In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the

In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual Author(s): Elizabeth M. Zechenter Source: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 53, No. 3, Universal Human Rights versus Cultural Relativity (Autumn, 1997), pp. 319-347 Published by: University of New Mexico Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3630957 . Accessed: 09/01/2011 11:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=unm. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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IN THE NAME OF CULTURE:CULTURAL RELATIVISMAND THE ABUSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL M. Zechenter Elizabeth at Law,2000OneLoganSquare, Lewis& Bockius,LLP,Counselors Morgan, PA 19103 Philadelphia, The modernsystemof internationalhumanrightstreatiesis basedon the conceptof universalismwhichholdsthat thereis an underlyinghumanunity whichentitlesall to certainbasicminimal individuals,regardless of theirculturalor regionalantecedents, rights,knownas humanrights.The influenceof culturalrelativism,multiculturalism, and postmodernism is slowlyunderminingtheseideals.Manyagreethatuniversalhuman rightsnormssimplydo not conformwiththeextremediversityof culturaland religious practicesfound aroundthe worldand thatuniversalrightsshouldbe modifiedto conformwithlocalculturaland religiousnorms.Othersquestionthe theoretical validity and intellectualcoherence of universalism.This is an importantdebate,the outcomeof whichwill havepracticalconsequences for millionsof peoplearoundthe world.This articleexaminesthe conceptsof culturalrelativismand universalism,theirtheoretical as coherence, strength,theirsocialand ethicalusefulness,and theirintellectual especially abusesperpetrated theyinfluenceinternational responsestogender-based againstwomen and otherdisenfranchised individualsliving in non-Western societies. I am humanand nothinghumanis aliento me. Terence,163 B.C. humanis alien to me. My owngroupaside,everything

RenatoRosaldo,1984

THESECOND WORLD the protection of human rights of individualswas UNTIL WAR,

seen as a sovereignprerogativeof the state andthereforeas a domesticrather than an internationalconcern.The atrocitiesof the SecondWorldWarprovided the impetusto changethat statusquo. In the discussionthat ensued, most scholarsandpoliticiansagreedthat individualsare far too vulnerableif left at the mercy of domesticlegal systems and that individualsneed more protectionagainstabuses sufferedat the handof the state. This agreement was most fullyexpressedin the creationof the UnitedNationsandthe enactment of the complexinternationalregime of universalhumanrights. This new internationallegal regime was groundedas much in the empiricalevidence of widespreadabuses as in the followingethicalandphilosophicalbeliefs: (1) no state can be entrustedwith an absolutepowerover its own citizens because of the tendency of states to abuse absolute power; (2) an international regimeof humanrightsprotectionis neededto protectindividuals againststates and other supralevelorganizations;(3) all individualsare entitled,by virtue of their commonhumanity,to a basic modicumof human dignity; (4) certain human rights are universal, fundamental,and inalienable, and thus they cannot and should not be overridden by cultural and religious (Journal of AnthropologicalResearch, vol. 53, 1997) 319

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traditions;and(5) the accidentof birthintoa particularsocialgroupor culture is not an ethicallyrelevant circumstanceand thus has no bearingon that individual'sintrinsichumanworthandher or his entitlementto be treatedas a humanbeing (Buergenthal1988; Donnelly1989). The modernsystem of international humanrightstreaties-which havebeen ratifiedby all nationsreflects these universalistnotions.For example,the Charterof the United Nations reaffirmsa "faithin fundamentalhumanrights, in the dignityand worthof the humanperson,in the equalrightsof men andwomen"(United NationsCharter,Preamble,1945)and states that the goal of the UnitedNations is to promoteuniversalrespectfor andobservanceof humanrightsand fundamentalfreedomsfor all withoutdistinctionsof race, sex, language,or religion(UnitedNationsCharter,Articles1(3)and55). BothUN Covenantsthe InternationalCovenanton Economic,Socialand CulturalRightsandthe InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights-state that "equaland inalienablerights of all membersof the humanfamily[are]the foundationof freedom,justiceandpeacein the world"andproclaimthathumanrightshave theiroriginin the "inherentdignityof the humanperson"(CPCovenant,Preamble,1976;ESC Covenant,Preamble,1976). Universalism,thus, is at the root of modernhumanrights law.Simplyput, universalismholdsthatthere is an underlyinghumanunitywhichentitles all individuals,regardlessof theirculturalor regionalantecedents,to certainbauniversalistshave sic minimalrights, knownas humanrights. Traditionally, basedtheir supportfor universalhumanrightson three majorjurisprudential theories-the naturallaw theory,the theoryof rationalism,andthe theoryof positivism(Dworkin1978). More recently, other theories such as, for example,the humancapabilitiestheory have been proposedto providephilosophicalfoundationsfor the universalityof humanrights (Nussbaum1993; Sen 1993;Rawls1971). Naturallaw has its roots in the ancientStoic philosophybut was morefully developedby ThomasAquinas.The naturallaw theoryemphasizesethicaldihavecertaininalienable mensionsof the law.It assertsthatindividuals rightsof the highestordergrantedto all individuals by Godor Providenceandthathuman-madelaws are just only insofaras they do not conflictwith the eternal naturallaws governingthe universe(Weinreb1987).The naturallaw philosophyis well illustratedin Antigone,a classicalGreektragedyby Sophocles.When Antigonewas preventedby the localpolislawfromburyingherbrother,she did so anyway,claimingthat her actionswere in accordancewith a higher,albeit unwritten,law andthat this unwrittennaturallaw supersededthe man-made it is difficultto justifyuniversalhumanrightsbasedon polislaw.Unfortunately, culturalandreligiousdiversity, the naturallawtheoryin a worldwitha profound withlittle,if any,agreementamongmajorculturesandreligionsaboutthe very existence of a higher order law and its mandates, and in a world plagued by doubts about the existence of any universal moral or ethical norms. Rationalism, a closely related concept, is a theory of universal laws based on a belief in the universal human capacity to reason and think rationally

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(Donnelly1989). Rationalismreplacesthe divineoriginsof universalhuman rightsfoundin the naturallawtheorywith the ideathathumanrightsare held by each humanbeing,in an individualcapacity,due to the universalcapacity of all humansto thinkrationally.Both rationalismandnaturallaw theoryare often combinedin the modem humanrights discourseand take the formof claimsthat universalhumanrights exist independentof culture,ideology,or value systems. In this view, universalhumanrightsare a class of rightseach individualpossesses by virtue of being a human.They are the rights of final resort, typicallyinvokedwhen all else has been tried andhas failed,andare therefore moral and ethical rights of the highest order. They are also extracultural andare meantto challengeandchangethe existingnorms,practices, andinstitutionsandto subvertoppressivecustoms(Donnelly1989,1990). Bothrationalismandnaturallaw idealsare expressedin the AmericanDeclarationof Independence,whichproclaims:"[w]e hold these truthsto be selfevident,that all men are createdequal,that they are endowedby their Creator with certainunalienableRights,amongthese are Life, Libertyand the Pursuitof Happiness"(Declarationof Independence,para.1 U.S. 1776).Various schools of thought, includingculturalrelativism, deconstructionism, interpretivism,andpostmodernism,disputethe validityof the rationalistapproachby arguingthat rationalismis merely a reflectionof Westernculture andit thereforefailsto reflectthe diversityof humanexperience. Positivism,on the other hand,justifies the existence of universalhuman rights by noting the worldwideacceptanceand ratificationof humanrights instruments.Accordingto positivists,universalhumanrightsnormshavebeen createdby andare embodiedin the international treatiesandcustomaryinternationallaw (Higgins1994).Positivistsobservethat culturaldifferencesnotwithstanding,all Westernand non-Westernnationshave signed and ratified the vast majorityof humanrights treaties and agreements,a fact which attests to the worldwideacceptanceof the humanrightsprinciplesset forthin these treatiesandagreements.This uniformworldwideacceptanceprovides, therefore,a legitimatebasisforadherenceto suchuniversalhumanrightsand other standardsunderlyingthese treaties and agreements.Positivists also observe that the source of humanrights lies not in individualculturesbut ratherin internationallaw which gave rise to the idea of universalrights. Consequently,positivists claimthat humanrights cannotbe withdrawnby any domesticlegal system andmust take priorityover the conflictingnorms of differentdomestic systems. Althoughpositivismprovidesa sound legal justificationfor universalityof humanrights,it does so primarilyfor individuals living in modernnation-states.Unfortunately,positivismfails to justify universalrights for indigenouspeoples, many of whom were forcefullyannexed into modernstates andmanyof whomdenythatmodernstates have a moral or legal authority to represent them in the internationalarena. The capabilities theory and related approaches look at the quality of life of various groups and individualsand ask whether individualsin a given culture live as decent a life as they are capable of living (Sen 1993). This approach

