Imagination, Cognition, and Persona Author(s): Mark Sadoski Reviewed work(s): Source: Rhetoric Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 266-278 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/465487 . Accessed: 17/09/2012 11:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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MARK SADOSKI TexasA&M University
Imagination,Cognition,and Persona In thisessayI willassertthatmentalimagery andhumanimagination arenot butarefundamental onlyinvolvedintheprocessofcomposing toit.Byextension, I willassertthatimagination is central toall humancommunication, andespecially tosophisticated usesoflanguage.I willalso assertthatitis thebasisoftheconcept ofpersonaand,perhaps, all ofrhetoric. Theessayhasthreeparts,withthefirst twointroductory tothethird. The first partexplorestheideasofseveralmodemphilosophers andimagiaboutimagery nationand theirrelationship The secondpart to languageand communication. reviewscontemporary theories ofmentalimagery andverbalprocessesas derived fromempiricalstudiesin cognitivepsychology. The finalsectionsynthesizes the ideas of thephilosophers and psychologists and relatesthemto therhetorical conceptofpersona,withexamples. The examplesI will use in the finalsectionwill deal withimageryin and persuasion.The processesof composingexposition, specifically argument imagery andimagination involvedindepicting character andactionorcomposing vividdescription, whileinteresting in theirownright, aremoreobvious.Donald whotestify thatimagery is not Murraycitesnumerous poetsand fictionwriters butthevehicleoftheircomposing("Write"59-60).To show onlythemotivation is basictoall composing, I willavoidthenarrative thatimagination andpoeticand steerintorealmswheredemonstration is moresubtle. Imageryin ModernPhilosophy I meanherethementalprocessofreproducing By imageryand imagination storedinmemory, orofrecombining sensoryandperceptual experiences partsof tocreatenewarrangements formerly perceivedexperiences apartfromtheiractual inreality. occurrence Whenwe recallthesensory aspectsofpastevents,we image them.Whenwe manipulate partsofexisting imagesintonewcombinations and/or whenwe enrichimageswithaffective we imagine.The termimagiassociations, nation is notused hereas a synonym forcreativity or visionary genius.On the is a normal,essentiallyhuman,mindfulactivitythatwe contrary, imagination tothelateJacobBronowengageinfrommoment tomoment. Itis also,according ski,nothingless thanthebasis of freewill,and thecentralproblemof human consciousness (Origins 18). 266
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To illustrate thispoint,Bronowski("Reach,""Speaking")was fondofciting a seriesof earlybehavioralexperiments by Hunter.In the firstexperiments, animalswerepresented withthreealternative doorswithlightbulbsoverthem. Whentheanimalswentthoughthedoorthathad thelit bulb,theyreceiveda reward.Throughsimpleconditioning, theanimals'reflexeswerequicklyfixedto thelitdoorway. However,whenHunterintroduced thevariableoftime,theresults werestrikingly different. Whenthelightoverthedoorwas turnedon and then turnedoff,and theanimalswererestrained, withinsecondsall buthigherorder mammalswouldforget whichdoorhadbeenlit.The animalslackedanyabilityto represent theabsentinmemory, inthepresent. to image:theywereimprisoned In further experiments Hunterfound,of course,thateven veryyoungchildren performed incomparably better thanthebestofhisanimals. Bronowskicitedthisexperiment to exemplify a criticalandessentialdifferencebetweenhumansandanimals.Humansnotonlycan holdpastperceptions in forindeterminate memory periodsbutalsocanreorganize thoseperceptions innew waystocreateorinvent. Bronowski heldthatthisabilitywasa uniqueevolutionary step,and responsibleforall our science and art.For whenwe imaginepast experiencesand thenprojectthemintoactualor hypothetical situations, we are quiteliterally aboutthebusinessofcreating and shapingthefuture. Muchofour livesarespentin mentally projecting realor imaginedsituations, decidingwhich alternative outcomewe prefer, andactingso as to producetheimagined, desired state,i.e.,freewill. Philosopher SusanneLangeralso has contended thatimagination is theprimarytalentof thehumanmindandthatlanguageactuallyevolvedin theservice ofmentalimagery. She has proposedthatourmentalimagesaremorepronethan else we knowtobecomesymbols, anything andthatinfact"thewholemechanism of symbolization was probablyworkedoutin thevisualsystembeforeitspower couldbe transferred to thevocal-auditory realm."(49). Thatis, in humanevoluinimagesprecededthinking tion,as inhumandevelopment, thinking inlanguage or otherabstract symbolsystems. Langerspeculatedthatoriginally imagery and vocalizationwere mentallyseparateand thatvocalizationsmay have become relatedtomentalimagesinprimitive communal whenemotionally rituals, charged communal vocalululations becameassociatedwithaccompanying rhythmic body movements orobjectsusedintribaldances.Laterthesevocalizations werefound to call to mindthesame gesturesor objectsfrommemoryoutsideof theritual andcommunicative context, languagebegan: Thegreatstepfromanthropoid toanthropos, animaltoman,wastaken whenthevocal organsweremovedto register theoccurrence of an an equivalentoccurrence image,andstirred in another brain,andthe twocreatures referred tothesamething.Atthatpoint,thevocalhabit thathadlongservedforcommunion assumedthefunction ofcommu-
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nication.To evokeideas in each other'sminds,notin thecourseof action,but of emotionand memory-thatis, in reflection-isto communicate aboutsomething, and thisis whatno animalsdo. (5152).
