India and China Relations

India and China Relations Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

Edited by

G. Jayachandra Reddy

seaps UGC Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies Sri Venkateswara University

India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

© Copy rights 2016 by the editor Published by

UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies Sri Venkateswara University Tirupati-517502 Andhra Pradesh, India Email: [email protected] First Edition: 2016 ISBN: 978-81-926904-8-3 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

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D&Dee - Designing and Creative Production, Nallakunta, Hyderabad - 500 044. Ph No: +91 9440 726 907, 040 - 2764 3862.

Foreword The India-China engagement is the defining relationship in building the much awaited Asian century. These two countries are Asian giants in every sense of the term; physically huge, demographically massive, economically resurgent and strategically most powerful, compared to any of their other Asian neighbours. There are two dominant narratives of India-China relationship. One seeped into civilization, history and culture that speaks of harmonies and creativity. Scholars and statesmen carrying rich and diverse threads in all these walks of life exchanged visits, carrying pleasant and empowering impressions of each other for centuries. They shared the world's most prominent “peace religion”- Buddhism and learnt human values, social norms and statecraft from each other. They together dominated the world's economic growth and prosperity between 1st to the eighteenth century; India being ahead until the 15th century and then the Chinese taking over until the rise of the West. And during all this period, they had peaceful competition and co-existence, even possibly occasional minor friction, but never any major misunderstanding or war between them. Thanks to the spread of Buddhism from India to China, the latter looked towards the former as a source of inspiration and guidance. Even after being interrupted by the sour experiences of British and other European colonial control, the civilizational threads of constructive coexistence continued to inform their respective approaches towards each other in the form of Panchshila. Nehru's India and Mao's China were together wary of the persisting Western dominance of World politics during the initial decade of the Cold War. They were keen to preserve their autonomy and strategic space from the encroachment of new global divisions and rivalries. The deeply rooted historical nostalgia within these two Asian giants prompt them even today to construct Asian century on the foundations of peace and coexistence. This narrative was however seriously breached by rather unexpected breakout of conflict between them when China launched its military misadventure in the Himalayas against India in 1962. This military aggression no doubt inflicted a serious humiliation on India but in no way it immersed China in glory. There are several explanations of the Chinese unexpected behaviour, but the one most appealing, should be the disconnect between China's new Communist revolutionary State and leadership from its civilizational and cultural moorings. In iii

the name of building a new and powerful modern state, this Communist leadership has perhaps been driven towards reconstructing its imperial and expansionist ethos. Why else the Chinese would have moved military into Tibet at a time when China's own economic and social reconstruction had not even been initiated. Why would they hound out a Buddhist Lama who has been pleading only for the religious and cultural autonomy for his community? Why would they attack India just to show-off their prowess to the world? Why would they inflict a punitive war on a small and self-respecting former ally Vietnam to boost a degenerated inhuman regime of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia? It is this civilizational disconnect uneasily mixed with the imperial mind-set that accounts for China's assertive and aggressive stance towards its neighbours in East and SE Asia. If China wants to see the rise of a peaceful and creative Asian century, it will have to seriously and demonstratively deviate from the present course. It will have to deal with peacefully and sensitively with Tibet and the Dalai Lama and his people so as to accommodate their aspirations and culture. Once that is done, a great deal of the resolution of India-China border dispute will fall in place through confidence building and peaceful negotiations. It has every right to compete with India and any other country economically. China has both the will and the capability to become a major contributor to Asia's development and prosperity. But no economic relationship can become a one way traffic, be it trade or harnessing of natural resources. Nor should the economic engagement be dictated only by strategic intents such as propping up one neighbour against the other as being done in relation to Pakistan and other South Asian neighbours against India, and camouflaging strategic assets creation and military presence under economic projects and cooperation. Maritime Silk Route cannot be a vehicle for transporting and moving submarines and aircraft careers. If and when China gives up its assertive and expansionist stance in Asia, India or any other Asian neighbour of China will not have any reason to hobnob with other global players to keep regional balance and stability in Asia intact. Everyone will then take care in reassuring an internally insecure China that its legitimate core concerns will not be offended.

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The simultaneous discourse on both these narratives, of constructive cooperation and uneasy conflict, suggest that we are still far from a proper understanding of the constraints and prospects inherent in India-China relationship. This Volume is a modest but sincere attempt in this direction. It is the result of a seminar organised by the Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies of Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, under the committed and able leadership of the Centre's Director, Prof. G.J Reddy. The papers contributed to this Volume cover a wide range from civilizational and cultural aspects to the diplomatic, strategic, economic and energy related issues involved in India-China relationship. The authors of these papers have put in serious efforts to raise relevant issues, provide possible answers and generate a healthy debate on the present and future prospects of Asia's most critical relationship. I have no doubt that this effort will receive the due acknowledgement and appreciation from scholars, commentators, policy makers and all those who are interested in a stable and prosperous Asia and a harmonious and mutually advantageous India-China relationship.

S.D. Muni

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Preface Historically, India and China have had relations sustained for more than 2,000 years, but the era of modern relationship began in 1950. The first records of contact between China and India were written during the 2nd century BCE. China and India have also had some contact before the transmission of Buddhism from India to China in the 1st century CE. References to a people called the Chinas, now believed to be the Chinese, are found in ancient Indian literature. The Indian epic Mahabharata (c. 5th century BCE) contains references to "China", which may have been referring to the Qin state which later became the Qin Dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350-283 BCE), the prime minister of the Maurya Empire and a professor at Takshashila University, referred to Chinese silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk dress) and "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra. Vijay Gokhale, Indian Ambassador to China, also observed that “even before the transmission of Buddhism, the Shang-Zhou civilization and the ancient Vedic civilization in 1500-1000 B.C. showed some evidence of conceptual and linguistic exchanges.” For instance, "wumingzhi" (nameless finger) in Chinese is called "anamika" (nameless) in Sanskrit and Pali. In the Records of the Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE) and Sima Qian (145-90 BCE) made references to "Shendu", which might have referred to the Indus Valley (the Sindh province in modern Pakistan), originally known as "Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When Yunnan was annexed by the Han Dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese authorities reported an Indian "Shendu" community living there. Therefore, China and India are two of the world's oldest civilisations and have co-existed in peace for millennia. Trade relations via the Silk Road operated as economic contact between the two countries. The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India and China, but is also credited with facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia. That India and China are not mere societies/countries, rather they are civilizations is testified by sufficient evidences as to when and how they started exchanging their cultural elements, but from the practices in both countries that existed and grew in parallel and shared their cultural traits since the beginning of human history, a tradition that has ever since continued.

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Cultural exchanges between India and China continued during the days of India's struggle for self-governance. In early 20th century, Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore visited China twice, in 1924 and 1929; while scholars and intellectuals since 1911 have been visiting and revisiting Tagore's life, works and philosophy. This is all about the history and cultural ties between India and Chin, but on the other side of the coin, China and India viewed as the 'Emerging Giants' have stood facing security challenges-- 'old' and 'new' tensions, the former stemming from historical territorial disputes and the latter from mounting economic, military and political rivalries. China has more clout than India in Southeast Asia, as could be discernible from the intensification of China's ties with Myanmar. However, India is gradually making its presence felt in this sub region. To enhance its influence, India launched in the 1990's its 'Look East' policy that has increasingly focussed on security issues in Southeast Asia notwithstanding China's prominence. In South Asia, India has wielded more influence than China which has however been making inroads into countries such as Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. There are some 'Old' tensions are rooted in territorial disputes. These relate to conflict over Tibet in the 1950's and deep suspicion over rival claims-- India's over Aksai Chin and China's over Arunachal Pradesh. Despite the rhetoric of friendship, the mutual suspicions and anxieties can frustrate their long term relationship. Alongside, surprises and doubts arise from India's relationship with Pakistan, and China's support for the latter along India's Kashmir and China's claims over Xinjiang province and Arunachal Pradesh, along India's North East and Tibet's South. Sadly, the war between China and India in 1962 and the breakdown of relations between the two nations shattered Jawaharlal Nehru's 'Asian dream.' This was based on his vision of both nations facilitating the rediscovery of Asia's pride of place after years of living in the shadow of the West. After the 1962 war India moved close to the Soviet Union while China reinforced its ties with Pakistan. 'New' tensions stem from mounting economic, military and political rivalries. This, however, has been mingled with the desire to cooperate. This was intensified from the early 1990's onwards with the onset of 'liberalisation', marked by a move from state to market

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led policies and more exposure to the world economy. This approach was initiated in China in 1978 and in India in 1990. Despite growing economic and strategic ties, India and China need to overcome several hurdles in order to establish favourable relations. Though bilateral trade has continuously grown, India faces massive trade imbalance. These conjoined twins at Himalayas have failed to resolve their long-standing border dispute which the Indian media outlets have repeatedly reported as Chinese military incursions into Indian Territory. Both countries have steadily established heavy military infrastructure along border areas. Additionally, India remains wary about China's strong strategic bilateral relations with Pakistan, while China has expressed concerns about Indian military and economic activities in the disputed South China Sea. Beyond regional rivalries, China and India are keen on bolstering their economic and political prowess on the international front. Though this is bound to be competitive, there is much scope of joining forces to confront major shared concerns. This rests on their vision of a 'new world order' by reshaping the nature of 'global governance' which centres on collective international policies. This volume, “India-China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues,” contains 25 articles, contributed by eminent scholars in this field of specialization. This compendium focuses on India-China historical ties with the strong cultural relations on one the side and the different dimensions of security challenges between two nations on the other side. The facts and figures provided in different articles of this book are a valuable source of information for the scholars concerned with the India-China relations with special reference to historical, cultural and security issues. On the capacity of being the Director of the Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies, I had the privilege of organizing the International Conference on “India-China Relations: Implications for Peace and Prosperity of Asia” on 11-13 October 2014. Consequently, as the editor of this volume, I am deeply indebted, among others, to Amb. C.V. Ranganathan, Former Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi and Prof. S.D. Muni, Former Ambassador to Lao PDR, New Delhi for guiding and extending their scholarly support in organizing the conference. I am equally grateful to my predecessors, the former directors of our Centre -- Prof. A. Lakshamna Chetty, Prof.

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Y. Yagama Reddy, Prof. K. Raja Reddy, Prof. C. Ravindranatha Reddy and Prof. P. Munirathnam Reddy -- for their scholarly guidance. I profusely thank my colleagues in the Centre -- Dr. M. Prayaga, Dr. G. Vijay Kumar Reddy, Dr. V. Ramesh Babu and Dr. M. Padmaja -for giving me this opportunity to bring together a wide range of view points on India-China relations at this movement of rising Asia. I thank all the participants both from abroad and India who participated in the conference; without their contribution this volume could not be shaped into the present form. My thanks are due in large part to the UGC, New Delhi, for its financial support to organize the conference. Mr. K. Dayanandam and Mr. Ch. Dhamodhar, D&Dee Designing and Creative Production, Hyderabad, deserve appreciation for the taking pains in printing this volume in an elegant manner. Finally, I wish to thank my office staff who extended their support at ground level for the success of the conference.


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Contributors Amb. C.V. Ranganathan

Former Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi

MD Afroz

Student at Centre for South Asian Studies, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry, India

C. Annapurna

Ph.D, Research Scholar, Dept. of History, S.V.University, Tirupati

Amit Kumar

Research Scholar, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies (CIPS), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi

Atrayee Banerjee

Senior Research Scholar, Human Rights, Department of Anthropology, Ballygunge Science College, University of Calcutta

I. Babu Rao

Post Doctoral Fellow, Centre for SEAP studies, S.V. University, Tirupati-517502..,A.P.

Bashir Ahmad Dar

Department of Political Science, University of Kashmir, Srinagar

Dalbir Ahlawat

Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia

Gaddam Venkata Ramana

Ph.D Research Scholar, Dept. of History, S.V.University, Tirupati

G. Geethanjali

Senior Faculty member, Business Communication & Soft Skills IBS, Hyderabad

G. Hannah

Assistant Professor, Sree Vidyanikethan Engineering College, Tirupati.


Professor and Director, Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati

P. Kusuma Harinath

Associate Professor, Department of English, S.V. University, Tirupati

Madhurima Chowdhury

Assistant Professor, South and South East Asian Studies, Alipore Campus, University of Calcutta

Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu

Associate Professor, Department of Entrepreneurship, GITAM Institute of Management, GITAM University

Olga Daksueva

National Chengchi University, International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS), Address: National Chengchi University, General Building of Colleges, International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, 12th Floor, North Wing No. 64, Sec. 2, ZhiNan Rd., Wenshan District, Taipei - 11605

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Prabhakaran Paleri

Former director general of Indian Coast Guard, Presently an academician and research scholar

T.M.R Prasad

Junior Lecturer in Civics, S.P.W. Jr. College, Tirupati-517502.,A.P

D.S. Rajan

Director, Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies, Chennai

Rabindra Sen

Professor, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata - 700 032, India

Saheli Bose

School of International studies, JNU, New Delhi

M. Sasikala

Research Scholar, Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati

J. Soundararajan

Assistant Professor, Dept. of Ancient History & Archaeology, University of Madras, Chepauk, Chennai - 600 005. India.

Sourabh Chatterjee

Lecturer in Chinese, Mody University of Science and Technology, (Formerly Mody Institute of Technology & Science), Lakshmangarh, Distt. Sikar, Rajasthan-332311, India.

Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi

Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Plot Number II, D/18, Major arterial road, Action Area II, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal - 700156, India

Tumtin Sonmang Koren

Research Scholar, Department of Geography, North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), Shillong, (Meghalaya)

S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni Associate Professor, Department of Defence Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai

Dr. Varalakshmi M.

Research Fellow, Centre for Gandhian Studies, GITAM University

C. Vinodan

Assistant Professor &Chair, Centre for Strategic and Security Studies, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India

Vishnubhatala NVLNGSharma School of Electrical Engineering, VIT University, Vellore, Tamil Nadu

Wang Dehua

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Professor and Director, Center for South Asian & Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for International Studies and Center for South Asia Studies, Tongji University

CONTENTS Foreword

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Preface

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Contributors

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From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations Amb. C.V. Ranganathan

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A Retrospection of Sino-Indian War of 1962 Vishnubhatala NVLNG Sharma

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Bilateral Engagements between India-China since 1988 Bashir Ahmad Dar

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Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A Reappraisal C. Annapurna and Gaddam Venkata Ramana

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India-China Relations: A Sino-Indian Perspective Atrayee Banerjee and Madhurima Chowdhury

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Archetypal Scapegoats - India and China G. Hannah and P. Kusuma Harinath

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Lao Tzu and Gandhi on Self transcendence for Peace and Human Development Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu and Dr. Varalakshmi M.

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Tagore (泰戈尔) and China (中国) Sourabh Chatterjee

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Cross Cultural Communication between India & China from a Business Perspective: Snap shots G. Geethanjali

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Maritime Security and International Cooperation - Also on the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road Wang Dehua

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The Fallacy of String of Pearls Theory in India-China Relations Prabhakaran Paleri

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Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India? S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni

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Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in 194 the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China J. Soundararajan The Convergence Dilemma: Mapping India-China Strategic Relations Dalbir Ahlawat

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India's China Policy: Quest for an Optimal Strategy Rabindra Sen

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India: Wanted a China Strategy D.S. Rajan

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Insurgencies in Northeast India and the Role of China G. Jayachandra Reddy and M. Sasikala

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Strategic Perspectives on India-China Relations: An Analysis T.M.R Prasad and I.Babu Rao

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Indian Ocean Region: A quest for supremacy between India and China MD Afroz

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The Balance-of-Threat Theory: Implications for the South China Sea Olga Daksueva

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Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role 328 of India and China Amit Kumar India-China Entanglement in Myanmar: An Energy Prespective Saheli Bose

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India-China: Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability Tumtin Sonmang Koren

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India, China and the Asian Energy Security C. Vinodan

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Sino-Indian Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi

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From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations Amb. C.V. Ranganathan Former Ambassador Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi Email: [email protected]

In 2012 the fiftieth anniversary of the armed conflict between India and China was recollected in the media. Many items appeared in the print media, and the electronic media held panel discussions. Most of the coverage deal t almost exclusively with the manifold failures of the then civil and military leaderships. In 2013 there was a reprise of the same when parts of the Henderson Brooks Report on the 1962 conflict found their way into the Press, reviving vociferous demands for the public release of the Report which is still classified and unavailable to the general public. What was missing in the Press and in the many panel discussions was informed analysis of the reasons why the Peoples' Republic of China, led by the charismatic Mao Zedong decided to take armed actions against India. Its Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, believed passionately that India and China living in friendship would lead to Asian revival, would usher in peace after the ravages of the Second World War and growth and prosperity for India which had gained independence and for China which had “liberated” itself from a century of domination by foreign forces. This talk is an attempt to deal with the several interconnecting and complex factors which played a role in the Chinese leadership's decision to resort to war against India and factors which influenced the Indian leadership to take reactive actions to deal with the situation. The talk then turns to more contemporary times where conflict has given way to an environment of cooperation between India and China. The two years 1950 and 1959 were crucial in the contemporary history of India-China relations. The intervening years were significant ones for the promise of warm friendship and India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Amb. C.V. Ranganathan

cooperation between India and China given prevailing complexities in the international situation. However, 1950 and 1959 are landmark years because of events relating to Tibet, the domestic situation in China under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the deterioration of relations between the two major Communist Parties of the Former Soviet Union and China and the continuing bitter relations between China and the USA, following the Korean War and the latter's support to the regime in Taiwan. Cumulatively these developments had a baneful impact on IndiaChina relations. These worsened with the public revelation of wide differences over the boundary between India and China through the release of official correspondence exchanged between the Governments of India and China on this question. Within India, this release of the correspondence, accompanied by armed incidents along the boundary regions , led to a big upsurge of public opinion in Parliament and outside which had the effect of constraining Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, from constructive negotiations on the boundary question. Between October 1949 to October 1950, both before and after diplomatic relations were established between India and the Peoples' Republic of China(P.R.C.), the Government of India were very concerned with clear indications that troops would be sent into Tibet thus unsettling conditions across the hitherto peaceful border between India and Tibet. Consequently, India advocated in notes to the Chinese Government that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations. In October 1950, the reply from the Chinese Government was to assert that Tibet was an integral part of China “and that the matter was entirely a domestic problem of China”. Further it criticized the viewpoint of the Government of India “as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China”. Such negative and hostile reactions led Prime Minister Nehru to declare in Parliament in November, 1950 that the boundary in the Eastern Sector had been clearly defined by the McMahon Line of 1914. He added, “map or no map that is our frontier and we will not allow 02


From Conflict to Cooperation: A Survey of India-China Relations

anyone to cross it”. These were the first indications of the deep suspicions which the new leaders of China harbored about India's intentions over Tibet viewing them as a continuation of the policies of British Imperialism. These suspicions only got exacerbated in 1959 when wide differences between India and China over the boundary became public and when The Dalai Lama with his large entourage escaped to India and was given humanitarian asylum by the Government of India. The reason for his leaving Lhasa, notwithstanding a 1951 seventeen point agreement between Lhasa administration and the Government of China on internal autonomy was that the agreement was not faithfully implemented, Tibetans living outside Tibet rose in violent rebellion against the Chinese, which was suppressed by force, and he felt that it was unsafe for him to continue in Lhasa. India was wrongly accused by the Chinese of instigating events in Tibet, and planning the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India. The Government of India decided to give humanitarian asylum to the Dalai Lama and his vast entourage which accompanied him, on the condition that no political activities would be carried out by him within India. This humanitarian action was in keeping with the cultural and spiritual links between India and Tibetan people over the centuries ever since Buddhism went to Tibet from India. By 1959, the deteriorating relations between India and China began to feature in the worsening relations between the former Soviet Union and China. Solidarity between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union gave way to deep ideological differences over contrasting opinions on the international situation and each others' external and domestic policies. The Chinese Party felt that its Soviet counterpart wanted to control the Chinese Party to make the latter submit to the strategic needs of Soviet-USA cooperation “for domination of the world”. In 1959 Soviet leader Kruschchev met President Eisenhower in USA and referred to peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist world. This was India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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vehemently opposed by China which had fought a bitter war with USA in Korea and felt encircled by USA from Taiwan and post war Japan. The ideological difference spilt over to state level relations when the Soviet Union reneged on its agreement to help China develop its own nuclear weapon and withdrew hundreds of its technicians from China, who assisted China's industrial recovery. In August 1959, there took place an armed clash at Longju in the Arunachal Pradesh sector between Chinese and Indian troops. The Soviet Union which supported China during its suppression of the Tibetan revolt earlier refused to support China over this incident. Instead its official news agency TASS called on both sides to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. This was seen by the Chinese as support to a “bourgeois “ state instead of support to a “socialist” state which played into the hands of the imperialists who sought to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union. In 1959 Kruschchev visited China and made his displeasure over Mao's India policy known to Mao. A long period of bitter confrontation between Soviet Union and China followed, which lasted for almost three decades, and at times marked by armed conflicts over territorial issues . For the Chinese in the late fifties, India was not seen as a non aligned country but as one which was doubly aligned to USSR and to USA in their confrontation with China. Some western academicians thus view the 1962 armed conflict between India and China as one which was meant to serve a lesson to the USSR. Two years before the armed conflict, in 1960, the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai visited India to negotiate a solution to the boundary question at the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru. Ever since the correspondence between the Premiers showing the wide differences between India and China over the boundary, the revelation that China had built a road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang through Ladakh and the Dalai Lama's entry into India, the Prime Minister was attacked in Parliament and outside for what was seen as a weak policy on China. Hence the visit of the Chinese 04



Premier was strongly opposed by certain political parties, prominent personalities and sections of the Press. During his visit the Chinese Premier in talks with the Indian Premier pointed out that China was willing to take a realistic attitude towards the McMohan Line in the Eastern Sector and he requested India to take a similar position with respect to Chinese claims in the Ladakh sector. He drew a parallel with China's approach to the boundary dispute with Burma, where the Chinese decided to follow a realistic approach by accepting the McMahon Line. In the face of opposition by his Cabinet colleagues Nehru did not agree with what was seen as a Chinese attempt at justifying claims to a vast area in Ladakh. The talks ended with an agreement to appoint officials on both sides to examine documents on which each side based its claims. In the event the final report of the officials only reinforced the positions of both sides which were made clear in the earlier correspondence between the Governments. It can be seen from all this that from the fifties of the last century, till the conflict in 1962, there were mutual misunderstandings, misperceptions and missed opportunities to solve the boundary question. From the Chinese side, India's reactions to events in Tibet for which the Chinese were solely responsible, were grossly misinterpreted as India having expansionist motives. The wide differences over the boundary added to this view. China's break with the Soviet Union caused by disputes over each one's world view had its effect on India-China relations in the backdrop of the Soviet Union seeking to establish good relations with what was seen a progressive India under Nehru's leadership. India was also seen as supporting American actions to help Tibetans oppose the Chinese in Tibet. From the Indian side also there were misperceptions of a revolutionary regime, which came to power on a strong nationalist platform bent on reunifying peripheral territories through force. The belief that a show of military presence, which was poorly equipped and unsupported by logistics, in areas India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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claimed by the Chinese in Ladakh, would not be attacked was sadly erroneous. Lastly Nehru's conviction that any armed conflict between India and China would attract the intervention of the major powers in the era of the cold war, was misplaced as this did not happen except for moral(and later) material support to India. As a result of the conflict, India is in full control of Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese are in control of the areas in Ladakh which they have claimed and occupied as a result of the conflict. A major outcome of this conflict has been the growth of China's relations with Pakistan, which in their origin and development have a distinct anti-India bias. From 1962 to 1979 relations between India and China had reached a nadir. For a period of eleven years from 1965 to 1976, during the last decade of the life of Mao Zedong, China itself was rocked by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched by him to immunize China from what he saw as revisionism in the Soviet Union . He believed that this had also infected his own senior colleagues, who were dismissed by him and ill treated. It was only after 1978, when Deng Xiaoping announced reforms to the autarchic system which prevailed under Mao, which included opening up China to the outside world and better relations with neighbors, that there was a turn for the better in India-China relations. In 1979, A.B.Vajpayee visited China as Minister of External Affairs on Chinese invitation. This was the first high level exchange after the 1960 visit of the Chinese Premier to India. The visit had some substantial results including a reiteration by Deng Xiaoping of the earlier 1960 proposal under a “package settlement”. This could not be followed up as the then Government of India led by a coalition under the Janata Party lost its majority in Parliament. When Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the high level communication with China was kept up when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, visited India in 1981. A trade agreement followed and a decision was taken that Vice Ministerial level officials of the two sides would meet annually to 06



discuss the border question and promote relations in other areas such as cultural and scientific exchanges. The major event which led to a decisive turning point in the bilateral relations came in 1988, when the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China. This visit came 34 years after the last visit to China by Prime Minister, Nehru, the long hiatus reflecting the abnormal situation in the bilateral relations between India and China. By this time, there were vast changes in China, its relations with USA had normalized, the conflict with Soviet Union abated under Gorbachev even before the end of the cold war, and its relations with South East Asian countries were improving as a result of China declaring to withdraw support to Communist Parties who were fighting the established Governments in these countries. Relations between USA and Soviet Union improved because Gorbachev did not interfere in Eastern Europe where Socialist Parties almost everywhere were overthrown by popular uprisings. The Berlin Wall was brought down without any countervailing actions by the Soviet Bloc. All this culminated in the implosion of the Soviet Union when the former Central Asian and European portions of the Union broke away and declared independence. In a continuum from the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China, relations between India and China have improved vastly. The momentum of high level visits has been sustained with exchanges at the levels of the Presidents, Premiers, Foreign, Defense and other Ministers of the two countries. With no country as with China, has India entered into as many signed joint declarations, statements, agreements, memoranda of understandings on diverse subjects, and institutionalized as many dialogue mechanisms. The significant aspect in all this is that periodic changes through general elections of ruling parties in India have not affected the forward momentum thus reflecting the consensus on India-China relations. To briefly summarize the broad political parameters, which have evolved as a result of the high level exchanges between India and India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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China in recent years, the accepted rubric to describe the relationship is that it is a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” based on the Five Principles and mutual sensitivity for each other's concerns and aspirations and equality. The relationship is seen as transcending the bilateral scope, and has acquired regional and global significance. Both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals and competitors. The two sides take a positive view and support each other's friendship with other countries. The two sides agree to enhance cooperation on maritime security, and work together to tackle non traditional security threats and to safeguard the security of international sea lanes and freedom of navigation. Periodic bilateral consultations on regional matters such as Afghanistan , counter terrorism, non proliferation, maritime affairs and other subjects of mutual interest have been agreed to. These are important commitments drawn from the context of the experience gained over the years in dealing with each other and the response of both countries to the developing international and regional situations. By the early years of this century, China has become the second largest economy in the world with a gross domestic product of U.S. dollars 10 trillion in comparison to India's US dollars 2 trillion. The present leadership in China seems determined to tackle the glaring deficiencies in social governance following its prosperity. At the same time China is also following a very robust policy in strengthening its defense capabilities. Accompanied by assertive behavior with respect to its maritime and territorial claims involving a number of its neighbors, across the seas and over land, including India, it is inevitable that each of them is adopting policies to strengthen itself, either by itself or through foreign assistance. In view of the expansive claims of the Chinese over areas in the South China Sea and with respect to islands also claimed by Japan, the USA has frequently called for peaceful resolutions of the disputes, early adoption of a practical code of conduct and compliance with international norms as prescribed by the Law of the Seas Convention. As of now there 08



are no signs of abatement over China's confrontation either with other claimants in South East Asia to areas in the South China Sea, such as notably Vietnam, and The Philipines or with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. With Japan bitter historical memories continue to bedevil Sino-Japanese relations. Having said earlier that India-China relations have improved vastly over the last two decades, we must now turn to the challenges posed to the relationship, which is complex, marked by cooperation and difficult problems which need to be faced boldly. In the common perception of the relations the boundary question is seen as the biggest problem. Ever since 1979, it has been agreed by the two Governments that this question should be solved peacefully , and in a fair manner, acceptable to both sides. Importantly that pending a solution, peace and tranquility would be maintained along the notional Line of Control which marks the limits of each side's military presence. There have been a series of formal agreements between the two sides which deal specifically with measures on maintenance of peace and tranquility from 1993 till the present. Mechanisms have also been put in place with the participation of civil and military officials, including places along the LOC where military officials of both sides would meet periodically, hold flag meetings when required, to ensure that crossings of the LOC are diffused peacefully. Since both sides have differences of perceptions on the locations of the LOC in certain areas there are intrusions. However at the highest levels there is a consensus to” mange and handle differences in a positive and forward looking manner, strengthen mutual trust, jointly safeguard peace and tranquility in the border and not let the boundary question become an obstacle to development of relations between the two countries”. ( Statement by Chinese Foreign Office after meeting between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Brazil). As for an eventual resolution of the boundary question, since questions of sovereignty are involved over territorial alienations, it is bound to take time. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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The quality of the relationship between China and Pakistan and how this would influence the question of the future of Afghanistan, which is delicately poised, is another challenge. It is well known that China has given massive assistance to Pakistan in building up its conventional as well as its nuclear and missile capacities. The domestic situation in Pakistan is one where an elected Government is facing huge challenges from forces who are opposed to moderation, modernity, plurality of faiths, maintenance of law and order , rule of law and the Constitution. Pakistan's serious reservations to India's role in Afghanistan to help in its economic and social development in accordance with the wish of its people, is utterly misplaced. India's participation in Afghanistan is far less a threat to Pakistan than the Taliban who thrive in the borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan and elsewhere in the interiors. What is needed is a serious trilateral dialogue between India-Pakistan-China to contribute to the future evolution of a stable Afghanistan, led by a Government of unity, free from foreign interference. China should use its undoubted leverage in Pakistan to bring this about. A big test of the depth and scope of India-China relations, which is often reiterated by leaders of India and China, would be the extent of constructive cooperation in the political and security fields relating to the Af-Pak areas. The fall out on India-Pakistan relations would be beneficial in tackling other long pending problems between them. Viable trade and economic relations between India and China pose another challenge. The huge asymmetry of economic strength between China and India gives China an advantage which is reflected in the trade figures where India always suffers from big deficits. Recently, after the new Government had assumed office, statements by Chinese Foreign Minister and the President have emphasized the need to explore new avenues to reduce this gap through Chinese investments in India. The fields suggested are infrastructure projects including industrial zones, railways, highways, power plants etc. It remains to be seen

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how such plans are executed given our many domestic constraints. Over the years China has successfully leveraged its vast geographical hinterland towards its north, west and south-west in changing the geopolitical situation in its favor. Examples of this are the rail, road and pipelines it has extended to Central Asia, Russia, Myanmar and to Indo-China. Announcements have recently been made by Chinese leaders to expand the age old Maritime Silk route as well as the overland silk route to interconnect the economic centers lying along these routes to China. These developments when they take place will affect India. Rather than take a defensive attitude to the schemes we should see how the strengthened connectivity would help India in its political and economic diplomacy with near and distant neighbors. In this regard, the proactive actions India is taking with respect to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar project is a useful beginning. To conclude, by the early years of this century, India became well poised with regard to its relations with the major powers as well as significant major regional groupings. These include, USA, Russia, China, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, ASEAN, E.U., BRICS, and the major constituents of these regional groups. The steady economic growth, its entrepreneurial class, display of its nuclear capability, democracy and the role its Navy plays in safeguarding vital sea lanes have cumulatively contributed to India acquiring a profile it lacked earlier. After the Indo-USA nuclear agreement which has enabled India to engage in commerce to build nuclear power plants and with USA's willingness to sell India very sophisticated defense equipment, India has joined the mainstream of major powers. Growth of each compartment of its relations with the major powers reinforces its relations with others. If this external profile is backed up by steady and sustainable economic, social and cultural progress at home India will be very well placed to face the challenges posed by China. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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A Retrospection of Sino-Indian War of 1962 Vishnubhatala NVLNG Sharma School of Electrical Engineering, VIT University, Vellore Email: [email protected]

Abstract The objective of this paper is to deeply retrospect the Sino-Indian war of 1962, which took place mainly due to the disputes over the border. This paper also examines the 20th century chronology of the disputes and the border skirmishes that took place between the two Asian giants and the incidents, political and social causes that led to the war. The roots of the border war date back to 19th century, when the British India as well as China claimed their stake in the mountain regions of Aksai Chin and a fewer parts of NEFA of India. Major changes in the Indian and Chinese governments in the late 1940's when both the nations enjoyed sovereignty the relations were friendly enough. But the movement of ones troops into another nation's border and China's rejection of the McMahon line which India considered as the authentic line for the border, China's Consideration of the McDonald line as official line, India's forward policy of 1959, China's construction of a military road in the disputed area of Aksai Chin, worsened the situations and on the other hand, India's grant of asylum to Dalailama fanned the blaze of dispute with China. China being prepared for the war with its neighbouring Sub-Continent and on the contrary India being unprepared and India's Non Alignment Movement gave a Victory to China. This paper also deals with the nature of the war, its outcomes and the conduct. Due to difficulty in obtaining the primary sources of the documents, this paper completely relies on secondary sources. Key Words: India, China, Sino-Indian, PRC, War, NEFA, Aksai Chin.

Introduction: The relation between China and India in the modern history is mostly characterised by the border conflicts and political strains in the relation. The issue of Tibet, and India's grant of asylum to Dalai Lama was the main reason for the political strain. India and China always has had diverse views on Tibet. Both the countries with growing economies and being the most populous countries of the world, raised issues over the border, which was the

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A Retrospection of Sino-Indian War of 1962

principle cause of the outbreak of the war. Though there were many meetings between the premiers of both the nations, many treaties signed, the skirmishes near the border went on. Crucially the 1961-62 period was of great importance between the two nation's relations and history.

Geographical Outlook: India and China are the largest countries in the Asian continent. China and India are separated by the formidable geographical obstacles of the Himalayas. China and India share a common border of more than three thousand kilometres, where the specific number can't be assumed due to border disputes. The most common border of the two countries lies in the north-eastern part of the Indian province of Kashmir and South-western part of china, The Aksai Chin and the southern part of China and the eastern part of India in NEFA.

Aksai Chin: Aksai chin lies in the western region of the Sino-Indian border, which originated in 1834, with the Sikh's conquest over ladakh.1 These Sikh confederacy states, which ruled the greater slice of the northern part of India in those days signed a treaty with the existing neighbours of India. But when the British defeated the Sikhs in 1846, sovereignty over the parts of ladakh was transferred to the British.2 The then British government poached the Chinese to negotiate the border. The border line at the Karakorum passes and Pangong Lake were well defined but the border line of Aksai chin was not defined. Sir. W.H. Johnson proposed a border line which placed the Aksai Chin in India. It was not accepted. Later a Chinese official, Hung Ta-Chen, proposed a border line and handed over the document to George McCartney, the then counsel general of Kashgar. It placed the northern part of the laktsang into China and the southern part in India. With this proposal Aksai chin was placed in China. This was accepted and sent to Chinese government in a note by Sir McDonald.3 The chines had not responded to the file. Hence that was considered as acquiescence. Although no boundary was India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Vishnubhatala NVLNG Sharma

officially negotiated The McCartneyMacDonald Line had been tacitly accepted by China as the boundary until Zhou confirmed the new Chinese claim line to Nehru in 1959.

Pre Sino-Indian war period: The period after the independence of India (c. 15.08.1947), Formation of the people's republic of China (c. 01.09.1949), to the SinoIndian war of 1962 is considered as the pre-war period. It is a crucial period of relation between the two countries of India and China. It was 30th Dec 1949 when Pic Courtesy: http://en.wikipedia.org/ India officially recognised the wiki/China%E2%80%93India_relations mainland of China as the PRC. India was the first socialist country to recognise China as an independent territory. India is the sixteenth country to start diplomatic relations with China by sending its diplomat Mr. K.M Panniker, as an ambassador to China.4 In the earlier days of the after independence, relation between the two countries was quite well. India's the then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, advocating the China's membership in the United Nations on 6th of December 1950 was a good example for the same.

Panchsheel: The five Principles of Peaceful CoExistence: Jawaharlal Nehru, with his base vision of 'Resurgent Asia', put forth five principles for the peaceful Co-existence of both the countries.5 It was a peace treaty put forth by Jawaharlal Nehru, to his counterpart Mr. Zhou Enlai and were enunciated in the preamble to the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", which 14



was signed at Peking on 29 April 1954. The five principles were, 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2. Mutual non-aggression. 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. 5. Peaceful co-existence. It was widely accepted by both the nations and the stressing of these principles by the Chinese premier in his later visit to India in June 1954 stands as a proof for the same.

China's infringement of Panchsheel: In 1954, China, in its official map, included the northern frontier of India in its map. This was clearly opposed by India on 2nd March 1955.6 Though there were several measures taking place for the friendly relations between the two nations, the border dispute between the two nations was worsening the relations. It was 4th of September when India officially objected the Chinese encroachment on Indian lands in Assam.7 The later reaction was unexpected. China for the first time, officially claimed 40,000 sq. kms of Indian land both in ladhakh and the NEFA (north Eastern Frontier Agency). Though there were border skirmishes, the relation between the two nations was going on a good track. It was a well said slogan in Hindi during the 1950's that 'hindi-chinibhai Bhai.' Which means Indians and Chinese are brothers, which was first initiated by the then prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru. India has also sent Mr. Beohar ram Manohar Sinha, a famous painter, who painted the original pages of the constitution of India to China, to establish cross cultural relations. In 1954, India published new maps, which considered the Aksai Chin, into Indian border, but the maps published during the independence didn't include the same in Indian borders. To which the then Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai strongly objected and wrote a letter to the counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru, rejecting India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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to accept the legality of the McMahon line of the Shimla convention in 1914 which was defined the border of Indian and Tibet in the eastern section.

Socio- Political issues: After the Tibetan uprisings in 1959, the spiritual head of Tibet, the then Dalai lama's sought for a Dharmashala in the north-western part of India precisely in the Himachal Pradesh. In March of 1959 thousands of Tibetan refugees settled in Himachal Pradesh, to which India granted asylum. Chinese government in the other part, accused India for imperialism and the border dispute was once again raised. It claimed as huge as 102,000 sq. kms. Of Indian sovereign land to be in Chinese borders and called for a border rectification.8 Zhou also claimed that China would relinquish its claim over most of the NEFA at the cost of Aksai chin for India. The Indian government with its domestic public opinion rejected the settlement.9

Sino-Indian war: Aksai chin was claimed by India to be a sovereign part of Kashmir, and was claimed by China to be a part of Xinjiang. China never showed its objection on the claims of India over Aksai chin after independence and Zhou stated that they had no claims over Indian Territory. But he later argued that Aksai chin was under the jurisdiction and that McCartney-McDonald line was the only border line that the British could accept but not the McMahon line. The progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.

The Forward Policy: India in 1959 started a forward policy whose aim was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their 16



supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line. There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty. China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet.10 According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been advancing. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information that China would not react with force. Indeed, at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with each force attempting to outmanoeuvre the other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.

Early incidents leading to war: There were many border issues and military conflicts during the first half of 1962, the summer and autumn of 1962. In June of 1962 many skirmishes occurred between India and China and caused the death of dozens of Chinese troops. And the intelligence bureau received information that there were symptoms of war. On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker.11 On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory. Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-defence, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened. In August, the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition, weapons and gasoline. On 8 September, a 60-strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola.12 Fire was not exchanged, but Nehru India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to free the Indian Territory and the troops had been given discretion to use force. On 11 September, all the forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian Territory.13 On the other hand, the Chinese in August were more ready for a combat. They started piling up ammunition and weapons. In August India, planned to occupy the Thang la ridge by setting an outpost at Dhola, in the southern part of the Thang la ridge. Where India interpreted that the McMahon line ran. The Indian army was given full permission to open fire at the Chinese army, if they tried to enter the Indian borders. However this operation was futile. Many Indian officials and some Majors in the Indian army were unsure of the authenticity of the claim of the Thang la ridge. On Oct 3rd, just about a week before the war, the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, visited New Delhi, and promised Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian prime Minister of India that there would be no war. On October 10th, the Indian patrol troops numbered around fifty, on their patrol to Yumtso Lawere met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1,000 soldiers.14 The Indian troops were not ready for an open fire at that moment, as the Yumtso La region was at a high altitude and there was no back up arm support for the Indian army. But the Chinese troops open fired as they assumed that the Indian soldiers were north of the McMahon line. However with high casualties, the Indian troops, held off the first Chinese assault. At this point, the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire. However, Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire, as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping.15 They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault. In the second Chinese assault, the Indians began to retreat, realising the situation was hopeless. The causalities were around 25 for the Indians and 33 for the Chinese. The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated, and then buried the Indian dead with military honours, as witnessed by the retreating soldiers. This was the first

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occurrence of heavy fighting in the war. This attack had a severe impact for India and also Jawaharlal Nehru tried to solve the dispute. But the latter half of October, 1962 it was clear that Chinese were preparing for a war. A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the build-up and reinforcement of positions south of the Thang La Ridge.

The War: Indian army was well assured that there would be no war in the near future. A brigadier of Indian Army, Brigadier D. K. Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out.16 On 6 October 1962, the Chinese leadership convened by Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units reported that the Indians may attack the Chinese in the Thang La in Operation Leghorn on October 10. The Chinese leadership and also the Central Military Council set upon war to launch a large-scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India. In Beijing, a bigger meeting of Chinese military was convened so as to set up for the approaching conflict. Mao and also the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war. Their strategy was that a main assault would be launched in the eastern sector, which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector. All Indian troops inside China's claimed territories within the eastern sector would be expelled, and the war would be terminated with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to pre-war positions, followed by a return to the negotiating table.17 India led the Non-Aligned Movement, Jawaharlal Nehru enjoyed international prestige, and China, with a bigger military, would be depicted as an aggressor. However, Zhou, felt that a well-fought war will assure peace between the nations for a long period, and determined the advantages to offset the costs. On 8 October, additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions.18 On 12 October, Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to clear Indian Territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders and personally met with Kaul, India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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issuing instructions to him. On 14 October, an editorial on People's Daily issued China's final warning to India it stated that: "So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale....It is high time to shout to Mr. Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops, with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression, can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory... If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well-intentioned advice and insist on having another try, well, let them do so. History will pronounce its inexorable verdict... At this critical moment...we still want to appeal once more to Mr. Nehru: better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble."19 It was marshal liu bocheng who headed the group to make a decision on the strategy for the war. He decided that the troops that were opposing were of India's best and to triumph over them would require deploying concentrated force. On 16 October, this war set up was approved, and on the 18th, the ultimate approval was given by the committee for a selfdefensive counter-attack, scheduled for 20 October.20 It was October 20 1962 when China officially started its war. The Chinese liberation army (PLA) of China, started its attack in two places, a thousand kilometres apart. Within the western theatre, the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin whereas within the eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture all the banks of the Namka Chu River. There were skirmishes that occurred in the Nathula Pass, in the state of Sikkim(A sovereign part of Indian Territory). Ghurkha rifles moving north were targeted by Chinese cannon fire. At 5:14 Am the Chinese troops started the cannon fire within the eastern theatre. At around 6:30 am, the Chinese infantry launched an onset from the rear and made the Indians to depart their trenches. Chinese troops though were able to occupy the overall regions of the Thang la ridges, now started moving towards the NEFA. After four days of fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a considerable portion of the controversial territory. On the morning 23 October, the Indians discovered a

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Chinese force gathered in an incommodious pass and opened fire with mortars, cannons and machine guns, resulting in heavy fighting. About two hundred Chinese troopers were killed and wounded during this action. Nine Indian troopers were also killed. On the opposite region, within the western theatre of the Sino-Indian boundary, the Chinese were able to get total control over the Aksai Chin region by 22 October. The Chip Chap valley was occupied on 20 October. The firings were ceased temporarily on October 24 when Zhou Enlai ordered not to move further into the Indian territory and that he wanted to have a bilateral talk with Jawaharlal Nehru and wrote a letter proposing for a negotiated boundary, On October 24th, four days after the outbreak of significant fighting in NEFA and Aksai Chin, Zhou sent a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, proposing: 1) a negotiated settlement of the boundary, 2) that either side disengage and withdraw twenty kilometres from present lines of actual control, 3) a Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA, and 4) that China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.21 Nehru's reply of October 27th appeared eager to restore peace and friendly relations, however questioned a mutual twenty kilometre withdrawal after "40 or sixty kilometres of blatant military aggression." Jawaharlal Nehru proposed, instead, a return to the "boundary prior to 8 September 1962" before any Chinese attacks occured; only then would India have an interest in talks. Zhou's reply came on November 4th, and processed his in-tent of 'line of actual control.' Zhou's 'line' the same that he had repeatedly offered since 1959 was merely the Indian-claimed McMahon Line in NEFA and also the traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin. The political activities continued. On November 8th, the Indian Parliament announced a state of national emergency and adopted a resolution to push back the enemies out of the great Indian Territory. Through the primary period of November, China had kept away from any further assaults; Peking clearly needed a diplomatic resolution. On November 14th, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote another letter to Zhou,


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again rejecting Zhou's proposal of 24th October and again repudiating the Chinese claims on Indian border. However the exchanges between the two countries and the external military support to India had made no movement toward settlement or compromise. On November 14th, the fighting resumed once again. The Eleventh Brigade of the Second Division took over the Walong sector on October 31st; the Eleventh was the third unit in ten days to be assigned responsibility for Walong (as there were many changes in the commanding authority). The Walong detachment of three infantry battalions was not, however, making ready for a defence. Even though Chinese strength at Rima was calculated at a Division, the Walong force was planning to attack the Chinese on November 14th, Nehru's birthday. General Kaul had planned a first major success against the enemy as a birthday gift to Jawaharlal Nehru.22 Chinese reconnaissance patrols were visible east of Chushul in mid-November, however no fire was exchanged. On November 17th, a powerful Chinese force stirred westward toward Chushul. And within the early hours of November 18th, opened fire on Indian outposts.23 Mortars and rockets additionally softened the Indian entrenchments. In serious fighting, the Chinese rear and flank attacks were fortunate. The casualties were serious for the Indians. Some blocking forces were sent in early November: an organization to Phutang and a platoon sent up the Bailey trail to Poshing La. As November advanced, more attention was given to Bailey trail. Three additional platoons now making a company were sent to Poshing La. On November 15th, the Chinese probably a battalion attacked the company at Poshing La. Radio reports indicated that the Chinese had worn out the Indian force. However, headquarters couldn't believe that the Chinese could bring a full battalion down the mountain trail, and a second company from Bomdi La was sent up Bailey trail. A third company was brought from Bomdi La to Dirang Dzong. By November 16th, the three battalions stationed at Bomdi La was cut to half strength. With the disintegration of forty eight Brigade at 3

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a.m. on November 20th, no organized Indian military force was left in NEFA (nor in Aksai Chin). Militarily, the Chinese triumph was complete, and the Indian defeat was absolute. Late on the evening of November 20th, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made an urgent and open appeal to the U.S.A. for armed intervention against the Chinese; he asked for bomber and fighter squadrons to start air strikes on Chinese troops in Indian territory if they continued to advance and canopy for Indian cities “in case the Chinese air force tried to raid them.”24 an American carrier was sent toward the Bay of Bengal; however the aircraft carrier was ordered back on November 21st. The victorious Chinese had ordered a ceasefire effective midnight, November 21, 1962.

Cease-fire: On November 20, 1962, India and also the world speculated regarding the nature and aims of the Chinese attack. It announced that, the pre-McMahon line on the foot of the hills. Zhou had merely restated the compromise that he had been offering for over three years: India could keep the controversial territory north to the McMahon Line in NEFA, however China would keep the controversial territory in Aksai Chin. Of the 47,000 sq. miles of controversial border land, Zhou's ceasefire gave a full sixty eight (the 32,000 sq. miles of NEFA) to India, and unbroken only 32nd (the 15,000 miles of Aksai Chin) for China. Instead of the "victor keeping the spoils," Beijing kept solely what was strategically vital. The area close her vital military road in Aksai Chin. Zhou's ceasefire statement made it clear that the Indians would keep their troops twenty kilometers back from the ceasefire line, and that China "reserved the right to strike back" if India failed to do so.25 The sick and wounded were returned during December, 1962. Other prisoners of war were returned over subsequent six months. At one point, Jawaharlal Nehru had declared that 6,277 Indian troopers were captured or missing. India's casualties for the Border War were finally reported as follows: Killed--1,383 India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Captured--3,968 Missing--1,696. India and China released no official count on the wounded but India mentioned that the causalities were high.

Conclusion: The Border War and therefore the ceasefire brought several changes and many implications to both India and the world. The political and military climate in southern Asia was dramatically changed in the last three months of 1962. India recognized several of the weaknesses in her Army; and lots of lessons still relevant today emerged from the 1962 Border War. India had long been concerned regarding maintaining a buffer zone between her and her powerful neighbours. China felt that legally Aksai Chin belongs to her, mainly as there was very scare Indian presence in that area. China was also very strong because of the important military route that bisected the Aksai Chin area. There may well have been space for compromise over these problems, however stubbornness and India's aggressive forward policy resulted in armed conflict. World leaders should heed different nations' stated important strategic objectives. Ignoring the recommendation of senior, intimate army officers was fatal for India. Several officers had warned Jawaharlal Nehru that India was poorly ready for war with China, they were eased or replaced, their recommendation unheeded. Leaders could believe what they require to believe, however unwisely rejecting the counsel's suggestion may cause a disaster. China had simply won a military triumph on the ground. However Beijing could have lost in terms of its international image. Western nations, particularly the U.S.A., were already suspicious of Chinese attitudes, motives and actions; after all, People's Republic leader Mao had declared that "The way to world conquest lies through Havana, Accra, and Calcutta."26 These western nations, as well as a suspicious U.S.A., seemed to minimize, or not totally known, the Sino-Indian dispute 24



background that China believed that Aksai Chin had been lawfully Chinese since 1899 or before, that no official boundary had been agreed upon between the two nations, and that Nehru's forward policy had trusted troops even beyond India's claim line into Tibetan territory. These same nations viewed China to be an aggressor in the Border War of 1962 and considered its goals to be hugely on world conquest. These war implications are relevant to us for decades and centuries. It is in fact correct to blame a single nation on the border issue. The McMahon Line claimed by India, which was signed in the Shimla treaty of 1914 and the McDonald line claimed by the Chinese was also a unilateral line. Though the Panchsheel promised peace and mutual co-ordination between the Asian giants, the first clause which states “Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.” Was violated which in tur caused the violation of the remaining principles. If the Tibetan Issue has not aroused between the nations there might not have been a war. The issue lies with both the nations, it is very important to create a bilateral line for the better and mutual coordination. It is true that there are some unstable factors affecting the relations between the Asian giants due to the border conflict being unresolved. Therefore, it is important that the mutual trust and understanding should be developed, for a better co-operation and mutual benefit.

Acknowledgement I sincerely thank, Dr. B. Morarji, Asst. Prof, VIT University, Vellore, for his kind and generous help in sparing time to help me with the Paper.

References & Notes : 1.

Mark A. Ryan; David Michael Finkelstein; Michael A. McDevitt (2003). Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 188. ISBN 978-0-7656-1087-4.

2.

http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War


25


3.

Calvin, James Barnard "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. (April 1984).

4.

Mark A. Ryan; David Michael Finkelstein; Michael A. McDevitt (2003). Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 188. ISBN 978-0-7656-1087-4.

5.

http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf

6.

http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/eurasia_border_ review/Vol3SI/ luthi.pdf

7.

http://www.rediff.com/news/chtime1.htm

8.

http://www.factlookup.com/article/Sino-Indian_War

9.

http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War

10. Ibid 11. Ibid 12. A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process", India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003. 13. http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War 14. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm 15. http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War 16. Alfred P. Rubin, “The Sino-Indian Border Disputes”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96125 17. http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War 18. http://www.rediff.com/news/chtime1.htm 19. India's Borderland Disputes: China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, by Anna Orton, Epitome Books, 2010, (pg. 50.) 20. http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War 21. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm 22. http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/Sino-Indian_War 23. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm 24. Ibid

26


Bilateral Engagements between India-China since 1988 Bashir Ahmad Dar Department of Political Science, University of Kashmir, Srinagar Email: [email protected]

Abstract India and China are the two important players in the contemporary world. Both the nations have a significant role, political as well as economic, within and outside their own region. The two states are the emerging economies of the world, China became the 2nd largest and India became 10th largest economy of the world. However, the bilateral relations of the two countries have some inherent issues since their inception which act as impediments to their cordial relationship and have led to a bloody war in 1962. All their bilateral relations including Trade relationship came almost to a halt for more than 15 years until they started to restore their ambassadorial level talks with the efforts of leadership from both sides at that time. The restoration of the bilateral relations after the halt is the main focus of the present paper. Further, the paper also focuses on the issues which hindered and still do so to a full-fledged growth of their bilateral trade. Key Words: India, China, Bilateral Trade, Emerging Economies

Introduction India and China, the two largest developing nations in the world, have a number of common concerns in the field of domestic development and economic reform. Though registering rapid economic growth these states find it hard to define their role at global level. Both the states are in favour of a multi-polar world in the shaping of which they can have an effective role alongside the United States. China's strategic interests in India spring from its desire to maintain a peaceful international environment create cordial relations with the nations and especially with neighbours, prevent any attempt towards the formation of anti-China blocs and to explore new markets, investment opportunities and resources to fuel the requirements of its rapid economic growth. Besides, China is keen to address its critical domestic problems in a coherent manner. To achieve all these objectives, it is necessary India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

27

Bashir Ahmad Dar

for China to have amicable political relations with her neighboring states especially India, despite the growing political and strategic relations of India with the United States in recent times. India on her part focuses on domestic development which requires building positive relationships with China. However, the attitude within India towards forging cordial relations with China remains disputed due to the historical bitterness of IndiaChina relations. While as the leftist parties such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) are always in favour of friendly relations with China, the right wing parties like Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) and some opinions within the security establishment view China as a major security threat. George Fernandes, then Indian Defence Minister in Vajpayee led BJP regime, called China India's enemy Number one.1 The trend of mutual trust and respect between the two states go along the growing competition between the two states to affirm their presence in terms of economic, political and military matters within the region. Although the roots of India-China relations can be traced back to past two thousand years, but with their Independence as sovereign nation-states in the mid-20th century, both the states developed a close bilateral relation characterized by mutual support and cooperation. However, in the late fifties the relationship between the two states deteriorated over the border and the Tibet issues which culminated into India-China war of 1962. Thereafter, the relationship between the two continued to deteriorate greatly and was shadowed by an atmosphere of mutual distrust, suspicion and hostility for about two decades. Thus the post 1962 period of the relationships between India and China until 1976 was characterized by animosity and bitterness and is commonly known as the era of Pessimism. During the prime ministerial tenure of Indira Gandhi (1966 to 1976) and Zhoi Enlai 1

28

“George Fernandes has declared China as India's 'potential threat number one” The Indian Express, 4 May 1988.


Bilateral Engagements between India-China since 1988

(1973-1976), both the states initiated the process of normalization of relations. It was the outcome of their mutual efforts that diplomatic relationships were finally restored in 1976 by appointment of K R Narayanan as Indian Ambassador to China and Chen Zhaoyuan as Chinese Ambassador to India. Deng Xiaoping assumed the leadership of China after the death of Moa in 1976. He initiated a series of market-led economic reforms and modernization policy for China in 1978. Deng visualized the policy of stable and peaceful relations of China with other countries necessary for her overall development. He abandoned the ideology-based foreign policy and attempted to improve relations with the neighboring states. Naturally improvement of relationships with India was in his mind. Similarly, Morarji Desai, the then Indian Prime Minister, followed the line of de-escalating tensions with China. He sent his Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China in February, 1979 to open a new chapter of negotiations for the settlement of bilateral disagreements. During Vajpayee's visit to China, Deng Xiaoping stated, “China and India should for the moment put dividing issues on side and do some actual work to improve climate to go about the problem. Neither country poses a threat to the other. How can India and China not be friends?” After Morarji Desai, Mrs. Indira Gandhi came into power in 1980 and contributed in the building of peaceful India-China relations for peace, prosperity and stability of between the two nations. During 1981 to 1988, at least eight rounds of talks on border issues were held at bureaucratic level between the two states. In 1980 while attending the funeral ceremony of Marshal Tito in Belgrade, and again in the same year in Cancun, Mexico, Mrs. Gandhi got an opportunity to meet her Chinese counterpart Hua Guo Feng in which both the leaders expressed their desire to foster cooperation among themselves in a bid to keep at bay the interferences of superpowers. It was, however, only after the Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China from 19 to 23 December, 1988 that both the states accelerated the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

29

Bashir Ahmad Dar

process of normalization. The unilateral decision of Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China is considered as a 'path-breaking' step in India-China relations. During this visit, India accepted China's proposal that bilateral relations could be improved on the basis of Panchsheel and expanded before the solution of border disputes.2 The relationship between India and China have been developing gradually and smoothly, and reaching toward maturity. Both the states share interests in many key areas. In the last few years, bilateral relationship, between the two countries have improved greatly, high level visits continued, border talks have achieved positive progress, cross border trade has increased manifold, exchanges and cooperation in the field of science, technology, education has improved, and mutual trust in security and military areas has also been enhanced. Although there have been some ups and downs, still Post-Cold War bilateral relations between the two countries have been largely peaceful. The evolution in the process of restoration of political relations has grown through three “ways”. First, summit meeting between the heads of state and government, second, regular visits of high ranking military and civilian officials, intellectuals and business leaders, third, steady and gradual processes of confidence building measures (CBMs) through different agreements and treaties.3 From the beginning of the 1990s, both countries concentrated on confidence building measures such as troop reduction on the borders, regular meetings of military commanders and political leaders, and intense bilateral talks to solve border disputes. For example, in the past both nations used to argue upon history and legal perspective but now they try to negotiate their boundary 2

MEA Library, Annual Report 1988-89, http://mealib.nic.in/?2024, Accessed on 10 November, 2013.

3

Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of India And The Government of The People's Republic Of China On The Maintenance Of Peace And Tranquiluty Along The Une Of Actual Control In The India China Border Areas on 7th September, 1993.

30



issues in a different way. They have agreed to resolve the boundary disputes on the pattern of 'give and take' in order to evolve the overall bilateral relationship.4 From mid 1990s, both the states are working upon addressing disputes regarding Sikkim and Tibet. China accepted Sikkim as a part of India in 2003 while as India in principle conceded Tibet as an integral part of People's Republic of China.5 By removing these mistrusts, the two states have enormously paved the ground for favorable environment in both states. Thus, the following factors acted as catalysts in the restoration of their political relations after the halt. a) Change of Guard in India and China Change of the leadership in India and China during the mid 1970s brought the two states closer after 1962 conflict. The gradual improvement in the India-China relations started after the change of Chinese leadership, and notably after the death of Zhou En Lai and Mao Ze Dong in 1976 when leadership came into the hands of Deng Xiao Pong who undertook economic liberalization and modernization at a massive scale that helped in the opening up of Chinese economy and Chinese society as well.6 Meanwhile Janta Party (first non-Congress government in Centre after independence) came to power when Mrs. Indira Gandhi lost the general election of 1977. Janta government sent Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then Minister of External Affairs, to China in order to initiate the process of f diplomatic channels between the two nations. It was in June 1980, when Deng Xiao Ping showed interest for the improvement of the relationship7 and announced a package of deal8 on India-China border which was rejected by India as it was against the Indian interests. 4

C. V. Ramganathan, Panchsheel and the Future-perspective on India-China relations, New Delhi: Samskriti Publications, 2005, p.221.

5

Ibid. p.222.

6

Ibid. p.42.

7

Ganguly Sumit, “The Sino-Indian Border Talks: 1981-1989-A View from New Delhi”, Asian Survey. Vol. 29 (12) December 1989, pp.1125-1126.

8

According to the Package deal, McMahon Line in East was accepted by China, in case India accepts Chinese occupation of Aksai-Chin.


31

Bashir Ahmad Dar

b) Rajiv Gandhi's Visit in 1988 After Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India in 1984. He was impressed by Mikhail Gorbachev's effort of (who assumed the reigns of CPSU in Soviet Union around the same time) improving the ties with USA which later on resulted in the end of forty long years of Cold War.9 In addition, Garbachev visited India in 1986 with a message to Rajiv Gandhi:10 “A normal China-India relationship was in Soviet interests and that India should not expect as before the Soviet Union to extend its unqualified and categorical support in any possible conflict between India and China”. This message proved significant in Rajiv Gandhi's decision to send P.N.Haksar as a special envoy to China to assure the Chinese leadership that India desired good relations with China and that 'India was prepared to adopt a forward looking policy without being mired in the past'.11 It created an opportunity to enhance the bilateral relationship. It was but natural for Rajiv Gandhi to think that if two old rivals, Soviet Union and USA, could agree to live peacefully, why can't India and China? Rajiv Gandhi took the advantage of this situation and proceeded towards the process of normalization of relations with China. Rajiv Gandhi visited China on 19 December, 1988, where he made a jubilant statement that he had come to 'renew old friendship' and his visit would mark 'a new beginning' in the development of bilateral relations between the two states.12 At the same time, Deng Ping told Rajiv Gandhi, “let both sides forget the unpleasant events in our past relations and let us treat everything with an eye on future”.13 His visit brought bilateral 9

Pokharna Bhawna, India-China Relations-Dimensions and Prospectives, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009, pp.50-51.

10

Li Li, Security Precipitation and China-India Relations, New Delhi: KW Publisher Pvt. Ltd, 2009, p.56

11

Ibid.

12

Summit Ganguly, “Sino-Indian Border Talks: A View from New Delhi 1981-1989”, Asian Survey, Vol.29 (12) December 1989, pp.1125-1126.

13

The statesman, 20 December 1988.

32



relations into a new stage of development as the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility along the lines of actual control and make efforts to improve and normalize the bilateral relations. Thus, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China paved a way for more favorable climate in India-China relationship. c) Dream of 'Asian Century' Asia will become the engine of global economic growth and that its two largest states, India and China, will lead at the forefront in the future. The making 21st century as an Asian Century is the projected 21st-century dominance of Asian culture and politics, assuming certain demographic and economic trends persist. The belief in a future Asian Century parallels the characterization of the 20th-century as the American Century and the 19th century as the British Century. The phrase Asian Century arose in the mid to late 1980s, and is attributed to a 1988 meeting with People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Deng Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in which Deng said that 'in recent years people have been saying that the next century will be the century of Asia and the Pacific'. Thus, 21st century is generally visualized to be the Asian Century. The dream for Asian Century made it necessary for both these States to come together during the late 1980's as Deng Xiaoping put it,14 “The total population of China and India exceeds 1.8 billion and accounts for more than one third of world's population, our two states share the same responsibility and we should make use of current peaceful environment to develop ourselves. It is said that the next century will be an Asian-Pacific century. It seems that the century has already come. In fact, however real Asian-Pacific century will only be realized when China, India and other developing countries in the region are fully developed”. Both states endorsed their faith in Panchsheel, when Deng Xiao Ping told Rajiv Gandhi that,15 14

Xinhue News Agency, 21 December, 1988.

15

Pokharna Bhawna, India-China Relations-Dimensions and Prospectives, New Delhi, New Century Publications, 2009, p.54.


