Immune Building Program - National Defense Industrial Association

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Jun 21, 2005 - Joint Program Management Office for Collective Protection. Collective Protection ... Ricin. MIC. Chlorine. Ammonia. Mass (mg). Pro b a b ility of In fectio n / Leth a l E ffects. VEE .... fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid.
Immune Building Program

Wayne A. Bryden DARPA Special Projects Office National Defense Industrial Association Joint Program Management Office for Collective Protection Collective Protection Conference 21 June 2005 Monterey, CA 21 June 2005

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Overview Threat: aerosolized chemical or biological agents; toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) External standoff

External proximate

Internal

air intake perimeter security

physical security

portal security

Goal: Goal:Make Makebuildings buildingsless lessattractive attractivetargets targets Objectives:

Payoffs:

• Protect building occupants (keep aerosolized agent from harming humans) • Restore building to function quickly • Preserve forensic evidence 21 June 2005

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• Save lives • Restore OPTEMPO • Determine appropriate treatment • Attribute source of attack 2

Threat Spectrum Viruses

Bacteria

Toxins and bioregulators

• DNA viruses • RNA viruses

• Vegetative cells • Spores

• • • • •

Neurotoxins Cytotoxins Enterotoxins Mycotoxins Neuropeptides

Chemical agents • • • •

TICs

Nerve agents Blister agents Blood agents Choking agents

• Thousands of substances with characteristics

Probability of Infection / Lethal Effects

1.0 0.9 SEB

0.8 C. burnetii

0.7

Botox

0.6

F. tularensis

0.5 0.4

GB

VEE

Chlorine

0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.00E-13

MIC

VX

B. anthracis

Variola major

1.00E-11

Ammonia

Ricin

1.00E-09

1.00E-07

1.00E-05

1.00E-03

1.00E-01

1.00E+01

1.00E+03

1.00E+05

Mass (mg)

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Challenges Technical challenge

Program component Technology development

Many enabling components and technologies do not exist today

Develop required components and technologies necessary for system implementation

• Active-response building protection has never Integrated system experimentation been demonstrated – Conduct systems analysis and full-scale experimentation for candidate architectures • Data and models to fully and confidently perform systems trades and systems – Design, implement, and evaluate optimized evaluations do not exist systems Active chemical/biological building protection has never been used in an operational military building

Full-scale demonstration Install and demonstrate protection system at an operational military site

Toolkit No validated capability exists to design and optimize building protection systems

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Develop and validate a software-based planning tool to assess building vulnerability and compare the cost and effectiveness of protection options

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POST EVENT CONFIRMED ATTACK

POSSIBLE ATTACK

NORMAL OPERATION

Building Protection Concept Outside air inlet

High-efficiency filtration / neutralization & over-pressurization

Internal passive airflow control

PROBABLY YES Fast trigger SAFE? sensors

COMMAND AND CONTROL

MAYBE NOT

Continuous Monitor In-duct neutralization

Laboratory Analysis

SAFE?

YES YES

NO

SAFE?

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Triggered filtration

Identification/ Confirming Sensor

NO

Neutralize at Source

Medical

Airflow diversion

Forensics

Evacuate/PPE

Decontamination

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Components FY01

FY02

FY03

FY04

FY05

FY06

Phase I Analysis and modeling

= Go/No-Go = Evaluate

Phase II Full Scale Experimentation

Technology Development

Prototypes

Operational Demonstration

Test Bed

Demo site

Transition

(Fort Leonard Wood, MO)

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Feedback

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Product II

Predictions

Product I

Feedback

Predictions

Building Protection Toolkit

Product III

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Fraction of Exposed Building Exposed Fraction of Building (FBE) (FBE)

Modeling 1.0

0.8

0.6

Segmentation Unprotected

0.4

“Unfilterables”

Passive Only

0.2

0 Mass of agent released (mrel)

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Fraction of Exposed Building Exposed Fraction of Building (FBE) (FBE)

Modeling 1.0 Sensors don’t work

Sensors work

0.8

0.6

Unprotected

0.4

Active only 0.2

0 Mass of agent released (mrel)

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Modeling 1.0

Fraction of Building Exposed (FBE)

Sensors don’t work 0.8

0.6

1-12 logs passive protection

Sensors work • Trigger detection < 30 seconds • Advanced shelter-in-place capability

Unprotected

0.4

Active Only

Passive Only

0.2

TACT = 25 sec

Passive + Active TACT = 0 sec

0 Mass of agent released (mrel)

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Testing • Active strategies are critical 1.0

− Experiments show sensors effectively initiate active protection

− Specifics will differ from building to building: characterize beforehand (to design an appropriate system) and afterwards (to maintain performance) − Coordinate design with HVAC, fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid conflicts (e.g., structural, airflow) 21 June 2005

Fraction of Building Exposed (FBE)

• Optimal architectures include both passive and active components • Immune Building systems can be applied to diverse building types

30,000 ft2 testbed 0.8

Internal release Experimental data point

Unprotected

0.6

0.4

0.2

Passive + Active

0 Mass of agent released (mrel)

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Demonstration Challenge the IB system in an occupied building under real-world operating conditions: – IB System sensors, neutralization, filtration, and active controls will be fully propagated in building – Releases in arbitrary locations and will include internal and external releases for BOTH chemical and biological threats – Challenge against simulants for spores, encapsulated agents, filter penetrants (SF6), low vapor pressure agents, mid-vapor pressure agents, and dusty agents – Subset of releases carried out as independently refereed validation tests 21 June 2005