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focuses on the questionof what it means to be human.It evaluatesvarious subgroupswithinthe society andcomparesthem againsteach other in order to detect structuralinequalities.The capabilitiestheoristslook for commonalitiesamongcultures,religions,andphilosophicaltraditions,as well as commonalitiesamongmen and women, and use those commonalitiesto argue that all individualsmust have at least some minimumrights necessary for humanfunctioning(Nussbaum1993).Althoughthe capabilitiestheoryrepresents a very thoughtfulattemptat justifyinguniversalhumanrights, its primaryweaknesslies in its failureto adequatelyaccountforthe factthatcertain significantdifferencesamongculturesjust cannotbe reconciledby lookingfor commonalitiesor pointsof agreementsamongthese cultures. foundationsfor the uniSince most attemptsto providesolidphilosophical versality of humanrights have not been entirely successful, the universal foundationsof internationalhumanrights are subjectto numerousempirical andtheoreticalattacks,primarilyfromthe variousproponentsof culturalrelativism. Until recently,the internationallegal communityhas uniformlysubscribedto the view that humanrightsshouldbe universalandthatthe internationalhumanrights regime createdby the UnitedNations,as well as by otherregionalhumanrights systems, shouldbe enforcedevenhandedly,irrespectiveof differencesin culturalcustomsandreligions.If humanrightswere to have differentmeaningto Westernandnon-Westerncountries,the whole system of humanrights law wouldbe renderedmeaningless.Consequently, the internationalcommunityhas shown reluctanceto defer to "culture"in cases of conflictbetween internationalhumanrights and culturalvalues. In fact, internationalhumanrights law mandatesthat the states must combat culture-basedviolence,especiallyif such violenceis beingdisguisedas a religiousor a culturalpractice(UnitedNationsHumanRightsCommission1989). law embodies,therefore,a collectiveaffirmation The currentinternational by the worldcommunityof the fundamental unityof the humanrace. Althoughthe universalityof humanrightsis still widelyacceptedby many nations, the influence of cultural relativism and multiculturalist and the entire system of international postmodernistideas is slowlyundermining humanrightstreaties(Sullivan1994).This growingdebateaboutthe validity of the universalistassumptionsunderlyingthe humanrights regime is, to some degree, inevitablein a worldwith ever-increasinginterconnectedness Humanrightsinstitutionsareincreasinglyexposedto a growandglobalization. ing varietyof norms,values, and beliefs, and to competingclaims of legitimacyfromvariousculturesandsubcultures.To humanrightsrelativists,universal humanrightsnormsare impossibleto defendin such a richlydiverse worldand are no more than a "Westernconceptwith limitedapplicability" (PollisandSchwab1979:1).Armedwithrelativistarguments,numerousgroups have mountedformidablechallengesto the ideal of universalhumanrights, including such constituencies as (1) Asian and Islamic governments which, despite their ratificationof all major internationalhuman rights instruments, outrightly reject human rights universalism, particularlyas it pertains to hu-

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manrights of women livingin theirjurisdictions;(2) numerousThirdWorld scrutinyofthe domestictreatregimeswhichwishto avoidintenseinternational ment of their citizens;(3) representativesof the newly organizedindigenous groupswho cravelegitimacyforthemselvesandtheircultures;(4) manysocial scientistsandphilosophersengagedin a searchfor soundertheoreticaljustificationof humanrightsuniversalismandits principles;(5) personswho value andwho view humanrightsas an extensionof the Western human"diversity" of sphere influence;and(6) those who fearthathumanrightsuniversalismeninterferencewithothercultures.Mostof the above-mencouragesuncalled-for of universalhuman tionedgroupsor individualsarguethat the promulgation rightslaws simplydoes not conformwiththe extremediversityof culturaland religiouspracticesfoundaroundthe worldandthat universalrightsshouldbe subsidiaryto localculturalandreligiousnorms.Othersquestionthe theoretical validityandintellectualcoherenceof varioustheoriesunderlyinginternational humanrightslaw. Clearly,this is an importantdebate,the outcomeof which will havepracticalconsequencesfor millionsof peoplearoundthe world. of culturalrelativismto the internaThis articleexaminesthe applicability tionalhumanrightsregime,especiallyas it shapesthe international responses to gender-basedabusesperpetratedagainstwomenandotherdisenfranchised individualslivingin non-Westernsocieties.The firstpartbrieflyoutlinesvariof culturalrelativism.The secondpartfocuseson majortheoous formulations reticalandpracticalweaknessesof culturalrelativismas appliedto the human rights arena.It argues that the culture-relativistcritiqueof the modernhumanrightslawis largelyinvalidandhas corruptingeffectson the humanrights regime,andit concludesthathumanrightsuniversalism,despiteall its flaws, is still the better approach. CULTURALRELATIVISMAS A SOCIALSCIENCETHEORY Variantsof CulturalRelativism in the secondpartof the twentiethcenCultural relativismgainedprominence and turyandis consideredby manyto be a hallmarkof modernanthropological relativismis a theory socialscientificthought(Bidney1968).Statedbriefly,cultural whichassertsthatthereis no absolutetruth,be it ethical,moral,or cultural,and thatthereis no meaningful wayto judgedifferentculturesbecausealljudgments are ethnocentric(Gellner1985).In practice,it is rathermeaninglessto speakof thetheoryof culturalrelativismtoday,sincethereareseveraldifferentvariantsof relativism(alsoknownas weakrelativism; the theory,rangingfromdescriptive thatculturesvary),throughnormative observation to commonsense a amounting areculture-bound, relativism (orstrongrelativism; positingthatsinceallstandards moralor ethicalstandards), therecanbe no transcultural upto the mostextreme exrelativism formof relativism,knownas epistemological relativism), (orextreme emplifiedby Geertz and his followers (claimingthat humans are shaped exclusively by their cultureand thereforethere exist no unifyingcross-culturalhuman characteristics)(Jarvie1983; Spiro 1984, 1986).

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The early form of culturalrelativismwas a reactionto the ethnocentric science whichglorifiedWesternsocieties assumptionsof nineteenth-century and diminishedthe achievementsof non-Westerncultures.Nineteenth-century scientistssaw humanevolutionas a processof progressivechangefrom theprimitiveto the advanced(Spencer1904).Althoughthey understood,more or less correctly,the basicschemeof socioeconomicevolutionof humansocieties (whichis, in fact,characterizedby the gradualchangefromforagingto adoptionof agricultureandthe emergenceof chiefdomsandstates), they erroneouslyincorporatedextraneousvalue judgmentsinto that scheme. Descriptiverelativistsbecame skepticalof broadgeneralizationsabouthuman beingsandchallengedthe notionof the naturalsuperiorityof Westerncivilization(Boas 1894, 1901;Benedict1934;Mead1928, 1963).Insteadthey emphasizedthe seemingly endless humandiversityand were able to demonstratethat even culturesplacedat the bottomof the evolutionaryscale were advancedandsophisticatedat least in some aspectsof theirculturaldevelopment. In fact,descriptiverelativistsfocusedso muchon exposingseemingly vast culturaldifferences,they tendedto disregarddatashowinga significant degree of patternedsimilaritiesamonghumancultures(Edgerton1992). Normativerelativistswere convincedthat in additionto being highlyvariable,culturesinculcatedtheir memberswith moralandethicalrules through involuntarysocializationand enculturationand that few, if any, individuals were consciouslyawareof the arbitrary characterofbeliefsthatwere ingrained into them (Herskovits1958, 1973; Fernandez1990). Consequently,normative relativistsfelt that there couldbe no extraculturalstandardsby which other culturescanbe judged,thus forcingrelativiststo acceptandtolerateall practicesengagedby others. Benedictobserved,for example,that morality "differsin every society,andis a convenienttermof sociallyapprovedrights"; consequentlyshe viewedallculturesas "equallyvalidpatternsoflife"(Benedict 1934:278). This formulationof relativismhas been characterized by some scholarsas "intellectuallyirresponsible."Kluckhohn,for example,observedthat ethical relativismis flawedbecause"ifone followsout literallyor logicallythe implications of Benedict'swords,one is compelledto acceptany culturalpatternas vindicatedpreciselyby its culturalstatus:slavery,cannibalism, Nazism,or Communismmaynotbe congenialto Christiansor to contemporary Westernsocieties, but moralcriticismof the culturalpatternsof otherpeopleis precluded" (Kluckhohn 1955:266).Despitethe criticism,relativistsarguethatas a practical matterrelativismmustbe coupledwithabsolutetoleranceof otherculturesor it wouldlose its teeth. Consequently,they believe that any attemptto make cross-culturaljudgmentsor to create universalstandardsrendersrelativism ineffectiveor trivial(Hatch1973, 1983). Furthermore,manyanthropologists preferto avoidjudgmentsaltogetherbecausethey fearthat criticismof other cultures and practices could become a theoretical and politicalminefieldfor the discipline (Downing and Kushner 1988). Some believe that anthropologymust be objective and ethically neutral in order to be scientific and conclude that true