33

Bashir Ahmad Dar

“The Panchsheel jointly initiated by our two states are principles that have stood the test of time very well. These principles are unequivocal, straight forward and clear cut. We recommend these principles to the international community as guiding principles for international relations. First of all, we as the two initiators should implement them and jointly pursue these five principles of peaceful coexistence with our neighboring states”. d) Disintegration of USSR and End of Cold War The normalization in India-China relations gained momentum after disintegration of USSR and end of Cold War. The global strategic environment had considerably changed for good. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India lost its trusted friend and ally. Soviet disintegration removed the long standing obstacle in India-China relations. Besides, India lost 20 percent of its export market due to economic decline of the Soviet Union which compelled India to improve its relations with other neighboring countries including China. e) World Shift from bipolarity to uni polarity The uni polar world forced both the Asian States to pursue the goals of economic development, peace and stability within and outside the region. The end of Cold War brought dramatic changes in the global strategic environment. The USSR balkanized into several independent states and U.S.A. emerged as the sole Super Power. The bi-polarity was replaced by unipolarity. India and China found themselves at the receiving end in the changing world order. China was particularly wary of American pronounced concerns over the violation of human rights by China, issues of free international trade, nuclear technology transfers and weapons sale. India also came under pressure from U.S.A. on a range of issues like nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, economic liberalization and intellectual property rights.16 Both India and China were conscious of the fact 16

34

Malik J Mohan, “China-India Relations in the post-Soviet Era: The continuing Rivalry”, The China Quarterly, Vol.142, 1995, p.319. http://journals.cambridge.org /action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid= 3557564 Accessed 2 July 2013.



that the main objective of American strategy in the post-cold war period was to effectively contain the emergence of any potential alternate power centre that can challenge American dominance any where in Europe or in Asia.17 Further, both India and China aspire to emerge as independent power centers in a multi-polar world where they will matter in their respective regions. Thus, both India and China aspire to benefit in making common cause with each other so as to resist arm-twisting by the United States. In the emerging uni-polar system, both India and China were worried about enormous U.S. military power. It was this realization which led to the rapprochement in India and China relations in the post cold war era. f) Process of Rapprochement The rapprochement process already initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 was taken a step further by the Indian president R. Venkataraman's visit to China in 1992.18 During his visit both the nations expressed satisfaction at the working of the Joint Working Group (JWG) and agreed further on intensifying economic cooperation. They laid emphasis upon taking concrete steps to promote mutual Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) like mutual troop reductions and regular meetings of local military commanders. The Indian initiative of sending its Defense Minister Sharad Pawar to China in July, 1992 was a milestone in Security Building Measures (SBMs) between the two neighbours. During his visit, the two sides agreed to foster academic, military, scientific and technological exchanges. A major step in the direction of growing India-China rapprochement was the visit of Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao to China in September, 1993. During his visit, he and Chinese Premier Le Peng signed the “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility” along the Line of Actual Control between their borders. This agreement was a significant development in 17

Ibid

18

Changappa Bidanda M, India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to post Cold War Period, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2003, p.280.


35

Bashir Ahmad Dar

the history of bilateral relations between the two nations as it stabilized relations on the one hand and initiated numerous Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on the other hand. Further, the India - China expert group was set up by both the nations to demarcate the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and discuss troop reduction. This group held two meetings, one in February 1994 and another in April 1994. Ways and means of maintaining peace and tranquility over the common border were also discussed by them. These visits included the important ones like the Indian Chief of Army Staff, General B.C. Joshi's and the Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Hation's to each other's countries. The Indian Vice-President K.R. Narayanan also paid a three day visit to China from 21st November. For the promotion of cultural ties, a cultural festival namely “Festival of India” was also held in Beijing on 6th May. All these factors and, more importantly the two visits by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1988) and Narsimaha Rao (1993) to China proved to be landmarks in the normalization process of India- China relations. China made substantial improvements in its bilateral relations with India. An important impetus to this process was also given in June 2003 when a number of bilateral agreements and one political declaration on basic principles of cooperation between India and China were signed. Firm intention of both the nations to promote bilateral partnership was upheld by the new Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, and his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, during their meeting at the ASEAN+3 summit in Vietnam in November 2004. In 2005, Wen Jiabao made an official visit to India, generally regarded as successful by both sides, and the recent visit of President Hu Jintao to India on 28 March, 2012 further strengthened the belief that China intends to uphold positive ties with India and to reach a reconciliatory point on a wide range of issues.19 19

36

Malik V.P., The rise of China-Perspectives from Asia and Europe, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008, p.143.



g) Economic Factors New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the rallying cry of under-developed world at different multilateral floras during the seventies of past century further cemented the belief of the two states that in the transition from post Second World War Bretton Woods economic order to a more justice based economic order their role was indispensable. Since, both India and China being the regional giants in terms of population and geographical area on the one hand and the largest market places of predatory multinationals of developed world on the other, it becomes incumbent for them to assume leading roles among the fractured nations of the South and East Asia. It is in this context that the leadership of both sides realized the urgency to work for the achievement of NIEO. Deng Xiao Ping of China confided to Rajiv Gandhi,20 “We put forward the proposal of establishing a New International Economic Order many times. Now we must do two things at the same time in world. One is to establish a New Political Order and the other is to establish a New International Economic Order”. On this occasion, Rajiv Gandhi accepted Deng Xiao Ping's opinion and during his meeting with Zaho Ziang, the Secretary of Communist Party of China said,21 “Chairman Deng Xiao Ping talked about the establishment of a New International Political and Economic Order is significant. The existing economic order is unfair and unreasonable. Only with the old economic order being changed can the new political Order be established. Chairman Deng Xiao Ping ideas were basically the same as the ideas held by India”. Thus both nations showed their desire to play an active role in third world politics. For this, it had become obvious that they had to align with each other. 20

Pokharna Bhawna, India-China Relations-Dimensions and Prospectives, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009, p.55.

21

Pokharna Bhawna, India-China Relations-Dimensions and Prospectives, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009, p.55


37

Bashir Ahmad Dar

In 2003, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited China and the two nations signed agreements on visa simplification procedures and education programs besides enhancing the bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2015. Furthermore, in 2005, steps were taken by China towards the resolution of its long-standing and highly dangerous territorial dispute with India.22 2.2 Bilateral Agreements The People's Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 1, 1949 and India got independence two years earlier in August 15th, 1947. India was the first non-communist country to establish an Embassy in PRC. On April 1, 1950, China and India began their diplomatic relations. The two nations signed the famous Panchsheel Agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) in 1954. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited India in June 1954 and Prime Minister J.L. Nehru visited China in October 1954. Premier Zhou Enlai again visited India in January, 1957 and in April 1960. India-China war of 1962 led to a severe setback in bilateral relations and Panchsheel became the first causality. Their ambassadorial relations were restored in August, 1976. Higher political level contacts were revived by the visit of the then Minister of External Affairs, A.B. Vajpayee in February 1979. The Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a return visit to India in June, 1981. Apart from the above factors, a number of exchange visits were paid to each other's country which paved the way for formation of a conducive and suitable environment between the two states. A series of exchanges in diverse fields were made in the year 2011. A visit to Sanya, port city of China, was made by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from 12-15 April, 2011 to participate in the third BRICS Summit. PM Manmohan Singh met with Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the Summit. Chief 22

38

P. Malik .V, The Rise of China-Perspectives from Asia and Europe, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008, p.144.



Ministers of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat visited China in June, September and November 2011. As part of the MEA-ILD exchange Programme and Distinguished Visitors Programme of MEA, the chairman of Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Party Secretary of Gansu Province also visited India in the year 2011. A youth delegation visited China in the 'Year of Exchanges' which were initially 100 and later on increased to 500. On this visit Premier Wen Jiabao addressed the Indian youth. Also, the leadership of both sides maintained regular contacts and met frequently in international gatherings. Indian Prime Minister met with Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2010 on the sidelines of the BRIC summit in Brasilia, Brazil. Again on the sidelines of the EAS in Hanoi in October, 2010, Indian Prime Minister met with Premier Wen Jiabao. PM of India also had a bilateral meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the EAS in Bali in November, 2011. Pranab Mukherjee, External Affairs Minister of India, visited China to attend the India-Russia-China trilateral meeting in October, 2007 and again in 4-7 June 2008 paid a successful visit to China. A return visit was paid by the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (his first as Foreign Minister) to India on 7-9 September in the same year. On the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Phuket in July, 2009. On this occasion it was the first meeting of S.M. Krishna's as External Affairs Minister with the Chinese Foreign Minister. Meeting of the Trilateral Foreign Ministers was held in Bangalore on 27th October, 2009. A separate bilateral meeting of the Indian and the Chinese Foreign Ministers was also held. Again on 5-8 April 2010 S.M. Krishna again visited China and held talks with the Chinese counterpart and met with Premier Wen Jiabao. It was in this visit when External Affairs Minister launched the Festival of India in China and attended a reception to mark the 60th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations. In an another important occasion, National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon visited Beijing as Special Envoy of PM in July, 2010 and later visited in November in the same year to hold the 14th round of Special India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

39

Bashir Ahmad Dar

Round talks on India-China boundary question. Indian External Affairs Minister again in a sideline meeting of BRICS met with Chinese Foreign Minister. The two foreign ministers, in addition to this, had telephonic conversations on major issues of interest. All these visits paved a way for India and China stepped up in functional cooperation in most if not all areas. The two foreign ministries have initiated dialogue mechanisms on issues relating to counter-terrorism, policy planning and security, besides strategic dialogue and regular consultations. There are also close cooperation in areas as diverse as water resources, judiciary, science & technology, audit, personnel, finance, labor. Exchanges at the government levels, Parliamentary and Party exchanges expanded by when the two countries maintained a close contact by these frequent visits to each other. Hon'ble Speaker of the Lok Sabha Somnath Chatterjee led an Indian Parliamentary Delegation to China in July, 2006 during which both sides signed MoUs to further strengthen the friendly relations and cooperation between the parliaments. To facilitate high level exchanges of Party leaders from China and State Chief Ministers from India, a special arrangement has been entered into by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA- IDCPC) in 2004. There are regular Party-to-Party exchanges between the CPC and political parties in India. The party level understanding is one of the important steps towards a progressive relation. The formal visits have opened routes for the informal cooperation such as these part to part exchanges. The regular visits have benefited the two nations in various forms. One of the important among them is involvement of the strategic and foreign policy think-tanks. They are continuously working to make a fruitful and progressive environment between the two nations. Their relation continued to get stronger during, 2011. China institutes of contemporary international relations (CICIR) have regular interactions with Institute of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Institute of Chinese studies 40



(ICS). The third Track-II dialogue between China Reform Forum and Aspen India was held in March 2011. The United Service Institute of India (USI) has with China Institute for International Strategic Studies and Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) has interactions with (The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs) CPIFA. Dialogues are now being initiated between pairs of India- China academic organizations

Trade relations Besides these, the other factor which helped in restoration their relationship between India and China was that of growing trade. The dramatic growth of bilateral trade started as well. It has changed from few hundred Million US dollars in mid 1990s to more than 60 billion US dollars in 2011 and is estimated to cross 100 billion US dollar in 2015. The bilateral trade between the two states since 1988 is as under. Table (1.1) shows the total bilateral trade between India and China and depicts that there was a regular and growing trend of total bilateral trade. In 1991 the total bilateral trade between the two states was only US $ million 264 which increased to US $ million 34886 in 2007. After 1995 the total bilateral trade had shown slight declined trend and for 1998 it had shown a negative growth rate of -12.5 percent. But after 2001 the annual growth rate of bilateral trade had slightly increased i,e 64.9 percent in 2001, 59.0 percent in 2004, and 60.0 percent in 2005. After the Chinese agreement to the WTO on 11 December 200123, the bilateral trade of India-China picked up significantly and grown speedily during the last few years. During the period 2001-2009, bilateral trade turnover jumped by nearly fifteen times from US$ 3.6 billion to nearly US$ 45.1 billion. Due to the global financial crises, bilateral trade between the two states has shown negative trend as in 2008 the total trade was 39.94 billion dollars which declines 38.99 billion dollars in 2009 as shown in the table and diagram below. 23

World Trade Organization, http:/www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/ china_e.htm Accessed on 12 December 2012.


41

Bashir Ahmad Dar Table 1.1: Total Bilateral Trade between India and China (US Million dollars) Year

Total trade

Annual growth

Year

Total trade

Annual growth

1989

116.04

-

2001

3639

64.9

1990

264.1

127.5

2002

4323

18.8

1991

264

0.003

2003

6448

49.2

1992

339

28.4

2004

10252

59.0

1993

676

99.4

2005

16399

60.0

1994

894

32.2

2006

23723

44.7

1995

1162

30.0

2007

34887

47.1

1996

1406

21.0

2008

39940

14.5

1997

1830

30.2

2009

38995

-2.4

1998

1602

-12.5

2010

61712

58.3

1999

1751

9.3

2011

73390

18.92

2000

2207

26.0

2012

65783

10.36

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, Government of India

Figure 1: Trade relation between India and China

Figure 1: Annual growth rate

42



But the economic relations of two most populous and fast growing economies of the world-India and China-are as intertwined in the complexities as has been the history of the relationship between the nation states. There are certain issues which have hindered and still do so to a full-fledged growth of their bilateral trade. China already has emerged as one of the largest trading partners of India. In 2012, the bilateral trade stood at $65.78billion, which is expected to touch the $100 billion-mark by 2015. But the trade returns a frustrating deficit for India. During the year 2012-13, India's exports to China stood at $13.53 billion, while imports stood at $52.24 billion. The trade deficit is about $ 40.77 billion against a deficit of $37 billion in 2011-12.24 There is handicap in selling Indian products in China, due to higher prices while Chinese goods - from portraits of Hindu deities and ladies cosmetics to sophisticated telecommunication hardware are flooding the Indian market which are demanded more due to lower price as compared to their own products. India wants to decline the percentage of primary products and raw materials, like iron ore, in India's export basket to China by including manufactured goods therein. Furthermore, India is interested in dismantling the barriers for cooperation in several areas especially in information technology, education, the financial sector, healthcare and tourism.25 So for as the interests of India are concerned, it is necessary to resolve the issues with China as the trade deficit is an important factor in the depreciation of the Indian Rupee's value. It has also put pressure on India to attract foreign investment. Although, India cannot blame China alone for this, but India herself is also responsible for several of these issues, as the India is mainly producer of primary products and is not self sufficient. In fact, the trade disparity shows that India's manufacturing infrastructures 24

The Hindu, 23 September 2013.

25

Acharya, Alka. “A Partnership of 'Global Significance.”, Economic and Political Weekly. 41:49344936 (2006).


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Bashir Ahmad Dar

are still weak and hence are not capable to produce high quality goods which consumers would like to buy, and , therefore, are unable to compete with their Chinese counterparts. Indian firms want the government in New Delhi to save them from Chinese dumping prices. But this policy might backfire and hurt the economy as well as the Indian consumer. For instance, the cabinet approved a 21% tariff on the import of equipments for big power projects in July 2012, a move aimed to protect local manufacturers from Chinese competitors. But the other side of the story is that India desperately needs to boost power production, as the massive power outage at the end of July 2012 has demonstrated. For that advanced Chinese technology - from boilers to turbines is becoming increasingly vital to pull off the biggest power plant projects. China already supplies over 40% of India's power gear26. Chinese strong and increasing engagement in the Indian market is a cause of concern to both Indian government and the Indian public. Though the U.S., Brazil, and Russia run large trade deficits with China, too but India's concerns are more sensitive especially in the context of the countries being neighboring rivals with clashing strategic interests. Besides the border dispute along the Himalayas, India is increasingly worried about China's influence over Indian Ocean shipping lanes, while China is wary of India's oil-exploration in the South China Sea.

Conclusion The exchange of visits between the different state functionaries and the agreements on different issues of common interest further cemented the relations between the two states. The increased level of consultations brought the two neighbors together on a number of policy issues. The regular process of consultations between the two states not only buttressed the process of evolution of a peaceful political and economic atmosphere but 26

44

Sharma, Amol, “Trade Gap Strains India-China Ties”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443687504577563 542149677000?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle% 2FSB10000872396390443687504577563542149677000.html%2520%2822%2520Aug% 25202012%29. Accessed on 21 July 2014.



also brought into its wake an antidote to the fear psychosis in the region. It has been after all the success of these diplomatic channels of communication and bilateral agreements that helped the two regional powers to take on global challenges at different international foras under a common banner. Finally, the paper ends with the note that Economic relations have been susceptible to political relations on both sides and both political and economic relations have shown mutual interdependence, where Political Relations act as a base and other things like economic relations, CBMs, Cooperation, Coordination, Dialogue, Conflicts, Competition etc are superstructures. Suggestions Need for Effective Mechanism to resolve the border and territory issues. Increasing trade has itself contributed to an easing of the border issues. China's recognition of Sikkim as part of India enabled a 2004 agreement to open the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim as trading links. The Nathula Pass was finally reopened in July 2006 after the end of 1962. In the first 51 days of trading in 2006 through the Nathula Pass, trade totaled US$186250. While the opening of the pass has been broadly interpreted as a positive step. The two states should evolve mechanism to prevent the border incursion so that peace, stability, tranquility on the disputed borders shall be ensured and reopened the ancient trade roots so that both the states will enhance their bilateral trade. As A.K. Antony, the Defense Minster of India says:27 “Till the final settlement of the border disputes, we are trying to find out more effective mechanisms to prevent occasional incidents. There are many points in the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that are disputed and they are patrolled by both sides. So, sometimes it leads to some face-off.” 27

The Hindu,26 July, 2013. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-chinaevolving-mechanisms-to-prevent-border-incidents/article4955573.ece


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Bashir Ahmad Dar

Teacher's interaction at School level On the pattern of China-India Media Exchange Program, cohosted by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and Global Times Foundation,28 both states should encourage the teacher to teacher contacts at the school level. Teachers have a role in mobilization or building opinion at grass root level so that positive thinking will evolve among the students on both sides. They should increase contacts and familiarity in every walk of life. The Program of Cultural Exchange during the years 20132015 which includes art and culture, youth affairs, cultural heritage, education and sports, media, publications and mass communications29 is a positive step toward it. Cultural diplomacy will play vital role in the India-China Relationship not only in resolving the bilateral issues including border and water issues, but also for stimulating the bilateral partnership in terms of maintaining peace, enhancing economic cooperation30 and establishing suitable environment for the process of resolving confrontations. 29

A Joint Statement-A Vision for future development of the India-China strategic partnership, 23 October, 2013, Minstry of External Affairs.

30

Y. Yagama Reddy, India-China relations Changing profile in the 21st Century,2010, Gyan Publishing p.131

References : Acharya, Alka. “A Partnership of 'Global Significance.”, Economic and Political Weekly. 41 (2006). C. V. Ramganathan, Panchsheel and the Future-perspective on India-China relations, New Delhi: Samskriti Publications, 2005. Changappa Bidanda M, India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to post Cold War Period, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2003. Ganguly Sumit, “The Sino-Indian Border Talks: 1981-1989-A View from New Delhi”, Asian Survey. Vol. 29 (12) December 1989. Li Li, Security Precipitation and China-India Relations, New Delhi: KW 46



Publisher Pvt. Ltd, 2009. Malik J Mohan, “China-India Relations in the post-Soviet Era: The continuing Rivalry”, The China Quarterly,142 (1995). Malik V.P., The rise of China-Perspectives from Asia and Europe, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008. P. Malik .V, The Rise of China-Perspectives from Asia and Europe, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008. Pokharna Bhawna, India-China Relations-Dimensions and Prospectives, New Delhi: New Century Publications, 2009. Sharma, Amol, “Trade Gap Strains India-China Ties”, The Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2012. Summit Ganguly, “Sino-Indian Border Talks: A View from New Delhi 19811989”, Asian Survey, Vol.29 (12) December 1989. Y. Yagama Reddy, India-China relations Changing profile in the 21st Century,2010, Gyan Publishing. Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of India And The Government of The People's Republic Of China On The Maintenance Of Peace And Tranquiluty Along The Une Of Actual Control In The India China Border Areas on 7th September, 1993


47

Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A Reappraisal C. Annapurna and Gaddam Venkata Ramana Ph.D Research Scholars, Dept. of History, S.V.University Tirupati

Abstract Several countries in Asia and Africa became colonies of European powers. As a result of prolonged freedom struggle several colonies got independence after 1945. After the Second World War in 1945. The world was divided into two power blocs namely the capitalist and the communists. All the capitalist nations joined hand with the United States of America and all the pro-communist and some third world countries who got independence from their colonial masters also looked towards USSR. Countries like India, which was exploited for nearly two hundred years was under developed. In the field of Agriculture, Education, Employment, Modern Technologies and Defence is lagging behind. It needs liberal financial and technical assistance to overcome certain problems under these circumstances, India aneeds cooperation and assistance from all the developed countries. By aligning with one power, India may not get the required moral and material support. Hence, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India by joining hands with Marshal Tito of Yugoslovia, Nasser of Egypt and Sukarno of Indonesia wanted to form a group of Third World and developing countries independent of the two power blocs to remain and present their case for better co-operation and support from the developed West. Before formally launching the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, as a preliminary to the NAM, nations from Asia and Africa met at Bandung in 1954 which is known as Afro-Asian Conference or Bandung Conference.

Introduction India is the first state to have pursued a policy that was new in the history of international relations the policy of “Non-Alignment”. This policy has been adopted by many nations those who got independence after 1945 in Asia and Africa. These Non-Aligned nations began to play an important role in world politics. The shaping of India's Foreign Policy was largely influenced by international developments after World War II. The Indian National Congress (INC), as a representative of different classes and sections of Indian society wanted to protect their interests, in 48


Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A Reappraisal

the formulation of a foreign policy of India after independence. Pandit Nehru in the formative stage of shaping the Foreign Policy of India undertook the policy of neutrality in dealing with outside powers. The victory won by the Soviet Union in World War II, the appearance of several socialist states, in Europe and Asia, emergence of capitalist states, it is a fairly widespread notion that Indian foreign policy was Nehru's “Private Monopoly”. The importance of the debates on foreign policy was determined by three factors. Firstly, they were meant for the outside world Secondly, the educated the people and thirdly, they helped to make foreign policy acceptable to all members of parliament. The Constituent Assembly of the Dominion was formed a part of the Constituent Assembly of colonial India. The Soviet Union and the United States were the only countries able to render their substantial economic aid to India. But the United States did not continue itself to examining the economic position of India. The struggle for India between the American and the British imperialists resulted in yet another approach whose exponents business circles in Bombay and to some extent, in Calcutta claimed that it would be better for India to leave the British CommonWealth and conclude a military and political alliance with the United States. Frank Moraes, author of a biography of interpreted the purpose of the visit as follows: “Nehru's idea in going to the United States was threefold-to demonstrate India's friendship for America as well as her gratitude for America's sympathy in India's struggle for independence to learn more about America; to make Americans more conscious of India as a factor in world affairs. The beginning of such reappraisal can be seen in Nehru's statement in July 1950, when he said, “our economic policy is obviously tied to England and other western powers”, but “political policy is another matter…..”. the most important Foreign Policy problem which the Indian Government had to takle at the end of 1949 was question of India's relations with China. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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C. Annapurna and Gaddam Venkata Ramana

India's position on the Tibet question which was a serious trial for India-China relations did not improve matters. The Tibetan authorities expelled the Kuomintang mission from Lhasa and proclaimed the “Independence of Tibet”. As some students of Indian foreign policy observe, “the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Sino-Indian relations for a brief period, but K.M.Panikkar assisted greatly in restoring friendly relations, the autonomy of Tibet and the Dalai Lama's status as the spiritual and secular ruler of Tibet whereas the Tibetan authorities recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and the Central Governments responsibility for Tibets defence and foreign relations. After the “Tibetan Question” was closed, in its policy towards China, the Indian government. SinoIndian relations were definitely improved by the fact that the Chinese Government. offered Nehru's Government's policy towards China in 1951-53 was generally supported by the ruling National Congress Party. In May 1954, the Colombo conference supported the proposal made by Indonesia between Nasser and Nehru, who visited Cairo at the invitation of the Egyptian Governmenrt. The conference took place in Bandung 18-24 April 1955. It was attended by 29 countries. India did much at Bandung to help China to use the Conference to extend its contacts. The Conference had been in favour of military blocs, Nasser said it had denounced pacts like SEATO and NATO. Relations between India and the USSR, US military aid to Pakistan, the emergence of SEATO and the Baghdad pact led India to invite in terms of peaceful coexistence, free from two power blocs and get liberal financial and technical assistance from both. The Soviet Government invited Nehru to visit the USSR. He accepted the invitation, the heads of govt. acclaimed the results of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung. The peaceful settlement of the conflict between China and India, the ending of the “Formosa Crisis”, insistence on China's admission to the UN, the moves for disarmament and against weapons of mass destruction, and so on. 50


Impact of Bandung Conference on Sino-Indian Relations: A Reappraisal

Nehru, received the French historian Tibor Meende at the latter's request, to discuss a number of problems. 'Replying to one of Mende's questions as to what were the practical results of the Bandung Conference, the organ of the National Congress Party, the Economic Review, exposed the colonialist theory of the “Whiteman's burden” and greeted Ghana's choice of nonalignment similar to India's. Since 1954-55 when Pakistan joined the aggressive blocs of SEATO and CENTO, the beginning of the crisis is associated with the discussion of the Kashmir problem at a SEATO council session, India's policy of non-alignment, its struggle for peace, coexistence and to solve the problem and nation. Still, the spirit of Nehru in the guiding principles in formulating India's Foreign Policy and recalled NATO ideals.

Panchaseela This agreement also described the principle of panchasheel to be followed by two countries, by this agreement a set of five principles, later came to be known as panchasheel came into being. The five points of panchsheel were: 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2) Mutual non-aggression. 3) Non interference in each others internal affairs. 4) Equality and mutual benefit. 5) Peaceful coexistence, implying that both the countries would respect each other's existence in international relations. In June 1954, Chinese premier Chouen-Lai paid return visit to India after a series of discussion both countries reiterated their faith in Panchasheel (52) His visit was marked by Hindi-Chini, Bhai-Bhai (India and Chinese are brothers) Chou was received with warm welcome in India and met various leaders.


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Syed Ali Mujtaba, PhD*

Bandung Conference An Afro Asian Conference took place on 18-24 April 1955 at Bandung in Indonesia in which 29 countries participated in conference of immense diplomatic importance at Bandung in Indonesia. Here also both countries vowed to enhance the cooperation among the third world countries, while keeping full faith in the principle of Panchasheel Having just returned form his China visit, Nehru's unrelenting enthusiasm for China was once again exhibited at Bandung when he become the main sponsor to Zhou En- Lai to this conference irrespective of criticism from various countries. However Zhou's Strategies and opportunism in Bandung won him laurels and labeled him as peacemaker especially when he announced that China was ready to negotiate with the US and favoured de-escalation of tension in Taiwan Strait. Nehru had tried to mediate in the Taiwan Crises without any success. China while advocating peace and mutual trust at Bandung was increasingly turning hostile to India. References : 1)

Yuri Nasenoko, Jawaharlal Nehru and india's Foreign Policy, Sterling Publishers PvtLtd, New Delhi, 1977.

2)

Bhawna Pokharna, India-China Relations: Dimensions and Perspectives, New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2009.

3)

O.P.Ralhan, Jawaharlal Nehru Abroad: A Chronological Study, S.S. Publishers, New Delhi, 1983.

4)

Bhat, Sudhakar, India and China, Popular book service, New Delhi, 1967.

5)

Sarkar Subhash Chandra, “Indian Relations to Development in Tibet” (ed.), in India China and Japan's Foreign Policy, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1992.

6)

Jawaharlal Nehru, Before and after Independence, The Indian Printing Works, New Delhi, 1967.

7)

Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1956.

8)

Bhupesh Gupta, Quit CommonWealth, Communist Party Publications, New Delhi, 1965.

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India-China Relations: A Sino-Indian Perspective Atrayee Banerjee1 and Madhurima Chowdhury2 1

Senior Research Scholar, Human Rights, Department of Anthropology, Ballygunge Science College, University of Calcutta 2 Assistant Professor, South and South East Asian Studies, Alipore Campus, University of Calcutta Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract The two ancient civilizations (India and China) have followed separate courses of development, which is but natural, even after being born in the same cradle of civilization. Being neighbors, the India-China trade relations had established since time immemorial. Historical records revealed that this trade relation was a two-way traffic and the elements of linkage were material and spiritual or cultural linkages. Beside material exchange, it was perhaps the spiritual linkage that transformed this relationship completely and took it to a new height. The Indian revolutionaries made China as one of their bases to carry out anti-British activities. Gandhiji's principles of Satyagraha and Ahimsa generated much heated debates in China and the Chinese people even pronounced him as a symbol of the 'eastern civilization'. If we consider the modern situation, India-China ties at governmental level remains stable at this juncture. New Delhi and Beijing have established a 'strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity'. India and China are even cooperating on international issues related to the diversification of global energy mix, climate change, arms control and disarmament, counter terrorism, human rights and southsouth cooperation. India and China are not viewing each other as security threats regarding the border issues but still, the boundary issue comes foremost in the list of problem areas. Other bilateral issues such as the disputed Tibet issue, India-US relation, China-Pakistan nexus, etc. remains to the core of several debates. Confusion and lack of communication is prevalent in both the countries and more and more people to people contacts between the two sides can bring a beneficial change to such conditions. Key Words: Tibet issue, China-Pakistan nexus, India-US relations, India-China trade relations.

Introduction India and China are the two giants of Asia of the oldest and living civilization of the world. Sindhu (Indus) and Ganges gave birth to Indian civilization, which influenced south and Southeast Asia. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Atrayee Banerjee and Madhurima Chowdhury

Similarly, Huangghe (Yellow River) and Changjiang (Yangtze River, The longest river of Asia; flows eastward from Tibet into the East China Sea near Shanghai) gave birth to the Chinese civilization, which on its part influenced northeast and Southeast Asia. India-China relations have undergone dramatic changes over the past five decades, ranging from the 1950's with a deep hostility in the 1960's and 1970's to a re-approchement in the 1980's and a readjustment since the demise of Soviet Union. The post-cold war era has offered enormous opportunities to New Delhi and Beijing to move in the direction of a productive relationship'. Both countries have realized the imperative need for cooperation in diverse areas, especially in the trade and economic domains, in the long-term interest of peace and stability in Asia as well as for faster economic development and prosperity at home. China and India, being the two most populous countries in the world, are together accounting for more than a third of the world's total population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). This makes the Sino-Indian relationship critical not only for those living in China and India, but for the whole world (Radtke, 2003) As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated during his visit to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 2004, will the SinoIndian relationship have tremendous impact on international relations in the twenty-first century. That being said, there is a surprisingly quiet discussion about this relationship. This research, thus hopes to contribute to the discussion by analyzing the relationship's nature, as well as, China's and India's attitude towards security-related issues. More concretely try to understand what impact trade and cooperation have had for the development of the relationship. Noticeable progress has been made in Sino-Indian relations in recent years which are entering a new period of all-round development. A growing number of inherent drivers and external factors may impact the bilateral relations which are at a critical time for “rebalancing” and “redefinition” (Jianxue, 2013). 54


India-China Relations: A Sino-Indian Perspective

Historical Perspective The reliable literature records of Sino-Indian interface could be traced from Han Dynasty (BC 206- AD 220). The first information is provided by Si Maqian (BC 145-BC90), the great Chinese historian, in his masterpiece Shiji Xinanyizhun (Records of the Historian: Foreigners in southwest). It has been narrated that people in the Shu (another name of Sichuan province) were wearing clothes that were brought from Shendu (Sindhu from India). Besides material linkage, there was yet another linkage - the spiritual linkage, i.e., Buddhism. Though the roots of communication had already been established, this new linkage made them undertake many religious pilgrimages from India to China and China to India, besides opening many trade centers (Yinzeng, 1990). The post liberation history of Sino-Indian relations has been that of friendship, setback and normalization. India was the first country in non-communist bloc to recognize China and establish diplomatic relations. There was a brief period of cooperation from 1949 - 1957 where diplomatic relations were formally established (1 April 1950) and high-level visits were exchanged. (Athwak, 2008). Friendly relations between China and India from 1950 to 1958 brought out great gains, either from the angle of peaceful construction of both countries or from the angle of safeguarding peace in Asia and the world. India-China relations deteriorated in June 1967 with the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from Beijing on alleged charges of - espionage activities. The winter of 1967 witnessed skirmishes on India-China border. During the 1970s Pakistan's problem between East and West Pakistan, China not only supported the military junta and its role in East Pakistan but also tried discreetly to moderate Yahya Khan's brutal policy towards East Pakistan but without success. Both China and India are two neighbouring countries on a fast India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

55


rise among newly emerging countries. With the swift development of trade and economic relations between China and India, China has become one of India's biggest trade partners. It is well known that China's hardware and India's software are complementary. China has developed friendly relations with both India and Pakistan in a separate way, while trilateral relations between China, India and the United States have maintained a general balance. These are conducive to stability in South Asia. Both China and India have common stands on a number of major international questions. With both countries taking part in more and more regional and international regimes, they support each other on many important questions such as climate change. It is not empty talk that China- India friendly relations are in conformity with the fundamental interests of the two peoples. That harmony is important, has more and more become a common understanding of both the governments and the peoples.

Handling Differences between India and China It can be seen from the history of international relations that it is somewhat of a rule that differences of one kind or another would emerge between countries especially between major powers. Since the differences between China and India have been related to questions such as Tibet and China-India boundary, which involve sovereignty and territorial integrity, the above point has become even more conspicuous. Reviewing the developments since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India, one can see that relations were quite smooth when both sides could handle their differences calmly, attaching importance to the overall interest. For instance, both sides dealt with the Tibet question quite well in the initial period after the establishment of diplomatic relations between them, with the result that this question did not affect the development of their friendly relations in the 1950s.

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Another question is that it is imperative that both sides should avoid making their policy in an emotional way. It could be seen from the situation during the period of confrontation between China and India that emotional approaches appeared on both sides, so that calm and objective judgment on things could not be made and a few wrong decisions were taken with serious consequences. On the contrary, judging from the situation of a short setback of China-India relations in 1998 after India's nuclear tests, both sides tried hard to avoid emotional approaches, so that China-India relations could come out of the low quickly and were restored and developed again. It is also important that both sides should offer greater guidance and education to the masses of the two countries to prevent feelings of narrow nationalism. Since both the Chinese and Indian people have been oppressed by imperialism and colonialism for a long period of time strong sentiments of nationalism are clearly found among the masses of both countries. This is understandable. However, under these conditions, it is even more necessary for both sides to guard against the sentiments of narrow nationalism and defend the overall interest of maintaining friendly relations between the two countries. Otherwise some very radical remarks and actions might emerge, leading to unwarranted damage to the relations between the two countries. The demarcation between patriotism and narrow nationalism is whether overall interest has been put in the foremost or not. Apart from the two governments, the media of both countries have also a great responsibility in correctly guiding public opinion.

India- China Relations Today Debates about Sino-Indian relations often start off from either one of two different, and even contradictory, schools of thought. The first of them takes a “realist” point of view, arguing that each of the two emerging powers would fight for dominance in the Asian continent. It tends to describe relations between the two countries as hostile. This could even lead to military confrontation between India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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the two nations, or at least to an even greater militarization of the region (Roy, 2011; Banyan, 2012 and The Economist, 2012). War is only contained because both countries have nuclear weapons and are increasing and modernizing their capabilities in conventional warfare. India belongs to the group of major importers of military technology. The second school of thought takes a liberal perspective, viewing China and India as two major emerging markets in a more and more interdependent world, where trade and commerce sustain peaceful co-existence. Observing the Indian media it seems that the “China threat“ theory dominates in most news broadcasts (Banyan 2012). There are many fields where India and China are cooperating, but there is not much progress especially in bilateral matters, as can be observed when looking at the way how both sides are handling the border issue. Trust is an important variable for sustainable cooperation, and that trust, or rather the lack of it, is a determining factor in Indo-Chinese cooperation. In the middle of the 20th century the new independent nation states Republic of India and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were founded. Both countries, but especially Nehruvian India, felt that they were vanguards of the anti-colonial movement. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru saw China as a natural ally, close to India, as both nation states had just fought off imperialism. The phrase “Hindi-Chini bhai, bhai!” (“India and China are brothers”) was coined during this era, in the light of the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement with the PRC. The uncomplicated relationship with India changed abruptly in 1955, when the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) occupied the region which is today known as the Tibet Autonomous Region. All Chinese governments since the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 had claimed Tibet as an integral part of China. Although India under Nehru quickly acknowledged Tibet as a part of the PRC, the political situation changed for both sides, with painful consequences for India.

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Occasional crossings of the Line of Control to India territory (LOC) by alleged Chinese soldiers and the “stapled visa affair“ concerning citizens of the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir (Mohan 2011) pour oil into the fire that keeps the “Chinese threat theory” hot and boiling. The recent test of India's Agni V long-range missile is also a part of India's strategy to contain China militarily from a greater presence in South Asia. With Agni V, India's indigenous Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), India has the capacity to attack any of China's strategic cities and regions with a nuclear bomb. The nuclear threat is one of the reasons, a realist would say, that hinders both countries to aggressively solve the border issue. It is also a deterrent ensuring, as yet, that the competition for dominance in some Asian regions did not evolve into an armed conflict. China has strong engagements with India's neighbours that mostly do not have really friendly ties with India. In the forefront is Pakistan. China assists India's western neighbour with building roads and power plants in Pakistan's Kashmir Region; India fears that China strengthens Pakistan's military and Pakistansupported anti-Indian militant groups in the region. Myanmar is another much contested territory among India and China. China and India are both competing for a greater economic and political influence in Asia. With an increasing military build-up and a sometimes chauvinistic rhetoric in both nations, the risk of a military conflict seems to be real. But the situation is not that simple or one-sided. Both countries are experiencing high economic growth in the last two, three decades. The liberal view of relations between India and China expects a peaceful rise of both Asian giants with both countries interlinked to each other with strong economic bonds and also with the same social, environmental and security threats which will force them to eventually work together. Cooperation is the only rationale that both countries can choose for their mutual benefit.


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Enhancement of the Mutual Trust With the common efforts of both sides, the main trend of ChinaIndia relations has been quite good in recent years. However, the inadequacy of mutual trust between the two sides has still been quite an outstanding problem, with certain negative impact on their relations. The inadequacy of mutual trust between China and India has been mainly revealed through the fact that the “China threat” theory has been on rise once again in India in recent years. There are a number of factors leading to the inadequacy of mutual trust between China and India. Some are the questions left over from history while some are related to real politics. Thus, the situation has been quite complicated. The first factor is that no major breakthrough has been achieved on the China-India boundary question. Since 2003, a number of rounds of talks have already been held by the Special Representatives of the two governments. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005, both governments signed the “Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China-India Boundary Question,” thus laying a good foundation for both sides to realize the final solution of the boundary question. However, owing to the complicated nature of this question, it seems that there is still some difficulty to reach the final settlement. Since the impact of the 1962 border conflict between the two countries has not fully vanished, the Indian side is still considerably apprehensive about China on the boundary question. The second factor is that the economic gap between China and India has been widening. In recent years, both China and India have achieved a fairly fast paced economic growth. However China's rate of growth has been higher than India's, with the result that the economic gap between the two countries has been widening. Since India has had all along quite a strong motive of competing with China, it seems that India is worried over the issue of the gap in economic development. 60



In accordance with the situation of China- India relations and with reference to historical experiences of China's relations with some other countries, if both sides could make greater efforts in the following three areas, it would play an important role in enhancing mutual trust between the two sides. Judging from the situation in recent years, mutual visits and meetings in third countries between leaders of China and India could play an especially vital role in promoting the mutual trust between the two countries. Leaders at the highest level of both countries have conducted in-depth exchange of views, from a strategic altitude, on ways and means to further develop relations between the two countries, offering some new thoughts and proposals and publishing some very important documents which have much significance in guiding the relations between the two countries. These mutual visits and meetings have also shown outstanding effects in dispelling the dark clouds which might appear sometimes in the sky of China-India friendship and promoting the confidence of both peoples in the future of their friendly relations. The final settlement of China-India boundary question will be the most important key to greatly enhancing mutual trust between the two countries. Judging from the present situation of ChinaIndia relations, it seems conditions are already mature for the final settlement. (a) The over-all relations between China and India have been good with Strategic and Cooperative Partnership already established. This is very conducive to the final settlement. (b) This century will witness the great event of simultaneous rise of both China and India. Both countries need a peaceful environment, which will be in conformity with the national interest of both countries. The final settlement of the boundary question will be a very important factor for this purpose. (c) The Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the China-India Boundary India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Question has laid a good foundation for the final settlement. (d) Since so many rounds of talks have already been held between the Special Representatives of the two governments on the boundary question, both sides are already quite aware of each other's stand on the question. If there is still a gap, it will not work for either side to press for unilateral concession by the other and the only right way is to explore a framework of compromise in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding for one another. Both sides could also take more active steps to support each other on major questions involving core interests of the other side. This would fully reflect the practical significance of their Strategic and Cooperative Partnership and play an important role in promoting mutual trust. The situation in recent years has indicated that both sides have taken a number of steps in this respect with favourable consequences. Economic stability and profit are the main motives for China and India to work together. Both countries “signed a draft bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement (BIPA) during President Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006. The agreement was one of thirteen trade pacts signed between India and China during the official visit and provides an institutional and legal framework for increased foreign investment flows between the two sides. India and China also agreed to encourage cooperation in oilfield bidding and exploration and the development of hydrocarbons in third countries." (Price, 2007). The main steps taken by the Indian side in support of China are: recognizing Tibet as part of China's territory; taking resolute measures so that the Olympic torch passed through New Delhi successfully in April 2008. The main steps taken by the Chinese side in support of India are: recognizing Sikkim as part of India's territory; making positive remarks on India's desire to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; 62



adopting a flexible attitude so that the resolution to lift nuclear embargo against India could be passed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. On the major question of climate change which involves fundamental national interest of both nations, China and India have cooperated very closely to make a joint approach, which has won the attention of the international community. Since both China and India are large countries and are very active in the international arena, both sides could find a number of problems on which mutual support is needed in the future. If both sides could give more support to each other, the mutual trust between the two sides would certainly be greatly enhanced. Bilateral relations between India and China after the war in 1962 have been ambivalent. The same can be said about the relationship of both countries in multilateral forums. Despite border disputes between China and India, a steady increase in trade and an increasing amount of cooperation is taking place between the two giants. The bilateral trade has shown to be beneficial for both sides, even though India at first feared that China would out-compete many of the domestic companies. The increased competitiveness has rather forced Indian companies to adjust and become more effective, which in turn have made them more competitive on a global scale. Bilateral trade has expanded a lot since the early 1990s and continuous to expand each year. India's export to China, for example, increased from $18 million in 1990/1991 to $8 billion in 2006/2007. China's export to India increased in an equal pace, from $35 million to $17 billion (Manmohan and Madanmohan, 2011). This kind of improvements, are essential for a developing economy and serves a good purpose finding the sectors which have the greatest comparative advantage, thus leading to a traditional specialization (Bottelier, 2007). China and India often join forces when it comes to oppose demands from western, developed countries. In climate policy, China and India signed a five year agreement in October 2009 to jointly fight climate change and to negotiate international climate India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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deals using common positions. This agreement was made prior to the UN climate change summit in Copenhagen in December 2009. China and India together, both members of G20, consistently argue that developing countries should not be required to set and meet the same targets for reducing greenhouse gases as developed countries that carry a greater historical responsibility for the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases. The BASIC nations (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) jointly opposed a proposal made at the Copenhagen Summit requiring developing countries, including India and China, not to increase their Greenhouse gas emissions after 2025. This was unacceptable for China and India, as they saw this as an attempt by Western powers to undermine their fast economic development. The BASIC countries prepared their counter-draft well in advance of the Summit, and India and China's cohesion on climate change remained throughout the Copenhagen Summit. They rejected calls by developed nations to set legally binding targets, and both countries signed a modified Copenhagen Accord afterward in March 2010.

Discussion Trade and cooperation has played an important role in the SinoIndian relations. It is not sure to what extent trade and cooperation in itself has prevented or reduced the attitude towards security issues, but it is evident that it has played a vital role in the development of the institutional progress. Despite gloomy predictions about the inevitability of competition between China and India, cooperation between Asia's two emerging powers is possible. It, will however, require a much more concerted effort to bridge the gap in socio-cultural understanding that existed between them, there remains a fundamental lack of appreciation on the part of each country of the underlying cultural and societal norms that define the othernorms that influence each country's perception of its own national interest. We argue that greater appreciation of these elements is critical if China and India are to successfully address 64



issues such as the ongoing border dispute and the mounting trade imbalance. In present and future scenarios, strategic and diplomatic relations between China and India are fraught with complication, tensions and misgivings on both sides upon the historical legacies of relations between the two countries. Much of the mistrust and misgivings emanate from the legacy of the 1962 war between the two countries. The following five decades have seen generation of Indians growing up with an inherent wariness of China and anything Chinese. The public popular imagination in India was fuelled by the often repeated stories of the - great betrayal by the supposed ally nation. In recent decades after India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, there was a lot of popular hope for a strong and mutually beneficial partnership between the two nations. This was reflected in the popular phrase that was chanted by Indian children in the 1950s: “Hindi-Chinibhai-bhai”, the general atmosphere of bonhomic and friendship was such that most Indians could not imagine the advent of Chinese military aggression on their relative unguarded northeast frontier. Without going into the details of the 1962 misadventure, it suffices to say that they caused a dent in the national psyche of India, which lurks uncomfortably in the background even today. There was a freezing of diplomatic relations after the 1962 conflagration, which only thawed in 1976 when relations were tentatively restored. From 1976 to the present, the salient features of bilateral diplomatic negotiation have been the cloak of confidentiality and secrecy maintained by the government and key negotiation on both sides. By far the most vexing issue has been the demarcation and resolution of the boundary line denoting the border between the two countries. To further complicate the issue, while there appears to be a tacit understanding of mutual respecting a notional Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries, there has been precious little achieved in terms of actually defining this LAC on the ground. To the casual observer, this impressive succession of India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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high-level diplomatic and strategic meetings and negotiations over the past few decades might suggest that serious headway has been made in resolving some of these core issues. In general, China-India relations have matured gradually, after passing through a tortuous course in the past sixty years and this is very significant. In the future, with the continuous development of friendly relations between the two countries, it can be expected that those unstable factors in their relations would be further removed so that mutual trust between the two countries would be steadily enhanced. It is believed that people could take quite an optimistic view on the future course of ChinaIndia relations.

References : Athwak, A. China - India relations Contemporary Dynamics. New Delhi: Routledge, 2008. Banyan. 2012. India-China relations and the media. Blame the messenger. Retrieved on 15/04/2014 from http://www.economist.com/blogs /banyan/2012/05/india-china-relations-and-media. Bottelier, P. “What India Can Learn from China Vice Versa”, Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. “The World Factbook”. Retrieved on 26/05/2014 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/index.html. Jianxue, Lan. Sino-Indian Relations- New way of Thinking and “Rebalancing”. Retrieved on 30/03/2014 from www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-08/23/content_6239926htm. Manmohan, A and Madanmohan, G. “An India-China FTA: Potential Economic Implications for the Asian and the North American Economies”, South Asia Economic Journal. 2011. Mohan, Raja C. 2011. China's stapled visa unstaples its stand on Arunachal. Retrieved on 15/04/2014 from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ chinas-stapled-visa-unstaples-its-stand-on-arunachal/738446/0. Price, Gareth. China and India: Cooperation and Competition, 2007.

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Radtke, K. “Sino-Indian Relations: Security Dilemma, Ideological Polarization, or Cooperation Based on Comprehensive Security?” Leiden, 2003. Roy, Bhaskar. 2011. Managing India - China Relations. Retrieved on 23/05/2014 from http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers 49%5Cpaper4834.html. The Economist. 2012. “Indian and China: A Himalayan rivalry”. Retrieved on 22/05/2014 from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national /article2639973.ece.


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Archetypal Scapegoats - India and China G. Hannah* and P. Kusuma Harinath** * Assistant Professor, Sree Vidyanikethan Engineering College, Tirupati. ** Associate Professor, Department of English, S.V. University, Tirupati Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract The immense economic growth that India and China have been portraying in the past two decades has promoted these countries from the list of Developing Countries to the list of Newly Industrialized Countries. One- third of the world's population resides either in China or India and so mammoth proportion of world's workforce is available in these countries. The countries therefore have the potential to accomplish any gargantuan task. Yet the countries have not made it to the list of Developed Countries and it can be attributed to the reason that these countries have been a scapegoat of certain issues like colonization in India and abundant rural population in China. Every page of the annals of history and every literary piece of these countries have the aspect of scapegoat etched in it. This paper has analysed the archetype scapegoat in two literary pieces one each from Indian literature and Chinese literature. The comparative analysis of the literary pieces brings out certain features of scapegoat apt to each of these countries. The features of the scapegoat thus sketched can be mapped to the history of the countries. The objective of the paper therefore is to justify that these countries have become a scapegoat of sorts which has become an impediment for their growth at large. Key Words: Developing countries, Newly Industrialized Countries, literature, history, economic growth and population.

Introduction: The pace at which India and China have been growing economically have lend a helping hand to promote these countries from the list of Developing Countries to the list of Newly Industrialized Countries. The immense workforce available in these countries makes any gargantuan task a child's play for them however they have yet gained the status of Developed Country. The colonization of India and population of China are the culprits for the crime that has been unreasonably levied on these countries. The literature of these countries cannot but reveal the fact of its scapegoatism in every page of their 68


Archetypal Scapegoats - India and China

literary piece. This present paper has analysed the archetype scapegoat in two selected literary pieces - one each from Indian literature and Chinese literature - of two different genres - a short story and a play to bring out certain features of scapegoat apt to each of these countries. The two literary pieces selected for study and comparison are Xu Lun's short story ' A New Year's Sacrifice' and K.A.Gunasekaran's Bali Adugal a play. The notion of comparative study between the texts is to bring out the features of the scapegoat and map them to the history of the countries. The objective of the paper therefore is to justify that these countries have become a scapegoat of sorts which has become an impediment for their growth at large.

Lu Xun's 'The New Year Sacrifice': Chinese Scapegoatism China has a wealth of literature, both poetry and prose, dating from the eastern Zhou Dynasty (770-22B.C) including the classics attributed to Confucius. Zhou Zhangshu whose short story 'The New Year Sacrifice' has been chosen for analysis, was born in Shaoxing. Father's death persuaded Zhou to take up westernized medical science, which was in contrast to traditional Chinese medicine. However he gave up his studies because he felt that curing his compatriots of their spiritual ills was more important than their physical diseases. This led him to venture into the literary field and employ the means to fulfill his dreams of redeeming the people of their nonsensical beliefs and superstitious rituals. His career as a writer began in May 1918, under the pseudonym Lu Xun. As a literary man he is an all rounder. His collection of short stories titled A Madman's Diary and Zhaohua Xishi gained him much popularity. His second anthology of short stories was named Pang Huang. Besides being a literary figure, Lu Xun was a historian, who published Zhonngguo Xiaoshuo Lueshi ( A Concise History of Chinese Fiction). Added to this he also has the credit of being a translator, from Russian to Chinese. Lu Xun's style is wry, and incisive and sardonic in his societal commentary. His mastery of the vernacular language, coupled with his expertise with tone India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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G. Hannah and P. Kusuma Harinath

make some of his works virtually untranslatable. Lu Xun's importance to modern Chinese literature lies in the fact that he contributed significantly to every modern literary genre except novel in his life. 'The New Year Sacrifice' is a sad story about a woman known as Xiang Lin's wife, who becomes a scapegoat due to her own unanswered questions in herself about life after death. She was a scapegoat because she had sacrificed her life to find out the answers and thus make her fellow beings cognizant of what happens after death. The narrator is a member of Lu family and is at home for winter vacation. He sees Xiang Lin's wife, the popular maidservant for his family, and she is a beggar. She does not beg him for money but asks him endless questions. She hopes to get an answer from him because she finds incapable of it. For she says “you are scholar, and have traveled too and seen a lot” (Evans 18). She draws herself nearer and whispers confidently: “After a person dies, does he turn into a ghost or not?” (ibid). Two other questions which she fires at him in succession are also concerning life after death. But the narrator sputters forth an answer with 'maybe'. This dampens the curiosity of the lady. Yet she ventures to ask about hell and family members reuniting after death. Following words clearly show that narrator really does not know what to say: Well as to whether they will see each other or not, Immediately I lost confidence and wanted to say the exact opposite of what I had previously said …. As a matter of fact I am not sure either… (Evans 14). In order to avoid further importunate questions, he walks off to his uncle's house in a hasty retreat. The next day Xiang Lin's wife dies. It is only after this that we learn more about the life of Xiang lin's wife and how and why she becomes a beggar and the 70



reasons for her unquenchable thirst for life after death. The revelation of the protagonist that is portrayed in the text thereafter discloses certain characteristic features of the scapegoatism, which can be enlisted as: 1. Quest: It was curiosity that was eating away her inwards and making her search for the answers to the questions. The quest eventually led her to sacrifice her own life for better knowledge for others. 2. Voluntary: It was her individual thirst but she felt that it was only right on her part to sacrifice her life for the sake of knowledge that many like her were deprived of. So she voluntarily became a scapegoat. 3. Turmoil: The whole life of Xiang Lin's wife's life was spent under turmoil and sufferings which she had to undergo due to the thirst for knowledge. All through her life she had to face disappointment after disappointment and eventually she found herself worthy to offer herself up for the unfulfilled quest. Besides these evident features it is also noticeable that the story is titled 'The New Year Sacrifice', it therefore has anthropological connotation too.

K.A. Gunasekaran's Bali Adugal : Indian Scapegoatism Oral literature in the vernacular language of India is of great antiquity, but it was not until Sixteenth century, that an extensive written literature appeared. Chief factors in this development were the intellectual and literary predominance of Sanskrit until then and the emergence of Hindu Pietistic movements that sought to reach the people in their spoken languages. In South India however a vast literature in Tamil was produced from ancient times. Among Muslim classical Persian Literature, poetry was the fountainhead of a later growth in Urdu literature produced for the Mughal court, and elaborate Urdu poetry was on set themes and were produced in abundance. In the early nineteenth century, with the establishment of vernacular schools and the importation of the printing presses, a great impetus was India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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given to popular prose, with Bengali writers perhaps taking the lead. English literature is being eagerly studied and to some extent assimilated to classical Indian modes and themes. A Tamil Dalit Play, written by K.A. Gunasekaran, Bali Adugal (scapegoats) has been selected to illustrate Asian aspect of scapegoat. Gunasekaran is a well- known activist, artist, actor, scholar, folk musician, playwright and director. Being a Dalit artist, he has authored many issue- based plays, which were performed in remote villages of Tamil Nadu. The translation of Dalit literatures in India into English and other foreign languages like French and Spanish is a leapfrogging transformation for providing a space for sharing the Indian Dalit's age old stigma of untouchability with foreign readers. The translation of Indian Dalit texts plays a vital role in creating historical awareness as well as historical sense through its inter linguistic process. Earlier Dalit literatures often dealt with suffering and pain, however they currently also discuss the solutions and suggestions for the age-old problems. Therefore Dalit literatures are no longer emotive expressions of pain and suffering. Being liberate in nature, they talk about the Dalit lifestyle, ceremonies, rituals, rites that form the background of the expressions. In adapting western theories in translation and literature, the translator and the writer have to conceptualize the Indian Dalit situation in their minds. Somewhat surprisingly, Bali Adugal is the only written Dalit play in recent past in India. The play is structured around an inscription on human sacrifice and threaded with a conversation between B.D. Ambedkar and Mulk Raj Anand, which had been extracted from Ambedkar's book, The Annihilation of Caste. The play takes its cue from the sacrifice of humans that was widely prevalent in India. In Indian social context the people chosen as the scapegoats were often from the backwaters of society and quiet often Dalits who refused to abide by the norms of the caste hierarchy. They were chosen as scapegoats with the 72



explicit motive of removing the 'evil' from the body politic through ritualizing the whole event and making it look divinely ordained in the eyes of the public. The playwright objectively questions this practice of scapegoating the Dalits, and at the same time subtly criticizes the point of the transference of this oppression on to Dalit women. The play therefore depicts the practice of scapegoating and the conflicts between the dominant Brahmins and the downtrodden Dalits in the village. In this play, the rich and the powerful, Brahmins dominate the poor and the downtrodden of the same village always ridiculing and suppressing them on all occasions. The play opens with the conversation between Dr. Ambedkar and Mulk Raj Anand which took place on an evening in May 1950 on seashore in Mumbai. Later the conversation serves as an interlude in the play. Dr. Ambedkar confesses that his participation in constitutional drafting committee was merely a 'scapegoat' - the title of the play. Conversation apart, the play features a scene where a 'rath' (chariot) is carried by the Dalits and it accidentally breaks. This damage of the 'rath' is attributed to the Dalits because a Dalit had designed it. In order to pacify the village goddess, the Brahmins demand a human sacrifice. Hearing the news everyone flees in fear. In the end a person is identified as a scapegoat, but he, to save his skin, bargains with the priest. He places his wife as a sacrificial lamb and saves his own life. Thus the play deals with the problem of Dalits and how they are victimized by the 'system'. The songs and music have to be heard and felt during the performance or else it would be very difficult to translate the emotive language of the play. Characteristic features of the scapegoat in this short story are as follows: 1. Caste System: If Dalits are looked down upon then it is not because they are less capable, but just because they are born in Dalit primitives and are Dalit by identity. The brutality of caste India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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system has made them a scapegoat as a community. 2. Turmoil: Being Dalits, entitled them to face turmoil lifelong. As scapegoats their torture only worsened day after day. 3. Force: unlike in the Chinese short story, Scapegoat in this play was a 'forced' scapegoat, forced by a male counterpart.

Conclusion From the two illustrations mentioned above it could be concluded that the practice of human sacrifice was an antique existence in Asian culture. And unlike in other cultures in India scapegoats were Dalits, slaves, serfs or outcasts. Voluntarily or forced they were scapegoats for the cause of bettering their own situation. They were victims of either natural calamities or customs and rituals of land, because on occasions of such kind they were sacrificed. This therefore makes us conclude that Asiatic culture of human sacrifice is blend of both anthropological and psychological scapegoatism.

References : Evans, Oliver, and Harry Finestone. The world of Short Story: Archetype in Action. California: Knopf, 1970. Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957. Guerin L Wilfred, Labor Earle et al. A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature. New York: OUP, 2005. Patton Paul, Protevi John. Between Deleuze & Derrida. New York : Continuum, 2003.

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Lao Tzu and Gandhi on Self transcendence for Peace and Human Development Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu* and Dr. Varalakshmi M.** * Associate Professor, Department of Entrepreneurship, GITAM Institute of Management, GITAM University ** Research Fellow, Centre for Gandhian Studies, GITAM University Corresponding author: [email protected]

Abstract Human learning process is dialectical; a process where opinions, preconceived and static notions get transformed into pure ideas and values to make people wise; to reach the stage of sublime; a state of bliss and peace that is devoid of negations and conflicts. Philosophically speaking this is an intelligible process. But empirically speaking to attain this state of peace; devoid of conflicts is only possible for a very few people. While the ultimate goal of philosophy is liberation of the soul which is often understood in metaphysical realms, there is also another way of understanding of the self; through understanding of one's self in relation with others; ultimately trying to make one's existence a purposeful and a harmonious relation with one and all. According to Lao Tzu an ancient Chinese philosopher there are paradoxes, contradictions and negations in nature and persons we perceive, and ideas we form. To overcome these contradictions and to understand the reality, Lao Tzu insists that a person has to place oneself to the last, and to Gandhi similarly, a person should be reduced to zero or nothingness. This is the stage, where all contradictions are stripped off and self is clear to self and resultantly not only a person feels the self transcendence, tranquility or peace at himself but also he is able to, communicate the world ably and live harmoniously in it. Thus, to both these philosophers, self transcendence is not a detachment with social world; rather it is a life lived amicably and nonviolently. Thus “Tao-The-Ching” for Lao Tzu is the classic way of life lived with virtue; a way to understand nature and world; to live happily and also selfsufficiently. Similarly to Gandhi “ahimsa” (nonviolence) is a comprehensive virtue to help humans to be free of conflicts. Philosophies of Lao Tzu and Gandhi were popular not only in their times; even today are gaining significance. Lao Tzu's concepts are used in management schools to better human relations and productivity; Gandhi's works are translated into world languages and his precepts, satya and ahimsa are taught to students of China from school level. It is in this context, the present paper discusses their philosophical precepts “Tao” and “ahimsa” as social virtues to resolve conflicts; to help human development and peace. Key Words: Tao - ahimsa - peace - conflict


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Dr. K. Manjusree Naidu and Dr. Varalakshmi M.

Introduction While Mahatma Gandhi is the father of Nation of India Lao-Tzu is the inspirer, teacher and founder of many ancient Chinese philosophies like Confucianism in China and other schools of thought. Richard Gregg (1935) a popular western scholar who had thorough respect for eastern philosophical wisdom, compared these two thinkers, opined that though the non-violent tradition was conceived by many thinkers like, Lao-tzu, Buddha, the Jain Tirthankaras, St. Francis of Assisi, George Fox, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy and many others, it is Gandhi who was the outstanding person in modern times to work out in difficult situations and for mass application (p.42). Further Gregg felt that due to “the dense population and prolonged ages of intense social experience” “India, China and other Asian civilizations” “have brought about an insight and realization of psychological validity of nonviolent resistance” (p.65). What is this psychological validity embedded in the philosophies of Lao Tzu and Gandhi? Does it really help to formulate better personality that helps human lives and human development? Lao Tzu and Gandhi expressed unique characters of human beings. In the ancient times people conducted themselves out of fear for nature and in the modern times people are abiding to laws of society due to fear from the authority and to have security for their livelihood and sustenance. But there is an inner conscience and an external cosmic order that impact in some humans to behave in fair manner always. These two thinkers studied human nature in different dimension and tried to show how human transcendence is possible in this life itself. Religion in terms of rituals is hardly touched by these thinkers. To both these persons of eastern part of the world, way of life; life lived without contradictions and above all with peace is significant. How do we acquire such life free from contradictions and conflicts? Today we are living in a more scientifically and technically advanced world an automated world; more so a world devoid of moral imperatives within the family level itself. Then, how far the words 76


Lao Tzu and Gandhi on Self transcendence for Peace and Human Development

and ways of life taught by these renowned philosophers are applicable to the present day times? This paper looks into these aspects. This paper initiates its discussion with a brief note on self transcendence as a theoretical base for the further discussion on the relevance of doctrines and postulates of Lao Tzu and Gandhi for self transcendence and thereby human development and peace.