thatlaterin history Langercontended theevocationofconsciousimagesbecame andspeechitselfstarted to becomemoreabstractly dispensable, symbolic. WhileLangerand Bronowskiemphasizedtheevolutionary of progression of theimaginedeventin all pastandpresent imageryto language,thecentrality behaviorhas founditsmostfundamental place in thepragmatist philosophy of he was veryconcernedwith GeorgeHerbertMead. Like theotherpragmatists, process,in Mead's case withthemind'sinnerpsychological processesas they totheiroutersocialcontexts. He believedthatbecausehumans existedinrelation are a social species,thebehaviorof anyindividualcouldbe understood onlyin termsofthewholesocialgroupofwhichtheindividual was a member. His philosophy was centered on theact.He heldthatrealitywas focusedin an action-oriented, ongoingpresent, influenced bythepast,butwithaneyetoward fromthepastandprojected thefuture. Mentalimagesremembered intothefuture ofreality. werea vehicleforthetransaction tomemory. Whatever Imageryis,ofcourse,notconfined maybe said itsreference to thefuture is as aboutitsoriginand pastexperience, genuine as to the past....
The presentincludes what is disappearing
Towardthatwhichis emerging ouractiontakes andwhatis emerging. of thataction. us, and whatis disappearing providestheconditions Imagerythencomesin tobuildoutbothstretches. (344-45) Mead,especiallyfascinated bytheuse oflanguage,feltthatthesocialuse of of themindand theself.He said fortheemergence languagewas a mechanism thatlanguage takes its meaningfromthe imaginedcompletionof an act. That is,
of thephysicalor mentaleventsit signifies languagemerelyincitesimaginings ofthoseevents.Theonewhosaysthe thefurther and,byextension, consequences theactsofwhich words,andthosewhohearthem,eachinimagination completes the wordsare the firstincipientmotions.Meaningarisesin theseanticipated ornottheyareeverrealizedin fact. whether consequences, To illustrate animaginary letus perform experiment suggested byJudson (93). Each oftheparticipants is observing conversation. Imaginea normalface-to-face that theother,readingtheorallanguage,pose,and gestureof theotherto verify in complementary bothhave completedthe speechact, in imagination, ways. looksaskance,browknit.The speakersensesthebreachand Suddenlythelistener incitedby thewordsso as to regain theflowof thought quicklyactsto redirect harmony: "No,no,whatI meantwas.. ." Thelistener's glancecausedthespeaker
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toreconstruct, inthemind'sear,thewaythewordsjustusedcouldbe takenbythe listenerin anotherway (thattheact could be completedin anotherway). The elicittheintended meaning(tocomplete speakerthenadjuststhelanguagetobetter the thesamewhether theactintheintended way).Thiswouldhappenessentially ordeceivingthelistener. persuading, entertaining, speakerwas informing, Imaginetwopeople Now letus removethevisualcues fromtheexperiment. Imaginethatthe conversing acrossa darkroom,or betterstill,on thetelephone. on theotherendis andthelistener monologue, speakeris engagedin a prolonged "yes" or "uh-huh."Now imaginethatsuddenlythe reducedto the obligatory signalsfrom the thoseobligatory silent,withholding listener becomesintentionally you've alreadyguessed,already speaker.The result?As if to provethetheory, Withina halfminuteor so thespeakerwould completedtheact in imagination. becomedisconcerted,and ask,"Areyoustillthere?" falter, andimpact In thismanner, checkandadjustthetrajectory speakersconstantly of theirspokenlanguage.The principleat workhereis thatoffeedback,a term butnotpopularized untillater(Judson).In dealing coinedduringMead's lifetime oftheself,Mead coined ofpersonality andtheemergence withthedevelopment an equally profound, but less well-known term,the generalizedother.Mead to understand andbe understood thatthegrowing child,inthestruggle suggested senseofhowthoseotherswouldreact developsan internal bysignificant others, developthecapacity tohisorherownactions,including speech.Thatis,children fromanother's toobservethemselves totaketheroleofotherstowardthemselves, pointofview,andto imaginehowthoseotherswouldrespondtotheiractionand thiscapacitydevelopsinto speech.In time,withmoreextendedsocialexperience, ofthelargersocialgroup.The a "generalized" a broadsenseoftheattitudes other, ofotherindividuals childthenhas developedtheabilityto imaginehowa variety other orgroupswouldrespondtohisorheractsandwords,touse thegeneralized to In particular, a partoftheminddevelopsthefacility inmindas ifforreference. listento ourselves,to