Jun 21, 2005 - Joint Program Management Office for Collective Protection. Collective Protection ... Ricin. MIC. Chlorine. Ammonia. Mass (mg). Pro b a b ility of In fectio n / Leth a l E ffects. VEE .... fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid.
Immune Building Program
Wayne A. Bryden DARPA Special Projects Office National Defense Industrial Association Joint Program Management Office for Collective Protection Collective Protection Conference 21 June 2005 Monterey, CA 21 June 2005
ColPro 2005
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Overview Threat: aerosolized chemical or biological agents; toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) External standoff
External proximate
Internal
air intake perimeter security
physical security
portal security
Goal: Goal:Make Makebuildings buildingsless lessattractive attractivetargets targets Objectives:
Payoffs:
• Protect building occupants (keep aerosolized agent from harming humans) • Restore building to function quickly • Preserve forensic evidence 21 June 2005
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• Save lives • Restore OPTEMPO • Determine appropriate treatment • Attribute source of attack 2
Threat Spectrum Viruses
Bacteria
Toxins and bioregulators
• DNA viruses • RNA viruses
• Vegetative cells • Spores
• • • • •
Neurotoxins Cytotoxins Enterotoxins Mycotoxins Neuropeptides
Chemical agents • • • •
TICs
Nerve agents Blister agents Blood agents Choking agents
• Thousands of substances with characteristics
Probability of Infection / Lethal Effects
1.0 0.9 SEB
0.8 C. burnetii
0.7
Botox
0.6
F. tularensis
0.5 0.4
GB
VEE
Chlorine
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.00E-13
MIC
VX
B. anthracis
Variola major
1.00E-11
Ammonia
Ricin
1.00E-09
1.00E-07
1.00E-05
1.00E-03
1.00E-01
1.00E+01
1.00E+03
1.00E+05
Mass (mg)
Based on Unclassified Sources 21 June 2005
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Challenges Technical challenge
Program component Technology development
Many enabling components and technologies do not exist today
Develop required components and technologies necessary for system implementation
• Active-response building protection has never Integrated system experimentation been demonstrated – Conduct systems analysis and full-scale experimentation for candidate architectures • Data and models to fully and confidently perform systems trades and systems – Design, implement, and evaluate optimized evaluations do not exist systems Active chemical/biological building protection has never been used in an operational military building
Full-scale demonstration Install and demonstrate protection system at an operational military site
Toolkit No validated capability exists to design and optimize building protection systems
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Develop and validate a software-based planning tool to assess building vulnerability and compare the cost and effectiveness of protection options
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POST EVENT CONFIRMED ATTACK
POSSIBLE ATTACK
NORMAL OPERATION
Building Protection Concept Outside air inlet
High-efficiency filtration / neutralization & over-pressurization
Internal passive airflow control
PROBABLY YES Fast trigger SAFE? sensors
COMMAND AND CONTROL
MAYBE NOT
Continuous Monitor In-duct neutralization
Laboratory Analysis
SAFE?
YES YES
NO
SAFE?
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Triggered filtration
Identification/ Confirming Sensor
NO
Neutralize at Source
Medical
Airflow diversion
Forensics
Evacuate/PPE
Decontamination
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Components FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
Phase I Analysis and modeling
= Go/No-Go = Evaluate
Phase II Full Scale Experimentation
Technology Development
Prototypes
Operational Demonstration
Test Bed
Demo site
Transition
(Fort Leonard Wood, MO)
ColPro 2005
Feedback
21 June 2005
Product II
Predictions
Product I
Feedback
Predictions
Building Protection Toolkit
Product III
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Fraction of Exposed Building Exposed Fraction of Building (FBE) (FBE)
Modeling 1.0
0.8
0.6
Segmentation Unprotected
0.4
“Unfilterables”
Passive Only
0.2
0 Mass of agent released (mrel)
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Fraction of Exposed Building Exposed Fraction of Building (FBE) (FBE)
Modeling 1.0 Sensors don’t work
Sensors work
0.8
0.6
Unprotected
0.4
Active only 0.2
0 Mass of agent released (mrel)
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Modeling 1.0
Fraction of Building Exposed (FBE)
Sensors don’t work 0.8
0.6
1-12 logs passive protection
Sensors work • Trigger detection < 30 seconds • Advanced shelter-in-place capability
Unprotected
0.4
Active Only
Passive Only
0.2
TACT = 25 sec
Passive + Active TACT = 0 sec
0 Mass of agent released (mrel)
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Testing • Active strategies are critical 1.0
− Experiments show sensors effectively initiate active protection
− Specifics will differ from building to building: characterize beforehand (to design an appropriate system) and afterwards (to maintain performance) − Coordinate design with HVAC, fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid conflicts (e.g., structural, airflow) 21 June 2005
Fraction of Building Exposed (FBE)
• Optimal architectures include both passive and active components • Immune Building systems can be applied to diverse building types
30,000 ft2 testbed 0.8
Internal release Experimental data point
Unprotected
0.6
0.4
0.2
Passive + Active
0 Mass of agent released (mrel)
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Demonstration Challenge the IB system in an occupied building under real-world operating conditions: – IB System sensors, neutralization, filtration, and active controls will be fully propagated in building – Releases in arbitrary locations and will include internal and external releases for BOTH chemical and biological threats – Challenge against simulants for spores, encapsulated agents, filter penetrants (SF6), low vapor pressure agents, mid-vapor pressure agents, and dusty agents – Subset of releases carried out as independently refereed validation tests 21 June 2005