I - Self transcendence Human beings are not simply biological beings; they are also emotional, rational, intellectual, potential and moral or spiritual beings. We may not know that a person whether has all these traits from birth or not. But certainly he can transcend from one plane to other due to increasing cognitive knowledge of world. Self transcendence means identification of one's being or existence with one purpose or with something that one aspires to see himself or herself. It is an advancement of self primarily in thinking and achieving it by personal efforts and practices. Self transcendence is generally understood in two terms: metaphysical and physical. It is metaphysical in religious sense and it is physical in social sense. Yet, subtly speaking, these two terms are treated as single experience by many a religious persons; sages, philosophers and social workers through their identification of self with God and fellow beings alike. The term transcendence of self is understood in its relation with universal consciousness or divine or Brahman or Father or Creator of the universe or whatever name is given to this consciousness that is within and without. Mostly this is the essence of all religions. Self liberation or self-identification is the metaphysics of religions. People become saints or sages and at times live away from normal human life and their association at personal level, seeking liberation of self. Another way of identification of a self is through making use of the supra sense of cognition in identifying the self with fellow human beings in their pleasures and pains. In fact religion too is to be understood in two senses: one to perform religious rituals and India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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meditate upon universal consciousness to be one with God. And, the other sense, is, one has to be in this world and to be kind with other fellow beings and with ecological nature to live a harmonious life. Hence Upanishadic perception says, “Know the soul as the rider, the body as the chariot and the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as the reins” (Chaitanya, 1977, p.9). Knowing of self is thus conducting one's self and experiencing the knowledge of self. Bhagavadgita deals with the application of this knowledge in the social life: “The Karma-Yogi is not content with insulated experience even if they be of the most beatific kind. In programming his life and action in the light of the deepest voice of his conscience, he is trying to transform the City of Man into a Rama Rajya, which has no denominational connotation whatever, but is the equivalent of the Rajyam Samariddham of the Gita and the Civitas Dei or City of God of St. Augustine” (Chaitanya, 1977, p.8). Understanding of self in metaphysical terms might also lead to confusion due to existence of different religions and their theories about such transcendental experiences. On the other hand, we have science that which is dated and known as modern science which is contributing to technology and positively facilitating the lives of humans. Yet, based on its need for experimental verification to evaluate religious experiences and moral values it is accepting only the experiences of modern sciences. Thus present life is not only full of individuals who are professionally excellent and knowledgeable but also are norm-free for their lives are comforted due to application of science and technology to their lives. But is this an end of life? Is it complete life? This seems to be a philosophical question. But today we have an ecological problem too and deprivation at various ways; of food, shelter and clothing and degradation in natural resources. Perhaps we have roots for these problems in degradation in human nature itself which is not originally bad and only self-centred. Many a theories have been in use on self transcendence in the field of philosophy and psychology and religion. Abraham Maslow a 78



psychologist attempted to bridge the gap between sciences and society, and, religion and knowledge of self by explaining about self transcendence in social and normative tones. And it is his way of explanation of self transcendence that may stand as a theoretical base for the further discussion on philosophies of Lao Tzu and Gandhi. Abraham Maslow's humanistic psychology1 and his theory of motivation argue that human self actualizes after passing through various levels of satisfaction of needs; physiological needs as hunger, thirst; and satisfaction of safety and emotional needs. However a potential self identifies itself with social and economic statuses at times without identifying his natural interests like arts, music and any other interest that pleases one's mind. But some people identify their natural interest at their very early age and excel in their fields and lead satisfied life for their self is actualized according to their natural interests. While some others late in their life identify these unfulfilled interests and try to please their interest in their little best. Both these people lead a fulfilled life and then through such fulfillment also become philosophical and moral and lead an axiological life at least from one point of time in their life. These tend to be healthy, witty and also helpful to others and sensitive to others' problems. Maslow names these people as peakers. And, contrary to this, people who do not identify their natural interest or who have not gratified their needs and who have not fulfilled their esteem needs may tend to be dissatisfied and unhealthy physically and psychologically. Thus Maslow's theory of self actualization became popular in the field of management to motivate people to use their potential self to achieve higher social and economic status and increase productivity of organization too. But what is missing is further application of Maslow's theory. For, Maslow talked about another part of self when a human self identifies his self with others' problems and pains. To such people gratification or satisfaction of their biological, emotional, or potential self are not important, rather they are more sensitive to life-situations of India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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others and their deprivation and suffering. Such people are “nonpeakers” according to Maslow. Maslow assumed that mesomorphs, social workers and crusaders come under category of non-peakers. In fact Maslow was fascinated by these selfscarifying people and who come to the “aid of the down-trodden or the unjustly treated” at the cost of their lives. He was questioning as to what produces in some people the socially desirable characteristics of kindness, social conscience, helpfulness, neighborliness, identification, tolerance, desire for justice and righteous indignation (Maslow, 1954, p. 234). Maslow assumes that if many people partake in other's critical conditions at least after fulfilling their needs the world looks better and happier. To Maslow human transcendence leads to human development and happiness and peace. From establishing a theory for good human psyche Maslow further aimed at “a normative social psychology” that “accepts the search for values as one of the essential and feasible tasks of science and society” (Maslow,1968, p.220). It is in this back drop Lao Tzu's and Gandhi's philosophies are under discussion in view of their identification of self and world. Gandhi and Lao Tzu can be named mesomorphs as Maslow named. For, these thinkers contributed for humanistic way of understanding of self, nature and world. Their normative precepts need a special attention to help not only day to day transactions and resolving conflicts at interpersonal level but to arrive at peace and development in larger societies.

II - Lao Tzu's and Gandhi's perceptions of man and world A comparative process helps identification of one's similar ideas with other. It also gives a willing space to allow new and productive ideas for furtherance of persons and institutions. Lao Tzu's and Gandhi's ideas can be discussed here at three levels: philosophical; social and political, and, at therapeutic level. Though we study these aspects differently these do not appear so in the words of Lao Tzu and Gandhi; rather philosophy became a way of life to these wise men through their sensible cognition, 80



sensitive reflections of world and further self therapeutic training which spiritualized their bodies and minds and their entire being. Their experiences together are gifted to us as sanctified knowledge or wisdom of age old culture and classic tradition to be followed if one, as a person or a nation, has an inclination to it.

Philosophy of Lao Tzu and Gandhi Lao Tzu was considered as ancient Chinese philosopher. The word Lao Tzu or Laozi connote “Old (lao) Master (zi). While some scholars considered his existence during sixth century C.E. to some others there was no historical Laozi. However, Chinese literature accorded a short book called Daodejung, (Tao-Te Ching) as written by Laozi. This was translated into English as “Classic of the Way and Virtue” that influenced Chinese culture very well. Taoism or Daoism which was named after Lao Tzu's philosophy was also treated as one of the major pillars of Chinese thought along with Confucianism and Buddhism. His thought, it is said, played a significant role not only in the area of philosophy but also in literature, painting, martial arts and other cultural tradition. Karl Jaspers treated him as “axial” philosopher (1974, cited, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Though Tao is translated as “the way” it refers to the order, balance of nature or the universe and according to Lao Tzu the way is known through intuition and simplicity; through a life lived with “love, respect and non action(wei-wu-wei: action through inaction) as we understand through various source on Lao Tzu's philosophy (Winter 2007 and Hundoble). A discussion here on Lao Tzu's is based referring to Tao-Te-Ching in its English translation (Kline, 2003, and Derek Lin, 2006). However, there are available several other translations. Tao TeChing consists of eighty chapters; each with only a few verses. What is specific of Lao Tzu's work is, it is not simply a narration and admiration of nature and world; rather it appears, that he was trying to look at the world and its processes as a dialectical process: initially he states of the reality, later contradictions and ultimately knowing its true nature through an introspection and India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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identification by the viewer of the world with the world: The way - cannot be told. The name - cannot be named. The nameless is the way of Heaven and Earth. The named is the Matrix of the Myriad creatures. Eliminate desire to find the way. Embrace desire to know the creature. The two are identical, But differ in name as they arise, Identical they are called mysterious, Mystery of mystery, The gate of all secrets (Chapter I: 1) This verse though looks simple, conveys his perceptions of world in various dimension: it is mystical and philosophical for it is in communion with some divinity. Such an understanding of the world through conscious identification of self with others in particular sense and with the world in general sense and forgetting how each individual “differ in name as they arise” is the life of a sage, according to Lao Tzu. But what is the empirical relevance of such an understanding? Lao Tzu holds that it is hard to define “good” and “bad” because it is hard to differentiate these two qualities of things and people. That means the “good” hitherto be treated as good be known how good it is only when we practice it ; so also we come to know that the “bad” is not actually that “bad” as we perceive so: “Thus being and non-being produce each other” and thus he asserts : “High and low bring about each other” (Chapter 2). How do we know the reality of the world? Is it through meditation in void or through contemplation with the world? Does Lao Tzu have something as ideal in the world? Though it is difficult for anybody to say of reality, for Lao Tzu the world is real and mystic in one sense and in other sense it is relative and changing. This is so not because of our changing identities but due to that reason that sometimes 'truth' needs to be viewed in the 82



contextual sense. Truth becomes contextual when it is applied for the empirical world and to understand fellow human beings by one's self in a particular situation; and truth is mystical when the idea of reality or nature is understood in terms of divinity and metaphysics. At the same time truth becomes an ideal to test oneself with existing morality. Thus Lao Tzu's idea of reality is mystical and metaphysical when he said, “The Tao is empty” and at the same time, it is “so deep” and “the source of all things” and that which “unravels the knots” and is known through wise men through “non-action” (Chapter 4). It is known for sages for they are virtuous. A sage is one who places himself in the end but is remembered forever due to his natural goodness: Heaven and Earth are everlasting The reason Heaven and Earth can last forever is that They do not exist for themselves Thus they can last forever Therefore Sages: Place themselves last but end up in front Are outside of themselves and yet survive Is it not due to their selflessness? That is how they can achieve their own goals (Chapter 7). The highest virtue or goodness is again compared with nature which treats everybody alike despite their external attributes or inner qualities; it is like water that “stays in places that people dislike” (Chapter 8). Lao Tzu's thought is thus, though not explicitly, is implicitly normative to see the world in a better way. He appreciates that which is simple and just. He is against qualities like greed and cunningness. He is against acquisition of riches and social positions that make the persons arrogant. Wealth creates thieves and disasters to the possessors in the words of Lao Tzu (Chapter 9). In praise of virtue and despise of vice Lao Tzu held: There is no crime greater than greed No disaster than discontentment No fault greater than avarice India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Thus the satisfaction of contentment Is the lasting satisfaction (Chapter 46). The Tao the way is known according to Lao Tzu when one knows that one has to carry soul or spiritual body in his head in a steadfast manner. One which is divine is impartial; hence Tao is the inner nature of human being and practice of virtue that is explicit. How a person knows of self? How we perceive our self is important to Lao Tzu. Lao Tzu insists us to question ourselves before we search for our being and with what we are identifying it. He asks a few basic questions as to whether, one is as innocent as infant in focusing energy and reach relaxation; one can rule the nation or office without manipulation and whether one can be in one social position and yet not be arrogant and feel the supremacy(Chapter 10). Thus, introspection is the beginning of growth and development and sages are such people who know of all the contradictions of human society: rich and poor; beauty and ugly; success and failure and thus these qualities make no difference to Sages: “… You will return to infancy Know the bright But keep to the shadows, …. Know the glorious But keep to the humble … Then constant virtue will be complete And you will return to the un-carved block. The un-carved block is cut into 'Vessels'. Wise men use them, as rulers of 'vessels' The great cutter Does not cut away” (Chapter 28). A study on Gandhi too depicts that Gandhi was reading the world through a study of his own self and thereby deriving certain 84



universal values. Anybody's autobiography shows nothing but the story of self told aloud. Gandhi's autobiography was not only differently named as An Autobiography or the story of my experiment with truth (1927) but was a distinct way of his search for eternal principles that rule human life and human societies. Gandhi as a staunch believer in religion could easily be liberated his self while he was practicing his first lesson of ahimsa in South Africa. But he aimed at emancipation of the world through a vision. Gandhi aimed at peace which is not free of conflict alone but at such “positive peace” that “includes longer term goal” as peace “as an end”; “as inner peace and cosmic unity with large whole and as a prescriptive and as guiding principle” as Michael Allen Fox defined it (2014, p.193). Thus Gandhi arrived at the guiding principles of life as truth or satya and nonviolence or ahimsa, while satya is the ultimate principle or being of things and world, ahimsa is the way to reach it. Gandhi could not find a better way than the way of ahimsa to reach satya. While detailing of this being or universal consciousnesses, Prof. K Ramakrishna Rao says that it is “the spiritual side of the person” and this “functions at three different levels physical (instinct and emotion), mental (reason), and spiritual (altruism)” (2011, p.6). In Gandhi this is spirituality applied: “Gandhi's practical spiritualism starts with an ideal that would be an instance where the dichotomies like the individual and society can be related not as parts of a whole but as reflexive of each other”(Rao, 2011, p.77). Gandhi's philosophy is a philosophy in action with a belief in faith in God or truth. In fact truth and God are alterable terms. Initially he conceived the idea of God as truth. But later he said “Truth is God”. The idea of God may be elusive to us but to Gandhi idea of truth is cognizable, practical, rational and humanistic that makes one nearer to God. It is ahimsa the best way to reach God and that brings humans closer and closer. This is the crux of Gandhi's philosophy that we relate to his ideas on social and political arenas of human lives. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Social and Political Ideas of Gandhi and Lao Tzu Though Gandhi's philosophy is much applauded for his nonviolent way of resolving conflicts from his South African times in the case of indentured Indians, till freedom movement in India, Gandhi's ideas of non-violence and truth are not being practiced by people of India in the sense as Gandhi practiced. Some people those who, with all the ardent endurance practiced nonviolence to achieve freedom, too, did not understand Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence in the way Gandhi wanted. Subsequently Gandhi's satyagraha a nonviolent method to resolve any conflict was treated as a political technique only. Hence social and political areas remained free of philosophy. But to Gandhi nonviolence is a pervasive spirit which should be practiced by all the people all the time. Hence it is not only the rational and tactical Gandhi that we have to understand but also the philosophical Gandhi who aimed at peace as a regulative principle ruling the minds of people all over the world through the moral precepts satya and ahimsa. As we find in Lao Tzu's philosophy a sage is conscious of all contradictions of nature good and bad, ugly and beauty and yet wants to know the Tao the way through virtue which is beyond these contradictions, Gandhi too wanted to see through application of nonviolence a virtuous behaviour in humans. Ahimsa is not just passive resistance rather it is for Gandhi, in its negative form is “not injuring any living being, whether by body or mind” and in its positive form it is “the greatest love, the greatest charity” and if it is “truly understood”, is “a panacea for all evils mundane and extra-mundane”. When somebody raised a doubt whether due to the practice of ahimsa one becomes potentially weak Gandhi said: “it does not mean helping the evil-doer to continue the wrong or tolerating it by passive acquiescence” (CWMG 18: 195). Further “a non-violent rebellion is not a programme of seizure of power, it is a programme of transformation of relationship ending in a peaceful transfer of power” (CWMG 77:267).

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Similarly Lao Tzu says about three of his practical virtues: I have three treasures I hold on to them and protect them The first is called compassion The second is called conservation [it is also translated as moderation] The third is called not daring (rash) to be ahead in the world [nonviolent] (Chapter 67) We find nonviolence or ahimsa as basis of all virtues and as a way in both the philosophies of Gandhi and Lao Tzu not only to know the mystic nature of world but more in its social application. And this is the basis of their idea of autonomous and self reliant states. Gandhi's concepts of swaraj and swadeshi have roots in philosophical concepts as dharma and swadharma. For, dharma for Gandhi is self-purification (Iyer, 1990). At the same time we find how swadharma as a counterpart of dharma the universal principle when Gandhi said: “One's respective dharma towards one's self, family, nation and the world cannot be divided into watertight compartments. The harm done to oneself or one's family cannot bring about the good of the nation. … one cannot benefit the nation by being against the world at large, …Where the heart is pure, from moment to moment one's duty becomes apparent effortlessly”(A letter of Gandhi, August 14, 1932, Mahadevbhaini Dairy, vol.II, p.15, cited, Iyer, p. 183). Swaadeshi, following dharma is to Gandhi, “to discharge” one's “legitimate obligation” towards family by “just means” and also according to the “universal Code of Conduct”. For, Gandshi says further, if through practice of swadeshi, one harms others, it is not swadeshi but egotism (Gandhi cited. Iyer, 1990, p.372). Then swaraj or self-rule of Gandhi is through liberation of self; it is not anarchy but a regulation of self first and its application in the political state. Though we understood virtue as self-sacrifice in both these philosophers it does not mean degradation of self or India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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submission to slavery. Such submission is injurious to the individual. Hence Gandhi says that “my conception of freedom is no narrow conception. It is co-extensive with the freedom of man in all his majesty” (Gandhi, cited, Prabhu and Rao, 1967, p. 312). Gandhi meant freedom of individuals to utilize their fullest talents for self but at the same time not for self only but also for the “social structure” “on whose surface one lives”(Gandhi, cited. Prabhu and Rao, p.312). Lao Tzu was considered as the first libertarian as well as nonviolent warrior and an advocate of self reliant states. He said: “Small country few people” [states small in size] and accepts for possession of weapons by people but not the use of those. Further he aims at people to be content with their homes, their clothes, food and customs (Chapter, 80). Thus he despises centralized states where people starve due to heavy taxes levied by rulers (Chapter, 75). People are to be ruled without military coercion. Ruling is to be done according to the Tao the natural way and that pleases people. A commander, who is arrogant and who achieves result by power and against Tao (nature) soon ends according to Lao Tzu (Chapter 30). Further to Lao Tzu a military rule is a misfortune to state; even if such a rule is victorious it is a victory that is without glory (Chapter 31). He further states: “Those who glorify Are delighting in the killing Those who delight in killing Cannot achieve their ambitions upon the world… Victory in war should be treated as a funeral (Chapter 31). And, it is the real state which is upright in integrity. But it is that country which becomes chaotic when more laws are imposed; where people have more weapons and where people are more impoverished. Hence Lao Tzu dreams of such state as the best when there is less interference of state with the lives of people (Chapter 57) and in such state people live simple and honest lives; contrary to this, “Goodness reverts to wickedness” (Chapter 58).

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Further, Lao Tzu is convinced in the humility as virtue when generals are not formidable and soldiers are not angry. He added: “those who are good at managing people lower themselves” and he calls this position as “the virtue of non-contention” (Chapter 68). And it is an ideal state: When people no longer fear force They bring about greater force Do not limit their place Do not reject their livelihood Because the ruler does not reject them Therefore they do not reject the ruler (Chapter 72). Still further, we find similar views on war between Gandhi and Lao Tzu. To cite certain instances, Gandhi when asked to show some historical evidence that his “soul-force” or “truth-force” that governed the universe he replied: “History as we know it, is a record of the wars of the world, and so there is a proverb among Englishmen that a nation which has no history, that is no wars, is a happy nation. How kings played, how they became enemies of one another, how they murdered one another, is found accurately recorded in history, and if this were all that had happened in the world, it would have been ended long ago. If the story of the universe had commenced with wars, not a man would have been found alive today” (CWMG 10: 47). He added: The fact that there are so many men still alive in the world shows that it is not based on the force of arms but on the force of truth or love” (CWMG 10:48) Gandhi's ideas on achieving peace were experimented and were proven as successful. But times have been changed. Can we apply these today too? Let us relook into this. Lao Tzu too expresses similar humility on the face of war and conflict to win over through violent attitudes. As we go through further, we find nonviolent action is not mere tolerance but an un-severing effort to change the violent oppressor to be nonviolent. The process is dialectical that starts with the assumption that humans are not India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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born divine and nonviolent. As we all know people do not be aggressive or angry and violent readily but behave so in order to save their goods, positions and at times for honors they crave for their existential life. At the same time we also feel that we can control violent attitude and behave composed all through our lives. Hence, Maslow may be right when he said: “This inner nature, as much as we know of it so far, seems not to be intrinsically or primarily or necessarily evil. The basic needs (for life, for safety, and security, for belongingness and affection, for respect and self-respect and for self-actualization), the basic human emotions and the basic human capacities are on their face neutral, pre-moral or positively “good”. Destructiveness, sadism, cruelty, malice, etc., seem to be violent reactions against frustration of our intrinsic needs, emotions and capacities” (Maslow, 1968, p.3). Maslow expected good societies through his normative social psychology. But Gandhi had gone farther; he not only analyzed the human nature but even transformed the violent persons and nations to be nonviolent. To know the process of conversion we have to seek to Gandhi's words again: “One can realize Truth and ahimsa only by ceaseless striving” but only coming “out of this mortal frame” (CWMG 44: 57). Ahimsa answers not only for issues as war and amassed violence; it deals primarily with the personal transformation of a person who claims himself as votary of ahimsa: “Wars in a large measure are fought for economic issues. If we give up selfishness and resolve to take the barest minimum for the satisfaction of our wants, there will be no occasion for wars. Unless there is a complete transformation in our economy and our style of life, peace will elude us, however hard we may strive for it (CWMG 90: 184). Hence it is a conscious effort that brings peace of people and states. Gandhi's ahimsa works at various levels and helps resolve conflicts and reconstruct even the damaged human societies. 90



Gandhi's peace restoration mechanisms can be many: at emotional level through positive transformation of the other person, at rational level going through truth factors and at religious level by application of love and fraternity; at economic level through sharing through concepts as trusteeship and sarvodaya. Trusteeship of Gandhi is based on non possession. Gandhi's idea of social transformation is through moral transformation. Gandhi felt that it is a [moral] burden to carry that material possession that is due to others (Gandhi cited, Prabhu and Rao, 1967, p.187). His idea of “non-possession is a principle applicable to a thought as well as things” (Gandhi, cited, Iyer, 1993, p.378). This is again based on a “golden rule” that is, “to refuse to have what the million cannot” (Gandhi, cited, Prabhu and Rao, 1967, p.191). Gandhi says that, though it was painful even for him in the beginning to renounce the thing belongs to him, he felt, the “positive joy” of non-possession that gradually took a “geometric progression”. Gandhi was convinced of that “if each retained of possession of only what they needed, no one would be in want, and all would live in contentment”(Gandhi, cited, Prabhu and Rao, 1967, p.187). To the rich he says, “Earn your crores by all means. But understand that your wealth is not yours; it belongs to the people. Take what you require for your legitimate needs, and use the remainder for society” (Gandhi cited, Prabhu and Rao, 1967, p.193). Further he rests the responsibility of trusteeship on the economically well off people. Gandhi's economic equality is to abolish the “eternal conflict between capital and labour”; the contrast between “few rich in whose hands is concentrated the bulk of nation's wealth” and “the semi-starved naked millions”. To Gandhi “trustee” is one who takes for himself that is enough to satisfy the needs that are “customary in his society and spends the rest for social service” (Gandhi, cited, Iyer, 1991, p.404). Further to Gandhi, if capital is power, so also work. Either capitalist or worker is dependent on the other. Hence worker is a co-sharer in the capital. The moment the worker realizes this there is an inevitable destruction. Gandhi India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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calls this destruction of capitalist as the destruction of worker. To resist this state he lays the down responsibility of community welfare in the hands of capitalists: “ I am inviting those people who consider themselves as owners today act as trustees, i.e., owners, not in their own right, but owners in the right of those whom they have exploited”( Gandhi, cited, Prabhu and Rao 1967, p.258). Gandhi evolves a socialistic state; at the same time his notion of state is not just utilitarian that aims at greatest happiness or good to the greatest number; rather his idea of state is founded by such individuals who are greater than utilitarian. For, an utilitarian is only logical and thus does not sacrifice himself in order to fulfil his goal according to Gandhi. But a votary of sarvodaya is an absolutist who will even sacrifice himself (Gandhi in Sarvodaya). Socialism is primarily for Gandhi through minimizing one's needs; whatever earned should be earned with the utmost honesty: “Even a single individual enforces this ideal in his life, he is bound to influence others” (Gandhi, cited, Iyer, 1993, p.408). Further, to Gandhi the word socialism is not only a beautiful word conceptually where “all the members of society are equal - none low, none high” (Gandhi, cited. Iyer, 1993, p. 411), but also a realizable precept that encompasses individuals, societies and transnational states: “If we erase the 'I's and the 'Mine's from religion, politics and economics, etc. we shall soon be free and bring heaven upon earth” (Gandhi, cited. Iyer, 1993, p. 414). Philosophies of Lao Tzu and Gandhi, based on the mystic view of nature through an introspection of self and, sensitive responses to the deprived, paved the roads for freedom, democracy and social development. Apart from the relevance of these ideas therapeutic relevance is a value addition to their philosophies.

Therapeutic application: Lao Tzu's philosophy was originally advocated by three sects that have trained their students in the wise use of natural energy or Tao 92



they call it. These schools are: philosophical school, meditative and adept school and religious school. The philosophical school believes that Lao Tzu wanted that people should return to the original condition of nature which was energetic, through wise use of energy and conservation of energy. Thus they gain personal tranquillity (Chang). The adepts' aim is to increase the allotment of space for the energy. It is through meditation the person is in direct view of the sources of their awareness. This inner self would allow people for the exploration for new vista of life. The last sect of religion established priesthood to perform rituals to Gods and deities. But more than performing and worshiping, this school focuses on helping ordinary people like villagers to make available the cosmic energy. It is said that magic is key to religious schools. Furthermore it is the disc (see figure 1) that depicts two types of energies Yin and Yang that help one to make wise use of energy and the way to explore to balance the natural energy which is in the individual too (Smith 1994, cited, Hundoble). Similarly to Gandhi nonviolence and its practice is not limited to one particular person who practices it. It is an education and training to cure the practitioner and people around. It can be practiced by any ordinary person according to Gandhi. It makes human to cease be brutal: “Though we have human form, without the attainment of non-violence we still share the qualities of our remote reputed ancestor, the orang-outang”(CWMG 67: 414). While the sword force is brute force, nonviolent force is in form of “soul force” and “truth force” that helps people to behave moderately, rationally and non-violently. It helps self-control and controls retaliating and violent attitudes for, Gandhi believed that “restraint is the law of our being” (CWMG 23:24). And “Ahimsa is not impotence. Ahimsa is nor powerlessness. Ahimsa is unconquerable power” - reasserts Gandhi (CWMG 32:380). Practice of ahimsa can be an yogic practice that can transform others; even a single individual who advocates and practices ahimsa according to Gandhi. Further he said: “I assume that you India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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wish to cultivate ahimsa, and therefore even if it was an act of violence, you will try and learn ahimsa from it” (CWMG 84:296). Thinkers like Gregg opined that the conflict between a violent and nonviolent person is like a martial art jiu-jitsu which he later called as moral jiu-jitsu where the violent oppressor will get astonished by the virtuous and voluntary suffering of a nonviolent opponent for the sake of a belief and for an ideal. Gregg further said that violent person would tend to change himself gradually and turn up with the new found ideas through nonviolence that allow him to listen to the others and to get feasible compromises and other alternative mechanism to war and violence that were hitherto convinced him in a different way (Gregg, 1935, p.52). Lao Tzu's philosophy is being applied in later schools in the health psychology as healing technique through wise use of natural energy or Taichi energy(Smith 1994, cited, Hundoble). It is represented in form of a disc called Taichi disc (see figure 1) that depicts two types of energies Yin and Yang that help one to make wise use of energy and the way to explore to balance the natural energy which is in the individual too. Positive energy is represented in white colour and negative energy in dark colour. And, the small and contrasting coloured dots in each area of the circle (please see the dots in the middle circle) represent that in all evil there exists some good and in all the good there exists some evil. This circle also represents that there exist contradictions in nature; dark and bright, night and day, dry and moist, sun and rain some attributes we give to nature and aggressive and passive qualities to nature and human beings. The first picture of the disc represents the conflicting situation and conflicting forces of self. This sort of state slows down the system. The second picture shows the balancing attitudes and situation of two opposite forces working for harmony. And the third picture shows a state of energy in opposite direction. It is an artificial harmony or apparent functional relations; unity shown here too is an apparent one. This way of looking at nature and human beings 94



helps to resolve contradictions and to live harmoniously is the belief of Taoists.

III - Recent Application of Ideas of Lao Tzu and Gandhi and Conclusions It is interesting to find recent applications of the unique ideas of Lao Tzu and Gandhi that set examples for the discussions carried so far. A study on the meaning of suffering conducted by Siroj Sorajjakool2(2008) within the backdrop of western existential philosophical theories of Sartre, Heidegger, Tillich and eastern philosophy of Lao Tzu and Chang Tzu shows that Sorajjakool was more fascinated to find the views of Lao Tzu when he used the metaphor of water to life. While Lao Tzu said in the world there is nothing submissive and weak than water and yet the strength of water is known only when it is exhibited Sorajjakool held that he sensed from his own life how he was trying to control and conquer “flow of life” too. Observing his own life experiences and further theoretical studies he sensed that even in the most depressant time one can find “something enticing and mystical about life”. This is an example as to how we can advance through a positive perception of self. Further, we find that more or less based on with similar assumptions as above, one can advance even in the most critical situations from a study on Pamela Reed's Theory of Self Transcendence by Jon Lafleur and others (2011). Reed's theory was applied to know: how the theory of self transcendence is reflected in their research, whether persons with late Alzheimer's disease show evidence of self transcendence during the creative bonding intervention, and to know and that whether persons with late stage Alzheimer's disease show evidence of well-being during the creative bonding intervention.


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The above study came out with interesting results that contribute to theoretical base on the study of self transcendence for their study was of good use and their study provided for insights for new areas of education for involvement of nursing staff. Further the research recommended the use of nursing to promote well being of people. Its further implications found that nursing can help manage self transcendence to encourage patients' reflections through meditation, prayer and journaling and also through fostering meaningful relationships with community relations, support groups and group counselling. Thus the theory of Self transcendence had shown its practical implications. As to application of Gandhi's ideas, there were a number of theoretical interpretations on Gandhi by thinkers all over the world recommending in the areas of education, economics and rural development. But recently Gene Sharp3 a sociologist who was influenced by Gandhi while he was doing his post graduation, worked on Gandhi's concept of nonviolent technique to resolve conflict. In course of time he improvised his idea of nonviolent revolution and influenced through his works on nonviolence to dethrone dictatorial governments and to establish democracies in Serbia, Egypt and other places of the world.

A Cultural Fusion of India - China: Through revisiting Lao Tzu and Gandhi: Gandhi's ideas are gaining significance in China in recent times. Prof. Shang Quanyu of South China's Normal University's school of foreign studies is currently doing research on the relevance of Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence, social harmony, and environmental protection to today's China. In view of a growing culture of consumerism, a concomitant of the rising affluence which is not conducive to the general wellbeing, China is importing India's soft power; the adaptation of yoga and Gandhian ideology to meet peaceful development. It is said that Gandhi's philosophy of renunciation and simple living may well be part of China. Shang further in his speech at Gateway House on March 13, 2013, expressed his hope that problem of over 96



consumption may be effectively addressed through China's strategy to promote minimalist policy (Modi, 2013). Prof. Shang translated former Indian diplomat - P.A. Nazareth's Gandhi's Outstanding Leadership (2006) in to Chinese language; also expressed his happiness for the way Gandhian ideas of nonviolence, from primary school children to university students, are part of curriculum today in China (The Hindu, March 8, 2013).

Conclusions As we find from our discussions, the spiritual side of any religion has morality too apart from its ritualistic aspects relevant to particular religion. On the other hand we have Maslow's theory that postulates that human transcendence leads to normative social psychology. Thus spirituality is also morality that is the resultant of highly conceived and defined religion or psychology. The following are the outcomes of the study that affirm the relevant social and moral aspects of Lao Tzu and Gandhi to help human development and peace: To philosophize people to be altruistic, truthful and helpful for they know the truth of a person, situation and that which is good for all. For self counseling and counseling others to behave in right direction to know one's potentiality that which is good for him and to others. To help distress by use of yin - yang disc at organizational level and thus to be optimistic and realistic to aim at feasible goals. Has a therapeutic use through creative bonding with children; aged; patients; youth and distressed others in need to advance themselves in their adverse situations. Their philosophies help to learn to be nonviolent. Nonviolent aptitude through practice of Tao-yoga or Indian yoga had an impacting influence on those who practice them and also those who are around the practitioners.


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Ahimsa and Tao are certainly alternative ways and energies to free of a conflicting attitude within a person and to promote harmony and peace between people, and people and nations. Their philosophies certainly help ecological balance. This is possible because virtuous people who are free of vices like greed, hatred, violence and discontentment practice moderation in consuming resources ; also help others to cultivate good qualities like love, compassion and nonviolent attitude; contentment and tranquility. In both the philosophers, Lao Tzu and Gandhi, it is through a dialectical process the human contradictions are overcome and a transformation is a possible phenomenon. As said at the outset, human beings are not perfect beings by birth; at the same time they are not vicious beings. Both nature and all beings possess some energy that can be used constructively or destructively. How best we can make use of this energy, needs cognition, education and training of a self to transcend from lower plane to higher and higher planes of life. Perhaps we have learnt certain guidelines through the humanistic and normative social psychology of Maslow and particularly his theory of motivation and self transcendence as basis; from Tao-Te-ching the classic way and virtue of Lao Tzu and from principles of truth (sat or being) the aim, and nonviolence or ahimsa the way, of Gandhi, to help ourselves and our societies.

Notes and Reference Notes: 1 Abraham H, Maslow calls his psychology a humanistic psychology for it is established as a “third alternative to objectivistic, behaviouristic (mechanomorphic) psychology”. To him this psychology is not purely descriptive or academic but suggests actions and implies consequences to help and to generate ways of life. It is a psychology that deals with how the person understands the way of life to help “his own private psyche”; also be as a social being and as a member of society. 98



He aspires that ultimately the best helper is only “the good person”. Hence this third psychology he calls is now as one facet of a general Weltanschauung (Maslow, 1968, Preface to the Second Edition, p.iii). 2 Siroj Sorajjakool is a Professor of Religion, Psychology and Counselling. His book Wu Wei, Negativity and Depression (New York: Haworth Press, 2001) is a study of his own experience with depression that lead to discover issues and discovery of Taoist wisdom that is outlined in his book (Editor's note to his article in Hakomi Forum). 3 Prof. Gene Sharp, a social scientist of our times, is a staunch believer in democracy and human freedom. He is a Nobel Peace prize nominee (2009, 20012 and 2013) and a Right livelihood awardee. He is the one who propagated nonviolent resolution to attain political freedom from dictatorial governments. As a young student he wrote his M.A. thesis, Nonviolence: A Sociological Study (1951), a study on the methods of nonviolence. Sharp's seminal work Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral power in 1960; other early works, Gandhi faces the Storm (1961) and “The Meaning of Nonviolence”(1967), depict Sharp's understanding of Gandhi and praise of Gandhi for his moral primacy for conflict resolution. He founded the Albert Einstein Institution in 1983 which is a non-profit organization to advance the use of nonviolent action in conflicts. Since fifty years he had been doing research on nonviolence. Recently a documentary film, How to Start a Revolution based on the use of Sharp's nonviolent techniques for recent successful nonviolent revolutions, was awarded as a best documentary at the Rain dance independent film festival in London (Gray, 2011).


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References : Chaitanya, K. (1977). Gandhi's Quest of Being in Becoming. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace foundation CWMG (GOI). Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (CWMG). New Delhi: Publication division Fox, M. (2014).Understanding Peace: A comprehensive Introduction. New York: Gandhi. M.K. Sarvodya (compiled). Ahmedabad: Navajivan (1951). Gray, Louise (2011). How to Start a Revolution? In Telegraph, 21 October, 2011. Gregg, R. B. (1935/1958). The Power of Nonviolence. Maine: Green Leaf Books. Hundoble, J. Taoism: Basic fundamentals of the way Iyer.(Ed.) (1990). Gandhi the Essential writings of Mahatma. New Delhi: Oxford Kline, A.S. (2003). Tao Te Ching (The Book of the Way and its Virtue). Chapters, 2, 4, 10, 28, 30, 57, 58, 67 and 75. Lafleuer, J. Lucas, S, Kronlein, J & McElveen, K.(2011). A ppt. on Pamela reed's Theory of Self Transcendence Lin Derek (2006). Tao Te Ching: Tao and Virtue Classic. Sky Light Paths. Chapters, 1,4,7,8,9,10,31,46,58,67,68,72 and 80. Maslow, A.H.(1954). Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row. Maslow, A.H.(1968). Toward A Psychology of Being. Second Edition. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Modi, R. (13, March, 2013). The Relevance of Gandhi in China Today. Shang Quanyu's conversation with Rajni Bakshi, Gandhi Peace Fellow at Gate Way House. Published by Gate Way House: Indian council on global Relations Rao, K.R.(2011). Gandhi and Applied Spirituality. New Delhi: Indian council of Philosophical Research (ICPR) and Matrix Sharp, G. (2005). Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. Extending Horizons Books and Porter Sargent Publishing Inc. Sorajjakool, S.(2008). Lao Tzu, Knowing, and Being in Hakomi Forum - Issue. 19-20-21, Summer 2008 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The Hindu (March 8, 2013). Gandhi's Teaching Part of Curriculum in Children. Winter, Bill (2007). Lao Tzu-The Libertarian. The Advocates for self-Government.

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Web links: http://www.ramos.nl/yyfire.html http://www.csuchico.edu/~cheinz/syllabi/fall99/hundoble/ http://professionallearningportfolio.weebly.com/uploads/1/4/2/9/1429 5870/pamela_reeds_theory_of_self_transcendence.pdf http:// www.indiwrites.org//china-connect/relevance-gandhi-chintoday http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Chinese/TaoTeChing.htm# _Toc42848703 http://www.theadvocates.org/celebrities/lao-tzu.html http://www.taoism.net/ttc/complete.htm

Figure 1 Taichi disc

Source: https://www.google.co.in/search?q=taoism&biw=1517


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Tagore (泰戈尔) and China (中国) Sourabh Chatterjee Lecturer in Chinese, Mody University of Science and Technology (Formerly Mody Institute of Technology & Science) Lakshmangarh, Distt. Sikar, Rajasthan- 332311, India. Email : [email protected]

Abstract In 1923, Beijing Lecture Association, Jiangxueshe (讲学社 ) invited Rabindranath Tagore to deliver a series of lecturers. Established in September 1920, Jiangxueshe was one of the many globally acclaimed institutions that mushroomed in China in the wake of the May Fourth Movement. The main objective of this institution was to invite foreign scholars and celebrities to arrange lectures by them for Chinese intellectuals. They thought it would help the Chinese intellects to prosper in many aspects, which will enrich their country. Every year, they used to invite the most respected global figures, research scholars, scientists, and Nobel laureates to deliver their valuable speeches and sermons. Before Rabindranath, the Association invited some dignified global figures like John Dewey (1859-1952), Bertrand Russell (18721970) and Hans Driesch (1862-1941). Most of them were not able to move them in a great way. Anyway, as the Chinese association felt that they were not receiving expected result after inviting so many global scholars, they finally decided to invite Rabindranath to their country. It is worthy to be mentioned here, some fervent critics and scholars like Das, Sun and Hay have averred that Tagore's visit to China created two fold reactions among the people of China. Tagore's visit to China received both friendly and hostile reactions from them. Many of them were in support of this visit and some Chinese were against it. Here my endeavour is to spotlight them and probe these with proper reasons and acute critical analyses.

The Chinese may have the highest regard for Sakyamuni (better known as Buddha across the Globe) but our great Nobel laureate poet is very close competitor of him. Rabindranath is the second best known figure in China and paid the highest reverence only after their Lord Buddha. It is very clear in the words of Wang Bangwei (王邦維 ) of Beijing University. He says, "In the background of over two millennia of China and India having been interconnecting, interacting, and learning from each other, the Nobel Laureate was closest to our times, real and intimate to us". 102


Tagore (泰戈尔) and China (中国)

Rabindranath lived 80 years and left us only 70 years ago. He was the closest to Wang's time and very intimate to him and his contemporaries. According to him, “From Sakyamuni we have enjoyed more of a reverent godliness and from Tagore we have enjoyed a tangible humanness that was noble and admirable”. Since time immemorial, they have the highest respect and warm regards for Buddha for his reverent godliness. They have learned how to take the right track of life from Buddha. From Rabindranath they have learned how to be human. They have enjoyed a tangible humanness of Rabindranath that was noble and admirable to them. His beauty shaping power, creative genius and faith in Asian civilization saved Asia from the condemnation of demoralization in the Eastern Hemisphere. He solidified Asian literary culture and personified the creative genius of Asian. His universal art values hope to the Indians, intimacy of the Chinese and tangible humanness of the Asians. Crossing the interface of the nationality, racisms and narrow religiosity, his art touches all Asian alike. All of them get equal pleasure, considering it as their own art and culture. Tagore was the first Asian to win the Noble Prize for Literature in 1913, for his magnum opus, Gitanjali, a collection of poems written by Rabindranath, which he translated into English later. The West came to know him for his own translation of Gitanjali and later by some other translator like W.B. Yeats. At a time when India was being ruled by the British and there was regression of every type in her political and cultural spheres, stopping all creativity and producing an all-pervasive gloom in the national life, the poet's song offerings in the form of Gitanjali took the China and West by surprise.


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He went to China with a message of love and fraternity to inculcate the essence of the ties between the two countries. In 1923, Beijing Lecture Association, Jiangxueshe (讲学社) invited Rabindranath Tagore to deliver a series of lecturers. Established in September 1920, Jiangxueshe was one of the many globally acclaimed institutions that mushroomed in China in the wake of the May Fourth Movement. The main objective of this institution was to invite foreign scholars and celebrities to arrange lectures by them for Chinese intellectuals. They thought it will help the Chinese intellects to be prospers in many aspects, which will enrich their country. Every year, they used to invite the most respected global figures, research scholars, scientists, and noble laureates to deliver their valuable speeches and sermons. Before Rabindranath, the Association invited some dignified global figures like John Dewey (1859-1952), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Hans Driesch (1862-1941). Most of them were not able to move them in a great way, except Bertrand Russell who received warm welcome and support to create a great impression on Chinese intellectuals. The main reason of the dissatisfaction was that others (invited scholars) spoke succinctly on limited topic, which failed to create a great impact on them. After that, the Association intended to invite Rudolf Euken and Henry Bergson, but did not succeed. They invited Rabindranath in 1923. Much before he set foot in Shanghai in 1924, Rabindranath Tagore was a celebrated figure in China. Chinese people had great respects and warm regards for Rabindranath. They liked Tagore's work so much that much before his reaching there and speaking to them directly, one of the founding fathers of the Communist party of China Chen Du xiu (陈独秀) translated Tagore's prize winning anthology, “Gitanjali” as early as 1915. Anyway, as the Chinese association felt that they were not receiving expected result after inviting so many global scholars, they finally decided to invite Rabindranath to their country. 104



Consequently, they sent an invitation to Rabindranath Tagore. Responding to their warm invitation, Rabindranath sent them his consent for visiting China. Tagore passionately advocated the reopening of the path (paved long before by the Chinese globetrotters Faxian and Xuanzang) between the two great civilizations India and China. This created an unprecedented uproar across the China. Not only did it create strong uproar but also culminated the hostility between Rabindranath and Liang Qichao (梁启超), President of Jiangxueshe. Liang Qichao was so inspired by Rabindranath that he conferred him the Chinese name, “Zhu Zhendan” which means “Thunder of the Oriental dawn” when translated into English. Liang admitted that he enjoyed much during the period of his staying with Rabindranath in China. When Tagore got the news that his name had been translated into Chinese, he was highly pleased. The Chinese association wrote Rabindranath, “We shall invite scholars and try to arrange an exchange of scholars. If I can accomplish this, I shall feel happy". These lines easily touched a man who had always nourished a deep love for China. Spurred by the strong interest and cordial invitation, Rabindranath decided to leave India for China. He was hopeful that his visit would re-establish the cultural and spiritual links between the two civilizations. In 1924, before sailing for China, Rabindranath told the press that Chinese invitation was an invitation to India herself. Therefore, as her humble son, he must accept it. In his own words, “When the invitation from China reached me I felt it was an invitation to India herself, and as her humble son, I must accept it.” Expressing great concern Tagore, further said, “I am hoping that our visit will re-establish the cultural and spiritual connections between China and India” (Hay 1970: 145). On 12th April 1924, Tagore set his foot in Shanghai (上海 ). It is worthy to be mentioned here that Chinese did not respond to Rabindranath immediately after his reach. However, in the course of time, his approach seemed to them prophetic. As soon as Chinese perceived his visit a glorious event and great India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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achievement for them, they started paying high respect to him. Their society was going through a rapid change as the consequence of Tagore's visit to them. Both India and China were benefited with this visit. During his fifty-day tour, he visited almost all major cities in China. Hang Zhou (杭州), Jinan (济南), Tianjin (天津) etc. are name but a few. On April 23, 1924, Tagore reached Beijing (北京 ) by train. At Qianmen (前门 ), he received warm welcome. Hundreds of people including renowned Chinese figures expressed their great concern for Rabindranath Tagore described his visit to China in a cheerful manner and described it as his return of the native. Chinese liked him in a great way. Tagore would never ever forget this special Birthday celebration with the intellectuals in China. This since the time of his visit to date, the name Rabindranath stands as India- China friendship. He will remain alive forever as the hyphen between the two countries. Rabindranath had deep love for the people of China. He was so impressed by them that he kept the time of his visit to China stored in his mind until the final day of his life. This is evident from his poem written in 1941 (at the last phase of his life). He composed a beautiful poem recollecting his beautiful time in China. It was a real nostalgia recollected in tranquility. He wrote: “In the vessel of my birthdays Sacred waters from many pilgrimages Have I gathered this I remember. Once I went to the Land of China, Those whom I had not met Put the mark of friendship on my forehead Calling me their own. The grab of a stranger slipped from me Unknowing, The inner man appeared who is eternal Revealing a joyous relationship 106



Unforeseen. A Chinese name I took, dressed in Chinese Clothes. This I knew in my mind Wherever I find my friend there I am born Anew. Life's wonder he brings.” Tagore was one of the earliest modern Indian thinkers and great patron of Renaissance who perceived the benefits of mutual understanding and good relationship between the two great civilizations, China and India. He was the first man to eulogize the long-standing friendly relationship between India and China. He strongly advocated the reopening of the path between the two countries that remained close for a longer period. He paid warm regards to the great contribution made by the predecessors for the cultural exchanges between the two countries. Tagore was highly enthusiastic in promoting inseparable friendship. He was in deep thought for a mutual understanding between the two oriental people, Indian and Chinese. He was the real hero for the revival of India-China relations. He looked forward to offering the song dynasty, following the advent of the Europeans. He entreated the people of the two countries to develop spirituality to achieve great success. According to him, spirituality is the gate way of being successful civilizations. He opposed the mad pursuit for materialistic gain like the people of the West who only knows how to gain and spend. The people of the Waste have given their heart away- a sordid boon. Like elite thinker of China, Tagore was the first modern Indian to think on China's place in the modern world. John Dewey and Bertrand Russell are the most important among his fellow thinkers. When in China, Tagore in his final lecture said, “I have done what was possible --- I have made friends.” The speech was many ways symbolic for the renewal of friendship between India and China. This is not a sheer friendship between the poet and his fans in China but an awakening of potential and mutual understanding between the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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two countries. We commemorate Tagore's contribution for reestablishing India-China fraternity in modern times. In the present day of complex relationship between these two countries, we aspire for his glorious presence in China for restoring a diplomatic relationship between the two countries. The founding Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru once wrote on Tagore's birth anniversary in 1961 that unlike Mahatma Gandhi who arrived 'like a thunderbolt us all', Tagore 'crept on us and permeated us'. Nehru described himself: “I belong to a generation which grew up under his influence”. About Tagore, Nehru commended, “For all his Indianness, he was essentially a person of international mould of thinking. Nationalism is sometimes opt to become a narrowing creed” (Nehru 1961: XV). Tagore and Nehru are regarded as among fifty foreigners who have contributed most in shaping China's modern development model. Tagore said in his first talk in China in 1924, “I am rather reminded of the day when India claimed you as brother…” (Das 1999: 48). This shows his thinking of fraternity. He was the first modern Indian to conceive Indians and Chinese as “Bhai-Bhai”. Tagore was the epitome and emblem of India India-China fraternity. Tagore influenced Nehru and his idealism in a great way that helped him keep good relationship with China during the 1950s, when he bore “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” sentiments in his heart. It is explicit from his own words when Nehru wrote in 1961 (on the occasion of Tagore's birth anniversary) that unlike Mahatma Gandhi who arrived like thunderbolt shaking us all, Tagore 'crept on us and permeated us'. To inculcate Tagore's influence on him, Nehru told about himself: “I belong to a generation which grew up under his influence”. Nehru further wrote, “For all his Indianness, he was essentially a person of international mould of thinking. Nationalism is sometimes opt to became a narrowing creed” (Nehru 1961: XV). 108



Having deep influence of Rabindranath on Nehru, he inherited the same feelings that Rabindranath felt for China. He had special friendly relation with China that made him think and say, “HindiChini Bhai Bhai”. Tagore's influence on Nehru's feelings was so deep on Indian that after six decades union rural development minister Jairam Ramesh felt the same love for China and he deep delved into his heart to describe it with a new coinage: China+India= Chindia. It can be taken as an icon to join two big nations. The root of lies in the stepping-stone set by Rabindranath long before today. Tagore's China visit in 1924 was so important to us that we prefer calling it 'Tagore's great visit to China', as cited Amartya Sen. According to him- it helps world's two great nations to come closer. The importance of it does not wait for an explanation. It blurred the interface of these two counties, bringing in a cosmopolitan culture like the advent of spring that rejuvenate winter beaten world after a winter sleep. It stands as the culture intercourse between world's two great nations. The great Chinese poet, Xu Zhimo (徐志摩 ), wrote about Tagore, “newly emancipated like the tender buds on the stem, need but the embrace of the southern breeze and the kiss of the morning dew to set them of lower, and you have supplied it”. Tagore did not know Chinese, but he was highly interested in China, their art, culture, civilization etc. He admired their social, cultural and ritual activities in his full-throated ease. Not only was he a great over of China, but also his family members were interested in China and its people. Needless to say, Rabindranath's father, Debendranath Tagore and his grandfather Dwarkanath Tagore visited China. Debendranath had considerable interest in Chinese philosophy. Therefore, it is very clear that Tagore family had deep love for China. To them China was not an alien land. As mentioned earlier, although Rabindranath did not know Chinese, he was well versed in Chinese culture. He developed and cherished a strong feeling about China, as he heard and learned about China from his father India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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and grandfather from the very earlier period of his life. Tagore's strong feeling and involvement with China and its people help him earn admiration on behalf of Chinese that broadened way of good relationship between the two countries. People of both the countries felt equal love and sympathy for each with an attitude of humanity and benevolence. Apart from all these admiration, love and sympathy for the people of China, Tagore felt the same pulse and sorrow for China as a Chinese does. This is very clear from his supersensitive reaction about the plight of the Chinese people expressed through his sensitive essay “Chine Maraner Byabasay” in 1981, only at the age of 20. With a touch of pathos, he vehemently condemned the opium trade held by British in China. He called this essay “Chine Maraner Byabasay”, which means (Commerce of Killing people in China). It was a complete attack on the British strategy followed by them in China. He brought out an intense attack on British people and their divesting impact on the Chinese people. This is why as soon as the Nobel Prize was awarded to Rabindranth Tagore, Chinese expressed their great concerns and celebrated the event with their hearts' content. Immediately after the award was announced, many welcoming notes and statements started coming to him. Say for example, in an important article, the great Chinese scholar Qian Zhixiu described Tagore that he was a man not only dedicated to his motherland but also to the welfare of global people. Qian Zhixiu was not alone to show warm regards for Rabindranath, but there are many others like Guo Moruo (郭沫若) and Hu Shi (胡適). Guo Moruo's poems not only reflected Tagore's influence, but also clearly showed the reference to the way of his own thinking. His own thought had been developed by the thought of Rabindranath. In December 1923, on the eve of his Chinese visit, Xu Zhimo ((徐志摩) wrote to Tagore: “Nearly all the leading magazines here have published articles on you and special numbers are issued in honor of your visit. Most of 110



your works in English have appeared in Chinese translation, some are in more then one version. Never before has a single writer, eastern or western, excited so much general interest in the heart of our your nation, and few, not even our ancient sages perhaps, have gifted us with such a vivid and immense inspiration as you have done” (Xu Zhimo 2005, Vol-VI, 378). A witness to that history, Professor Ji Xianlin (季羡林), who saw Tagore in 1924 when he was a middle school student at Jinan, late lamented doyen of China's India studies. Considering him unlucky, as he did not know much about the poetry (at that time), he wrote: “Then I was only 13, and I did not know much of poetry and knew even less of India. Yet I felt at that time that he must have been a great man” (Wang Shuying 2006:296). During the 1950s, professor Ji was delivering his lecture at Beijing University on “Indian literature in China”. He could not suppress his deep feelings and great influence of Indian literate and Rabindranath on him. Showing all his study materials to his beloved students, he said: “In 1924, the great patriotic modern Indian poet Tagore visited China. It was an earth-shaking event at that time. An overwhelming number of newspapers and magazines featured special article introducing the life, thought and works of Tagore. Xiaoshuo yuebao (小说月报 ), a journal and fiction monthly, brought out a special 'Tagore Issue' (Vol-14, Num. 9 & 10) and another instant extra issue named 'Welcome to Mr. Rabindranath Tagore' (Vol- 15, Num- 4). “In this special and extra issue, Chinese writers exhaustively introduced Tagore, writing his biography, analyzing his thought, and selectively discussing his works. It may be said that China was intoxicated with the Tagore fever around the time of his visit to China, both before and after.” (Wang Shuying: 2006:289). In a later article titled 'Tage'er yu Zhongguo' 泰戈尔与中国 (Tagore and China) written in 1979. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Discerning the full purpose and explaining it in proper way, Ji Xianlin said: “The most important achievement of Tagore's visit was the strengthening of the traditional friendship between the people of China and India…….bringing over the friendship of the Indian people, sowing the seeds of friendship wherever he went in China, and carrying back of friendship of the Chinese people………viewing from the perspective of the history of SinoIndian relations, his visit became the curtain raiser for a new epoch. From then on, the contacts between the two countries gradually increased. He vigorously advocated the study of Chinese language and culture, and set an example by establishing the Cheena-Bhavana in Visva-Bharati.” (Ji Xianlin 1979). It is very clear how Tagore's visit influenced the people of China and met their expectation. His visit created a great impact on the relations between the two countries. Tagore, too, liked and enjoyed their appreciation with his heart's content. His appreciation is very clear from his 'Leave Taking' address in Shanghai on 22 May 1924. At the time of his departure from China to India, Tagore in his final speech in China told: “I may tell you now that when my people heard I had received an invitation from China; there was great rejoicing and excitement amongst them. Most of you are aware that I have had, before this, other invitations from countries in the West, but this time the feeling of rejoicing was not restricted to that small circle which knows England……… it came from those who had no knowledge of England at all, and yet who were full of admiration at your generosity in inviting a man from the East, at a time when most people are infatuated with Western culture. They felt that this was a great opportunity for us to reopen the ancient channel of spiritual communication once again…….They thought it absolutely easy for me to let you, through the length and breadth of China, know how we in India have a love for you, and how we, 112



long to be the recipients of your love” (Das 1999: 73). Tagore's visit to China in 1924 has turned into a modern intercourse between two great civilizations China and India. Surpassing the time, action and place, it has been able to stir the two nations. We are enjoying the fruit of past-tree, living in today's time. His close observation of China life and ability to set up a close relationship enabled us to set up a good diplomatic relationship between the two counties. We reap now what Rabindranath sowed much before. Tagore's visit to China became most significant and historical event for his speech, private and public statement and very good relation with Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929) and other Chinese scholars and other literary masters. It broadened the way of exchanging heritage and culture between the world's two great nations. It will remain as the historical event and emblem of strong relationship between India and China. Since the time of Faxian (法显) and Xuanzang (玄奘) to date, we have some significant features of Sino-Indian cultural intercourse. Let us discuss it step-by-step from the very binging. At first Han Emperor Ming dreamed of the golden Buddha. Then, a search team led by Cai Yin was sent to India on behalf of Han government to invite Buddhist missionaries for a China visit. After that Dharmaraks and then Kasyapa Matanga visited China, and finally the Baimasi (白马寺 ), Monastery of white horse was set up for the transition of the scripture by the two eminent and pious Indian monks Dharmaraks and then Kasyapa Matanga. The whole process was like a formula for solidifying a heritage culture of admiration-invitation-hospitality-learning apt for both China and India. After this incident when Liang Qichao received Tagore in Beijing, he spoke to the intellectuals at the Beijing Normal University and requested them to attend the Tagore programmes. He mentioned glorious historical past, good relation between India and China, and eminent Indian monks who visited China. Liang Qichao India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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allusions and historical instances was nothing but the replica of the same procedure mentioned above. Mentioning the past incidents and mentioning the India China relationship, he requested the intellectuals of Beijing to show same warm regards to Tagore that they have learned from the history and mutual relationship between the two countries. Tagore's sojourn in Beijing and entire tour in China including Shanghai (上海), Hangzhou (杭州) Nanjing (南京), Jinan (济南), Taiyuan (太原) and other places en-route followed the traditional trend- the host guest cordiality that widened the path of cultural intercourse, mutual exchange of arts, science and commerce. On the whole, Tagore's China visit was an evidence of optimal hospitality on the part of the Chinese hosts. It was also one of his most exciting and moving experience among Tagore's numerous foreign trips all over the world. It was an extremely lively and touching scene everywhere and viewed in the light of Sino-Indian cultural intercourse, the fruitful event was very much in the traditional mode. In nutshell, Tagore's visit to China was an epitome of optimal hospitality for the Chinese hosts and unprecedented greetings and welcome for Indian guest. It was the most successful and satisfactory moving experience for Rabindranth among his all foreign trips across the globe. The event was highly significant, perfectly oriental, exceptionally success for inculcating the SinoIndian cultural intercourse. Although traditional in mode, it was highly successful for diplomatic relationship between India and China. His visit to China re-established and reciprocated the traditional culture of interaction and education exchange. He broadened way paved by Chinese Buddhist monks Fa-Hien or Faxian (法显) and Hsuan- Tsang or Xuanzang (玄奘). Chinese took his interaction, discussion and cultural exchange so cordially that Beijing celebrated his 63rd (In the Chinese tradition the 64th) birthday at their place by all walks of life on 8 May, in 1924. It was an outstanding event in international intercourse that 114



rejuvenated traditional relationship set by the Chinese traveler Faxian and Xuanzang. The most significant programme in the birthday celebrations was Liang Qichao's speech that Hu Shi translated into English. The most memorable of thing of the event was conferring Rabindranth the Chinese name, 'Zhu Zhendan'. The episode is highly significant for India China diplomatic relationship a mutual blending of Sino-Indian culture. This event is enough to evoke geo-civilization sentiment and spirit, brimming with the cordiality between two fraternal countries. This nostalgic event is the reminiscent of the fraternity between two the countries. It is enough to remind them about their legacies and heritages rooted deep in their oriental culture. Their duty is to retain it forever.

Conclusion Tagore was one of the earliest modern Indian thinkers and great patron of Renaissance who perceived the benefits of mutual understanding and good relationship between the two great civilizations, China and India. He was the first man to eulogize the long-standing friendly relationship between India and China. He strongly advocated the reopening of the path between the two countries that remained close for a longer period. He paid warm regards to the great contribution made by the predecessors for the cultural exchanges between the two countries. Tagore was highly enthusiastic in promoting inseparable friendship. He was in deep thought for a mutual understanding between the two oriental people, Indian and Chinese. He was the real hero for the revival of India-China relations. He looked forward to offering the song dynasty, following the advent of the Europeans. He entreated the people of the two countries to develop spirituality to achieve great success. According to him, spirituality is the great way of being successful civilizations. He opposed the mad pursuit for materialistic gain like the people of the West who only knows how to gain and spend. The people of the Waste have given their heart away- a sordid boon. Like elite thinker of China, Tagore was the first modern Indian to think on China's place in the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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modern world. John Dewey and Bertrand Russell are the most important among his fellow thinkers. When in China, Tagore in his final lecture said, “I have done what was possible --- I have made friends.” The speech was many ways symbolic for the renewal of friendship between India and China. This is not a sheer friendship between the poet and his fans in China but an awakening of potential and mutual understanding between the two countries. We commemorate Tagore's contribution for reestablishing India-China fraternity in modern times.

References : Amartya Sen, “Tagore and China”, journal of Shen Zheng University, vol-14, January 2011. Front Line: India's National Magazine, “Remembering Tagore on his 150th birth anniversary”, January 13, 2012. Girija. K. Mookerjee, “Tagore's view of Asian”, East and West, vol-12, no. 2/3, and “The work and Life of Rabindranath Tagore”, June-September 1961. Guo Moruo, “My views on Tagore's visit to China”, creation weekly, no. 23 October 14, 1923. Guo Moruo, “The Collected words of Moruo”, vol-11, (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1959), page- 145,147. Kali Das Nag, “Tagore and China (Calcutta 1945), page- 32, 33, 34. Liu Jian, “Enjoying Institute Ananda or Delight through the Finite”, Social Science Weekly, August- 5, 2010. Lu Xun, “The Complete Words of Lu Xun”, vol- 10, (Peking: People's Literature Publishing House) 1981. Lu Xun, “The Complete words of Lu Xun”, vol- 4 (Peking: People's Literature Publishing Housing, 1981), page- 12, 13. Mao Dun, “The Complete works of Mao Dun”, vol- 34 (Peking: People's Literature Publishing House, 1997), page- 222. Margarct. W. Fisher, “The Impact of Communist China on visitor from India”, (The Far Eastern Quarterly), vol-15, no. 2, February 1956. 116



Qian Liqun, Wen Rumin and Wu Fuhui, Thirty years in Modern Chinese Literature (Beijing University Press, 1998), page- 34,35 and 36. Stephan Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West, Tagore and his critics in Japan, China and India- Harvard University Press 1970, page- 206, 207, 209 and 210. Tan Chung and Geng Yinzeng, “India and China: The Contact and Conflict of Two Great Civilization”, (Peking: Commercial Press), 2006. Visva- Bharti Bulletain, “Rabindranath Tagore's visit to China”, no.1, pt.I and “From Calcutta to Peking”, May 1924, pt.II, “In China”, June 1924. Xu Zhimo, (Essays), translated by Tan Chuang, vol-IV. Wang Jinhou, “New Literature in the Era of May Fourth and Foreign Literature” (Cheng du: Sichuan University Press), 1989. Wang Yan, “Tagore's visit to China in 1924: A Positive Reevaluation of some Misunderstanding”, South Asian Studies, vol- 1, 2011, page- 132, 133, 134. Witold. Rcdzinski, “A History of China”, (Oxford: Pergamon Press), 1979. World Focus, “Rabindranath Tagore, visionary of a New World”, vol- 373, January 2011.


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Cross Cultural Communication between India & China from a Business Perspective: Snap shots G. Geethanjali Senior Faculty member, Business Communication &Soft Skills IBS, Hyderabad Email: [email protected]

Abstract To quote Derek Torrington,” Think globally, Act locally” is very much relevant in the sense that today's managers should have a global vision and local precision in all their dealings, including Cross Cultural Communication. This paper focuses on the importance of learning, understanding and implementation of CCC with special reference to India and China in terms of Business etiquette and manners. It throws light on Communications in China, appearance in China is very conservative , Behavior & Manners in China, Acceptable Public Behavior, Business Attire, Conversations and Networking, Meetings, Presentations, and Negotiation Tactics ,Dinner Etiquette and others. In the multi cultural global work place, it is important to know the norms of behavior or etiquette of different cultures to avoid culture shocks and for the smooth functioning of business. Etiquette makes our interaction with others pleasant and considerate.Radhika Shapoorjee president of IPAN Hill &Knowlton at New Delhi ,says, “ Etiquette underscores consistency and continuity ,is learned and acquired and there by establishes credibility about a person's background ”She adds, “through etiquettes ,we know about a person's Philosophy of life that affects work behavior” . Where is Etiquette is required ? Personal Family Home, Schools, College Social, Cultural and at Office. Why Etiquette is required ? Professional etiquette - must for Career ,builds leadership, quality, business & careers It refines skills needed for exceptional service Without Etiquette You limit your potential Risk your image Jeopardize relationships. China is believed to have one of the oldest and prominent continuous civilizations. China has over 4,000 years of verifiable history. Beijing is the capital of China and is the heart and focal point for the country. The official language is standard Chinese, which is derived from the Mandarin dialect. Most business people speak English. English learning of late by Chinese was in great demand and they are the largest number of internet users in the world .There are many dialects in China however there is only one written language. A Communist form of government rules China. The Chinese government promotes atheism although the constitution guarantees freedom of religion. 118


Cross Cultural Communication between India & China from a Business Perspective: Snap shots

There are fundamental systemic differences between India and China, which may have a drastic influence on their business relations. Most of the experts agree that in India, the system on one hand is chaotic and prone to communal and ethnic conflicts, on the other it is decentralized in decision-making, flexibility oriented and resilient so as to prevent social pressures from affecting the country's overall stability. The Chinese system in contrast is disciplined, centrally controlled and people oriented. The success of India-China cross-cultural management would very much depend on the ability of the two to synthesize their strengths and weaknesses, in the light of the opportunities that exists and in the overall interest of mutual benefits. In this backdrop this paper emphasizes the importance of Business Communication between India and China. According to Lee Iacocca, “There's one phrase I hate to see on any executive's evaluation, no matter how talented he may be, and that's the line, 'He has trouble getting along with other people.' To me that's the kiss of death.” The quality of the personal relationships in an organization determines the communication culture of the firm. When people trust one another and believe that they are appreciated, the communication climate is a positive one. Psychologist Jack Gibb provides a list of ways to promote positive relationships. This is also true when we are communicating across cultures.