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withanyformof evaluation(Steward1948;Hastrup scholarshipis incompatible andElsass 1990).Othersfeel thatcriticismof any culturalpractice,no matter how inhumane,wouldjeopardizetheirfieldworkandacademiccareers(Downing 1988).To be sure, anthropologists doingfieldworkare oftenfacedwith an If ethicalconflictwhen they observeculture-sanctioned abusesof individuals. chooseto supportan indigenoussocietyin its struggleagainst anthropologists humanrights abuses propagatedby an oppressivestate or some other large multinationalentity, state officialsmay retaliateagainstthe whistle-blowers anddenypermissionto conductfieldwork.If anthropologists chooseto support a statepolicyaimedat eradicating humanrightsabusesperpetrated byanindigenous society againstits own members,that society may refuse to cooperate with anthropologists, thus makingfieldworkdifficultor impossible.Finally,if anthropologistsdecide to help a dissentingindividualor groupwhichrebels customsof its own culture,lackof cooperation fromthat againstdehumanizing make the fieldwork Given the cost of fieldequallyimpossible. societymay high work and the large empirical,theoretical,and financialinvestmentthat goes havebeen eagerto get involvedin huinto fieldprojects,few anthropologists manrightsissues. Manyanthropologists .willingly,if somewhatunconsciously, embracethe self-servingillusionof neutralityand objectivityto resolve the moraldissonancecausedby observinginjusticeandtake solacein leavingthe balanceof powerunalteredby theirpresencein the societiesthey study.However, as JohnStuartMillobserved,"apersonmaycauseevil to othersnot only to by his actionsbutby his inaction,andin eithercase he is justlyaccountable themforthe injury"(Mill1952[1859]:272). In the 1970s the most radicalversionof culturalrelativism,knownas epistemologicalrelativism,emerged.Epistemologicalrelativistsarguedthat not standardsagainstwhichculturalpractices onlydo there exist no extracultural may be judgedas acceptableor unacceptablebecauseall culturesare mutually incomprehensible-asRosaldoput it, "myown groupaside, everything humanis aliento me" (Rosaldo1984:188)-they also arguedthatthere is no such thing as objectivereality,truth,or reason (Geertz1973, 1984; Clifford relaandMarcus1986;MarcusandFisher1986).Accordingto epistemological andrational tivists, all knowledgeandmoralityare exclusivelyculture-bound, thinkingandthe scientificmethodare no morethana culturallyboundformof Westernethnoscience.In that view, science is not a logicallycoherentsysbutrathera culturallybiasedway of thinktem of verificationandfalsification, from or is no different that magic witchcraft(Geertz1973, 1984).The rise ing of epistemologicalrelativismcoincidedwith the emergence of many new schoolsof thoughtthatrose to prominenceat thattime suchas deconstructionandMarxism,all of whichhaveattackedthe very ideaof ism, postmodernism, or scientific,rational, ethical reasoning.Marxism,for example,emphasizes the inevitability of class consciousness in shaping individuals' viewpoints (Kolakowski 1978). Deconstructionism and postmodernism profess that there is no way of knowing anything beyond one's direct experience and reject the very concept of reality (Jameson 1991). All these schools repudiate the con-

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cept of objectivityand consequentlythe universalityof basic humanrights. To many anthropologistssteeped in those theories, any attemptto define even the mostbasicschemeof universalhumanrightsis meaninglessab initio. As a result of the confluenceof the theoreticalandpragmaticconcernsdescribedabove,manyof which are indeedvalid,anthropologyas a discipline has largelyfailedto examineculture-and group-sanctionedabuses of individualhumanbeings (AmericanAnthropological AssociationExecutiveBoard 1947;Messer,this issue). Moreover,by adoptingculturalrelativism,proclaiming unqualifiedtoleranceof all cultures,andby takinga group-centeredperspective, anthropologyhas left little room for rationaldiscussionaboutthe in non-Westernsocieties. rights of individuals,particularly ReactionsagainstCulturalRelativism Obviously not all anthropologists accept cultural relativism and the and antiscientificparticularismof its variants.Manyreject antiexplanatory relativismin favorof an evolutionaryanalysisby observingthat societies do indeedchangetheir customsby developingmore humanehabitsin conjunction with the growthof their economic,technological,and scientificcapabilities. They emphasizethe commondenominatorsamongcultures,suggesting that it is properto speakof the commonhumanityof peopleas the basis for cross-culturalmoralityandethics that are not completelyculturallyrelative. Redfield(1953,1957)andKroeber(1935,1948,1952),for example,havetried to developan objectiveschemeby whichone couldjudgeothercultures'customs. Kroeber(1948, 1952) suggestedthat there is an observableprogress from nonstratifiedto stratifiedcultures.He saw culturalevolutionas an increase in technologicaltraitsaccompanied by increasedrationalismanda correspondingdeclinein magic,superstition,torture,mutilations,andotherreligiously motivatedbrutalities. In the 1960s, Sahlins(1960) demonstratedthat culturalevolutionis more usefullyviewed as a combinationof two simultaneousprocesses of specific and generalevolution.Specificevolutioninvolvesadaptationto variousecologicalconditions,whereasgeneralevolutionis progressiveinsofaras more complexformsreplacesimplerones. Sahlinsobservedthat specificandgeneral evolutionare not differentrealities,but ratheraspects of the same process. Specificevolutionaccountsfor localvariationsin ecologyandaccidents of history;thus it lendsitselfto the relativistpointof view. Generalevolution, however,is a progressivechangethatallowsus to makecomparisons,to rank variouscultures,andactuallyto demonstrateculturalprogress.Accordingto Sahlins,generalevolutionis characterized by the increasedabilityof cultures to harnessenergy;increasedcomplexityin social organizationsfromsimple foragingbands,throughtribes,chiefdoms,andfinallyto states;andthe greater year-roundadaptabilityto physical environment. There is a wealth of archaeological and ethnographicdata that confirms beyond doubt the basic evolutionary characterof human culture (Flannery 1972; Sanders, Parsons, and Santley 1979; A. Johnson and Earle 1987; Service 1975; Steward 1955). Reflecting a


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majordeparturefromSpencerianevolutionism,modem anthropologyviews evolutionas changecaused by a combinationof mountingpopulationpressure, greaterintercultural contact,andincreasingtechnologicaldevelopment, ratherthansimplyas progress.In fact,evolutionarychangeis costly, andits benefits, such as increasedfood security,increasedprotectionfrompredators, andgrowthin scientificandmedicinalknowledge,are often counterbalanced,althoughnot entirelyoffset, by the costs of evolution,whichinclude increasedlaborcosts, increasedwork time, decliningmarginalproductivity, increasedwarfare,and the decline of individuallibertyfor all, especiallyfor women,thataccompanythe emergenceof socialstratification (Boserup1965; Cohen1977;A. JohnsonandEarle1987). Feministscholarsare also deeplytroubledby the factthat relativism,postviolenceandavoid modernism,or deconstructionism marginalize gender-based the realityof systemic power imbalancesbetween the sexes (Gordon1993; Moore1988).Moreover,theyareconcernedthatlargenumbersof nondominant fromvarioussocietiesare routinelydisregarded andexgroupsandindividuals cludedfromculturalrelativists'analysesas if they meritedno attention. Others,like Gellner(1985),questionthe culturalrelativistassertionabout the inherentincomparability of differentculturesby observingthat although numeroussocial scientists have conductedfieldworkin seeminglyalien cultures, andnumerousindividualshave traveledandlived in alien cultures,no one has ever encountereda culturethatwas so vastlydifferentas to be wholly or uninterpretable to outsiders.Similarly,no languagehas incomprehensible ever been foundthat was not capableof beingunderstood,translated,andacquiredby outsiders.In fact,modernresearchindicatesthat languageacquisition is largelygeneticallycontrolled(Pinker1994).Moreover,the factthatnumerousindividuals havebeen ablesuccessfullyto switchcultures,migrateinto othercultures,or adoptor modifytheirowncustomsandbeliefsbeliesthe idea thathumansareso exclusivelyshapedby theirnativecultureas to be incapable of comprehending or adoptingother culturesor that culturesvary so signifito outsiders.Gellner'sinsightshavebeen cantlyas to be entirelyunintelligible strengthenedby modernresearchin evolutionarypsychology,sociobiology, primatology, psychiatry,moderncognitivesciences,andneurosciences,which showsratherconvincingly thatthereis sucha thingas universalhumannature, lendingcredenceto the universalistbeliefthat there is an underlyinghuman unitywhichallowsus to devise minimumuniversalstandardsapplicableto all humanbeingsregardlessof theirculture(Barkow,Cosmides,andTooby1992; ToobyandCosmides1990;DalyandWilson1983,1988). WHAT IS WRONGWITH RELATIVISMIN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS? Cultural relativism has many flaws. Most formulations of it are contradictory; others are tautological. As a whole, relativism is based on a static conception of culture. It shows a bias toward functionalism and tends to justify

