in contemporary times (1991-2011): political changes in

THE ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES (1991-2011): POLITICAL CHANGES IN ARMENIA AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF THE LAST THREE CATHOLICOI OF ETCHMIADZIN PART II: CATHOLICOS GAREGIN II (1999) AND THE REINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE CHURCH LEVON PETROSYAN The death of the Catholicos Garegin I on June 29, 1999, was a big loss for the Armenian Church and Armenian people. Unfortunately, he could not carry out his long-term projects, and especially, his plan to celebrate the 1700th anniversary of Christianity in Armenia. Catholicos Garegin I passed away, leaving Holy Etchmiadzin in the same uncertain state that it occupied before his election. On June 4, 1999, the Episcopal Assembly and Supreme Spiritual Council of the Armenian Apostolic Church elected Archbishop Nerses Pozapalyan, an experienced Armenian clergymen who was for many years the chancellor of Holy Etchmiadzin, Catholicosal Locum Tenens.1 His principal duty was the organization of the National Ecclesiastical Assembly and the preparation of the Catholicosal election. PALACE REVOLUTIONS AND THE NEW CATHOLICOSAL ELECTION President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and the ruling Pan-Armenian National Movement had a conflict with Armenian military-political forces over the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh problem. After its resignation on February 3, 1998, the PanArmenian National Movement yielded its place to the newly “rebranded” Republican Party of Armenia. Having this party as political support, Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) and defense minister Vazgen Sargsyan (1992-1999) became respectively President and Prime Minister of Armenia. October 27, 1999, is an important date in the history of the Armenian Church and Armenian state. Simultaneously, two major events happened on that day: the election of the Garegin II in the Cathedral of Holy Etchmiadzin and the murders of Prime Minister V. Sargsyan, Speaker K. Demirchyan, and other high-ranking officials of the Armenian National Assembly. These events radically transformed political and religious life in Armenia, and highly reinforced Russian influence in the country. As during the Catholicosal election in 1995, when President Ter-Petrosyan endorsed the candidacy of Garegin I Sargsyan, Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia, during the 1999 election, the Armenian political leadership supported the candidacy of Archbishop Garegin Nersesyan, Vicar General of the Araratian Pontifical Diocese. Certainly, President Robert Kocharyan and Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan had several reasons for this endorsement. 2 First, Archbishop

1

During the election of the Catholicosal Locum Tenens held by the members of the Episcopal Assembly and Supreme Spiritual Council of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Archbishop Nerses Pozapalyan received 24 votes; Archbishop Garegin Nersesyan, 10 votes; and Bishop Vicken Aykazian, 1 vote, see Etchmiadzin 7 (1999):5. 2 President R. Kocharyan and Prime Minister V. Sargsyan, who derived political credit thanks to the Karabagh War, refused to support the candidacy of the spiritual father of this war, Archbishop Pargev Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies, vol. 25 (2016):156-184

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Garegin was a natural ally of Kocharyan and Sargsyan against ex-President TerPetrosyan who did not support his candidacy during the 1995 Catholicosal election. Second, as a strong administrator, Archbishop Garegin could unify the Armenian Church under his authority. 3 Third, as a Soviet-style church administrator, Archbishop Garegin always adapted church policy to the ruling party’s ideology.4 Fourth, with his well-developed relationship with the Armenian Diaspora, Archbishop Garegin could collect financial aid from wide-spread Armenian communities and attract investments in the Armenian economy. Once the Armenian state chose its candidate, getting the desired result in the Catholicosal election was purely a technical question. The state and Archbishop Garegin did not have any major problems in controlling the election. From one side, state administration representatives “convinced” potential Catholicosal candidates to withdraw their candidacy.5 From the other side, Archbishop Garegin met with hostile clergymen and gave them generous promises of hierarchical promotion or economic support after his election. 6 Several bishops and high-ranked clergymen publicly accused the Armenian government of interfering in the Church’s affairs by supporting one candidate over others. Two days before the Catholicosal election, Rev. Michael Westh, a priest from the Church of Denmark who lived in Armenia for many years and taught at the Gevorgian and Vazgenian Theological Seminaries, reported: The special thing about this particular election is that a growing bitterness against governmental interference has emerged from within the Church leadership, since a majority of top clerics did not agree that the Government’s candidate was the best one. Around October 1, 1999, six archbishops (of whom two were patriarchs) released a document of protest intended for the Government, but at the same time the document indirectly failed to appreciate the Government’s candidate. Over the last week or so, an increasing number of sources state that another 30 or 31 bishops and archbishops agree with the intention in the released document. If this is so, it means that 36-37 of the 49 highest ranking clergy may

Martirosyan. In the past when R. Kocharyan was president of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic he had close ties with Archbishop Pargev, but once he became President of Armenia he abandoned him. 3 Catholicos Vazgen appreciated the energy and organizational skills of Archbishop Garegin. During one of his official speech Vazgen I noticed: “He extended his attention over other churches situated outside of the Araratian Pontifical Diocese. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate him and express my appreciation for his works. I wish him a strong health, inexhaustible energy and new inspirations in his service to the Holy Church, to our faithful and to our fatherland,” see Etchmiadzin 9-10 (1987):10. 4 Under the Soviet-style administration, managerial qualities of a high-ranked clergyman served the interest of ruling regime. Qualities of Soviet-style administration included: creation of the atmosphere of fear, total control of staff, severe punishment of dissidents as an example to others, exclusion of any form of criticism, formation of blindly devoted subalterns, favoritism, nepotism, etc. For studies of Soviet managerial culture, see Bruno Grancelli, Soviet Management and Labor Relations (Boston: Allen & Unwin), 1988. 5 The Soviet state used very efficient psychological strategies to control high-ranked clergy. For each celibate clergyman, Soviet security services opened a special file collecting all information about his personal life. If a high-ranked clergyman had economic affairs, a secret conjugal life, or any blameworthy behavior, he became easy to manipulate. The KGB threatened to reveal the information to the public or just to arrest the clergyman if he refused to accept and support the “official” Catholicosal candidate. 6 Primate of the Diocese of Aragatsotn, Bishop Navasard Ktjoyan, who was fiercely opposed to the candidacy of Archbishop Garegin, after meeting him and negotiating his promotion, became his closest friend and ally. For lobbying the candidacy of Garegin among clergymen and laymen of his entourage, he had been generously “rewarded.” After the Catholicosal election he became Vicar General of the Araratian Pontifical Diocese. By this alliance of the two important clergymen having close ties with the ruling party, the Armenian Church became incomparably more integrated into Armenian statehood than it had been before.

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gather around one single alternative candidate, and thus the election tomorrow may become a choice between only two candidates. The Government’s favorite candidate is Archbishop Karekin Nersessian (49 years old), bishop of the Ararat Diocese with Yerevan as its center. So far, only this one candidate has been announced as of today, October 25. A possible alternative candidate supported by a majority of senior clergy may thus be announced tomorrow right before or during the first sitting of the electing body. Meanwhile, the 49 bishops, archbishops and patriarchs gathered today.7

If a few days before the Catholicosal election in 1995 there were several declared candidates, a day before the Catholicosal election in 1999, because of an atmosphere of fear created by the Armenian state administration, Archbishop Garegin Nersesyan was the sole officially declared candidate in the election. On the last day of election Archbishop Nerses Pozapalyan Catholicosal Locum Tenens confronted the government candidate. The situation was confused not only for clergymen, but also for lay delegates of the National Ecclesiastic Assembly. One of the delegates of the National Ecclesiastic Assembly, Barlow Der Mugrdechian, reported on the Catholicosal election: The afternoon air was filled with excitement and anticipation on Wednesday, Oct. 27, 1999, as 452 delegates from more than 30 countries prepared to enter the doors of the sanctuary of Holy Etchmiadzin, to cast their ballots for the 132nd Catholicos of All Armenians. One by one the delegates entered the Church as their names were called, each feeling the weight of responsibility as an elector who would decide the leader of the Armenian Church into the next millennium. Presiding over the election were Archbishop Torkom Manoogian, Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem, Archbishop Mesrob Mutafyan, Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, and Archbishop Nerses Bozabalyan, Locum Tenens (interim head of the Armenian Church). Four hours later, His Holiness Karekin II Nersisian was elected as the new Catholicos of All Armenians, by a majority vote of 263 (226 votes were necessary for election on the first ballot). The only other candidate in the election, Archbishop Nerses Bozabalyan, received 176 votes, with 11 invalid votes.[…] As a delegate I was motivated by the duty to select a candidate whose leadership qualities would take the Armenian Church into the 21st century. What made this already formidable task even more difficult was the fact that there was no formal campaign for office, and without a campaign, it was harder to formulate an opinion. Although a political style campaign would not have been desirable, it would have been preferable for the candidates themselves to present their own opinions and views on a variety of issues. Neither of the two final candidates publicly spoke to the delegates at the Assembly about what their goals would be when elected to this high office. I personally spoke to many delegates who had only a cursory knowledge of the two candidates. Biographies of the two candidates were not even available to the delegates prior to the election. The issue of informing the delegates about candidates prior to election should be remedied at future Assemblies. There was no consensus candidate among the bishops themselves, who were publicly divided over which candidate to support. Several bishops had publicly accused the government of Armenia of meddling in the election by supporting one candidate over others (interestingly enough, this issue was not as hotly debated four years earlier during the previous election for Catholicos). Thus, the election took place in an unusual atmosphere, but always with the thought in mind that the choice was an important one for the Church.8

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Michael Westh, “Election of Catholicos Armenia 1999,” http://groong.usc.edu/ro/ro-19991025.html. Barlow Der Mugrdechian, “Karekin II Elected 132nd Catholicos of All Armenians,” http:// armenianstudies.csufresno.edu/hye_sharzhoom/vol21/dec68/catholicos.htm. 8

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The Catholicosal election became politicized. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), the political support of the Catholicos of the Great House of Cilicia, hoped that once again a Cilician Catholicos would become Catholicos of Etchmiadzin. Even though the Catholicos of Cilicia Aram I Keshishian had earlier officially announced that he would not be a candidate for this Catholicosal election, ARF Chairman Hrant Margarian endorsed his candidacy anyway. Later, the ARF Executive Council of Armenia announced that because of the unfavorable atmosphere of the Catholicosal election, it should be postponed. 9 Evidence suggesting the interference of the Armenian state in the 1999 Catholicosal election was presented on the Wikileaks website in August 2011.10 THE CELEBRATION OF THE 1700TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADOPTION OF CHRISTIANITY After the surprising resignation of L. Ter-Petrosyan and the tragic elimination of the political elite in 1999, President R. Kocharyan had an exclusive opportunity to increase his authority and concentrate all administrative power in his hands. 11 Newly-elected Catholicos Garegin II not only blessed the leadership of R. Kocharyan, but also helped him to strengthen his authority among Armenians in the Diaspora. This tight collaboration between the Armenian state and church existed in different periods of Armenian history. If during Soviet dominance, the Armenian Church was subservient to the dictates of the regime, after the independence of Armenia in 1991, the Armenian Church became the social, political, and economic partner of the Armenian state. In this new condition, the Armenian Church enjoyed more freedom in its ritual and administrative lives, but the level of its responsibilities vis-à-vis the Armenian state rose significantly. Under R. Kocharyan, the relationship between the presidency (1998-2008) and the patriarchal rule of Garegin II transformed into a conglomerate relationship. As inheritor of the Soviet atheistic regime, the presidency of R. Kocharyan was highly Machiavellian. His interest in the Armenian Church related only to its political and economic aspects, and his presence at religious ceremonies had more symbolic significance than spiritual significance. Unlike his predecessor L. TerPetrosyan, he had neither a historical vision of the Armenian Church nor a personal interest to understand its interior religious life. He was often absent from important

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Asbarez Newspaper, “Elections of Catholicos Should Be Postponed ARF Says,” http:// asbarez.com/41371/elections-of-catholicos-should-be-postponed-arf-says. 10 On March 13, 2003, during a meeting with United States diplomats, Mesrop Mutafian, Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, reported to them the fact of the Armenian government’s interference in Church’s affairs and the personal support of the President R. Kocharyan to the candidacy of Archbishop Garegin: “Mesrob lamented that Karekin’s election to the Catholicosate in 1999 had not been democratic, and, in fact, had been orchestrated by Armenian President R. Kocharian”, see Wikileaks, “Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II on the church, Armenia, and Turkey,” http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03 ISTANBUL399.html#. 11 As ex-apparatchik educated in Soviet “fear based” administrative culture, R. Kocharyan was naturally “allergic” to all kind of democratic thoughts and challenges. As President of Nagorno-Karabagh, he did not have any social and political platform in Armenia, and had been “promoted” to the positions of Prime Minister and later President by Armenian government strongman V. Sargsyan. After the murder of V. Sargsyan, R. Kocharyan strengthened his leadership only by the help of internal economic allies – several Armenian oligarchs – and an external mentor: Russian Prime Minister, and later President, Vladimir Putin. Thus in a very short term President R. Kocharyan obtained total control of economic and political life of Armenia.