Introduction A Communist form of government rules China. The Chinese government promotes atheism although the constitution guarantees freedom of religion. The Chinese practice a variety of religions, however, Confucianism; despite not being a formal religion is practiced widely throughout the country. China is the most densely populated county in the world with approximately 1.17 billion people as of 1992. Almost 100 percent of the population are ethnic or Han Chinese. There are strict rules regarding childbirth and each couple is limited to have only one child. The initial approach Chinese business contacts are mostly referrals; essentially a business relationship is struck based on another business associate recommendation. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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However, it is common today for cold calls and direct contacts, given the availability of the internet and the competitive nature of Chinese businesses. You may source from the internet, trade fairs, catalogues and brochures, advertisements and approach the Chinese companies directly through a call or email. Address a person using his or her family name only, such as Mr. Chen. Avoid using someone's given name unless you have known him or her for a long period of time. Formality is a sign of respect, and it is advisable to clarify how you will address someone very early in a relationship, generally during your first meeting. Business interactions between men and women are reserved. After an initial handshake, avoid body contact such as hugging or kissing on the cheek. Business Relationship in China Chinese business relationship inevitably becomes a social relationship after a while. Unlike Western business relationship which remains professional and perhaps, aloof, even after a long time, Chinese business relationship becomes a social one. The more you share your personal life, including family, hobbies, political views, aspirations, the closer you are in your business relationship. Sometimes, a lot of time is spent discussing matters outside of business, but then a lot of time, the other party is also making up his mind about your deal based on how much he sees your personal relationship with him. Seniority is important in China Seniority is very important to the Chinese especially if you are dealing with a State owned or government body. Instead of addressing the other party as Mr or Mrs XX and XX, it is always appropriate to address the other party by his 120



designation eg. Chairman XX and XX, Director XX and XX or Manager XX and XX. When giving out name cards or brochures, make sure you start with the most senior person before moving down the line. When giving out a name card or receiving one, ensure that you are stretching out with both hands with the card. Remember to face the card you are giving out in a manner such that the recieving party gets it facing him correctly. Tips: In China, it is assumed that the first person that enters the room is the head of the group. Giving Face or Gei MianZi Giving face (aka giving due respect) is a very important concept in China. You must give the appropriate respect according to rank and seniority. For example, if you are buying gifts for an initial contact, make sure you buy better gifts for the senior managers instead of buying similar gifts across the board. Similarly, sitting positions in a meeting room or a dining table is accorded accordingly to rank, importance and seniority. It is good to seek advice before embarking on your first meeting with Chinese business contacts to avoid making the wrong move. Extension for Giving Face Do not underestimate the concept of losing face. Arriving late, causing embarrassment, behaving confrontationally, insisting too hard on paying a bill or calling attention to a mistake can all cause loss of face. However, complimenting someone on their business acumen in front of their colleagues is an easy way to win points. If a Chinese person has misunderstood you, or cannot (or does not want to) answer a question, they may laugh to cover their embarrassment. Try not to get agitated. They may come back to you with an answer later once they've had the chance to India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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think it through or find out the answer. If they don't, you'll need to ask again - but it's best not to do this in front of others so as not to cause a loss of face. Lunch/Dinner in China There is no business talk in China without at least one trip to a restaurant. Sometimes, a trip is made to the restaurant even before any business discussion takes place! Inevitably, the restaurant will always be a grand one and you are likely to be hosted in a private room. There is an elaborate seating arrangement for a Chinese business meal. There are fixed seating positions for the host and the guest and then they are seated again according to seniority. This is a very important aspect of a formal dinner and it is important that you follow the rules accordingly. However, it seems that the Northern Chinese are very particular to this formal seating arrangement while the Southern Chinese have to loosen the formalities somewhat. Try to master chopsticks before you arrive in China. Chinese food is eaten informally, with everyone serving themselves from several main dishes on a central turntable. You will usually be seated on the right of your Chinese host, who will always serve you first. Extension for Dinner in China Frequent toasts are not unusual. Mao tai (or baijiu), a fiery 60-70 proof liqueur distilled from sorghum, is what you'll typically drink. If you can't keep up (and it's usually better not to), join in the toast with beer or a soft drink. Better yet, bring a partner who can drink on your behalf! However, do not toast to a woman. Drinking a lot (and even drunkenness) may earn you respect or trust, since many Chinese believe that alcohol causes barriers to come down and true intentions to be revealed.

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During a meal, do not turn a fish over to get to the flesh on the underside. Superstition holds that turning a fish over will cause a fishing boat to capsize. You may be invited to eat at someone's home. Always bring a gift (fruit or flowers or something from your own country), and remember to take your shoes off at the threshold. Dress Code Conservative suits for men with subtle colors are the norm. Women should avoid high heels and short sleeved blouses. The Chinese frown on women who display too much. Subtle, neutral colors should be worn by both men and women. Casual dress should be conservative as well. Men and women can wear jeans. However, jeans are not acceptable for business meetings. Controversial Issues in China There are some taboo areas in social conversations with the Chinese. Try to avoid these conversational topics as much as possible. I have seen many nasty arguments as a result of these topics: Don't mention that Taiwan is an independent state or a country Don't praise Shanghai in front of natives of Beijing and similarly vice versa Survival Tips Bring a large supply of business cards. You may meet many more people than anticipated. Keep in mind that in China, and virtually all other countries, that 3/6/00 means June 3, 2000. When sending correspondence, avoid confusion by writing your date in full.


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Compliment someone in front of their boss and colleagues is an easy way to win points. Do not try too hard to "go Chinese." Chinese do not expect you to know all of their etiquette, and they make allowances for foreigners. Keep the above guidelines in mind, but above all, be yourself. Do learn a few words of Chinese. This shows an interest in your host's language and culture. It also is a very good icebreaker. Eg. Hello

Thank you

ni hao

xie xie

Hello (honorific)

Cheers (toast)

nin hao

ganbei

Always keep in mind Smile Be Professional Giving Face Keep learning beyond the “classroom” Make friends The Geert Hofstede analysis for China is similar to that of Honkong where Long-term Orientation is the highest-ranking factor. However, the Chinese rank lower than any other Asian country in the Individualism factor. This can be attributed primarily to the Communist rule and its emphasis on a collectivist culture. Geert Hofstede analysis for China has Long-term Orientation (LTO) the highest-ranking factor (118), which is true for all Asian cultures. This Dimension indicates a society's time perspective and an attitude of persevering; that is, overcoming obstacles with time, if not with will and strength. (see Asian countries graph below). 124



The Chinese rank lower than any other Asian country in the Individualism (IDV) ranking, at 20 compared to an average of 24. This may be attributed, in part, to the high level of emphasis on a Collectivist society by the Communist rule, as compared to one of Individualism. The low Individualism ranking is manifest in a close and committed member 'group', be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group.

Appearance in China Conservative suits for men with subtle colors are the norm. Women should avoid high heels and short sleeved blouses. The Chinese frown on women who display too much. Subtle, neutral colors should be worn by both men and women. Casual dress should be conservative as well. Men and women can wear jeans. However, jeans are not acceptable for business meetings. Revealing clothing for women is considered offensive to Chinese businessmen.

Behavior & Manners in China Do not use large hand movements. The Chinese do not speak with their hands. Your movements may be distracting to your host. Personal contact must be avoided at all cost. It is highly inappropriate for a man to touch a woman in public. Do not point when speaking. To point do not use your index finger, use an open palm. It is considered improper to put your hand in your mouth. Avoid acts that involve the mouth. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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It is illegal to give gifts to government official however; it has become more commonplace in the business world. It is more acceptable to give gifts either in private or to a group as a whole to avoid embarrassment. The most acceptable gift is a banquet. Quality writing pens as considered favored gifts. The following gifts and/or colors are associated with death and should not be given: Clocks Straw sandals A stork or crane Handkerchiefs Anything white, blue or black Always arrive on time or early if you are the guest. Do not discuss business at meals. Do not start to eat or drink prior to the host. As a cultural courtesy, you should taste all the dishes you are offered. Sample meals only, there may be several courses. Never place your chopsticks straight up in your bowl. By placing your sticks upright in your bowl your will remind your host of joss sticks which connotes death. Do not drop the chopsticks it is considered bad luck. Do not eat all of your meal. If you eat all of your meal, the Chinese will assume you did not receive enough food and are still hungry. Women do not usually drink at meals. Tipping is considered insulting, however the practice is becoming more common. 126



Communications in China Bowing or nodding is the common greeting; however, you may be offered a handshake. Wait for the Chinese to offer their hand first. Applause is common when greeting a crowd; the same is expected in return. Introductions are formal. Use formal titles. Often times Chinese will use a nickname to assist Westerners. Being on time is vital in China. Appointments are a must for business. Contacts should be made prior to your trip. Bring several copies of all written documents for your meetings. The decision making process is slow. You should not expect to conclude your business swiftly. Many Chinese will want to consult with the stars or wait for a lucky day before they make a decision. Present and receive cards with both hands. Never write on a business card or put it in your wallet or pocket. Carry a small card case. The most important member of your company or group should lead important meetings. Chinese value rank and status. Develop a working knowledge of Chinese culture. Allow the Chinese to leave a meeting first. As you start or expand your business in China, having an understanding of Chinese business etiquette is important to your success. Knowing and practicing common customs will also help you relax, avoid embarrassment, and focus on the matters at hand on critical occasions. This document provides a brief set of guidelines on Chinese business customs and practices based on India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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queries that have been received by Trade Commissioners at our Embassy and Consulates in Greater China. For further information, there are reference links at the end of the document. While nothing can be at your own personal experience, we hope that this information will be of assistance in sensitively guiding your activities. In your business dealings in China, you will make many friends, both Chinese and foreign, who can help you learn the ropes. Follow their advice and example! The toughest business people you encounter will often also prove to be genuinely warm and accommodating hosts, and will overlook simple errors of table manners or business etiquette as we would in Canada - if your purposes are serious and your conduct respectful.

Background Before beginning, recognize that the following qualities are valued by the Chinese and therefore relevant to your Chinese business interactions today: Saving and giving face Respect for elders and rankings (note that the latter is particularly important when dealing with government officials) Patience Politeness Modesty

Approaching Business in China Top tip: Business in China relies heavily on personal relationships: make sure you have some! Doing research on the market is important in China, but personal relationships are equally essential to business success here. It is crucial to establish and maintain good relationships with key business contacts and relevant government officials. Attending industry networking events, contacting industry associations and

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municipal or provincial investment promotion bodies, and following up on personal introductions are all good ways to start the relationship-building process. While many Canadian firms have done business successfully with credible firms in China, it is important to remain aware of potential scams that you may encounter as you approach business in China.[1] For further information on scams that can affect your business, please see our report on the Trade Commissioner Service website regarding frauds and scams.

Attending and Conducting Meetings Top tip: Don't be late, and know who's boss! In general, meetings in China follow the same format as those in Canada, albeit with a bit more ritual. The Chinese value punctuality, so arrive on time or even slightly early for meetings or other occasions. The following points should be kept in mind: Dates: Check the Chinese calendar. If you are scheduling a meeting, avoid all national holidays, especially Chinese New Year, when the entire country effectively shuts down and it can be very difficult to organize meetings with key individuals. The May 1 and October 1 holidays also affect businesses: be forewarned. Preparation: Be well prepared in advance of your meetings. Your Chinese hosts will most likely know you and your business quite well. Have a detailed proposition of the value of your company and product; your counterparts will have one for you (see section below on “Materials”). Chinese businesses often meet with numerous foreign businesses seeking to establish relationships; if you are unable to capture their attention at the first meeting, you may not be able to secure follow-up. Language of the meeting: Make sure you know the language capabilities of your hosts before the meeting. It is more India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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convenient and reliable for you to have your own interpretation if your hosts don't speak English or have little English capability. Meeting room set-up: If you have specific requirements for a meeting room set-up (e.g. projector and screen), be sure to communicate this to your hosts in advance of the meeting. They are usually happy to accommodate, but often do not have the in-house capacity to set up the technology on the spot. Materials: Have Chinese-language materials (e.g. brochures, presentations) about your company to share with your hosts. While your contact in the organization may speak perfect English, the decision makers in the company may not. It will be challenging for your interlocutor to convince others of your company or product's value if they are not equipped with Chinese materials. Dress Code: Government officials and top management dress formally for meetings, while business people at working levels may adopt a more casual style. If you're not sure, go formal it will convey respect and seriousness. In the summertime, there can be a suggestion for men to “go casual”. This means polo shirts or button-down short sleeve shirts, as opposed to suits and ties (or shorts which are definitely not appropriate).

Introductions: Addressing others: Seniority is valued in China. It is important to address your counterparts by their title (Chairman, Director, etc.). Find out who the most senior person in the room is, and address them first. Introducing yourself: Say your name clearly, and remember to state both the company you work for and your position. As a point of reference, know that Chinese will refer to their company first, then their title, and then their name when introducing themselves to others. Handshakes: As in Canada, meetings often start with handshakes. Ensure that you are not too aggressive with your 130



handshake. Don't be surprised if you are at the receiving end of a decidedly non-aggressive handshake. If things go well, you may also be on the receiving end of a prolonged handshake: anything goes. In western business contexts, you have probably found yourself in “squeezing” contests (among men): who has the stronger grip? In China, the question will be “who lets go first?” Don't be shy about holding on if your counterpart is enjoying the contact it is meant well. Giving/Receiving business cards: Similar to introductions, hand out business cards to the most senior official first. Chinese use both hands when giving and receiving anything of value, including gifts and particularly business cards; you should do the same as this is one of the first points at which you will make an impression. Take a moment to look at and acknowledge the individual's card. Have your own cards translated into Chinese on one side. Your title is important; this is how your hosts will determine who should be invited to meetings, what weight your words carry, and where you will be seated. Your name: Having a Chinese name, ideally one with meaning rather than a transliteration of your English or French name will be taken as a sign of respect as well. The best approach is to have a local contact or native speaker help create one for you. A link to an online Chinese name creator is provided at the end of the document under “Useful Links”. Seating Arrangements: The host will take the lead, and you will likely have a name card or designated seat based on your role in the organization. Meeting structure: Particularly in government circles, meetings may follow a fairly formal structure, with the senior member of the hosting party introducing himself/herself and colleagues, and then proceeding to state his or her views and position on the matter in question. Following this, the leading member of your party should do the same. Subordinate India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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members of the Chinese party will not usually speak unless asked to do so by the most senior person; your observance of the same protocol (even if your management style permits a more fluid approach) will have the advantage of conveying who is in authority and who, within your own team, may have special expertise or authority in a given area.

Dining Top tip: Follow the leader! Business often gets conducted during meals. As with business meetings, food and seating are determined by the hosts. The following points should be kept in mind when dining formally with the Chinese: Beginning to eat: Follow cues from your hosts and start eating when the hosts begin. There will be cold dishes placed on the table when you are seated; wait to be invited before you dig in. Keeping pace: At formal banquets and high-end restaurants, serving staff may keep up an almost constant rotation of dishes. They will also change your plate frequently with a clean one, so as not to mix dishes and flavours. While at first this may be distracting, accept the rhythm and you will soon cease to notice it. In order to have a sense of what is coming next, know that the meal will proceed with meats of various varieties and peak with a fish course, followed by a staple (rice, dumplings, noodles) and wind down with a sweet or dessert. Refusing food: The Chinese tend to offer a lot of food, and it is acceptable to refuse food if you have dietary restrictions or allergies. However, it is a sign of politeness to accept some of everything, and sample (even a little of) all dishes served. But don't eat or drink all of something you don't like, since this may be taken as a sign that you want more! This is where the rotation of plates can serve to your advantage: a nod to the wait staff to remove a plate will allow for your preferences to be accommodated unobtrusively.

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Drinking: While local wine can be preferred at banquets, the Chinese more frequently offer strong distilled alcohol called baijiu or maotai(a very special type of baijiu) for toasts and there may be many toasts during a meal. Never drink from the toasting glass except during a toast - and don't let the size of the glass fool you as to the power of the contents! The Chinese know that their alcohol is considered strong for foreigners, and under normal circumstances, they will not push you to drink. Some hosts will provide drinking yogurt to help protect your stomach, which can be helpful to allay the effects of the alcohol. Try to avoid drinking baijiu on an empty stomach as you will feel the effects of the alcohol quickly it's a good idea to eat something before the toasts begin. If you cannot or do not drink for medical or personal reasons, this is respected but you should advise your host or your working level contact of this at the beginning of the banquet, or even beforehand. It will be noted carefully by your hosts and arrangements will be made to avoid embarrassing you. Toasting: Your host will start off the banquet with a toast to your presence / friendship/ cooperation / getting to know each other / clinching a deal. You may choose to reciprocate, toast for toast, or to wait until the host, his or her colleague, and one other member of the hosting party has toasted. Typically, the principal guest is expected to toast a few courses after the host toasts. If you are toasting, your comments should be warm and sincere, and your toast should not be any longer than your host's. When toasting, the Chinese normally say gan bei, which translates to “bottoms up”. Note that drinking is sometimes expected as proof of a close relationship where partners can reveal their true selves, even in a business context. While this expectation is slowly changing and may vary by region, it is something to be aware of. If the group at the banquet is very comfortable with each other, it is also not uncommon to go around the table toasting each member of the party. Take your cue from your hosts and from your local contact or interpreter. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Note: There are great differences in dining and toasting customs among different regions in China. When in doubt, ask your host. He or she will be very happy to explain them to you and will be impressed at your interest in and respect for local customs. Conversation: The banquet is generally a social event in a formal context. Discussion will likely centre around pleasantries, background information on the region or the company, but it is not a time for negotiating or challenges. The focus may not be the food per se, but there will be pride in the offerings provided. Paying the bill: The host pays. If you are hosting a meal, do not show money in front of your guests. Either have someone slip out and settle the tab or wait until your guests have left before paying. Hosting the banquet: It is not common business practice to be expected to host a banquet at the conclusion of a deal. Certainly if you would like to host a banquet this is your prerogative, but it would be considered bad form in a business context for the Chinese company to insist you do so or provide you with the bill at the end of the meal. Concluding: There is little lingering at banquets. Formal dinners often end suddenly, when the senior member of the hosting party stands up (quickly followed by staff and subordinates), briefly thanks the guests for attending, and proceeds to leave the room. This may appear abrupt the first few times you witness it, but is simply a decisive and useful way to bring the occasion to a close. If there is a dessert / fruit course, you can expect this to follow fairly shortly before the senior member of the hosting party departs. Gifts (see below) are usually offered at the conclusion of the banquet, prior to departure.

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Conclusion Cross-cultural communication is a field of study that looks at how people from differing cultural backgrounds communicate, in similar and different ways among themselves and how they endeavor to communicate across cultures. Wherever business takes you, learning the culture, etiquette and protocol of the host country is a key step to success.

Gift Giving Gift giving is a common Chinese custom that business visitors to China should prepare for and use to advantage. The advice of a Chinese friend or colleague is invaluable in doing this properly, but here are some simple guidelines: Who: Typically, a single large group gift is presented to the chief person or leader of a Chinese organization. What: Gifts should not be too expensive. The gifts you receive will often have strong local associations that are a matter of real meaning (local identity) and therefore pride to the giver. The best gifts to offer in return will be items that are unique to Canada: small paintings, carvings, or books (keep your host's English capabilities in mind!) are appreciated and reasonable as gifts. The Chinese are fond of dark red, gold or blue, which are all appropriate colours for gift wrapping. When: Gifts are usually given at the end of an introductory meeting or at a banquet. Delegations visiting China are normally expected to offer gifts to their hosts, and the opposite is true for Chinese travellers. How: Always give and receive gifts or anything of value with two hands. Note that it is common in China for the recipient to refuse the offer of a gift at first. The giver should persist, and the recipient will eventually accept. What Not to Give: Gifts to avoid include clocks and scissors or other sharp items such as knives or letter openers. Avoid wrapping gifts in white or black, which are colours associated with funerals. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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References : BCOM ,Business Communication ,A South Asian Perspective.An Innovative Approach to learning and Teaching. Lehman;Dufrene;Sinha ; Cengage Publishers 2012 .Print. Christine Genzberger (Ed) and Edward G. (1994). Japan Business: The Portable Encyclopedia for Doing Business With Japan, Hinkelman World Trade Press John Mole(1996), Mind Your Manners: Managing Business Cultures in Europe, Nicholas Brealey Publishing Cortland L Boovee, John V.Thill :Business Communication Today ,Ninth Edition .2013.Pearson Publishers.Print. Munter,Mary.”Cross Cultural Communication for Managers” Business Horizons. Vol36. Issue 3 May/June 1993. Shome M.K.Bhardwaj.G and singh,S.K (1997), “organizational communication: A cross cultural study” Indian Journal of Applied Psychology,Vol.34,No 1. Terri Morrison, Wayne Conaway, George Borden and Hans Koehler(1995). Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: How to Do Business in 60 Countries, Adams Media Corp Vijaya V - Elements of cross cultural communication competence: Derivative of a case study Comparing Indian and Japanese communication', IUP Journal of soft skills, 4 (3), Sep 2010,. Co-authored by Tiwari Binay

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Maritime Security and International Cooperation - Also on the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road Wang Dehua Professor and Director, Center for South Asian & Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for International Studies and Center for South Asia Studies, Tongji University1

Abstract As East Asia struggles to cope with the growing challenges to maritime security in the Western Pacific including changes in great power balance, the intensification of maritime disputes, and fundamental disagreements on the interpretation of the Law of the Sea three new imperatives are redefining the geopolitics of the region. The author will discuss following five “W”s: (1) What is the significance for Maritime Security and International Cooperation? (2) Whether China has “The String of Pearls” Strategy in Indian Ocean? (3) What is Indian Maritime Doctrine and how to understand India's Indo-Pacific policy? (4) Whether Dragon (China) and elephant (India) can dance a nice tango in maritime domain? (5) What a new initiative the maritime domain with the idea of working together in the “maritime silk route” in the Indian Ocean. Finally the author argues that China and India should hand in hand to cooperate in building Indian Ocean into Peace, Cooperative and Harmonious Ocean. Key Words: Indo-Pacific, China-ASEAN, China SAARC, Maritime, Maritime Silk Road

1

Professor Wang Dehua is Prof and director of Center for South Asian & Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for International Studies and Center for South Asia Studies, Tongji University , South-Asia and Developing Country Studies of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Professor at the Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Advisor to the China Association for SouthAsia Studies. He has served as Vice President of the Shanghai Association for Ecological Economic Studies. Wang is the author of more than ten books: such as RISE OF THE ASIAN GIANTS: DRAGON-ELEPHANT TANGO; The Contending Powers and Securities in the AsiaPacific Region; Famous Speeches of the United Kingdom; Famous Speeches at the UN Forum; The Pithy Speeches at the UN Forum; On Harmonious Indian Ocean: Also On Power Game in Indian Ocean; Rising China in the Age of Oil-Price Peak; and The Sovereignty Dispute over Islands and Waters of the South China Sea, as well as a number of papers on economic, security or non-security issues, such as energy security and harmonious Indian Ocean.


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Map of Indian Ocean

Introduction On the occasion of 2014, the Year of ' Friendly Exchange' to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the enunciation of “ Panchsheel" - the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence2, Please allow me to thank host to invite me here to present a paper on the topic of “Maritime Security and International Cooperation -----Also On the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road”. The rise of China is being described as the topic of great importance in contemporary international politics. What kind of global power will China be in the next decade or two? To what extent will a rising or risen China determine the course and nature of the international system? What's China's maritime security doctrine will impact the world? Answers to these and many more related questions are of paramount importance to the future of China's relations with the world in general, and to China's neighbours in particular, including, of course, India. 2

th

Chinese President Xi Jinping on 28 June 2014 said countries should uphold sovereign equality and oppose any attempt to oust the legitimate government of a country through illegal means.Chinese president stresses sovereign equality. Xi made the remarks in a keynote speech at a commemoration marking the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence at the Great Hall of the People in downtown Beijing.

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Maritime Security and International Cooperation - Also on the String of Pearls and the Maritime Silk Road

I. What is the significance for Maritime Security and International Cooperation---A historical must of Chinese & Indian Dreams The 21st century has brought with it immense economic opportunities with increasing trade and continuous growth in international commerce. With more than 80 percent of the world trade being carried through oceans and seas, the maritime sector holds a key position towards development of mankind and alleviation of poverty. We see multifaceted threats to international security, economy and environment in the background of growing terrorism, piracy, exploitation of sea resources, degradation of ecosystems and global warming. This requires comprehensive and collaborated approach to handle and collective efforts to capitalize on the opportunities towards progress. Every new Chinese leader has a favorite phrase to express his vision. During a visit to an exhibition in Beijing on November 29 last year, President Xi Jinping first revealed his vision of rule in the coming decades by saying, "to realise the renaissance of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history". Many believe the new leader is trying to mobilise domestic support for his agenda of continuing reform and opening up, by inspiring people towards a Chinese Dream the title of a 1987 play about a Chinese couple dreaming of success in the United States; while seeking Maritime Security and International Cooperation is a historical must of Chinese Dream. Ending his European tour with a speech in the Belgian city of Bruges, Xi said he considered China's relationship with the European Union as Beijing's priority and praised its commitment to a lasting peace that China would also seek to uphold. According to David Brunnsrom, “China should not doubt the U.S. commitment to defend its Asian allies and the prospect of economic retaliation should also discourage Beijing from using force to pursue territorial claims in Asia in the way Russia has in Crimea, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Wang Yi said, the year 2013 has seen the groundbreaking of diplomacy under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) with Comrade Xi Jinping as General Secretary. China has put forth a series of new concepts, taken new measures and demonstrated a new look in the country's diplomacy. Showing greater global perspective and being more enterprising and innovative under the new circumstances, it has opened up a new vista of friendly cooperation between China and other countries. We have become more determined in pursuing the path of peaceful development. We have made greater efforts to build major-country relationships that are healthy and stable. We have made neighborhood diplomacy higher on the priority list of China's diplomacy. We have consolidated our traditional friendship with other developing countries in a more extensive fashion. We have become more active in playing our role as a responsible major country on hotspot issues. But, Daniel Russel, President Barack Obama's diplomatic point man for East Asia, said it was difficult to determine what China's intentions might be, but Russia's annexation of Crimea had heightened concerns among U.S. allies in the region about the possibility of China using force to pursue its claims.”3 While U.S. high military officer predicted 2014 may witness another SinoJapanese War over Diaoyu Islands.4 2014 marks the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), which ended in China's defeat. Considering the current confrontation between both countries, Japan becomes the biggest challenge facing China. This anniversary has already become a daunting memory in the minds of many Chinese people. 3

David Brunnsrom said that U.S. warns China not to try Crimea-style action in Asia.

4

Five tiny uninhabited islands slumber in the Pacific Ocean a short distance from Taiwan, China, and Japan. The Japanese call them the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese call them the Diaoyu Islands. Japan controls the islands, but China wants them. While international law favors Japan, it would be a mistake to think the law will stop China from grabbing them. That means that even though no one uses the islands currently for anything, if World War III takes place anytime soon, this is where it will startimplausible as that may sound. Quoted from Why Are China and Japan Inching Toward War Over Five Tiny Islands?

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According to the Chinese classical method of numbering years, 60 years completes a cycle. It is said that 1954 is another important year in understanding Chinese modern history. China was a declining nation in 1894, and the war with a rising Japan could be regarded as the straw that crushed the empire. The ensuing six decades witnessed China suffering from weakness and humiliation. 1954 was one year after China fought to a standoff with the US on the Korean Peninsula. It was also the very year that China launched its first constitution, and initiated its process of industrialization through the first fiveyear plan. It bears great significance in the path to China's rejuvenation. Another 60 years have passed since 1954. At the beginning of 2014, China has already become the second largest economy, enjoying the second largest defense budget and having the liveliest market. Although it still has many problems, its vitality and ability to reform still prevail over the rest of the world. Challenges of maritime security from Japan will definitely be a thorn in China's flesh. But Chinese people should open their mind and focus their attention on more important issues. For decades both Japan and China avoided sovereignty debates over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. But Japan claims there was never any agreement to 'shelve' any dispute over the islands because they were always Japanese territory. This is now a source of increasing tension, with the potential to plunge the region into conflict.5 Faced with the South China Sea issue "sensitive" issue6 concerned 5 6

The Sino-Japanese confrontation over the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also have claims to parts of the potentially energy-rich waters. For Instance, The Philippines will file a case against China over the disputed South China Sea at an arbitration tribunal in The Hague next week, subjecting Beijing to international legal scrutiny over the increasingly tense waters for the first time. China, which has refused to participate in the case, claims about 90 percent of the South China Sea, displaying its reach on official maps with a so-called nine-dash line that stretches deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia.


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by the people of Europe during his European Tour, President Xi highlights China's bottom lines by stressing that we "don't pick things, not afraid of the thing. In other words, we don't mess around, not afraid of things, about our territory sovereignty, should resolutely defend" , of course. A little bit earlier ( June 19, 2013), “Chinese President Xi Jinping said in Beijing that China and Vietnam should push forward with seeking a political solution to the South China Sea issue.”7 Let me dwell upon two events, which were drawn the attention of world media. One event is: Themed "Safe and Secure Seas Strengthening Co-operation in Maritime Security"，Government and Military Leaders to Discuss New Naval Security Challenges at International Maritime Security Conference 2013 was held on 15 May at Changi Exhibition Centre (CEC)，Singapore. Over 350 delegates discussed evolving transnational threats to maritime security and safety, examine prevailing operating paradigms， further collaboration towards a regional security framework and cooperative action across borders, which ,I think, is beneficial to maritime security and international cooperation. While second event is China has increased its efforts to find the missing Malaysia Airlines plane by dispactching two additonal ships to the search area west of Perth, Australia. The search mission has tested the military's capabilities for quick response, joint activities, comprehensive support, and international security cooperation." Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng said. Unprecedented international cooperation has been a highlight of handling this tragedy that has likely taken hundreds of lives. 11 countries including China are involved in the search and recovery mission in heavy seas far off the west coast of Australia.8 However, during the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance was variously described as the cornerstone and the linchpin of U.S. 7

China, Vietnam should seek South China Sea solution: Chinese President, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/20/c_124880874.htm

8

China stresses importance of international cooperation.

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Asia strategy, but over the past decade the role of this strategic alliance has come under increasing scrutiny. New dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region have prompted a rethinking of U.S. priorities in Asia. China's rise as well as India's rise has called for a more complex assessment in both Tokyo and Washington of the circumstances under which the alliance might be tested. Japan's struggle with slow economic growth and a rather unpredictable effort at political reform has made strategic adjustment difficult. Similar concerns in the United States over its own economic recovery and stalled politics in Washington during the Obama administration's second term infuse the policy debate over the implementation of the “rebalance” to Asia. Against above-mentioned background, World attention is paid to Chinese new maritime doctrine of new leader President Xi Jinping who has been in office for one more year. Xi's concepts and practices of diplomacy have shaken the world, 9while on Oct. 3 last year during his trip in Indonesia, Xi said in a speech that 9

Xi's doctrine now roughly contains six points. The first is to establish a sense of identity with the world in a “community of common destiny”. No matter how high China rises and no matter what system or development mode it adopts, it is always part of that community rather than being detached from the rest of the world. The second is to express a world dream with a “Chinese dream”. The ideal of a “harmonious world” of the last leadership might be too high and faraway to reach. And the new leadership chooses a more simple, direct, popular and clear way to talk to the world: you have your American dream, African dream, Latin American dream, etc. and I have my Chinese dream. We hope that all our dreams will come true and all of us will enjoy peace, development and prosperity. The third is to ensure peace and development with bottom-line thinking. Peace and development are not achieved without conditions and Chinese core interests of security, development and sovereignty brook no violation, just as NPC spokeswoman Fu Ying asked, in response to a question from an American journalist, “Shall we have peace if we have a weak defense force?” The fourth is to improve China's image as valuing profits more than justice with a right approach to morality and interests. Without moral guidance, how can China talk about the morality of a big developing country? The fifth is to manage relations with the US towards a new model of big country relationship, with the lowest objective of having no confrontation or conflict, medium objective of mutual respect, and the highest objective of cooperation and win-win. All three objectives can be pursued in parallel. The sixth point is to dispel misgivings of neighboring countries with the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness. China will practice these principles and hope other countries will also do so to make them a common philosophy in this region.


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China and the ASEAN will promote maritime cooperation and build a 21st-century maritime Silk Road. In his speech at the Indonesian parliament on Thursday, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to build a China-ASEAN community of common destiny and provided guidance for constructing a new Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century. After a decade of fruitful cooperation since the launch of strategic partnership between the two sides, we have every reasons to believe it is high time to bring the brilliant concept of a new maritime silk road between China and the ASEAN into reality. Moreover, a new maritime silk road is the shared aspirations of both peoples and is originated from their common memories. Luo Yongkun, assistant researcher with the Southeast Asia division of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations said that jointly building a maritime Silk Road will involve a new consensus, including discussing the signing of a treaty on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, strengthening security exchanges, setting up an Asian infrastructure investment bank and prioritizing maritime connectivity development.10 Zhang Jiuhuan, former Chinese ambassador to Thailand, Singapore and Nepal, said, "Upgrading the free trade area is another significant step for the Chinese government to beef up China-ASEAN cooperation." Zhang said "upgrading the free trade area" is needed for both sides. He said the area will help improve the trade of commodities and services and investment cooperation in order to provide convenience and freedom. "All-dimensional cooperation will create more favorable conditions for the maritime Silk Road," said Zhang. "China's economic growth will also bring about more opportunities."11 China has invited India to be part of its new initiative to build a Maritime Silk Road which it says is aimed at improving connectivity and trade among Asian nations through the sea on 10

China to pave way for maritime Silk Road (Xinhua), October 11, 2013.

11

China to pave way for maritime Silk Road (Xinhua) October 11, 2013

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the lines of ancient Silk Route. The invitation for India to join the Martime Silk Road was extended during the just concluded 17th round of border talks between the Special Representatives of the two countries in New Delhi. China's Special Representative Yang Jiechi has conveyed Beijing's wish in this regard to his Indian counterpart Shivshankar Menon, a Chinese official said. India's response was positive, the official added. I think China's initiative has received favorable response as it is tallying with the realization of India dream. According to SRIKANTH KONDAPALLI, “China surprised India last week once again with a new initiative this time in the maritime domain with the idea of working together in the “maritime silk route” in the Indian Ocean. China's leaders, officials and media have been projecting this concept - initially during the maiden visit abroad by the new leader Xi Jinping to Indonesia last October and then in an interaction with the visiting Sri Lankan foreign minister at Beijing early this month. After the Ming Dynasty initiatives by Admiral Zheng He in the 14th century in the Indian Ocean region, the sea-faring faction in China is pushing this idea once again.”12 Chinese President Xi Jinping (front row C), Myanmar President U Thein Sein (front row 4th L) and Indian Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari (front row 4th R) together with delegates from China, India and Myanmar attending a conference marking the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence pose for a group picture during their meeting in Beijing, capital of China, June 28, 2013. In his keynote speech delivered in the memorial meeting to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the enunciation of the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence on 28th June 2014, Chinese president Xi stressed that China is a strong advocate of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and practitioners. The five principles of peaceful coexistence are the cornerstone of China's 12

See China Tosses Maritime Silk Route Bait to India


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foreign policy. China is the participant, builder and contributor of contemporary international system. China will unswervingly take the road of peaceful development, unswervingly on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence to develop friendly cooperation with all countries in the world, determined to pursue the win-win strategy of opening up. At present, the Chinese people are to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation of the Chinese dream and struggle. Understands that the glorious dream of a Chinese dream with people all over the world, the Chinese people are willing to be with the people of all countries in achieving their dreams in the process of mutual support, mutual help, China is willing to common development with all countries, particularly neighboring neighbors,?13 Xi said that China will unswervingly take the road of peaceful development. The road of peaceful development is China, according to the time development trend and their own fundamental interests,will make a strategic choice. The Chinese people advocate "do as you would be done by". China does not agree with the” theory of strong will bully ", there is no hegemony, militaristic gene.in Chinese blood. While Vice President of India Shri M. Hamid Ansari's recent China visit is of great significance as it is reported that India and China have to narrow down differences and build on convergences by exploiting the potential of Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful co-existence propounded by the two countries along with Myanmar in 1954, Vice President Hamid Ansari said on Saturday. "In our respective bilateral relations, our common interests far outweigh our differences," Ansari said while addressing a commemorative meeting of the 60th anniversary of the five principles in which Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Myanmar counterpart Thien Sein also took part.14 13

Xi to attend the memorial meeting and delivered a keynote speech http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0629/c1024-25213360.html

14

India and China have to narrow down differences: VP Ansari June 28, 2014

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Ansari, who is on a five-day visit to China, said India, China and Myanmar are bound by age-old linkages and geography. "We may be at different stages of development but we can learn from each other's national experiences," he said. "We need a new paradigm for global action. Our destinies are intertwined. Our quest is, should be, for a framework in which opportunities and challenges for the betterment of our societies co-exist," he said. "In this endeavour, Panchsheel can act as a catalyst to help us better coordinate our efforts, enhance mutual understanding, share developmental experiences and tackle trans-national threats more effectively," he said. In his address, Ansari said besides being ancient civilizations and neighbours, India and China are also strategic partners. "On the way forward, we have to build on our convergences and narrow down our differences. Panchsheel can help us exploit this potential for cooperation and come up with fresh, innovative initiatives to improve the lives of our people," Ansari said.15

II. Whether China has “The String of Pearls” Strategy16 in Indian Ocean? India is suspicious as Chinese submarine docks in Sri Lanka NEW DELHI: The docking of a Chinese submarine in Colombo on a long-range deployment patrol earlier this month is yet another indicator of the ever-increasing forays of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The PLA-N is fast transforming from a "green-water" force used 15

Ibid.

16

US Air Force Lt. Col. Christopher Pehrson called China's military strategy in the area the "String of Pearls," defining it as a "manifestation of China's rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces." 15While in India some one said that the Chinese have surrounded ''India” with a string of pearls strategy with bases in all of India's neighborsin Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mayanmar (several ports), and the Malacca straits.


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to operating close to its own shores into a potent "blue-water" force, one with "long legs". Though the Indian Navy has been tracking the increased activity of Chinese warships in the IOR, including submarines quietly on the prowl in the Bay of Bengal, this is a rare instance of a PLA-N submarine openly berthing in the region that India considers its "own strategic backyard". The diesel-electric Type 039 "Song-class" was at the Colombo International Container Terminal, which has been funded by China, from September 7 to 14. This was just ahead of Chinese President Xi Jingping's visit to Sri Lanka, which along with Maldives has shown enthusiasm for China's new Maritime Silk Route plan in the IOR. The Chinese government, on its part, said the submarine had only made a replenishment stopover in Sri Lanka on way to the Gulf of Aden for escort and anti-piracy operations, as was the “common practice” for navies around the world.17 Then, will China and India are the main rivals in Indian Ocean, some one raised the question, as China's economy grows, so will its ability to project force in the Indian Ocean. The US military assessment says that it is "easily possible" that China's military strength will be about one-quarter of America's by 2030. Will China then continue to play second fiddle to the US in the region, or will it use its growing clout to shift the landscape in its favor? While China has the second-largest navy in the world (still far behind the US) and is expected to be the world's largest economy in the next 20 years, India is not far behind. Its Navy ranks third, and the country is expected to be among the five largest economies within 20 years, while Robert D. Kaplan, in the latest Foreign Affairs, discusses the rivalry between two rising powers as they compete for energy resources and regional influence. The Indian ocean will be the stage and as US naval primacy fades in an “elegant decline” when I was asked by Global Times to make a comment on Robert D. Kaplan's prediction. 17

http://www.ccnovel.com/48568.html

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My conclusion is “No.”, as China will not seek hegemony in Indian Ocean with more than 600 years long tradition of Zheng He spirits, as China continues to revitalize itself starting from the 1980s, the Chinese people found that their contemporary foreign policy is echoed by Zheng He and his emperor's diplomatic spirit 600 more years ago. The reason of my conclusion is based upon following facts: The five principles have become the foundation of China's foreign policies, including the eight principles of foreign aid in 1964, the four principles of economic and technological cooperation with African countries in 1983, and the four principles of relations with Latin American countries in 1990. They have also been written into the Constitution. The five principles have evolved over the past 60 years. The principle of sovereignty now also takes into account responsibility and obligation in addition to rights. Also, fairness and justice have been generally recognized, and peace and security and win-win cooperation have been added to the principles - which require the world to evolve from situations of negative peace to positive peace. Countries not only need to stop using force but also to take precautions to avoid conflict. They are also required to form an international community based on common and sustainable development China has fully adhered to and implement the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence over the past 60 years, scholars in Cambodia have said." When we look at the overall foreign policy or diplomatic strategy of China, we see that China completely adheres to these principles very strictly, especially the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of other countries," Dr. Joseph Matthews, the director of International Cooperation Department at the Asia Euro University in Phnom Penh, told Xinhua in an interview on Friday.The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or known as Panchsheel Treaty in India, was initiated in 1954 by leaders of China, India and Myanmar. The principles stand for mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. "The treaty was signed 60 years ago, but now, it is still very much relevant and is still working very well," he said. Joseph said the concept of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence could be seen as the foundation of bilateral relations, not only between China and India, but also between China and more than 170 other countries around the world that have relations with China quoted from Interview: China fully adheres to Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Cambodian scholars Through friendship and cooperation with other countries, common prosperity can be enjoyed by all. China and India are not rivals but cooperators. China recognizes that India's rise is beneficial to Asia and the world, although for years, China and India looked at each other with a mix of apathy and suspicion. As the two giant Asian powers have often been described as competing with each other on many sectors, Hu said that "China and India are not competitors, but partners who can cooperate with each other". "Mr Prime Minister has stressed from time to time that the world has enough space to accommodate the development of both India and China, which I completely agree," Hu said.18 "The common interests between China and India greatly exceed their disputes, and the two should always adhere to mutual benefit and mutual development," Hu said. The longstanding geopolitical rivalry between the two coupled with the almost simultaneous rise of both China and India to world prominence ensures that these two big countries may be competitors.19

III. What is Indian Maritime Doctrine and how to understand India's Indo-Pacific policy? Many scholars assume that the European model of realpolitik will prevail in Asia as the dual rise of China and India reorders 18

Wu Jintao meets with Singh, stresses border issue, cooperation, (chinadaily.com.cn)

19

An article in Beijing Review outlines, “with its 1.1 billion population, sevent

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regional politics. Others predict that Asia's China-centric tradition of hierarchy will reassert itself. But Indians look as much to nineteenth-century U.S. history as to any European or Asian model. Indeed, successive prime ministers explicitly cited the Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in hotspots around the Indian periphery.20 According to Iskander Rehman 's India's Aspirational Naval Doctrine, A 'springboard', 'a central triangle', 'a never-sinking aircraft carrier' or, for the more dramatic, a 'dagger' plunged deep into the surrounding waters there has been no dearth of vivid metaphors describing India's enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean. A simple glance at a map should provide ample evidence of India's maritime destiny. An array of land-driven concerns has, however, since Independence, had a way of dragging India back to shore, thwarting its sporadic thalassocratic ambitions. Blessed by its geography, India is cursed by its neighbourhood. The pan-oceanic vision nurtured under the Raj and shared by great post-Independence figures such as Nehru and K.M. Pannikar has been buried under the 'sacred soil' of the numerous territorial disputes and festering insurgencies that have convulsed the subcontinent and consumed much of its leadership's strategic attention for the past six decades. The Indian Navy, arguably the most strategic-minded of the three services, has had to grapple for years with its 'Cinderella service' status, which has left it with but a meagre portion of the defense budget. Having played a mostly peripheral part in most of India's past conflicts the Navy has also been hard pressed to define and justify its role. In such a context, the latest edition of the Indian Maritime Doctrine issued by the Naval Headquarters, which builds upon both an earlier version released in 2004 and India's Maritime Strategy (2007) provides a vital insight into how the Navy draws its inspiration.21 20

Strongman, Constable, or Free-Rider? India's “Monroe Doctrine” and Indian Naval Strategy http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Indias_Aspirational_ Naval_Doctrine.pdf

21

Ibid


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The study proceeds in three parts. Section one focuses on the essence of the maritime doctrine itself, as well as on the complex institutional setting which provides its backdrop. The document's lofty ambitions, when juxtaposed with the study of current realities, suggest that it may be more advocatory and aspirational than genuinely reflective of reality. The second section ventures that India's naval thought can best be understood as syncretic, with a variety of traditions shaping the service's vision and evolution. Four different traditions or schools of thought are identified: The Indian Continentalist School, more inward than outwardlooking, and which has seldom let maritime issues seep through the mental barrier of the Himalayas. The Raj Pan-Oceanic School, developed at the height of the British Empire when the Indian Ocean was unified for the first time as a common strategic space. The Soviet school, which is more defensive in orientation, and which focuses largely on the control of chokepoints and area defence. The Monrovian School, through which India, in the tradition of most regional powers with enviable maritime positions, seeks to extend sea control over what it perceives to be its maritime backyard.22 In my opinion, India may be a counterweight to US.,i.e. India and USA may be the main rivals. In his important study on 'India and Indian Ocean', published in 1945, Sardar K M Panikkar showed his great foresight as a statesman when he wrote 'The Indian Ocean will be one of the major problems of the future. Indian Ocean, as India will not allow any power to dominate in Indian Ocean. India is reaching out far into the Indian Ocean, way beyond its shores, as it sees this ocean as its domain. In an article published in 2009 in the Naval War College Review, Donald L Berlin, professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu and an expert on Indian Ocean strategic issues, wrote: 152



New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its back yard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region - the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. This is what the United States set out to do in North America and the Western Hemisphere at an early stage in America's "rise to power" In India and Australia: Maritime Partners in the Indo-Pacific, C. Raja Mohan pointed out :”One is the growing recognitions that the security problems in the East Asian waters must be addressed within the broader framework of the Indo-Pacific. The second is a weakening of the United States which has been the principal security provider in the Indian and Pacific Oceans for many decades. The third is a consequential change in India's maritime orientation from being a lone ranger to a partner eager to build maritime coalitions.”23 Washington has repeatedly reaffirmed that it will remain a 'resident power' in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the Obama Administration has matched the rhetoric with an intense diplomatic focus on Asia in the last two years “To be sure, the United States24 will remain the most powerful military force in Asia for a long time to come. Nevertheless, its forward presence in the Indo-Pacific is coming under stress amidst the proliferation of advanced military capabilities in the littoral and the adoption of asymmetric strategies by its competitors, most notably China and Iran.”25 23

India and Australia: Maritime Partners in the Indo-Pacific, C. Raja Mohan ,The Asialink Essays 2011

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China and U.S. militaries held an annual meeting under the Sino-U.S. military Maritime Consultative Agreement from Sept. 27 to 28 in northern port city of Qingdao. The two militaries agreed to enhance contacts and communication in order to increase mutual trust and cooperation with a respectful, equal, active and constructive attitude. They exchanged views on maritime security situations of the two countries since 2010 and discussed detailed measures to solve problems in this area. The two sides agreed to strengthen military-to-military cooperation in anti-piracy and humanitarian aid as well as disaster relief efforts

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Traditionally the Pacific and Indian Oceans have been viewed as two different and self-contained worlds. A number of developments have begun to compel a more integrated view of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. East Asia's high growth path has generated stronger economic links with resource rich West Asia and Africa. India is now looking beyond the Strait of Malacca to include the South China Sea in its national security calculus, As India became a trading nation, like China before it, it was inevitable that Delhi's national security policy would acquire a new maritime focus. The new reliance on the sea for importing ever-growing quantities of energy and mineral resources, and for exporting its products to widely dispersed global markets, meant India would naturally turn;26

IV. Whether Dragon (China) and Elephant (India ) can dance a nice tango in maritime domain? In order to make the Asian Economic Community manageable, Asia would have to approach regional economic integration in a phased manner. This is the approach that has been adopted by the successful regional blocs of today, viz. EU and NAFTA that started with an effective skeleton comprised of a core group of countries before expanding the membership later to others. In view of the attempts already made at regional economic integration, the Asian economic community in its initial phase, it is argued, be built of five strong blocs of Asia that might form a core group, viz. ASEAN, China, India Japan, and Korea (ACIJK). Once the process of integration is consolidated and some gains of integration are visible, AEC could be thrown open to other economies of the region. Southeast Asian nations and India vowed on Thursday to step up cooperation on maritime security, a move that comes amid tension with China in the potentially oiland gas-rich South China Sea. In a vision statement agreed at a summit in New Delhi, India and the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) set their sights on a new 26

China, U.S. militaries hold annual maritime security meeting(Xinhua)08:21, September 29, 2012.

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"strategic partnership" that would bring closer political, security and economic cooperation. Significantly, they underlined the need for freedom of navigation, a contentious issue because of competing claims with Beijing over parts of the South China Sea, though there was no mention of China in their statement. In speeches, the Philippines and Vietnam referred to tensions in their region, but India's foreign minister sought to distance New Delhi from the wrangling over the South China Sea.27 Taken together new challenges to communication lines open the space for Delhi and China to consult more intensively on maritime issues and develop a framework for security cooperation in the increasingly turbulent waters of Asia The phrase 'String of Pearls' was first used in 2005, in a report entitled “Energy Futures in Asia” provided to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton. It alleged that China was adopting a “string of pearls” strategy of bases stretching from the Middle East to southern China. These “pearls” were naval bases or electronic eavesdropping posts built by the Chinese in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistani and Sri Lanka. The purpose was to project its power overseas and protect its oil shipments. Nine years have since elapsed. The phrase, or theory, still sticks in the international media and in some think tank reports. The so-called “bases” are found nowhere in the Indian Ocean. The most telling evidence is that the PLA Navy has been conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for five years without any bases of their own. Jean-Paul Adam, the Seychelles Foreign Affairs Minister, announced in December 2011 that his country had invited China to set up a military base in his country, but the Chinese Ministry of Defense only responded that the Chinese side would “consider” replenishment or port calls in the Seychelles and other countries. China has only two purposes in the Indian Ocean: economic gains and the security of Sea lines of Communication (SLOC). The first objective is achieved through 27

Ross Colvin, In China's shadow, ASEAN leaders look to India for maritime security, NEW DELHI Thu Dec 20, 2012


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commercial interactions with littoral states. For the second purpose, the Chinese Navy has, since the end of 2008, joined international military efforts in combating piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. In fact, the only thing justifiable in the “string of pearls” theory is that it underlines the growing importance, even then, of the Indian Ocean for China's ever-expanding national interests, especially in terms of energy import. Nowadays China is securing its energy needs from all parts of the world, but the Middle East still prevails as the most important source. By the end of 2013, China had become the largest trader and the largest oil importer in the world. The Indian Ocean, and hence the security of SLOCs from Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, to the Malacca Strait, is thus vitally important for China. Two countries are most important for China's freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean: the U.S. and India. The U.S. is the only country that has the full capabilities to control the chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and cut off the SLOCs all the way to China, but it is unlikely to exercise such capabilities, unless, perhaps, in an all-out war with China. Even during the Cold War neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union endeavored to cut off any SLOCs in the world. Besides, the SLOCs are life-lines for all states. Cutting off China's SLOCs will also affect U.S. allies of Japan, ROK and Australia. So long as Sino-American relations remain manageable, such a worst-case scenario is unlikely to occur. For China is today dependent on these routes to trade with nations and increase its gross domestic product from $200 billion in 1978 to about $10 trillion by 2013. China's trade has increased from $620 billion in 2002 to $3.8 trillion in 2012. Significantly, a large section of the above trade figures are based on the maritime domain, with very less trade transiting through the land borders. This overwhelming dependence on the maritime time had added new demands on the maritime areas. Continuing its maritime dependence is China's increasing profile in the possession of world-class merchant fleet, production of containers and the expansion in port-handling capacity.

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V. What a new initiative - the maritime domain with the idea of working together in the “maritime silk route” in the Indian Ocean The Silk Road was named by the German geographer, Barn Ferdinand von Richthofen, as the greatest East to West trade route between China, Central Asia and Byzantium. This ancient route between East and West was established during 206 BC to AD 220 in Han Dynasty of China for the political contact with the many Kingdoms of Central Asia. Since then, the Silk Road has also become the trading routes between China and West. In fact the term "Silk Road" has vividly described the complex reality happened along the long way between these two continents politically and economically. The Silk Road consists of a network of both land and sea routes. Many caravans and ships had successfully made their ways to Eurasia over the centuries, adapting various function according to different political situation, economic conditions, geographic environments, taste and demand of many different races for particular products, religious belief, their artistic aspects as well as development of technology and skills. In my opinion, despite differences, there are some common denominators of strategic interests and threat perceptions that would favor a cooperative approach of silk road construction among most of the great powers and their regional partners. They include, among other things, global energy security, war on terrorism and increasing threat from non-state actors to the Westphalia model of modern world order in following aspects. 1. Energy security: Based on these, the following provides a deeper insight into the prevailing ones, which also have implications for other countries that have stakes in these India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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waters. The common challenges of big sea powers are facing: Another driving factor behind the maritime silk route is China's Energy Cooperation. In 2012 China became the largest energy consumer with nearly 22 percent of global total energy demand. According to the estimates of British Petroleum, China is to overtake the United States as the largest oil consumer by 2025 and Russia by 2027 as second largest gas consumer. Most of this today over 80 percent passes through the Indian Ocean region with West Asia contributing to about 56 percent of China's oil imports while Africa accounts for the rest. Even though China, Russia and Central Asia have expanded land routes in the energy sector, for the foreseeable future, China's “Malacca Dilemma” is not expected to be resolved without naval or diplomatic initiatives in the Indian Ocean. Naval and diplomatic efforts then are behind this idea of the silk route. 2. Piracy: Piracy has been the bane of shipping since historic times and continues till today. The Indonesian waters, Bay of Bengal and East Africa are among the worst affected areas in the world. The trend of increasing violence and use of sophisticated weapons/equipment is particularly unreassuring. Besides, these attacks are no longer confined to 'private-end' motivations, as was the case earlier. Some insurgents in Southern Asia have been resorting to hijackings to finance their movements and, at times, to demand release of their companions from government custody as a quid pro quo for the crew taken hostage. It is also feared that terrorists may use it to their advantage. 3. Maritime terrorism: From West Asia, the terror-oriented ideology of A1 Qaida spans the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia. Its offshoot here, the Jammah Islamiyah (JI) furthers its agenda in a sub-region that provides a fertile breeding ground due to the ongoing Islamic insurgencies here. This makes the choke-points of the Indian Ocean extremely vulnerable to terror attacks. In the West Asian waters, such attacks have 158



occurred in the past such as on the USS Cole,Limburg and the oil installations of A1 Faw. It is commonly believed that these are imminent in the east too. Besides the criticality of the choke-point, the Malacca Straits is lined with two hub-ports that are intricately linked to global economy. The terrorists may either use the tactics of the pirates to hijack ships, or even tempt the pirates to do it for them. One of these ships carrying dangerous cargo may be turned into a floating bomb directed towards a hub-port (a 'maritime 9/11'). As an extension of the cur rent global insecurity of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) falling into the hands of terrorists, some experts have even expressed anxieties of a radiological attack in the Malacca Straits. 4. Smuggling of drugs and weapons. Drug trafficking originates from its two cores of narcotics production, viz., the Golden Crescent in the west and the Golden Triangle in the east, that nourishes global terrorism and insurgencies. The sea provides a medium for the smuggling, particularly in the east. The funds raised through the sale of drugs are used to buy illegal arms in Afghanistan and Cambodia, plenty of which are available at low prices as left-overs from the wars in the past. .. 5. Eliminating the traditional and non-traditional threats to security is a worldwide issue facing us all. I am happy to notice that senior US Navy leaders welcomed China's decision to participate in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and pledged to work closely together with Chinese forces in the region, including sharing relevant intelligence and establishing lines of communication. This is a good omen, since it reflects American respect for China's interests and a willingness to accept a role for China in providing regional stability beyond East Asia. As one senior Chinese official put it, No country, not even a powerful country like the United States, can tackle all the challenges and problems alone. Our countries have common views on more and more strategic issues. [But to] realize greater growth of US-China relations, it India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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is essential for China and the United States to show mutual support [and to] treat each other as equals. I am cautiously optimistic about prospect of international maritime cooperation between big powers in Indian Ocean as it would be comforting to think, To realize the ideal of peace, cooperative, and harmonious oceans, I shall use following four “C”s to elaborate. Constituting the new security concept rather than sticking to old security concepts. When the world entered the 21st century, the nature and the future of Sino-India relations once again became questionable.. History and reality have proved time and again that military might cannot create peace, nor can power politics ensure security. To forge an entirely new security concept is the only workable answer to the increasing non-traditional threats to security. Cementing security cooperation rather than confrontation. The primary goal of the conference is to foster a dialogue between the Chinese and Indian experts in order to generate ideas for potential areas of cooperation between the nation's respective navies. Confrontation is too costly to be adopted as a policy option even if there is the danger of limited Sino-India. confrontation over border. The current danger for building a cooperative relationship between India. and China is the tendency of growing misunderstanding and miscalculation in both Delhi and Beijing. India's desire to assist in the security in the Malacca Straits was clearly expressed by the Indian Defence Minister at the 5th Shangri La Dialogue in June 2006. He said that as a major state-user India would be willing to assist the security and navigational safety in the Malacca Straits, if requested for by the littoral states. The southern part of India's Nicobar island chain is geographically well placed to enable this since it is located only 160 km from the northern tip of Indonesia's Sumatra Island, viz. virtually overlooking the northern entrance to the Straits.

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Chindia, a new term is both eye caching and of great significance and a famous Indian economist, who at present a Member of Parliament representing the Congress Party from Andra Pradesh in the Rajya Sabha, in his new book. This is a manifestation of the world's two most populous countries desiring for people and cooperation. China and India are developing at the fastest rate, if they can cooperate with the fastest rate, which will not just mean the arrival of the Asian Century, but will become “twin engine” to drive the world development. Curing the symptoms and getting at the roots rather than focusing on the　 present. The drive to wipe　 out nontraditional threats to security should not only focus on the　 present, but aim at both curing the symptoms and getting at the　 roots. Only by setting up a fair and rational new international political and economic order and eliminating poverty and backwardness,　 can the soil which breeds and spreads non-traditional security threats represented by terrorism be removed once and for all. A vital point in this regard is to energetically promote development in the developing countries. Combating both kinds of security threats rather than compromising our attention to traditional security threats. Under-scoring non-traditional threats to security should not compromise our attention to traditional threats to security. This is something which requires proper handling and should be dealt with in an all-round way. We should be aware that for many countries, traditional security threats remain the principle threats at present in spite of the steep increase in nontraditional threats. In short, world security and prosperity will be greatly shaped by the relationships between China, India and USA, the world's sole superpower. China's rise has been the most dramatic, transforming global geopolitics like no other development. Never India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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before in history have there been a strong China, and a strong India at the same time. The rivalry between the Elephant and Dragon is often hyped, but India would not challenge China unnecessarily. There is no dispute between China and India in the Indian Ocean. Currently, the Chinese leadership is reinvigorating the Maritime Silk Road. China tabled a 3 billion Yuan China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund for the maritime economy, environment, fishery and salvage, and communications on the sea. In October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed to ASEAN that it build the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century. This coincides with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's pledge to upgrade the Gold Decade (2000-2010) of China-ASEAN cooperation into a Diamond Decade. In the Indian Ocean, China is cooperating with littoral states in building the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and ChinaIndia-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor. These megaprojects, with heavy investment from China, will fundamentally change the political and economic landscape of the Indian Ocean and benefit all countries in the region. They will also help to mitigate security concerns in the Maritime Silk Road, ranging from territorial disputes in the South China Sea to transnational threats such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. In the 15th century, Admiral Zheng He went on his seven voyages to the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean with the largest naval fleet in the world. These voyages were not aimed for conquest of peoples or of territory. Instead, they were visits to swap Chinese silk and porcelain for exotic souvenirs such as zebras and giraffes. Zheng He didn't venture to establish bases either. In so doing, he left a legacy that is intangible but invaluable for China today. It is an image of China that the Chinese people would like to project again in the 21st century as they did 600 years ago: a country

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standing tall in the center of world, strong yet benign, and friendly to all.28 At the beginning of the 21st century, India and China have the unique opportunity and resources to improve mutual relations as well as to promote peace in their neighbourhood and the world. Every Chinese leader, right from Chairman Mao to President Hu Jintao has acknowledged India to be a great civilization and a great power, and a complementary economic force parallel to China's own growth. China has much to learn and benefit from Indian culture and philosophy: Indians' entrepreneurial spirit, the tradition of public debate and argument, and the fondness for logic and mathematical thinking are but a few of the attractive qualities that India has to offer. For lasting peace, both cultures and economies must continue to grow and prosper.

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During his visits to Indonesia and Malaysia, the Chinese delegation, headed by President Xi Jinping, pledged to foster comprehensive strategic partnerships with both countries and inked a wide array of important agreements with the two Asean member states. Apart from agreeing on five-year trade plans with Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, the high-level visits saw Chinese corporate players signing several memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with local companies for collaborations in the areas such as industrial parks, currency swaps, aviation, and tourism. What surprised observers, however, was his proposal of re-building of the so-called "new maritime silk road" in Southeast Asia. In his speech delivered in the Indonesian parliament on Oct 3, the Chinese president made no reservation in echoing the Chinese plan to turn the centuries-old maritime passageways (the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea) into one that would spur maritime connectivity in the 21st century. In order to support his proposal, Xi reiterated the Chinese government's readiness to fund Asean's maritime-related projects through its new state investment arm, the China-Asean Maritime Cooperation Fund. While such an announcement was not new, it seemed China is now taking a much more proactive approach in this matter.


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The Fallacy of String of Pearls Theory in India-China Relations Prabhakaran Paleri Former director general of Indian Coast Guard Presently an academician and research scholar

Abstract India and China are very potent neighbours caught in a paranoid geographical context for more than half a century. The countries shared a smooth and silky relationship for centuries prior to that. The Tibetan imbroglio and the changed geopolitical mindset, especially of China in the Indian context, transformed the association into hostile dimensions as perceived by the world. The oft-quoted tipping point was the war of 1962 in which, it is believed and accepted by the majority, India succumbed to a humiliating defeat.1 The defeat often echoes as a hasty hypothesis in every forum on India-China relations. Since then, the challenges and the imperatives based on the majority belief systems proclaimed that India should be watchful of China and its geostrategic designs. The majority belief system can play truant in geostrategic decisions at the macro level of national governance. The fallacies around such belief systems are overruled by the forceful proclamations of the majority. Decisions, thereby, not only deviate from the issues, but also cascade into intricate after-effects suspending the process of realignment. This happens every day in China-India relations though both the nations sensibly admit the need for building confidence under mutual respect. The relations are riddled with fallacies. One of them, explored in this paper, is the randomly rolled “string of pearls theory.” The author briefly examines the fallacy in the geostrategic context to appreciate the gravity of the terminology that has never been used officially by any of the governments except in an internal report in the United States.

