the trick with the Trojan Horse], which we may take to determine a certain fictional essence E, which the singular term in question refers to. But fictional essences are properties, i.e., entities that an actualist like Russell, or even a presentist, would accept in his ontological inventory. More generally, in being properties, I would say that fictional entities are, to adapt an expression from Armstrong 1997, “no real addition to being”, in that properties must be acknowledged in our ontological inventory anyway, quite independently of any analysis of fiction, and intertextual reidentification. This is in line with RRSR. Similarly, there are in my approach, so to speak, past and future objects that do not presently exist, but simply in the sense that singular terms that we prima facie take to be referring to them refer to real essences. For example, “the original manuscript of Plato’s Phaedo” can be taken to express the denoting concept [THE original manuscript of Plato’s Phaedo], which determines not so much an object, but a real essence E, a property which, for all we know, is not presently exemplified. Since real essences are properties, to admit past and future objects in this sense is again no real addition to being, in line with GRRSR. Compatibility with GRRSR is not gained however in a way that ignores ID. For, since singular terms for fictional, past and future objects typically have a referent in this approach, we can grant that sentences (5) (“Van Inwagen admires Ulysses”) and (6) (“Van Inwagen admires Socrates”) are true, by way of corresponding ultimately to a
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relational fact linking an individual and an essence, rather than to a mysterious relational fact with a nonexistent relatum. Let me further clarify this point. First note that for a predicate scheme like “x admires the F” to be true of someone, y, it must be the case that y has appropriate “admiration-beliefs”, that is, as I see it, beliefs involving, in this case, the denoting concept [THE F] and which could be expressed by sentences such as “the F was wise and wisdom is a virtue”. Now, from my point of view, a proposition expressible with “the F was wise” typically “purports to speak about an essence” and is true just in case there is exactly one essence E such that wisdom is truly predicated of it in the metaessential sense. Now, the admiration could be purely de dicto, when (unbeknownst to y) the denoting concept [THE F] does not determine anything (as is the case, for example, with the denoting concept expressed by “the coach of the team who won the soccer world championship in 1942”; there was no world championship in 1942). But the admiration is, in a sense, de re, when the denoting concept determines an essence, as with (5) and (6), in which cases there are relational facts involving a person (Van Inwagen) and an essence. We also have the intuition, I think, that in (5) the admiration is, so to speak, more de re, for Ulysses is fictional, whereas Socrates concretely existed. Now, it is appropriate in my approach to grant a secondary sense in which a singular term “the P” may singularly refer to an entity x. This sense applies when the denoting concept [THE P] expressed by the term refers (in the primary sense) to an essence E, which in turn is univocally exemplified by x. In this case, we may add, [THE P] indirect ly determines x. With this further notion, we do justice to the intuition that we just considered: (5) differs from (6) in that only so far as the former is concerned Van Inwagen admires by way of employing a denoting concept that, in the past, indirectly determined an entity. 13. Relations and metaessential predication We have seen how “intentional” relations like admiring (and similarly being afraid of, thinking of, etc.) should be dealt with in the present approach. But it is worth considering also non-intentional relations such as touching or being taller than. For, once we assume that a property such as being a ship can be predicated in a metaessential way, we should assume the same for these non-intentional relations. Let us see
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how this can be understood. For simplicity’s sake we consider only dyadic relations (we can easily generalise from them). Let us assume that a criterion C, when taking in input one such relation R, also takes in input a pair of times . Correspondingly, we have in output pairs , where E1 and E 2 are conventional essences. Thus, we should represent the metaessential predication of R with respect to E1 and E2 , rooted, so to speak at times t1, and t2 as follows: C(, R, ). For an expression like this to be true, we require first of all that E1 and E2 be conventional essences in the sense explained above. Moreover, there are additional conditions, depending on the nature of R. We can distinguish in fact two main kinds of (non-intentional) relations. The intratemporal ones, like touching, kissing, being over, etc., require two individuals existing at the same time. When R is of this kind, the further condition is simply that there is a time t equal to t1, and t2 and such that, at t, there are individuals x and y, univocally exemplifying E 1 and E 2, respectively, and which are in the relation R. Further, there are intertemporal (non-intentional) relations, like taller than, wiser than, being an ancestor of, etc., which, so to speak, require two individuals possibly located at different times. For them, we must add this further condition. There are properties P 1 and P 2, such that at each t i, E i is univocally exemplified by an object that also exemplifies Pi (for i = 1 or i = 2). Moreover, there is a relation R* (appropriately connected to R in a sense to be explained with a forthcoming example) such that