Nord Hall, Fort Leonard Wood, MO

IB IBSystem SystemInstallation Installationisiscomplex complexand andrisky risky –– Modeling Modelingwill willreduce reducerisk riskininthe thedesign designphase phase –– Testbed Testbedwill willbe beutilized utilizedtotooptimize optimizestrategies, strategies, components, and CONOPS components, and CONOPS

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Technology Development Decontamination

Advanced Filtration Photocatalytic Oxidation

Chemical Filtration Multiport

Injectors

HVAC Duct

CLO 2 Sensor

CLO 2 Generator

CLO 2 Generator

Control Signals

to HVAC

Regeneration (Heat)

CL 2

+ 2Na CLO 2

Solid Sodium

Diluent

Humidifier

Diluent

Foster FosterMiller Miller

Reg

(Air, 2N , …

Chlorine

Reg

SMART Filter

Alarm Signal

CLO 2 Generator

Reg

Gaseous

air

+++ +++ ----+++ +++ ----+++ +++ ----+++ +++

Airflow

2 CLO 2

CLO 2 +

Diluent

CLO 2 +

Diluent

Chlorite

Electrostatic Precipitation

+ 2Na CL

Real-Time Neutralization 2

Enhancements

dielectric capillaries

RF energy

2

e-

e-

OH2

other compounds added to airstream

2

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volumefilling nonO3 thermal plasma e OH- oxidative species

air

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Chlorine Dioxide Effects

ClO2 Oxidation Protein “unfolds” and is inactivated

Active

Inactive

Explosive limit

100000

Incipient collateral damage

10000 1000

Spores

100 10

IDLH

NIOSH human STEL standards TWA

1 0.1 0.01

0

5

Bacteria & Viruses Odor threshold

10 15 Exposure Time (hours)

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Collateral Damage

U.S. Government Joint Program • Demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of ClO2 decontamination technology in a building • Develop and validate EPA approved decontamination protocols and techniques First Operational Test • Transition capability to Anniston, AL government and industry 21 June 2005

Effective Kill Levels

1000000

ClO2 gas phase concentration (ppm)

Mechanism of Inactivation

20,000 ppm-hours ClO2 • Only polyurethane foam seriously damaged

200,000 ppm-hours ClO2

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• Copper and steel corroded • Polycarbonate discolored

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Technology Transition: Novatron High-Intensity UV AUVS

Approach

Intense UV source

0 50

fm c 0 ,00 lo w 0 f r 1 – Ai

Flux multiplier cavity

Creation of intense UV and killing of microorganisms in HVAC

Technology • Low power, continuous-wave UV DC lamps • Uniform photon flux multiplication (increases UV flux by a factor of 50 or more) • UV interaction with DNA to induce crosslinking • Air sterilization – in less than 1 second – only a few feet needed for high kill levels even for high velocity airflow • B. subtilis 4.5 to 6.2 log kill • 0.3 I.W.G. pressure drop 21 June 2005

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BP246i BioProtector commercial prototype

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Technology Transition: Cold Plasma Cold Plasma Neutralization • In-duct air neutralization • Scalable – low power, “real-time kill” (single pass) [duct mounted]

e-

dielectric capillaries

e-

OH-

O3 e-

OH-

PlasmaSol Technology • Ambient air plasma generator • Non-thermal electrical plasma • Dielectric wall discharge suppresses the glow-to-arc mode transition • Electrode configuration enables plasma to have 100% contact with species of gas treated • High energy density (typically energy densities of barrier, corona discharge are 0.01 – 0.1 w/cm3) • Air / medical equipment sterilization

oxidative species air

volume-filling nonthermal plasma

TITAN Technology • Cold plasma induced hydroxyl radical generation (BIT) • Activation of H202 yielding exponential number of long-lived hydroxyl radicals • Mesh “active layer” • Scaleable system Agent

Log reduction

Agent

Log reduction

B. subtilis (spore)

>6

B. anthracis

> 3 (experimental constraint)

CEES (mustard)

>5

DFP (nerve)

> 1 (model agreement)

Diazinon (nerve)

>5

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BPTK Modeling and Simulation External Environment

Protective Architectures

Threats

Building CAD Drawing

Population Characteristics

CONOPS

IFC file

MESO.dat

TK Wrapper

• External threat • parameters

• Internal threat parameters • CB component parameters

MESO/RUSTIC

CONTAM model (.PRJ file)

• People movement • Responder actions

CONTAMX

• External concentration • Wind pressure

TK Post-Processor

• • • •

ACATS

Internal Room Concentrations, Pressures, & Airflows Room and Inhabitant Exposures Sensor Response Times HVAC Response Times

• FBE for Architectures • Costs of Architectures • Recommended Architecture

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ACATS Wrapper

IFC Translator

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ACATS Post-Processor

• Casualties For Responses • Recommended Response

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Immune Building Transition • Demonstration system provides test platform for future technology development. • Improved sensors • Improved neutralization technologies

• Fort Leonard Wood will continue to operate the demonstration system (MOA in place, DoD memorandum issued for support beyond DARPA’s departure).

Science & technology community

DOD chem/bio community

• Contractor involvement helps mature building protection technologies.

Industrial base

• IB is coordinating with the DoD R&D and user communities.

DoD operational community

• Promulgate IB lessons learned to protective building design processes (Toolkit).

DoD civil engineering community

• Working with homeland security community on technology development and extension of concept to tall buildings 21 June 2005

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Additional Information Publicly accessible sites with additional information about the DARPA Immune Building Program: http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/ib.htm https://dtsn.darpa.mil/ibdemo/default.asp

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