Introduction For a prognostic observer in international relations, the affiliation of India with China will be different from that of China with India.2 China's relationship with India is termed adversarial by Indians since an all out war between the two countries in 1962.3 Prior to that, it was a kind of consanguine brotherhood, as the government under Jawaharlal Nehru made them believe. It turned bitter after the war, more so, chorused by the media. Media is free and acts as the self appointed spokespersons of the people in a democratic environment. It is a healthy state of affairs 164


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in a knowledge society provided the community can grasp the reports analytically, understanding the limitations and interests of the media. The cultivated opinion of the Indian public with its associated grapevine on India-China relations has not changed since 1962. Probably, the government has a different perspective. The interest of the public in foreign affairs is short-lived because of domestic exigencies unless fanned by the media. The public slurps the grapevine in a hurry. On the other hand, the government too was never seriously concerned about the views expressed by the people in foreign affairs. Interestingly, the Indian political establishment maintains consensus ad idem identity of mind - about majority matters related to international engagements.4 This concord among the political class was found amusing to India-watchers abroad. Absence of serious political divergence could be seen in the speedy conclusion of many international treaties at the government level. India's relationship with China is mostly based on such voluntary appreciations prevailing ab initio with certain relaxations for the critics within. For example, the opposition, trumpeted by the media, may attempt to pull up the government when there is a reported “Chinese aggression” on the border. It will be fast and short unlike the prolonged debates on a domestic issue. The government is aware that incursions on the border are many times more than what the media report. The only difference is that, before 1962, the people absorbed the views of the government, whereas they started relying more on the media and the associated scuttlebutt for information subsequently. Does this show that Indians lost faith in their governments on such matters? It may not be so, but the apathy of the government in communicating with the public on foreign relations is showing. It should not be mistaken for lack of transparency. This trend is seen more in the present than in the past. Most of the scholars go as per the public viewpoint based practically on the media cacophony and social grapevine besides postulations of their own beliefs and political affiliation. The media too sports a different outlook in doing business compared to the past. The result is a foggy view of India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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foreign policy among the public, which incidentally also includes the media. It matters a lot, especially in the public view of IndiaChina relations. A commonly used expression in India-China relations is about China “backstabbing” India. Such statements do not follow ethical diplomacy. India was a country known for its dharmic diplomacy that was an example for other countries in the distant past. It is from this dharmic diplomacy the term aditi devo bhava originated. In Indian lexicon, backstabbing is a simple colloquial expression that highlights probable existence of deception in an interactive matrix between two organic systems. It doesn't mean a relation turned sour or hostile. Here comes the interplay of deception in diplomacy and, thereby, in the geostrategic context. Deception is not recommended in diplomacy.5

Changing World Order and China Amitav Acharya, professor of international relations at American University, Washington, D.C., raises a question in an article in The Times of India whether China's territorial disputes in Asia would repeat a 1914 by which Europe's past would become Asia's future.6 He quotes the warning of The Economist that disputes about clumps of rock could become as significant as the assassination of an archduke. The World War I was triggered by the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 whereas the real cause was the resurgent imperialism, wrote Acharya. He also adds the Japanese prime minister's comparison of present tensions with China as those prevailed between Germany and Britain before World War I. But Acharya does not want to compare history with the goings on in the present to assess the future. Acharya brings out six differences between Europe of 1914 and Asia of 2014. The first is that the world has become multiplex from multipolar. Great powers of the day are globally bound together by multiplex relationships that demand restraint under interdependence. Three of the rest relate to the common

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abhorrence to war especially of global nature, nuclear deterrence and, the necessity and limitations to settle disputes. The last two differences mention about the power of the intergovernmental and other organisations and institutions in the present day world as well as the matured and tolerant approach of the governments and their leaders focused on economy by development. Simply put, war as an instrument of national policy is no more a choice for any responsible and prudent government today. Here the question is about the level of prudence in India-China relations. Can it hold without triggering a conflict? There are many who think China can become an Asian belligerent. According to them, if a war can breakout in 1962 between India and China, 48 years after the shot was fired at a half-crazed archduke,7 there are reasons to believe that China may drag its neighbours to war over disputes in future. Those who argue about the possibility of war may quote that deception is inherent in the Chinese psyche, and the version of the Chinese art of war. It simply means China cannot be trusted. But, according to Acharya, Chinese leaders are not guided by imperialism. The statement is seemingly true and acceptable to argue the case in point. The catch is that the imperialistic mindset is just one of the abnormalities of geostrategic paranoia to ignite a war. Insecurity can still lead a country to war, unless it holds extreme tolerance. India is subliminally tolerant thanks to its socio-political heritage. It may not be so with China. Unlike India, Chinese leadership can take archaic and autarkic decisions under its political manifesto. Without such autarky, suppression of challenges cannot happen. From Tibet to Tiananmen Square, the world has witnessed such reflections. China will remain centralised unless it acquires democratic deportment. “Old order changeth” is a kind of archaic expression to explain any change in third person singular. The world too goes through the changes from the old order to the new one. The new world order was highlighted when the Soviet Union micronised in 1991.8 But, the world did not become unipolar as many expected. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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The world stands vehemently on the principle of economic development as the new found dictum for survival. This mood reflects in the governance of China more than anywhere else. No one is better poised than China in becoming an economic super state.9 This is the guiding information that China is not likely to get into a belligerent disposition in Asia. If it does, it will miss its economic target. China is very much within the new world order where it is seemingly aware that belligerency does not pay. But there are skeptics who could cry “we warned you,” as China is yet to prove their tolerance and understanding of the changing world order

The China-syndrome of Development China, as a human system, has always been in a hurry to outpace the rest of the world in every period of its existence in one form or another, except during the internecine conflict periods. The Deng Xiaoping regime turned the lights on market-oriented economic development in 1978, earlier than India changed tack to liberalisation. The Chinese were dramatically elevated to higher qualities of life under strict political control in a short time. But it took more time for China to look outward across its borders. China's entry into the world arena commenced seriously in the beginning of the new century much to the surprise and chagrin of others who were powerful and already in the outreach business for years since the time of colonisation. This is in spite of the fact that China was very much within its rights to manoeuvre outside its borders pursuing geostrategic outreach for economic reasons. China is a coastland10 with a coastline measuring about the double of India's coastline.11 It shares land border with 14 other countries with the third longest with India after Mongolia and Russia. India has six land neighbours. More the borders, larger the issues a country will face on boarder security, one of the elements of national security.12 India shares its third longest land border with China after Bangladesh and Pakistan. China's terrain specificity with the ocean across its long winding coastline is not strategically wide. China lies restricted within the narrows of the 168



South and East China seas, Korea Bay and Yellow sea sans an open ocean roadstead. Naturally, it has world war vintage maritime disputes all around that are unlikely to be resolved in the new world by old tricks. Whereas, India was open to the Indian Ocean with low category13 borderline disputes with Pakistan and Bangladesh among its seven maritime neighbours.14 In a recent development the Bangladesh issue was turned around for settlement by an award of the UN tribunal under the geostrategically far-sighted Bangladesh initiative.15 China's maritime disputes are very complex. They can make China inordinately apprehensive of its freedom along the far and near sea lines of communication (SLOC). China needs unhindered manoeuvrable space external to its geolocation in the ocean. Even then the multiple choke points will be predicaments to free passage. This apprehension, China knows, can be allayed to a great extent by outreach, especially in “other-than-war” situation.16 This also shows that, for China, the alliances across the seas in the ocean could be primarily aimed at “other-than-war” security situations and not under hegemonic ambitions. The ocean choke points are vital for China in its aggressive plans for economic development. China guzzles maximum oil in the world. It comes from outside. Naturally China has to look out for safe transportation of oil through the choke points along the established SLOC. It has to assert in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea for economic survival. Northern sea route is not viable. Consumption of oil is expected to increase annually. Though the country has the world's largest coal reserves, there are limitations in coal production. For this reason, it is natural that China will be geostrategically aggressive in the present world order to get into many countries in Africa and Persian Gulf for oil. This is already visible and has caused apprehensions among many China-watchers. The “string of pearls” springs out of this apprehension and more.


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String of Pearls The routes and regions that are important to China starting with South China Sea are the SLOC to Africa and Persian Gulf, and the countries within this maritime matrix. They are within a circle reaching out to Port Sudan and Central Asia. Those concerned about China's moves will obviously watch it with certain suspicion laced with paranoia. Primarily they are Australia, India, Japan, and the United States who will attempt to validate the motives and consequences of the Chinese checkers. Each country will have its own geopolitical interests. They will not like to see another player, a recent one at that, in the area. But, under international law, they will have to either grin and bear or join the game advocating “more is welcome.” The string of pearls originated in this context. It is an expression tucked in to mention China's trail of oil along the SLOC. Indian media, academia, bureaucracy and, to some extent, the political establishment lapped it up immediately on pronouncement and started serving haphazardly to all and sundry, as an Indiaspecific challenge. Nothing could be so much out of place. The terminology lacks critical research and is not even a kind of seatof-the-pants usage based on intuitive exploration. Its usage may not go well with India in serious geostrategic deliberations and engagements in Chinese affairs. The term can even be viewed suspiciously as a dogma innocuously intended to misguide Indian academia and decision makers. It has never figured in Chinese strategic proclamations or doctrines. The term was first used in an internal report in the US Department of Defense, supposedly for internal consumption. US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Pehrson was said to have coined the term. The phrase, it is understood, was first used by Booz-Allen-Hamilton, an active defense contracting firm in 2004.17 The string of pearls theory talks about Chinese strategy to contain the Indian Ocean to isolate, blockade and strangulate India. It is a fact that there will be increased Chinese presence all over Indian Ocean and the seas beyond the Malacca Strait 170



including South China Sea in future. It will be the bloodline for China. Managing it with capital investments in alien spaces will be an expensive and expansive proposition. Certainly China will be aware of the stakes involved. It is factual that China is engaged in creating a network of maritime and associated facilities through geostrategic alliances across various ports and locations that are around India and other countries in Asia and Africa. The projected reasons and supporting activities point out towards energy consolidation and maritime trade for economic development. Such alliances existed in the days of yore among geopolitical entities. China has all the reasons to ensure the flow of oil from far away locations. The motive for such attempts lies within this imperative and not in creating a “string of pearls” determined to choke any target country including India, though the attempts can be viewed as a challenge by those who are interested in resource denial to contain China. Amazingly it looks so, but the ocean terrain is different from land. From the strategic view point, choking a perceived adversary by mere ocean connectivity demands an entirely different approach. Economic endgames are different from military endgames. If otherwise, China is making a mistake and none other than China would be aware of that. Creating a string of pearls in water just to choke even an indulgent adversary is an expensive proposition. It is imprudent for any country to design such an idealistic catenary, in this case a casual lal dupatta, just to choke a country like India. A person can be choked with a dupatta, but no nation can be throttled with geostrategic alliance around it in the ocean in the form of a string of pearls. This is more so when the identified pearls are vulnerable, though some of them could turn out to be swing states where India too can push its way through. From this standpoint, it is all about a string of artificial pearls for those who still insist on the usage. The caveat here is that artificial pearls too have value. Every geopolitical entity seriously involved in maritime trade starting with ancient times through pre-colonial and colonial India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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periods were engaged in creating alliances on the trade routes. The alliances are not part of the connecting links of a geostrategic string but isolated and independent convoy posts of guidance and safety along the supply chain. Such posts cannot be turned around as killer domains when so desired in modern times. Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of fuelling stations across the ocean falls in this category though such an idea is no more valid today.18 More than a catenary, they can be visualised as a hub and spoke arrangement with China at the hub. The countries at the end of the spoke include Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The emergence of such geostrategic relations speaks about China's proactive policies for getting out of the claustrophobic geolocation that is essential for its unwavering development. For anything, China should be appreciated and admired for their geostrategic initiative within its very own right and invited to establish partnerships, as it will be worthy of economic interaction for any country within the hub and spoke initiative. It includes India too as a geostrategic partner. The entities that are said to be involved in the Chinese net are, Coast of mainland China Hainan Island (China) Woody Island (Paracel Archipelago. Controlled by China; also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan) South China Sea corridor (Chinese platforms) Chittagong (Bangladesh) Sittwe (Myanmar) Kra isthmus canal (Thailand) Hambantota (Sri Lanka) Gwadar (Pakistan) Coco Islands (Myanmar) (Present status is not clear as there are denials of Chinese presence there. China had arrangements in the island much before the string of pearl theory originated. It was more a military listening post) 172



Seychelles (anticipated) Obviously, except for economic exigencies, nothing prevents China in expanding further and establishing military, intelligence and shipping presence in the locations for safeguarding its objectives which are presently considered to be economic in nature. China has so far declined to openly comment on its intentions to establish overseas naval presence. A shift in objectives will be visible early for a keen observer. Even the proponents of the string of pearls theory agree that the primary concerns of China are regime survival, territorial integrity and domestic stability. All these factors are related to economic development. For consistent growth of economy, China must satisfy its need of energy and associated resources. China had issued a white paper in 2009 highlighting its intentions with modernisation. The country categorically denies that it would seek hegemony.19 In such case it was not necessary to call the network a string of pearls subliminally suggesting that India could be caught within it.

Global Commons and Military Under UNCLOS, sea lines of communication are not exclusive to any country even where it has jurisdiction. They pass through the high seas which are global commons and territorial seas where there are provisions for innocent passage. The attempt of a geopolitical entity in sharing the global commons cannot be termed vested interest. But resource denial as a vested interest of an individual entity or group of entities cannot be upheld under international law. China's move to establish itself overseas is strictly commercial in nature according to various studies. Simultaneously, China is also expanding and modernising its military to support its objectives of resource movement. That too is natural. China undoubtedly will be a strong military force of recognisable strength and visibility. A modern military can effectively maintain and hold individual components overseas. It will also be prepared for various actions and exercises on the part of the parent nation. China's overseas India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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approach, for example, includes improvements to the military to indicate that China is ready to meet the potential threats. The modernised military also supports a country's rise as a global power, and as a nation which commands respect. China is ensconced in this principle. For nations that are wary of getting encircled by such oceanic alliances, the strategy can be upsetting. A country can also slowly establish control over shipping movements. It can be an issue of concern to nations which are not closely allied with it. China, for example, has growing influence on shipping routes throughout the Indian Ocean, leading some countries to express unease about the safety of oil and supply shipments in the region. The Chinese nodes in the ocean are also supported by various activities over land. Among them are the road to Karachi from Gwadar, rail line from Southern China to Gulf of Cambodia and the Kra isthmus canal development. The scenario undoubtedly indicates that China wants to establish influence in Indian Ocean which is one of the important and busy traffic ways of the world. More than 80 percent of the world's seaborne trade in oil transits through Indian Ocean choke points. With the overview of this, strategic policies over the region are always considered important in many Asian and European countries. United States had maintained powerful influence in the region. There are reasons for India to be concerned about when powerful nations establish presence in the area. India had ventured out to South China Sea to tie up with Vietnam in 2011 for offshore oil exploration along with an extradition treaty. The agreement between the Indian and Vietnamese state-owned oil companies included new investments and exploration, and supply of oil and gas to the two countries. Chinese authorities had raised objections about this pact, claiming jurisdiction. One of the leading newspapers in China even stated in its editorial that there was strong political motivation behind the exploration projects and wanted China to denounce the agreement illegal. The Chinese claim on the South China Sea has been rejected by both 174



India and Vietnam, saying, as per the U.N., the blocks belong to Vietnam. India has also made it clear that it would continue to explore in the resource-rich South China Sea.20 China can counter the strategic appeal of India by joint ventures in oil exploration with Bangladesh or Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal under the changed scenario.21 The Government of India and the Indian intelligentsia should understand that while the string of pearls theory is a fallacy in the geostrategic context, the country cannot be complacent in governing the ocean under integrated maritime security. Integrated maritime security is a complex and specialised task which is much beyond sheer military power projection or any other run-of-the-mill governance of the ocean often practised under instinct along the beaten track.22 India needs a secure maritime environment to achieve sustained national development. Indian Ocean certainly is not India's Ocean, but India has specific rights over its maritime zones and universal claims on the global commons. India has to exert in this region for fundamental national security reasons. Protecting India's EEZ of over 2.3 million square kilometers, securing India's energy lines, promoting overseas markets and fulfilling international commitments are some of the interests to which India has to be sensitive. The problems associated with resource and strategic issues will become more pronounced in the future, especially with the global economy's continued reliance on energy reserves in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. China and India are rapidly growing and are becoming increasingly ravenous for energy. There is potential for conflict as they try to feed their economic growth and expand their influence in the Indian Ocean. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is substantially strong. India should be prepared to face simultaneous strikes at multiple fronts if a war breaks out unlike in 1962 which was a one track massacre. That will be a heavy price to pay for India if it likes to wish away war. This is the critical centre of gravity in the string of pearls theory though speculative at this point in time. In short, India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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India will face Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean and nearby waters in the not so distant future in other-than-war situations replicating the cold war encounters of the US and Soviet navies. The navies of both the countries will be playing chicken much to the discomfort of India. It will do better for India and China to think about an appropriate “bilateral incidents at sea agreement” (Sino-Indian INCSEA Agreement), not only to avoid conflicts at sea but also other probable violations, and to safeguard mutual interests which also include deflecting third party interventions at critical times. India has a very agile foreign policy and long established responsible relationships with the entities around and far. There are also comments on waning Sino-Pak relations that will also limit the validity of string of pearls theory. China is seemingly wary about Pakistan's support to terrorism and stability.

Playing the Game - the Key Issue In game theory, a game can be played in many ways. It all depends upon the desired end result, the ultimate goal. In the geostrategic context, there is no easy reach to the ultimate goal as situations will be never ending. Hence, the choice will be on a kind of win-hold-win situation. Secondly, winning does not mean that one will not lose in between. In modern times, the purpose of geostrategic game is not annihilation or deletion of an entity from the map. It is survival by assured existence. Deletion by total annihilation of an entity through war is impossible. The vanquished and the decimated will rise in different forms. Nations may vanish through circumstances leading to geostrategic erosion, which in mathematics is called entropy maximisation. For India to play the game of geostrategic checkers with any country, it has to understand the other in relation to itself and the nature of the game without inhibition and prejudice. There is no place for fallacies, belief systems, complacencies, etc. in any game plan. Recommended geostrategic game plans are aimed at winhold-win situations. Of course, opinions and demands of the 176



governments can vary. One of the major setbacks for India with respect to China will be its military structure and administration. India still follows a multi-military system of the world war vintage. The warfighting armed forces of India are divided ab initio constitutionally as the naval, military and air forces in designated terrains as implied in the terminologies used.23 It has a multitude of “other armed forces” with a watertight niche for each one. In spite of the fact that every terrain where the game is played is mutually inclusive, the warfighting and other forces of India, in course of time, have drifted and settled in their own turfs under obdurate inertia. It will not be easy to get them out by shattering the inertia. But, it has to be done, though every move of the government will be resisted under the feeling of power erosion. This slip was visible in every war independent India fought so far. No war was ever fought under the unified command concept. It is a major flaw for India's war fighting forces however competent they may be individually. Integration is not unification. The commanders operate in their own niche. This mindset has to change. On the other hand, China does not have any such shortcomings in its military structure. Numbers are secondary when it comes to cohesion and unified decision making. It is of utmost importance that India looks at a unified command system for the warfighting forces for jointness similar to those of the United States or even better by appropriate legislation and not by ordinances, notifications or executive orders of the bureaucracy. Delay will make India bleed more. This is the key issue in military comparison between India and China. This paper does not indulge in comparing other geostrategic components though they too are vital.

Conclusion The relationship of India with China in the geostrategic context is under the prescription that international relations are not based on equitable exchange of goodwill but time-centred political appreciations. The string of pearls theory is an absolute fallacy created hastily by a private third party. The factuality of Chinese India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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efforts in extending geostrategic influence in and around the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is acceptable. The countries in the region who are not party to it have the right to evaluate the geostrategic implications of such move on them. Obviously, India and other countries with unresolved disputes with China have reasons to sit up and take note of the moves. Though presently it looks that China's attempts are aimed at ensuring the much needed oil supply to mainland from the Persian Gulf and Africa, it could use the facilities to intimidate its potential adversaries in the region. Though such moves are quite unlikely under the changing world order, there are means and ways for the concerned to respond prudently if they happen. Such responses should not be guided by fallacies.

Notes: 1

The author has a different view on the whole issue of “humiliating defeat” and the reasons for the war that are not reflected in this article. In his considered opinion and critical appreciation, the war was well fought by the soldiers of India and the reasons for the war have much to do with the global developments of the period. This hypothesis is not tested for the time being.

2

This statement is applicable to all international relations. Relationships will be based entirely on the nations' prerogatives exercised through their respective governments and, therefore, are time variable. The variants will not be easily visible. Hence deep exploration is necessary to understand the differences.

3

Another clash in 1987 saw both the countries practising restraint to contain the issues.

4

There are exceptions to this statement.

5

Paleri, P., National Security: Imperatives and Challenges, Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, 2008, pp. 258-80.

6

Acharya, A., “Why 2014 is not 1914, “The Times of India, Kozhikode, 28 June 2014, p. 10.

7

As mentioned by the President of Stanford University, quoted by Acharya. Ibid.

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The Fallacy of String of Pearls Theory in India-China Relations 8

Macronisation is a word used by the author in depicting change by geographical erosion of a geopolitical entity in course of time. It avoids the usage of the word “disintegration” which is considered inappropriate. See Paleri, n. 4, p. 193.

9

A term used by the author to depict a matured and powerful state consistently with highest national security index in which national security means the wellbeing of the people and not just physical security of the nation. See Paleri, ibid, p. 262.

10

Coastland is a term used by the author in a research study to differentiate a geopolitical entity which is littoral but not an island. See Paleri, P. Integrated Maritime security: Governing the Ghost Protocol, Delhi: Vij Books, 2014, p. 59.

11

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/, accessed 12 May 2014.

12

Paleri, n.4.

13

A term used in this paper to show the maritime disputes of India are relatively less serious and better manageable than the disputes China have with its maritime neighbours.

14

Sultanate of Oman is likely to be the eighth maritime neighbour to India once the legal continental shelf regime is established.

15

The award came from UN's Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2014.

16

According to the author, every geopolitical entity, in the strategic appreciation, goes through two different situational periods in its life cycle. They are war and other-than-war situations. The latter, in popular usage mentioned as peace time, is when the entity is not engaged in a declared war with another. Peace is an abstract terminology whereas war is a legal terminology. Therefore war and peace cannot be combined. The term “peace,” therefore, is replaced by the more appropriate term “other-than-war situation” in the life of the people of a country. The ratio of these periods will indicate the comparative stability of the entity's life span.

17

String of Pearls: Focus on Indian Ocean, abhijitsuryawanshi.blogspot.in/2012/02/string-ofpearls.html#!/2012/02/string-of-pearls.html, accessed 30 April 2014.

18

Paleri, n.9, pp. 218-65.

19

Ibid, p. 244.

20

english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7617302.html, accessed 10May


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2014. 21

See note 14.

22

n.9. Integrated maritime security is about governing maritime security by integrating it with the wholesome concept of national security governance in a land-based approach. Maritime security gets integrated only when it is inclusively amalgamated or assimilated within the national security governance.

23

See Seventh Schedule, List 1, Item 2, The Constitution of India.

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Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India? S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni Associate Professor, Department of Defence Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai Email: [email protected]

Ushering Asia There has been a gradual but sure tilt towards Asia as the dominant region which could shape the future world order. Termed as the “Asian century”, this movement has thrust countries like India and China into the limelight as potential powers that would soon dictate economic and other aspects of world life.1 Globalisation has not only made countries of the world more interdependent but has also given rise to newer markets. The contrast between the developed West and the developing East cannot be starker. While population growth trends in the European countries are down, more and more people of the world are located in Asia. Industrial production is tapering in the West as is consumption demand. Hence principal manufacturing facilities are relocating to the rising economies of China, India and the like. The large and increasing middle class in these two countries especially, with higher spending capacities than ever before, has meant that they will also transform into much needed potential markets. The automobile industry is an illustration of this. In the last decade almost all auto majors have set up manufacturing units in India. In fact, India is set to become the third largest automobile manufacturer in the world by the end of this decade.2 China on the other hand, holds more dollar money than America itself making it the highest foreign exchange reserve in the world amounting to nearly $3 trillion.3 It has fared comparatively better than India with higher and steadier economic growth and healthier balance of payment (BoP) situation. In this context, it would be significant to evaluate India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni

India's ability to “cope” with a maritime assertive China given its economic and more importantly strategic significance.

'Hindi Chini' Being contiguous neighbours sharing more than 3000 kms of discontinuous border, portions of which are contentious, both India and China have a long history of interaction. The earlier exchanges were largely peaceful with records of periodic visits by Chinese travellers to the courts of Indian kings.4 The Buddhist religion was brought to China by the Indians and trade thrived on the silk route.5 In the modern era too, the interaction has been extensive though at times not peaceful. The ignominious defeat meted out to India by the Chinese in 1962 still dominates the Indian psyche in neighbourly relations. However now, economic relations dominate the agenda. China is now India's largest trading partner with $6.5 billion of its total exchanges.6 This has risen from a mere $1.8 billion in 1997-98. Both countries depend largely on the sea for moving most of their trade volumes around the world. With projected increase in economic growth for these two countries, a proportional increase in the dependence on the sea is inevitable. The geostrategic location of these Asian neighbours also accentuates their reliance on the maritime realm. While India is a peninsula and a northern sentinel of the Indian Ocean, China with its widening global role has set its sights on expanding its influence and control over the world's waters. This unique historical position in which these giants find themselves juxtaposed at present, throw up a variety of scenarios. One is the opportunity in deepening maritime cooperation that would obviously garner benefit for both. The other is the challenge that the lesser partner India could face in the wake of an economically strong and politically assertive China. It could also place obstacles to India's proposed rise. Yet another worst case scenario is when Chinese actions are specifically designed to circumvent and even reduce the impact of India's influence among other powers.

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Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India?

“Coping” as a policy One of the strategic options that is suggested by scholars of International relations for any contending and/ or competing power is “to cope” with the rise of the PRC.7 The difficulty is heightened in the case of China as the stated policy of “peaceful rise” or heping jueqi8 as they call it is often at odds with actual action of assertion and even threat or actual use of military force to deal with disputes. This article seeks to evaluate how effective if at all, has the Indian coping been to face Chinese challenges with special reference to the maritime domain. In the immediate South Asian neighbourhood, China has established firm strategic relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives through port and associated infrastructure development be it the Gwadar (Pakistan), or Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and extensive assistance to Maldives. In fact, China became the first non-SAARC country to have a full diplomatic mission in this small island nation in 2011.9 Chinese are the largest tourist group to this country and military contacts are also on the rise. India though is a significant partner of Maldives has certainly lost ground with this neighbour. This is a far cry from the time of the tsunami disaster in December 2005 when India's spontaneous assistance salvaged berthing facilities in the port of Galle as well as offer of $23 million for reconstruction.10 The development of the Hambantota port successfully completed by the Chinese is a curious case. It was offered to India in 2010 which was inexplicably turned down. 11 As for Bangladesh, recently India lost a maritime dispute arbitration case against this neighbour when the Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded more than two thirds of the area under dispute to it.12 Through a $203 million agreement in 2013, China has offered Bangladesh two Ming class submarines. The development of the port of Chittagong with the help of Chinese assistance is also seen as part of the strategy to gain greater access into the Indian Ocean.13 The concerns of the Indian strategic India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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community regarding the military might of its neighbours has been addressed to a certain extent by the installation of “coast battery” on the Sagar island,14 proximate to the Bangladesh coast. Also, proposals for a deep sea port as well as base for land to ship and surface to air missiles on this very island are also being worked at. While it ostensibly is to monitor movement of vessels, the strategic connotation cannot be missed. Bangladesh is now looking to build a second port in Sonadia which could provide sea access to Yunnan province of China as well as to the landlocked northeastern states of India.15 The largely adversarial relationship with Pakistan makes any response to Chinese overtures almost non-existent. However, to check Chinese Gwadar port effort in Pakistan, India now has a 2009-built listening post in Oman, located directly across the Arabian Sea. Indian warships also have berthing rights in this Persian Gulf kingdom.16 Also, with the Iran nuclear deal in place, India has a vital opportunity to develop the southeast port of Chabahar in Iran which could essentially circumvent Pakistan and enable a route to Afghanistan.17 Iran has sought India's investment in augmenting the port's terminal facilities promised under a 2003 bilateral agreement. So, in the immediate South Asian neighbourhood and its vicinity, India seems to have adequately replied to Chinese attempts to gain access and eventually control of maritime assets in the region.

(A)Qua(e) Reply? Let us also evaluate India's replies to Chinese forays in other parts of the world with reference to the maritime realm.18 Furthering India's interest in the regional context is the intensification of the eastward thrust in foreign policy. This has now manifested as “Act East” instead of the earlier “Look east” focus. During the ASEAN-India Summit held in Myanmar in November 2014, PM Modi signalled that India's orientation towards East Asia would deepen with a more action-oriented policy. This was also taking cue from the 2011 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's urging India “not just to look East, but to engage East and act East.”19 Of special significance is the growing strategic ties with Vietnam. 184



The two-way high level visits have received fillip with Indian Prime Minister visiting the friendly Southeast Asian country last year and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung returning the same in October 2014. Among the agreements that were signed are MoUs to explore new oil and gas projects in Vietnam.20 Other high level exchanges include Vietnam's Defence Minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh visiting India in May 2015;21 India's foreign minister Sushma Swaraj making a trip to Vietnam and more importantly Indian head of state President Pranab Mukherjee also sojourning to the Eastern friendly nation.22 Earlier India announced a $100 million line of credit to enable Vietnam to procure defence equipment including off-shore patrol vessels to man the South China Sea.23 Though India has had rights to explore for Oil and gas in the Vietnam waters of the South China Sea as early as 1988, it is only now that there have been increased objections from China mentioning sovereignty issues and non interference from foreign powers.24 In fact the OVGL has the largest foreign site in Vietnam. Unlike other instances, here India has stood firm on her commitment to further commercial exploration for oil in Southeast Asia despite Chinese dissatisfaction.25 India needs to brace herself against China's reactions and must expect more such confrontations. In addition to Vietnam, joint and multilateral naval exercises have engaged India regularly with almost all nations of this sensitive maritime area including MILAN exercises which began in 1995 and are held biennially.26 The Indian navy has identified South China Sea as “a secondary area” of interest27 and has deepened relations with countries like Vietnam and Singapore through regular visits by naval ships, joint naval exercises. It undertook surveillance missions in 2004 in this disputed area and even dispatched INS Viraat the next year. Since 2005, SIMBEX with Singapore has been held in the South China Sea on alternative years. The growing Indian interest in a physically removed area like South China Sea is even thought to be a response challenge to India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Chinese forays in attempts at supremacy in the Indian Ocean region which India considers as its maritime backyard.28 The oft occurring movement of Chinese subs in the region and a possibility of establishing a naval base that would entrench its foothold in Indian Ocean could be seen as potential threats.

Dragon Trail Added to this is China's African saga where she has offered development funds to almost all countries of this hitherto neglected continent. China has now grown into Africa's largest trading partner with $200 billion annually29 gaining immense access to badly-needed natural resources like minerals and metals. However, India's historical links with the continent and the presence of private investment unlike China's governmentbacked and worse still financed projects, give her an edge. India already contributes vastly to peacekeeping operations in the African continent. 30 Anti-piracy could be yet another area of maritime cooperation with African countries. The concern is reflected in the IndoAfrican Framework for Cooperation of 2008.31 The framework talks of “Sharing of experiences and information to enhance capacity to fight international terrorism, including through the African Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism”.32 India's maritime doctrine also places huge emphasis on “the immense importance of the Indian Ocean to India's security and economic development”33 which factors in Africa. India has also responded to Chinese overtures by increasing “its military ties with African states on the Indian Ocean, including Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Tanzania, Mozambique and especially South Africa”.34 Seycelles a small but strategically significant Indian Ocean nation has come into China's Indian Ocean radar with the 2007 visit of its President to the island nation. 3 5 Chinese anti piracy warships were offered replenishment facilities in 2011 while Seychelles got a Chinese patrol vessel in May 2014.36 Chinese President Xi Jinping visited 186



Maldives in September 2014 making it the first ever such venture by a Chinese leader. China is investing in development projects.

Modi and Indian Ocean The incumbent Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi embarked on a three nation tour of Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka in March 2015. In his own words, this move “reflects our foreign policy priorities in India's immediate and extended neighbourhood.”37 This can also be seen as a reaction to the worrying trend of increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region. Mauritius received an Off-shore Patrol Vessel, CGS Barracuda from India in December 2014 to man its 1.9 million square kilometre EEZ against piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing and drug trafficking.38 Significantly, it is the first warship built by India for export.39 A Coastal surveillance radar System is also being installed by India. India has also recently agreed to assist in infrastructure development by improving sea and air transportation to far flung Agalega islands.40 This will serve vital for defence purposes too. India also promised a $500million concessional line of credit to this Blue Economy nation.41 India too has been helping in maritime surveillance by donating Chetak helicopters earlier, a Dornier aircraft last year and recently two Land Rover type four wheel drive military vehicles to the Seychelles Peoples' Defence Forces.42 In a recent visit to the island nation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated a coastal surveillance radar project the first of which is to be located in the capital Mahe. The March 2015 visit also saw furthering of maritime security cooperation through hydrographical surveys, and development of electronic navigational charts on a commercial basis.43 As the largest country in East Africa, Tanzania holds potential to be a significant player that can help India realise its dream of becoming “a formidable power in the Indian Ocean Region.”44 It needs help in anti piracy operations. The Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete's visit in June of this year, saw the inking India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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of hydrography agreement to further maritime cooperation.45 In Madagascar, India has set up a radar-equipped listening and surveillance station, the first on foreign soil. Mozambique has also allowed Indian Navy warships to conduct regular patrols in its territorial waters and EEZ.46 India has conducted hydrography surveys and regular port visits to this African country. President Filipe Nyusi made his maiden Asian visit upon assumption of office to India in August 2015. During this interaction PM Modi “discussed ways” to “intensify cooperation in maritime security and ocean economy.”47

Performance review The purpose of this article was to ascertain whether India has responded to the augmentation in Chinese influence in the maritime sector the world over and if so, what was the level of success of such responses. The fact that China is a rising power that could soon assume a predominant position in the world cannot be ignored. India is placed in a unique position where it could also achieve comparable growth. With a yet-to-be-resolved border dispute and a proposed policy of encirclement through the “string-of-pearls” strategy that puts geo-strategically located ports in India's neighbourhood up for China's control or influence, India has to successfully manage or “cope” with Chinese actions. China continues to further its accessibility to the Indian Ocean, by offering economically attractive plans to assist in infrastructure development especially with reference to ports. The maritime cooperation fund is a huge enough enticement that cannot be refused by any of the littoral states.48 For island nations, China provides military hardware in the form of ships and other equipment in turn for berthing and other rights. The rapid strides in China's economic expansion could give her ample strength to be assertive in the strategic arena. Conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea over islands like Shenkaku, Spratly, Paracel have now become more assertive. The difficulty in India coping with Chinese action is accentuated by the sheer scale of the 188



Chinese ambition.49 India's approach to “cope” with China includes reinforcing old maritime relations with countries in the Indian Ocean littoral. In extra-regional areas like South China Sea, India has remained steadfast in her goal of ensuring freedom of navigation of seas as well as exploitation of energy resources. In countries where India's influence could not make a difference like Pakistan, India attempts to offset Chinese advantage using counter balancing measures. In African countries India has historical links to her credit and furthering and deepening them could prove quite effective. China's naval modernisation is a prevalent concern. It should not be forgotten that China's long term plan is to possess a blue-water navy. It is aimed at challenging US naval dominance. However, it would also counter India's ambition to extend influence over Indian Ocean. India has also made impressive progress in the development of its fleet and naval armaments. Two aircraft carriers INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant operational next year; the successful building of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos with Russian assistance, on-going programme to build warships including corvettes, frigates and destroyers will help India create a “powerful modern ocean fleet”.50 India's response to each and every Chinese foray into the maritime realm of the Indian Ocean or elsewhere might not be possible. However, India must be wary of Chinese inroads into her immediate neighbourhood. The problem is complicated by the fact India does not enjoy purely cordial relations with most of the South Asian countries. China's economic clout is another challenge India must counter as offer of aid or other financial assistance is easy for the communist nation. If India is to expand her sphere of influence and ascend to the position of a future superpower she must match China every step of the way. The Indian response has been measured and at times appropriate but it has to continue nonetheless. It can be said that “India is waking up to the importance and potential of its own position in the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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middle of the Indian Ocean”,51 can only be seen as a “dramatic reorientation of Indian strategic thinking”.52 This must proceed unabated. End Notes: 1

For example, an Economist interactive chart predicts that China could economically overtake US by as early as 2019, Catching the eagle, May 2, 2014 http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/05/chineseand-american-gdp-forecasts, while yet another ongoing research pegs India to be world's No.1 economy by 2048, see India 'will become world's biggest economy in less than 40 years', The Telegraph, July 16, 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10182819/India-willbecome-worlds-biggest-economy-in-less-than-40-years.html 2

India to Become World's 3rd Largest Automobile Manufacturer by-2020 says Ford MD David Dubensky, The Economic Times, March 29, 2015 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/auto/news/industry/in dia-to-become-worlds-3rd-largest-automobile-manufacturer-by-2020-saysford-md-david-dubensky/articleshow/46734961.cms 3

http://www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm

4

In fact, Fa-Hien visited India in the 5th century AD during the reign of Chandragupta II and his travelogue is one of the earliest foreign records about India. Hieun Tsang visited during Harsha's reign. 5

The ancient silk route traversed from China through the Southeast Asian region and passed through the Indian subcontinent and extended as far as Rome in Europe. There are now calls to revive such interaction. For details see, Reviving the ancient Silk Road: China's new economic diplomacy, The Strait Times, July 9, 2014 http://www.straitstimes.com/ news/opinion/invitation/story/reviving-the-ancient-silk-road-chinasnew-economic-diplomacy-20140709 6

As of 2013-14 data by the Department of Commerce, Govt of India http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopn.asp 7

Sheo Nandan Pandey, Coping with the Rise of China: Imperatives for South Asia, January 2011, Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, Berlin, Germany. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?id=125885&lng=en 8

Ibid., p.

9

Chinese ambassador announces plans to build 1,500 houses in Maldives, Minivan News, January 29, 2014 http://minivannews.com/politics/ chinese-ambassador-announces-plans-to-build-1500-houses-in-maldives76469 190


Coping with China in the Maritime Realm: Whither India? 10

India Takes Major Role In Sri Lanka Relief Effort: Aid Is Sign of Nation's Emergence as Regional Power, Washington Post, January 20, 2005 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A221942005Jan19.html 11

India refused to build Hambantota port: Rajapaksa, March 10, 2010 http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/mar/18/what-mahinda-rajapaksasays-about-indo-lanka-ties.htm 12

Bangladesh wins another battle in the bay, Dhaka Tribune, July 8, 2014 http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2014/jul/08/bangladeshgets-19467-square-km 13

Jonathan Miller, China Making a play at Bangladesh?, Forbes, January 3, 2014 http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmiller/2014/01/03/chinamaking-a-play-at-bangladesh/ 14

Navy to commission security outpost in Sagar Island, The Statesman, December 2, 2013 http://www.thestatesman.net/news/27983-navy-tocommission-security-outpost-in-sagar-island.html 15

Bangladesh woos China in snub to West, Al Jazeera, June 23, 2014 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/bangladeshwoos-china-snub-west-20146236549759339.html 16

http://combatgears.wordpress.com/2013/03/01/indian-listeningstation-in-oman-monitoring-pakistans-naval-communications/ 17

Iran offers India a bigger role in Chabahar port: Report, The Indian Express, July 18, 2015 http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/iranoffers-india-bigger-role-in-chabahar-port-reports/ 18

http://fpif.org/impact-chinese-maritime-policies-india/

19

http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/modi-unveils-indias-act-east-policyto-asean-in-myanmar/ 20

http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/joint-statement-on-the-statevisit-of-prime-minister-of-the-socialist-republic-of-vietnam-to-india/ 21

http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/vietnams-defence-ministermeets-pm-modi_1601178.html 22

Rajiv Bhatia, Namo takes on dragon; Modi's leanings towards Vietnam, a challenge to China, Deccan Chronicle, September 04, 2014 http://www.deccanchronicle.com/141102/commentary-oped/article/namo-takes-dragon-modis-leanings-towards-vietnamchallenge-china 23

India to supply Vietnam with naval vessels amid China disputes, Reuters, October 28, 2014 http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/28/indiavietnam-idINKBN0IH0L020141028 India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni 24

Dr. Munmun majumdar, India's stakes in the South China Sea, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 13; July 2013, http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_13_July_2013/28.pdf 25

South China Sea: New Arena of Sino-Indian Rivalry, Yaleglobal online, August 2, 2014 http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/south-china-sea-newarena-sino-indian-rivalry 26 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Milan-2014-Naval-exerciseoff-Andamans-concludes/articleshow/30149435.cms 27

David Brewster, India as an Asia-Pacific Power p.141

28

Brian Stoddart, India and the South China Sea, Global Policy Journal, July 1, 2014 http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/07/2014/india-andsouth-china-sea 29

India and Africa: Elephants and Tigers, The Economist, October 26, 2014 http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/07/2014/india-andsouth-china-sea 30

Ruchita Beri, Evolving Indo-Africa relations: Continuity and Change, Occasional Paper No 76, South African Institute for International Affairs, February 2011, p. 12 http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/ 123456789/30796/1/saia_sop_76_beri_20110222.pdf?1 31

For full text of the Africa India Framework for cooperation 2008 refer http://summits.au.int/en/content/africa-india-framework-cooperation 32

Ibid., p.5

33

Daniel Large, India's African Engagement, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR016/SR-016-Large.pdf p.31 34

Ibid., p.35

35

http://www.maritimeindia.org/INDIA-SEYCHELLES.html

36

Sohinee Basak, India-Seychelles relations : the way ahead, National Maritime Foundation, June 21, 2014 37 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shashi-tharoor/modi-indian-oceantour-china_b_6849936.html?ir=India&adsSiteOverride=in 38

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/29indian-ocean-swa/1237-new-warship-strengthens-indo-mauritianrelations.html 39

India exports its first warship cgs barracuda to mauritius, The Hindu, December 20, 2014 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiaexports-its-first-warship-cgs-barracuda-to-mauritius/article6711039.ece 40

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-offers-500-million-credit-to-

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mauritius-during-pm-modis-visit-5-pacts-signed-745925 41

http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/03/12/india-mauritiusmodi_n_6852162.html 42

Seychelles military gets new Tata four-wheel drives from India, Seychelles News Agency, June 4, 2014 http://www.seychelles newsagency.com/articles/655/Seychelles+military+gets+new+Tata+fourwheel+drives+from+India 43

India, Seychelles sign four pacts to improve security ties during PM Modi's visit , March 11, 2015, First Post, http://www.firstpost.com /world/indiaseychelles-sign-four-pacts-improve-security-ties-pm-modis-visit2147953.html 44

Mohammed-Khalid, India and Tanzania in the Geopolitics of Indian Ocean, Indian Ocean Digest, Vol.27, No2, Issue 48, July-December 2010, pp. . http://www.scribd.com/doc/58315223/Mohammed-Khalid-India-andTanzania-in-the-Geopolitics-of-Indian-Ocean 45

Text of PM's Media Statement during the State Visit of President of United Republic of Tanzania, June 19, 2015 http://www.narendramodi.in/text-ofpm-s-media-statement-during-the-state-visit-of-president-of-unitedrepublic-of-tanzania 46

http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/274-ndiasstrategic-objectives-in-the-indian-ocean-region.html 47

The full text of Narendra Modi's speech on Nyusi visit, http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao =mozambique&id=2147490839&tipo=one 48

http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/chinas-maritime-march-west4543.html 49

Abhijit Singh, The Indian Navy's 'China' dilemma, IDSA Comments, April 28, 2014 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndianNavys Chinadilemma_asingh_280414 50

Prokhor Tebin, High sea: Indian Elephant versus Chinese Dragon, Russia and India Report, Mrach 21, 2012 http://in.rbth.com/articles/2012/03/21/ high_sea_indian_elephant_versus_chinese_dragon_15211.html 51

Shashi Tharoor, Modi's Indian Ocean Tour Shows That India's Watching China, The Huffington Post, March 12, 2015, http://www.huffing tonpost. com/shashi-tharoor/modi-indian-ocean-tour-china_b_6849936. html?ir= India&adsSiteOverride=in 52

ibid


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Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China J. Soundararajan Assistant Professor, Dept. of Ancient History & Archaeology, University of Madras, Chepauk, Chennai-600 005. India. Email: [email protected]

From of ancient days there was a direct marine trade contact between China, Malabar Coast, East and West Countries of India, with the help of the seasonal winds. During their occurrence a wide spread Marine trade was witnessed from the following places. (1) From China to India (2) From India to east Asian countries

Trading conduct of China to India In trading they used a gold coin weighing 1 candareen (also) Chinese musk, fine silk gauzes, embroidered taffetas, blue (and white) china-ware, copper cash, copper, iron, and camphor. The merchants of this country carry on their business like pedals do in China. Here also is another class of men, called chokis (Yogi), who lead austere lives like the Taoists of China, but who, however, are married. These men from the time they are born do not have their heads shaved or combed, but plait their hair into several tails, which hang over their shoulders; they wear no clothes, but round their waists they fasten a strip of rattan, over which they hang a piece of white callco; they carry a conch-shell, which they blow as they go along the road; they are accompanied by their wives, who simply wear a small bit of cotton cloth round their loins. Alms of rice and money are given to them by the people whose houses they visit. In this country there are two seasons, the wet and the dry. In the first two months of the rainy season there are only passing showers, during that time the people lay in a stock of provisions; 194


Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China

in the next two months there is a continual downpour day and night, so that the streets and market places are like rivers, and no one is able to go out of doors; during the last two months the rain gradually ceases, and then not a drop falls for another six months. The soil is unproductive, pepper, however, grows on the hills and is extensively cultivated; this article is sold at five teals the Pio-ho, which is 400 castles of Chinese weight. All trading transactions are carried on by the Chittis, who buy the pepper from the farmers when it is ripe, and sell it to foreign ships when they pass by. They also buy and collect precious stones and other costly wares. A pearl weighting three-and-a-half candareens can be bought for a hundred ogaces of silver. Coral is sold by the catti; inferior pieces of coral are cut into beads and polished by skilled workmen; these are also sold by weight. The coin age of the country is a gold piece, called Fa-nan, weighing one candareen; there is also a little silver coin called a Ta-urh, which is used for making small purchases in the marked. Fifteeen Ta-urhs make a Fa-nan. There are no asses or geese in this country, and there is neither wheat nor barley; rice, maize, hemp, and millet abound. Articles of tribute are sent to China by our ships on their return voyage. When a ship arrives from China, the king's overseer and a Chitti go on board and make an invoice of the goods, and a days is settled for valuing the cargo. On the day appoint-ed the silk goods, more especially the Khinkis CHINESE SHIPS (Kincobs), are first inspected and valued, which when decided on, all present join hands, where upon “The price of your goods is now fixed, and cannot in any way be altered.” The price to be paid for pearls and precious stones is arranged by the Weinaki broker, and the value of the Chinese goods taken in exchange for them is that previously fixed by the broker in the way above stated1.

Cultural and Trade relations with India to China India had cultural and trade relations with China since ancient times itself. The spread of Buddhism helped the strengthening of this relationship. Evidences suggest that from the time of the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Kushana King Kanishka or from the first century A. D the Buddhist monks had travelled to China, Central Asia and Afghanistan. It was from China that Buddhism had spread to Japan and Korea. The Indo-China contact also led to the visits of Chinese Buddhist monks, Fa-Hsien, Hsuan Tsang and It Sang to India. Fa-Hsien visited India during the of Chandragupa II, (380413) A.D, while Hsuan Tsang and It Sang visited India during the first and second half of the seventh century A.D. The trade relationship between India and China had become strengthened during the early centuries after Christ. Before the 6th century A.D the trade relationship between India and China was conducted through the silk Route. In India it was with Kerala that China had many trade links. It is assumed that even during the Ancient times Kerala had commercial links with China. “Even before Christ there was trade relationship between Kerala and China”, Kerala History Association, But lack of ancient historic evidences limits our knowledge on the subject. According to evidences trade ties existed between Kerala and China during the Perumal era2. The spread of Buddhist doctrines from India to China beginning sometime in the first century CE triggered a profusion of crosscultural exchanges that had a profound impact on Asian and world history. The travels of Buddhist monks and pilgrims and the simultaneous circulation of religious texts and relics not only stimulated interactions between the Indian kingdoms and various regions of China, but also influenced people living in Central and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the transmission of Buddhist doctrines from India to China was a complex process that involved multiple societies and a diverse group of people, including missionaries, itinerant traders, artisans, and medical professionals. Chinese pilgrims played a key role in the exchanges between ancient India and ancient China. They introduced new texts and doctrines to the Chinese clergy, carried Buddhist paraphernalia for the performance of rituals and ceremonies, and provided 196



detailed accounts of their spiritual journeys to India. Records of Indian society and its virtuous rulers, accounts of the flourishing monastic institutions, and stories about the magical and miraculous prowess of the Buddha and his disciples often accompanied the descriptions of the pilgrimage sites in their travel records. Fa-Hsian, Husan Tsang, and Yijing were among hundreds of Chinese monks who made pilgrimages to India during the firs millennium CE. The detailed accounts of their journeys make them more famous than others3.

Religious Centre These travel records are important historical resources for several reasons. First, they provide meticulous accounts of the nature of Buddhist doctrines, rituals, and monastic institutions in South, Central, and Southeast Asia. Second, they contain vital information about the social and political conditions in South Asia and kingdoms situated on the routes between China and India. Fa-Hsian was one of the first and perhaps the oldest Chinese monks to travel to India. In 399, when he embarked on his trip from the ancient Chinese capital Chang'an (present-day Xi' an in Shaanxi province), Fa-Hsian was more than sixty years old. As he proceeded westward toward India, Fa-Hsian encountered the multiethnic societies of Central Asia. In Loulan, for example, he saw people who dressed like the Chinese but followed the customs of India. Then in Sri Lanka, he describes the elaborate ceremony overseen by the local ruler to venerate the Buddh's tooth. These records of relic veneration contributed to the development of similar ceremonies in China. They also triggered a demand for the bodily remains and other objects associated with the life of Sakyamuni Buddha. In fact, the demand for Buddhist relics and ritual items in China resulted in the formation of a unique network through which Buddhist doctrines and ritual items circulated between South and East Asia.This network also fostered a relationship of mutual benefit for Buddhist monks and itinerant traders. While Buddhist monks often hitchhiked on merchant caravans or ships, long-distance traders profited from India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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the creation of new demands for commodities associated with Buddhist rituals. Furthermore, Buddhist monasteries provided accommodation and health care to the long-distance traders, many of whom reciprocated by giving donation to the monastic communities. Buddhist monks and itinerant traders as well as the existence of maritime trading channels linking the coastal regions of India and China. It is also evident from Fa-Hsian's account that maritime travel between southern Asia and China was perilous and the navigational techniques extremely rudimentary. This statement in the context of Chinese discourse on foreign societies, where eating habits and manner of clothing were usually associated with the sophistication of a non-Chinese culture, indicates the unique status of the Indians in the Chinese world order. This perception of India as a civilized society persisted until the tenth century, kindled through the reports of later Chinese pilgrims and the works of Chinese clergy that highlighted the erudition of Indian people and the complexity of their society and cultural traditions4. China was becoming an important centre for Buddhist learning outside southern Asia, from where the doctrines were transmitted to Korea, Japan, and other neighbouring kingdoms. Dissatisfied with the translations of Indian Buddhist texts available in China, Husan Tsang also wanted to procure original works and learn the doctrines directly from Indian teachers. Husan Tsang set out on his pilgrimage to India without formal authorization from the Tag court. His illegal departure from China may have been one of the reasons why Husan Tsang deliberately sought audience with important foreign rulers in Central and South Asia. The principal audience of his work, to appreciate the personal and intimate contact he made with powerful rulers in central and South Asia. His account thus provides rare insight into the political, diplomatic and religious activities undertaken by contemporary rulers in Central and South Asia.

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What is there for you to be nostalgic about?” Husan Tsang replied, “The king of the Dharma (i.e., the Buddha) has founded his teachings and it is proper for us to propagate them. How can we forget about those who are not yet enlightened while we have gained the benefit in our own minds?” He argued that China was a civilized land with laws, principled officials, and cultured people. Such dialogues between Husan Tsang and Indians make the account of his travels unique and significant for the study of crosscultural perspectives. It not only offers the views on India and the Indian society of the Chinese pilgrim, it also provides rare glimpses into the Indian perception and knowledge of China, seldom available in contemporary Indian sources. Husan Tsang's account is also exceptional because of his meticulous records of Buddhist sites such as Bamiyan and Nalanda. These notices have already aided the work of modern archaeologists and historians of medieval South Asia. Thus, The Records of Western Regions is a rich resource for historians, archaeologist, Buddhologists, and those interested in studying cross-cultural interactions in the premodern world. Compared to the travel records of Fa-Hsian and Husan Tsang, the works of Yijing have attracted limited attention from students and scholars of Asian and world history. Yijing embarked on his trip to India in 671 and returned in 695 (Map 5). Before returning to China, he completed and sent to China from the kingdom of Srivijaya (located in present-day Indonesia) two works of immense importance. The latter contains biographical information about fifty-six Chinese monks who travelled to India in the seventh century. On other occasions, he recommends a compromise due to cultural difference between India and China5. Indo-China and several islands in the Indian Ocean over which extensive political and commereial deqalings were maintained. At the peak of their power the Chinese emperor had close displomatic links with the Pallava sovereigns whose help was sought for defeating some of the foreign powers. The Pallava India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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army and navy maintained the highest efficiency and were conducting difficult military and naval expeditions on several occasions6.

The Trade Conduct with India to Roman (Yavanas) Before the death of the Roman king Augustus in 24 A.D., a well organized sea trade route was existed. For this many historical evidences are available now. Those Roman ships, (Yavanar kalams) which came to the Malabar Coast of western India were also halted in the coromandal coast for trade purpose. This view is confirmed by the discoveries of Roman coins and Roman country's archaeological artifacts which were obtained from the east & western coasts of India. Based on the artifacts from Arikamedu, it is understood that ancient, ”Puducae”, (Puducherry) city people had a highly civilized and led a very good Tamil cultural life. They were also possessed the aesthetic sense in the field of paintings and sculptures7. Through the Arikamedu port city, Romans did their in land trade with ancient traders of India and conducted off - shore marine trade with many other countries. The Roman trade contacts were recorded or referred in Indian literature and foreign accounts. Both the Indian literatures and foreigners accounts were inter exchanged themselves. For example, Sangam Age literature is considered as a very special literature in south India. Pattinappālai, Puranaanuru and Akanaanuru (149 - 7-11), Cilappatikāram, Manimēkalai (19, 107 - 108) registered the history of Kavirippumpattinam. The Pukar trade with the Roman Empire, other Arab countries and eastern oriental countries were clearly listed and narrated in the contents of the Cangam age texts. The . poetic verses in such Cankam texts refers the ancient maritime trade activities. Particularly Natrinai (58 : 5) mentions about ,”Viram pattinam “ , port city. This place may be the Arikamedu , which was located in the eastern coast where the river Arikamedu merges with the Bay of Bengal Sea. (Estuary). The “Akham”, poetic verses denote this place as, “Virai Mun Thurai Vaelirukku

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Sondhamanadhu”. (The port city of Virai belonged to the Vaelir who controlled the land in front of the sea)8. It also represents the presence of salt pans here and there during that time . Sinam kezhu thanai veliyan Irangu neer pangan kanal am Perunthurai adupoera vaelir virai mun thurai…(Akhnaanuru -149 - 7-11), (Viram pattinam existed as a port and posses an oasis). From this it is understood that “Virai”, existed as a port city which was located on the coast. Virai refers to Viram pattinam. Thus, the present day Arikamedu was once a part of Virampattinam or Virai or the whole city of Virai. It also evidences that the Virai port city was flourished as a big port9. Apart from this Pattinappālai, Puranaanuru (56, 17-20) poetic verses narrate the trade commodities which were brought in and brought out (import and export) via Kavirippumpattinam. What kinds of trade goods were imported via sea by the traders are mentioned particularly in the following verses, How these imported merchantile goods were exchanged with the other country's goods were also well described in such poems. e.g. Akhanaanuru: (7 - 10) “Thalli Am Paeriyatru ven nurai kalanga Vanar thantha vilai maan nankalam Ponnoedu vandhu kariyoedu peyarum Pariyoedu vanthu kariyoedu peyarnthiru Vazg kezhu musiri arpuzhai valaisi”. The white foamed sea had the huge fine ships which exchanged gold for spices, horse for spices at the ports of Musiri10. In addition, it also described the coastal sea city on the banks of river Cauvery and its town planning. The residential quarters patterns in the Kavirippumpattinam were well explained with best words in such literatures. Particularly Romans, Greeks, Arab and Chines traders came and stayed (Yavanar Irukkai - a settlement place of Yavanas) in their owned settlement area. Thus, traders from other countries had a trade link with ancient India's ports11. Let us now have a glimpse of how the glory of the ancient city of Pukār is told India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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in literatures some 1800 years ago. The Pattinappālai, talks of the .. following subjects: The Glory of Kāviri, The Fertility of Marutam land, Cōlanādu: . the Groves, Ponds and Tanks, 'Attilcālaikal' .. . (Feeding House), 'Tavappalli' (Meditation Centers), .. Activities of the Maravar (gymnasiums), Puraccēri (outskirts of the city), Settlement of Fishermen (paratavar), Events of the Daily Life, Events of the Night, Toll houses, Markets (selling all commodities and precious gems) Flags (the Model City may provide for Flags of all nations), The Peasant (their life style) The City Kāvirippūmpattinam, .. Greatness of Tirumāvalavan (Karikāln) Ruined mandapas and so on. .. Talking about the fame of the City for its fair dealing in commercial activities the following words are added ll. 213-219): Pattinappālai, .. The traders, men of goodwill who observe The golden rule and behave like the yoke's central pin; Truthful for their good name of their class; Dealing justly with what are theirs and what is others; Not buying unfairly, nor giving short of measure, Declaring their modest profits openly, Live here in numbers large, with wealth long earned, Merchants from other lands, we versed in tongues Other than their own, having sojourned in other climes Live in this city of ceaseless splendor manifold In loving amity with the townsfolk…12

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The above citation from the Pattinappālai, says traders in the .. ancient city were fair in their dealing. e.g. 1. Masuli pattinam (Andhra pradesh) 2. Kalingam (Orissa) 3. Marakanam (pudhucherry) 4. Puducae (puducherry) All the above said ancient ports were mentioned in Ancient India 1960-1965-69)13. Amphorae jars were used by Greeks and Romans14. The rouletted (English name) and Aritine potteries were discovered from this Arikamedu port city15. In addition to there the exploration in this Arikamedu port city and excavations were carried out by the following persons: (1) French expert Mr. J.M. Casal (2) R.E. Martimer Wheeler (3) K.V. Raman, University of Madras and Pensylvenia University Professor Ms. Vimala Begley ( joint venture by the two educational institutions collaboration) All of them confirmed the presence of the above said potteries resemble those excavation findings. By this we can understand the used potteries of Greeks and Romans. Their spread in India (our country), evidenced the trade contacts between these countries. They are considered as an un shakable historical vestiges. More over the potsherds bearing the script namely Kannan and Saathan palaeographically that these inscribed shreds were belonged to 1st century A.D. It should be mentioned that the Roman Pottery Aritine was manufactured at ARIZZO, a place in Itally during the early century of Christian era 1st Century AD. It was not manufactured previously or after that period, wherever they are found in the world clearly shows their spread and presence, which confirmed the trade contacts of Romans and other countries. from by this, if more Aritine potsherds and other such objects found in the other India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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parts excavations, discoveries can help us to do a comparative study of the Ancient merchantice, trade contacts can be made analysed. (In case, the occurance of more evidences from different perth of the world also had a comparative outlook). Literaries by Ptolemy, Greek Scholor, Pura Nanuru, Aka Nanuru etc., Periplue, Maris, Etrithriyan, Malaengal, Mylarba (1950 A.D) reveals that many ancient port cities were existed in the ancient Tamil country particularly from Kanyakumari to Chennai. Some important citieis are as follows:Kullaththurai, Eyirp Pattinam, Arikamedu, Kavirippumpattinam, Tondi, Marungai, Korkkai, Kumari. By this it is evidenced that the above said ports of ancient Tamil country did a busy trade with the western countries. The term, “Yavanar”, is mentioned many times in ancient Tamil literatures (Cankam)16. Roman coins were discovered from these port cities. In addition they occurred in the following places: Arikamedu, Karaikkadu, Sengamedu, Kottaimedu, Azhagankulam, Vasavasamudram, Vellaamur Kodumanal, Kanjipuram, Poombuhar, Korkkai, Karur, Madurai, Pudukkottai, Velluur, Chennai, Mayilapore, Mambalam, Uraiyur, Paerur and Vijayamangalam. Roman coins were found in Kerala, Vanji, Musiri, Thondi, Pattinam, Kottaiyam and Akki allure. Such coins were found in Andrapradesh, Nellore and Nangththaspar. In Karnataka , Chandravalli and Akkappalli are the places where the same was recovered. Certain Greek words were found in ancient Tamil literatures. Ancient barter system was in favor of ancient India. Kavirippumpattinam received many imported goods Via sea from different countries. In addition taxes and gold was also imported. Akil, Pearl and Thukil were exported. From Rome, silver and gold coins were exchanged for ornaments and other accessories. Because, Roman ladies were fond of such things from Tamil Nadu. Roman politicians condemned their behavior. Even Tamil people wished to receive many things from Rome17. Among them Lady lamps (Paavai Vilakku), Time measuring instruments and foreign labourers were imported for the Tamil 204



Country. Manimegali refers to, “Yavanar Thatchchar”. In the above said port cities, “Arikamedu” “Kavirippumpattinam”, existed as an important port. Arikamedu and Kavirippumpattinam excavation and research confirmed the the place as once flourished as port city. During the period between the early years of 1st Century A.D. and the early phase of 2nd century A.D. it had a busy trade contact with Romans. Dhakshina Taxila ( Historic Relics from Arikamedu) “Pliny (77 A.D) mentions,”Musiri”, as an important port city. In the later half of the 1 st century A.D. Tamil Country had” Contract market”, (Emoria Nomina) . This was mentioned in the book,”Periple De La Mer Erythree) (80 - 89 A.D). More over the term, “Market” ( Emoria) , was used by Mattil Paththoelemae in 150 A.D. In 24 A.D. 120 cargo ships were sailed for trade journey at the same time, from ,”Myos Hormos”, port city. They crossed the Red sea and then reached India. Strabon, the Greek Historian gave this description .The artifacts from this site research provides special references on their own. Along with other potteries, Arezzo potsherds were also found. Previously found Augustus Emperor's ring stone and the occurrence of Arezzo potsherds indicates the commercial trade contact between the western countries and coromandal coast during 1st century A.D. From the Arikamedu and Kavirippumpattinam excavation vestiges, researchers formulated the following facts: *Augustus emperor consolidated the western European countries * The trade contact between India and Itally was expanded Both these facts were inter related and happened at the same period of time18. On the basis of geographical grounds, a city was existed in the coromandal coast and it had a trade contact with the western countries. More over the site where excavation research was carried was the same place which was mentioned and referred in Periplus and Ptolemy. i.e. Podukae19. Roman period or middle first sub division possessed the above said findings. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Archaeologists and Historians used Proton magneto meter, Sonar magneto meter and Echo sounder to study the Stratigraphy researches. By this the trade contact between Arikamedu and Rome are scientifically researched by them20. With the help of the research works, new comers from other countries to India were studied well. During the 1st Century A.D. To 6th Century A.D. Greeks and Romans along with Christian missionaries and traders reached to the destination by sea routes21. By them Tamil Country enjoyed the trade contacts. The artifacts which were discovered from excavation, reflects the trade contact between Tamil Country, Greek, Rome and China. These hints are treated for oceanic history sources to write the trade contacts of Tamil Country

End Notes: 1.

Geo. Phillips in JRAS 1896, pp.341-44; cf. Rockhill, T'oung Pao xvi pp. 449-52. Trade conduct between A medieval Experience.

2.

Vasisht.M.C. Beginning of Kerala - Chinese trade, (Page No.1 t0 26).

3.

Xinruliu, Ancient India and Ancient China Trade and Religions Exchanges AD. 1-600, Oxford University press 1988. (Page No.1 to 51).

4.

Roberta Tomber, Lucy Blue and Shinu Abraham, Migration, Trade and peoples, Part-1: Indian ocean commerce and the Archaeology of Western India, The British Academy London (Page No.1 to 57).