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religious ceremonies of public significance which caused no small frustration for Catholicos Garegin II.12 Despite R. Kocharyan’s desire to use the Armenian Church network to make new politico-economic alliances, Catholicos Garegin II had an historical, theological, and ethnocentric vision of the relationship between the Armenian state and the Church. More than any Armenian political leader, Garegin II aspired to build a close union between the Armenian Church and state, such that they would collaborate at all levels of social life. He confirmed this idea in his speech given on the occasion of the celebration of the 1700th anniversary of the adoption of Christianity as a state religion in Armenia and the 10th anniversary of the Independence of Armenia: During our history we were often deprived from a national state, often our land was trampled, but our faith and our hope remained intransigent and unsinkable.[…] Even the Great Genocide could not shake our faith in Resurrection which we confessed during 1700 years. By his life-giving faith Armenian people who had escaped from Genocide gave birth from ash and death’s grave to the first Armenian Republic.[…] In this list of the hardship and harm, heroism and victory we should highlight church-state unbroken union for the benefit of the nation and for the construction of our fatherland.[…] Let us glorify the MostHigh (God) and lets see with open spiritual eyes the presence of God beside us and the Providence of our Lord by which the 1700th anniversary of Armenian Conversion and 10th anniversary of Independence coincide. This shows us again that the Faith enlightens the way of the prosperity of our Fatherland and the well-being of our people. We should not be afraid and weaken facing the problems because God is with us. Despite the ordeals, deaths and losses that we incurred during thousands of years, the Armenian people live as a nation and state, as a church. God is with us because here is my consolidated nation in Armenia, Artsakh and in Diaspora as an integrated Church.13

As with many of his predecessors, Catholicos Garegin II saw Armenia as not only a political unity with concrete geographical borders, but a vital space for the Armenian people marked by a tumultuous history.14 As the leader of the Armenian Church, Garegin II tried as much as possible to enhance the physical presence of the Armenian Church in Armenia through the construction of new churches and religious buildings; but he also increased the political power of the Church regarding state policy.15 In this direction, the celebration of the 1700th anniversary of the

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John Whooley gives an interesting interpretation of the religious indifference of R. Kocharyan: “This apparent indifference has been connected with what appears to be the popular opinion that Kocharian had enriched both himself and his family during his period in office, and in consequence was sometimes disdainful of the proprieties expected of him as president,” John Whooley, “The Armenian Apostolic Church in Armenia. The Question of Renewal,” Studies in World Christianities 15.3 (2009):260. 13 Etchmiadzin 9 (2001):24-25. 14 Holy Etchmiadzin continues to use the theme of tragic events of the history of Armenia to exhort Armenian people from different religious denominations to be unified in a national megachurch—the Armenian Church, under the leadership of the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin. This exhortation is retrospective in tone: it calls the Armenian Diaspora to “return to its roots”—that is, to return to the ways of the Golden Age when Armenians had the same faith, shared the same culture, and the same spiritual leader: the Armenian Church Catholicos. It calls Armenians to the same strategic goals, resolving all national problems using only the resources of Armenians. This is an important point in the Armenian Church’s modern policy, expressed in the story of the “Iron Ladle” of Catholicos Khrimian Hayrik (1892-1907), and memorized by a monument consecrated by the Catholicos Vazgen in Holy Etchmiadzin. For the history of the Iron Ladle, see http://armenianhouse.org/khrimyan-hayrik/loving-father.html. 15 Yulia Antonyan characterized the development boom of the Armenian Church as a “Reconquista,” Yulia Antonyan, “Religiosity and Religious identity in Armenia: Some Current Models and Developments,” Acta Ethnographica Hungarica 56.2 (2011):327. With Garegin II, not only did the

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adoption of Christianity as a state religion was an opportunity for the Armenian Church to reaffirm its role and place in Armenian society. Two ceremonies received high importance in the program of the celebration: the Blessing of the Holy Chrism (September 22) and the consecration of the St. Gregory Illuminator Cathedral in Yerevan (September 23). In these religious ceremonies, distinguished guests participated including Pope John Paul II, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexei II, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and religious leaders of other Christian churches.16 ARMENIAN SYMPHONIA17 OR THE FLIGHT OF THE DOUBLE-HEADED EAGLE18 The ceremonies of celebration for the 1700th anniversary marked a new phase of the relationship between the Armenian state and church. If, during the rules of previous political and religious leaders—L. Ter-Petrosyan, Catholicoi Vazgen I and Garegin I—Armenian state-church relations approximated the French model,19 the KocharyanGaregin II tandem changed this relationship and started to follow the Eastern, old Byzantine model of state-church relations incarnated in modern Russia. In his first Kondak (encyclical), Catholicos Garegin II defended the idea of a harmonious union of the state and church in Armenia: In the conditions of our independent national state the relationship between Armenian Church and State should have new quality guaranteed by juridical acts. The Armenian Church and the Armenian State represent Armenian people in its integrity. Only by a

Armenian Church reconquer the religious market in Armenia but also discovered new financial resources in the United States, expanded its influence on the American continent, and organized an inquisition against clergymen with “heretical” social, political, or administrative views. 16 Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexei II avoided meeting Pope John Paul II in Armenia. He participated in the ceremony of the Blessings of Holy Chrism and the consecration of the St. Gregory Illuminator Cathedral in Yerevan (September 22-23) and left Armenia a day before Pope John Paul arrived in Armenia (September 25). Alexei II never forgave the Pope for his anti-Russian policy and the support of Catholic communities in Ukraine. On several occasions, and even months before his death, Pope John Paul expressed his desire to visit Russia and to find agreement on the problems between two churches, but the strong “nyet” of the Russian Patriarch prevented such a visit. 17 “ Symphony” is an Orthodox political theory that promotes a close collaboration between temporal and religious powers which equilibrate, match, and adjust their social and economic policy. In the history of Armenia, the perfect Symphony in state and church relationship did not exist. Often the Symphony became a “monothematic sonata” where one pole (state or church) is developed on the main tone. During the history of Armenia, after a short period of collaboration between Armenian kings and Catholicoi, one pole took over the other. The result of this victory of the king was total state control over the Armenian Church. The victory of the Armenian Church over the state was more pitiless: abolition of the Armenian kingdom (Arsacids, Bagratids, etc). If Byzantine-type Orthodox “symphony” tended to Cesaropapism, the Armenian Symphony inclined to Theocracy. This is the main difference between Byzantine and Armenian symphonic models. 18 The double-headed or bicephalic eagle was the symbol of the Armenian Arsacid dynasty as well as the Byzantine and Russian empires, and it is the coat of arms of the modern Russian Federation. In our day, Catholicoi and patriarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church carry a bicephalic eagle as symbol of perfect harmony between temporal and religious powers. From a theological point of view this is an aberration because of the unnatural, monstrous character of the double-headed eagle. 19 According to Zoe Knox, in Western countries there are four category-models of state-church relationship: 1. Full separation of the church and state (USA), 2. State church has symbolic privileged status and there are equal rights for all religious communities (UK, Finland), 3. Church and state are separate and there is strong secularist government and education system (France), 4. Church-state accommodation where churches have the status of legal public corporations (Germany); Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 108-9.

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harmonious union of these two powers—spiritual and temporal—can we create a prosperous and thriving future for our people.20

Actually, the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin “copied” from the Patriarchate of Moscow the strategy and the methods of reestablishing a “harmonious union” with the state administration. Russian President V. Putin and Patriarch Alexei II shared with R. Kocharyan and Garegin II their “precious experience” of consolidating church and state administrations and reestablishing the medieval symphonic ideal.21 Russian political and religious leadership highly recompensed Armenian colleagues for their choice for Church-state symphonic relationship.22 On January 21, 2007, for his contribution to the development of church-state relations, Patriarch Alexi II awarded President Robert Kocharyan a prize “for outstanding efforts to strengthen the unity of Orthodox peoples” from the International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations. 23 Thus, under Kocharyan’s political leadership, the Armenian Church started to enjoy fully its exclusive rights on “Armenian souls.” The Catholicosal double-headed eagle that symbolized the union of the secular and religious authorities took its free flight in the Armenian sky.24 All church-state integration programs that Catholicos Garegin II could not fulfill during the presidency of R. Kocharyan were achieved with President Serzh Sargsyan.25 During the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan (in office since 2008) the

20

Etchmiadzin 2 (2000): 7-8. For the “symphonic experience” in modern Russia, see Knox, Russian Society, 105-31. 22 The official position of the Russian Orthodox Church on Symphonia is that: “The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit ideal of church-state relations. Since church-state relations are two-way traffic, the above-mentioned ideal could emerge in history only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest people’s shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state. Attempts to work out this form were undertaken in Byzantium, where the principles of church-state relations were expressed in the canons and the laws of the empire and were reflected in patristic writings. In their totality these principles were described as symphony between church and state. It is essentially co-operation, mutual support and mutual responsibility without one’s side intruding into the exclusive domain of the other. The bishop obeys the government as a subject, not because his episcopal power comes from a government official. Similarly, a government official obeys his bishop as a member of the Church, who seeks salvation in it, not because his power comes from the power of the bishop. The state in such symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her spiritual support, prayer for itself and blessing upon its work to achieve the goal of its citizens’ welfare, while the Church enjoys support from the state in creating conditions favourable for preaching and for the spiritual care of her children who are at the same time citizens of the state,” see “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,” http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/3/14.aspx. Our criticism of this text is that it idealizes church-state relations by characterizing them as a “two way traffic” and a “co-operation, mutual support and mutual responsibility without one’s side intruding into the exclusive domain of the other.” In reality, in a Symphonic relationship the state (presidential administration, ruling party, etc.) has total control of the church with direct influence on the Patriarch or Catholicos and welldeveloped spy network. 23 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/185538.html. 24 The alliance between President R. Kocharyan and Catholicos Garegin II was based not only in a common Soviet mentality, but also in their common strategic interest. Despite the many adversaries and difficulties that they encountered, they always won the “game,” and they needed each other’s support to finalize their triumph. 25 During the history of the Armenian Church, several Catholicoi lost their lives for their opposition to royal authority and in defense of Christian principles, but Garegin II never criticized the Armenian president or government. In the spirit of the theology of the “silence of the lambs” during the Tsarist regime, the Russian Orthodox Church each year launched anathemas against some audacious people who were not afraid to put in doubt that the Tsar had a divine vocation, see Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, L’Empire des tsars et les russes; le pays et les habitants, les institutions, la religion (Paris: Robert Laffond, 1990), 933. If this “silence of the patriarchs” is characteristic of Orthodox churches, the Georgian Patriarch Ilia II 21