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the dysfunctional beliefs and customs of non-Western cultures while nondominantvoices withinthose societies. It overemphasizes marginalizing the rightsof a groupover the rightsof individuals.It forcesus to abandonany meaningfuldiscussionaboutothercultures.However,the most troublingaspect of culturalrelativismis its applicationto the internationalhumanrights legal regimebecauseof its potentialconsequences.At a minimum,if relativism were to underminethe universalistfoundationsof moderninternational humanrightslaw, all meaningfuldialogueabouthumanrights abuseswould end. Instead,all sorts of culturallysanctionedviolationsof individualswould be legitimized,andindividualswouldbe left unprotectedagainstrulers,governments,and others in power. Before takingup the argumentin favorof humanrightsuniversalism,let us considertwo real-lifecases anduse themas for our analysis. a springboard CaseI: IndianSati In 1987,RoopKanwar,aneighteen-year-old Rajputgirl,wasburnedalive on her husband'sfuneralpyre.She was marriedby her parentsthrough an arrangedmarriageat the age of sixteen andwas a universitystudent whenher husbanddiedof cancer.It is not clearwhethershe committed sati voluntarilyor underpressurefromher in-laws.It is said that she appearedto be heavily druggedon the day of her burning.The case causedquitea stir in India.Women'sgroupsorganizedmarchesin protest of the practice.Manyof the Rajputs,however,bothmenandwomen, defendedthe practiceon the basisof culturalrelativismstatingthatsati is an ancientRajputtradition.They claimedthe rightto commitsati as partof theirethniccultureanderecteda shrinein honorof RoopKanwar, who becamea symbolfor a groupof Rajputextremists.Indianhuman rightsactivistswere brandedby them as Westernimperialistsimposing their views on ancientIndianculture.The Indianfeministmovement was discreditedfor denigratingtheir nationalculture,for its lackof nationalpride,andfor tarnishingthe imageof Indiaabroad.Althoughthe Indiangovernmenthas repeatedlypassed laws prohibitingsati, these laws are difficultto enforcebecause federalprosecutorsare often unable to gather evidence againstthe offendersfrom a communitythat 1994:39-57) protectsthem. (extractedfromCoomaraswamy Considera few hypotheticalquestions: Wouldit matterandshouldit matterwhetherRoopKanwarcommittedsati willingly?Wouldit be justifiableculturalpracticeif she committedsati voluntarily? Wouldit matterif she objectedto her death?Does she have the rightto reject the cultural practices of her culture or her ethnic subgroup, or is she bound, through the accident of her birth, by these practices no matter how unfair they are?

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Wouldsati be justifiableif it were supportedby a majorityof a group?Would ofsati holdthe samelegitimacyif the vastmajorityof sati supportjustifications ers were menwhile100percentof the victimswere women?Is it relevantthat thereneverwas a sati burningin whichthe victimwas a widowedmanandthat most supportersof sati findthe ideaof malesati totallyridiculous? Whatif sati supporterswere politicalopportunistsusing sati as a way to rallypoliticalsupportandto dividethe Indiansocietyalongethnicsubgroups? of sati victims?Does Whatif womenwho supportsati were mothers-in-law it matterthat given the landinheritancesystem in India,a widowedwoman has a legal rightto inherither deceasedhusband'sland?Does it matterthat the in-lawsof a widowedwomanhavea significanteconomicincentiveto dispose of her in orderto retainownershipof the land,whichis theirprimary,if not only, asset? Is an invocationof an ancientcustomsufficientto legitimize the practice? Does the age of a sati victimmatter?Whatif she is fullycontrolledby the familyof her in-laws?Whatif she is a child?Whatif she is an olderwoman who has alreadylived most of her life andis consideredan economicburden on her children?Does it matterwhetherthe womanis pregnantor not?How faralongdoes she haveto be in her pregnancybeforeher deathby sati would be unjustified?And if a pregnantwomanis to be spared,does she become eligiblefor sati afterthe childbirth? Is sati legitimateif the womanconsentsto her ownburning?Canherconsent ever be legitimate?Canher consentever be informed?If she livedher whole life in a smallvillageandknewof no otherrolemodelsforwomen,wouldshe be consideredcapableof renderingan informedandvoluntaryconsent? Is it relevantwhetherthe sati victimis a childbride,throughan arranged marriage,livingsince her earlypubertyin her in-laws'house with no income or decision-makingpower of her own? Is it relevantwhether she has any deathby sati? Does it matterthat if practicaloptionsother than "voluntary" to refuse to she would be ostracized she were die, by the village,her in-laws wouldthrowher out of the house, andshe wouldhave no placeto go? Is it wrongfor Indianfeministsand humanrights activists to invoke the universalhumanrightsidealsin theirfightagainstsati andotherpracticesof tortureor violenceagainstIndianwomen?Are these Indianfeministsbetraying theirnationalheritageby doingso? Are these IndianfeministsandIndian humanrights activistsmindlessvictims of Westernculturalimperialism?Is theirjudgmentof Indianculturalheritageless legitimatethanthatof the supportersof sati? Whatof the long-standing,pluralistic,and rationalistictraditionsof India whichare similarto those espousedby Westernuniversalism(Nussbaumand Sen 1989)?Do these traditions,considerablyolderthanthe adventof sati in Rajasthan, provide the needed cultural legitimacy to the position of Indian feminists and human rights activists? To most rational people familiar with the facts of Roop Kanwar's case, whether they live in India or abroad, no doctrine or philosophical theory, in-

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cludingculturalrelativism,is sufficientto justifyher death.Culturalrelativism, no matterhow nuanced,inevitablyprovidesthe logicaljustificationfor defenseof sati has such inhumanepractices.Ironically,the cultural-relativist of the well-demonstrated the detrimentaleffect disregarding pluralityand diverin sity of Indiantraditions favorof adoptingone viewas representativeof Indianculture,in this case the view of sati supporters.Sucha cultural-relativist constructionof Indiancustomsand traditionsmerely serves those who pick andchoose ancientcustomsat will andthose who resurrectcustomsto serve their own politicalagenda(in this case, Rajputextremists)or their own economicneeds (in this case, RoopKanwar'sin-laws). CaseII:AlgerianHolyWarriors In 1996,two teenageAlgeriangirls were firstrapedandthen murdered in frontof the entire villageby the followersof fundamentalist Islamic leaderSherifKosami,who issued an edict that all women who attend schools, in violationof the traditionof Islam,shall be rapedand murdered.In addition,the motherof the two girlswas slaughteredwhen she attemptedto shieldher daughters.The murderedgirls were fifteenand sixteen years old andattendedhigh schoolin the hope of becomingeither nurses or doctors.Both were religious,bothwore veils, andboth studiedthe Korandaily.Accordingto the girls'father,the girls wanted to practicemedicinein smallvillageswhere there are no women doctors and where village women are deprivedof basic medicalhelp because Islamprohibitswomenfromundressingin frontof male doctors. Sherif Kosami,religious leader of the fundamentalistArmedIslamic Group,does not approveof women's educationbecause, in his view, educationcorruptsMuslimgirls.Kosamihas issuedan edictin whichhe proclaimsthat women attendingschools shouldbe punishedby death. Moreover,Kosamibelieves that the "holywarriors"of Allah,i.e., his followers,have a moraland religiousrightto rape their victims,or as Kosamiputs it, they have a license "forenjoymentof marriage."The newspapersreportthatat least 112 schoolgirlsor womenteacherswere rapedandmurderedin Algeriain the firstfew monthsof 1996.(extracted fromBhatia1996:C11) Again,considera few questionin this case: Does it matterthat both parentsof the slain girls believedthat education was appropriate andnecessaryfortheirMuslimdaughters?Are theirviews as legitimateas those of Kosami?Andif yes, why is it thatmanyculturalrelativists wouldarguethatKosami'sactionsare culturallysanctioned?Correspondingly, why are the less popularviews in a culture not considered to be worthy of protection? What if Kosami and his policies were overwhelmingly supported by Algerian women? What if many Muslim women have so deeply internalized the