monitorthe courseof our wordsas thoughtheywere ourownfeedback. someoneelse's. We becomecapableofproviding Butwriters, thisfacility. No sophisticated use oflanguageis possiblewithout other.Lackingany inparticular, to thegeneralized mustbe especiallyresponsive mustimagwriters visualorverbalfeedbackfroma listener, moment-to-moment oftheirlanguageon an audienceas iftheyweretheaudience.Some inetheeffects to someonein Steinor E. B. White,spokeof writing writers, suchas Gertrude andAlfred North andothers, suchas JohnSteinbeck Whitehead, spoke themselves; RobertGravesandAlanHodge ofwriting tospecific,imaginedothers(Winokur). Vladimir Perhapsmostprovocatively, wroteof "thereaderoveryourshoulder." whenhe imagines Nabokovhas said,"I thinkthattheaudiencean artist imagines, thatkindof thing,is a roomfilledwithpeoplewearinghis own mask"(qtd.in inthefinal ofthisenigmatic statement Winokur 26). I willproposean explanation to current turnbriefly cognitive psychology. section,butI willfirst
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Imageryin CognitivePsychology testedtheoriesof has developedempirically Current cognitivepsychology regarding therole speculation us beyondphilosophical imagery thathavebrought hereis theworkof Of particular importance and languageinthought. ofimagery AllanPaivio and his colleagues,whohave developedthedual codingtheoryof This theoryhas been testedand refinedover thepast mentalrepresentations. evidencetosupport bodyofexperimental years,andhasan impressive twenty-five to the connections manyof itsgeneraland specificaspects.It also has intriguing discussedabove. philosophy consists is thathumancognition ofdualcodingtheory The mainproposition butpartlyinterconnected representation oftwoindependent largelyoftheactivity (language), is specializedfortheuseofverbalrepresentations One system systems. andall othernonverbal and theothersystemis specializedforhandlingimagery in thewayourmemories hereis meantliterally, Representation representations. ofourpast. thestoredexperiences preserveandre-presentforourconsciousness inthesetwoparallel occursintheactivity Inthistheory meaningorcomprehension systems. the activityof thesetwo systemsis A usefulanalogyforunderstanding Thevalueofmoney oflanguagetocurrency. Ferdinand de Saussure'scomparison canbe expressedintwoways.First,ithasvalueintermsofthegoodsandservices within-system ithas a moreformal, forwhichitcan be exchanged.But,secondly, ofother can be for any combination exchanged five-dollar bill that a value,such holds that five dollars. dual coding theory coins totaled Analogously, billsor that of representations for nonverbal be exchanged can mentally verbalrepresentations be or that can or states for which stand they they theobjects,events, feeling such as inflected intootherverbalrepresentations forms,synonyms, translated relatedwords could evoke images and so forth. Likewise, antonyms, paraphrases, and nonverbal memories. This is how or related images and language other meaningoccurs. is notseenas one-to-one, but withinandbetweenthetwosystems Processing a an of the word arouse For example, image particular dog might one-to-many. However,thesamewordcouldarousea wholesetofother dog,say a petterrier. associatedimages, ofnonrandom, experientially "dog" images,thatis,a network withaccompanying feelingsandmoods.Theseimagescouldthenevokelanguage relevant forthem,whichcouldinturnevokefurther language,andso on, standing went. as faras the"thought" not andan imageis therefore betweena linguistic The relation representation ofcertain Whatconstrains theprobability butitis probabilistic. unique,orrandom, or is thelifeexperienceofthelistener imagesbeingevokedbycertainwordings contextin whichthetermis used.For and situational reader,and thelinguistic as in "a saltydog," a different image example,if dog wereused idiomatically,
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mightbe evoked.If thereaderhas experiencewithgrizzled,profanesailors,the imageor imagesmightbe quitespecificand vivid.If thereaderhad no such unfamiliar witharchaicsailingidioms,thephrase experience,and was further If thelinguistic contextsurwouldbe muchless "meaningful." and situational thetermswas supportive, theunfamiliar readermightstilldelimitthe rounding itsmeaning,perhapsto theextentof coalescing termcontextually and intimate fromrelatedexperiences a fairlyrichimageofwhatsuchan individual wouldbe like.Butin unsupportive contexts, thetermmightbe confusedormisunderstood. ofmeaningin Theserepresentations andprocessesformthebasicdefinition is dual codingtheory, moreelaboration and qualification althoughconsiderably involved. (See Paivio, Imagery,Mental Representations.)Fromthesebasic repre-