5.

Tansen Sen, The travel records of Chinese pilgrims Fa-Hsian, Husan Tsang, and yijing (Source for Cross-cultural encounters reference ancient China and Ancient India) Page No.1 to 24).

6.

Minakshi. C, Administration and Socila life under the Pallava , University of Madras, 1977.

7.

Villiyanur - Pulavar N. Vengadesan (1990) Varalatril Arikamedu, Thirumudi Pathippagam,Villiyanur. Page 12 25.

8.

Begly .V. Arikamedu Maru Thiranaivu, Aejaea 87 (1983) Page 461 81.

9.

Jouveau Dubreuil Les ruins de Pondicherry, 1941.

10.

Begley V. and Richard Daniel De Puma eds. Rome and India. The Ancient Sea Trade ( Madison, 1991).

206


Maritime Trade of Ancient Tamils with the East and West in the special reference to the Trading conduct of India to China 11.

Ibid.

12.

M. Raghunathan, Six Long Poems from Sangam Tamil (Madras 1978), pp. 63-64.

13.

Ancient India, Vol - 2, July 1946, A.S.I. New Delhi PP.

14.

Amphorae jars were ancient European storage jars. They were used to store grains and liquid (Sprit and oil), particularly in Travel by Europeans. It is a kind of a jar. In the upper part two handles were present. It is an unique feature of this jar. The word, Amphorae”, is derived from a Greek word.

15.

Rouletted plates were made by awell livigated clay. They will produce metal sounds when it was striken. It is an important feature of this kind of pottery.At the base, very fine paintings were painted in circles.

16.

K.V.Zvelebil “The Yavanas in old Tamil Literature”, Charisteria Orientalia Prahai 1965.

17.

Vimala Begley, “New Investigation at the art of Arikamedu “, in Journal of Roman Archaeology, Michigami, Vol. 6, 1993.

18.

Auguste, The Roman emperor's name was written in Latin in a Roman coin. He was born in 63 B.C at Rome. He was died at Nela in 14 A.D.

19.

R.E.M. Wheeler,” Arikamedu “- Bulletin of ASI, No. 2, July -1946, New Delhi.

20.

J.M. & G.Casal, Site Urban at sites Sumeraires Des Environs de Pondicherry, Paris. 1956.

21.

J.M. & G. Casal, Fovilles de - Virampattinam - Arikamedu Imprimedia Nationale, Paris , 1949.


207

The Convergence Dilemma: Mapping India-China Strategic Relations Dalbir Ahlawat Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University, Australia

Abstract Shift in the balance of power from the West to the East placed China and India as the major strategic players to shape the strategic contours of the 21st Century. Notwithstanding the trust deficit lingering on since the debacle of the 1962 border incursion, strategic pre-eminence of the Indo-Pacific region exhilarated potential for cooperation and convergence of interests between the two nations largely in areas such as security and strategic domains. However, the level of convergence hinges, in large measure, on pursuance of the conflicting core geo-strategic interests in each other's region of influence. Currently both countries consider the doctrine of self-defence as the cornerstone of their respective security policy and justify it, in part, on grounds of the challenge posed by the evolving power relations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the United States' 'Asia pivot' strategy. However, analysts believe that China's growing strategic, military and economic clout is aimed at 'containing' India, if not globally, at least within Asia. Concomitant with, and as a consequence of, Chinese postures, India for its part has developed several strategic options. These include a counter-containment policy: muscling up its military to act as a deterrent, building leverage in East Asia and forging closer ties with the United States. It is against this background that an attempt is made in this paper to a) undertake an analysis of the evolving security and strategic paradigm since the end of the Cold War; b) make an assessment of the opportunities that exist for bilateral strategic cooperation between India and China; c) examine the efficacy of the initiatives that India and China have taken to counterbalance each-other through strategic engagements in the region; d) underline India's options to engage with the US to counter China while retaining its strategic autonomy; e) finally conclude the paper with possible future strategic options.

Introduction The post-Cold War period witnessed a shift in the balance of power from the West to the East and placed China and India in the forefront as the major strategic players to shape the geo-strategic contours of the 21st Century. A major feature that proved to be a 208


The Convergence Dilemma: Mapping India-China Strategic Relations

benchmark in this transition was the 9/11 incident that resulted in a shift in the US engagement from the Asia Pacific region to Middle East Asia. This shift occurred against the backdrop of the US' traditional role as a guarantor of peace in the region since the end of the Second World War after neutralization of Japan. China availed the prevalence of peace meticulously and fuelled double digit growth in the gross domestic product (GDP). Consequently its defence expenditure increased at an average rate of 8 per cent annually from 1990-1997 and over 12 per cent per year between 1998 and 2005 and in the subsequent years a 10.7 per cent rise, resultantly by 2012-13 its defence spending reached to estimated $119 to $166 billion, around 2.1 per cent of the GDP.1 The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its deleterious impact on the US economy further inspired China to pursue its ambition of 'peaceful rise' (China claims peaceful development) to fill the power vacuum created by the US. In the process, armed forces were being transformed to project military strength beyond its borders reflecting its long-held aspirations to become a prominent regional power.2 China's development of the 5th generation stealth fighter planes said to have demonstrated antisatellite and anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities are particularly pertinent in this regard- a development that prompted China's neighbours, including India, and the US to a nearly consensus point that how these acquisitions could be described as a 'defensive strategy' as claimed by China. This concern was further strengthened during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in November 2012 by adding a new caveat that hinted at China's assertive policy. It pledged to “never yield to outside pressure” and “protect China's legitimate rights and interests overseas”.3 This unprecedented overture gave rise to the notion of “China threat”. In a similar vein, India too witnessed economic growth since liberalisation of its economy in early 1990s. However, India's development was dented by a rising China. To countervail the evolving geo-strategic realities, India was forced to increase its India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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defence budget from around $14 billion in 2000 to over $47 billion by 2013, that is, around 2.5 per cent of its GDP4, if not to counterbalance China, but to develop a minimum credible deterrence. It is envisaged that India not only plans to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years but also strengthen its 'Look East' policy by initiating cooperation with 'China wary' Asian countries and the US.5 Overall, this unusual situation has placed India in a dilemma as to how to respond to China's rise. It is against this background that an attempt is made in this paper to a) undertake an analysis of the evolving regional strategic landscape and security paradigm since the end of the Cold War; b) make an assessment of the opportunities that exist for bilateral strategic cooperation between India and China; c) examine the efficacy of the initiatives that India and China have taken to counterbalance each-other through strategic engagements in the region; d) underline India's options to engage with the US to counter China while retaining its strategic autonomy; e) finally conclude the paper with possible future strategic options for India.

Evolving security and strategic paradigm since the end of the Cold War A rising China is hotly debated both in the US and Asian strategic circles. Mainly two opinions come to fore, that a rising China poses unabated threat to its neighbours therefore it needs to be checked before its rise, while others believe that China's rise is inevitable and it should be incorporated in the evolving world order.6 The first concern attracts more attention not only because of China's military modernization but also its demonstration of power to challenge the statuesque. The US, a traditional peacekeeper in the region, felt challenged by China on several occasions. That include Beijing's objection to the US's intention to depute the USS George Washington, a nuclearpowered super carrier, to conduct military exercises to express solidarity with South Korea against North Korea's sinking of a 210



South Korean Navy ship. Further China challenged the existing territorial claims over the South China Sea (SCS), placed restrictions over the freedom of navigation in this region, and botched the US proposal to set up a multilateral forum to settle regional disputes. Similarly, over the past decades, the relations between China and Japan, notwithstanding strong trade ties, have witnessed deterioration mainly because of China's objection to Japanese officials' visit to Yasukuni war shrine and nationalisation of three of the five Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by the Japanese government. China objected to the act of nationalisation as a violation of its sovereignty and responded by patrolling the area aggressively around the islands and even within the twelve nautical mile territorial zone with the intention to 'protect' its sovereignty.8 The ferocity in the relations reached to a precipice by December 2012 when China considered flights by Japan over the islands as a violation of its air space and in retaliation dispatched fighter jets to intercept the intruding aircrafts. Tokyo accused the Chinese actions in its 2013 Defence White Paper of changing the status quo by “force based on its own assertion which is incompatible with the existing order of international law”9. In a similar vein, China is accused of harassing the Vietnamese ships involved in fishing and oil exploration near the Paracel Islands that legally appear to belong to Vietnam but claimed by China.10 Beijing appears to have become more aggressive recently and has attempted to sink Vietnamese boats. At least on two occasions, China objected to Indian ventures, in July 2011, the INS Airavat, an amphibious assault vessel, while on its friendly visit to Vietnam was objected to by the Chinese naval forces as having entered into Chinese waters.11 Again in September 2011, when ONGC Videsh Limited, as per its three-year agreement with its counterpart Petro Vietnam started exploration operations in the SCS, China warned India of serious consequences.12 Witnessing Chinese hegemonic postures, US Defence Secretary, Chuck Hagel indicated that “China has undertaken destabilising, unilateral actions asserting India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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its claims in the South China Sea".13 The situation further aggravated in November 2012, with the issuance of new passports by the Ministry of Public Security that included map of China inclusive of the disputed territories. To strengthen its regional strategic policy, Beijing not only issued instructions to its maritime law enforcement agency to stop and search ships that entered in the contested waters of the SCS but also established an Air Defense Identification Zone in November 2013, which means any aircraft entering into the airspace must report flight plans to Chinese authorities, maintain radio contact and reply promptly to identification inquiries. Yang Yujun, a defence ministry spokesman, justified the setting up of the zone to “guard against potential air threats”.14 By the first half of 2014, Chinese interference in the SCS intensified to the level that it imposed fishing permit rule, expelled two Philippine ships from Ayungin Shoal, which compelled Philippines to appeal to the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration over China's claim to waters near the Philippines, and collided with Vietnamese vessels over China's setting up of an oil rig in the block claimed by Vietnam. China's aggressive postures, claims over disputed territories and the SCS precipitated to the point of confrontation at the recently (May-June 2014) concluded Shangri-la Dialogue in which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech forewarned China to follow the “rule of law at sea” that includes “making claims that are faithful in light of international law, not resorting to force or coercion, and resolving all disputes through peaceful means”.15 As against these principles, China laid emphasis on international norms, rather than the international law, that include “respecting sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; non-interference in internal affairs; respect[ing] social systems and chosen development paths”.16 Against the Chinese emphasis on international norms, Chuck Hagel voicing the China-wary countries and taking note of aggressive measures initiated by China warned that “the United States will not look the other way 212



when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged”. In retaliation China's Lt Gen Wang retorted that they were "tastes of hegemony,...expressions of coercion and intimidation,…rhetoric that usher destabilising factors into the Asia-Pacific to stir up trouble, and…unconstructive attitude”.17 Witnessing challenge to its traditional peace keeping role, shifting balance of power, the US after withdrawal from Afghanistan intends to pivot Asia and reinvigorate its security relations with important countries like Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and Australia among others.18 The US also intends to involve a democratic India to counterweight China. In this regard, adjudging India's rising naval strength in the Indian Ocean, rising military prowess and development of credible nuclear deterrence, the countries of the region intend to widen the narrow geo-strategic focus from Asia Pacific to the Indo-Pacific region. From Beijing's perspective, Washington's 'rebalancing' in Asia is overwhelmingly seen as an effort by the US to slow down China's rise to limit its rightful role as a major power.19 Against the evolving Chinese hegemonic perceptions and the US pivoting towards the Indo-Pacific region, India notwithstanding developing some understanding and ushering in confidence building measures has also witnessed China's aggressive policy postures in the form of border incursions, building a 'string of pearls' in the South Asian region, strengthening 'all weather friendship' with Pakistan, increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, and building pressure on India against convergence of its strategic interests with 'China wary' countries aimed at containing China.

Opportunities for bilateral strategic cooperation between India and China History shows that no two great power aspirants have shared borders in the past. This raises a question, could it be feasible for India and China to share a border, because in addition to competition, rivalry and divergences, both need to co-exist side India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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by side. In this regard, both Chinese and Indian civilisations (Han and Hindu) though located very close geographically, have not yet witnessed any major strategic conflict in the past, and more so since India's independence and China's liberation both have cherished the norm of peaceful co-existence, except for the blemish incident of 1962. Both the countries channelized their energies in their domestic developments and limited their security and strategic policies to self-defense without entering into vagaries of the Cold War alliance system. Both have maintained a good neighbourly policy, for example, during the wars fought between India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999, regardless of the “all weather friendship” with Pakistan, China maintained neutrality notwithstanding the fact that it was in a position to shift the balance just by mobilization of its forces within China. Despite being in an advantageous position, China did not project its national power. This gives credence to China's policy to maintain peace and stability in the region. Similarly, India has maintained neutrality in China's difficult relations with Japan and Vietnam to name a few, and on the issue of Taiwan. Also, India in order to maintain a correct relationship with China has not allowed Dalai Lama (Tibetan government in exile in India) to engage in political activities, on its soil, against China. Rather both the countries have given credence to the liberal framework by adding value to the borders as connecting lines rather than the dividing lines. The trade between the two has taken a quantum jump from just $117 million in 1987 to over $73 billion in 2014 with a targeted aim of $100 billion by 2015. Even considering the scope of bilateral trade and convergence of ideas on global power shift, the two neighbours appear to be heading towards interdependency. At least, at this juncture, neither country can afford disruption in its economic ascendancy, so except for cooperation there appears to be little choice for conflict. Notwithstanding the impending issues, such as geo-strategic conflict of interest, both have shown civilizational maturity to harness the differences amicably, ruled out rivalry and insisted on 214



enough space for both to grow simultaneously and accommodate each other.20 Though increasing economic interdependence has not arrested strategic issues, at the same time, the bilateral relationship has not been taken hostage to differing strategic perspectives. Rather, what has stand out are the shared interests that include maintaining regional stability by combating religious oriented terrorism and secessionist movements, harnessing economic and trade opportunities, maintaining access to energy supply. Also, both express reservations on the role and aspirations of the US in the Indo-Pacific region though with variance in nature and scope. As succinctly put by Chinese Premier Li: “Both Mr. [Manmohan] Singh and I believe there are far more interests than differences between our two sides. We need to confront issues with a broad mind, and tackle them in a mature way”.21 Though the 1962 debacle left a deep scar on both sides, a boost in the relationship was witnessed during PM Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 that opened new vistas for two-way visits. President Hu Jintao's visit to India in 2006 culminated in a historic joint statement, which highlighted a ten-point strategy to promote peace and co-operation. The year 2006 proved historic in the sense that it “virtually spelt out the contours of a border settlement on the basis of a mutual exchange of claims”.22 The frost was further melted in the Himalayan foothills with the landmark decision to open the Nathu La Pass, sealed since 1962, for trade that links the passage between Sikkim and Tibet. If the first 14 years of the 21st Century are any indication, the leadership of the two countries has generated positive vibes in their relationship. In 2003 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit resulted in appointing Special Representatives to explore a framework for boundary settlement, Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in 2005 gave impetus to establishment of a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. If Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's 2008 visit proved instrumental in charting out “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century”, Premier Wen India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Jiabao's 2010 visit resulted in establishing mechanisms for regular exchange of visits between heads of governments/States. The ongoing summits between the leaders bore fruit that was evidenced when Li Keqiang after being appointed as premier in 2013 undertook his first visit to India. Convergence in the evolving regional strategic environment made Manmohan Singh to undertake another visit to China, within five years, in October 2013 that resulted in signing the historic Defence Border Cooperation Agreement with a provision that “neither side will use force or threaten to use force or seek unilateral superiority to alter the LoAC's status”. Witnessing convergence on the bilateral and regional issues the two sides signed “A vision for future development of India-China strategic and cooperative partnership”.23 Ultimately, the visits and mutual understanding culminated in declaring 2014 as the Year of Friendly Exchanges between India and China. The relationship was further upgraded with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014 and signing of 12 agreements, including increasing co-operation in trade, space exploration and civil nuclear energy, and pledging to work towards peace on the disputed border.24 Friendly exchanges between the two countries certainly proved instrumental in not only overcoming the trust deficit but also building strong bridge in the bilateral defence cooperation. Developments such as Indian Defence Minister's visit to China in July 2013, conduct of joint anti-terrorism training “Exercise Hand in Hand 2013” in Sichuan, China and the PLA navy hospital ship Peace Ark's port call at Mumbai in August 2013 underline an upswing in the relationship. Wen Jiabao went to the extent of declaring that "Combined, we can take the leadership position in the world”.25 Even on the conflicting issues, both have demonstrated maturity including resolving the standoff in the Sumdorong Chu valley in 1987, in the Indian Ocean in 2009, in Ladakh in 2013, and in Chumar in 2014. Witnessing incursions over the claimed territories and standoff, as against the speculation mainly by the 216



Western strategists of escalation of military conflict, both demonstrated “oriental concept of harmony that is fundamentally different from the geo-politics and balance of power that have dominated the system for hundreds of years”.26 Developments such as these rather proved instrumental in clearing the fog, misunderstandings and misperceptions about each other and in establishing “Working Mechanism for Consultations and Cooperation of India China Border Affairs” and of late signing of the “Border Defence Cooperation Agreement”. Mapping the maturity of the two countries, Jonathan Holslag underlines that “both sides have made progress to allow the border zone to look less like a battlefield”.27 Both the countries taking note of the similar challenges to their national security such as threat of terrorism, both cross-border as well as internal, identified that directly or indirectly Pakistan was linked in one way or the other. Notwithstanding Pakistan being an ally, Chinese sources identified the presence of Uighur militants in Pakistan's tribal areas that posed threat to Chinese nationals working in different projects in Pakistan. In this regard, William Dalrymple maintains that Chinese concern about connections between Uighur separatists and extremists in Pakistan is already “causing Beijing to reconsider its relationship with Pakistan and seek common cause with India…against the extremist threat”.28 Considering the intensity of the threat, India and China have not only signed a counter-terrorism agreement but also initiated joint military exercises. Lieutenant General Yang was quoted by Xinhua as saying that exercises are intended “to exchange anti-terror experiences, enhance mutual understanding and trust, and boost cooperation between the Chinese and Indian Armies”.29 In addition to strengthening bilateral relationship, common membership of organisations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, East Asia Summit, G20, BRICS has resulted in both sides using common platforms to discuss vital issues having bearing at local, regional and international levels. The India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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institutional platforms have proved instrumental in perceptible convergence on increasing “exchanges in the areas of peacekeeping, counter terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief”.30 The above discussion highlights the unfolding convergence matrix between India and China, that was further reinforced by President Xi Jinping by offering Prime Minister Narendra Modi to “Let us work together to achieve peaceful cooperation and inclusive development for benefit of our two people and in the interest of peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world”.31 Taking a self-appraisal of the relationship between the two countries, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao succinctly summed up in April 2003 that “in the last 2,200 years, China and India spent 99.9 percent of the time enjoying friendly relations. Only 0.1 percent of the time relations were no good”.32

India-China: counterbalancing each-other through strategic engagements in the region The 0.1 per cent perhaps refers to the unprecedented strategic issues that India and China confront since the 1950s to the present, at a time while sharing a border and wishing to simultaneously become great powers. An effort is made in this section to discuss in details the counter-balancing strategic perspectives of the two. These include unresolved territorial disputes, mutual suspicions of each other's intentions and power realignments at the global and regional levels. If Samuel P. Huntington was alive, he would have certainly espoused the Indo-Chinese conflict as a 'clash of civilisations'.33 However, the ground reality presents that it is more a clash of similar aspirations, interests and geo-strategic calculations with a bearing on bilateral and regional issues. Since 1948, China has formally resolved territorial and border disputes with its twelve neighbouring states through a peaceful and concessionary diplomatic approach.34 India is the only exception, not with standing the good neighbourly postures (panchsheel). The 218



question thus arises why the border dispute with India lingers on. In this case a multi-causal approach can be adopted based on the indicators such as India as a competitor next door that could pose a challenge to China's big power ambition, India hedging with the East Asian powers to check China's rise and India's aspirations to involve the US to maintain a strategic balance. In a sense, the security dilemma “stems from the impossibility of gauging with certainty the intentions of another state”.35 After 17 rounds of talks, the recent one held in February 2014, between the Special Representatives of India and China on the boundary question, the ground reality is that the issue remains unresolved and the usual rhetoric of maintaining “peace and tranquility in the India-China border areas” is being ceremonially repeated in press statements.36 Though agreements on border peace and tranquility and confidence-building measures have been signed between the two in 1993, 1996 and 2013, so far they have reached only to the point of deciding on the modalities for resolution of the boundary issue. No doubt, Beijing appears to have purposely kept the boundary issue alive with its 'lay back' approach, mainly to deal with India at its own terms and choosing. While the border issue gives credence to pragmatism, strategists have also noticed a shift in China's postures on other geo-strategic issues. This was evident with China's claim over the area south of Tawang - Arunachal Pradesh. In November 2006, China's aggressive posture was reflected by no less than Sun Yuxi, the Chinese ambassador to India, that “In our position, the whole of the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory” and that too before the Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to India.37 Since China has expressed its resentment against the visits of Indian prime ministers and president to Arunachal Pradesh as it considers this territory as part of China. India is also perturbed by China's shift from the existing level of military forces to heavy deployment of military reinforcements, including the replacement of “older liquid-fuelled, nuclear India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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capable CSS-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with more advanced and survivable solid-fuelled CSS-5 MRBMs and may be developing contingency plans to move airborne troops into the region”.38 According to diverse sources, both the Xinjiang and Tibet military districts house two motorized infantry brigades each that are being backed up by the army aviation based in Chengdu and Lanzhou military districts, within easy reach of Tibet and Xinjiang. This strategic positioning by the Chinese military equipped with short and medium range missiles poses not only a serious challenge to India's conventional deterrence strategy but also puts India in a dilemma of escalation into a real military security threat at a short notice.39 In addition to the heavy reinforcement along the border and claims over Arunachal Pradesh, China also shifted its policy on Kashmir to give legitimacy to the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir with its intentions to link Gwadar Port in Pakistan (constructed and managed by China) to its western states through road and railway network. Moreover to give credence to Pakistan's stance on Indian Kashmir as a 'disputed territory' China continues to fund projects in the region, which include upgrading the Karakoram Highway, the Bunji and Bash dams, and the Kohala and Neelam-Jhelam hydroelectric projects, all these actions “undermine China's neutrality in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir”.40 Even during the Kargil War in 1999, the Western world held Pakistan responsible for intrusion in the Indian territory but China remained reticent on this issue. In yet another incident, China's refusal to grant a visa to a senior Indian military commander BS Jaswal, apparently on the grounds that his responsibilities included the disputed territory of Kashmir, obviously reflected China's postures to botch Indian ambition to become a regional power.41 Above discussed actions indicate China's intentions to give a permanent fixture to the 'disputed territory', that too in favour of Pakistan. As per a recent report “Chinese troops are seen in some of the Pakistan forward posts in the general area of 3rd and 4th PoK brigades, opposite Rajouri 220



sector. Reportedly, they are imparting weapon handling training to Pakistan Army troops”.42 As though this was not sufficient to hurt Indian sovereign vibes, the Chinese geo-strategic intention was further reinforced by printing its map on the passports that among other disputed territories also included the territories either claimed or controlled by India, as part of China. These developments infuriated the Indian strategists as to the reasons for these aggressive and hegemonic actions. A more basic issue that bedevils relations between the two countries is China's “all weather” friendship with Pakistan. Beijing continues to bolster Islamabad's military capabilities and assist in supplying nuclear reactors. Moreover, Pakistan and China are “suspected of being in the planning stages for the joint development of a 4.5-generation successor to the JF-17 in response to India's acquisition of the French Rafale”.43 China has remained circumspect about Pakistan's use of its own territory for terrorist activities. This was visible during Chinese President Wen Jiabao's visit to New Delhi after the Mumbai terrorist attack. Whereas all other visiting dignitaries from the US and Europe not only condemned the terrorist attack, but also visited Mumbai as a token of their solidarity with India, Mumbai did not appear in Jiabao's itinerary. He was even disinclined to mention the attack in his press statement. Instead, he added Islamabad to his homeward journey. Similarly, though Li Keqiang undertook his maiden visit to India as premier, but he also visited Pakistan after visiting India. In diplomatic circles, these moves were interpreted as equating India with Pakistan. Some geo-strategists argue that China's policy initiatives vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean have also exacerbated India's apprehensions. China's so-called 'string of pearls' strategy of developing sea ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh and entering into strategic relations with India's neighbours in the Indian Ocean traditionally thought of by New Delhi as “India's Ocean” are India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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construed as deliberate and calculated moves.44 Moreover, linking the states in India's periphery like Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar with road, rail, pipeline or port network, and efforts to reach to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Burma indicate China's intentions to penetrate, as deep as possible, to contain India's influence in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, arrival of a Chinese long-range deployment patrol submarine ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India and subsequent arrival of Submarine Changzheng-2 and warship Chang Xing Dao within seven weeks “made clear that it will not allow the Indian Ocean to become 'India's Ocean'”.45 All these actions accumulatively cast a long shadow of doubt over China's ulterior motives and designs. China's response to all these propositions, however, is its ambition of a “peaceful rise” and an assertion that the “string of pearls” is mainly intended to facilitate further trade with India, which, in recent years, has exceeded a substantial US$73 billion. Notwithstanding the positive trend in bilateral trade, the increasing wedge between the Chinese and Indian economies only increases the “barrier” of mistrust. China's overall rise and muscling up of power in bilateral relations as well as in India's region of influence challenges New Delhi in more than one way. How to respond to China's rising power poses a credible challenge to the Indian strategists. Taking a serious note of increasing Chinese hawkish postures and increasing nexus between China and Pakistan, Indian military has evolved strategic doctrines like “two-front war” and “cold start”, against a collective threat posed by both China and Pakistan. Moreover, to counter the motorised high altitude divisions and missiles positioned towards India, the Ministry of Defence took some tangible initiatives such as approval of a fiveyear plan with a budget to the tune of $13billion in 2011 to expand military operations that include developing two mountain strike corps dedicated to offensive operations and another two divisions to deploy along the border. Taking cognizance of the Chinese reinforcements and force mobility along the border, the 222



Ministry of Home Affairs approved $347million in June 2012 to facilitate tactical developments through construction of 804kms. of 'strategic roads' with an objective to facilitate ground mobility of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police with backup provision to airlift and airdrop in case of emergencies.46 No doubt, the strategic planning appears to be sound, but operational issues regress the full potential, for example, limited progress in building the infrastructure, force modernisation and appropriate logistical support.47 To overcome the infrastructural deficiencies and to establish a more credible deterrence, India decided in November 2011 to deploy a regiment of BrahMos surface to surface supersonic cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh, “making it India's first offensive tactical missile development against China”.48 In addition, even if only to demonstrate its big power credentials, India enhanced its deterrent capabilities by test-firing the Agni-V and VI intercontinental ballistic missiles, which, with a range of over 5,000 kilometers, have the capability to reach major Chinese cities. Though this development was viewed negatively by China, it nevertheless led Beijing to adopt a conciliatory posture that was discernible at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation gathering in June 2012 when Li Keqiang, slated for premiership, described the Sino-Indian relationship as the 'landmark bilateral relationship' of the 21st Century. This clearly demonstrates a definite shift in India's traditional approach of 'dissuasion' to one of credible deterrence. In addition, India has taken tangible steps to modernise its navy, by budgeting for the acquisition of new submarines and aircraft carriers and becoming net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. As discussed in the first section, what is emerging in the Asian region is a “China threat” perception, mainly because of China's claims over land and maritime jurisdiction. This indicates that Asia-Pacific countries are more likely to “balance China instead of accepting Chinese primacy in a hierarchical tributary state system”.49 This opens an opportunity for India to further India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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strengthen its 'Look East' strategic relations with 'China wary' countries. Considering India's overall development and increasing strategic posturing, Asia's small and medium powers identify leverage in India to counter balance a rising China. The ASEAN countries mainly view India's naval growth as a promising development. This situation makes India's engagement with South-East Asia somewhat easier than that experienced by China. A visit in mid-2012 by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Myanmar led to signing of an agreement to build a road from India to Thailand through Burma, aimed at connecting India not only with the South-East Asia but also making India's northeast states as a central hub, with further provision of passing three major road routes and a railway network through Bangladesh to connect its “seven sisters”. This initiative would certainly be instrumental to subterfuge Pakistan and China's motives to instigate insurgency in the northeastern states and counter the threat to choke the 'chicken neck', a narrow passage connecting rest of India with northeastern states. In a similar vein, on the western front, to counterbalance China's rail and road links to Pakistan and develop regional dependency on the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, India took lead to construct a road and rail network in Iran through Afghanistan to link the Central Asian Republics (CARs) aimed at minimizing dependency on Pakistan as well as on the Gwadar Port. In addition, in response to China's hegemonic perceptions in the Pacific region, countries like Australia, Japan, Vietnam and the US while recognizing India's growing influence in the South Asian and Indian Ocean region, and India recognizing potential of these countries, convergence of interest has given rise to bilateral strategic relationships. The security agreements between India and major Pacific countries are not only inked to address issues of terrorism, piracy and safeguarding sea lines of communication, but also to “balance” the shifting power in the region. To strengthen its strategic framework, India has 224



conducted joint naval exercises with the US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and other major countries in the region. In addition, it has entered into an agreement with Vietnam on naval ship repairs on its ports. Just as China established the so-called “string of pearls”, in a sense, India has developed its own parallel strategy: a so-called “necklace of diamonds”50 which is being further strengthened with the visit of PM Narendra Modi to Japan, Australia, Myanmar and other important countries in the region. Based on the above discussion, it appears China and India are locked in a zero sum game, as each posits its actions as selfdefensive but the same actions by the other are considered as aggressive. Commenting on India's signing of security agreements and its inclination towards the US presence in the region, a Chinese expert Dai Bing asserted that “For the foreseeable future, therefore, while a 'cold war' between the two countries is increasingly likely…”.51 In the process, “New Delhi's perspective of China's strategic encirclement of India, and Beijing's fears of Indian attempts to limit China's influence in South and Southeast Asia and its power projection into the Indian Ocean, override their formulaic statements of shared interests as partners in strengthening a multipolar world”.52

Engaging US to counter China while retaining its strategic autonomy After independence, the Cold War rivalries, Pakistan's joining of the US sponsored security alliances and domestic developmental compulsions, all placed India in a unique position to remain nonaligned and pursue autonomy in its strategic affairs and make decisions on international issues on a case by case basis. However, the 1962 debacle though attracted the US assistance, but this assistance was “neutralised by the US government [by] deciding to get a quid pro quo from India asking India to compromise on Kashmir with Pakistan”.53 This irredentist US overture to compromise with its sovereignty, further strengthened India's stance to retain autonomy in its decisions. This situation further India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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aggravated during the 1971 War after the US dispatched the nuclear powered USS Enterprise to demonstrate a show of strength with Pakistan and subsequently, emergence of ChinaUS-Pakistan nexus. India fearing excessive US influence in Asia, marched into the Soviet camp, while retaining its own strategic autonomy. After disintegration of the Soviet Union, India taking cognizance of the new geo-strategic landscape took a pragmatic approach to build a new partnership with the US, however, it was only after the 1998 nuclear tests that India justified conducting to deter the 'China threat' and China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear programme, that coincided with the US' broader strategic framework for the region, and brought the two on the convergence route.54 The US in its efforts to counter a rising China and finding limited advantage in supporting Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan found it appropriate to claim India as an ally and avail opportunities that an emerging India offered. For this, Pakistan's use of Jihadi forces to wage the 1999 Kargil War, the so called threat from Islam, proved benchmark for the US to reorient its policy towards India. The Clinton administration not only accused Pakistan of its role in Kargil but pressured Pakistan to unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kargil. The US General Anthony Zinni, Commanderin-Chief of Central Military Command and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia threatened Islamabad that “the US would not bailout Pakistan if India decides to launch a major attack across LoC”.55 Even the US media also showed a remarkable shift in favour of India by almost prefecturing the LOC as an international border.56 (Washington Post, 1999). The US government shifted its stance on Kashmir and “advised Islamabad to forget about history and see ahead”.57 It even ruled out the possibility of UN resolutions' implementation. While giving briefing to House International Relations Sub-Committee on Asia and Pacific, Robin Raphael supported that the UN resolution for a plebiscite on Kashmir is out dated: 226



The difficulty is that a lot of history has gone by since that time, number one. Number two, the government of India at this time doesn't share the view that those resolutions are still relevant. And third, in practical terms, as I said in my statement, it is time to move forward, not to look to past prescriptions but to come up with a prescription that fits the situation on the ground and current political reality.…58 India reciprocated the US positive gestures by extending unconditional support for its fight against international terrorism against the 9/11 attacks. The changing perceptions about eachother reflected a substantial shift on the existing blockers that had kept the two apart. As against China's rise, the US appreciated India's role in the region, shared Chinese threat of passage to the Indian Ocean and prescribed elevated role for India in the IndoPacific region. A closer Indo-US relationship developed during the second term (2005-09) of President George W. Bush, despite India being not a signatory to the NPT and CTBT, the two countries signed a Defence Framework Agreement in 2005 and Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 2008. These two landmark agreements aimed to provide assistance to India's civilian nuclear programme, notwithstanding resistance from India's neighbours, changed the regional power dynamics.59 A 10year defence accord further strengthened the relationship and opened new vistas that included technology transfer, weapons production and missile defence cooperation and finally resulted in awarding India status of “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”, providing India de-facto recognition as a nuclear weapons state.60 The election of Barack Obama gave further impetus to the bilateral relationship, which was eloquently couched in such phrases as India being an “indispensable power” and a “leader in Asia”.61 This development triggered first round of India-US strategic dialogue in 2009, in a sense “institutionalising” formal bilateral consultations on China. In addition, Obama assured to support India's membership to the United Nations Security India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Council, non-proliferation regimes, export of advance military technology and weapons to India. Underlining the strengthening partnership with India the US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta applauded that, “Our two nations [India and the US], I believe, have finally and irreversibly started a new chapter of our history”, was very well received in the diplomatic circles.62 In response to the evolving warm relationship between India and the US, and to counter the civil nuclear initiative, China responded by selling two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan; thereby seeking “nuclear parity” between India and Pakistan. Though the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan attracted international criticism and sanctions, but China categorically criticized India only that it was “infuriated and deeply hurt, not as much by the tests themselves” but by the justification that India construed a 'China threat'.63 The People's Daily noted that the US “needs to rely on India to restrict China. India needs to show its value to the United States by flexing its muscle toward China so that it could gain U.S. military support and help raise its international status”.64 In the process, China to restrain India firmed up its defence relations with Pakistan, shifted its stance on Kashmir by stapling visas and claimed sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. According to the Chinese sources, in the past China “tended to dismiss India as a peer competitor,...Beijing is now paying increasing attention to India's drive for a great power status through diplomatic initiatives and a military buildup”.65 However, India's development of credible deterrence, strengthening of relations with the US and leaning towards the Asia Pacific region resulted in China moderating its tone and tracing the antecedents of mutually reinforced bilateral relationship that started with the foundation laid by Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988, signing of major agreements in 1993 and 1996, and high level visits from both sides. To further recognise New Delhi's elevated status, Beijing knowing full well that its diplomatic campaign to isolate New Delhi would apparently push it in the US camp, resultantly that will precipitate in not only 228



strengthening the US presence in the region, but also influence adversely the perceptions of other south Asian states. This could further prove instrumental in alienating China in the region, ranging from South Asia, South East to North East Asia. So the Chinese strategists adopted a reconciliatory approach by engaging India directly and dissuading it from joining the US, Japan, Vietnam or any other 'China-wary' country. Moreover, while expressing rapprochement with India, China forewarned India to be cautious of the ill-conceived US rhetoric of US-India relationship, as democratic and natural allies, to “foil Western conspiracies aimed at dividing China and India”.66 To avoid such division, Chinese strategists coaxed India to be partner in architect of 21st Century as the Asian Century. Admittedly, India is at a precipice in the development of its relations with the US and China, that poses a serious challenge to India's policy making establishment. Should India come to terms with China and thereby ensure a durable peace in the Indo-Pacific region, or should it forge an alliance with the US in an effort to contain China? It is, no doubt, a dilemma worthy of Macbeth! To be on the pragmatic pedestal, during the second term of Obama administration some major strategic divergences cropped up between India and the US. India was skeptic of the proposals put forth by Obama himself for membership of India in the UNSC and non-proliferation regime because membership in these institutions requires broad support, that appeared to be out of the purview of the Obama administration. Also, the two countries found at odd with each other with the implementation of the 123 Agreement and specifically due to the Indian Liability Act the US companies found themselves at a disadvantage.67 In the process, the US found itself out of the tender process for the sale of 126 multi-role aircrafts. This resulted in India's reservations to enter into long term strategic framework with the US. Other issues being erosion of India's position vis-à-vis Pakistan, mainly because of the Obama's exit strategy from Afghanistan that included negotiations with Taliban through Pakistan. In this case India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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India with an investment of over two billion dollars in Afghanistan found itself marginalized. As against the US objective to isolate Iran for its nuclear programme, India has to continue its trade relations with Iran mainly because of its historical links, presence of Shia population in India and more importantly India's investment in developing strategic rail and road links that link Iran's Chabbar Port to the CARs through Afghanistan. In addition, India's participation in forums that work against the US interests that include Russia-China-India nexus, Indo-Russian defence relationship, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, all accumulatively restrict it in aligning with the US and supporting its policies towards Middle East and Iran. With this the strategic dialogue that started in 2009 with great expectations from both sides appeared to be losing its charm by the fourth round that took place in June 2013. The US found itself engaged in volatile theaters such as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Ukraine whereas India found itself immersed with Chinese border incursions, future role in Afghanistan and strengthening relations with Iran. As against Leon Panetta's assertion of India as a 'linchpin' to the US 'pivot', John Kerry acknowledged the relationship with India simply to maintain strategic balance and peaceful development in the Indo-Pacific region.68 Like the US, India also remains wary of China's long term strategic calculations, though China has tried to initiate confidence building measures but unresolved border issue quagmires the relationship and perceptions about each other. Notwithstanding 17 rounds, it appears China would resolve the border issue at its choosing and timings, that could be translated as vying India against the US and Asia Pacific countries, isolate India and later deal with an isolated India at its own terms and conditions. As Deng Xiaoping hinted in 1989: “Coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible”. 69 Notwithstanding, India's presumption that increase in trade ties 230



would neutralize China's support to Pakistan, China continues to supply weapons to Pakistan aimed at establishing parity with India, mainly to nudge India to be defensive on negotiation table. Moreover, China's raucously forging of closer relations with India's neighbours appear to be aimed at eroding India's influence in its own region. Linking Tibet, Xinjian and Yunan by road and rail up to the border with India, and stationing “at least 25 nuclear-tipped medium-range missiles in Tibet”, indicate building constant strategic pressure on India. In addition to the continued probe of the Line of Actual Control, the “frequent border incursions in remote areas may be designed to collect taxes and carry out land surveys in preparation for claims of ownership”.70 Considering the predicament in which India is placed, “New Delhi would persist with its policy of engaging with both China and the US without antagonizing either side”.71 In a positive sense, in the short term, India finds this as an opportune time, when it can ride on both the waves (China and the US) and extract maximum from the big powers and still play the role of a balancer in the region. However, in the medium to long term, India has to come out with its own security and strategic doctrine, make open the doctrine to other countries and pursue its interests with likeminded countries.

Conclusion Based on the above discussion, so far India has gained little from China from a strategic perspective. Similarly, after a short convergence of interests between India and the US, both are heading towards a divergence. Relations with Pakistan have not improved, achievements in Afghanistan would be under strain after the US withdrawal, the initiatives taken to give weight to the Look East policy lacks India's seriousness.72 In nutshell, when the power is shifting from the West to the East, India is still struggling with its existing insecurities rather than becoming an architect of a new power paradigm in the new century. Instead of basing its decisions on an issue by issue basis, India needs to draft a master India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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strategy and within that broad framework make its decisions. And this strategic policy no longer should be held back by the regional fixation of the yester years but driven by a desire to play active role at local, regional and international levels. No doubt, India has established credible deterrence against the major powers but how long can India afford this level of budget for its defence mechanisms and how long can it protect its borders with barbed wires. Without doubt, the power of China is increasing at an incredible rate, to match this the BJP government and specifically Modi blitzing with giving Bharat its rightful place in the shifting geo-strategic framework, need to craft a master strategy for India so that aims and objectives are known to other competitors and partners. For this, India has several options. One option could be going all the way with China to visualize the 21st Century as an Asian Century. However, India does not appear to be in a position, for at least next ten years, to put all its eggs in a single basket, mainly because of unpredictability of China's intentions and the risk of isolating itself from the other China-wary Asian countries and the US. The GFC facilitated the decreasing gap between the decline in the US power and rise in that of China: “in 2007, the United States' economy was four times as large as that of China; by 2012, it was only twice as large” and may overtake between 2020 and 2025.73 Considering China's increasing power, looking at the US with incredulity, China would certainly attempt to put pressure to refurbish the existing world order to have better stakes or would endeavour to construct a parallel international order by setting up its own mechanism with China as the dominant member. Initiatives in this direction such as Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS development bank could be cited as examples. Considering the option of aligning with the US in structural strategic framework, perhaps India would like to restrain itself, mainly because of the US's shifting strategic priorities and India's regional strategic considerations. The US will not remain hostage to India's core strategic interests. The US-China relationship is 232



more interdependent than the US and India. The US has maintained a golden silence on the Chinese incursions and at the same time maintained sound relations with Pakistan. Chinese investment in the US increased by almost seven times from $3.4 billion to $22.8 billion during 20072012. Therefore in the absence of trust deficit New Delhi would restrain itself to go all the way with Washington. Perhaps India could work as a swinger state--maintain balance of power, if not globally then at least in the Asian region, by siding with one power or the other. But if history is any indication, India followed this policy (non-alignment) during the Cold War and could not demonstrate much leverage. Additionally, the US and China still demonstrate the strongest interdependency if not strategically, then certainly in economic terms. China's accommodation of the US may alienate India. Though an uphill task to analyse how weak the US is and how strong China is, what could be a better bet for India is a concert of powers both in its Western and Eastern flanks. With a concert in the East including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, Philippines, China, US and Russia and other willing states. Though the East Asia Summit could serve this purpose but it lacks teeth and viability in case of conflict or war like situation. On the Western side the concert could include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, India, Russia and other like-minded countries. In these two concerts of power, the Indian Ocean becomes a linking pin, a strategic hub. India should maintain its domineering postures by developing blue water naval force and a credible deterrence through force modernization and nuclear missile capabilities. China proffers a multi-polar world with uni-polar Asia, whereas the US wishes to preserve the status quo by supporting a uni-polar world with a multipolar Asia. Both ways, this proposition would strengthen India's power projection and it can play a bigger role while at the same time alleviating its security concerns vis-à-vis China-Pakistan nexus. India's strength lies in not working against the big powers but working with them without forming alliances against each other. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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End Notes: 1

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2

Hartfield, Robert and Brian L. Job, Raising the risks of war: defence spending trends and competitive arms processes in East Asia, The Pacific Review, 20(1), March 2007, 5.

3

Constitution of Communist Party of China (Adopted on Nov. 14, 2012), The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China ht t p://www.china.org .cn/china/18t h_cpc_cong ress/201211/16/content_27138030.htm accessed on 24 April 2014.

4

SIPRI Year Book, 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments /milex/milex_database accessed on 27 May 2014.

5

Sasi, Anil. “'Look East' has become 'Act East Policy', says PM Modi at ASEAN summit”, 12 November 2014. http://indianexpress. com/article/india /india-others/look-east-has-become-act-east-policy-pm-modi-atasean/#sthash.wmTCjs7f.dpuf accessed on 25 November 2014. “Sushma Swaraj tells Indian envoys to Act East and not just Look East”, The Economic Times, 26 August 2014.

6

Buzan, Barry. “China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3, 2010, 5-36.

7

China Tells America: Turn Around the USS George Washington, 27 November 2010. http://www.businessinsider.com.au/china-us-koreawar-drill-2010-11 accessed on 20 November 2011.

8

Erickson, Andrew S. “New U.S. Maritime Strategy: Initial Chinese Responses”, China Security, 3(4) Autumn 2007, 53. Katz, Richard. “Mutual Assured Production Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan”, Foreign Affairs, 92 (4), 2013, 18. Jackobson, Linda. “China's Foreign Policy Dilemma”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2013, 9.

9

Defense of Japan 2013, Ministry of Defense, p. 30, http://www.mod. go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html accessed on 1July 2014.

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25 Gentleman, Amelia. “Wen ends his visit with giants vowing to be cooperative”, The New York Times, 13 April 2005, http://www.nytimes. com/2005/04/12/world/asia/12iht-wen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 accessed on 5 June 2014. 26 Yuan, Jing-dong. “Sino-Indian Relations: Peaceful Coexistence or Pending Rivalry”, in Emilian Kavalski, ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012, p. 213. 27 Holslag, Jonathan. “The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(6), 2009, 817. 28 Dalrymple, W. “Afghanistan: as China forges new alliances, a new Great Game has begun”, Pakistan Defence, 31 March 2014. http://defence.pk/threads/afghanistan-as-china-forges-newalliances-a-new-great-game-has-begun.307005/ assessed on 24 November 2014. 29 Cited in Krishnan, Ananth. “With focus on terrorism, India-China begin joint military drills”, The Hindu, 6 November 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/with-focuson-terrorism-indiachina-begin-joint-military-drills/article5317800.ece accessed on 28 May 2014. 30 “India, China agree on host of defence cooperation measures”, The Times of India, 24 February 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com /india/India-China-agree-on-host-of-defence-cooperationmeasures/articleshow/30955838.cms accessed on 28 May 2014. 31 “Let's work together, Xi tells Modi”, The Times of India, 10 June 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Lets-work-together-Xitells-Modi/articleshow/36315823.cms accessed on 15 June 2014. 32 Malik, Mohan. China and India: Great Power Rivals. Boulder Co: First Forum Press, 2011, 3-4. 33 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 1993, 22-49. 34 Hongyi, Hongi. “Explaining Chinese Solutions to Territorial Disputes with Neighbour States”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2(4), 2009, 487-523. China signed border agreements with Kazakhstan (April 1994), Kyrgyzstan (July 1996), Tajikistan (August 1999), Vietnam (Dec. 1999), Russia (May 1991), Myanmar (Oct. 1960), Nepal (Oct. 1961), North Korea (Oct. 1962), Mongolia (Dec. 1962), Pakistan (March 1963), Afghanistan (Nov. 1963), Lao PDR (Oct. 1991). 35 Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 30(2), 1978, pp. 167-214. 236



36 “17th Round of Talks between the Special Representatives of India and China on the Boundary Question”, Ministry of External Affairs, 11 February 2014, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/22861 accessed on 25 May 2014. 37 Defence News, 18 November 2011, http://defencenews.in/defencenews-internal.aspx?id=a849VZVKBO0 accessed on 22 April 2014. 38 A 2010 Pentagon report cited in Pakistan Defence. “China deploys Ncapable CSS-5 MRBMs on Indian border: US”, 25 August 2011. http://defence.pk/threads/china-deploys-n-capable-css-5-mrbms-onindian-border-us.126571/ accessed on 20 June 2014. 39 For details, see Chansoria, Monika. “Assessing China's Preparedness for High Altitude War” CLAWS Journal, Winter 2012, 46-57. Chase, Michael S. and Andrew S. Erickson. “The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China's Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting”, Asian Security, 8(2), 2012, 115-137. 40 Bajpaee, Chietigj. “China-India Relations: Regional Rivalry Takes the World Stage”, China Security, 6(2), 2010, 5. 41 Mohan, C Raja. “India, China and the United States: Asia's Emerging Strategic Triangle”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2011, 2. 42 Chinese giving arms training to Pak soldiers: BSF report, 15 November 2014. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/chinesegiving-arms-training-to-pak-soldiers-bsf-report/#sthash.E41Yb2aO. dpuf accessed on 20 November 2014). 43 Mendiolaza, Gustavo. “Pakistan in the Middle, China's balancing Act and India's Dilemma”, Future Directions International, 27 March 2013. http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/29indian-ocean-swa/953-pakistan-in-the-middle-china-s-balancing-actand-india-s-dilemma.html accessed on 29 April 2014. 44 Brewster, David. India's Ocean: The story of India's bid for regional leadership. London: Routledge, 2014, 32. 45 Ibid. 46 Patil, Kapil. “India's New Mountain Strike Corps: Conventional Deterrence”, The Diplomat, 8 August 2013. http://thediplomat.com /2013/08/indias-new-mountain-strike-corps-conventional-deterrence / accessed on 26 June 2014. 47 “India to upgrade 73 roads along China border”, The Hindustan Times, 18 December 2013. 48 “India to Deploy Brahmos Cruise Missiles to Counter China”, Asian Defence News, http://www.asian-defence.net/2012/02/india-toIndia and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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deploy-brahmos-cruise-missiles.html accessed on 2 May 2014 49 Malik, Mohan. “India Balances China”, Asian Politics and Policy, 4(3), 2012, 346. 50 “Why India is pursuing military strength?”, People's Daily Online, 20 August 2009. 51 Bing, Dai. “India building a security barrier against China”, China.org.cn, 8 February 2010. http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201002/08/content_19387164.htm accessed on 28 March 2014. 52 Frankel, Francine R. “The breakout of China-India strategic rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean”, Journal of International Affairs, 64(2), 2011, 1-2. 53 Dixit, J N Dixit. India's Foreign Policy Challenge of Terrorism: Fashioning New Interstate Equations. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2002, p. 292. 54 Fernandes, George. “China is enemy no 1: George”, The Indian Express, 4 May 1998. http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/ie/daily /19980504/12450024.html accessed on 20 June 2014. 55 Cited in Usmani, Irfan Waheed. “An Inglorious End to Glorious Adventure: Conceiving and Executing the Kargil Operation (1999), The Historian, 6(2), July-December 2008, 100. 56 The Washington Post in its editorial stated that “Pakistanis are plainly to blame for having started the fighting….In an evident act of provocation, hundreds of Islamic guerrillas and…Pakistani soldiers infiltrated across the line of control”, Washington Post, 28 June 1999. 57 Fayyaz, Shabana. “Kashmir Conflict: US Post Cold War Perspective”, Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 15, Spring/Fall 1997, 76. 58 Cited in Mahmud, Ershad. “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy”, Policy Perspective, 2(1) 2003, http://www.ips.org.pk/pakistan-and-itsneighbours/1124-post-cold-war-us-kashmir-policy.html accessed on 23 March 2014. 59 Rice, Condoleezza. “Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, 79(1), January February 2000, 56. 60 Jane's Sentinel: Country Risk Assessments, South Asia. Surrey: HIS Global Limited, issue 27, 2011, 285. 61 Kellerhals Jr, Merle David. “India an indispensable partner, US officials say”, 1 June 2010. www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2010/June/20100601090431dmslahrellek0.7037622.html accessed on 20 July 2014. 62 Panetta, Leon E. “Partners in the 21st century”, Institute for Defence Studies 238



and Analysis, 6 June 2012. http://idsa.in/keyspeeches /LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury accessed on 3 July 2014. 63 Yuan, Jing-dong. “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century”. The Washington Quarterly, 30(3), 2007, 132. 64 Zude, He. and Fang Wei, “India's increasing troop may go nowhere” People's Daily, 15 November 2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn /90777/7644825.html accessed on 30 June 2014. 65 Yuan, n 63, 132. 66 Garver, John W. “The China-India-U.S. triangle: Strategic relations in the Post-Cold War era”, NBR Analysis, 13(5), 2002, 1-2. 67 Baru, Sanjaya. The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh, New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2014, 238. 68 “Joint Statement: Fourth U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue”, US Department of State, 24 June 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 2013/06/211084.htm accessed on 2 July 2014. 69 Special Report, “Less biding and hiding” The Economist, 2 December 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17601475 accessed on 18 June 2014. 70 Jane's Sentinel: Country Risk Assessments, South Asia. (Surrey: HIS Global Limited, issue 27, 2011, p. 277. 71 Mathai, Ranjan. “India's foreign secretary”, quoted in Hu Yinan, China, India resume military dialogue, China Daily, 8 December 2011, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-12/08/content_ 14230300.htm accessed on 17 May 2014. 72 Baru, n 67, 238. 73 Pei, Minxin. “How China and America See Each Other”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com /articles/140755/minxin-pei/how-china-and-america-see-each-other accessed on 18 October 2014.


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India's China Policy: Quest for an Optimal Strategy Rabindra Sen Professor, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata - 700 032, India Email: [email protected]

Abstract China is a 'foreign policy priority' for India and the partnership is considered crucial for Asia's emergence as the political and economic centre of the new international order. Recognising India's growing importance, China too considers its relationship with India as one of its most important bilateral ties. This is attested to by President Xi Jinping's visit to India just a few months after the change of government in 2014 and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to China before the end of his first year in office. Given the magnitude of China's ascent, it can certainly be argued that India's China policy has to a very large extent been a function of China's strongly entrenched position in and around India's neighbourhood, and in the world at large, more so given India's perception of China. What then would be the best policy option before India for dealing with China and for managing the complex but important relationship?

Sino-Indian Relationship: Under The Shadow of Mistrust Commenting on the importance of our ties with China in January 2006, the then Indian foreign secretary had observed, 'our relationship with China is a key component of our “Look East” policy'. 1 In the same year, emphasising the importance of friendly relations with China, Pranab Mukherjee, then defence minister, in his address at the Fifth Asia Security Summit (Shangrila Dialogue) in Singapore had said:

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China is India's largest neighbour and therefore developing friendly cooperation with China is one of the priorities of our foreign policy. With frequent high-level exchanges… the process of building trust and understanding has gained momentum and …relations have diversified across a wide range of areas. Our ties with China have reached a certain degree of maturity where we are determined to build upon our existing commonalities and identify newer area of mutually beneficial cooperation. At the same time we are striving to address our differences in a proactive and purposive mannner, without allowing them to affect the comprehensive development of our relationship.2

Introduction As already mentioned, China too recognises India's growing importance and attaches considerable importance to ties with New Delhi.3 This is hardly surprising because India, as Harsh V. Pant avers, undoubtedly is a major player in the AsiaPacific regional balance of power along with the US, China, and Japan.4 In spite of the importance attached by both the countries to bilateral ties and hopes of improvement in relations that have surfaced from time to time,5 however, the Sino-Indian relationship has overall been mired in suspicion and mistrust.6 China may have replaced the US as India's largest trading partner, but even in the sphere of economic relations there is anxiety arising out of India's soaring trade deficit with China.7 Not surprisingly, as Zhang Yan, former Chinese ambassador to India put it, relations between the two countries remain 'very fragile, very easy to be damaged, and very difficult to repair.' 8 Being rising powers, India and China will, as is quite natural, increasingly compete for resources, markets and influence. But the important question is whether the two Asian powers succeed in safeguarding the relationship in the midst of the turbulence and face-offs witnessed especially in recent times. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Mutual Perceptions and Concerns India has its share of concerns vis-à-vis China. A sophisticated military infrastructure put in place by the Chinese in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) adjoining India has given them a three-to-one advantage over India.9 India, quite naturally, views with a great deal of concern China's recent assertiveness coupled with rapidly growing military clout.10 Being the weaker power, India is naturally concerned about the overall military balance tilting to its disadvantage. 11 China with its policy of 'uniting with the small' 'to counter the big' i.e. India is becoming more and more influential in South Asia.12 Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan, building of port facilities around India's periphery, and a dramatic increase in the PLA's incursions and transgressions across the LAC all have led to a dramatic shift in the official Indian perception of China since 2006, with China now being widely seen as a major security threat in the short to medium term.13 Recent surveys conducted by Pew Global Research show a growth in popular distrust, with the percentage of Indians with a favourable view of China falling from fifty-seven per cent in 2005 to thirty-four per cent in 2010 and further down to just twenty-five per cent in 2011.14 Likewise, the percentage of Chinese holding a favourable view of India fell from thirty-two per cent in 2010 to just twenty-seven in 2011. The unequal strategic equation has led to an aggravation of tension between the two.15 Indian strategists fear being surrounded by Chinese proxies, not only on the Western Front but also along India's troubled northeastern border. 16 The Indian government worries that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a “string of pearls” that could eventually undermine India's pre-eminence and potentially rise to an economic and security threat. 'There is a method in the madness in terms of where they are locating their ports and staging points,' Kanwal Sibal, a former Indian foreign secretary and presently a member of the government's National Security Advisory Board said of China.17 242



'This kind of effort is aimed at counterbalancing and undermining India's natural influence in these areas.' 18 Chinese officials, of course, deny ulterior motives for their projects in South Asia. Although top Indian leaders have tried to play down talk of a rivalry with China, saying there is enough room in the world for both the economies to rise simultaneously,19 India nevertheless has embarked upon courting trade partners more vigorously in responding to China's growing influence.20 There are deep worries in India also over Chinese manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean. 'China wants to be a major player in the Indian Ocean, alongside India and the US,' said Kanwal Sibal.21 It is pertinent in this context to refer to China's Maritme Silk Road initiative, a series of agreements intended to link China to Europe by sea. While Beijing has presented the initiative as a vision of international cooperation, many in the Indian government view it as a means to covertly expand Chinese influence. 22 'It is a precursor to eventually positioning themselves more permanently in the Indian Ocean,' said Sibal.23 Beijing, of course, has denied any such plan. 'China has never, and will not, use socalled military or other means to try and hem in India,' said Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao.24 China too has its own concerns. Among Beijing's principal defense-related concerns are India's longstanding hosting of the Dalai Lama, exiled spiritual leader of Tibet, growing energy links between India and Vietnam in disputed Southeast Asian waters, and India's expanded military and political links with Washington. 25 Chinese strategists keep a wary eye on India's 'great power dreams', its military spending and weapons acquisitions, and the developments in India's naval and nuclear doctrines. A dominant theme in Chinese commentary in the last decade is that India's growing strength - backed by the United 26 States - could tip Asia's balance of power away from Beijing. Beijing fears that an unrestrained Indian power - particularly one that is backed by the West and Japan - would not only threaten China's security along its restive south-western frontiers (Tibet India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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and Xinjiang) but also obstruct China's expansion southwards. 27 While India is wary of China and its special relationship with Pakistan, China is suspicious of New Delhi's strategic partnership with the United States and other countries including Japan and their implications for China's security.28 Washington looks upon Beijing as a challenger, actual or potential. And Beijing suspects that the United States is bent upon forging a new alignment of forces in the Asia Pacific region to undercut Chinese position and influence.29 While Beijing and Washington seek a 'constructive' and 'cooperative' engagement, beneath the surface there is an undercurrent of tension resulting from mutual perceptions. Commenting on the defence cooperation agreement signed by India and the United States on June 28, 2005, for example, the state-run Global Times expressed apprehension that the agreement might be part of Washington's scheme of things to form an alliance network to guard against China.30 In an article in Beijing Review after former US President George Bush's visits to India and Pakistan, Zhang Lijun had commented, “India is the best bet to restrict a future strong China, as per US regional strategy in Asia.” 31 Worth noting in this connection is that the US Defence Department's Third Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), released in February 2006, mentioned India as a key strategic partner while projecting China as a potential rival. 32 Chinese leaders have not failed to notice recent statements by American officials considering the relationship with India as a 'priority' for Washington. The Obama administration, for example, has repeatedly described the relationship as 'one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century for the United States'.33 The Chinese leaders have taken these statements even more seriously in view of their own assessments of the new American 'pivot to Asia' strategy. 34 New Delhi has tried to reassure Beijing, but to no avail.

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Notwithstanding the Indian security concerns arising out of China's rapidly increasing economic and military might, the importance of China in the eyes of India and the world has only increased. While the Indian leaders do at times openly voice the concerns about China's moves, 35 the self-restraint exercised by them and the care taken to downplay border violations and other prickly incidents should not be overlooked.36 However, with problems still remaining, the question is whether distrust, embedded in the mindsets of the two countries will be the final word in Sino-Indian relations.

How Best to Manage the Vital Relationship? Former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran emphasised the need for a diverse diplomatic tool-kit to deal with the challenges posed by China. Articulating India's policy on China, Saran said, 'We should avoid being proactive, even while we seek to expand our own strategic space. Nervous articulations of a threat can trigger mirror-image and hostile perceptions on the other side. There is no inevitability of conflict with China.'37 Arguing for a nuanced policy on China, Saran said that India should concentrate on building its economic and military capabilities, which would help it deal with the challenges.38 Having quite often faced criticisms for its seemingly naïve attitude towards China, India has developed a more hard-headed realist approach towards its Chinese neighbour, 39 entering into a strategic partnership founded on common reservations about the supposedly 'peaceful' rise of China's, pursuing a Look East (now renamed as Act East) Policy, intensifying ties with the ASEAN member states, and other countries like Australia, Japan 40 and even Mongolia.41 India is strengthening its strategic links the countries on China's periphery.42 India's evolving Asia strategy reflects the desire for an arc of partnerships with China's key neighbours - in Southeast Asia and further east along the AsiaPacific rim - and the United States that would help develop counter-leverages of its own vis-à-vis China.43


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The following are among the measures adopted by India to deal with the perceived threat from China: Addition of two specialized mountain divisions with a combined strength of about 80,000 troops for 'rapid reaction force capability in the mountains', planned upgrading of road networks in the mountain regions, for developing the region and also facilitating military supply chains, forward deployment of Russian-built Sukhoi fighter jets and revival of a number of landing grounds, developing robust longand short-range missile capability, and acquiring capabilities for counter the Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean 44 India should stay on course in its efforts to move up the power ladder to be able to take a firm stand against China as and when necessary, keeping in mind at the same time that it has strike a balance between being too defensive and too offensive. New Delhi clearly realises the importance of seeing to it that the channels of communication with Beijing are kept open and confidence building mechanisms are in place to guard against unwillingly putting the relationship with China in jeopardy. If China is much stronger today than in the past, it has become even more important and necessary for countries the world over including India to deal with China and somehow manage the vital relationship.45 A clear evidence of this is the flurry of official, ministerial and summit level exchanges covering issues from border disputes to closer economic and political ties.46 To quote Aarti Betigeri, 'While China's neighbours might be keen to curtail its ... ambitions, they are also trying to engage with the country and retain good relations.' 47 The two countries are fully conscious of the need to be cautious and careful in ensuring that the process of constant engagement does not founder on the rocks of deep-rooted mistrust and largely negative mutual perceptions. 48 Not surprisingly, both India and China realise the need for damage control during tense situations arising from time to time.

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While Prime Minister Narendra Modi was forthright in raising the issue of 'repeated incursions' with his Chinese counterpart during the latter's visit to India in September 2014, he himself said that the Sino-Indian relationship was 'filled with vast opportunities.' 49 Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal also quite relevantly has pointed out, 'We have preferred to speak about areas where we have common interests'. 50 Prime Minister Modi does understand the important role that China could play in his plans for the Indian economy. For China and no less for India, the first priority is peace in its neighbourhood without which the goal of economic development cannot be attained. The Indian prime minister may have succeeded in giving a positive push to the perceptions about India-China relations on the street, but the challenge, as Manoranjan Mohanty rightly argues, is to build on this to address the long festering border dispute and engage China in the developing major bilateral and multilateral partnerships. 51 The opportunities are immense but the key question is whether the leadership of both countries can rise above history. 52

Conclusion China is important to India in more ways than one. Time has come to ground our China policy in terms of our long term interests. In the new millennium China's importance and international standing is bound to increase and so will India's. Finally, coming to the need for a rethink over our policy towards China, is it not necessary to take a long term view of national interest and strive for a relationship with our largest and most important neighbour based on the stakes we have in the relationship? We would also hope that China in its own interest would do the same. Both sides have everything to gain from improved bilateral ties, which will also be a bargaining chip in dealing with threats to our security.53 As Alka Acharya rightly observed, 'The problem of mutual suspicion must be addressed concretely and substantially by both.' 54


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To conclude with Surjit Mansingh's appropriate observation on the future of Sino-Indian relations, '...the picture is a complex mix of cooperation and competition. As both China and India continue their thrusts toward economic growth and military modernisation at different speeds, and are accorded progressively higher status by other powers, the outcome of their interactions is unpredictable. It is unlikely to be as dismal as some fear or as bright as others would hope.' 55

End Notes: 1

Rabindra Sen, 'Sino-Indian Relations: Dead Weight of Old Mindsets or Opening of New Vistas', in K. Raja Reddy (ed.), Foreign Policy of India and Asia-Pacific, New Century Publications, New Delhi, 2012, p. 339.