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inferiorstatus affordedto them by Muslimclerics that they frequentlyendorsetheirsecond-classstatusas naturalanda partof the God-givenorderof things?How shouldthe internationalcommunitydeal with this situation? Can an individualespouse ideas that are outside the mainstreamof her cultureor embracenovel ideas in orderto changethe nativeculture?If not, how couldany cultureever change?Does the job of decidingwhetheran idea or practiceis typicalof a culture (and, therefore,blessed as legitimateby culturalrelativists)alwaysrest withthe group?Giventhatvariousgroupsand individualswithinAlgeriaholddifferentviews as to whatconstitutesIslamic or Algerianculture,whatare the criteriafordecidingwhichsubgroupactually representsthe true Algerianculture?Whoseviewpointshallthe international communityacceptas legitimateandwhy? Whyshouldn'tthe international communityinsist thatall cultures,no matter what their beliefs, be boundby universalhumanrightsthat prohibittortureandmurder?Is it not, in fact,betterthatinsteadof engaginginjudgments as to whichsubgrouprepresentsthe true culture,we guaranteeinsteadcertain minimumrights,such as the rightto life, to all individualsin every culhumanrightslaw currentlydoes, so thatindividuals ture, as the international candecideforthemselvesto whichsubgroupthey wish to belongandto which beliefs they wish to subscribe? In thinkingaboutthese issues, let us keep the followingfacts in mind.A typicalratioof males to femalesat birthrangesbetween 106:100to 104:100 (Sen 1990).In contrast,Islamiccountrieshavethe lowest ratiosof femalesto males in the world,dippingas low as 48:100 in the UnitedArabEmirates, 60:100 in Qatar,and 84:100 in SaudiArabia(Nussbaum1995:90).Sen has calculatedthat as manyas one hundredmillionwomen worldwideare currently "missing"andthata "greatmanymorethana hundredmillionwomen are simplynot there because women are neglected comparedto men" and thereforeare not given medicalcare or nutritioncomparableto their male counterparts(Sen 1990:66).In manytraditionalcultures,disproportionately fewerfemalechildrensurvivechildhood,andthe survivorsdisproportionately suffer from malnutrition,diseases, and beatings and are routinelyrefused medicalcare and educationresultingin women havinga significantlylower life expectancythanwomenin othercultures.Giventhese facts,whichdemonstratea long history of abysmaltreatmentof women living in traditional societies, anyinvocationof traditionto justifybrutalitiesagainstwomenmust be treatedwitha greatdealof skepticismandbe subjectedto the highestlevel of internationalscrutiny.The cases of RoopKanwarand the Algeriangirls are, in manyways, "easy"because in both situations,the victims lost their lives in the name of "culture."Whataboutcustoms that "merely"restrict womento home,or veil them,or mutilatethem,or preventthemfromobtaining education, or deny them salaried jobs, etc.? Most cultural practices that restrict women are not benign, and many have grave if not outright morbid consequences. Which cultural practices are internationallysanctioned and allowed to exist is therefore a matter of enormous consequence. In the follow-

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ing section, I will try to point out why it is imperativethat we retain and upholdthe universalnatureof humanrights law. Contradictions of CulturalRelativism Logicalscrutinyrevealsthat most applicationsof culturalrelativismto huOn the one hand,relativistssubscribeto manrights are self-contradictory. the propositionthatthere are no universallaws or principles,yet on the other handthey also insist that one must be tolerantof the culturalpracticesof others,thus makingtolerancea defacto universalprinciple.If it is true that there are no universalrules,be they ethicalor moral,then culturalrelativists commitan errorby demandingthat,as a matteror principle,no culturalpractice shouldever be judgedby other culturesor by outsiders.So long as we recognizeat least one universalprinciple,we shouldcarefullyconsiderwhich principlesdeserveto be applieduniversallyandwhichdo not.A goodcase can be madethat other values, such as justice and fundamentalfairness,are far moreworthyof beingpromotedas universalratherthanthe principleof tolerancewheretoleranceis definednotas avoidanceof hastyjudgmentsbutrather as an avoidanceof any extracultural judgmentirrespectiveof circumstances. Culturalrelativiststend to employthe conceptof cultureas a ready-made, all-purposeexplanationof humanbehavior.Whydidthe practiceof sati evolve amongstRajputs?Whydidthe Rajputsabandonthe practiceof sati at a certain pointin time?Whyare some peopletryingto resurrectit? Culturalrelativism offersno meaningfulexplanationsto any of the abovequestionsandprevents us froma rationaldiscussionof any opportunisticuses andmisuses of tradition. Appealsto selectively chosen ancientcustoms or religions shouldbe moreproperlyanalyzedas attemptsto legitimizethe politicalorreligiousagendas of variousfactionswithina society.Correspondingly, it is questionableto assume that the views of the individualsopposingtraditionalpracticesare somehowinauthenticor not reflectiveof their culture.These individualsare no less membersof their society thanvariousfundamentalists who claimto "the tradition." The father of the slain girls voiced that concern uphold poignantlywhen he told the reporters,"mydaughtersdied as martyrs.... These madmenwho took the lives of my wife anddaughtersare the enemies of Islam"(Bhatia1996:C11). StaticConception of Culture Culturalrelativismis basedon a staticconceptionof culture.By emphasizing stabilityandculturalcontinuityof customsor traditions,relativismdisregards or minimizesthe importanceof social change.In fact, it ignores the inevitabilityof change in every society and dismisses the thornyfact that some traditionspersistwhile othersare selectivelydiscontinued.All formsof cultural relativism fundamentallyfail to recognize culture as an ongoing historic and institutional process where the existence of a given custom does not mean that the custom is either adaptive, optimal, or consented to by a majority of its adherents. Culture is far more effectively characterized as an ongo-

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ing adaptationto a changingenvironmentratherthanas a staticsupraorganic entity. In a changingenvironment,culturalpracticesroutinelyoutlive their usefulness,andculturalvalueschangeeitherthroughinternaldialoguewithin the culturalgroupor throughcross-culturalinfluences.Any contactbetween culturesis likely to cause at least some modificationin the customs of the of these customs.It contactingculturesor at least to inducea reinterpretation of customsthat is this constantreinterpretation, reinvention,andmodification allowsculturesto surviveandbe viableover time. Culturecan also be viewed as an uneasycompromisebetween conflicting needs andwants of variousgroupsandclasses withinthe society,where the dominantgrouptends to maintainperceptionsandinterpretationsof cultural values andnormsthat are supportiveof its own interests,proclaimingthem to be the onlyvalidview of thatculture.For example,ethnographic examples indicatethatmen,whoas a groupdominatethe powerstructureof most stratified societies, have discardedancientcustomsthat are inconvenientto them but have selectivelyretainedthose customsthattend to subordinateanddisadvantagewomen(Butegwa1993).Althoughviolenceagainstwomenhasbeen documentedin practicallyall types of societies, the distributionof such violence andgender-baseddominancevaries significantly.For example,women living in foraginggroups enjoy a high degree of freedomand equality(Lee 1979, 1984;Lee andDeVore1968;Leacock1978;Kaplan,Hill, and Hurtado 1990). Similarly,women living in simple horticulturalmatriarchalsocieties in their cultureand are far better prohave a higherdegree of participation tected againstgroup-basedviolencethanwomenlivingin patriarchal groups (0. Johnson1978). In contrast,women borninto stratifiedsocieties endure high levels of physicalviolence,rape, spousalabuse,unequalaccess to diet, restrictionson movement,andfemaleinfanticide(Edgerton1992).The division of laboris also not equitablein most societies (A. Johnsonand Earle 1987).Time allocationstudiesrevealthatwomenworktypicallylongerhours societthanmen andthatthis differenceis most pronouncedin nonegalitarian ies (A.Johnson1975,1987).Inmoststratifiedsocieties,womenserve as beasts of burden,carryloadsof waterandfirewood,engagein dailysubsistenceand child-caringactivities,andeven have been documentedto engagein hunting, warfare,anddivingfor food.Furthermore,nutritionalstudies show that even if some societies can ensure an adequatediet for all their members,they selectivelyfail to do so in the case of women andfemalechildren,depriving even pregnantor lactatingwomen(P.Johnson1981).Suchfailureis maladaptive and has detrimentaleffects on the longevityand qualityof life of such societies(Edgerton1992).Atthe sametime,in moststratifiedsocietieswomen are excludedfrompublicaffairs,and men dominatethe social,religious,and 1985; politicalagendas(Edgerton1992;Sahlins1968, 1972;Boulware-Miller Dwyer 1991). In many regions, the low status of women was further reduced at the time of colonization with the imposition of new political, social, and cultural orders (Etienne and Leacock 1980; Leacock 1978). In recent years, this process of marginalizationof women was again reinforced by well-mean-