mentalstructures sentations, largerand moreintricate such as "concepts"or "schemata"or "plans" are formed,and are, in fact,extensionsof the basic andprocesses(cf.FlowerandHayes).In fact,current workdemrepresentations can accountforall theresearchfindings thatdualcodingtheory usedto onstrates andmore(Sadoski,Paivio,andGoetz). arguefortheexistenceofschemata, Dual codingtheoryembracesknowledgeof the worldand knowledgeof tocomposingandcomprehending. languagein an integrated way,thusis relevant Bothlanguageproduction and comprehension are theorizedas muchmorethan intralinguistic processes.Communicative languageis seenas a symbolicsystem to directtheinterpretive or used by a speakeror writer processesof thelistener withan eye and an ear towardthe reader.Whenlanguageis wieldedskillfully, commonto the intendedaudience,the audience experiencesand predilections thesetintended Therelationshouldderivean instancefromwithin bytheauthor. unitsrestrict boththesetof otherpossible shipsbetweenimagesand linguistic termsthatcouldhavebeenusedandthesetofotherimagesthatcouldhavebeen andfocusthemessagebeyondwhatlanguage evoked.Thusimagery helpsrestrict alonecoulddo (Begg). As an independent formsa majoraspectof ourknowledge system, imagery of the world.It is through imagerythatwe literallymakesense of language. thesensoryworldin itsabsence,withstaticimages Imageryservesto represent theworld,with thatpreserve Butitalsoservestointerpret experienced perceptions. foranimating, comdecomposing, dynamicprocedures extending, transforming, newimagesthatneedbearnoresemblance topastorfuture bining,andgenerating Forexample,basedonourlifeexperiences, we canimagineourselves experiences. andreactions thatmaybe veryunlikeourcurrent exhibiting behaviors, attitudes, ofpersonality andpersonality ones.Thisidea has beenthebasisofsometheories growth (e.g.,Kelly). and emotional(i.e., affective) functions. Imageryalso servesmotivational and These affective functions are particularly germaneto languageproduction Paiviostates: comprehension.
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Affective and emotionalreactions,being nonverbalby definition, mustbe identified theoretically withthe nonverbalrepresentation systemand,therefore, theywouldbe expectedto accompanysuch nonverbal cognitive as imagery....Theconceptual reactions relation is so closethatG. Mandler(1975,p. 194) referred tocentrally (cogniemotionalreactionsas autonomic tively)represented imagery. (Mental Representations78)
The intimate, perhapsinextricable relationship betweenimageryand affect has been notedby otherresearchers frompsychophysiology (Lang; Ley) to reinreaderresponseto literature searchers (Sadoski,Goetz,andKangiser). The otheraffective function of imageryin dual codingtheoryis itsrolein motivational directing goal-oriented action.Accordingto Paivio,"imageryprovides the primary cognitivemediumforrepresenting end states(goal-objects, behavioraloutcomes)and 'tryingout' different situations, behaviorsthatmight achievethoseends" (MentalRepresentations 80). This idea is of coursevery similartoBronowski's definition offreewill,andMead'sconceptofimagined acts as meaning. Withtheseideas in mind,letus turnto a synthesis ofall theforegoing ideas in thefieldofrhetoric. Imageryand Rhetoric The relationships betweenthe ideas of philosophers such as Bronowski, suchas PaiviohavebeenrelatedtocomposLanger,andMead andpsychologists ingandrhetoric before.AnnBerthoff has collecteda volumeofrelevant essays. Britton, Burgess,Martin,McLeod,andRosenfoundMead's "generalized other" usefulin explainingtheirnotionsof audienceand internalized other.Closely relatedideasaretheimpliedaudience(Perelman;Hirsch)andtheimpliedauthor (Booth).AnselmStrausssuggeststhatMead's workanticipated themotivational theoriesof KennethBurke.JohnSchultzhas made use of Paivio's theoriesof imageryin his storyworkshop method.Flowerand Hayesborrowheavilyfrom dual codingtheoryin theirmultiple thesis.In thissectionI would representation liketorelatetheforegoing andpsychological philosophical aspectsofimagery to therhetorical conceptofpersona,andthento relatepersonato composingargument,bywayofexample. The idea of personahas been discussedby a numberof rhetoricians and butthegeneralviewofpersonatakenhereis essentially thesame literary critics, as WalkerGibson's.PersonaderivesfromtheLatinwordformask-thetheatrical maskswornbyGreekandRomanactorstorepresent characteristics such particular as tragedy andcomedyto an audience.It is also therootofthewordspersonand In essence,a personais a particular of personality. self-image, partofa multitude thatcan be construed fromouroverallpersonality, or personae,or self-images,