2

Strategic Digest, vol.36, no.8, August 2006, p.994.

3

News From China (Embassy of the People's Republic of China, New Delhi), vol. XXV, no. 3, 2013, p. 4.

4

Harsh V. Pant, 'India in the Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China', Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, p. 57.

5

An occasion of great importance was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in1988. In the first part of the last decade, an apparently forward movement in bilateral relations in fact led Alka Acharya to point out that Sino-Indian relations were on the verge of a qualitatively new phase of understanding. See, Alka Acharya, 'Climbing Down', The Economic Times, November 17, 2006.

6

According to Mohan Malik, the two countries are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country seeing its actions as defensive, but the same actions appearing to be aggressive to the other. Mohan Malik, 'China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare', http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india-todaydiplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare (Accessed August 14, 2015). For a discussion of the Chinese responses to India's bid for permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council and the Indo-US nuclear deal as test cases for studying the Sino-Indian mutual perceptions see, Sen, n. 1, pp. 340-49.

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7

See, Iskander Rehman, 'Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India's CounterContainment of China in Asia', Asian Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 2009, p. 115. Trade volume has risen from a paltry $350 million in 1993 to $70 billion in 2012, and is projected to surpass $100 billion by 2015, but there is still no strategic congruence between China and India. Malik, n. 6. India suffers a trade deficit of almost $ 40 billion with China. See, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-narendramodi-to-visit-china-in-may-external-affairs-minister-sushma-swaraj/ (Accessed August 14, 2015). Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has said that India has sought increased market access for pharmaceutical, agricultural and software services to bridge the trade deficit. Ibid.

8

Malik, n.6.

9

Ibid.

10 Iskander Rehman has argued that 'China has engaged in a policy of containment of India, challenging its regional pre-eminence in South Asia and stymieing its emergence as a major world power.' See Iskander, n.7, p. 114. Harsh V. Pant also is of the opinion that China's foreign policy is aimed at enhancing its economic and military prowess to achieve regional hegemony in Asia. Pant, n.4, p.56. Chinese cyberwarfare activities to probe Indian military establishments too are worth mentioning in this context. See, Vijay Sakhuja, 'India, China face off on long border', December 18, 2014, at http://asia.nikkei.com/print/ article/65966 (Accessed August 14, 2015). 11 Malik, n. 6. China wants to send out a message to the other nations that the 'Chinese Dream' is to work for a “harmonious world” and that it would not pose any threat to any country. However, western commentators doubt the official Chinese interpretations. See, Manoranjan Mohanty, 'Xi Jinping and the 'Chinese Dream', Economic & Political Weekly, September 21, 2013, vol. XLVIII, no. 38, p. 34. For an assessment of the 'Chinese Dream', also see, R. S. Kalha, 'An Assessment of the Chinese Dream: 2015', Strategic Analysis, vol. 39, no. 3, May-June 2015, pp. 274-279; and Pinaki Bhattacharya, 'China Unplugged! Poised to Reshape the Geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific', Strategic Analysis, vol. 38, no. 3, May-June 2014, p. 271. 12 Malik, n.6. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. Many Indians, of course, do not see China's emergence as a world power as automatically a bad thing. See, http://www.hindustan times.com/india-news/asiantigersmeet/india-china-quietly-strugglein-indian-ocean/article1-1266373.aspx(Accessed August 14, 2015). India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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15 Sakhuja, n. 10. 16 Iskander, n. 7, p. 122. 17 Vikas Bajaj, 'India Worries as China Build Ports in South Asia', at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/global/16port.html ?_r=0 (Accessed August 14, 2015) 18 Ibid. 19 'China and India are partners, not rivals, says Wen Jiabao', The Times of India, December 16, 2010, cited in Rabindra Sen, 'China's Shadow over India's Myanmar Policy', International Journal of East Asian Studies, vol.1, no.1, 2011/2012, p. 139. 20 Bajaj, n.17. Also see, Andrew Buncombe, 'Is India worried about China's influence in South Asia? Modi's first foreign trip suggests so', at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/is-india-worriedabout-chinas-influence-in-south-asia-modis-first-foreign-trip-suggestsso-9544094.html (Accessed March 7, 2015). Indian sea-power thinkers point to the prospect of a permanent Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. Abhijit Singh, 'China's 'Maritime Bases' in the IOR: A Chronicle of Dominance Foretold', Strategic Analysis, vol. 39, no. 3, May-June 2015, p..293. Harsh V. Pant, however, is of the opinion that China will have great difficulty in rivalling India in the Indian Ocean. Harsh V. Pant, 'China Shakes Up the Maritime Balance in the Indian Ocean', Strategic Analysis, vol. 36, no. 3, May-June 2012, p. 367. 21 'India, China in choppy waters over Indian Ocean dominance?', The Hindustan Times, December 7, 2014. 22 China's most ambitious regional initiative is the 'one belt, one road' project. See, Singh, n. 20, p. 300. There is also the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which also touches the Afghan border. Ibid. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has said that India was willing to extend 'synergy-based endorsement' to China's proposed Maritime Silk Route, and not a 'blanket endorsement'. See, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pm-narendramodi-to-visit-china-in-may-external-affairs-minister-sushma-swaraj/, n.7. 23 Bajaj, n. 17. 24 FM: China not seeking to contain India, (chinadaily.com.cn), at http://english.sina.com/china/p/2014/0909/735246.html (Accessed August 15, 2015) 25 'Chinese, Indian defense ministers hold wary meetings', Los Angeles Times, September 4, 2012, at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_ now/2012/09/chinese-and-indian-defense-ministers-meet-warily. html(Accessed August 15, 2015). 250



26 Malik, n. 6. 27 The US-Indian strategic engagement, coupled with India's expanding naval and nuclear capabilities and huge economic potential, have made India loom larger on China's radar screen. Ibid. 28 Rabindra Sen, 'Rising China and India-Japan Ties', in G. Jayachandra Reddy (ed.), India-Japan Relations: Culture, Religion & Regional Integration, UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati, 2014, p.186. 29 Ibid. 30 The Pioneer, July 21, 2005. 31 Zhang Lijun, “A Passage to South Asia”, Beijing Review, vol.49, no.11, March 16, 2006, p.14. Cited in Sen, n. 1, pp.345-46. 32 Cited in Sen, n. 1, p. 346. 33 Chidanand Rajghatta, 'Panetta to push India to partnership', The Times of India, May 25, 2012; cited in Rabindra Sen, 'China and India: Challenges in taking the Relationship Forward', IMI Konnect, vol. 3, no. 9, Winter Special Issue, 2014, p.10. 34 Ibid. 35 In 2010, under pressure to do some hard talking, the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself said, 'there is a new assertiveness among the Chinese...so it's important to be prepared.' Cited in Shashank Joshi, 'Why India Is Becoming Warier of China', Current History, vol. 110, no. 735, 2011, p. 160. 36 Iskander, n.7, p. 138. Both states have made efforts to reduce mutual tensions by setting up joint working groups, and signing a number of confidence building measures and memorandums of understanding on a number of issues. See, for example, Sen, n. 1, pp. 338-339. 37 The Times of India, September 10, 2009. Surjit Mansingh also thinks that the risk of large-scale military conflict between them in the near future is low. Surjit Mansingh, 'Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st Century: Friends or Rivals?', The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. XIX, no.4, Winter 2007, p.142. 38 The Times of India, n. 37. 39 Iskander, n. 7, p.125. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.,p.140. 42 Malik, n. 6.


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43 Ibid. In this connection see especially, Indrani Bagchi, 'PM's foreign map gets busier', The Times of India, February 25,, 2015. 44 Sakhuja,n.10. The present government has decided to nearly double the deployment of Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel on the India-China frontier, and shown urgency in expediting projects along the border. In his election campaign, Modi had promised a tough stance against both China and Pakistan. 'Modi's foreign policy: Tough on Pakistan, China at arm's length', http://www.rediff.com/news/column/modis-foreignpolicy-tough-on-pakistan-china-at-arms-length/20140626.htm (Accessed August 15, 2015) 45 Sen, n. 28, p. 195. By 2020 China seeks to double not only the 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) but also the per capita income to reach $4,000. Mohanty, n.11. China is predicted to surpass the GDP level of the US by 2040 and become the world's largest economy. Ibid. Commenting on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) promoted by China and which has drawn the support of many countries, including key American allies, Kishore Mahbubani has gone to the extent of considering it as an “epochal event”-one that heralds “the end of the American century and the arrival of the Asian century.” Cited in Srinath Raghavan, 'Modi's Opportunity in China', Economic & Political Weekly, April 25, 2015, vol. L, no. 17, p. 10. Raghavan, however, has expressed reservations about 'such grandiose claims'. Ibid. 46 For important visits of the leaders of the two countries since the 1990s, see Rabindra Sen, 'Sino-Indian Relations: Through the Prism of Nathu La', in Haraprasad Ray (ed.), India-China Interface and the Road Ahead, The Asiatic Society, Kolkata, 2012, pp. 214-217. 47 Betigeri, cited in Sen, n. 28, p.194. 48 Ibid., p.195. 49 Prime Minister Narendra Modi too wants China as a partner in India's development, negating the assumptions that his government would be less accommodating toward Beijing than its predecessor. Brahma Chellaney, 'Modi takes Indian Diplomacy to the big leagues', August 28, 2014, at http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/InternationalRelations/Modi-takes-Indian-diplomacy-to-the-big-leagues(Accessed August 15, 2015). It is important to note that Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj announced during her visit to China in February 2015 that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would visit China in the month of May and that he hoped to have an 'outcome driven' visit, especially on the crucial boundary question. See, n. 7. It has now been decided to set up a contact group comprising officials to deliberate on a range of issues, including trade and investment.

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50 See,n.21. Given the dominance of security concerns in our dealings with China, areas where India can usefully cooperate with China to enhance its own interests tend to be seen as peripheral. Of course, as Srinath Raghavan argues, the security dimension of our relationship with China cannot be wished away. Raghavan, n. 45, p. 11. 51 Manoranjan Mohanty, 'History Challenges Modi in China', Economic & Political Weekly, vol. L, no. 22, May 30, 2015, pp. 13-16. 52 Ibid. 53 Sen, n. 1, p. 349. 54 Acharya, n. 5. 55 Surjit Mansingh, 'India and China Today and Tomorrow', The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs. vol. 46, no. 2, 2011, p. 41.


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India: Wanted a China Strategy D.S. Rajan Director, Chennai Centre for Chinese Studies, Chennai Email: [email protected]

Abstract The new Indian government's readiness to continue the policy of 'engagement' with China is appropriate and sound. It should at the same time recognize that contradictions in Beijing's foreign policy are becoming sharper; national security interests have come to dominate China's external line and territorial assertiveness of China is giving rise to fears among neighboring countries. The situation imposes a demand on India to begin crafting of a holistic strategy towards China. For this purpose, an important requirement for India is to gain a full understanding of what the Chinese themselves think about their country's development and position in the world. While strategizing, New Delhi should not miss the firm resolve of China for never giving up its territorial claims against India. It should be alive to the possibility of future border conflicts with China in the background of latter's 'local wars' military concept.

All indications are that Prime Minister Modi government in India is going to continue its predecessor's policy of 'engaging' the People's Republic of China (PRC). Within a short time of taking over, it has taken initiatives to improve bilateral political, military and economic relations with Beijing; they have led to certain positive results; notable are the prospects that have emerged for establishment of Chinese industrial parks in India during the late June 2014 visit to Beijing of an Indian delegation led by Vice-President Ansari and for increased military contacts between the two sides at the time of the trip to Beijing of the Indian Army chief, Bikram Singh in early July 2014. Modi has met the Chinese President Xi Jinping at the sidelines of BrazilRussia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) summit held in Brazil in mid-July 2014. On its part, the People's Republic of China (PRC) lost no time in sending its Foreign Minister Wang Yi to meet India's new leadership; this taken together with a reported proposal for a visit to India by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 254



September this year , has signaled PRC's priority to strengthen contacts with the new regime in India. There are reasons to believe that the present bonhomie with Beijing as only a tactical phase in which the two sides find their interests, especially economic, converge. India seems to be far away from fully developing a strategic vision for itself, while China's future outlook already stands concrete and well documented. In any case, one cannot miss the divergence between India's long term view seen so far and the already firm and well documented China's postulates set to determine its future world position. Looking from India's point of view, the task for it to begin crafting a sound long term strategy towards China capable of handling such divergence, thus, assumes priority, especially noting the increasing contradictions in Chinese foreign policy and the emerging uncertainties in regional geopolitics, especially as an offshoot of the impending US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It needs to be acknowledged that New Delhi has already shown signs of change with respect to its China policy. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gave a hint to a revamping of China policy, when it, during the poll campaign, charged the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime of having been soft towards Beijing and the BJP leader Modi called upon China in his one of his poll speeches (Pasighat, Arunachal Pradesh, 22 February 2014) to shed its “expansionist mindset”. But was the previous UPA government really soft on China? At the best, it can be said that its China strategy has been subtle; as an indicator, former Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh combined his belief that India and China 'have enough space to flourish' with criticism (Washington, late 2009) of “certain amount of Chinese assertiveness” towards India. The UPA government also made some beginning in improving border military infrastructure. The new Indian administration can build up the tempo set by its predecessor. Prior to strategising, India should understand the basic thinking of the Chinese themselves on the rationale behind its current India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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foreign policy. Foreign policy statements coming from top levels in China provide clue that regard. What the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping has said (Speech delivered at a party Politburo Study session convened on 28 January 2013) are important. He declared that “China will never pursue its development at the cost of sacrificing interests of other countries …. We will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security or development interests”. The 18th CCP Congress document echoed the same spirit. It proclaimed that China's 'banner is to forge a win-win international cooperation'; at the same time it laid emphasis on making 'no compromises' on issues concerning 'national sovereignty and security of core interests'. Most significant has been the document's clarification that “the two aspects are pillars of Chinese diplomacy and do not conflict with each other” (People's Daily, 16 November 2013); this marks China's consolidated position on the subject which is now being debated throughout the world. Of particular interest has been the mention, undoubtedly exhibiting a high sense of assertiveness, that China “will never yield to outside pressure” and “will protect legitimate rights and interests overseas'; this has been noticed for the first time in a CCP congress document. One can see without ambiguity from pronouncements above, that China's external line has become core interest-based with assertiveness as key operative element. It is clear that the PRC has now transformed itself into an anti-status quo power. “The PRC will play the international role of a responsible, big country”, says Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ( Beijing, 8 March 2014).Explaining in broad terms, noted China scholar Harry Harding observes that China's quest now is for great power status and to achieve that goal it is deploying competing strategies (http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.in/2011/03/ three-competing-strands-in-chinese.html). The policy shift began 256



after 2008; before that Beijing's emphasis in international relations was on 'hiding one's capacities and biding one's time' (veteran leader Deng Xiaoping's famous 24-character maxim of tao guang yang hui). The change seems to have come about mainly due to China's confidence gained through its ability to achieve a sustained growth; also due to its conviction that the country's 'comprehensive national strength' has grown and hence in proportion to that, it should increase its influence over the world. Assertiveness also looks an offshoot of China's changed threat perceptions demanding high priority to sovereignty-related questions. Notable are observations of Lt Gen Qi Jianguo, China's Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in his article in Party journal 'Study Times' (22 January 2013) which is believed to be a study material for the military. The article listed five “risks and challenges” for China - “ the long term danger coming from Western subversive strategy of penetration and subversion , including use of military hard strikes” , “ domination of rightists in Japanese politics, Japan's changing self-defence policy into an 'outside oriented' policy, which would affect stability in East Asia”, “ involvement of great powers in South China Sea” , “ neo-interventionism”, i.e “ neocolonialism waving the banner of human rights” having implications for national sovereignty” and “ non-traditional security factors including cyber security, terrorism and energy security”. Added to the list are also 'financial' and 'outer space' threats (Maj Gen Luo Yuan, the Hindu, 28 June 2013). Prime Minister Modi has of late been seen highlighting civilisation contacts like visits of Buddhist scholars to India, for promoting bilateral ties; that is no doubt apt, but at the same time New Delhi, while making its China strategy, should note that civilisation aspects could also be behind China's current assertiveness, which affects India. As scholars see, questions of 'face' which are dominant in the Confucian ideas often make it impossible for China to compromise (Orville Schell and John Delury on China's Quest for Rejuvenation, http://artsbeat.blogs. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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nytimes.com, 16 July 2013). There could be a cultural root for China's territorial claims against India; well known also is the Chinese traditional 'Tian Xia' (Under Heaven) concept, stipulating that all territories belong to emperor who has the mandate of heaven to rule the entire world and rulers of territories outside emperor's control derive power from emperor. The Chinese traditional idea on peace (heping) contains 'unity of opposites' of idealism and realism; the idea while stressing peace, has simultaneously an aggressive connotation implying an option 'to rule or stabilize the world'. Giving a true picture on civilisation aspects are some authoritative views outside China: “China is a civilisation state pretending to be a state”, says noted Sinologist Lucian Pye (http://harvardpolitics.com /covers/ national-security-covers/rethinking-china/, 1 January 2013). “China judges all the states, at various levels of tributaries on the basis of approximation to China's political and cultural forms”, says Dr Kissinger (Book “On China”, http://www. c3sindia.org /india/2595, 4 October 2011). “China's inheritance is that of a Middle Kingdom with tributaries accepting its suzerainty and paying tributes in return for not being attacked”, says a comment in an Australian paper (http://www. canberratimes.com.au/ comment/a-realistic-approach-to-china-20130217-2el8d.html, 18 February 2013). On the other hand, Chinese scholarly views, offer somewhat a weak defence. According to them, the term 'tribute system' is a western invention devised around the nineteenth century (Chinese Journal of International Politics (CJIP, 2009- 2 (4): 545-574. doi: 10.1093/cjip/pop010). They say that SinoCentrism did not always demand foreign rulers' submission to China as vassals, even during periods of Chinese strength. The Tang, for example, did not insist on Japan's declaration of vassalage (http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/545. full). How are the peripheral countries in the region responding to China's core interest-based foreign policy? It is becoming clear that powers like Japan and South China sea littorals, having 258



serious territorial problems with China, recognise that there are contradictions in the PRC's policy and fear that the resulting increased level of Chinese territorial assertiveness with inclination to use force if necessary to settle disputes, can hurt their strategic interests. They along with US perceive that China's actions, backed by a strong military, are leading to a change in regional balance of power. On one hand, they are eager to have China as economic partner, on the other they look towards US as a balancer. India's response to China's regional assertiveness is muted. It has not taken sides on sovereignty issues in Asia-Pacific. There was only a general statement that “Major Powers are affecting economic-military balance in Asia-Pacific region”, without naming any country including China ( Dr Manmohan Singh at Combined Commanders meeting, New Delhi, 13 November 2013).The Modi administration can be more vocal on China. It is presumably taking note of the symbolic attempts of China to assert on the territorial issue; latest instances include the reported 15 July 2014 Chinese violation of Line of Actual Control in the Demchok sector of Ladakh, almost coinciding with Modi-Xi meeting in Brazil and the release of official boundary map in Beijing, though not a new practice, claiming overseas territories including India's Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. The latter has happened, while India's visiting Vice President Ansari was still in Chinese soil. As a sign of China's realisation of the need to improve its image abroad which has come to suffer from the policy of assertiveness, Beijing in the recent period has tried to redefine its international role through bringing forth three concepts - New Type of International Relations, New Type of Great Power Relations ( both 2013) and Asian Security Concept (May 2014). It has also mounted new diplomatic initiatives aimed at establishing connectivity with Asian nations- revival of the ancient Silk Road by establishing the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and construction of a new "Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century”. In essence, the concepts and initiatives reflected China's desire to have 'no India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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conflict' and cooperation with outside powers. The Asian Security concept incorporated China's 'commitment' to seek peaceful settlement of disputes with other countries over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. What should not be missed is the change in China's tone while promoting these concepts - instead of resorting to usual assertion that China will never compromise on core issues, Beijing now says that it will 'uphold principles and pursue interests” and that all nations should 'accommodate core national interests of each other' and “ properly handle differences”. They do represent some softpedalling, but in substance, definitely there is no change in China's position; it can be seen that the new moves have in no way precluded China's determination to assert on issues concerning territorial sovereignty. The bottom line therefore is that China can be expected to accord a dominating position to national security interests in its foreign policy formulation, wherever and whenever required. India should address the key question - how a strong and fully modernized China will behave in future and what will be the strategic implications for it? Power Transition theorists (Organsky, Koglel and Lemke) argue that a rising power when gets dissatisfied with status quo, will approach parity with the dominant state in a region or system with willingness to use force to alter the system. Others (Johnson) hold optimistic views that factors like economic interdependence, the likely high costs with respect to lost trade and foreign investment etc, will restrict the ambitions of a rising power. The debate continues, but at the best it provides a tool for India to assess China's strategic intentions. A brief mention has already been made about the convergence or divergence in visions of India and China. An elaboration may be appropriate. Based on documentary evidences, it can be seen without difficulty that the convergence is on two points (i) time set up for achieving development goals ( India to “transform” the country by 2020 as one of the world's first four economic powers - “India Vision 2020”, prepared by the Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC) of India's 260



Department of Science and Technology under the chairmanship of Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam; China to complete two “centenary goals”, i.e. “ the building of a moderately prosperous society and double China's 2010 GDP and per capita income of rural and urban residents by 2020 and turning China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious and realize the Chinese dream of the great renewal of the Chinese nation by the middle of this century”- Xi Jinping, Beijing, 15 May 2014) and (ii) the stated aims to work for a peaceful external atmosphere to suit their paths to economic development, both looking for mutual benefit through bilateral and global economic cooperation. There can at the same time be clash of strategic interests of India with China. Giving a clear picture on India's vision are the country's “Look East” policy and “extended neighbourhood” concepts as well as the BJP's election manifesto (talks about India's global strategic engagement “in a new paradigm and on a wider canvass, that is not just limited to political diplomacy, but also includes the country's economic, scientific, cultural, political and security interests, both regional and global, on the principles of equality and mutuality”). The Indian vision in essence is to create a 'multi-polar' Asia, with an inclusive, pluralistic and balanced regional architecture that ensures that no single power gets to set the agenda'. This goes against Beijing's apparent aim, to have a China-dominated regional order. Bilaterally, a clash of interests of India and China is visible on so many counts. The BJP manifesto, emphasises infrastructure development in India, especially along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. China is uneasy with any Indian border infrastructure building activity including addition of troops. It has at the same time been fast consolidating its defence strength in Tibet. India-China clash of strategic interests can also be seen in East Asia; China considers this area as its own backyard and is wary of New Delhi's increasing economic and military ties with Vietnam and other countries in the region. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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So, what factors should India take to determine its China Strategy? (1) Undoubtedly, deciphering Chinese intentions on the boundary issue should get its priority. New Delhi should understand that China genuinely believes that Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin belong to her, that it rejects the McMahon line viewing territorial problems with India as ones left over by history and shows no inclination for a real compromise with India despite its rhetoric in favour of 'mutual accommodation'. An authoritative article (Wu Yongnian, Liberation Daily, a Chinese language party organ, 25 October 2012) recommended that to “establish peace and stability in the border, India and China should seek to establish a zone of economic development in Southern Tibet and work together for more than next 10 years, so that a final solution to the boundary question can be reached”. India should not get confused by such Chinese opinions which on the surface look flexible, but in reality as 'propagandist' intended only to show the PRC in favourable light on the border issue. To understand the Chinese mind, relevant from India's point of view could be Chinese views of their 'historically lost' territories, though they do not mean Chinese claims now. Beijing connects the country's external boundary as existed during Qing dynasty period to the contemporary borders. The maps published in the PRC in end eighties and in first decade of the century encompassed vast areas belonging to neighbouring countries (The Historical Atlas of China, 1982-1987 and History of China's Modern Borders, vol. 1, 2007). Parts of India's Northeast and Andamans were shown in the maps as 'historically lost territories' of China. The possibility or otherwise of China using force to recover claimed territories should also figure in Indian calculations. Forceful recovery of 'Southern Tibet' (as China calls Arunachal) and fighting a 'partial war' with India were topics in the Chinese blogs some time back. China's use of force to turn territorial

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conditions in its favour has precedence. Beijing launched 'counter attacks in self-defence' against Vietnam, India and former Soviet Union in 1979, 1962 and 1969 respectively. In the current period, China is indulging in a show of force in East and South China seas. For New Delhi, also important would be to note that China's 'Active Defence' strategy set for the PLA, the agency tasked with protecting national sovereignty, does not rule out the armed forces resorting to 'offensive operational postures'. The PRC is also visualizing 'local wars under informatisation conditions'. The belief is that such wars can be short and happen in China's periphery, enabling Beijing to realist limited political objectives. It would be at the same time a mistake to think that China's 'use of force' as part of its assertiveness now might inevitably lead to 'wars', which may jeopardize maintenance of international and neighbourhood peace, a sine-qua-non fixed by China for its development. Discussions in some of the writings in China by influential scholars are ruling out a war option. One, written by Liu Yuan, Political commissar, PLA General Logistics Department, says (Huan Qiu Shi Bao, 4 February,2013), “ in the strategic opportunity period (16th CCP Congress described it as first 20 years of this century), make sure that war is last option. Economic construction should not be allowed to get interrupted by accidental warfare. But we should not rule out hand for a hand. Deng Xiaoping, at periods of strategic opportunity in 1979 and 1983, had to fight battles. So, in this period, the test is whether we can endure and wait till enemy strikes first blow”. India should also be alive to China's showing its assertiveness in certain subtle ways. Up gradation by China of status of Sansha city in Hainan as a base point to administer the disputed Paracels could be of symbolic importance to it. How about China setting up a base point in Tibet, say in Cuona prefecture, to administer Arunachal? Other subtle ways include, opening disputed territories under Chinese control for tourism and broadcast on weather in the contested areas in national TV network. Will China include “Southern Tibet” in its weather broadcasts? India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Cartographic attempts to press territorial claims are another case in point. Notable is the stamping of Chinese map on passports showing India's Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as Chinese territories; it included South China Sea with the nine dashed lines to claim Chinese sovereignty and include Taiwan as China's territory. The latest example is the release in June 2014 of a new Chinese 'full' official map showing Beijing's claims over territories abroad including in South China Sea and India's Arunachal along with a declaration that there are no 'primary and secondary' Chinese territorial claims (“ New Map Stretches to Stress South China Sea Claims”, http://chinadigitaltimes.net /2014/06/china-unveils-new-map-south-china-sea/, 26 June 2014). This completely destroys the impression in some quarters now that at the moment China gives priority to 'bigger' South China and East China Sea issues, not to 'smaller' ones like the boundary question with India. For China, all territorial issues are of equal value. In a nutshell, India's strategy on the boundary issue should be based on caution. It should continue the border talks, but without expecting any breakthrough in them. Its long term plans should take into account the likelihood of future border conflicts with China and it should continue to build its defence preparedness as an insurance against any misadventure by China, howsoever it looks illogical at present. (2) The nexus between China and Pakistan, two nuclear states, naturally emerges as the next major determinant of India's strategy towards the PRC. The 'all weather' ties between them are likely to get further strengthened in future. Pakistan, not sure of the support from the US, a declining world power, may like to rely more and more on China's political, economic and military support. On its part, Beijing has come to a stage requiring it to do a balancing act between Pakistan and India. While it may need Pakistan with respect to energy requirements and safety of sea lanes of communication, its importance of India as a partner, in the fields of economy and global affairs is also growing for valid 264



reasons. Beijing may choose to come closer to India on counter terrorism particularly in the context of presence of Jihadi elements in Pakistan supportive of Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang. So, over all, the picture seen so far on China using Pakistan as a strategic counter weight against India may undergo a change. India's strategy should be in the way of encouraging such a change, with an eye on neutralising the existing 'two fronts' security threat. Dialogue with Pakistan must also be carried on by India with may go to soften the negative impact coming from the nexus. Modi's invitation to his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif augurs well in this connection. If China persists with its policy to use Pakistan as a proxy to apply pressure on India, New Delhi can follow a counter strategy; China will sit up and notice if India revisits its Tibet and Taiwan policies. One wonders whether the invitation extended in India to Tibet and Taiwan personalities for attending Prime Minister Modi's swearing in ceremony, is a signal to China in this regard. (3) New Delhi should understand that economic links alone cannot improve its ties with Beijing. It should address the question as to why China-Japan security ties have come to suffer now, despite their economic closeness. (4) The new regime in India, will aim to nurture a policy of 'strategic autonomy' for the country, as the BJP's election manifesto suggests. Nevertheless, it should realise that India alone cannot counter balance China' s rise and help from other China-wary regional powers like Japan and ASEAN nations would be necessary. As said earlier, these powers definitely look for economic benefits in their ties with China, but at the same time consider strong relationship with the US, may be India too, as a balancing factor. For India also US relations are important; US assistance can increase India's military potential to meet challenges from China. But it would be prudent for India to ensure that there is no 'ganging up' of powers against China; it should at the same time become a key player in Asia-Pacific,


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playing a stabilising role in participating in multi-lateral mechanisms for setting up an open and inclusive regional order. (5) India should set its own house in order, leading to it becoming strong and self-sufficient nation economically. It should try to fill up the existing strategic gap with China. The PRC's economy is now four times bigger than that of India and there is a big military asymmetry between the two nations. (6) New Delhi's strategy should be in the direction of taking advantage of demographic dividends in the country; China's working age population is dwindling. To conclude, India's policy should continue to aim at 'engaging' China; the country however lacks a strategic culture. Remedy lies in India's ability to respond to China's rise by way of forming a long term outlook, which can ensure its strategic interests. But that can happen only when China's strategic intentions are properly understood by India.

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Insurgencies in Northeast India and the Role of China G. Jayachandra Reddy1 and M. Sasikala2 1

Professor and Director, Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati 2 Research Scholar, Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati Corresponding author: [email protected]

“China, in fact, holds the key to the availability of weapons and ammunition among the terror groups in Northeast India that is actually keeping insurgency alive in this far-eastern frontier”.1 Wasbir Hussain

Introduction India has been challenging by two major security issues, since its independence - Kashmir international border issue on the northwestern part and the insurgency issue of north-eastern part of India. Both are entirely different in their nature but perennial, complicated and unanswerable within the immediate future. This paper deals with the insurgencies in northeast India and tries to trace out the involvement of China. The seven states of northeast India has been known for its rich and untapped natural resource base. Moreover, this region has also been considered as the gateway to the Southeast Asia with its strategic and geographical location. Thus, this region has been playing a significant role in different ways in formulating government policies both at national and international level. Northeast has becoming a major concern in establishing good contacts/relations with Southeast Asia through India's 'Look East Policy' now it is otherwise called as 'Act East Policy'. In view of these reasons, researchers or policy makers use to consider this region is a 'hub of socio-economic opportunities' or 'hub of ethnic complications' or 'hub of strategic pursuits'. In fact, the geography of northeast India has been posing a major challenge to the policy makers to look at it with great political vision. The political desire of developing this region has been hampered with its


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geographical isolation or difficulties. One of the major challenges is that this region has no easy access to the other parts of India. Moreover this region has the better access to Myanmar and China than India (except Assam). More than 70 per cent of geographical area is under mountains, nearly 90 per cent of population from rural areas. A variety of drainage pattern and series of mountains are the major source of life for as many as 350 communities who belong to many tribes and languages. Therefore, northeast is often describes as 'Asia in miniature' where the brown and yellow races living together.2 The region covers a geographical area of 2.55 lakhs sq.km, which is just 7% of the total country's area. It is connected to India just by a narrow corridor known as the 'chicken neck' between Nepal and Bangladesh. In addition to these geographical limitations the entire region has been controlled by some tribal groups. The infighting among tribal groups has been still continuing because of poverty, low per capita income, less infrastructural facilities and lack of faith in political leadership. In addition various ethnic factors, forest cover, hilly terrain, networking among militant groups, availability of porous international border with Bhutan, China, Bangladesh and Myanmar and involvement of foreign agencies have made the situation more complex. Because of these reasons the insurgence activities in this region has been unstoppable. Bangladesh and Myanmar have been the key transit routes through which small arms made in China reaches the Northeast. The major channels in Myanmar are the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). These two ethnic insurgent groups have acted as the interlocking chain for the illegal weapons flow from Yunnan in China via Myanmar to Northeast India, but the most effective illegal weapons trader in Myanmar is another armed ethnic group, the United Wa State Army (UWSA).3 With this backdrop this paper attempts to analyse the insurgency activities and its related issues on one side and the China's connections with the insurgency and the means of support on the other. 268


Insurgencies in Northeast India and the Role of China

Economic Backwardness and Inherent Insurgencies Insurgency has become a serious political issue in the Indian history. As many scholars viewed that insurgency in northeast has been a protracted struggle, well organized manner, in order to achieve some of their interim objectives and finally to transform the present political and economic situation with a different regime. Insurgency has also been viewed as “an extra constitutional, competitively progressive and variegated struggle launched against the incumbent authority by a consciously mobilised section of indigenous masses for the fulfillment of certain conceptual goals manifesting emancipation."4 It may be a difficult task to pick up a specific point or reason as a root cause for the insurgency but broadly the contribution of its geography, demography and socio-economic factors together to some extent. The population growth of this region has exceeded two hundred per cent between 1951 and 2001, indirectly creates more pressure on livelihood where the resources are limited to expand the economic activity.5 The tribal population of the country, as per 2011 census, is 10.43 crore, constituting 8.6 per cent of the total population, 89.97 per cent of them live in rural areas and 10.03 per cent in urban areas. The decadal population growth of the tribal's from Census 2001 to 2011 has been 23.66 per cent against the 17.69 per cent of the entire population. Generally, in Indian context schedule tribes have been considered as one of the most backward community. Such is the case, high concentration of tribal population has been noticed from northeastern states (table 1). Highest 94.5 per cent of tribal population has been noticed in Mozoram and the lowest being 12.4 per cent in Assam. It is interesting to note that the least percentage of tribal population of 12.4 per cent from Assam is also higher than the national average of 8.2 per cent. Out of seven states only three states like Assam, Manipur and Tripura are having less than 50.0 per cent of tribal population and the other states having extremely higher than 50.0 per cent. It is understood India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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that the high concentration of tribal population leads to missing the thread of development on par with the other parts of the country. Table-1: Tribal Population in North East India (2001) State Arunachal Pradesh

Total Population

ST Population

% of STs

1,097,968

705,158

64.2

26,655,528

3,308,570

12.4

Manipur

2,166,788

741,141

34.2

Meghalaya

2,318,822

1,992,862

85.9

Mizoram

888,573

839,310

94.5

Nagaland

1,990,036

1,774,026

89.1

Tripura

3,199,203

993,426

31.1

1,028,737,436

84,326,24

8.2

Assam

All India

Source: Census of India, 2001, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India

Some tribes are small and others numerically strong. The Adis are 26.9 per cent and the Nishi 21.74 per cent of the Arunachal tribals while the Aka are only 0.63 per cent. The Mishing are 11.24 per cent and the Boro-Kachari a third of the Assam tribals. The Garos are 50 per cent and the Kasi 47 per cent of the Meghalaya population. The Mizos are 87.3 per cent of the tribals in their State. In three States tribals are more than 80 per cent of the population and in one, two thirds. But their proportion is low in the populous States of Assam, Manipur and Tripura. The Bodo-Kachari, numerically a third of the tribals in the northeast, is only 3.7 per cent of Assam's population. Besides, the proportion of tribals has changed in Tripura from 56 per cent in 1951 to around 30 per cent in 2001.6 Another group in conflict is the more than 40 lakh advasis whom the British brought to Assam from Jharkhand in the 19th century to work in the tea gardens. They are not included in the Schedule Tribes and most of the other tribes oppose their inclusion for fear that the inclusion such a big group will lead to competition for the few jobs available and for the depleted natural resources.... The 270



urban centres where economic decisions are taken, are dominated by non-tribals, mostly from outside the region.7 The brief narration of the distribution of tribal population and their economic status strengthens the general argument that the backwardness has been a direct factor which gives an opportunity to perpetuate the insurgencies in this region.

Roots of Insurgencies There are a good number of major and minor groups established by themselves with a variety of objectives. If chronology has been considered, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) will be in forefront. Ukhru, Nagaland being its headquarters which was established in 1946. Angamin Zapu Phizo began his secessionist movement for an independent homeland for the Nagas. In the course of time the operations have been extended to Senapati, in and around Dimapur, the capital city of Nagaland to some extent to Tamenglang parts of the state of Manipur. Over the period and leadership disputes, now the NSCN has been divided into two groups like NSCN(M) headed by Muivah and Isaac Swu mainly considering the Indian Nagas and NSCN(K) has been a group of Burmese Nagas, S.S. Kaplang as its leader. In 1956, Angami Zapu Phizo, who started the first tribal insurgency in the country, went into exile in Britain, via the erstwhile East Pakistan, from where he led the Naga bush-war against New Delhi until his death in April 1990. Phizo's successors in the Naga movement, as also a multiplicity of other separatist militancy, have also long operated from outside the India. It is true that historically the region has witnessed high levels of violence, particularly armed insurrection and political violence directed, in equal measure against settlers, against different ethnic groups and the authorities, stemming mostly from ethnic and state subjugation. Insurgency has taken a toll of thousands of lives, both of security forces and citizens, as is clear from the table2. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Table-2: Incidence of Violence in the North East Head

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1335

1312

1332

1234

1332

1366

Extremists Killed

572

571

523

404

405

395

Security personnel Killed

175

147

90

110

70

76

Civilians Killed

660

454

494

414

393

309

Incidents of Violence

Source: Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs, 2006-07

The Naga National Council, which had been the predominant group for nearly four decades, splintered after several leaders refused to accept the Shillong Accord. In 1980, Muivah, Swu and SS Khaplang, a Hemi Naga from Myanmar, broke away and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). With renewed backing from China and to some extent, Pakistan, the NSCN became the most lethal and feared insurgent group in the restive northeast till the emergence of the ULFA in the 1980s.8 But in 1988, the NSCN split into two - the IM faction led by Swu and Muivah and the K faction led by Khaplang - after a failed attempt to assassinate Muivah. This led to bloody internecine clashes as both factions sought to establish their dominance in Nagaland. Rebels from northeast India killed at least 20 Indian soldiers and injured 11 in an ambush in the Indian state of Manipur, near the India-Myanmar border. It was the deadliest single attack on the Indian army in the first decade of 21 Century. But in late March, the armed National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), or NSCN(K), broke its 14-year-old ceasefire with the Indian government. Since then, NSCN(K) and its allies have launched a series of attacks that have killed at least 35 Indian security personnel. It indicates that NSCN(K) chairman S.S. Khaplang is trying to show India the consequences of sidelining his group over the past decade in peace negotiations with rival Naga insurgent groups.9 In retaliation Special Forces of the Indian Army carried out a surgical strike on 30 June 2015, inside Myanmar, slaying about 15 insurgents of the groups believed to 272



be responsible for the deadly Manipur ambush. It is a good development in fighting against the insurgency activities with the support from Myanmar. Major General Randhir Singh said, as quoted Zee News, that “we are in communication with Myanmar authorities and we have traditionally had close relationship with Myanmar Army,”10 The British connection to the NSCN existed from the early days of Naga National Council. Phizo, the mentor of both factions of the NSCN, had led the charge against the Indian government, spearheading well-concerted guerrilla warfare. International connections exist also to the Shan Independent Army of Myanmar, the Karen Independent Army of Myanmar, and the Burmese Communist Party of Myanmar. Also, NSCN reportedly received $1.7 million from the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) to buy arms from Thailand and Singapore recently. No further detail on this transaction is available.11 In recent years, the NSCN is avoiding direct confrontation with the Indian security forces. The NSCN is now deeply involved in spreading its network throughout Northeast India, and is battling the Kuki National Army. This could be a temporary phase, before the NSCN launches a much wider campaign engaging many small groups it has set up. The NSCN(M) is continuing to terrorize civilians, extorting large sums of money from them. The NSCN acts as a private army for some mainstream state politicians, and provides them with large purses prior to the state or national elections. As a corollary, the NSCN issues threats to politicians who oppose the group actively.

China Factor The tribes inhabiting the Northeastern region of India share close historical, ethnic and cultural ties with the tribes in China, Tibet and Myanmar. Barring Khasis and Jaintias of Meghalaya, almost all hill tribes belong to the Tibet-Chinese fold and to the TibetBurmese family. It was this feeling of affinity toward the border people of erstwhile East Pakistan and Burma that led some of these tribal groups to turn toward their own stock rather than India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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toward the country they inhabited. The strategic location of the Northeastern India and the access to China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal, together with material and moral support of foreign intelligence agencies to these groups have facilitated insurgency in the Northeastern region. Safe sanctuaries to hide, material and moral support from the locals across the borders and the machinations of forces hostile to India fuel the insurgency.12 With the given geographical, cultural advantageous into consideration, China has been keenly observing and encouraging infightings among the tribes and against the Indian government. These external linkages have serious implications for the Government of India in dealing effectively with the menace of insurgency. Brands of insurgency or terrorism, whether actively promoted by foreign powers or furtively assisted by the parties having a stake in the destabilization of the country, have a tendency to cooperate and complement each other. In India's Northeastern region, insurgent outfits such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and both factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), fighting for independent homelands, have received assistance from the neighboring countries. The forms of assistance range from supply of arms and ammunitions and other logistical support of provision of a safe haven, camping and training facilities.13 From the early 1960s and throughout the 1970s, China was reported to be involved in rendering material and moral support to insurgent groups in the Northeastern India. The hostile nature of Sino-Indian relations in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino- Indian war was regarded as the main reason for China's anti-India stance and the resultant support to the outlawed insurgent groups. In May 1966, the Nagas approached the People's Republic of China for 'any possible assistance'. Subsequently, Isaac and Muivah, leaders of Nagaland National Council with a band of 300 men reached Yunan province in January 1967, where the Naga rebels were imparted with the knowledge of arms and guerilla tactics, 274



and they were indoctrinated in Maoism. With Chinese support the Naga insurgency became stronger and more intense with better tactics and modern weapons. “Naga rebels were the first to establish transborder contacts, in the early '60s. The 1962 Indo-China war only catalysed the process. Facilitated by Pakistani intelligence in Dacca, Kughato Sukhai, the self-styled Naga prime minister, wrote to Chinese leaders on May 29, 1963, alleging persecution and oppression by India. He exhorted China to “honour and follow their principle of safeguarding and upholding the cause of any suppressed nation of Mongolian stock”. In November 1966, China welcomed a 300-strong contingent of Naga rebels led by Thinusilie and Muivah. Trained, and laden with huge quantities of arms and equipment, the contingent returned in January 1968 and established a huge camp in the Jotsoma jungles. When Indian forces attacked it in June that year, they recovered Chinese weapons and incriminating documents”.14 Speaking in parliament on December 13, 2000, MoS, Home Affairs, I.D. Swami, said that a surrendered ULFA militant had disclosed that some of his colleagues crossed over into China via Bhutan and established contact with the Chinese Army in 1993.15 A news report of December 2000, quoting unnamed intelligence sources, said that a consignment worth an estimated US$750,000 reached Cox's Bazaar, a coastal town in Bangladesh at around the same time, another report claimed that an arms consignment had arrivedinMyanmaratatownnamedTamu,closetotheborderwithIndia.16 Wasbir Hussain, Executive Director, CDPS, Guwahati and former member of the National Security Advisory Board, India, has narrated a specific incident and a chain of links between insurgency groups and Chinese weapon manufacturers. The following statement reveals the extent and the range of network and weapons dealing: India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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“If one looks at the charge-sheet filed by the National Investigating Agency (NIA) on 26 March 2011 against Anthony Shimray, chief arms procurer of the IsakMuivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), it becomes clear that the insurgent group was actively buying weapons from Chinese companies. The FIR lists out the plan in detail and specifically says that Shimray, accompanied by a representative of another rebel group, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), visited the Norinco headquarters in Beijing. Norinco or the China North Industries Corporation, is one of China's largest State-owned weapons manufacturers. Bangkok-based NSCN-IM rebels paid USD 500,000 to Norinco and bought 1,800 weapons that landed at Bangladesh's Cox Bazar in 1996 and were transported onwards to Northeast India, to NSCN-IM and NDFB camps. Half of these weapons, of course, were seized by Bangladeshi security forces while being off-loaded.”17 “Around 2007, NSCN-IM faced desertion from its ranks with people going away with weapons. That was the time the outfit again decided to buy 1,000 weapons, mainly AK series rifles, light machine guns, sub-machine guns, pistols, rocket-propelled grenades etc. NSCN-IM approached another Chinese arms manufacturing company, TCL, and paid USD 1,00,000. The money was paid through a Thai arms dealer Wuthikorn Naruenartwanich alias Willy. The deal did not materialise due to the 'disturbed situation' in Bangladesh where the consignment was meant to be delivered. The NIA has electronic receipt of the payment.”18 It is an evident that Wang Qing, a Chinese spy and a TV reported was arrested and deported after she reportedly visited the headquarters of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-

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Muivah) or NSCN (IM). On this occasion Indian authorities said Qing admitted to being a spy for the People's Security Bueau, a Chinese intelligence agency, has also admitted that she conducted a secretive four-hour-long, closed-door meeting with Thuingaleng Muivah.19 Some significant details are about China's latest attempts at beefing up Paresh Baruah's 28 battalion of ULFA, with many Meitei groups for some fresh attacks in Assam. Authoritative security sources disclosed that the Khaplang faction of NSCN and elusive ULFA chief Paresh Baruah are playing the key role from their hideouts at Taga in Burma and that at least eight insurgent groups of Manipur have already joined hands. Many inputs about the Chinese connection came from Anthony Shimray of NSCN-IM and Raj Kumar Meghen of the UNLF arrested by National Investigation Agency (NIA), both of who had participated in meetings with Chinese intelligence agencies operatives following requests from both these groups for support including sophisticated weapons.20 There's a long history of Chinese engagement with Northeastern insurgents, and after a lull in the post-Mao era, such engagement seems to have picked up over the past decade. Media reports present a variety of forms of engagement. Rebel leaders have spent time on Chinese soil, met with leading Chinese intelligence officials, procured arms from China's shadowy arms markets, gathered intelligence for China in India, and even trained cadres on Chinese soil.21

India's Response It is true that the northeastern region shares certain common problems like ethnic unrests, insurgency, immigration, drug trafficking, communication gap etc. However, there are severe intra-regional differences in social issues and ethno-political aspirations. The region is, in fact, one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse regions in Asia and each state ha its distinct cultures and traditions.22


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On November 11, 1975, then Nagaland Governor LP Singh signed the “Shillong Accord” with six representatives of the Naga rebels in the capital of Meghalaya. The ambiguous nature of the agreement and the lack of support from hardline leaders like Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu meant the Shillong Accord did not lead to lasting peace.23 But there was some breakthrough in weakening the Naga movement and it was only a short gap. During this period, initially, China had stopped extending support to it, while the creation of Bangladesh meant the insurgents could no longer seek shelter in the erstwhile East Pakistan. The government established contacts with the NSCN-IM in the mid-1990s to explore the possibility of holding peace talks and Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao met Muivah and Swu in Paris in June 1995. Late Union minister Rajesh Pilot, an old northeast hand, played a key role in wooing the Naga rebels to the negotiating table during meetings in Thailand, where the NSCNIM leaders established a base and acquired several businesses. The NSCN-K too agreed to a truce with the government and began peace talks in 2000. However, the group ended the truce earlier this year and launched a series of attacks on security forces, including an ambush in June in Manipur that killed 18 soldiers. In 1993, China has come out with a promise to scale down their support to the Nagas and the Mizos. In High-level exchanges during the Vajpayee government, China promise not to assist Naga and Mizo insurgencies. The ULFA terrorists in Assam have procured arms from the Chinese Army.24 The present Modi Government at the Centre talking of a 'zero tolerance policy' on terror, something that has not been clearly articulated as yet. Going by New Delhi's diktat to the security establishment in Assam to go all out against the insurgents indulging in violence, in the wake of the 23 December 2014 massacre of around 80 Adivasis in the state by rebels of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Songbijit faction), one can assume that the Centre now is in favour of tough action to 278



neutralise rebels. The approach seems to have yielded good results because from 23 December 2014 to 31 January 2015, security forces engaged in stepped-up counter-insurgency operations against the NDFB (Songbijit) have arrested nearly 140 cadres, killed a top commander, and recovered nearly two dozen rifles, including sophisticated German HK 33 and US-make M 16 rifles and a range of AK series ones, most likely made in China.25 The historic peace accord signed by the government and the NSCN-IM on 3 August 2015 came nearly 40 years after another similar treaty inked in Shillong failed to establish peace. On this occasion, the NDA government has signalled its intent to be more accommodative towards the demands of the NSCN-IM, with Prime Minister, Narendra Modi describing this accord as what can be achieved when the two sides “seek to understand concerns and try to address aspirations”. This has given rise to hopes of a lasting solution in Nagaland.

Conclusion There is every reason to believe that unless the flow of small arms to the region is checked, insurgency cannot be eliminated or controlled in Northeast India. Any new anti-terror policy that New Delhi may formulate in the coming days would have to take this fact into consideration. More importantly China factor will also come into play, something that the Indian Government will have to confront. It is very much important to the Indian government to normalize the security situation in the Northeast that emerges as an important role in pursuing India's Look East Policy or Act East Policy. Therefore, New Delhi will have to devise a strategy to neutralise insurgency in the Northeast, and that strategy must not be considering not only to curtail weapons but it must be a comprehensive in nature targeting the socioeconomic wellbeing of the people of Northeast region. The Look East Policy announced by the Government of India envisages the North Eastern region as the centre of a thriving and integrated economic space linked to the neighbouring countries such as Myanmar and Thailand by a network of rail, road and India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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communication links criss-crossing the river. The policy tries to leverage the strategic geographical location of the region, with past historical links with Southeast Asia and its rich natural resources to transform this region vast potential into reality. However, this requires not only massive efforts towards infrastructure links but also a major improvement in the security situation. China's renewed interest in insurgencies in the north-eastern states cannot be wished away, coming as it does in the backdrop of its increasing aggressiveness, military activities in border areas, claims on Arunachal Pradesh and the links of the Maoists with insurgents in the Northeast. Engaging the rebels in talks will alone not suffice. New Delhi must display greater clarity of vision. Mistaking talks with insurgent groups as an end rather than a means to an end will push us into a self-made strategic trap.

References : 1. Wasbir Hussain, Insurgency in Northeast India: The Chinese Link, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, #4826, 2 February 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/insurgency-in-northeast-indiathe-chinese-link-4826.html 2. Pradeep Kumar Rai, 2009, Insurgency in Northeast India: Cross Border Connection, Scholar's Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.167-178. 3. Wasbir Hussain, Insurgency in Northeast India: The Chinese Link, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, #4826, 2 February 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/insurgency-in-northeast-indiathe-chinese-link-4826.html 4. V.K. Anand, 1981, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi. 5. ______Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, 2008, Seventh Report, Government of India, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi 6. Sen, Sipra, 1993, The Tribes of Tripura: Desription, Ethnology and Bibliography, Gian Publishers, New Delhi. 280



7. Walter Fernandes, 1999, The Conflict in the Northeast: A Historical Perspective, Economic and Political Weekly, No. 34, pp. 3579-3582. 8. Rezaul H Laskar, 2015, Naga accord: Will the 'framework agreement' end insurgency?, Hindustan Times, Aug 04, 2015, New Delhi, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/naga-accord-will-theframework-agreement-ensure-peace/article1-1376223.aspx 9. ______The Chinese Connection, Foreign Policy, 15 June 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/25/the-chinese-connection/ 10. ______ Zee News, 2015, Manipur attack: Indian Army hunts down insurgents along Myanmar border, June 30, 2015, http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/manipur-attack-indian-armyhunts-down-insurgents-along-myanmar-border_1610448.html 11. Madhu Gurung and Ramtanu Maitra, 1995, Insurgent groups in Northeast India, Executive Intelligence Review, Vol.22, No. 41, October 13, 1995, http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_ne_ india_groups.html 12. Pradeep Kumar Rai, 2009, Insurgency in Northeast India: Cross Border Connection, Scholar's Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.167-178. 13. Ibid 14. Ajit Doval, 2011, Remote Control Rebels, Outlook, Feb 7, 2011, http://www.outlookindia.com/article/remote-control-rebels/270225 15. The Indian Express, New Delhi, December 14, 2001 16. "The arms were reportedly to be handed over ultimetely to the NSCNIM", http://www.satp.org/news/december/news07.htm . 17. Wasbir Hussain, Insurgency in Northeast India: The Chinese Link, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, #4826, 2 February 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/insurgency-in-northeast-indiathe-chinese-link-4826.html 18. Ibid 19. Lyle Morris, 2011, Is China Backing Indian Insurgents?, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/is-china-backing-indianinsurgents/ 20. Anil Bhat, 2011, China as the Backup of NE Insurgents, Times of Assam, Nov. 23, 2011, https://www.timesofassam.com/headlines/china-asthe-backup-of-ne-insurgents/ 21. ______The Chinese Connection, Foreign Policy, 15 June 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/25/the-chinese-connection/ India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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22. Haopik, T. 2001. Conceptualising Northeast India: A Discursive Analysis on Diversity, Bangladesh e-journal of Sociology, Vol. 8. No. 2, pp. 109-120, http://www.bangladeshsociology.org/BEJS%208.2%20 Conceptualising%20Northeast%20India.pdf , accessed on 28 August 2015 23. Rezaul H Laskar, 2015, Naga accord: Will the 'framework agreement' end insurgency?, Hindustan Times, Aug 04, 2015, New Delhi, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/naga-accord-will-theframework-agreement-ensure-peace/article1-1376223.aspx 24. Pradeep Kumar Rai, 2009, Insurgency in Northeast India: Cross Border Connection, Scholar's Voice: A New Way of Thinking, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.167-178. 25. Wasbir Hussain, Insurgency in Northeast India: The Chinese Link, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, #4826, 2 February 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/insurgency-in-northeast-indiathe-chinese-link-4826.html

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Strategic Perspectives on India-China Relations: An Analysis *T.M.R Prasad and **I.Babu Rao *Junior Lecturer in Civics, S.P.W. Jr. College, Tirupati-517502.,A.P ** Post Doctoral Fellow, Centre for SEAP studies, S.V. University, Tirupati517502..,A.P. Email: [email protected].

India's foreign policy always respects the Principle of good neighbourliness or maintaining good relations with neighboring country. Gujaral doctrine strengthened this principles which was propounded by former Prime Minister I.K.Gujaral. “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” is popular slogan that indicates the friendliness and good neighbourliness between India and China which was strengthened by Panchasheel Agreement. India and China account for 35 % of world total population and 15 percent of total geographical area of the world. For more than two thousand years, they had a cultural, commercial, ideological link through Buddhism. Now India and China are the emerging superpowers of the world and they can make 21st century as an Asian century. Both China and India are two most important nations in Asia, the role and impact of these two Asian giants cannot be ignored in the regional politics of both South Asia and Pacific rim. They have succeeded to maintain their domestic and external relations peacefully, with some worring hiccups. Their decisions have influenced international affairs. Undoubtedly, both are the neighbouring countries, nevertheless, their mutual relations characterized by many irritants like, unresolved territorial dispute, Aksai chin issue, military policy, nuclear and missile proliferation, and so on. It is in this context, this paper analyzes on political and strategic relations between the two biggest nations in the world in 21st century. Friendly relations between India and China are necessary for peace, security and stability of South Asia in particular and the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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T.M.R Prasad and I.Babu Rao

world at large. But the relations are marked by a zig-zag pattern having a long history of ups and downs. The present relations between the two countries or so competitive, they could not be explained by any analytical frame work. The relations are characterized by conflicts and co-operations as well as like unresolved territorial dispute, Aksai-Chin issue, military Policy, Nuclear and Missile Proliferation and so on considerable consequences on the course of India-China relations.

Background India shares 4056 Km along borderline with China. Naturally, the border territory consists of glaciers, dense forests and isolated plateaus. This is extremely difficult for the alignment of the border at mapping, surveing or patrolling. During British rule in India, Sir Arthur McMahon took efforts to know both the natural boundaries, recognized and drew a line [1040 Km] in 1913-14 as the indicator of the border between India and China. But the Chinese formally do not accept the McMahon Line, as they call it as the result of British colonial legacy. This was one of the main causes of the India-China war in 1962 and China has occupied about 38,000 Sq Km of the India territory of Aksai Chin in Ladakh district of Jammu and Kashmir state.1 Later, on 26 June 1981, the then Chinese Foreign minister Huang Hua paid a trip to New Delhi, the first visit by a top Chinese leader after a gap of twentyone years. The two countries decided to resume discussion on border issues. The talks stated at Beijing and the two countries had eight annual border talks during 1980-88.2 In the first phase, seven rounds of talks took place between India and Chinese officials till these were discontinued following the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988, the two countries set up the Joint Working Group (JWG) on border issues.3 A Joint Working Group comprising military and technical experts was constituted to discuss in detail the final aspects of the border dispute. Both sides decided upon periodic meeting between military personnel in the border areas on a regular basis to ensure peace. The two sides 284


Strategic Perspectives on India-China Relations: An Analysis

agreed to work out a mechanism to deploy troops at a safe distance. The bilateral relations took a boost with the signing in 1993 the agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line Of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border area, and another agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the military field was signed in 1996.4 The JWG had 14 rounds of talks on boundary question during 1989-2003. But, with very little positive improvement in the border disputes, both countries were finding it difficult to discuss their problems. However, India and China continue to have an unresolved boundary dispute stretching nearly 4,000 Sq Km in the north. China occupies nearly 43,000 Sq Km of territory in Jammu and Kashmir and claims about 90,000 Sq Km territory, nearly the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh in the north east of India.5 On July 13, 2011, the Chinese patrols intruded into the Yangtse area of Tawang in the Eastern sector by scaling the 200 feet of the loose stones constructed on the India side. That issue may reflect on the deterioration of China's relation with India.

Aksai Chin Issue: Recent Debate The Aksai Chin region is administered by China under the Hotan prefecture in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang section of the road is 654.8 Km in length6. It is regarded as the highest traversable road in the world. The national road is of strategic significance to China, both as the only link to its military outposts on its remote far-western border and as the most feasible land connection between Xinjiang and Tibet. The repaving is part of a plan to upgrade road and rail infrastructure across the less developed western regions. While officials say the objective is to primarily boost development and bridge the gap with the more prosperous east, the plans have also stirred interest in India as they will widen the asymmetry in infrastructure across the disputed western section of the border. In the year 2010, the government opened a new rail link between Xinjiang and Tibet, shortened the distance between the two regional capitals, Urumqi and Lhasa, by more than 1,000 Km.7


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The government opened more than 5,000 Km of new highway in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in 2011, and will add 8,000 Km of railway lines in Xinjiang in the next Five-Year Plan.8 Besides, the joint working groups on the border issue and the joint economic group on economic and commercial issues, there are bilateral exchange in areas of science and technology, outer space, mining, a defence personnel and culture

China's Military Policy China has always formed military policies to defanged India's capabilities. The sole object of Chinese strategy was and still remains to exploit the Indo-Pak hostility to its advantage. If we look at China-Pak military assistance since independence of Pakistan, China has been major supplier of military weapons to it. After the Indo-Pak conflict in 1971, Pakistan alone received $ 1 billion aid from China. Owing to appeasement policy of China, it had denounced the emergence of Bangladesh and accepted the nascent state only after the fall of the Mujib government in a military coup. The Indian Express revealed on 30 December 1983 that the Pakistan Air Force had been strengthened during 1982-83 with the induction of Chinese A-5 and F-6 Air Craft belonging to Mig-19 genre. Finally, China had been supplying these aircraft to Pakistan since 1965, and by 1983 Pakistan had accumulated 200 of them.9 During the 1990s, the supply continued unhindered. When the US suspended the sale of 71 F -16 to Pakistan, China readily cooperated with Pakistan in the joint development of the FC1 fighter plane thought to be equivalent of F-16 and fitted with a Russian engine.10 This shows that China has taken interest in Pakistan military buildup to restrict Indian dominance in South Asian region.

Nuclear and Missile Proliferation After the nuclear explosion in 1998 by India and Pakistan, the South Asian region has come under nuclear threats. China had acquired this status in mid-1960s. The China's acquisition insisted 286



India to develop its own nuclear weapons. India took its first nuclear test in 1974 with a view that Pakistan would get or had been preparing under the leadership of China. This apprehension proved true when Pakistan took nuclear test in May 1998. So many world media reports blamed China to conceal nuclear support to Pakistan. The New York Times of 4 June 1998 pointed out that China provided blueprints for bomb, as well as highly enriched uranium and tritium, scientists and key components for a nuclear weapons production complex, among other crucial tools.11 More recently A. Q. Khan the father of Pakistan nuclear bomb' acknowledged the above China's assistance for Pakistan nuclear bomb. However, Chinese scholars have consistently refuted China's support in nuclear technology transfer to any country, but there is no doubt in the mind of international scholars that China's assistance to Pakistan is only with a view of' “India factor” clearly in mind.

Chinese Premier's Visit to India Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's three-day India visit (19th to 21st May 2013) was his first trip outside China after assuming office in March 2013. This in a way was indicative of Premier Li's desire to promote friendship and cooperative relationship with India, a rising economic power with possibility of being a huge market for Chinese products. More appealing reasons put forward by Premier Li for strengthening ties with India were their age-old cultural and civilization contacts. Premier Li stated about old contacts between China and India as “Both China and India have a long and great history that goes back thousands of years. The Chinese and Indian civilizations are amongst the oldest of human civilizations. They represent the two pillars of the civilization of the East. The towering Himalayas have not prevented them from mutual attraction and illumination”.12 He has also mentioned about Fahien and Huin Tsang, two eminent Chinese monks who visited India centuries


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ago crossing the difficult Himalayan range of mountains and were among those illustrious persons who wrote extensively about India and its people regarding their social, religious cultural activities.

The new Chinese president Top of Form The Chinese new president Xi Jinping likes to put forward the cooperative relationship with India. He has urged India to broaden military exchanges and cooperation between the armed forces and make good use of 'Special Representatives' mechanism to resolve the boundary dispute in a fair and rational manner. The Chinese president is also interested in enhancing people-topeople exchanges and cooperation, and expansion of youth exchanges programme. According to China, its ties with India is one of the most important bilateral relationships and entrusts itself to pushing forward the two countries' strategic cooperative partnership. He appealed for strengthening coordination and cooperation in different regional organization and universal organizations like United Nations, BRICS, and the G-20 for promotion of peace, stability and development in Asia as well as world.13 The solution of a problem through consultation and mutual discussion and not through violent means like war is a better option for the solution of complicated issues. If India and China work for avoiding the confrontation through mutual discussion and solve their ongoing problems through peaceful negotiations, it would be suitable for the needs and aspirations of both the countries When India and China talk the world watches and if the two countries talked in one voice the world will be forced to listen." This was the sentiment echoed by Chinese President Xi Jinping when he met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Fertilize in Brazil on the margins of BRICS Summit on 14 July 2014. This is the first highest level contact between the two countries since the new government came to power in New Delhi. The meeting was originally scheduled for 40 minutes but it went on for 80 minutes.