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conglomerate relationship between the Armenian state and church was transformed into a “hypostatic union,” and Catholicos Garegin II became the theoretician of this ideology which he formulated through his speeches and preaching.26 One of the important aspects of the Armenian state-church symphonic relationship is the close interconnection between Armenian Church dioceses and Armenian embassies in foreign countries. Certainly, the Armenian Church was always important in Armenia’s foreign policy, but after independence, the Armenian Church’s overseas dioceses received new responsibilities. From that time, they did not only attend to the spiritual needs of local Armenian communities, but they also became responsible for organizing all kind of help and support for the Armenian state. 27 In other words, in the international arena Armenian Apostolic Church diplomacy not only adjusted its demarches with Armenian foreign policy, but the Church itself became the tool of the Armenian state in foreign countries; the Armenian Church and State symphonic relationship was exported to foreign countries.28 Catholicos Garegin II acted as an active member of the diplomatic corps of Armenia defending the international positions of the Armenian state. Thus, the enemies of the Armenian state became the enemies of the Armenian Church, and the friends of the Armenian Republic became the friends of the Armenian Church. THEOLOGICAL REBRANDING OF ARMENIAN NATIONALISM The revival of nationalism in Armenia at the beginning of the 21st c. is a complex phenomenon. If in early 1990s nationalism in Armenia was a function of Soviet influence, the quest for independence, and the Karabagh war, with a spontaneous and revolutionary character, by early 2000 Armenian nationalism was a function of

is an exception. Many times he publicly criticized President Mikheil Saakashvili for his economic or social policy. 26 The phrase “hypostatic union” underlines the quality of the union between the Armenian Church and state. The apologists of the orthodox “Symphony” theory affirm that the church-state relationship is in the same category as the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. According to the understanding of the Catholicos Garegin II, the Armenian people are the result of the union of the soul (Church) and the body (State). 27 The Armenian Diaspora was very enthusiastic about the Independence of Armenia and local Armenian Churches in different ways helped the newborn Armenian Republic. Thus, overseas dioceses became partners of the Armenian state in foreign countries and mediated its dialogues with local administrators and Armenian organizations. 28 On August 6, 2012, one of the Armenian internet news agencies published an article written by a group of Armenians living in France who were extremely worried about the “spying” role of the Armenian Church. This article, entitled “Has the Church betrayed the citizens of Armenia?,” revealed a decree sent by Bishop Arshak Khachatryan, Chancellor of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, to Archbishop Norvan Zakarian, Prelate of the Armenian Church in France, asking him to collect data about Armenians living in his diocese who were having administrative problems with the Republic of Armenia. Here is the English translation of the decree: “Your Eminence, the government of the Republic of Armenia requested the Catholicos to get his support in the organization of the state migration policy. By the help of the overseas dioceses of Holy Etchmiadzin, the government of Armenia hopes to get appropriate information on the citizens of Armenia 1) whose children born in foreign countries do not have appropriate documents, 2) who have problems with documents because of military obligation, 3) who have an expired Armenian or USSR passport, 4) who left Armenia having no birth certificate. In support of the request of the Armenian government His Holiness requests you to reveal in your diocese the presence of the Armenian citizens under these categories and report data about them,” decree N°774, given on May 7, 2012, at Holy Etchmiadzin, http://hetq.am/arm/articles/17294/ekexecin-matnum-e-hayastani-qaxaqacinerin.html. Indeed, although the Soviet Union failed, the Armenian government used KGB methods and Armenian Church networks to collect information about Armenian citizens living abroad.

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the political and religious leadership of the country with a structured character.29 Two architects of modern nationalism, the Armenian state and church, worked together to strengthen religious and national affiliations among Armenian citizens, for the purpose of mobilizing the Armenian population and creating a national consensus against the anti-Armenian policies of Azerbaijan and Turkey. 30 Thus, Armenian modern nationalism is not Anti-Islamic (because of the good political relationship with Arab countries and Iran), not Anti-Russian (because of the strong economic and political ties with Russia),31 not anti-Semitic (because of the historic and cultural parallels between Armenians and Jews), and not Anti-Western (because of the presence and influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the Western countries).32 Perfectly adjusted to the external policy of the Armenian state, it does not have any religious denomination as a political target, but rather a specific ethnic group which serves as the image of the collective enemy: the Turks.33 Although Armenian nationalism has a religious color, modern nationalists in Armenia are not at all religious. 34 Certainly, they consider the Armenian state, nation, and church a sacred unity, but they are devoid of a common religious language or modes of religious communication.35 They revitalize their thoughts and

29

The revival of modern Armenian nationalism is related also to the fact that Armenia is ruled by the “Karabaghtsi clan,” which is a distinct ethno-political interest group that does not originate from the core of Armenia. Having an “identity problem” as being not Hayastantsi (Armenians from Armenia), both Karabaghtsi Presidents R. Kocharyan and S. Sargsyan tried hard to develop a new type of nationalism in Armenia which gave them not only political credit but also helped them to “reaffirm” their Armenianness. 30 Continuing to develop the thesis of Benedict Anderson that “nation is an imagined political community,” Knox notices: “Because nations are constructed, they are not immutable. The elite can manipulate the sentiments attached, in the name of tradition, culture or religion, for personal political purposes. Nationalism is a key instrument for mobilizing popular support,” Russian Society, 135. 31 Although during the last years there has been a rise of anti-Russian sentiments in Armenian caused by the forced joining of the country to the Eurasia Customs Union, the murder of an Armenian family by a Russian soldier in Gyumri. These feelings were further strengthened after the patriotic rebellion of “Sasna Tsṙer” in July, 2016. 32 The sources and the themes of nationalist discourse in Armenia are various: 1. Psychological (syndrome of persecuted ethnic group), 2) Historical (Golden Age of Greater Armenia), 3. Economic (support from Diaspora), 4) Geographical (enemy neighbors), 5) Political (Nagorno-Karabagh conflict), 6) Cultural (exclusivity of the Armenian culture). Konrad Siekierski, in his article “The Armenian Apostolic Church and the Ethno-Religion in Post-Soviet Armenia in Armenian Christianity Today: Identity, Politics and Popular Practice, ed. Alexander Agadjanian (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 9-34, distinguished six elements of the ethno-religious genealogy: 1. Noah, 2. Thaddeus and Bartholomew, 3. Conversion, 4. Alphabet, 5. Avarayr, 6. Genocide (cf. “One Nation, One Faith, One Church”). We should add to this list the adoption of anti-Chalcedonian Christology, signifying the rejection of the philosophical and sophisticated characters of the Imperial churches and societies (Byzantine, Latin) in favor of the vernacular faith and popular aspects of the Armenian Church and society. 33 In Armenia “Turkishness” is a monolithic political category (as the collective image of the enemy of Armenianness), and not a national affiliation (citizen of Turkey or Azerbaijan). Beside ethnic and cultural distinctions between Turks and Azeris, both nations are unified under the collective name of Turks— enemies of Armenians. 34 Some of them criticize the adoption of Christianity in Armenia and even advocate for pagan Armenian religion. They are unified under the umbrella term, “Armenian Aryans.” For more information about this group, see http://vahagnakanch.wordpress.com. 35 Modern religious nationalism has been described as a “fusion of nationalism and religion such that they are inseparable.[…] We see people not only demanding their own nation and sovereignty, but asserting that their nation is religiously based.[…] Religion is so important to the nationalist movement that it adopts religious language and modes of religious communication, builds on the religious leaders and institutions to promote its cause,” Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, “Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship,” Ethnicities 3.2 (2003):225, cited in Konrad Sierkierski,

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feelings more from the idea of “Armenia from the sea to sea,” rather than from the “mystery” of Holy Etchmiadzin. The only things they need from the Armenian Church are its religious myths and symbolism in order to strengthen the ideology of the greatness of the Armenian ethnos as a “chosen nation.” From the other side, Catholicos Garegin II gave a bright religious color to Armenian nationalism and utilized it for the sake of Armenian Symphony.36 His preachings and speeches are awash with religious language (like the “mystery of Holy Etchmiadzin,”37 “first Christian country in the world,”38 “nation elected by God,”39 etc). For the Armenian Catholicos, Holy Etchmiadzin is not only the spiritual center of the Armenian nation, but also a pledge of its eternity: Here, in front of Ararat, by the vision of Gregory the Illuminator, the Son of God descended and Armenian Bethlehem was founded in order to spread the luminous rays of the love of Bethlehem from the Holy Altar of Descent (iǰman sełan) upon the life of Armenians. He descended to seal up by a golden hammer and to decorate the mystery of our pan-national conversion so that with Holy Etchmiadzin our people live permanently, and despite being split and spread over the world stay unified.40

Catholicos Garegin calls the faithful to have the same passion toward the Armenian state as they have for the Armenian Church and God. Thus, during his first patriarchal visit to Jerusalem he preached in the Church of Holy Sepulcher and resumed his symphonic thoughts: The light of Etchmiadzin unified the Armenian state and church showing us, the people of Hayk, our mission. And what is this mission, if not love for the fatherland, love for the Church which during the centuries in conjunction with love toward God lead our people through terrible ordeals to deliverance.41

According to Catholicos Garegin II, the Armenian faithful should carry three kinds of love: love toward God, love for the Armenian Church, and love for the Armenian State. If the first two categories of love are theological virtues that had been taught by the Armenian Church Fathers throughout the centuries, the “passion” for the

“Nation and Faith, Past and Present: The Contemporary Discourse of the Armenians Apostolic Church in Armenia,” Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies 18.2 (2009):100. 36 The Armenian Apostolic Church does not deny being ethnophyletic. This term designates the idea of a particular church not based on geographic criterion (Church of Armenia), but on an ethnic affiliation (Armenians’ Church—Hayastaneayc‘ Ekełec‘i). This national distinction of religious communities is specific to Orthodox churches. 37 Despite being a political center of Armenian people, the Ararat valley and the town of Etchmiadzin got their religious importance after the 4th century. Before Christianization of the country and the destruction of pre-Christian temples, the Taron valley and the town of Ashtishat had much more religious significance than any other region or city in Armenia. 38 The Christianization of Armenia was a long process, and the Armenian people did not become Christian in one day. After the death of Trdat III and Gregory the Illuminator, Armenian nobility openly opposed this new religion. During 4th c., several patriarchal successors and high ranked clergymen had been murdered by Armenian kings and princes who rejected Christian ethics and embraced pagan customs. The total Christianization of Armenia did not become a reality before the invention of the Armenian alphabet and the translation of the Bible in Armenian language. Even the events of the Vardanian war in the midst of 5th c. show that some Armenian princes were sympathetic to the pre-Christian Zoroastrian religion. 39 The theme of “divine election” or God’s plan for the Armenian nation had been addressed in early Armenian historiography and patristic literature. 40 Etchmiadzin 1 (2002):4. 41 Etchmiadzin 1 (2000):67.