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personawe assumein a givenactofcomposingis mentallife.Thustheparticular thatwe choosetoproject eitheractualorimagined, thataspectofourpersonality, to an audienceinhopeofachievingdesiredeffects. a as well as spokendiscourse,thistakestheformof projecting In written familiar, thataninformal, "toneofvoice."Forexample,Gibsonsuggests particular formssuch as use of rhetorical speech-liketoneof voice is achievedthrough and structures, loose sentence activeverbs,contractions, pronouns, second-person morepassivevoice, toneis achievedthrough authorial thelike.A moreformal, andsecondavoidanceofcontractions parallelconstructions, periodicsentences, we taketoward andthelike.Personais alsorelatedtotheattitude personpronouns, towardthesubject thesubjectof thediscourse.For example,positiveattitudes towardthesubject attitudes negative while language, honorific dictate generally herebecausein is necessary Qualification language. dictate pejorative generally be usedforreverse terms might or honorific pejorative the contexts specialstylistic possible. are attitude tone and effect, e.g.,irony.Manynuancesof ofBronowski, Langer,and inthephilosophies ofimagination Theaffirmation ofpersona, the to conception correspondent to be directly especiallyMead seems the to cognitive best serves explain dual theory presently coding whilePaivio's to byan converted language are and motives which feelings, images, processesby Assumor readers. listeners and by motives feelings, back into images, authorand to withothers(orevenof articulation of verbalcommunication ingtheintention both with a an persona, assume identity, must perforce themselves),authors towardthesubject.Thisidentity tonetowardtheaudienceandattitude appropriate or an assumedpersona,an of own personalities, their facet maybe an everyday of mediatestheconversion then This persona in imagination. synthesized identity rhetoric. into mental and verbal representations bothnonverbal that aspectof theauthor'scognition thepersonais a temporary Specifically, and language the affects, images, and manipulate a toregulate servesas governor formsthatseemto thesubjecttotheauthorintorhetorical thatmentally represent in another and language affects, in images, best succeed evokingappropriate audience. or imagined other, the generalized of the author's cognition, aspect of both in the minds are out carried acts which mental is the vehicle by Persona authors as both of themselves authors' imaginings audiences and through authors decisionsnecesfeedbackloopofrhetorical and as audiences,andtheconsequent themostdesirableverbalencodings.Speakerscan adjustpersona sitatedto effect lacking butthewriter, initially directfeedbackfromlisteners, through andrhetoric mustregularly stepoutofthepersonatoexaminetheeffect feedback, anyexternal readfrom mustregularly ofthelanguageon imaginedreaders.Thatis,thewriter to"home otherandmakerevisionsas necessary ofthegeneralized theperspective suchmonitoring maybe simultaneous In skilledwriters effect. in"onthepredicted mustregularly providefeedback butinanycase thewriter withtheactualwriting, other." hisorher"generalized to hisorherpersonathrough
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Ofcourse,writers canneverknowtheactualeffect oftheirwriting on all their readers,andmayfeela strong fidelity towardtheirownvisionandstylistic habits regardlessof theeffecton others.Hence, as Nabokovputit, we auspiciously imagineanaudiencewearingourownmasks.Writers striveintheanticipation that theiraudienceswillbe enoughlikethemselves to understand. In argument, andexhortation, persuasion, writers mustbe critically sensitive totheirpersonaandtheirgeneralized other, perhapsevenmoreso thanindescripor thepoeticforms.Writers withan eye towardinfluencing an tion,narration, audienceneed to evoke imaginings and feelingsin theaudiencecommensurate withthepurposesathand,carefully a personatoprojecttheappropriate construing toneof voice and critically forflaws.Whilethisis evaluatingtheperformance itselfan act involving muchimagination, therhetorical devicesusedin argument andpersuasion also involveimagery andimagination, andtheimagesevokedmay be as important or moreimportant thanlogicalchainsof propositions. Consider thefollowing sectionofa recentpoliticalad: Hey, big spenders! If you thinkyou've got problemsbalancing the