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institutions,such as, for exing economicprogramsinstitutedby multilateral ample,the structuraladjustment programsinstitutedby the WorldBankor the lendingpracticesof the International MonetaryFund(JointConsultative Group on Policy 1991). By emphasizingstability,culturalrelativismdisregardsand minimizesthe systemicaspectsofwomen'ssubordination, muchofwhichseems to be correlatedwiththe socioeconomic level of developmentof a givensociety, ratherthanbeingsome immutablecharacteristic of humanlife. It is alsosignificantthatwomenfrommanystratifiedsocietiesseek to change the restrictiveandoutdatedsocialcustomsin orderto survive.For example, manyAlgeriansdeploreKosamiandhis extremistviews. Newspapersreport that more than a hundredthousandAlgerianwomen demonstratedin 1996 who wantto resort to the most reagainstvariousreligiousfundamentalists strictiveof traditional Muslimcustomsin orderto gaineven greatercontrolof women.As one Algerianwomanputit, "Womenhere arethe leadersof change in society. ... Algerianwomenhavea longtraditionof fightingso thatfundamentalistsconsiderthem enemy"(Bhatia1996:C11).Such actionsare often describedby theiropponentsas foreign-motivated implants.A more accurate view wouldbe to recognizethat Muslimwomenare engagedin a socioeconomic and politicalstrugglewith religiousfundamentalists, who manipulate religiousandculturalideologyto theirownadvantageandwhodisregardother, more liberalstrandsof Muslimideology.Discreditingof indigenousaspirations for socialchangeas nothingmorethanWesterncontamination or as an aberrantforeignimport,merelybecausethese aspirationsruncounterto some entrenchedculturalpracticesof the majorityin power,seems to show singularlybadjudgment. Insteadof using cultureas the so-calledexplanationandjustificationfor all behaviors,it is farmorefruitfulto analyze(1) whoseinterestsarebeingserved customsandwhose are infringedby them, (2) why some by the "traditional" customsareabandoned whileothersaremaintained orresurrectedandbywhom, who in benefits from cultural versus whogainsfrommain(3) practices change the status who is the direction andthe internaldytaining quo,(4) influencing namicsof culturalchangeandwhethersuchculturalchangesmightleadto genuine equalityand improvementof life to currentlymarginalizedsubgroupsor individuals or to a furtherdisenfranchisement of the voiceless,and(5) whatis the best way in whichthe universalidealsof humanrightscouldbe used to effectchangein the natureanddynamicsof nativepowerrelationsin orderto that the culproducemore equitableresults. It wouldseem only appropriate turalrelativistswhoderidehumanrightsuniversalism as superficial shouldbear the burdenof enumerating some sortof criteriaby whichthe international comwithina givencultureshouldbe munitymayjudgewhichgroupsor individuals classifiedas legitimaterepresentativesof thatculture.Withoutsuchcriteria,it is impossible to decide what is and what is not part of a given culture and why. The modern internationalhuman rights regime, in contrast to the relativistic proposals, represents a thoughtfulattempt to balance competing claims for the legitimacy of various groups and societies, while protecting those most at risk.

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Functionalism Manyrelativistsprovidetacit or even explicitjustificationsof cannibalism, infanticide,genitalmutilation,torture,violence,brutalityagainstwomenand children,tortureof animals,andotherpracticesthatare repugnantof the ideals of international humanrights (Benedict1934;Edgerton1992).Harris,the leadingproponentof culturalmaterialism,has long arguedthat virtuallyall culturalpracticesare adaptive,even if the peoplewho engagein them haveno of these customs andpractices(Harris1971, 1977, consciousunderstanding data 1985). Anthropological show, however, that many societies engage in customsandpracticesthat are either inefficientor inhumaneor are actually maladaptivein that they endangerhumanhealth, happiness,biological,and even culturalsurvival(Edgerton1992).In fact,persistenceof a given custom does not meanthatit is adaptive,optimal,or consentedto by a majorityof its andFeldman1981;BoydandRicherson1985).Boyd adherents(Cavalli-Sforza and Richerson(1985)have shownthat maladaptivepracticescan spreadin a populationdue to indirectbias even undernaturalselectionandin the presence of better-adapted variants.Consequently,beliefs andpracticesthat are harmful,inefficient,or neutralfromthe evolutionarypointof view cananddo persist over long periodsof time. Relativistsandfunctionalistspresumethat culturesshouldnot be tinkered with,lest they shouldbe irreparably damagedor destroyed.Theyareconcerned thatchange,whethereffectedby internalor externalfactors-such as the universalhumanrightslaws-could leadto destructionof cultures,forif a partof a cultureis modifiedor takenaway,then the wholeculturemightcollapse.Consequently,functionalistsfocus on justificationsof traditionalcustoms,forgetting that cultureshave been continuouslychangingandremakingthemselves throughoutthe historyof humanevolution.It is highlyunlikely,for example, that the millennia-old Indianculturewill suddenlydisappearor be damagedif we were to eliminatebrutalpracticessuchas the burningof widowsandif we were to insiston the protectionof the rightto life of womenlike RoopKanwar. In fact, Indiahas demonstrated,ratherconclusively,that fundamental beliefs canbe changedin a relativelyrapidmannerwithouta corresponding collapseof society.Forexample,Indiahas madeenormousstridesin mitigatingthe importanceof the caste system, a system of beliefsthat appearsto be farmore ingrainedin the Indianpsychethanthe customof sati ever was. In practice,culturalchangeis inevitableif culturesare to surviveandthrivein the changing world.Blindadherenceto oldcustomsthathavelongoutlivedtheirusefulness In addition,not all culturalpracticesare of is nothingbut counterproductive. equalimportancein the overallcultureof the group,andsome canbe modified moreeasilythanothers.It is erroneousto assumethata reductionin culturally sanctifiedviolence,suchas sati,wouldsomehowundermineIndianculture.And beholdento culturalrelativism,justifythe culyet numerousanthropologists, tural and religious beliefs of other societies, even if those justificationsare farfetched and franklyquite unconvincing,rather than examine their rational,ethical, and adaptive qualities (Edgerton 1992).

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abouttheExistenceof TraditionalCulture TheMisconception Culturalrelativismadmonishesus to respecttraditionalculturesbut tends to gloss over the fact that even in the most egalitarianand nonstratifiedof societies, there is no such thing as one culture.Instead,all culturesalways have consistedof groupsand individualswith conflictingagendas,and their customshave reflectedthe interestsof the dominantclasses. It is exceedinglyhardto determinehowone shouldgo aboutdecidingwhich customsare representativeof a given culture.Shallwe, for example,assume that if 100 percentof the individualswithinthe culturepracticea given custom,then suchcustomis legitimate?Orcanwe just accepta simplemajority's view as to whattheirtypicalculturalbeliefsandpracticesare?Andwhatif this majoritybenefitsfromthe given practiceat the expense of the minority?Is such a practicestill legitimateandrepresentativeof that culture?Judgments as to whatare the boundariesof a given cultureandwhatare its representative customsandtraditionsare inevitableandcannotbe avoidedjust by embracingculturalrelativism,althoughsuch an avoidanceof judgmentappears to be one of manyreasonsthatculturalrelativismremainsso attractive.Given the long-standinghistoryof Westernimperialism,manyscholarsand politiciansare appropriately hesitantto judgeforeigncultures,lest they standaccusedof ethnocentrismandlackof sensibilityto others.Consideringthe enormousdifficultyinvolvedin makinganyjudgments,especiallywise andbalanced judgments,it is easy to understandthe reluctanceto makethem.Althoughno one can deny that even the best judgmentsand soundreasoningcan be and havebeen used in an ethnocentricmanner,makingjudgmentsis not synonymous with ethnocentrismper se. Culturalrelativistsare correctin pointing out thatby endorsingor rejectinga foreigncustom,one risks an impositionof one's own culturalprejudiceson others.They are also correctin emphasizing thatupbringingandeducationbringwith them inherentbiases.But the belief that judgmentsof other culturesmust be avoidedaltogether,because they may be ethnocentric,is illusory.One simplycannotavoidmakingjudgments when facedwith oppressionand brutalitymasqueradingunderthe guise of culturaltradition.Such a nonjudgmental toleranceof brutalityis actuallyan ultimateformof ethnocentrism,if not an outrightethicalsurrender.The fates of RoopKanwarandthe Algeriangirlscallformoralandethicaldecisionmaking. By withholdingjudgmentin either situation,we are perpetratingfundamental injusticesagainstthose who lack the voice and abilityto speak for themselves.Culturalrelativism,despiteits pretensesto the contrary,involves makingjudgmentsand,in the process,ends up condoningabusesperpetrated againstthe voiceless and disenfranchised. Emphasison theGroupat theExpenseof theIndividualand the Misunderstanding of Self-Determination Unlike anthropologists,who often tend to emphasizethe importanceof groups,most universaliststake the positionthat the locus of humanrightsis most properlysituatedin an individual.Universalistsrecognizean individual