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Armenian State is a relatively new concept in the Armenian Church.42 Certainly, previous Catholicoi Vazgen I and Garegin I also preached that Armenian citizens should be loyal to the Armenian state, but with Garegin II the Armenian state became a theological category.43 Having Christian mysteries as the center of its theological thoughts, the Armenian Church over the last decades has become more and more “state-centric.” For this theological rebranding the Armenian government generously recompensed the Armenian Church, granting it different privileges.44 THE ARMENIAN CHURCH IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND IN SOCIAL LIFE One of the strategic achievements of Catholicos Garegin II was enhancing the presence of the Armenian Church in public institutions: the army, schools, prisons, etc. The first sphere to be penetrated by the Armenian Church was the military. Since the Karabagh war, the Armenian Church was with the Armenian Army and during peace time, the Armenian Church did not limit the army’s activities; it blessed Armenian soldiers and military symbols. 45 Even though the Armenian Army Chaplaincy program had been created by Garegin I,46 with Garegin II this service took on an institutional character. In 2010, the number of military chaplains increased to thirty-eight.47 On September 21, 2011, Armenian clergy involved in the

42

The Armenian Church closed all the doors to integration into other religious, political, and cultural areas, and transformed the Armenian-speaking population in Armenia into an “imagined community” a long time before the 18th-19th century’s “origin of national consciousness” as described by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 37-46. With its Christianization at the beginning of 4th c., Armenia culturally broke with the Iranian Zoroastrian religion. In the middle of the same century, the Armenian Church achieved total autocephaly by rejecting the Byzantine Church’s jurisdiction. In the beginning of 5th c., aided by the invention of the Armenian alphabet, the Armenian Church renounced Greek and Syriac Christianities. In the 6th c., the Armenian Church gave up Greco-Roman Christological thought. In the beginning of 7th c. the Armenian and Georgian Churches were separated. During Muslim rule over Armenia, this isolation of the Armenian Church was intensified. Thus, by rejection of exterior influences and by its refusal to integrate into a foreign cultural area, Armenian Church created a cultural and religious island—Armenia. 43 The Armenian Church was also indirectly involved in the Armenological quarrels in early 2000 between historians from the United States and Armenia. For historiographical methods and contradictions of these two schools, see the essay published by Armen Ayvazyan, The History of Armenia as Presented in American Historiography: A Critical Survey (Yerevan: Artagers, 1998), and its detailed critique by Sebouh Aslanian, “The Treason of the Intellectuals: Reflections on the Uses of Revisionism and Nationalism in Armenian Historiography,” Armenian Forum: A Journal of Contemporary Affairs 2.4 (2003). Aslanian qualifies Ayvazyan’s essay as “a symptomatic text of a new ethos surrounding nationalist history in Armenia.” According to him the role of historians from Armenia in this formation of this new ethos is “to generate and maintain national identity” and “to defend the security interests of the state,” 3. 44 On October 25, 2011, the National Assembly of Armenia adopted the “Property Tax” and “Land Value Tax” laws, which bestowed tax privileges to the Armenian Church, see Etchmiadzin 10 (2011):153. 45 On January 28, 2002, during an official ceremony at the Ministry of Defense, Catholicos Garegin II blessed the Armenian Army Standard and made a prayer for Armenian soldiers. Etchmiadzin 1 (2002):67. In Orthodox churches there is a tradition of blessing buildings, houses, cars, or other objects. The blessing of weapons is one of the paradoxes of the Orthodox churches when nationalism erases the pacifist spirit of the Christian faith. No theological formulation can justify the blessing of a destructive instrument, such as the blessing of a Kalashnikov rifle by a Russian Orthodox priest. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2012/aug/28/pussy-riot-russia-church-state. 46 On November 3, 1997, an agreement was signed between Holy Etchmiadzin and the Ministry of Defense of Armenia for the creation of the Armenian Army Chaplain corps. 47 Etchmiadzin 3 (2010):44.

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Chaplaincy program in the Armenian Army participated in the military parade dedicated to the 20th Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Armenia.48 Another example of the presence of the Armenian Church in the state public sphere is the introduction of the subject of the “History of the Armenian Church” in Armenian schools. In 2002, Holy Etchmiadzin and the Armenian government signed an agreement introducing Armenian Church History as a subject in secondary schools. In 2005, Catholicos Garegin II and the Armenian prime minister reaffirmed the agreement; and since 2005 it has been considered a mandatory subject in middle and high schools. Many observers remarked that this decision is a violation of the religious rights of the Armenian citizens who are not members of the Armenian Church.49 Obviously, the problem is not in learning a religion or religions in secondary school per se, but when a religious organization creates the subject program, organizes teachers’ training and selection, and controls teaching procedure to transform the course into a class of catechism. By this enforcement, the Armenian Constitution is violated and international conventions signed by Armenia are breached.50 Catholicos Garegin II pays careful attention to the religious education of the young generation.51 One of his successful programs in this field was the foundation of the Youth Centers (Hayordeac‘ tner). In 1993, then-Vicar General of the Araratian Pontifical Diocese, Archbishop Garegin received important funding from the Armenian General Benevolent Union and built up a project of converting Soviet Pioneers Palaces into Armenian Church Youth centers. Currently, four Youth Centers function in Yerevan (New Nork, Arabkir, Malatia, Kanaker) and three in the other regions of Armenia (Vanadzor, Etchmiadzin, and Ashtarak). In the near future, the Armenian Church plans to open new Youth Centers in other Armenian cities.52

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That was an unprecedented event, an extreme expression of the medieval symphonic vision in the modern world. Unfortunately, Armenian media did not depict its negative effect on the formation of a healthy democratic society in Armenia. 49 The seven-year program of study of the History of the Armenian Church is not only a presentation of the historical, doctrinal, and moral aspects of this religious community, but it is also a study of the Armenian Church’s ritual elements. In reality the teachers of this course are “selected” by the Armenian Church and play the role of “scholar preachers.” By prayers and other religious gestures and by advocating the “exclusivity” of the Armenian Church, they intimidate agnostic, atheist, and non-apostolic pupils to “put” them in the right way. This kind of program is outlawed by the Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools, see http://www.osce.org/odihr/29154. 50 In reality the introduction of a religious course in Armenian schools created not only a latent conflict within the Armenian scientific community, as Satenik Mkrtchyan notices—see, “Where Did We Come From? Creationism versus Evolution in Armenian Public Schools,” in Armenian Christianity Today: Identity, Politics and Popular Practice, 57-70—but also within the modern (Western) academic world. 51 The Armenian Church created other mechanisms to assure its influence in the Armenian educational system. Every year Church administrators organize Armenian Church Olympiads among scholars and distribute prizes to secondary schools teachers. 52 Holy Etchmiadzin reports that “at present approximately 3,500 students attend these Youth centers. The number of the instructors and administrative staff exceeds 300. The students enroll in classes of various specializations, including arts and crafts, painting, music, sports, computers, journalism and foreign languages. There are also dance and circus (acrobatics, gymnastics) classes. The children attending the Armenian Church Youth Centers receive basic education in their chosen fields. The curriculum is created in order to have the student master the subject, and the child is transferred to the following level only after successfully passing a year-end exam. Lectures, examinations, open classes and debates are organized to improve the high level of their work. Based on the education received in the Armenian Church Youth Centers, the student is fully able to continue his or her education in an institution of higher learning or their chosen vocational sphere,” http://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=1&id=98&pid=4&lng=en.

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Catholicos Garegin II did not limit the presence of the Armenian Church to the field of secondary education. In 2005, after the death of the founder and the first Dean of the Faculty of Theology of Yerevan State University, Archbishop Shahe Adjemian, the Catholicos “appointed” Bishop Anushavan Jamkochyan as the new Dean of the Faculty.53 This act was a direct intervention of the Armenian Church in the public education sphere and had two main objectives: to not let atheist academicians acquire control of the Faculty of Theology and to use the intellectual resources of the Faculty of Theology in the interest of the Armenian Church.54 Archbishop Shahe was a wise churchman who knew that the Armenian society needed lay theologians who could act independently of the Church. His principal objective was the creation and reinforcement of independent theological thought in Armenia, that is why he kept the Faculty of Theology separate from Church control. Unfortunately, after his death, by silent agreement of the state, the Faculty of Theology transformed into an Armenian Church “preaching center.” Catholicos Garegin II also implanted the presence of the Armenian Church into the penitentiary system of Armenia. Back in 1993, Archbishop Garegin created the Prison Ministry within the Araratian Pontifical Diocese and appointed priests to visit prisons operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Armenia.55 Father Karapet Keledjian, an experienced priest, has preached in several prisons, baptized many prisoners, and celebrated liturgical services.56 During the rule of Garegin II the Armenian Church has also built well-developed systems of social assistance. One of the successful social programs is Soup Kitchen. With the help of the AGBU, the Armenian Apostolic Church organizes three soup kitchens in Yerevan, providing meals for 600 individuals each day.

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The Dean of the Faculty, Bishop Anushavan Jamkochyan, combines this appointment with the position of Rector of the Cathedral of Yerevan. Probably, by the appointment of a “part-time” Dean, Catholicos Garegin wanted to diminish the importance of the Faculty of the Theology vis-à-vis Gevorgian and Vazgenian Seminaries. 54 In early 2000, several papers had been published in the journal Etchmiadzin that presented Garegin II as a good administrator, see Etchmiadzin 8 (2001):3-4, 21-30. After gaining control of the Faculty of Theology, Holy Etchmiadzin “commissioned” several articles to create an excellent image of Catholicos Garegin II. The author of these articles, Avetis Kalashyan, Professor of Church History and former ViceDean of the Faculty of Theology, using Soviet politburo-style praise presented Catholicos Garegin II as a multi-talented Catholicos whose abilities exceeded those of his predecessors, see “Ecclesiological thought of the Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II”, Etchmiadzin 1 (2009):48-64; “Theological thought of the Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II,” Etchmiadzin 12 (2009):41-61; “Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II thought about Diaspora,” Etchmiadzin 11 (2011):39-61; “Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II thought about State-Church relationship,” Etchmiadzin 12 (2012):41-70. Usually these kind of papers are dedicated to the memory of a defunct Catholicos, and this glorification of Catholicos Garegin II during his lifetime is an apparent example of the “cult of personality” which seeks to create an idealized and heroic public image through ridiculous and unquestioning flattery. In reality, Catholicos Garegin II does not write his own sermons and speeches, as Vazgen I and Garegin I did, so all the studies about his intellectual thoughts are futile. 55 In 2007 Catholicos Garegin II and the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Rowan Williams visited the Corrections Center for Women located in Abovyan http://www.armenianchurch.org/index.jsp?sid=1&id =16858&pid=16855&lng=en. 56 In some prisons, the Armenian Church even built chapels. On November 30, 2008, Catholicos Garegin II offered a service of consecration for the newly constructed Holy Resurrection Chapel in the Kosh Penitentiary.