familycheckbook, considerLudwigII of Bavaria.This 19thcentury romanticspenthis countryintobankruptcy. He sailed in a gold-plated
boatandbuiltthreecastles,including one thatsoakedup theequivalentof$46 millionandstillwas notcompleted. No wonderBavarians call him"our mad Ludwig."Well,todayyou mightbe mad-as in angry-and-not-gonna-take-it-anymore-about crazy-spending Uncle is so farin debt-$1.6 trillion-thatjust Sam. The U.S. government on thisdebtgobblesup dollarsat therateof$3,424every theinterest second.("Observations") The personaenvisionedhereis an irasciblemuckraker. A lowbrowlampoon ofgovernment is intoned andslangexpressions vernacular such spending through as "Hey,bigspenders!" "ifyouthink "soakedup,""gobbles you'vegotproblems," Uncle Sam." The authorsoundsraffish, but subtly up," and "crazy-spending elevatestheaudienceby assumingacquaintancewithmoresophisticated terms suchas "consider," "19thcentury and theauthoritative romantic," "equivalent," use of figures. The attitude of derisiontowardautocratic spendersis achievedin severalways:LudwigII is termed"mad"andassignedpersonalblameforbankruptingBavaria; imagesof a bizarregold-platedboat and multiplecastlesare withthe simpleact of balancingthefamilycheckbook;thephrase contrasted is an allusiontothemaniacalTV anchor"angry-and-not-gonna-take-it-anymore" maninthefilmNetwork. Butperhapsthemoodofirrationality is bestachievedby the sensoryaspectsof the text'ssurfacefeatures.The typeface variesfrom boldfaceto underscoring to italicsto boldfaceitalics.Sentencesare unevenand pepperedwithhyphensand dashes-it LOOKS and soundscrazy.The overall
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ofwildexcessis achievedmorenonverbally effect thanthrough verbalreasoning andlogicalpersuasion. Now considerthisexcerptfroman introduction toa recent prophetic seriesofarticlesalso on economics: Areweheadingforaneconomiccollapse?Ominoussignsandportents abound:New Wall Streetscandalssurfacedaily;recordhighsand precipitous dropsbuffet theDow; Brazil,Mexico,and otherThird Worldcountriesowe hundreds a of billionsof dollarsand threaten defaultthatcouldbringdownmanyof thelargestU.S. banks;farm debtnow totalsover$192 billion;theentireU.S. savingsand loan systemis bankrupt yetdiscreetly keptafloatby gentlemen's agreementsand fiscalcharades;the gulfbetweenrichand poor in this is nowwiderthanat anytimesince1929;theU.S. is nowthe country world'slargestdebtor,its budgetand tradedeficitsappearout of control;mounting criesfortradeprotectionism reflect growingfrusat homeandincreasing trations tensionsabroad. Clearlywe're on thebrinkof something big-but what?("The ComingCrash,"1987) Thepersonaprojected hereis theseriously reflective andconcerned journalist. It is achievedthrough moreformallanguage,extendedparallelism, andtheframThetoneis authoritative ingdeviceofthetwoquestions. butruminating; therecord of evidenceis presented as "ominoussignsand portents," whichraisequestions rather thanfixblame.The attitude towardthesubjectis urgent, butmoreheedful thaninvective. Whilemuchofthelanguageis abstract andonlyindirectly invites sensoryimagery through metaphor, a nonverbal perception emerges.The feeling evokedis a rhythmic formof battery, akinto beingawash in a poundingsurf. Scandalssurface, recordhighsandprecipitous theDow,thesystemis dropsbuffet thereare afloat,thegulfbetweenclassesis everwider,thingsareoutof control, andtensions:we'reon thebrink.Theparallelclauses mounting cries,frustrations, arestrung intoconsecutive wavesofprose,andthepersistent of together rhythm some lines approachespoeticmeter.The centralsentenceis such an extended thatour abilityto integrate litanyof information it all is strained, nonverbally theidea ofcollapse.It is an exampleofwhatM. A. K. Hallidaycalls emphasizing ofcertain insyntax syntacticimagery, theforegrounding as theexpression patterns ofan underlying thematic meaning. morestylistic toshowhowthesetexts Certainly analysiscouldbe undertaken The pointis thatboththeseexamplesofpersuasion producetheireffects. demonstratethatevenin theabsenceof narrative episodeor vividdescription, imagery and affectare verymuchat workin thecomposingand comprehending process. not only,or even mainly,because of theirverbal The two textsare different Thetextshavea different messages,butalso becauseoftheirnonverbal meanings.