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as the unitof culturalevolutionandselection.They also recognizethatrights of groupsare best protectedby attendingfirst to individualrights. For example,the best wayto protectthe rightsof anyculturalgroupto practicetheir customsandreligionis to guaranteefreedomof religionandexpressionto all theirmembers.Thatway,anybodywishingto practicemaydo so, whilethose wishingto abstain,forwhateverreason,havetheirrightsprotectedas well. In contrast,if one were to grantsuch a rightto the group,the individualswho disagreewith the views of the majoritywouldhave no recourse.Historyhas shown over and over that groupsand culturesshow a proclivitytowardthe exploitationof individualsor entire classes of individuals,such as womenor children,andthatwithoutthe properlegalconstraints,groupswill abusetheir powersin a mannerthatguts the very ideaof humanrights. In contrast,proponentsof culturalrelativismadopta group-centeredview of the worldanddisregardthe fact that manysocieties place severalrestrictions on manyof theirmembersandespeciallytheirwomen.Manyproposals callingfor the establishmentof grouprightsare based on researchthat does not adequatelyreflectsuchintracultural diversity.Whatmaybe advantageous for the group,or for religiousor politicalelites withinthatgroup,mayor may not be in the interests of individualsbelongingto that groupor even in the interests of the entiregroup.Fartoo manyethnographiesprovidelittle or no information aboutintracultural diversityandtreatwomenandotherdisadvanas taged groups essentiallymarginalandirrelevantby failingto reflecttheir opinions,beliefs, and the degree of their acquiescenceto the dominantculturalpractices(Geertz1968). freedomtendsto varywiththe degreeof socioecoThe degreeof individual of a culture nomicorganization (A.JohnsonandEarle1987).Individuals livingin communitarian societieshavea relativelyhighdegreeof indepennonstratified in these societiesmay dencefromthe group.Althoughthe rightsof individuals the informal be contingenton gender,age, or kinshipstatusof the individual, to negotiatea reasonabledegree structureof these societiesallowsindividuals of independenceandthus to escapemost of the group-sanctioned abuses(Lee 1979, 1984; Lee and DeVore 1968; Flanagan1989). The more complexand more stratifiedthe society,the morepronouncedare differencesbetweenthe interestsof the groupandthe individuals(A.JohnsonandEarle1987).For example,the morestratifiedthe society,the less freedomis affordedto women. Manystratifiedsocietiespracticehypergyny,i.e., the familiestryto ensurethat their daughtersmarryup into familieswith a higherstandingthantheir own (Edgerton1992). To make their daughtersmarketable,familieswatchthem vigilantlyto ensuretheirvirginity,throughphysicalseclusionof girls,whether by veilingor purdah,throughthe practiceof footbinding,femalegenitalmutilation,andotherphysicalconstraintsthataredesignedto decreasewomen'serotic desiresandinsuretheirfidelityto a futurehusband(Kerr1993;Mathieu1989, 1990; Patel 1986). Such gender-based exploitationserves the purpose of fami-

lies, but it does so at a heavycost to girls andwomen,who lose theirfreedom and whose qualityof life is diminished drastically.

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Yet most relativistssubscribeto the view that all groupsof peoplehave a rightto createtheir own formof governmentandculture,no matterhow repressive or reprehensibleit maybe either to outsidersor to the minorityof individualsliving within that culture.Accordingto this interpretation,selfdeterminationmeans somethingquite differentfromthe legal definitionof self-determination (whichbasicallystates thatno state mayimposea cultural or politicalsystem on peoplelivingbeyondits borders)(Higgins1994).Furof self-determination leadsto the conclusionthat thermore,this interpretation individualsliving in oppressiveand inhumaneregimes shouldbe left at the mercy of these regimes and cultures.In this vein, manyrelativistshave argued that even the most brutalcustoms which are groundedin culturalor religiousprescriptionsshouldbe exempt fromthe prohibitionof tortureor otherhumanrightsstandards.But historyshows that ethicalandmoralstandardscanbe andhavebeen raisedthroughoutthe worlddue to the adoptionof a universalapproachto humanrights.Abolitionof slaveryis one exampleof suchglobalelevationof humandignity(Donnelly1989).Althoughslaverywas acceptedby virtuallyall traditionalreligionsandnumerouscultures,it is now generallyagreedthat slaveryis not compatiblewith the inherentdignityof the humanbeing, regardlessof religiousand other culturaljustificationsof the practice.Therefore,it is not unreasonable to arguethatin orderto ensure basic dignityfor all individuals,cultural-relativistic claimsshouldat least be subjectto the minimumstandardsof universalhumanrightslaw. TheAbdicationof EthicalResponsibility; Self-ServingUsesof Cultural Relativism;Unsustainability The self-imposedstraitjacketof absoluterespect for all forms of cultural behaviorprecludesrelativistsfrommakingcross-cultural judgmentsandfrom in engaging meaningfulcomparisons.Manygovernments,especiallythose of the ThirdWorldcountries,haverealizedthe politicalusefulnessof relativism andhave erected uponit the positionthat governmentsare free to suppress andsuspendthe humanrightsof their citizensin the nameof culturalsovereignty. In recent years, several ThirdWorldcountrieshave challengedthe very principleof the universalityof internationallaw (Cook 1990; Hannum 1990).The problemwith theirchallengeis thatthey are mostly,if not exclusively, self-serving.Those who defendculturallysanctionedviolenceagainst women do so, not in orderto upholdabstractancientculturalprinciples,but typicallyto advancetheirown self-interest,be thateconomic,social,or political. Their claimsthat universalhumanrightsare nothingmore thana Western importationdesignedto perpetuateWesternimperialismand to impair the economicand culturaldevelopmentof ThirdWorldculturesare thinly veiled attemptsto strengthentheir own powerbase. Religiousfundamentalists such as Kosami routinely denounce the excessive individualism of universal human rights and object to the imposition of Western values, which they claim are embedded in universal human rights law. Such self-serving rhetoric was also embraced by most of the former governments of the Soviet

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bloc countries,andit was only abandonedafterthe fallof Communism.Even thoughthe Sovietblocgovernmentsratifiedthe vast majorityof international humanrightsinstruments,they continuedto denouncethe so-calledcapitalist natureof humanrights law and insisted that the treatmentof their own nationalswas a purelydomesticmatter.Theyalsoarguedthatanygrantof rights must be contingentuponan individual'sperformanceof his or her duties to the society andthat the needs of a communitymust alwayscome beforethe rights of individuals.In spite of this rhetoric,the citizens of the Soviet bloc embracedthe idealsof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRightsandother humanrightsinstrumentsin their struggleagainstCommunism.It was only afterthe fallof Communismthatthe cynicalnatureof the Communistrhetoric was fullyexposed.Unfortunately, such rhetoricis still prevalentamongmany in Asia andAfrica. regimes particularly Historyhas shownthatit is unwiseto acceptat facevalueanyofficialclaims that the systematicdiscrimination or presenceof cruelcustomsis partof the culturalheritageof a society. The only meaningfuldefense of abusivecustoms that wouldbe consistentwith the principlesof humandignityand autonomywouldbe a bonafide showingthat each subjugatedand abusedindividualconsentedto such a practiceandthat such consent was knowingand informed.In practice,most individualslivingin traditionalandindigenoussocieties havefew, if any,economicor otheroptionsandare incapableof giving an informedconsentto harmfulor brutalizingcustoms. The growingconflictsbetween rights of individualsand group-sanctioned violenceare onlylikelyto intensifyin the nearfuture.In particular, the impact of cultureand traditionon the treatmentof womenmust be carefullyevaluatedby analyzingwhobenefitsfromthe traditionversus whobearsthe cost of the traditionandby lookingat class andpowerdistributionin the society,as well as the politicsof the so-calledtraditions.International humanrightsnorms offera usefulframeworkfor resolvingconflictsbetweenwomen'srights and traditional customsthatharmanddehumanizewomen.Universalhumanrights standardsact as limits on the excesses of culture-and religion-basedviolence. They ensure that cultureis not used as an excuse to limitand impair women'sdejure anddefacto rights. Ultimately,the rights of individualsand groupsmust be balancedby evaluatingthe natureandsignificanceof cultural practices,their effects on the weakestmembersof the society,the degreeto whichthe conflictingrights interferewith each other,the cumulativeeffects of the reof potentialrestrictionson either's rights,and the proportionality striction(Sullivan1992).The extent to whichwomenwill be ableto exercise their rights withinvariousculturesand succeed in minimizingviolence and gender-basedinequalitieswill be ultimatelylinkedto these women'sabilities to sharein the interpretationof their culturaltraditions. The assertion, often made by relativists, that indigenous women are indifferent to, or offended by, Western notions of human rights is factuallyerroneous. The criticism of feminism as nothing more than a Western imperialist ideology fails to explain the ever-growing women's movements across the