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ECUMENICAL TRENDS AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE During the patriarchal rule of Garegin II, the Armenian Church participated actively in the ecumenical movement and strengthened its relationship with other Ecumenical organizations and Christian churches. The celebration of the 1700th anniversary of adoption of Christianity as state religion in Armenia inspired Armenian Church representatives to have more confidence in ecumenical dialogue. The Armenian church accepted Ecumenical Charter (Charta Oecumenica), a joint document signed in April 2001 by the Conference of European Churches and the Council of European Episcopal Conferences which contains guidelines for increasing co-operation among the churches in Europe. If in his ecumenical vision Catholicos Garegin I had more affinity with Catholic and Protestant churches, Garegin II built an exclusive relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church. During his patriarchal rule the ties between the two churches became very strong. There are several reasons for the Russophile orientation of the modern Armenian Church. First, Garegin II was a longtime friend of Russian patriarchs Alexei II and Kirill I, and as a church administrator shared with them the same Soviet experience. 57 Second, in its symphonic union with the Russian state, the Russian Church serves as a “successful” example for the Armenian Church, and Catholicos Garegin II and Armenian presidents received significant political and religious support by “duplicating” this model in Armenia.58 Third, wealthy Russian-Armenians are generous sponsors of the Armenian Church, and it is a necessity for Garegin II to have a good relationship with the Russian political and religious establishment. 59 The close relationship between the Armenian and Russian churches has had a positive influence in the consolidation of the Armenian community in Russia and strengthening of its ties with Armenia.60 If in its political plan the Russian Church expresses its solidarity with the Armenian state and Church, in its theological plan the Russian church has a very reserved approach on Armenian Church doctrine, neither admitting the Armenian Church as member of Orthodox Church family nor recognizing the

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If after the fall of Soviet Union in Eastern European countries many clergymen had been punished for their collaboration with secret services, in post-Soviet countries there was no investigation against churchmen for their close ties with the KGB. Certainly, during the Soviet regime no one could become a celibate priest, with the potential to reach high ranks in church hierarchy, without “signing a contract” with secret services. The reason that civil society in post-Soviet countries is not sensible on the question of collaboration is that during the Soviet Union everyone “collaborated” with the regime in some way (for example becoming a member of the Pioneer or Komsomol organizations). Thus the political and religious leadership in post-Soviet countries cherish nostalgic feelings for the Soviet past. In that aspect as long as Soviet apparatchiks rule over the Armenian state and Church, the post-Soviet era has still not started. 58 Certainly, Armenian Symphonia has its own ideological myth (the adoption of Christianity as state religion in Armenia as well as the history of successful collaboration between Armenian king Trdat III and Gregory the Illuminator), however from the perspective of a strategic political alliance between Armenia and Russia, the Russian political establishment and its “symphonic experience” has a direct influence on the relationship between state and church in Armenia. 59 It is worth noting that the Russian Church did not support the formal prelate of the Armenian Church in Russia in his confrontation against Catholicos Garegin II. Defrocked Archbishop Tiran tried in many ways to preserve control of Armenian churches in Russia, but did not receive any help from the Russian state and Church and was obliged to give up his struggle with Garegin II. 60 The loyalty of the Armenian Church to the Armenian and Russian strategic alliance helped Bishop Ezras Nersesyan, Primate of the Armenian Church in Russia and brother of Catholicos Garegin II, to reorganize Armenian religious communities in that country building new churches and community centers. One of his major projects was the construction of the Armenian monastery complex in Moscow in 2011.

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orthodoxy of its doctrine. Despite the good personal relationship between Armenian and Russian hierarchs and patriarchs, the conservative theological orientation of the Russian Church could not permit the Armenian Catholicos to sign any common doctrinal declaration with the Russian Patriarch along the lines of the common statement signed between Pope John Paul II and Garegin I in 1996.61 Catholicos Garegin II recognizes the significance of the relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the context of the political confrontation of Armenia and Greece with the Turkish government and the persecuted situation of the Christian communities in Turkey, the close relationship between the two churches became a necessity. In June 2006, upon the joint invitation of Archbishop Mesrop Mutafian, Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, and Bartholomew I, Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Garegin II made a patriarchal visit to Istanbul.62 Turkish nationalistic organizations protested against the visit of Garegin II and his statements on the Armenian Genocide.63 Relationships with other Orthodox churches have also developed in mutual understanding. Traditionally, the Armenian Church has had a difficult relationship with the Georgian Church. If, during the Soviet period, the question of Armenian churches in Georgia could not be broached, in the post-Soviet period Catholicoi Vazgen I and Garegin I defended the rights of local Armenians over all Armenian churches in Georgia. In his turn Catholicos Garegin II tried not to complicate the relationship with Georgian Patriarch Ilia II, but he insisted strongly on the protected status of the Armenian churches in Georgia. During the patriarchal rule of Garegin II, the heads of the Armenian and Georgian churches met several times to find a solution to these problems. In July 2011, Garegin II visited Georgia, but the ensuing negotiation did not result in any concrete agreements.64 The Armenian Church has a particular relationship with Prechalcedonian churches, called the Oriental Orthodox Family of Churches. Several times, Coptic, Ethiopian, Syrian, and Indian orthodox patriarchs and hierarchs visited Armenia. In May 2003, during the visit of Coptic patriarch, Pope Shenouda III and Garegin II signed a common declaration confirming their commitment to the first three ecumenical councils.65 Catholicos Garegin II developed unprecedented ecumenical relationships with Western Christian denominations. The visit of Pope John Paul II in Armenia in September 2001 marked an important stage in the relationship between the Armenian and Catholic Churches. On September 26, 2001, on an outdoor altar built in Holy Echmiadzin, John-Paul II celebrated the Latin Mass with Armenian Catholic hierarchs. On January 19, 2005, Pope John Paul II expressed his deep consideration for the Armenian Church by the erection and consecration of the statue of St. Gregory the Illuminator in the Vatican, in the outside niche of the Cathedral of St. Peter. The successor of John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI, continued the good

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In its very conservative approach, the Russian church characterizes all Christian denominations as heterodox (inoslavie). For more information about the attitude of the Russian Church towards other Christian churches, see Basic Principles of Attitude to the Non-Orthodox. In the English version of this document the term inoslavie is translated “non-Orthodox” instead of as “heterodox,” see http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/attitude-to-the-non-orthodox. 62 Etchmiadzin 6 (2006):3. 63 For the press conference of Catholicos Garegin II given in Istanbul, see http://www.azadhye.net/news/ viewnews.asp?newsId=806alh50. 64 http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia_georgian_churches_fail_to_settle_disputes/24238571.html. 65 Etchmiadzin 5 (2003):9.

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relationship with the Armenian Church.66 On February 22, 2008, he dedicated the north courtyard of the Vatican Basilica to St. Gregory the Illuminator of Armenia and confirmed again that the Armenian nation is the first Christian nation: This great Saint, more than 17 centuries ago, made the Armenians a Christian People, rather, the first People to officially be Christian. The conversion of the Armenians is an event that has profoundly marked Armenian identity, not only on a personal level but for the entire Nation. The term “Illuminator,” with which this Saint, so dear to you, is called, highlights the dual function that St Gregory played in the history of Armenia's conversion. “Illuminator,” in fact, is a term in Christian usage used to indicate the passage from darkness to the light of Christ. And truly, Christ is precisely the great Illuminator who radiates his light on the entire lives of those who accept him and follow him faithfully. Now, St Gregory was called the Illuminator precisely because in him the Face of the Saviour was reflected in an extraordinary way.67

By the invitation of the Pope, on May 6-12, 2008, at the head of an important delegation, Catholicos Garegin II visited the Vatican and Italy.68 During a press conference Armenian Catholicos highlighted the positive tendencies in the relationship of the two churches: The architects of the relationship between two churches are Catholicos Vazgen I and Pope Paul VI. The germs that they seeded had been cultivated by Garegin I and Pope John Paul II. Being in physical pain, both of them supported each other. In order to fortify this warm fraternal love, in our turn with a delegation we gave a visit (to Vatican). God bless this mission!69

If in the relationships with Catholic and Orthodox churches the Armenian Church developed a spirit of dialogue and mutual understanding, its attitude toward Protestant churches is eclectic. In general, Holy Etchmiadzin has a good relationship with all classical Protestant communities. The absence of an administrative center or a spiritual leader among most of churches in this Christian family makes all relationships impersonal and superficial. That is the reason that the Armenian Church has a more developed relationship with Anglican Church than with other Protestant churches. Garegin II and Archbishops of Canterbury met each other several times and made mutual visits. Despite the problems between the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Armenian Catholic and Evangelical churches,70 Catholicos Garegin II could develop relatively

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The Armenian Church as a member of Oriental Orthodox family participates in theological dialogue with the Catholic Church. Since the creation of the Dialogue Commission involving representatives of the Catholic Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches in 2003, Armenian Church representatives have participated in all nine meetings in two different delegations from the Catholicosates of Holy Etchmiadzin and Antelias. See http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/sub-index/index_ancientoriental-ch.htm. 67 See http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/february/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_ 20080222_san-gregorio_en.html. 68 Etchmiadzin 5 (2008):3-29. 69 Etchmiadzin 5 (2008):24. 70 Holy Etchmiadzin always blames these communities for not fully serving the interests of the Armenian state, and several of its representatives consider the Armenian Evangelical Church as a “sect” (http://terhambardzum.com /news/2011-06-12-172). Despite this lack of confidence between the two communities, the leadership of this Armenian Evangelical community considers the Apostolic Church as a “mother” church.

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positive tendencies in the relationship with these Armenian denominations. During an interview given to the newspaper Nor Yaṙaǰ (New Haratch), Garegin II admitted that while there was a good understanding with the Armenian Catholic Church,71 the relationship with the Armenian Evangelical Church was more complicated: Today the relationship with other Armenian denominations is not bad, for example with the Armenian Catholic Church in Armenia and in the Diaspora.[…] Unfortunately we do not have a very good relationship with the Armenian Evangelical Church because of its missionary activity in our homeland where 1700 years ago the light of Christ had been adopted. We understand the role of missionary to be when you preach among pagan people who have not received Christian faith. So, it is inexcusable and unacceptable when you preach among the faithful of the Armenian Apostolic Church to make them followers of the Armenian Evangelical Church. This is a wrong perception of the missionary.72

The rise of anti-Christian sentiment in the Muslim world following the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan as well as the Arab Spring did not provoke extreme violence against Armenian religious communities in the Middle East. Armenian communities maintained their traditional neutral position and stayed away from intercommunity violence.73 Toward that end, the two Armenian Catholicosates worked together to maintain the positive credit that local Armenian communities have in Iran and the Arabic world.74 Even though the religious leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed many times that the conflict between Armenians and Azeris is not a religious confrontation, there is always a risk that it can be transformed into a religious war. Before the Armenian-Azeri conflict, Garegin II knew personally Allahshukur Pashazadeh, Grand Mufti of the Caucasus, and on many occasions met him. After the end of the Karabagh war and the consecration of Garegin II as Catholicos, the two religious leaders continued to communicate with each other and acted to establish a stable peace and mutual confidence between two people.75 The mediator between Garegin II and Allahshukur Pashazadeh was Russian Patriarch Alexei II who organized in Moscow conferences and meetings of the religious leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).76 During these meetings Garegin II defended the rights of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabagh to live in a free and independent country and raised his voice against the destruction of Armenian cross-stones (xač‘k‘ars) in the Armenian Cemetery in Julfa (Nakhichevan) in 2005.

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During his visit to the Armenian Catholic monastery in Venice, Garegin II called it “Little Armenia,” see Etchmiadzin 5 (2008):28-29. 72 Nor Yaṙaǰ, October 1, 2011, http://spasavor.blogspot.com/2011/10/blog-post_07.html. 73 Armenian political parties play an important role in community life in Muslim countries. Traditionally, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) has closer ties with the Shi‘a community, while the Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavars) is in alliance with Sunni leadership. This separation of the Armenian political forces do not harm community solidarity, but gives room to the Armenian community for more political flexibility in Muslim world. 74 It is interesting to notice that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a very good relationship with Holy Etchmiadzin. Every year Garegin II meet several times with Iranian diplomats and high ranked statesmen who express their sympathy for Armenian Christian culture. In some ways, the Armenian Church plays a strengthening function in the Russia-Iran-Armenia political axis. 75 In 2003, Pashazadeh asked Garegin II for a mediation to release two Azeri soldiers captured by Karabagh military forces. After the mediation of Catholicos Garegin II, the two Azeri soldiers were released. 76 For the meetings and conferences organized by Russian patriarch, see Etchmiadzin 10-11 (2001):5-24; 10-11 (2003):20-24; 2-3 (2004):5-14; 7-8 (2006):6-10.