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look,feel,andsound,notmetaphorical butactual.Thevisualcuesintypeface,the sensations syntactic images,andthephonological rhythms all producenonverbal and perceptions thatare a fundamental basis of meaning.Such sensationsand context (i.e., perceptions arouseaffective statesthatserveas a generalbackground ofthis a mood)formorespecificcognitive andaffective processing. Inthecontext mood,evendispassionate, denotative languageis morelikelytoevokeimagesand withthemood.If theauthor'sdictionalso offersconnotation, affectsconsistent ofthediscoursemaybe achievedinthereaderwhether theeffect ornottheauthor's is entertained. moreto logicorreasoning Mood andconnotation oftencontribute persuasion thanlogic. The same authorcould easily have composedbothtexts,yet a different if not personais at workin either,callingout in partof us a complementary, readerwhorespondsin kind.Authorswhohaveattended wellto their uncritical, "generalized others"succeedinreaching imagus becausetheyhavesuccessfully tobe us. Thisis no fantasy; a partofthemis us anda partofus is inedthemselves Becauseofour them,byvirtueofourcommonlanguageandsharedexperiences. social nature,andtheuniquelyhumanabilityto imagineourselvesin theroleof we can verballyinitiate, others, guide,andcompletementalactsofa verysimilar basisofpersona, natureinourownmindsandthemindsofothers. Thisis theentire ifnotall ofrhetoric. Conclusion The assertionsmade in thisessay involvesome of the mostformidable and rhetorical conceptsin modemphilosophy, psychology, social psychology, Thisdiscussionis necessarily abouta wide theory. limitedinscope;itsaysnothing constraints, orpracvariety ofdiscoursemodes,individual differences, situational ticalapplications. Norwilltheseassertions be easilyprovenordisproven. Welack and thenecessary tostudyinternal, mentaleventsdirectly, methodology subjective we maybe onlysubliminally awareofmanyofourimagesandfeelingsandtheir forexample,maybe so mucha effects on ourbehavior.The "generalized other," of that it is conterminous with self-whenwe thinkin inner our part personality andimmediately revise who we to? When we write a sentence are speech, talking it because it doesn'tcommunicate our meaningwell,to whomdoes it fail to communicate? (I believethatfeedbackfromthe"generalizedother"is actually whatis meantbythemuch-bandied termmetacognition,butthisis another topic.) Perhapsthe only generaltestof such ideas is theirpragmaticusefulnessin organizing empirical findings into theories.
advantagein morefully However,thepresentapproachoffersconsiderable ofthepsycholthepsychology ofcomposing. understanding Anycompletetheory as well mustaccountfornonverbal ogyof writing (or anyotherhumanactivity) are of fundaThesematters as verbalcognition, and affectas well as cognition. moremechanistic butnot well addressedby some current, mentalimportance,
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cognitive theories. In modemphilosophy andcognitive psychology, imagery and and imagination have as muchor moreexplanatory power,boththeoretically empirically, as abstractions suchas concepts,schemata,instantiation, executive and thelike. Abstractconstructs have theirplace in processes,metacognition, theoriesofthemindanditsoperations (abstract mathematical languagesarealso composedandcomprehended), butmoreofthecomposing ofpersuasive, expository, narrative, andpoeticdiscourseis probablybasedon ourvirtualfeelingsand images.Muchoftheangstofcomposing maywellbe duetotheinherent frustration oftrying tomakewhatis basicallynonverbal verbal.The tugandpullbetweenan author'svisionand themeansto reachan audiencecharacterize muchof the Thisprocessis repletewithrecursive processofseriouscomposing. stutters, taxing perplexities, reflective pauses, and impulsiveleaps ahead, and to completely accountforitis a hugetask.Butgivingimageryand imagination a fundamental andcriticalto their place in suchaccountsis bothessentialto theircompleteness Thephilosophical andpsychological as a founclarity. acceptanceofimagination dationofthought andlanguageputsitattheverybaseofrhetoric andcomposition. WorksCited Begg,Ian. "ImageryandLanguage."Imagery:Current Research,andApplication. Ed. Anees Theory, A. Sheikh.New York:Wiley,1983.288-309. Berthoff, AnnE. Reclaiming theImagination: PhilosophicalPerspectives forWriters and Teachersof NH: Boynton/Cook, 1984. Writing. Portsmouth, Booth,WayneC. TheRhetoric ofFiction.Chicago:U ofChicagoP. 