is exemplified by R*. And here is the example. Consider the proposition that Clinton, as he is at the present moment, t, is taller than Napoleon, as he was at a certain moment t' in the past. We can take this to be true on the ground that, roughly, the following proposition is true: ∃1 E(C(t, called Clinton, E) & ∃1 E(C(t', called Napoleon, E') & E and being 6 feet tall are coexemplified at t & E' and 5 feet tall are coexemplified at t'', and six feet tall is an height greater than 5 feet tall. In this case, R is the relation of being taller, P1 and P2 are the properties 6 feet tall and 5 feet tall and R* is the relation of being a greater height. By analogy with what we did for times, we can extend this treatment of relations to stories, just as we did for properties. In view of this, “Polyphemus is taller than Clinton” receives, roughly, the following analysis: ∃1 E(C(Odyssey, called Polyphemus, E) & ∃1 E'(C(now, called
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Clinton, E') & ∃P1(E and P1 are coexemplified now & ∃P2 (E' and P2 are coexemplified in the Odyssey & P1 is an height greater than P2). Intuitively, P1 is the property six feet tall (suppose this is how tall Clinton is) and P2 is being as tall as a giant (a property clearly attributed to Polyphemus in the Odyssey). 14. Some tentative conclusions Since writing fiction is an essentially linguistic activity by means of which (by and large) we invent rather than describe, in explaining what it is about, we need not go beyond a description of our conceptual structure. Hence, if my analysis is right, there is no reason to postulate fictional objects (understood as particulars) over and above the properties (conventional fictional essences) appealed to in my account (in line with actualism). But in using sentences of identity through time, we try to describe the world. Accordingly, in relation to them, we cannot rest content with an attempt to describe our conceptual structure. My own ontological analysis in this respect ended up with the idea that there are conventional essences relative to a reidentification criterion. But, as we saw, this is compatible with endurantism, perdurantism, sequentialism, Plantinga's essentialism, etc. As I see them, these are different theories about the real world. They are grist to the mill of the prescriptive ontologist, who must decide about them not merely by trying to decipher our conceptual structure (it is neutral, if I am right, with respect to them), but by bringing in additional considerations, which may very well be of an empirical a posteriori nature (e.g., by appealing to relativity theory in order to argue for perdurantism). The main issue can be roughly put as follows. If a real essence is univocally exemplified by an object, is this object, so to speak, an enduring, a perduring or a merely “sequential” object, an ens successivum, in Chisholm’s (1989) terminology? Moreover, we could ask, is there a reidentification criterion that could be preferred to the others in that it (typically) yields essences that coincide with objective essences in Plantinga’s sense and/or correspond to persisting objects? We should not take for granted, I think, that there are universal answers. For example, Chisholm may be right in insisting that ships are entia suc cessiva, whereas persons are persisting entities. And, there may be a reidentification criterion that functions better in capturing Plantinga essences of living beings and another to be preferred in an effort at cap-
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turing Plantinga essences of rocks and stones (if we assume essences of this kind)27. References Armstrong, D.A, (1997), A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Castañeda, H.-N., (1974), ‘Thinking and the Structure of the World’, Philosophia, 4, pp. 3-40. –– (1979), ‘Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections’, Poetics, 8, pp. 31-62. –– (1980), On Philosophical Method, Bloomington, IN, Noûs Publications. Chisholm, R.M., (1970), ‘Identity Through Time’, in Language, Belief and Metaphysics, (eds.) H. E. Keifer and M. K. Munitz, Albany NY, State University of New York Press. Reprinted in Chisholm 1989, pp. 19-41 (the page reference in the text is to this edition). –– (1971), ‘Problems of Identity’, in (ed.) Munitz 1971, pp. 3-30. –– (1989), On Metaphysics, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. Cocchiarella, N.B., (1982), ‘Meinong Reconstructed versus Early Russell Reconstructed’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11, pp. 183-214. Coburn, R.C., (1971), Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity, in Munitz 1971, pp. 51-101. Craig, W.L., (2000), The Tensed Theory of Time, Dordrecht, Kluwer. Deutsch, H., (1985), ‘Fiction and Fabrication’, Philosophical Studies, 47, pp. 201-211. Hirsh, E., (1971), ‘Essence and Identity’, in (ed.) Munitz 1971, pp. 31-49.
27 This paper is my last try (so far) at implementing an appeal to conventional
essences in order to account for reidentification sentences and provide a general ontological picture that takes them as departure point. Since 1986 (cfr. Orilia 1989), I have pursued this line in various forms. Originally, in the context of Castañeda’s guise theory. In Orilia 1995, roughly, as part of a conception of fictional characters as denoting concepts. Since Orilia 2000b, by identifying fictional characters with fictional essences. In addition to colleagues, friends and mentors whose help has already been acknowledged in my previous publications on this topic, I wish to thank for their interest and suggestions all the participants in the 2005 Bergamo workshop on ontology, On What (Perhaps) There is, where this work was presented. Among them, Richard Davies deserves a special mention for his careful editing of a previous version of this paper and for stylistic suggestions.
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