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The relationship between the two religious leaders improved after the participation of Catholicos Garegin II in the World Summit of Religious Leaders held on April 26-27, 2010, in Baku.77 After receiving the invitation from an Azerbaijani religious leader and through the mediation of the Russian Patriarch Kiril I, the Armenian Catholicos accepted this invitation and attended the summit. During his visit to Azerbaijan, the Catholicos was received by President Ilham Aliev and had the opportunity to visit St. Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Church in Baku. In his turn, Allahshukur Pashazadeh visited Yerevan in November 2011 to participate in the meeting of the Presidium of the CIS Interreligious Council.78 In both meetings, the Armenian Catholicos, the Russian Patriarch, and the Grand Mufti of the Caucasus signed a joint declaration supporting peace negotiations between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. Although these meetings did not decrease the tension between two peoples, they helped to create an atmosphere of dialogue. CONSTRUCTION THEOLOGY OR ARMENIAN CHURCH PLASTIC SURGERY The two terms of R. Kocharyan’s presidency (1998-2008) marked Armenian society profoundly. Inspired by his political tutor, Russian President V. Putin, he built strong vertical power and strengthened authoritarian tendencies. From an economic point of view, the country has successfully held back recession, stabilized its economic situation, and achieved 10-15% annual economic growth. 79 In early 2000 the construction sector in Armenia was experiencing a boom. The Armenian Church also profited from this economic growth and embarked upon unprecedented construction works.80 However, the Church’s construction boom in Armenia could not increase the religiosity of the population in Armenia because it was caused by the restoration of a medieval type of sponsorship. In the mode of medieval princes, modern Armenian sponsors built churches in order to perpetuate the name of their clan. So the construction of the churches in modern Armenia did not result from the spiritual élan of the Armenian faithful and spontaneous realization of parish members,81 but from the will of rich sponsors from Armenia or the Diaspora. Giving money to build a church allowed the donors to select architectural styles and materials (which may not be in harmony with traditional architecture),82 the name of the church, and in

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Etchmiadzin 4 (2010):27-32. Etchmiadzin 10 (2011):124-33. 79 The share of GDP per person (purchasing capacity) went from 500 USD to 3000 USD. The proportion of the poor was also reduced to 30 or 35 percent. In particular, the number of families receiving state poverty allowance decreased to 50,000. Poverty now is seen mainly in the lack of access of the population to social and cultural resources such as healthcare, leisure, and general improvement of living conditions, see Svetlana Aslanyan, Aharon Adibekian, Nelli Ajabyan, Barbara A. Coe, Civil Society in Armenia: from a theoretical framework to a reality an assessment of Armenian civil society (2005 – 2006), CIVICUS Civil Society Index report for Armenia (Erevan: Center for the Development of Civil Society, 2007), 43. 80 Before his election as Catholicos, Archbishop Garegin carried out construction and restoration projects of many religious buildings in Armenia. He was certainly influenced by his spiritual father Vazgen I who was called “the Builder” by the Armenian people. For detailed information about the construction of churches during the patriarchal rule of Garegin II, see M. Danielyan, “The new rise of the construction art in Armenian church,” Etchmiadzin 11 (2009):65-77. For the list of constructed and renovated churches in Armenia during patriarchal rule of Garegin II, see Etchmiadzin 11 (2011):84-94. 81 During the Soviet regime, the administration tried to abolish completely parish life in Armenia. Especially in the big cities, many churches had been destroyed and others had been “hidden” in the backyard of the buildings. 82 If traditional Armenian churches are small and modest, new religious buildings are large and luxurious, which does not create an atmosphere of religious compunction. Antonyan notes that the faithful see in 78

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some cases also the priests who would serve in “their” church. Indeed, for Catholicos Garegin II, the construction of religious buildings become not only an administrative method to increase the visibility of the Armenian Church, but also a means to impose his ideological, ethical, and theological vision—Construction Theology—to demonstrate his personal social weight and the economic wealth of the Armenian Church.83 One of the major scandals related to the Construction Theology of Garegin II was the decision to demolish the Cinema Moscow Open Air Hall in the center of the Yerevan, and to build St. Anna church in its place.84 In March 2010, after the media reported on this project, many organizations and Armenian intelligentsia raised their voices against it. The mobilization of civil society saved Cinema Hall from destruction,85 however, Catholicos Garegin did not abandon the idea of building a church in this quarter. He carried out the construction of St. Anna church and the building of the new patriarchal residence in the place of the previously demolished Language Institute building. 86 For Armenian Church administrators, building an Armenian church in a central zone is done to secure its permanent place in society. But, in reality, the construction of “sponsored” churches in public spaces can have a negative impact on the image of the Armenian Church as rich and associated with the oligarchy.87 Garegin II has a much broader vision of church construction (ekełec‘ašinut‘iwn). With the construction of religious buildings and the administrative reform that he undertook, he aims to build a monolithic Armenian Church as a strong and centralized institution being in symphonic union with the Armenian state. From this perspective, the central point of his administrative reform was the adoption of the new Statute of the Armenian Apostolic Church during the Assembly of the diocesan representatives held in Holy Etchmiadzin (October 30 – November 4, 2009).88 This regulatory document restricted the rights of the parish councils, giving large authority to the clergy. Henceforth the nomination of a priest rests within the

these new-built churches a “lack of sacredness,” Yulia Antonyan, “Church, God and Society: Toward the Anthropology of Church Construction in Armenia,” in Armenian Christianity Today: Identity, Politics and Popular Practice, 38. 83 The modern architectural preferences and sponsor-hunting skills of Garegin II created a polarization between Armenian society and the Church, provoked alienation of the simple faithful from church administration, divided Armenian ecclesiastics into poor, spirituals, pious priests and rich, businessoriented, oligarchophile clergymen. The construction of modern and luxurious religious buildings also introduced new ethical norms among clergymen whose small cells have been transformed into comfortable suites. New modern buildings, religious conformism, ethical liberalism, and business culture took over the care of small medieval churches, the christocentric ethic, and the patristic spirit. 84 The sponsor of St. Anna Church is Hirair Hovnanian, an Armenian businessman from the United States who gave the name of his wife to the church. Another Armenian oligarch, Gagik Tsarukyan, built five churches devoted to St. Hovhanness, after the name of his eldest son, see Antonyan, “Church, God and Society,” 45. 85 For more information about the confrontation over this project, see at http://www.armenianow.com/ social/ 21521/moscow_openaircinema. 86 Etchmiadzin 7 (2009):132. 87 Although the Armenian Church administration claims that there is a lack of religious buildings in Armenia, there is an over-construction of churches in proportion to the faithful population in Armenia. One of the arguments of the opponents of the construction of the churches is that without parish life, churches are like museums or theaters. The majority of the people in Armenia participate in religious ceremonies as spectators or visitors without understanding the meaning of the religious services, and they do not have any deep relationship with liturgical and community life. Their religiosity is limited to making the sign of the cross or in lighting candles. 88 For the full text of the Statute, see Etchmiadzin 11 (2009):38-47.

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authority of the Primate of the diocese and not within the parish council.89 The Catholicos himself possesses the authority to reorganize religious associations in the Diaspora, to create new dioceses, to reconsider or not the elected Primate candidates, or even to nominate directly Primates of a diocese. Obviously, the new Statute eliminates democratic authority and self-government of local religious communities and strengthens superior-subordinate relationships in the Armenian Church. 90 Catholicos Garegin II intentionally transformed the Armenian Church’s “bottom-up” organizational approach into a “top down” structure in order to control everything and everyone in the Armenian Church.91 These new dispositions created tensions between local parishes and Catholicos Garegin II. The opposition to the new Statute and the creation of the new dioceses was especially strong in the parishes of Nice (France) and Geneva (Switzerland). After the creation of the Diocese of France, the church council in Nice refused to accept this reorganization and opposed the authority of the parish priest, Fr. Vache Hayrapetyan, regarding him as an “agent” of the Catholicos.92 After unsuccessful dialogues and negotiations between the elected Primate of the Diocese of France Archbishop Norvan Zakarian and the church council members, the local Armenian community has been divided into “pro-Gareginian” (mostly Armenian immigrants from Armenia and post-soviet republics) and “anti-Gareginian” parties (mostly Armenians from Turkey and Middle East) who struggle against each other to control church buildings and parish activities.93 In Geneva, during two assemblies held in March 2010 and May 2011, 90% of the Armenian Church council of Switzerland voted against the reactivation of the Diocese of Switzerland (formally founded in 1992). Despite this popular vote, Catholicos Garegin II reactivated the Diocese by a Kondak given on March 2011, appointed Fr. Mesrop Parsamyan as Locum Tenens of the Primate, and sent him to Geneva.94 Subsequently, local parish members refused to accept the authority of Fr. Mesrop, and the Catholicos defrocked local Armenian priest Fr. Abel Manukian (Oghlukian).95 Certainly, these two cases of opposition to Catholicosal authority have economic and personal explanations, 96 but the most important factor of the confrontation is the heterogeneity of the Armenian Diaspora

89

Ibid., 40. Before the adoption of the new Statute a group of the specialists (clergymen and laymen) had already prepared a project for an Armenian Church Constitution which fully respected the right of local parishes in the organization of religious life. Unfortunately, this document has been ignored by Catholicos Garegin II who aspires to obtain more control over Armenian communities in the Diaspora. 91 Even though there is a Superior Spiritual Council in the Armenian Church, its function is formal and symbolic because the members of the Council are chosen by the Catholicos and never criticize patriarchal policy and decisions. This is a typical Soviet managerial style: to build an administrative hierarchy and interdependence in each level of administration in order to control the decision making procedure which is against the spirit of Conciliarity, a fundamental theological principle in Orthodoxy. 92 Local Armenian parish councils in France were forced to adopt the new statute and, by a Kondak given on October 26, 2006, Catholicos Garegin II created the diocese of France of the Armenian Church, Etchmiadzin 12 (2006):3-5. 93 In 2013 Archbishop Norvan Zakarian resigned from his position as Primate of the Diocese of France of the Armenian Apostolic Church, in an open letter accusing Garegin II of a lack of respect vis-à-vis his person, of humiliating him in front of Armenian statesman and clergymen, and of favoritism toward clergymen educated in “business psychology” (cf. http://www.azad-hye.net/news/viewnews.asp?newsId= 508ajsd48). 94 Etchmiadzin 4 (2011):142. 95 Etchmiadzin 6 (2011):152. 96 By the article 1.10 of the new Statute each diocese should give 4% of its budget as donation (called “Mite of the Illuminator”) to the Holy Etchmiadzin, Etchmiadzin 11 (2009):39. 90

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and the legacy of the historical confrontation between Armenians from the Ottoman and Russian Empires. In both cases, in Nice and in Geneva, the principal opponents to the authority of Garegin II were Armenian immigrants from Turkey who settled down in these cities in the second half of the last century and hold prosperous businesses. During the Soviet period, when Holy Etchmiadzin had limited authority in the Diaspora, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople played an important role in the Armenian Diaspora and provided priests and deacons to local parishes. Currently, however, with a weakened Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople on the one hand, and an independent Armenian state and strong Catholicosal authority on the other, TurkishArmenians feel invaded by new immigrants from Armenia and post-Soviet countries. As “first comers” and the founders of Armenian community organizations in these cities, they deny the rights of the “Soviet Armenians” to play a more important role in local church parishes. The frustration of the Turkish-Armenians increases especially when Etchmiadzin sends “Hayastants‘i” (Armenians native to the modern Republic of Armenia or to the former Armenian SSR) priests who naturally defend the interests of “Soviet Armenians” to become members of church councils. Another question related to the problem of the creation of the “Gareginocentric” Armenian Church is related to the human resource policy of Holy Etchmiadzin. The central point of the human resources policy of Catholicos Garegin II is to suppress dissenting elements and to recruit exclusively loyal clergymen. During the patriarchal rule of Garegin II, more than one hundred clergymen have been defrocked for different reasons.97 Certainly, some clergymen renounced their priesthood because they did not find their spiritual ideal within Armenian Church, but the majority of defrocked clergymen were punished for their ideological opposition to the Catholicos. In particular, he opposed the Armenian religious intelligentsia— vardapet-s (celibate priests) ordained and sent by Garegin I to study in Western universities. Garegin II gave them an ultimatum: interrupt their studies and return to Armenia, or be defrocked. Many of them refused to interrupt their studies and were thus defrocked for their “disobedience.” During the patriarchal rule of Garegin II, clergymen without a rich “sponsor” have been ignored for promotion, sent to poor parishes, or even defrocked, whereas by contrast, clergymen having rich “sponsors” among Armenian oligarchs have been promoted in the hierarchy. 98 Indeed, this situation has created an atmosphere of fear and frustration among clergymen from brotherhood of Etchmiadzin.99