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globe(Cobbah1987;Dwyer1991;Kerr1993;Legesse 1980;PetersandWolper 1995).For example,Africanwomenhave organizededucationalcampaignsto combatthe brutalsexual surgeryof clitoridectomy.ManyMuslimfeminists are fightingagainstconservativeMuslimclerics, such as Kosami,by recogis nothingmore than "patriarchal attinizingthat religiousfundamentalism tudes andculturaltraditionsdisguisedas religiousnorms"(Mernissi1991:ix; see also Patel 1986;Dwyer1991;Weaver1994).As one prominentMoroccan feminist,FatimaMernissi,sees it, true Islamallowsfor "dignity,democracy, andhumanrights."Accordingto Mernissi,"ifwomen'srightsare a problem for some modernMuslimmen, it is neither because of the Korannor the Prophet,nor the Islamictradition,but simplybecause those rights conflict with the interestof a male elite" (Mernissi1991:ix).Peasantwomenin India haveorganizedthemselvesto preventdowry-related burningof youngwomen 1986). The FourthWorldConferenceof Women,which took (Jayawardena placein Septemberof 1995in Beijing,wasattendedbylargenumbersofwomen fromtraditionalsocieties. All those developmentsbelie the relativists'view thatuniversalhumanrightsare excessivelyWesternandnot desiredby nonWestern individuals.Many such non-Westernindividualsnot only support andembracethe universalstandards;they use them as a tool in the internal culturaldialoguethat is ongoingin manysocieties today. Froma practicalperspective,relativismis unsustainable inthe modemworld. Even the most remoteindigenousgroupshave been substantiallyintegrated into the globaleconomyandare subjectto ever-growingexternalinfluences (CulturalSurvival1993).It is preciselythese peopleswho desperatelyneed the protectionof their humanrights, and ironically,it is often the dictators, the fundamentalists, and the multinational companieswho chantthe mantra of culturalrelativismfortheirownbenefit.By refusingto engagein the evaluation of other culturesand their practices,culturalrelativistsare unableto analyzethe true natureof such politicallymotivatedclaims and are unwittingly lendinga helpinghandto those who benefitfromresurrecting,appropriating,or inventingwhatevercustomsthey see fit. CONCLUSION Culturalrelativism,in its variousforms,has enteredthe debateabouthuman rightsandhas been steadilygainingpopularityamongmanygroupsandindividuals.Perhapsthis is so becausesome scholarsbelievethatculturalrelativism is the onlyalternativeto the dangersof ethnocentrismandmoralabsolutism (Hatch1983;Jarvie1983).Or maybethis is due to its intuitiveappealto manypoliticiansandactivistswho use it to advancetheirownagendas.Orperhapsbecauseof the politicalexpediencythatculturalrelativismoffersto governments and those in power, the ideas of cultural relativism continue to expand well beyond academe. Whatever the reason, cultural relativism has the potential of underminingthe modern human rights law developed during the last fifty years. In fact, some majorinternationalhuman rights treaties, such as


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ontheElimination ofAllFormsofDiscrimination the Convention againstWomen, arebeingrewrittenandamendedto accommodate variousculturalandreligious differencesin the nameof culturalrelativism,guttingin the processthe whole ideathatwomendeservebasichumanrightsprotections(Cook1990). Contraryto the assertionsandfearsof relativists,humanrightsuniversalism does not take awaydecision-making cultures,nor does powersfromindividual it have demoralizingand homogenizingeffects.Nor is there any evidenceto is merelya formof uncriticalethnocentricWesternconshowthatuniversalism to undermine non-Westerncultures.It maywell be thatunispiracydesigned versalhumanrightsidealswere firstrecognizedanddevelopedin the West,but that does not mean such ideals are alien to non-Westerncultures.Similarly, humanrightslaw duringthe last forty while the developmentof international by Westernnations,it does not meanthatthe yearswas primarilyspearheaded humanrightsregimeis ethnocentricandunjust. resultinginternational The mainobjectiveof the existinguniversalhumanrightsregimeis not to imposea jacketof arbitraryandhomogenizinguniformityamongdiverseculturaltraditions.Instead,the goal of universalismis to create a floor below whichno society can stoop in the treatmentof its citizens. Conversely,universalismhas never aspiredto establishan upperceilingof whatthe idealor maximumlevel of humanrights shouldbe, leavingsuch improvementsand enhancementsto each individualculturein accordancewith its resourcesand abilities.All majorinternationalinstrumentsandtreaties,such as the United NationsCharter,the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights,togetherwith conventionssuchas the its two bindingCovenants,andall majorinternational conventionagainsttorture,slavery,andgenocide,are attemptsat universalizing only the minimumstandardsof treatmentof all individuals. huDue to a minimalistapproachto standardsetting,modeminternational manrightslaw is fullycompatiblewith culturaldiversityandmoraldiversity foundaroundthe world.Underuniversalism,each state and cultureretains sovereignpower over its own culturaldevelopmentalbeit withinthe limits delineatedby internationallaw.Althoughthe limitationsimposedby internationalhumanlaw are minimal,they provideimportantprotectionsfor individualswhowouldotherwisebe entirelyat the mercyof the state or the group in power.These protectionsincludesuch basic rights as the right to bodily abuse; integrity;the rightto be freefromtortureandphysicalandpsychological the rightto be free fromarbitrarycourts,imprisonment,andpolicecoercion; the right to be free fromslaveryandgenocide;the rightto free speech;and the rightto choose to be associatedwith, or be free of, any religion,culture, ethnicity,and language. Althoughhumanrights universalismhas its flaws,universalismoften provides the onlyavenueavailableto individualsin theirintracultural strugglefor fairness, justice, and equality. Consequently, the abandonment of universalism in favor of cultural relativism would have profoundimplications for those brutalized in the name of culture or religion. Even the critics of human rights universalism admit that the internationalsanction provided by universalism is

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conduciveto the preservationof internaldialoguewithin manytotalitarian societies andthus providesthe neededleverageto improvethe humanrights situationwithinthose countries(An-Na'im1992). The tensionbetweenthe rightsof groupsto maintaintheir traditionalculture andthe rights of individualsto rejectthat culture,eitherin whole or in part,is only likely to increasein the future.We must strive thereforeto develop criteriafor balancingthe needs of both by findingnew ways in which universalidealscanbe internalizedandlegitimizedin variouscultures.There aremanyas yet unansweredquestions,suchas howto determinewhichrights are more fundamentalthan others, which rights should be considered nonderogable,andwhichrightscan be recognizedas more culturallydependent. Is it possible to developan internationalconsensus as to the criteria whichcouldbe used to criticallyevaluateculturalcustomsandto judgethem? How shallwe engage in a comparisonof cultures?How can we most effectively legitimizethe claimthat certainethicaland moralconsiderationsare absolutein a sense that they shouldnot be violatedor deferredunderany circumstances?Such answers have yet to be completelyarticulated,but in orderto achievefurtherprogressin this area,it is necessaryto abandonthe uncriticalpluralismpostulatedby culturalrelativism.Indeed,anthropologists are in the uniquepositionto promotethe observanceof humanrightsamong the societiesthey workin by researchingthe congruencebetweenlocaltraditionsandthe universalnorms.Inalllikelihood,the observanceof humanrights in all societies will be significantlyimprovedif those rightsare perceivedas legitimateandfittinginto the localtradition(An-Na'im1992). There exist genuine differencesamongcultures,and not all such differences caneasilybe reconciled.The universalhumanrightslawrepresentsan attemptto strike a properbalancebetween the rights of each individualculture to createits own moralandethicalnormsandthe needs of individualsto be protectedagainstarbitraryand brutalcustoms and culturalpractices.As such, humanrightsuniversalismis worthyof protectionagainstthe cultural relativisticassault.Despiteall its flaws,humanrightsuniversalismstill offers the best hope of dignifiedlife to the world'spopulation. REFERENCES CITED American Association Executive Board(AAA),1947,Statement on Anthropological HumanRights(submitted to the UnitedNationsCommission on HumanRights). American (n.s.)49(4):539-43. Anthropologist A Quest An-Na'im, A.A.,ed., 1992,HumanRightsin Cross-Cultural Perspectives: forConsensus. of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia: University andJ. Tooby,eds.,1992,Adapted Mind:Evolutionary Barkow, J.H.,L. Cosmides, andthe Generation of Culture. NewYork:Oxford Press. Psychology University Boston:Houghton Benedict,R., 1934,Patternsof Culture. Mifflin. GirlsSlainIfTheyAttendSchool.Atlanta Bhatia,S., 1996,Algerian Journal/Atlanta 18 February, Constitution, p. C11. Relativism. of Bidney,D., 1968,Cultural Pp.543-47in International Encyclopedia

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