Nord Hall, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
IB IBSystem SystemInstallation Installationisiscomplex complexand andrisky risky –– Modeling Modelingwill willreduce reducerisk riskininthe thedesign designphase phase –– Testbed Testbedwill willbe beutilized utilizedtotooptimize optimizestrategies, strategies, components, and CONOPS components, and CONOPS
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Technology Development Decontamination
Advanced Filtration Photocatalytic Oxidation
Chemical Filtration Multiport
Injectors
HVAC Duct
CLO 2 Sensor
CLO 2 Generator
CLO 2 Generator
Control Signals
to HVAC
Regeneration (Heat)
CL 2
+ 2Na CLO 2
Solid Sodium
Diluent
Humidifier
Diluent
Foster FosterMiller Miller
Reg
(Air, 2N , …
Chlorine
Reg
SMART Filter
Alarm Signal
CLO 2 Generator
Reg
Gaseous
air
+++ +++ ----+++ +++ ----+++ +++ ----+++ +++
Airflow
2 CLO 2
CLO 2 +
Diluent
CLO 2 +
Diluent
Chlorite
Electrostatic Precipitation
+ 2Na CL
Real-Time Neutralization 2
Enhancements
dielectric capillaries
RF energy
2
e-
e-
OH2
other compounds added to airstream
2
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volumefilling nonO3 thermal plasma e OH- oxidative species
air
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Chlorine Dioxide Effects
ClO2 Oxidation Protein “unfolds” and is inactivated
Active
Inactive
Explosive limit
100000
Incipient collateral damage
10000 1000
Spores
100 10
IDLH
NIOSH human STEL standards TWA
1 0.1 0.01
0
5
Bacteria & Viruses Odor threshold
10 15 Exposure Time (hours)
20
Collateral Damage
U.S. Government Joint Program • Demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of ClO2 decontamination technology in a building • Develop and validate EPA approved decontamination protocols and techniques First Operational Test • Transition capability to Anniston, AL government and industry 21 June 2005
Effective Kill Levels
1000000
ClO2 gas phase concentration (ppm)
Mechanism of Inactivation
20,000 ppm-hours ClO2 • Only polyurethane foam seriously damaged
200,000 ppm-hours ClO2
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• Copper and steel corroded • Polycarbonate discolored
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Technology Transition: Novatron High-Intensity UV AUVS
Approach
Intense UV source
0 50
fm c 0 ,00 lo w 0 f r 1 – Ai
Flux multiplier cavity
Creation of intense UV and killing of microorganisms in HVAC
Technology • Low power, continuous-wave UV DC lamps • Uniform photon flux multiplication (increases UV flux by a factor of 50 or more) • UV interaction with DNA to induce crosslinking • Air sterilization – in less than 1 second – only a few feet needed for high kill levels even for high velocity airflow • B. subtilis 4.5 to 6.2 log kill • 0.3 I.W.G. pressure drop 21 June 2005
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BP246i BioProtector commercial prototype
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Technology Transition: Cold Plasma Cold Plasma Neutralization • In-duct air neutralization • Scalable – low power, “real-time kill” (single pass) [duct mounted]
e-
dielectric capillaries
e-
OH-
O3 e-
OH-
PlasmaSol Technology • Ambient air plasma generator • Non-thermal electrical plasma • Dielectric wall discharge suppresses the glow-to-arc mode transition • Electrode configuration enables plasma to have 100% contact with species of gas treated • High energy density (typically energy densities of barrier, corona discharge are 0.01 – 0.1 w/cm3) • Air / medical equipment sterilization
oxidative species air
volume-filling nonthermal plasma
TITAN Technology • Cold plasma induced hydroxyl radical generation (BIT) • Activation of H202 yielding exponential number of long-lived hydroxyl radicals • Mesh “active layer” • Scaleable system Agent
Log reduction
Agent
Log reduction
B. subtilis (spore)
>6
B. anthracis
> 3 (experimental constraint)
CEES (mustard)
>5
DFP (nerve)
> 1 (model agreement)
Diazinon (nerve)
>5
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BPTK Modeling and Simulation External Environment
Protective Architectures
Threats
Building CAD Drawing
Population Characteristics
CONOPS
IFC file
MESO.dat
TK Wrapper
• External threat • parameters
• Internal threat parameters • CB component parameters
MESO/RUSTIC
CONTAM model (.PRJ file)
• People movement • Responder actions
CONTAMX
• External concentration • Wind pressure
TK Post-Processor
• • • •
ACATS
Internal Room Concentrations, Pressures, & Airflows Room and Inhabitant Exposures Sensor Response Times HVAC Response Times
• FBE for Architectures • Costs of Architectures • Recommended Architecture
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ACATS Wrapper
IFC Translator
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ACATS Post-Processor
• Casualties For Responses • Recommended Response
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Immune Building Transition • Demonstration system provides test platform for future technology development. • Improved sensors • Improved neutralization technologies
• Fort Leonard Wood will continue to operate the demonstration system (MOA in place, DoD memorandum issued for support beyond DARPA’s departure).
Science & technology community
DOD chem/bio community
• Contractor involvement helps mature building protection technologies.
Industrial base
• IB is coordinating with the DoD R&D and user communities.
DoD operational community
• Promulgate IB lessons learned to protective building design processes (Toolkit).
DoD civil engineering community
• Working with homeland security community on technology development and extension of concept to tall buildings 21 June 2005
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homeland security community 17
Additional Information Publicly accessible sites with additional information about the DARPA Immune Building Program: http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/ib.htm https://dtsn.darpa.mil/ibdemo/default.asp
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