97

For a non-exhaustive list of the defrocked clergymen, see Etchmiadzin 11 (2011):82-83. Catholicos Garegin II has provided the clearest examples of nepotism in the modern history of the Armenian Church. In 2000, a few months after his consecration as Catholicos, Garegin II removed Archbishop Tiran Kyureghyan from his position of Primate of Russian Armenians because of his opposition to Garegin II’s candidacy during the Catholicosal election. In May 2001, without presenting the case to the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Armenian Church, the Catholicos defrocked Archbishop Tiran, Etchmiadzin 5 (2001):45, and a few months later, in September 2001, he ordained his brother Ezras Nersesyan bishop and nominated him Primate of the Armenian Church in Russia. In April 2010, Garegin II ordained one of his nephews bishop and nominated him to be Primate of the Aragatsotn region of Armenia. 99 In his article entitled, “The consequence of the silence of commanders,” Harutyun (Garegin) Harutyunyan, a defrocked celibate priest (vardapet) and former superior of the Vazgenian Seminary in Armenia, criticized the Soviet-type administrative policy of Garegin II, and compared his rule to Stalinism, http://hetq.am/arm/news/48132/ hramanatarneri-lrutyan-hetevanqy.html. 98

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ONE CHURCH, TWO CATHOLICOSATES: OPPOSITION OF HOLY ETCHMIADZIN AND ANTELIAS The only Armenian religious institution which could provide strong resistance to the doctrine of Armenian Symphonia and the centralization policy of Catholicos Garegin II was and still is the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia.100 Despite a common ritual and dogmatic identity, the Catholicosates of Etchmiadzin and Antelias are not only different churches within the “megachurch” called the Armenian Apostolic Church, but they have fundamental differences in administrative style, political culture, educational methods, and human resources policy. If Holy Etchmiadzin is still using Soviet administrative ethics and managerial techniques at all levels of its hierarchy, Antelias is historically more Westernized as a religious institution and administrative center. So the clash of two Armenian Catholicoi incarnating different cultural values was predictable.101 After the Catholicosal election Catholicos Garegin II attempted to prevent charismatic Aram I from extending his authority in the Diaspora and creating new dioceses under his jurisdiction. 102 However, the Cilician Catholicos was resolute in this question and he used a double standard policy. During the “Tiranian quarrel” Catholicos Aram I did not support defrocked Archbishop Tiran Kyureghyan in order “to not put in jeopardy the unity of the Armenians in Russia,”103 but he did create a split and disunion in the Armenian community in Canada. He encouraged and supported Armenian immigrants from Middle Eastern countries (Lebanon, Iran, Syria, the Gulf States, etc.) in their plan to separate from the Canadian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church and to form a distinct religious community under the jurisdiction of Antelias. In October 2001, Catholicos Garegin II refused the request of Aram I to admit the necessity of the creation of a new diocese in Canada. Despite this decision, in January 2002 the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Catholicosate of Cilicia declared the creation of the Canadian Diocese.104 Two years later, Aram I appointed Bishop Khajag Hagopian Locum Tenens of the Canadian Prelacy, and in February 2004 nominated him Prelate. Catholicos Garegin II was annoyed by this decision of Aram I, but could not change the course of events. On this occasion, the diocesan councils of the three North American dioceses of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin (Eastern,

100

After the election of the new Armenian patriarch of Jerusalem in 2013, Archbishop Nourhan Manougian became the fiercest opponent of Garegin II and in his open letters accused the Catholicos of authoritarian rule of the Armenian Church (http://www.thetruthmustbetold.com/nourhan-letter; http:// www.lragir.am/index/arm/0/society/view/107260). 101 The religious role and significance of the Catholicosate of Cilicia is huge among the Armenian communities in Middle Eastern countries. Backed by the powerful Armenian Revolutionary Federation, this Catholicosal See incarnates the remnant of the last Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia and the memory of the lost Western Armenia. 102 Some partisans of the extension of the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia in the Armenian Diaspora express the idea that the Cilician Catholicosate should organize the religious life of Armenians living in the Diaspora and the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin should limit its jurisdiction to Armenia and ex-Soviet republics, see http://www.azg.am/AM/ 2001071802. 103 In June 2001, being in conflict with Garegin II, Archbishop Tiran, Armenian Primate of Russia, addressed a letter to Catholicos Aram I, asking him to accept the “Union of the Armenian Church in Moscow” under his jurisdiction. After an examination, the Central National Committee of the Catholicosate of Cilicia rejected the request of Archbishop Tiran, see http://www.azg.am/AM/2001071801. The defrocked Archbishop Tiran is currently the pastor of the “schismatic” church of Sainte-Marie of Nice (France) whose parish administrators refused to recognize the spiritual and administrative authority of Garegin II. 104 In English it is officially called the Armenian Prelacy of Canada, see http://www.armenianprelacy.ca.

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Western and Canadian) made a joint statement condemning the creation of the new Diocese and the nomination of the Cilician Primate in Canada.105 On April 2, the Spiritual Superior Council of the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin made a strong statement against the Cilician See, accusing it of endangering Armenian Church unity: This phenomenon is more than a creation of an uncanonical diocese. This confirms that the Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia is not ready to correct its schismatic spirit adopted in 1956 and to restore with the Holy See the canonical situation in the Armenian Church. Contrary to its assurances to be devoted to the slogan of “one Nation, one Fatherland, one Church,” by the new “reorganization,” the Catholicosate of Cilicia constantly tries to expand and to be fixed in the dioceses of the Catholicosate of All Armenians seized during the Cold War for political motivations. It deepens the schism in the Armenian Church and endangers the improved relationship built with Mother See since 1988. The Catholicosate of Cilicia does not want to consider that in the modern world the situation has changed, it does not want to see the new imperatives created after the independence of our motherland, and to evaluate the spirit of the new times, which require us to restore and to keep strong the unity of the Armenian Church and the Armenian Nation. Against every attempt to weaken the superior and eternal values of the Armenian Church, that is to say, the unity and the solidarity of our world-spread nation, the Holy See of Etchmiadzin will oppose its determined persistence in order to keep this unity unshakable and unfaltering.106

Indeed, the creation of a Canadian diocese under the jurisdiction of the Cilician Catholicosate split Canadian-Armenians into two hostile parts: pro-Etchmiadzin and pro-Antelias. Understanding that the confrontation could be transformed into a open conflict between these two groups and definitely harm the peace in the Armenian community in Canada, Garegin II and Aram I tried to find a compromise. In March 2005 the representatives of Etchmiadzin and Antelias created a Canonical Commission to discuss the problems existing between the two Catholicosates.107 The members of this Commission met each other many times and worked together to make an agreement on canonical and ritual issues. Official sources reported that the Commission had a “warm, constructive atmosphere leading to (good) results”108 and Catholicos Garegin himself described the relationship between Antelias and Etchmiadzin to be “fraternal.”109 But in reality the confrontation is still alive. Indeed, since the great Armenian schism of 1956, the Catholicosate of Cilicia adopted an independent policy from the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin and Armenia, and can be considered not only as religiously concurrent to the Holy See, but also as the political opposition to the leadership of the Republic of Armenia. During the tragedy of the post-electoral events on March 1, 2008, when ten people died in the clash of demonstrators with national police and military forces, Aram I appealed to political parties to form a coalition government: “In this tragic moment there is a vital need to

105

This statement did not only condemn the act of the creation of a new Cilician diocese in Canada and the nomination of a Prelate, but it also considered as uncanonical the two Cilician prelacies in United States: “Like the uncanonical Cilician diocesan structures in other places in North America, this (diocese) is also subject to objection,” Etchmiadzin 2-3 (2004):24. 106 Etchmiadzin 4 (2004):15. 107 Etchmiadzin 2-3 (2005):17-18. 108 Etchmiadzin 8 (2010):5. 109 http://hetq.am/arm/interviews/5192/.

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form a unified (coalition) government in order to get out from this uncertain situation and guide country in stability and strengthen internal solidarity.”110 Obviously, this declaration of Catholicos Aram I can be distinguished from progovernmental statements made on this subject by Garegin II.111 In recent years, Catholicos Aram I has several times blamed the Armenian government for economic and political problems in Armenia and highlighted that the Armenian Church has an important mission to speak out on the problems existing in Armenian society. One of his strongest declarations was made during the Armenia-Diaspora Pan-Armenian Conference: The greatest alarm of our nation is the real fact that the migration from Armenia continues with the same flow. Our enemy wanted to see Armenia without Armenians, and today we alienate Armenians from Armenia. From the one side, the increase of the disease called corruption, the economical anarchy of a small group of people, and from the other side, the miserable condition of the intelligentsia, writers, teachers and in general the simple people require rigorous reforms. The [Armenian] Church can not be indifferent to these phenomena.112

Thus the Catholicosate of Cilicia aspires not only to wield authority in the Diaspora, but also among the population in Armenia with the goal of becoming a spiritual leader for “all Armenians” as it claims to be.113 ACTIVATION OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND CRITICISM OF CATHOLICOS GAREGIN II Modern civil society as an agent of democratization and of self-organized associational life is a new phenomenon in Armenia.114 Civil society started to acquire its strength and influence in the political and social life in Armenia in the mid-2000s when, with the help of foreign donor organizations, many Armenian NGOs started to hold public protests against administration and commercial organizations. The presidential election of February 19, 2008, marked another stage of the formation of the civil society in Armenia. Although the tragic events of March 1, 2008 had negative impact on the political image of Armenia, it is undeniable that the wave of popular protests and demonstrations organized by the Armenian National Congress political coalition made democratic elements and civil society in Armenia more visible and stronger. What is the role of the Armenian Church in the formation of democratic civil society in post-soviet Armenia? Is the Armenian Church a contributor or an obstacle to the democratization process in Armenia? On several occasions the Catholicos and

110

Etchmiadzin 3 (2008), p. 18-19. Ibid., 11. 112 http://www.armweeklynews.am/i3/Armenia/asep/asep2013.html. 113 In some Cilician dioceses during liturgical services Catholicos Aram I is mentioned under the title “Catholicos of All Armenians of the Great House of Cilicia”. This is an apparent usurpation of the title “Catholicos of All Armenians” which is reserved to the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin, see http://www.1in. am/arm/press_diaspora_ 106574.html. 114 It is not easy to give a formal concept and definition to civil society in Armenia. According to the CIVICUS: “In Armenia, this was done at the first meeting of the NAG, which was held on November 2, 2005. The definition proposed by CIVICUS for the Armenian context was discussed and adopted by the National Advisory Group. The main point was that the definition of Civil Society referred to not only to formal civic organizations or NGOs, but also to informal groups and associations, religious groups and political parties. In other words, it recognizes that NGOs are only one part of civil society.” See Aslanyan et al., Civil Society in Armenia, 23-24. 111

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clergymen claimed that the Armenian Church advocates democracy in Armenian society. During R. Kocharyan’s second-term presidential inauguration ceremony on April 9, 2003, Garegin II affirmed: With the freedom and independence we also made the choice of democracy. With all our successes that we achieved during the last decade on many occasions we understood that we have a long way to pass in order to reach genuine democracy which has as its ultimate goal to value the human being, an idea taking its source from Christian spirit and thought.115

