IETF 83 - IP packet staining - March 27 2012.pptx

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Mar 27, 2012 - Destination Options ext. Does not require “slow path” processing + has space for many stains + has sp
IP(v6)  packet  staining  

dra$-­‐macaulay-­‐6man-­‐packet-­‐stain-­‐00  

IETF 83 March 2012 Tyson Macaulay, VP Technology, 2Keys Security Solutions [email protected] +16132929132

Draft released Feb

th 14

2012

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Prior work

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Summer 2010 http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol13_No3.pdf Fall 2010 http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol13_No4.pdf Winter 2011 http://iac.dtic.mil/iatac/download/Vol14_No1.pdf

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Why?

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Older detection approaches are failing •  Time between compromise and exploitation can be sub-second •  Too much latency between detection and intelligence distribution •  .dat files and CRLS are huge –  Not appropriate for metered services (3G/4G)

•  On-line queries subject to disruption and compromise 7

>2015

Multi-layer (5+): Legacy controls + Proactive Intelligence + Smart device security

Hacktivists Spies Criminals Soldiers, Terrorists

Business Data risk = reputation risk = compliance risk = financial risks = intellectual property risks

Control Data (kinetic) Artificial Intelligence / Autonomous Threats

= physical risk = property risk

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What?

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Threat Intelligence Closed source

Traffic flow analysis

Messaging / Web analysis

Customer support

Intra-carrier Info share Product vendor subscriptions

Reputation and Threat Intelligence

Correla'on  and   aggrega'on  

Open Source info Spamhaus, MAUWG, CERT, SANS, Team Cymru

DNS Traffic shaping

Domain Name Services

How?

IP header staining IPv4 header

X

IPv6 header

Not  enough   space  /  fully   allocated  

X X

Largely  not  supported   by  network  nodes  or   end-­‐points  

Nxt  Hdr  



Does  not  require  “slow  path”  processing  +   has  space  for  many  stains  +  has  space  for   digital  signature  as  appropriate  

Short  on  space  and   trend  towards  other   uses  (load  balancing)?  

Ext  length  

Destination Options ext

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Destination Options format

Op'ons  type  

8-­‐bit  iden'fier  of  the  type  of  op'on.  The  op'on  iden'fier  for  the  reputa'on   stain  op'on  will  be  allocated  by  the  IANA  

Op'ons  length  

8-­‐bit  unsigned  integer.  The  length  of  the  op'on  (excluding  the  Op'on  Type   and  Op'on  Length  fields).    

S  bit  

When  this  bit  is  set,  the  reputa'on  stain  op'on  has  been  signed.    

U  bit  

When  this  bit  is  set,  the  reputa'on  stain  op'on  contains  a  malicious  URL.    

Stain  data  

Contains  the  stain  (reputa'on  informa'on)  data  

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IPv6 concept of operations Stain  applied  as   Des'na'on  Op'on   header  extension    

Untreated  IPv6   packet  

Perimeter  device   may  read  stain  and   apply  policy  –  or   pass  to  endpoint  

End  point  device   reads  stain  and   applies  policy.  

Packet   Manipula'on     Device  (PMD)  

Carrier network

Or…

Enterprise network

PMD  

Internet/partner intranet network

Enterprise network 14

Questions & Comments to date Draft 01 (April 2012) –  Is this legal? –  Provide sample code? –  More details on S and U bits –  Add use-case for home users (mitigate loss of NAT firewalls) –  Add stain semantics –  Discuss scalability advantages over .dat or CRL-type solutions –  Discuss reputation algorithms 15

Conclusion Is “packet staining” worth pursuing?

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Back-­‐up  

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Use-cases IP Packet Staining Internet

Bot Master SSL

Peer Z

Peer Y

Peer X

Compromised device

AS 666 Peer W

Intelligence source

Carrier Network PMD

Intelligence Distribution

Smart Transport

Smart Medicine

× Smart Home

Enterprise WAN

Industrial Control

Intelligence management

Stained packet from suspect source

Unstained / neutral packet

Compromised / victim device

Packet Manipulation Device (PMD)

“Staining reading device” © Tyson Macaulay 2011