1961. Britton, James, etal. TheDevelopment ofWriting Abilities11-18.London:MacmillanEducation,1975. New Haven:Yale UP, 1978. Bronowski, Jacob.TheOriginsofKnowledgeandImagination. A SenseoftheFuture.Cambridge, "The ReachofImagination." MA: MIT, 1977.22-31. "The SpeakingEye,The Visionary Ear." The Visionary Eye: Essays in theArts,Literature, and MA: MIT, 1978.75-87. Science.Cambridge, Burke,Kenneth. A RhetoricofMotives.Berkeley:U ofCalifornia P, 1969. De Saussure,Ferdinand. CourseinGeneralLinguistics. 1915.Trans.WadeBaskin.Ed. CharlesBally andAlbertSechehaye.New York:Basic, 1970. Flower,Linda, and JohnR. Hayes. "Images,Plans and Prose:The Representation of Meaningin 1 (1984): 120-60. Writing." Written Communication New York:Random,1969. Gibson,Walker.Persona:A StyleStudy forReadersand Writers. andAlanHodge.TheReaderOverYourShoulder:A Handbook Graves,Robert, forWriters ofEnglish Prose.New York:Macmillan,1944. Halliday,M. A. K. "Linguistic FunctionandLiterary Style:An InquiryIntotheLanguageofWilliam Golding'sTheInheritors." Explorations in theFunctionsofLanguage.London:EdwardArnold, 1973. 103-40. Hirsch,E. D. ThePhilosophy ofComposition. Chicago:U ofChicagoP. 1977. HoraceF. TheSearchforSolutions.New York:Holt,1980. Judson, 2 Vols.New York:Norton,1955. Kelly,GeorgeA. ThePsychology ofPersonalConstructs, Lang,PeterJ."A Bio-Informational TheoryofMentalImagery." Psychophysiology 16(1979):495-512. Langer,SusanneK. "Speculationson the Originsof Speech and Its Communicative Function." Baltimore: JohnsHopkins,1962.26-53. PhilosophicalSketches.
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and Imagery." Imagery:Current Theory, Research,andApplicaLey,RobertG. "CerebralLaterality tion.Ed. AneesA. Sheikh.New York:Wiley,1983.252-87. Mandler, George.Mindand Emotion.NewYork:Wiley,1975. Mead,GeorgeH. Mind,Self,& Society.Chicago:U ofChicagoP, 1934. and Communication 29 (1978): College Composition Murray, Donald M. "WriteBeforeWriting." 375-81. Reprinted with "Observations." Reader'sDigest,April1985: 133. (c) 1988 Mobil Oil Corporation. permission ofMobilCorporation. Paivio,Allan.Imageryand VerbalProcesses.New York,1971;rpt.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaum, 1979. A Dual CodingApproach.New York:OxfordUP, 1986. MentalRepresentations: de Rhetorique etPhilosophie.Paris:PresesUniversitaires Perelman, Chaim,andL. Olbrechts-Tyteca. France,1952. inStoryResponse:Relationships "Imagination Sadoski,Mark,ErnestT. Goetz,andSuzanneKangiser. 23 (1988): BetweenImagery, and Structural Importance." ReadingResearchQuarterly Affect, 320-36. Sadoski,Mark,AllanPaivio,and ErnestT. Goetz."A Critiqueof SchemaTheoryin Readingand a Dual CodingAlternative." forthcoming. ReadingResearchQuarterly, FromStarttoFinish.UpperMontclair, 1982. NJ:Boynton/Cook, Schultz,John.Writing ofGeorgeHerbertMead. Chicago:U ofChicagoP, 1956. Strauss,Anselm.TheSocial Psychology 1987:42. "The ComingCrash."UtneReader,July/Aug. on Writing. Philadelphia: RunningP, 1986. Winokur, Jon.Writers
ResearchFellow at Texas A&M Mark Sadoski is Professorof Educationand a Distinguished His chiefareaofinterest is thepsychology University. He haspublished widelyinthefieldofliteracy. in readingand composing.He can be contactedat the of literacy, including theuses of imagination TX 77843-4232. CollegeStation, Department ofEDCI, TexasA&M University,