Although Garegin II made several favorable declarations for democratization in Armenia, in reality his policies showed that in modern times Holy Etchmiadzin cannot be seen as an institution supporting the formation of democratic society in Armenia. As long as the Catholicos advocates Symphonia and the nationalist trends emanating from it, and as long as rich local oligarchs sponsor the Armenian Church, it will never play a positive role in the formation of democratic society. But if the Armenian Church focuses its activity on providing a pure spiritual product without serving as political and economical tool in the hands of the state, it will highly contribute to civil society in Armenia. One of the major ordeals that the Armenian Church endured was the presidential election of 2008 and the popular contest of its result. The silence of Catholicos Garegin II during the first days of the post-electoral protests was interpreted as support for the ruling party. On February 29, Catholicos Garegin II held a meeting with Armenian Church bishops and diocesan primates and made a statement concerning the demonstrations in Yerevan. Even thought this statement declared the Armenian Church as having a neutral position in the presidential election, it had a pro-ruling party direction. First, it tended to deny the right of the people to peaceful demonstrations against the result of the election; second, it declared the results of the election as definitive: We call the representatives of the opposition who did not accept the results of the elections to act according to the terms of the law, in order to not disturb the stability and the peace of our country. The rallies and marches are not the better way to contest the final results of the elections.116

The necessity of the mediation of the Armenian Church increased especially after the violent demonstration and disproportionate response of the government on March 1, 2008. Catholicos Garegin II visited the opposition leader L. Ter-Petrosyan in person to discuss the extremely delicate political situation, but the first President of Armenia refused to receive him. This fact depicted not only the refusal of the ex-President L. Ter-Petrosyan to see a mediator in the person of Garegin II, but also his personal opposition to Garegin II’s patriarchal authority. Certainly, the demarche of Garegin II was not risk-free for his patriarchal image, but in this extremely difficult time for Armenia, from a political and ethical point of view it was justified. During the Presidency of Serzh Sargsyan (since 2008), civil society in Armenia has become more influential. Using modern communications strategies and internet networking, several civil society organizations and volunteer groups have reached a

115 116

Etchmiadzin 3-4 (2003):10. Etchmiadzin 2 (2008):11.

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wider audience and achieved greater visibility.117 The Armenian Apostolic Church (and specifically Catholicos Garegin II) have become a target for critics, receiving negative remarks for its close affiliation to the state and ruling party. Several scandals have come to light and have seriously damaged the image of the Armenian Church and its leader: e.g., the construction of a fancy restaurant at the Kecharis medieval monastic complex;118 a luxurious car obtained by Archbishop Navasard Ktjoyan, Vicar of the Araratian Patriarchal Diocese; 119 the negligent attitude of Catholicos Garegin II toward the disastrous situation of the medieval churches in rural Armenia;120 a law that exempted the Armenian national church from land and property tax; 121 and a revelation about the engagement of some high-ranked clergymen in business activities.122 The Armenian Church leader’s image has been further seriously damaged after his visit to Georgia in 2011 and the release of video record of his “fraternal” discussion with Georgian Patriarch Ilia II.123 CONCLUSION Undoubtedly, during the patriarchal rule of Garegin II the Armenian Church has become economically more prosperous, politically more influential, and socially more visible. Holy Etchmiadzin strengthened its ties with overseas dioceses and played the role of consolidator for Armenians living around the world. Did the prosperity of the Armenian Church provoke moral growth of the population in Armenia? Are the multiple new-built churches and religious buildings in Armenia indicators of religious enthusiasm and spiritual development? In reality, in the new socio-economic situation the Armenian Church has become more bureaucratic as an institution and more patriarchal as an administrative system. Church bureaucracy and patriarchalism are not exterior signs of spiritual progress! The indicators of the religious situation in Armenian reflect the lack of a fundamental strategy for the moral and ethical education of the population and the abatement of religious intolerance. In the socio-political situation where the majority of the people see the Armenian Church as a collaborator with the ruling party, where

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One of the social groups, “We Won’t Stay Quiet,” (Ch‘enk‘ Lṙelu) was composed of politically independent young people aiming to “bring the most urgent issues up for public discussion through the media,” http://www.eurasianet. org/node/64219. 118 See http://hetq.am/eng/print/3546/. 119 In March 2011, Yerevan newspaper, 168 Zham, reported that Archbishop Navasard Ktchoyan rides in a Bentley and possesses a handgun. In his turn, Archbishop Navasard reprimanded journalists for investigating his personal life, declaring that the car is a gift from one of his godsons and the firearm a gift from thenPrime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, see http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/3549149.html. 120 In July 2011, during an interview organized to discuss the situation of the monastery of Sanahin, where small trees are growing on the church walls and dome, Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian historian and expert on medieval architecture, reported to the media that during a conversation in 2006, Catholicos Garegin II declared that he would have nothing to do with monasteries or churches up in the mountains: “Logically, the [Armenian] Church should be the most interested institution to be worried about religious building. I do not even mention that government agencies should be concerned that trees do not grow on the domes of the churches,” said Karapetyan in the interview, see http://www.arminfo.am/armenian/ culture/article/16-07-2011/05-35-00. This fact created active discussion and arguments in the “blogosphere,” and even a Facebook group was formed, advocating the deposition of the Catholicos Garegin II. 121 See http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenian-church-tax-relief-controversy. 122 See http://hetq.am/arm/articles/16304/. 123 In July 2011 on a video uploaded to YouTube, Catholicos Garegin II showed his incompetence in the Russian language and his lack of ethics towards the old Georgian patriarch, see http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=jIzmiGUfqJs&feature=related.

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the citizens of the country have lost their trust in the government, the Armenian Church has a fundamental responsibility to support the population morally and cultivate their optimism for the future. Social problems in Armenian society and the inefficient economic policies of the government push the Armenian population to emigrate from Armenia. The Armenian Church missed its mission to understand the social needs and psychological problems of the people in order to discourage immigration and keep Armenian people in their fatherland. The national mantra of “we are the first Christian nation in the world” is empty of its curative function when Armenian clergymen refrain from engaging in ethical discourse on corruption; shirk from condemning the criminal permissiveness of oligarchs; fail to fight against social injustice; and fail to support the rising spiritual intellectuality of the faithful. In the situation where Armenian society passes through a never-ending transitional period of failed reforms, high level poverty, and other negative phenomena, the Armenian Church needs to form and put in practice a moral and ethical code for the population, to build healthy social relationships at all levels of society, more than to build empty churches. Indeed, instead of developing a universal plan for the Armenian Church and shaping a long-term strategy, Armenian Church administrators prefer traditiondriven and short-term solutions. Instead of healing the society from internal moral disease and providing effective treatment for its spiritual woes, they use “band-aid” solutions to cover problems, falsely believing that Church economic prosperity is the exterior sign of religious progress.124 It is true that all traditional Christian churches today encounter major problems to modernize their methods of preaching and to involve new people in community life. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Armenian Church to deal with two challenges: the formation of the theoretical and theological platform for religious education, and the acceptance of dissent as a fundamental requirement of a free society. Thus, it is urgent to conceptualize, to define, and to describe a strategy for religious education of the young in Armenia and in Diaspora dioceses. The courses on Armenian Church history taught in Armenian schools and religious centers cannot serve as a solid source of moral education for the younger generation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist moral values system, the Armenian Church has a mission to educate the Armenian population in Christian values and form a new moral code for Armenian Society. Instead of assuming the role of moral instructor, Catholicos Garegin II prefers to enlarge church administration which becomes static, devolving into a bureaucratic system serving the Armenian state as a Department of Religious Affairs. Wedded to old-fashioned, inefficient education methods, the Armenian Church has failed to orient religious education to empirical facts and to synthesize traditional religious elements with the contemporary spiritual needs of the population in order to make church community life more dynamic and to attract young people. Certainly, a small ethnic community such as the Armenian Church can be socially dynamic, rather than an old Byzantinetype bureaucratic system serving the interest of one or group of people who rule the country.

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Unfortunately, presently there is no organized monastic life in Armenia. Currently, Holy Etchmiadzin is more of an administrative center rather than a monastery and the monks living within it are preoccupied more with administrative work and the economic prosperity of Holy Etchmiadzin than with the contemplative life.

Levon Petrosyan

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The second problem is related to the Church administration’s highly negative attitude to ideological plurality. If, during the first stage of the formation of the religious market in Armenia in early 90s several religious missionaries had few adherents, in the last decade they started to compete successfully with the Armenian Church.125 The spiritual dynamism, charisma and committed leadership of these communities attract new members. The Armenian Church tries to discredit them as misleading sects and dangerous for public moral health, and tries to prevent the registration of some religious organizations. 126 Holy Etchmiadzin organized persecutions not only against “sects,” but also against religious communities within the Armenian Church trying to control any community or clergyman expressing unusual religious zeal.127 Indeed, the doctrine of Armenian Symphony is incompatible with development of civil society and religious pluralism in Armenia. Demanding exclusive rights on Armenian souls because the Armenian Church is exclusively an Armenian brand is contrary to the healthy development of a modern democratic society. Any religious community should earn the confidence of the people through the quality of its “spiritual product” and not because during its “business history” it provided a service to the state or nation. Instead of collaborating with the state and using its administrative resources in order to favor the sale of the “exclusive product,” the Armenian Church has an imperative to apply new methods to improve the quality of its religious “product,” to get the confidence of its “consumers,” and to work out new approaches in its customer service culture. For example, having very limited financial and economic resources, Catholicoi Vazgen I and Garegin I made fundamental changes to Armenian religious culture. By his spiritual serenity Vazgen inspired faith and hope to the Armenian people as they passed through the difficult period of the end of the Soviet Empire and the war against the Azeris. In his turn, during his short patriarchal rule and by his charismatic preaching, Garegin I opened new spiritual and intellectual doors for the Armenian Church. What is the real investment of the Garegin II in the religious culture of the Armenian Church? This question is still open for Armenian Church history. What is certain is that Catholicos Garegin II is a builder, but not a religious reformer aspiring

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For a complete list of the registered religious organizations in Armenia, see http://www.gov.am/u_files/ file/kron/Tsutsak2-%20herakhos-new. 126 In 2004, by a public declaration, the Superior Spiritual Council appealed to the state administration to not register the Jehovah’s Witnesses organization because its members are “antipodes of the national and state interests and aspirations,” see Etchmiadzin 12 (2004):16. 127 The best example of organized persecution is the case of the Fr. Harutyun community. As a priest of St. Gayane church in Etchmiadzin during the Soviet period, he started to form a religious community. After the independence of Armenia his parish became one of the more dynamic religious communities in the Armenian Church. Under the spiritual guidance of Fr. Harutyun and his wife, devoted young men and women shared prayer and biblical lecture time in his house-community center close to St. Gayane monastery. Many of his pupils entered in Gevorgian and Vazgenian Theological Seminaries and became celibate priests in Holy Etchmiadzin and in St. James monastery in Jerusalem. By the help of some pious sponsors Fr. Harutyun even created a farm to support the needs of his community. Vazgen I and Garegin I did not have any major opposition to their religious activities, but Garegin II started a systematic persecution against Fr. Harutyun. Several reasons can be considered as motivation for that antipathy. First, the devoted faithful of the Fr. Harutyun community were in “spiritual opposition” to the Holy Etchmiadzin, criticizing the lack of spiritual ethics of its hierarchs. Second, the house-community center had a strategic location and could be seen as a perfect construction site to expand the limits of Holy Etchmiadzin. As a result of this persecution, and with the help of several “sisters” of the community, Holy Etchmiadzin was able to discredit Fr. Harutyun and deprive him from public preaching and celebrating the Holy Liturgy. Although the majority of the devoted faithful left his community, Fr. Harutyun continued his spiritual activities.

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to bring new ideas and new approaches to the Armenian Church. During this transition time, Armenia and the Armenian Church need to have religious leaders with long-term perspectives and new vision who are open to new changes and challenges. Levon Petrosyan is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University