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In a significant move President Xi Jinping invited India to attend Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to be held at Shanghai in China in November this year. He also asked India to deepen cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Xi also told Modi that "China and India are long - lasting strategic and cooperative partners rather than rivals." Xi also noted that both countries are chasing the dream of "national rejuvenation" and he argued that working together will be the fastest way for both to achieve their goals. During the meeting both sides agreed to find a solution to the border question and till then maintenance of peace and tranquility on the border is essential. Modi told Xi that an amicable solution to the border disputes would set an example for the world on how to peacefully resolve conflicts. Xi called for negotiated solutions the border dispute with the India at an early date. This shows the changed Chinese attitude as hitherto it advocated the policy to solve the border problem and continue cooperation in other fields. Indian Prime Minister came up with two suggestions for strengthening people to people contacts between India and China. He suggested the addition of one more route for the Kailash - Mansarovar Yatra in view of the terrain difficulties and Xi accepted this as a suggestion for consideration. Modi also pitched for strengthening civilization links between India and China and stressed on reinforcing the Buddhist linkages. As for trade imbalance concerned, the Chinese president acknowledged that there were possibilities of enhanced trade in services from India, possibilities of expansion of Indian export and Chinese tourism to India as being areas of opportunities for deficit to be reduced.14 Ever since new government came to power in New Delhi, China is sending positive overtures to India to woo the new government despite Narendra Modi's repeated criticism of Chinese incursion into Indian territory during his election campaign. As a Gujarat Chief Minister Modi visited China several times to augment Chinese business investment in Gujarat. Chinese Prime Minister India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Le Keqiang was among the first foreign leaders to greet Modi on his election victory. Beijing is also aware of the huge majority that BJP got in the elections and does not suffer from any limitation of the preceding Manmohan Singh government. China is also aware of Modi's praise for Japanese technology and Modi's wish to visit Japan as his second foreign tour after Bhutan has irritated China. China is keen to outshine Japan by forging ties with new government in Delhi. Four high level exchange have taken place since Modi's ascent to power.

Chinese Foreign Minister in India First of all, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited India on 8-9 June 2014 where he held talks with Indian President, Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister. Trade and investment drove the first India, China talks under the new government. India and China Tiave set a target of $ 100 billion in bilateral trade a year by 2015. India expressed its concern over the vast trade deficit off $ 31 billion out of bilateral trade of 65 billion in the year 2013. India has asked for more investment from China into Indian infrastructure particularly in the railway sector.15 The two ministers discussed the next steps on the long standing border row as well as a roadmap for all the upcoming meeting between high dignitaries of the two countries. Mr Wang told that he came as a special envoy of Chinese President Xi Jinping who is scheduled to visit India later this year.

Vice President Hamid Ansari in China Year 2014 has been designated as the year of India, China Friendly exchange and sixty years of Panchsheel. Vice President of India Hamid Ansari visited China from June 26 to 30 2014, to commemorate 60 years of Panchasheel. During his visit the two countries signed a first ever Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to formalize the setting up of China - dedicated industrial parks in India with four such parks being considered an industrial park cooperation working group to finalise location and investment policies has been set up. Another MOU on flood data

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sharing off Brahmaputra river was also signed. The data will help India in flood forecasting. India provides money for maintenance of three Hydrological centres on the Chinese side. The data will be provided from May 15 to October 15 each year. The third MOU will help the two countries establish a framework for regular interactions between administrative officers to share experiences and learn from each others practices.16 As Vice President Hamid Ansari was in China, Chinese troops intruded into the Indian side of the Pangong lake in eastern Ladakh , aggressively underlining their claim over the disputed water body. South Block sources said that Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) boats came 5.5 kilometers into the Indian portion of the saltwater lake, the larger part of which lies under Chinese control in the Autonomous Region of Tibet. The incursion, which happened on June 24 and lasted over two hours, involved four high speed Chinese interceptor boats that were pushed back by Indian troops on US-built interceptor vessels.

India- China in the Global and Regional Scenario India and China have witnessed increasing level of engagement at world arena. Both have found some real convergence of interest on issues such as climate change, democratisation of international financial institutions through multilateral forums such as RussiaChina- India- Strategic Triangle, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); Brazil-South Africa-India- China- (BASIC), G-20, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS) etc. India is an observer at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation whereas China has observer status in SAARC. This multilateral Cooperation helps to strengthen bilateral ties. But China's strategic support to the countries of South Asia better known as 'String of Pearl' policy has raised doubts in India about Chinese intentions. The development of a number of strategic ports of South Asia, Like Gwadar in Pakistan, which is located at the mouth of the Sea of Hormuz. It is viewed warily by India as a possible launch pad for the Chinese navy giving them the ability to launch submarines and warships in Indian Ocean. But the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Chinese leaders deny such possibilities by saying this is not to contain India but to protect country's own ''legitimate economic interests" in the Indian Ocean. China has also announced nuclear reactor sale to Pakistan has stirred much frenzy in India. Bangladesh is also seeking Chinese assistance in developing road links. Railway lines, the Chittagong Port and the deep sea port at Sonadia island. China has also emerged as a major supplier of arms to Bangladeshi Armed Forces. The Bangladesh- China Defence Cooperation Agreement was inked in 2002, expanding strategic and military cooperation the Bangladesh Navy (Nau Bahini) is collaborating extensively with the Chinese Navy in acquiring missile boats, torpedo boats, gunboats and marine hunters. 17 China has evolved strong strategic and economic relation with Sri Lanka as well China has extended its support for major Sri Lankan projects such as the I.5 billion flagship Hambantota Development Zone, which includes international deep sea port, an oil refinery and an airport. Although the Hambantota Project is viewed as an engineering marvel is acknowledged that only the Chinese are capable of building such mega infrastructure projects. Indian analysts see the dual-use purpose if this project and interpret it as a clear sign of the growing strategic relationship between Colombo and Beijing. Moreover China has established military equipments and surveillance facility over the Coco Island of Myanmar which is mere 18 km away from India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands. China is the most important supplier of military aid to Myanmar and assisted to construct a naval base at Sittwe. A strategically important seaport close to eastern India's largest city Kolkata. Beijing also funds road construction linking Yangon and Sittwe, providing the shortest route to the Indian Ocean from southern China. The assertiveness of China in the region has propelled other countries of the region to enhance cooperation in order to balance Chinese might in the region. The US policy of Pivot Asia, the India-USA-Japan Singapore and Australia joint military exercises is also a step in 292



this direction. More recently the Japanese King Akihito visited India which helped to further strengthen ties with India. In diplomatic arena this is also construed to be a measure to counterbalance China in the region.

Strategic perceptions China's present strategy appears to focus on managing the external environment to ensure conditions conducive to its economic development. China's manufacturing industry has increasingly huge appetite for petroleum and raw material inputs sourced from all over the world including Africa and Latin America. Chinese goods are finding their way the world over. China's international relations appear to be mainly focused on retaining its status as a global economic power with the PLA safeguarding such interests. It has shown little hesitation in dealing with 'rogue regime' like Sudan and Myanmar to serve its purpose. As China looks increasingly to outside world for its growth and prosperity, and for an increasing role in the global power structure, its vulnerability increases. So from a nation drawing its strength land based forces, China is working to increasing its maritime capability. Protecting the 'Sea Lanes Of Communication' (SLOC), improving port infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan etc. Along the SLOC and keeping the seas free of piracy in choke points are all important for China's maritime security. To fulfil these obligations, we can expect Chinese naval presence in international waters to increase in the coming years. A second aspect is the Chinese perception of threats to national unity and internal stability. China's Defence White Paper 2008 makes a pointed reference to "Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and 'Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.18 China's promotion of SCO started with special focus on terrorist threat originating in the Central Asian and Afghan regions has relevance to this perception. Significantly the White Paper also talks of damages caused by increasing non-traditional security India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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threats like terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and information insecurity showing a clear understanding strategic security threats in the modern context. In consonance with these perceptions, the Pentagon Report 2010 "Military and Security Development Involving the People's Republic of China" identifies three components of PLA mission.19 These are providing guarantee of strength for the consolidate its rule, provide security guarantee for safeguarding the period of opportunity for national development and providing powerful strategic support. The PLA modernisation which has been going for a decade now has to be understood in this context. China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia. Beijing's Defence White Paper 2008 had described the 'increasing US military presence in AsiaPacific' as China's 'security concern.20 China's opposition to the US-led 'exclusive bilateral alliances in Asia - Pacific region, all left over by the Cold War' was highlighted by Lt. Gen Ma Xiaotian the Chinese delegate to the Shangrila 2009 Dialogue.21 The Pentagon Report 2010 "Military and Security Development Involving the People's Republic of China" presented to the U.S. Congress has expressed its concern on this count, particularly with reference to development of China's navy, missile and nuclear capabilities. So India's growing strategic convergence with the U.S. and the signing of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement has increased Chinese suspicions of India.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): Glosserman defines Confidence Building Measures (CBM) as the “both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, that address, prevent or resolve uncertainties among states, including both military and political elements”.22 These confidence measures contribute to a reduction of uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion and thus help to reduce the possibility of incidental or accidental war. There is a need for new Confidence Building Measures between China and India. 2 3 Firstly, the two countries should strengthen 294



communication and coordination to expand cooperation in international affairs. India and China should enhance coordination and cooperation within the frameworks of the United Nations, the G-20 and BRICS, among others and work together to address major global challenges such as climate change, energy and food security. Secondly, the two countries should maintain high-level contacts and increase political mutual trust. Two countries should also expand exchanges between their governments, legislatures, political parties and the military, strengthen strategic communication through various consultation mechanisms and carry out dialogues on new topics such as maritime cooperation. Thirdly; China and India should expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges so as to promote mutual understanding. Lastly, the two countries should properly handle their differences and work for peace and stability. They should push forward border talks in the spirit of peace, friendship, equality, mutual respect and return understanding so as to jointly safeguard peace and security on the borders.

Conclusion India and China are two neighbouring countries on a fast growth trajectory among newly emerging countries. It is well known that China's hardware and India's software are complementary. It is Chinese turn to help India to achieve permanent membership of the UN Security Council. This will generate tremendous amount of goodwill among the Indian people and the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" will come into effect in the real way. It is rightly said that 21st century belongs to Asia and both countries ought to make serious efforts to promote Confidence Building Measures to further consolidate their friendly relations.


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References : 1. Bhavana Pokharna, India-China Relations : Dimensions and Perspectives, New Century Publications, New Delhi,2009,p.45. 2. Ibid.,p.56 3. The Hindu, 29 November,2010. 4. Pradhan,R.D,Dragon's Shadow Over Arunachal ,A Challenge to India's Policy , Anmol Publications, New Delhi,2008,pp.160-1. 5. The Hindu 13 September ,2009. 6. Indo-China Border: The Current Situation, Accessed on 2012. http://rakeshvanamali.worldpress.com. 7. Ibid., 8. Zoravar Daulat Singh, Indo-China Relations The Border issue and Beyond, viva books,2009,p.41. 9. The Indian Express (Mumbai) 30 December, 1983. 10. The Hindustan Times (Mumbai),27 June,1995. 11. The New York Times, 4 June,1998. 12. “A Hand shake across the Himalayan”, The Hindu, 20 May,2013. 13. Press Trust of India,(PTI)28 March,2013. 14. www.indiatimes.com, 15 July 2014, www.livemint.org, 16 July 2014 15. The Hindu, New Delhi, 9 June 2014 16. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 28 June 2014 17. Srini Sitarman,, “Is South Asia Moving into the Chinese orbit and setting off Alarm Bells in New Delhi? Foreign Affairs Journal, July 19, 2013, Available at www.foreimpolicyjournal.com/2013/07 18. China's National Defence in 2008, Beijing, January 2009. 19. D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e , h t t p : / w w w . d e f e n c e . g o v / p u b s / pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf. 20. China's National Defence in 2008, Beijing, January 2009 21. Shangrila Dialogue 2009: 2nd Plenary Session on 30 May, 2009. 22. Brand Glosserman, “Cross-Strait Confidence Building Measures”, Issues and Insights, Vol.5,No.2, 2005. 23. http://ignca.nic.in / ks-41062htm

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Indian Ocean Region: A quest for supremacy between India and China MD Afroz Student at Centre for South Asian Studies, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry, India Email: [email protected]

Abstract As A.T Mahan an influential naval strategist said about the Indian Ocean region “whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate the Asia”. Throughout the history many super and regional powers tried to control the Indian Ocean region but none of them succeeded except the British. The growing energy concerns for both China and India and their heavy dependence over IOR (Indian Ocean Reason) has provided initiative to continue naval modernisation and advancement. Energy security, SLOCs (Sea Lanes of Communication) and naval advancement in region are interlinked. This paper therefore is an attempt to assess how Chinese expansion and presence in the region can challenge the geo-strategic and security equations. The paper will focus on how it can possess threat to the larger Indian interest in the region. Further it will try to focus on to what extent Chinese threat is real. Key Words: SLOCs, 1962 War, String of Pearls, Choke points.

Introduction Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean after the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean and one of the most strategically significant trade corridors in the world. With the land masses on all three sides, there are only three major entry points and all of them are strategically important. In the south-east entry point is Strait of Malacca; in the south-west the entry point is around the Cape of Good Hope and final in the north-west is the Suez Canal. There are also some important choke points in the region for example, Hormuz Strait, Malacca Strait, Baad-al-Mandheb and Suez canal, all of these choke points are strategically as well as economically very important particularly, The strait of Hormuz and The Malacca Strait for India as well as China due to their heavy dependence on West-Asian and Persian gulf region for their growing energy needs. As the both the countries are dependent India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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on reliable transport, even the temporary blockage of chock points can lead to a substantial increase in total energy cost and this incensement in the energy cost will undermine the development of both the countries. Hence, the disruption of energy flow is a huge security concern for both the countries. The Indian Ocean plays a vital role in global oil flow and maritime trade and almost all the power either regional or extra regional are keen to protect their trade interest in the region, and this complicated the security equation and challenged the stability of the region. Almost all the major global players are rushing to ensuring their presence in the region, which is posing challenge to the natural players of the region. Gradually the region is transforming into the new battle ground of twenty first century.

Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean and the String of pearls strategy Land lock nature of china in Indian Ocean region makes China an extra regional power in Indian Ocean. Although technically it is an extra regional power but its dependency over the region makes it a major player in the region along with India and USA. India and China always had a suspicious attitude towards each other that suspicion of interest resulted in a full fledge war during 1962, when India launched “Operation Onkar” a strategy designed to establish military posts along the Mac Mohan Line. Negotiations in April to attempt to settle the increasing tension failed. This was the end of Sino-Indian honeymoon period. Shortly thereafter, the Indian army implemented its “forward policy” pushing northward 1. Further relationship become more tense when China tested its first nuclear bomb on 16 October 1964, this started the nuclear arm race in Asia, scholars even move further and describe this rivalry as “ The Asian Cold War”. Today, even much of the hostility between these two Asia giants is because of their old border dispute. But the recent development in the region especially in Indian Ocean is a new matter of concern for India. Chinese dependence over the region on imports such as 298


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oil, natural gas to sustain its economic growth forces it to insure security for its sea lanes and trade routes, particularly Malacca Strait. With almost 80 percent of China's oil passes through the Malacca Strait made its dependence on the littoral states for safe transportation. Dependency to that extent makes China to consider itself as a part of the region. This is what India defined as the Chinese expansionist nature particularly; the so-called “String of pearls” 2 strategy of China. Through what is being called “String of pearls strategy” China is building strategic relationship along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy interest, but also to serve broad security objectives in the region. What Christopher J. Pehrson defined String of pearls strategy is that the each “pearl” in the String of pearl is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. For instance, Hainan Island, with it upgraded military facility, an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, a container shipping facility in Chittagong (Bangladesh), Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and the construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar as is the construction of a navy base in Gawader Pakistan are “pearls” of the “String”3. Although Chinese foreign policy thinkers and political establishment made it clear that China does not have any expansionist intention, Beijing's rise is peaceful and all the neighbouring state will definitely be benefited with its rise, they argue China will be a different kind of great power unlike the westerns which always had an imperialistic ambition. However, Shen Dingli a prominent Chinese thinker advocated the Chinese right to establish overseas bases to protect its overseas rights and interest. As long as the bases are set up in line with international laws and regulations, they are legal ones. But if the bases are established to harm other countries, their existence becomes illegal and they are likely to be opposed by other countries. He further says that it is not terrorism or piracy that is the real threat to China although it is a matter of concern for China India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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but as same as USA, but the ability of other states to block China's trade routes that poses the greatest threat. According to him China needs overseas bases to cut the supply costs for its navy 4. Chinese expansionist intention is not new in fact it has long been evident. The year 2005 marked the 600th anniversary of Chinese experience as a maritime power. In 1405, emperor Yongle of the Ming dynasty dispatched a “treasure fleet” of 62 ships under the command of the explorer Zheng He. Four of his ships were some of the largest wooden sailing vessels ever built5. China has always been concerned not only to protect its vital economic interest but also to ensure its strategic presence in the region. The governing elites of China have three overarching concerns, regime survival, territorial integrity and domestic stability6. No doubt that the regime survival is the foremost concern of the Chinese governing elite, but the territorial integrity is also a matter of great concern. To protect the territorial integrity according to Jiang Zemin, it needs a “Great Wall at sea” because he considers that the threat to Chinese integrity is from the naval presence of other power in the region particularly USA in Taiwan and Japan. Even the colonial power occupied China by their superior naval capabilities; China would have never been colonized if it had a strong navy.

String of pearls and Indian response India has long been suspicious of Chinese intention in its backyard. For India as one of the largest littoral state in Indian Ocean, Chinese expansion is a matter of great concern. It is not only challenging the security and geo-political status but also the natural right of India to dominate the region. New Delhi is quietly watching each and every Chinese move in the region. New Delhi considers Chinese “string of pearls” strategy as a process of encircling India through naval advancement and strategic presence. Some scholars in India argue that New Delhi should not consider Chinese presence as a threat for its interest. They further strengthen their argument by the logic as China being largest trade partner of India replacing US recently; will not risk its 300



economy by going for war or direct confrontation with India. They consider it as an opportunity for both the countries to cooperate in the field of non-conventional security particularly with piracy, terrorism and high sea crimes which is a common threat for both the countries. But the logic of economy as a deterrence will not last long. The interdependence theory in Sino-India relation seems doomed to be failure on several grounds. The very first is that the interdependence does not accurately convey the nature of trade relationship between the two countries, the trade between the two is highly unequal. Indian finished goods in Chinese markets are very limited at the same time Chinese goods had flooded the Indian market and effecting India's indigenous industry with its low cost production. Secondly, both states trade expectations are marked by uncertainty, and growth in trade has not led to a concomitant lowering of military expenditure. In such a situation we cannot expect trade as form of deterrence in Sino-Indian relations. We have a good example of Taiwan and Japan which count more than Indian trade to China have very hostile relations, and it was clearly visible in South China Sea with Japan over the Island dispute. Sun Tzu says that “if you know your enemies and yourself, you would not be imperilled in a hundred battles”, thus India is aware of Chinese capabilities and gradually developing mechanism and resources to meet those challenges in near future. India has responded to this strategic challenge posed by Chinese encirclement in two ways. First, India is modernising its own military and naval capabilities, recently India has added one aircraft carrier “INSVikramadity” in its naval fleet and became forth naval power in the world. India is also building up its own nuclear and conventional military strength. Unfortunately, over the past two decades the gap between China and India has increased in almost all spheres. Militarily, China is spending at least three to four times more than India every year, this gap is further widening. Against the requirement of three percent of India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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GDP on defence, India's average expenditure is around 2.25 or 2.3 percent for the last decade. China may have land superiority over India, but Indian Navy is capable of giving a tough time in battle to China. Its deep naval sea port in Mumbai (western naval command) and Vishakhapatnam (eastern naval command) gives strategic advantage in Arabian Sea and enable India to more easily cut China's Sea Lanes of Communication between the Persian Gulf and Strait of Malacca. Further Andaman and Nicobar give advantage in the Bay of Bengal against the Malacca strait. Indian navy is not only limited to Indian Ocean it is capable of carrying out operation further deep inside the South China Sea. Second, India has achieved some degree on land encirclement of China. This is probably not as much as China is holding. Indian airbase in Tajikistan is one of many examples of that. India close to Chinese border in Afghanistan growing its influences and is a biggest investor of the South Asian region in Afghanistan's. It realises the strategic importance of Afghanistan in near future for its growing energy needs and through Afghanistan it will be able to reach deep inside the Central Asia for energy needs. Post Taliban government consider India as closest strategic, economic and political partner in the region. Even Afghan government is asking for security assistance in post US-NATO Afghanistan from India. Indian presence in Afghanistan is a great challenge for Chinese and its close ally Pakistan's interests.

China's Malacca Dilemma Recently Chinese premier Hu Jintao termed his country's dependency over the narrow and vulnerable Strait of Malacca for oil import from which China must somehow escape as “Malacca dilemma” of his country. Rising China does not have good relations with its maritime neighbours like Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia, and the reason behind these hostile relations is the Chinese claim over much of the South China Sea region and its resources. 302



In the lights these realities China fears that extra regional powers especially USA with the help of these hostile neighbours during the war like situation can easily block this life line of Chinese economy easily particularly oil and energy resources which is essential for China to continue its growth. It is the top priority of China to escape from this short of dependence over “Malacca Strait”. Escape means to develop other alternatives to reduce its dependency over this narrow and vulnerable sea route. There are some alternative options for China and it has already started working on some of them. These alternative routes can be a direct road route from the Gawader port of Baluchistan province in Pakistan via Karakoram highway to Xinjiang province of China but the problem is that the north western part of Pakistan is unstable and terror affected and it will be a tough job to provide a safe transit, especially when the separatist Chinese Uyghur got a safe haven in this reason with help of other local Taliban groups. Other possible routes are via proposed Kra canal in Thailand which will connect China to the Bay of Bengal or China is looking for a secondary sea routes in the Indonesian archipelago.

Sino-Pakistan alliance and India's concern After a clear defeat by Indian forces during Bangladeshi liberation in 1971 Pakistan was desperate for a regional ally because the Americans failed to come for Pakistani help when it was in desperate need. During the Cold war days Pakistan was involved in bringing USA and China close to each other especially after the rift between the Chinese and the Soviet leadership over nuclear and border settlement issues. Pakistan played a very influential role in connecting China with the west, particularly with United States during the 1970s. During his visit to Pakistan and secret visit to Beijing in 1971 the national security adviser in Nixon's regime Hennery Kissinger made ground for Nixon's visit to China. Finally Nixon visited China in 1972, throughout all these events Pakistan was the main actor. Further through CIA funding Pakistan started proxy war against the Soviet in Afghanistan by India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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training and arming Mujahedeens (The Holy Warriors) to fight against the Godless communists. In November 2005, during his three day visit to China, Pakistani president Parvez Musharraf and Chinese president Hu Jintao define Sino-Pakistan relations as “deeper than the ocean and higher than the mountains”7, indeed his statement is justifiable. Continued Chinese assistance to Pakistani military and economy validates the statement. In fact Pakistani ambition of becoming a nuclear power was not only supported but assisted by China. Pakistan's first nuclear device was tested at Lop Nor in China in 19908. China has always taken Pakistani side on Kashmir issue even it supported Pakistan's low intensity engagement in Kashmir. Pakistan always uses China as a bargaining chip to prove its interest regionally or internationally. Pakistan showed its loyalty towards China when it adjusted it border with China and gave Aksai Chin part of Kashmir to China. The real intention of Pakistan to give Aksai Chin to China was perhaps, to engage India on two fronts in Kashmir by successfully bringing China into to Kashmir. During his visit to China in 2011 Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani, the schedule for providing 50 JF-17 fighter aircraft was expedited and negotiation for providing J-20 stealth fighter commenced.9 Recently Chinese built Gwadar port in Baluchistan province of Pakistan to ensure its safe access to Persian gulf for energy resources. Undoubtedly Gawader will provide key tactical advantage, it will also reduce dependency over Karachi port, which is vulnerable and can easily blocked due to its close proximity with India. During 1965 and also during 1971 Indian navy blocked the Karachi port they even destroyed half of its port during the war. Even during the 1999 Kargil war India threatened Pakistan of naval blockade. No doubt that growing Sino-Pakistan relation or Sino-USPakistan triangle is a matter of great concern for India. India policy makers are well aware of this fact. During the recent past the relation between India and USA has reached to a great height, 304



on the other hand relations between Pakistan and USA has become suspicious towards each other, especially after the incident of US operation on Pakistani soil in which Al-Qaeeda leader Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces. This incident led suspicions and questions on Islamabad over its commitment to fight against terrorism. Although Pakistan uses “China card” when it comes to deal with India, but it is not true that Sino-Pakistan relations have no implications. Initially China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar project because Pakistani government gave US to access to use its two airbases during the Afghan invasion. China is also worried about growing Islamic extremism and separatist movement in Xinjiang region which has its roots in Pakistan and has caused many deaths in China.

Conclusion Through these recent developments in the Indian Ocean region India should not immediately reach to the conclusion that the Chinese presence in the region is an immediate threat to Indian interest. One cannot simply say that the two Asian giants have always conflicting interest in the region especially when the two are biggest trading partner of each other in the region. There are many examples of maritime cooperation between the two, especially in the area of maritime security both the traditional and non-traditional security. But at the same time cooperating does not mean undermining the national security. India should choose a balanced approached towards it. Trade and security should be in a balanced way. In future if there will be a situation of direct confrontation, which is unlikely to happen, India should be prepared for that. Although Indian navy is well equipped with modern technologies and equipments in the region, at the same time one should not underestimate or doubt about the Chinese capabilities and its presence in the region. However, India through it geographical superiority is capable of giving a tough challenges to China in Indian Ocean Region. India can also align with other likeminded India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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countries to counter China in the region if it is necessary in future, it may not favour entering into formal alliances because it will limit India's options, India should develop close relationships with other powers to secure a stable environment for sustained growth in view of a common threat.

References : 1. China India relations contemporary dynamics- by Amardeep Athwal (Routledge) p-22 published 2008. 2. String of pearls” The phrase “String of Pearls” was first used to describe China's emerging maritime strategy in a report titled “Energy Futures in Asia” by defence contractor, Booz-Allen-Hamilton. This report was commissioned in 2005 by the U.S. Department of Defence's Office of Net Assessment. 3. Christopher J. Pehrsonhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ 4. Shen Dingli, a physicist by training, is a professor of international relations at Fudan University. In his article titled “don't shun the idea of setting up overseas military bases” 28 january 2010. http://www.china. org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm 5. Louis levathes “ when china ruled the sea, The treasure fleet of the dragon throne 1405-1433, oxford university press- 1996,page-75. 6. Robert G. Sutter, China's Rise in Asia, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, p. 64. 7. Harsh v. Pant, china-pakistan Nuclear Deal: why the surprise?, deccen herald, 28 march 2012 at http://www.deccenherald.com/ content/76919/china-pakistan-nuclear-deal-why.html (Accesed 28 march 2012). 8. Deepak kapoor, India's china concern, 26 jun 2012, Strategic Analysis, Routledge http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012689538 9. Ibid.

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The Balance-of-Threat Theory: Implications for the South China Sea Olga Daksueva National Chengchi University, International Doctoral Program in AsiaPacific Studies (IDAS) Address: National Chengchi University, General Building of Colleges, International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies, 12th Floor, North Wing No. 64, Sec. 2, ZhiNan Rd., Wenshan District, Taipei-11605 Email: [email protected]

Abstract After 1970s the world has changed, economic interdependence has increased, the globalization has shown prominent effects on the world's economic processes, and has influenced on the concept of security that has to be adapted to these new realities. Latest developments have also partly revealed the inability of the realist theory as a main theoretical framework at that moment to interpret the new world. Thus, there have been many debates on a possible failure of the classical realism inside the school itself and critics by other theorists; and there appeared new developments inside the realistic school. One of these was a new revision of the traditional balance-of-power theory by Kenneth Waltz and later its modification as a balance-of-threat theory made by Stephen Walt. Walt modifies the balance-of-power theory by emphasizing the role played by threat perceptions in stimulating balancing behavior among states. Walt argues that states tend to balance against threats and not necessarily against power; moreover he singles out four main criteria to measure a level of threat. In this paper this theory will be tested in the Southeast Asian region by taking two growing economies China and India into consideration, because these two powers have already become major players in the regional scene. However, the author argues that despite the fact that both states are emerging powers with large potential and existing capabilities, one of two China poses a greater threat to the countries in Southeast Asia. Key Words: Balance-of-threat, Perceptions, South China Sea, India, China, ASEAN

Introduction The Asia-Pacific region amazes with paradoxical tendencies of development. On the one hand, East Asia attracts world's attention by its economic miracles and, on the other hand, the region faces severe security challenges, and Southeast Asia can be taken as an excellent example of displaying these controversies. It India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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is a much diversified region but shows impressive progress and success in economic development, regional integration and constructing confidence-building measures (CBMs) among members, however the region also meets serious security issues, including domestic instability, unsolved territorial disputes, economic crises, and transnational security threats, etc. Moreover, the rise of emerging powers contributes to even larger complexity of regional development. All factors mentioned above push the academic world to discuss unpredictability and future development of inter-state relations and their impact on the region itself. This research focuses on reasons why some countries pose larger threat than to the same countries. The author tests one of realist theories the balance-of-threat theory in the Southeast Asian region by taking two growing economies China and India into consideration. Both of them have become significant players in the regional arena and established close relations with ASEAN states. However, the author argues that despite the fact that both states are emerging powers with large potential and existing capabilities, one of two China poses a greater threat to the countries in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the author contends that the balance-of-threat theory can be used to explain different perceptions of China and India by smaller neighbors and the latter's policies toward Asian giants. It particularly touches the South China Sea, one of the hottest spots in the region, that is subject to increasing tensions and clashes at the sea. In addition, the South China Sea is declared as 'core interests' by many countries from inside and outside the region. Thus, the research topic is currently significant and topical, and it presents an alternative perspective on South China Sea disputes.

Literature review on the balance-of-threat theory Literature for this research topic is divided into two main parts, the first one of which presents the origins and following discussions of the theory, and the second one is literature related 308


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to case studies.

The origins and following discussions of the theory After 1970s the world has changed, economic interdependence has increased, the globalization has shown prominent effects on the world's economic processes and influenced on the concept of security that has to be adapted to these new realities. Latest developments also partly revealed the inability of the realist theory as a main theoretical framework at that moment to interpret the new world. Thus, there were many debates on a possible failure of the classical realism inside the school itself and critics by other theorists; and as a response to this polemic its followers evolve new flows within the realist school, one of which was a new revision of the traditional balance-of-power theory by Kenneth Waltz and later its modification as a balance-of-threat theory made by Stephen Walt. Stephen Walt in his book The Origins of Alliances developed own balance-of-threat theory firstly proposed in the article “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power” in 1985. His main contribution as himself suggested was the hypothesis “that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Thus I propose balance of threat theory as a better alternative than balance of power theory.”1 He also clearly clarified all factors contributing to defining the threat and provided historical empirical evidences to prove it; in doing so, he used the theory to analyze building alliances in the Middle East during the Cold War. Inside the realist school, there are several theories that compete with each other, and the Walt's theory is a good example. Walt modified the traditional balance-of-power theory. Realists consider 'power' as a key concept that lies on the basis of international relations; however, there have always been different views on the concept of power itself, which once spilled over into the discussion and opinion exchanges published in 1

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (US: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5.


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American Political Science Review in 1997 between John A. Vasquez, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller, and later was expanded into the book Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate. With regard to the Walt's balance-of-threat theory, Vasquez called it as one of “degenerative tendencies within a research program.”2 Moreover, on the one hand, he pointed out that the traditional balance of power and the Walt's balance of threat can be taken as “two versions of realism.”3 However, on the other hand, he concluded that Walt using balance phraseology explained facts in a way different from the original theory, moreover pointing that this theory did not point to any novel theoretical facts. As Walt himself fairly singled out the contradictions on Vasquez's conclusions on his theory, if at first Vasquez identified it as a direct refutation of Waltz's balance-of-power theory, so then later he presented the balance of threat as a “felicitous phrase.”4 To answer the Vasquez's critics, firstly, Walt pointed out that 'power' and 'threat' are not independent. “Balance-of-threat theory openly incorporates power, subsuming it within the more general concept of threat.”5 Secondly, Walt disagreed with Vasquez's conjectures and argued that his works provide enough novel facts; moreover, some of his articles offer empirical evidence on the theory.6 2 John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review, Volume 91, No. 4 (December 1997): 904. 3 Ibid, 905. 4 Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political Science Review, Volume 91, No. 4 (December 1997): 933. 5 Ibid. 6 In particular he mentioned that in the article “Alliances, Threats and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs” he explained the dynamics of alliance formation in Europe before the Second World War; while one of the critics made by Vasquez (p. 904) was that Walt didn't project his theory on the central system of major states Europe.

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Kenneth Waltz in his turn made own conclusions on the balanceof-threat theory by defining it as a “part of description of how makers of foreign policy think when making alliance decisions,” i.e. an application to the policy-making process, but not a theory.7 Moreover, Walt's definition of bandwagoning was criticized by Randall Schweller as well.8 As mentioned above, the Walt's theory has been subjected to criticism by some realists and other critics. Nevertheless, it has found own niche in international relations theory so far. Later on, some scholars examined this theory versus the traditional balance-of-power theory by taking examples in other regions. Michael Mastanduno takes into consideration the distinction between status quo and revisionist states, adding the third category of countries - “on the fence” states. Moreover, analyzing the U.S. post-Cold War security strategy he comes to the conclusion that U.S. security policy has conformed to the predictions of balance-of-threat theory. Some recent scholars verify accuracy of the theory by examining the level of threat posed to Southeast Asian states by China's rise, while adding an extra “trade expectation” theory.9 Walt's latest articles also probe the theory and advocate that in recent times there has been no anti-hegemonic coalition due to lack of threat perceived by the majority of countries. Many major powers are anxious about the U.S. unilateral policy but don't fear any invasion or other threats posed by the hegemonic power. These states will choose another strategy - soft balancing - when it “accepts the current balance of power but seeks to obtain better outcomes within it, by assembling countervailing coalitions 7

Kenneth Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, Volume 91, No. 4 (December 1997): 916.

8

Randell L. Schweller, “New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review, Volume 91, No. 4 (December 1997): 928.

9

Ian Tsung-Yen Chen and Alan Hao Yang, “A Harmonized Southeast Asia? Explanatory Typologies of ASEAN Countries' Strategies to the Rise of China,” The Pacific Review. Volume 26, No. 3 (2013).


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designed to thwart and impede specific policies.”10 Although Walt belongs to the realist school, he analyzes threat perceptions and their role in stimulating balancing behavior among states; questions he raises in the book give an impression that he has made a step toward constructivism, thus, some scholars of this school pointed to the similarity of his ideas with constructivism.11 For example, Petr Kratochvil investigated the balance of threat theory and drew the conclusion that identification of threat is primarily dependent on identities of the self and the others. Threat is considered as an “attack on the identity of the actor, i.e. the danger that enemy destabilizes the order, stability and societal equilibrium of the self, to 'balance a threat' might be interpreted as to maintain the equilibrium of one's own identity.”12 Thus, he specified three factors that influence on defining threat, namely, the perceived importance of the other, the perceived enmity, and the degree of sedimentation of the role identity. From this perspective, Peter Kratochvil indicated the Russian self-identity and its threat perceptions provided by the others, namely the West and the East.

Case studies literature There are mainly two different perspectives on case studies presented in various literatures, the first one highlights different perspectives on each country's engagement in the region. For example, many scholars analyze the China's or India's strategy toward the region, their interests in the South China Sea or bilateral relations with a particular country. For example, Glaser and Das made researches on policies of China and India to Southeast Asia. The second part compares two countries' strategies toward the region and their bilateral relations. Some 10 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Volume 61, No. 1 (January 2009): 104. 11 Petr Kratochvil, “The balance of threat reconsidered: construction of threat in contemporary Russia,” The Fifth Pan-European Conference (Netherlands, The Hague, September 9-11, 2004): 3. 12 Ibid, 4.

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researchers evaluate India's 'Look East' policy and China's 'String of Pearls.' Pehrson from the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, views 'String of Pearls' from the prism of US-China relations in the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. Another scholar David Scott analyzes China's and India's rise from the geopolitical perspective, according to him geography matters and shapes their bilateral relations. As mentioned before, this research will test the theory in the South China Sea context, and it is a main contribution of the article. There are only a few similar researches done in different regions, especially in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the author will compare two emerging regional powers and implications of their engagement with the region for all participants.

Objective criteria of the balance-of-threat-theory Stephen Walt modifies the balance-of-power theory by emphasizing the role played by threat perceptions in stimulating balancing behavior among states. Walt argues that states tend to balance against threats and not necessarily against power. In order to define threat posed by any power he points out four main criteria, namely: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions. In this chapter the author analyzes objective criteria of the threat definition, including aggregate power, offensive capability, and geographic proximity. Aggregate power includes state's total resources, i.e., population, industrial and military capability, technological prowess, etc. This factor comprises what balance-of-power theorists consider as power. Currently it is obvious that China and India have obtained a large overall power; and table 1 provides the brief data on important indicators that according to Walt comprise aggregate power.


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Table 1. Comparison of countries in terms of national power Countries

Population, July 2014 GDP (PPP), $ bil., 2013 Armed Forces (1000s), 2013* Defence, $ bil.*

China

1,355,692,576

13,390

2,285

126

India

1,236,344,631

4,962

1,325

46

Source: CIA World Factbook. Source*: “Comparison of World Military Strength Results China and India,” Global Firepower. http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparisondetail.asp?form=form&country1=India&country2=China&Submit=Compare+Countries (accessed June 5, 2014).

In recent times there have appeared different power estimation indices, one of which calculated by International Futures computer model is called Power Index. The index combines the weighted factors of GDP, defense spending, population, and technology. Scores are expressed as a state's relative share of all global power. Thus, in 2010 China ranks the second powerful country with 24.52 percent, while India accumulates 7.23 percent and occupies the third position. However, by 2029 China will become the most powerful nation, and in 2046 India will outrun the United States and become the second strongest state in the world.13 Another alternative measure system is the National Power Index provided by Indian think-tank Foundation for National Security Research. The research center evaluates countries' ranks based on main six parameters: Economic Capability, Military Capability, Population Capability, Technological Capability, Energy Security and Foreign Affairs Capability. According to the given data, in 2012 the United States (77.77) ranked the top, followed by China (58.66), while India (35.4) occupied the eighth place.14 13

The data is provided by Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures. http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=n4ff2muj8bh2a_&ctype=l&strail =false&nselm=h&met_y=POWER&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&n selm=h&met_y=POWER&fdim_y=scenario:1&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=co untry&idim=country:CN:IN:US&ifdim=country&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false (accessed December 19, 2013).

14

Satish Kumar, Kanwal Sibal, S. D. Pradhan, Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, Rahul Bedi and Bidisha Ganguly, “National Power Index 2012,” Foundation for National Security Research, December 2012. http://www.fnsr.org/index.php? option=com_ content&view=article&id=4173 (accessed January 14, 2014).

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Speaking of Asian giants, with two largest populations in the world, both have been demonstrating rapid economic development. China since 1979 has shown remarkable economic achievements, its overall power has dramatically enhanced. Later on, in the beginning of 1990s India opened its market and started economic reforms that turned itself into one of the most rapid growth economies. Currently, after the two countries carried out domestic economic reforms, the results are decisive: in 2014 China is the second largest economy in the world, and India is the third one in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).15 Followed by the economic development emerging powers pay more attention to modernization of own military forces, and thus increases military expenditures. In 2013 China's military expenditures exceeded $ 188 billion USD (2.0% of GDP), and Indian expenditures reached $ 47.4 billion USD (2.5% of GDP).16 Nowadays, the level of technology prowess plays an essential role in the success of developing the country and seeking its niche in the world. In other words, national development depends on the speed of creation, adoption and implementation of new technologies, thus, now countries have started investing in R&D to advance the level of science and technology. According to Battelle's “2014 Global R&D Funding Forecast”, in 2013 the China's share in total global R&D spending is 16.5 percent and ranks the second largest investor in the world, while Indian share is less than 3 percent that makes India the eighth main investor in the world. With regard to share of national GDP, China's amounts to 1.9% ($ 258 bil.), while Indian share equals 0.85% ($ 42 bil.). In general, accumulative power is an objective factor; power enables states to implement a desirable national policy, achieve great-power quest, but it may bring opportunities and threats as 15

ET Bureau, “India displaces Japan to become third-largest world economy in terms of PPP: World Bank,” The Economic Times, April 30, 2014. http://articles.economic times.indiatimes.com/2014-04-30/news/49523310_1_capita-income-third-largesteconomy-world-gdp (accessed November 14, 2014).

16

SIPRI Military Expenditures Database, SIPRI. http://www.sipri.org/ research/armaments/milex/milex_database (accessed June 5, 2014).


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well, neighboring countries may feel threatened by a larger and stronger neighbor. Thus, comparing two states' power it can be concluded that China has obtained larger accumulated power than India; Chinese economic, military, and technology power surpasses India. The stronger China becomes, the more anxious its neighbors in Southeast Asia and India feel. This factor is significant, and according to the balance-of-power, weaker states are likely to balance the strongest, in this regard, power is the single component. However, it does not fully explain states' behavior, so it is necessary to examine other constituents. Another element is offensive capability. According to Walt, states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either military weak or capable only of defending. Nevertheless, it seems hard to distinguish offensive capability from aggregate power; however, Walt suggests examining situations when only country's offensive capabilities have changed while other factors have stayed invariable. In more recent publications Walt himself incorporates this factor into aggregate power and tests three key factors.17 In this research the author subdivides it from aggregate power and discusses military capabilities, special focus is on navy, because Southeast Asia or broader Indo-Pacific is likely to serve as a field of clashes between regional powers in future. It is apparent that countries with broad international maritime trade seek for building up strong naval forces to protect their trade interests.18 Thus, it is expected for emerging powers to follow the tendency and modernize own naval capabilities. In the 17

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Realism, Balance-of-Threat Theory, and the “Soft Balancing” Constraint in World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008): 61.

18

The idea that sea power is a key to country's greatness was advocated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer and strategist. His ideas are well perceived in Chinese military circles. See: Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh, “Mahan's Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?” World Affairs (March/April 2012). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/mahan%E2%80%99s-navalstrategy-china-learned-it-will-america-forget-it (accessed December 22, 2013).

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case of China and India, both countries acquire large offensive and defensive capacities, for the last decade they are two largest weapons importers in the world.19 It's necessary to mention that military expenditures of both countries in the post-cold war era have dramatically increased in absolute numbers but the share of GDP decreased.20 However, as already mentioned, Indian military capabilities mostly rely on import from overseas, main suppliers of which are Russia, the United States, Israel, etc. Meanwhile, although China still buys a large amount of weapons but it is already capable to build up own high-advanced weaponry. This is a big difference between the two Asian giants that is taken into consideration by their smaller neighbors. With regard to offensive capabilities, Southeast Asian states might perceive more threat from a nation with strong navy and air forces, because this region is bounded by and thus heavily relies on the Pacific and Indian oceans. Traditionally, China was viewed as a strong land powerful but with limited naval forces. However, this tendency is dramatically changing; nowadays, China builds a strong navy to complement huge maritime trade. “As China grows, China's maritime power also grows,” says Ren Xiao, director of the Centre for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy at Fudan University, China.21 India also tries to catch up China and enhance its naval capabilities by 2015.22 19

According to SIPRI data, in 2003-2007 China was the largest importer of major conventional weapons, its share in total share of international arms imports amounted to 12 percent, followed by India with 9 percent. However, in 2008-2012 the tendency has changed, India has become the largest recipient (12%) while China's share decreased to 6%. It can be explained by China's intentions to decrease its dependence on arms imports by advancing indigenous production.

20

SIPRI estimates military expenditures of all countries since the end of 1980s. Since 1989 China's expenditures have increased nine times, and in 2012 it totaled $188 bil. USD (2.0% of GDP). India's expenditures also increased from $19,093 mil. to $47,398 mil. USD, but its share decreased from 3.6 to 2.5 percent.

21

David Lauge, “Special Report: China's navy breaks out to the high seas,” Reuters, November 27, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/27/us-china-navyspecialreport-idUSBRE9AQ04220131127 (accessed December 22, 2013).

22

Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 88, No. 2 (March/April 2009): 21.


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Next, geographic proximity is critically important; if states are located nearby, they are more likely to interact. On the one hand, such inter-state interactions bring great economic opportunities by increasing volume of transnational trade. However, on the other hand, it creates risk situations; nations are faced with a potentially high risk that they may be threatened or attacked by at least one of its neighbors.23 Moreover, if countries share common borders they are more likely to get involved in territorial disputes against each other. In this aspect Walt uses the Boulding's conclusion “the further the weaker,” where he “asserts that the power of some entity is greatest at its home and that that power diminishes as the distance from home is increased because of increases in the cost and time which are necessary to transport that power.”24 So, rephrasing the Boulding's assumption it is proposed that the further state is located the weaker threat it poses to other nations. From this perspective, China and India both face a problem of bad images in the eyes of own neighbors. Smaller neighbors perceive a threat from a larger neighbor; the further the country is located, the less threat it poses to another state. For example, India poses more threat to Nepal rather than the Philippines, meanwhile, China is considered as a threat in eyes of Vietnam but less for Sri Lanka. However, speaking of Southeast Asia, China has common borders with three countries, namely: Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, with a land border of 3,889 kilometers in total. Besides, China shares maritime borders with the Philippines and Vietnam. At the same time, India only shares with Myanmar a border of 1,463 kilometers, and maritime boundaries with Myanmar, Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, India is considered as part of South Asia, while China is located in East Asia. During the Cold 23

Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, “The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 1976): 581-620.

24

Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, “The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 1976): 585.

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War, the two security complexes were separate with limited interactions. On the contrary, nowadays due to geopolitical factors, Western powers, Australia and the United States in particular, strive to merge two Asias into the Indo-Pacific region. One of the elements that make China to be observed as a more threatening state is the presence of territorial disputes with Southeast Asia. Currently, South China Sea disputes are recognized as one of world's hottest spots. The territorial dispute over the ownership of the Spratly Islands involves four Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) and China, and Taiwan. Another dispute primarily relates to the claim of sovereignty over the Paracel Islands between Vietnam and China, and Taiwan. Up to now, India has no boundary disputes with Southeast Asian states, however China and India since the independence have not solved own border disputes yet. Moreover, due to high dependency on maritime trade, India and Southeast Asian countries share similar concerns over the South China Sea issues. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next section.

“Intentions, not power, are crucial” Offensive capabilities without offensive intentions might not bring a large threat, as Walt emphasizes, “intentions, not power, are crucial.”25 The main reason why great powers created the antiGerman coalition was not because Germany acquired substantial power but due to its extremely dangerous ambitions.26 During the Cold War one superpower was perceived as favorable while another one as hostile. Egypt made choice in favor to the Soviet Union because the Soviet revolutionary ideas were popular in the country but more important, the USSR was willing to provide significant material assistance, meanwhile the United States built close relations with Israel and refused to supply Egypt with 25

Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Volume 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985): 13.

26

Ibid, 12.


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modern weapons and supported Nasser's opponents.27 In other words, the US foreign policy was perceived as hostile towards Egypt and threatening to its interests, thus Nasser chose to ally with the Soviet Union as a less aggressive side. It's apparent that offensive intentions are hard to measure and they are very subjective; however, the author will try to analyze China and India's intentions toward the region. Probably, state ambitions are the most important factor among these four criteria. The great majority of countries have welcomed peaceful rise of China and subsequent economic opportunities, but later on, some neighboring states have faced Chinese ambitions backed by the growth of its overall power. It seems that South China Sea disputes can greatly demonstrate China's growing ambitions and the danger such ambitions may bring to its neighbors. Firstly, China declared the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands as state's core interests.28 Secondly, these disputes involve six parties, among them four are ASEAN states, and complicate relations between its members. Thirdly, this issue indirectly affects other major powers from outside, namely: the United States, Japan, and India, etc, and further tangles the issue. The author will further elaborate intentions of both states toward the South China Sea, which include their rhetoric and particular actions, as well as the reaction of Southeast Asian countries. Comparing discourse of these two states toward the South China Sea issue, it can be observed that China is more direct and it has

27

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (US: Cornell University Press, 1987).

28

There have been debates whether the South China Sea is included into national core interests, and China accuses the international community to misinterpret its words. However, it seems so far that Beijing accepts the fact that both Seas are an integral part of the PRC, and the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty are in core interests. See: “China's defense minister vows no territorial compromise,” Xinhua, April 8, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201404/08/c_133246210.htm (accessed June 6, 2014).

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explicitly stated constancy of own positions,29 while India raises its voice and backs ASEAN states' stance.30 Rhetoric is often accompanied with actions, in this sense two recent skirmishes happened in disputed waters become a good illustration of China's offensive intentions, one of which is the 2012 two-month standoff between vessels of China and the Philippines occurred near the Scarborough Shoal. It clearly displays a two-sided approach toward the region; on the one hand, Beijing provides numerous economic benefits to those who adhere to its positions. However, on the other hand, it is also able to punish those who keep unfavorable to China's policy; and this strategy tends to become more frequently used and viewed by some scholars as an alarming signal to its neighbors.31 Moreover, the Scarborough case not only brings threat to an individual Southeast Asian country - the Philippines, but also ASEAN as a united organization. The AMM clearly revealed China's strategy aimed at Southeast Asian institutions. Firstly, Beijing decided that a weak and divided ASEAN is in its national interests; and secondly, China revealed its hand on the question of ASEAN unity.32 Confrontation of interests among ASEAN members sends an unambiguous signal for these countries to 29

High-ranked officials have made numerous speeches to reaffirm China's position on territorial disputes. See: David Lauge, “Special Report: China's navy breaks out to the high seas,” Reuters, November 27, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2013/11/27/us-china-navy-specialreport-idUSBRE9AQ04220131127 (accessed December 22, 2013), “Premier Li Keqiang Gives Joint Written Interview To Mass Media from ASEAN Countries,” Xinhua, October 8, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/08/c_125496903.htm (accessed October 21, 2013).

30

Zachary Keck, “India Wades Into South China Sea Dispute,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-wades-into-south-china-seadispute/ (accessed June 10, 2014).

31

Bonnie S. Glaser, “China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy A New and Worrying Trend,” PacNet Newsletter, July 23, 2012. http://csis.org/files/publication/ Pac1246.pdf. (accessed October 20, 2014).

32

Ernest Z. Bower, “China Reveals Its Hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/chinareveals-its-hand-asean-phnom-penh. (accessed October 21, 2014).


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apprehend potential assertiveness of Chinese policy and realize the latent possibility of danger of Chinese economic 'carrots and sticks.' The recent clash between Vietnam and China near the Paracel Islands again demonstrates assertiveness of the latter's actions toward neighboring countries in disputed waters. It arouses tensions and suspiciousness from ASEAN side toward China's policy. During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar in May 2014, ASEAN ministers expressed “serious concerns over the ongoing developments in the South China Sea, which have increased tensions in the area” in a joint statement.33 However, they failed to reach a consensus to get united against China's assertiveness. With respect to both clashes, India has not only officially articulated its positions, but also intensified its activities in the region. In particular, Indian navy can be seen in waters of the South China Sea and in other parts of the Pacific Ocean; furthermore, it deepens defence and maritime cooperation with ASEAN members; since 2000 naval exercises in the South China Sea have become quite common. Delhi conducts bilateral and multilateral joint exercises with individual ASEAN states, carries on friendly port visits by invitation of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries as well. Deeper naval cooperation with India is in ASEAN states' interests; especially it refers to Vietnam and the Philippines. Both countries have recently enhanced their overall cooperation with India, including defence and naval aspects, as well as between each other.34 33

“ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea,” ASEAN, May 10, 2014. http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statementcommuniques/item/asean-foreign-ministers-statement-on-the-currentdevelopments-in-the-south-china-sea?category_id=26 (accessed June 12, 2014).

34

The recent event holding between two nations soccer match and cultural performances between two navies on one of disputed isles is illustrative of VietnamPhilippines cooperation and solidarity in front of China's growing threat. See: Manuel Mogato and Nguyen Phuong Lihn, “Philippine, Vietnamese troops drink beer, play volleyball on disputed isle,” Reuters, June 8, 2014. http://www.reuters. com/article/2014/06/08/us-philippines-vietnam-idUSKBN0EJ06820140608 (accessed June 13, 2014).

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Regarding perceptions of both states, ASEAN members historically were more in favor to China and welcomed its domestic reforms and subsequent economic growth. Since the beginning of 1980s China-ASEAN relations have significantly improved as a result of growing bilateral trade and investment and in 1990s the trend of gaining a benign reputation has gained strength. China has furthermore used the economic crisis to forge closer relations with these states.35 Meanwhile, they treated India as an outsider and were quite suspicious and reluctant to involving India in the region. Nowadays the situation has dramatically changed and both sides shifted their policies toward each other. The main reason lies in growing assertiveness of Chinese intentions in the region that can be seen in these two conflicts that go along with Beijing's officials' statements and domestic regulations36 targeted the South China Sea. Unequivocally supporting ASEAN's positions, India emphasizes the strategic importance of the South China Sea, according to its Maritime Military Strategy the South China Sea is a blue water area of “strategic interest” for India.37 Moreover, navy chief Admiral D K Joshi made a strong statement that “India will protect its interests in the disputed South China Sea, even if it means sending forces there.”38 35

“ASEAN Perceptions of a Rising China,” in The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China, eds. Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa, C. Richard Neu, (The RAND Corporation: Monograph Reports, 2001): 29-42.

36

For example, Hainan local authorities have issued fishing and maritime security regulations that further complicate relations with ASEAN and other states. See: M. Taylor Fravel, “Hainan's New Maritime Regulations: An Update,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/hainans-new-maritimeregulations-an-update/?allpages=yes (accessed June 12, 2014), and Carl Thayer, “China's New Fishing Regulations: An Act of State Piracy?” The Diplomat, January 13, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-new-fishing-regulations-an-act-ofstate-piracy/ (accessed June 12, 2014).

37

David Scott, “India's Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Play,” India Review, Volume 12, No. 2 (2013).

38

“India will protect its interests in disputed South China Sea: Navy chief,” The Times of India, December 3, 2013. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-1203/india/35569507_1_south-china-sea-ongc-videsh-interests (accessed January 13, 2014).


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These actions of India could be considered as offensive intentions of a strong naval power, however, some countries in Southeast Asia encourage New Delhi to 'engage East and act East.'39 Meanwhile, any appearance of the Chinese navy in waters of the South China Sea can be considered as aggressive and provocative actions that may destabilize the situation in the region. Nevertheless, involving India and other great powers causes further tensions and great-power rivalry in the region; it is likely to escalate clashes occurring in waters of the South China Sea. In particular several serious challenges can be singled out. First, India for protecting own interests in the South China Sea may get involved in the rivalry with China, wherefore ASEAN is likely to be put between two fires. Second, like other major powers, India's position on the South China Sea disputes is very ambiguous, on the one hand India declares no side in these disputes but proposes navigation in the South China Sea, but on the other hand, it holds economic projects with Vietnam in disputed waters and backs the Philippines in the arbitration process. Next, even though border issues exist between India and several countries, like Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, “ASEAN has a more benign image of India, something that is important for India-ASEAN security cooperation to move forward.”40 The same conclusion is made by Ian Storey that there is indeed some disappointment over moderate progress in the development of ASEAN-India relationship, nevertheless, “they [ASEAN] will be looking for support from India at regional security forums, to send a message to the Chinese that stability

39

Such countries like Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines openly support India in engaging in regional affairs and expressed their gratitude for the constructive role it plays; even Myanmar, a non-claimant, is positive to India's role in the region.

40

Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Challenges in India-ASEAN Security Cooperation” Delhi Dialogue V, February 19-20, 2013. http://www.delhidialogue.org/ (accessed January 13, 2014).

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and freedom of navigation are crucially important to all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”41 Both countries regard the South China Sea as part of national interests and pursue active policy in the region; moreover, have explicitly stated the necessity to protect them by all possible means. However, both strategies toward the issue are different. China uses economic 'sticks and carrots' policy along with strong “unshakable” position and military hard power. Meanwhile, India's strategy is based on soft power, including military soft power.42 Thus, taking all factors into consideration, ASEAN countries perceive high-level threat from China, and following by increasing assertiveness, ASEAN seeks for rebuilding regional balance of power by inviting other major powers. Therefore, India thanks to its benevolent image in eyes of Southeast Asian countries becomes an obvious alternative to achieve their goal of balancing, even though it still poses some level of threat.

Conclusion Applying the balance-of-threat theory to Southeast Asia, following conclusions can be made. First of all, despite numerous critique of the theory the author provides strong evidence that it is applicable to contemporary international relations, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. It explains changing countries' perceptions of each other and accordingly shifting patterns of state behavior. Second, regarding objective criteria of the threat definition, China has surpassed India in terms of aggregate power, including military capabilities. However, it's worth to note that India attempts to catch up with the backlog, especially in military 41

Dr. Ian Storey gave interview to Radio Australia about India-ASEAN relations before the 2012 Commemorative Summit. See: “ASEAN poised to welcome India into closer relationship,” Radio Australia, December 19, 2013. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au /international/radio/program/asia-pacific/asean-poised-to-welcome-india-intocloser-relationship/1063538 (accessed January 13, 2014).

42

India's strategy is well described in Ajaya Kumar Das's research work. See: Ajaya Kumar Das, “India's Strategy towards Southeast Asia,” in India-ASEAN Defence Relations, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: RSIS Monograph No. 28, 2013), 56-95.


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aspects. Third, comparing geographic locations, China is traditionally located closer to Southeast Asia, thus as mentioned above, “the further the weaker” is a main concept to explain Chinese threat from a geographic aspect. Therefore, with its rise China poses a greater threat to its neighbors, particularly to Southeast Asian countries. Next, according to the Walt's theory, intentions are the most important component of threat. For decades of its rise China was perceived as a favorable, peaceful nation, by the end of 1990s Southeast Asian countries had a high regard for China's rise and economic benefits that were brought into the region. Nevertheless, in recent times China has already risen and displayed its will and ability to acquire what it claims for. At this moment, Southeast Asian nations have perceived threat and started looking westward. As India has a more benign image for Southeast Asian countries, they pursue policy of involving the South Asian state in the region in order to counterbalance China's full-grown power. Thus, attracting India to engage with the region was a response to China's rise. Comparing levels of threat posed by these countries to the specific region can bring better understanding of regional development trends in general and policy-making process in individual countries in particular. In the global context, China's rise threatens the existence of the unipolar order led by the United States and also arouses worries and speculations over its possible assertiveness in the region to secure core interests. In this regard, China is required to revise its foreign policy to reassure its neighbors of peaceful direction of national development and build necessary CBMs to improve the image in eyes of ASEAN states. As for Southeast Asian states, they advocate peace, stability and prosperity in the region, and in order to protect their interests countries should get better-knit and pursue foreign policy toward further internationalization of the South China Sea by inviting other outside powers and push China for completing a more binding Code of Conduct. 326



Meanwhile, India should keep pursuing a well-balanced foreign policy toward South China Sea disputes and the Southeast Asian region in general. Besides, through bilateral relations with specific countries it can promote further integration with ASEAN; more involve in existing international institutions, such as ASEAN-India Dialogue, ARF, EAS, ADMM+, APEC, etc, and strengthen its voice in these organizations to be considered as an important player in regional affairs. The Look East policy has been an important tool to promote Indian interests in the AsiaPacific region but became outdated, and now requires being adapted to changing environment. It should send a clear message of state's interests and goals, as well as future direction of the policy toward the given region; “as India looks East, now is the time for India to act East in order to advance not only its national interests but to promote regional interests.”43 The new government faces great challenges to equipoise all directions of foreign policy and achieve great-power status for the country. Nevertheless, an opportunity door is open for India and now it can play an active role in the region and the world; moreover, big and small powers bring India into the game, so India should seize the chance and reveal itself as a player that is able to play in the regional and international arena.

43 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Challenges in India-ASEAN Security Cooperation” Delhi Dialogue V, February 19-20, 2013. http://www.delhidialogue.org/ (accessed January 13, 2014).


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Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role of India and China Amit Kumar Research Scholar, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies (CIPS), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi Email: [email protected]

Abstract The persistent economic growth of the Asian giants, which is considered to be responsible for the tilt of the global power towards Asia, has brought significant changes in the international relations among the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries as well as globally. However, the growth of the two giants, India and China, which are hugely dependent on the imported fossil fuel for their ever hungry industries, is largely dependent on the South China Sea (SCS). The rise of these two Asian economies has increased the importance of SCS for their emerging economies. The SCS is important not only for the Asian countries alone but equally for the country's external to the region. Despite its importance, SCS has been a home to a number of maritime crimes including piracy, violence, trafficking (of human, drugs and arms) etc. In spite of a recent drop in these activities the sea remains a problem for the region, where a number of political, geographical, and economic factors make the sea a particular opportune place for sea born crimes. Further, the incident of 9/11 attack has increased the threat of maritime crime with severe consequences. In the background of these pressing problems which has threatened the peace and security of the region, some opportunities have been opened for aspiring superpowers, like India and China, to cooperate in a number of areas such as management of Sea Lane of Communication (SLOCs), anti-piracy operation etc. Thus this paper will try to understand, to which extant these two and other Asian countries are dependent on the sea? How these two countries have an impact on the security management of the region and in what way they will be impacted by the degrading security environment in the region?

Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role of India and China Background The persistent economic growth of the Asian giants, which is believed to be the cause behind the tilt of the global power 328


Managing Security Environment in South China Sea: the Role of India and China

towards Asia, has brought significant changes in the international relations among the Southeast Asian (SEA) countries with an immediate impact felt across the globe. Although, most of the Asian economies have been performing well during last a few decades, however, two Asian Giants, India and China, which have performed remarkably well, has outstripped others with a growth trajectory indicating even higher. The growth story of these two Asian giants is influenced by a number of factors, encompassing internal as well as external factors. However, the factor common between the two nations is their reliance on South China Sea for energy security by way of importing hydrocarbon and other energy resources for mating the voracious appetite of their ever hungry industrial sector as well as for the access to the international markets for their finished products. Thus, the rise of these two Asian economies, coupled with the rise of Southeast Asian economies, has increased the importance of South China Sea in leaps and bounds. Therefore, the South China Sea is not merely important only to the countries neighbouring it but to the countries which are external to the region too. However, the sea is facing a number of problems encompassing traditional as well as non-traditional security threats, jeopardizing international maritime trade as well as the economic growth of the region and the region as whole. And worst, a possible platform for launching a new arms race thereby, endangering the peace and delicate strategic balance of the region as a whole. Meanwhile, some positive signs in form of development of strong naval forces of the two regional giants, namely India and China along with bilateral, multilateral as well as individual country level initiatives from the regional countries to encounter these challenges. At the same time, we must not forget that most of the Southeast Asian countries are smaller in size or in their capabilities to deal with such problems, and worst, the mistrust caused by the Chinese assertive moves in East China Sea and South China Sea have added to the worries of the regional countries. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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These are some of the larger burning questions which have formed the base of this article. Thus, the first part of this article will try to highlight the importance of South China Sea, in terms of what lies within as well as underneath its waters. The second section will be dedicated to some of the most challenging threats that the sea is facing today. Subsequently, the third section will try to see the emergence of naval forces of the two Asian giants, India and China, and will try to understand their prospective role in the security management at the sea. And the last section of this chapter will try to highlight some of the positive incidents, raising a ray of hope.

South China Sea: an Ocean of Opportunities The 3.5 million square kilometers South China Sea with an average depth of over 2000 meters is boarded by the East China Sea to the northeast, the Pacific Ocean and Sulu Sea to the east, and the Java Sea and Indian Ocean to the Southwest. Stretching from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the Southwest to the strait of Taiwan in north, the sea serves as a maritime borderland between the nation-states of South East Asia (SEA) and China. Broadly the sea contains four archipelagos: the Pratas (Dongsha Island), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Islands), Paracels (Sisha Islands), and Spartlys (Nansha Islands) (Till, 2009). The sea, as is perceived today as maritime borderland, has been considered so since 1680, when Hugo Grotius, a Dutch political thinker and legal expert, formulated Mare Liberum, The Freedom of the Seas, or the right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East India Trade (Rosenberg, 2011). The influence of sea power on history has long been recorded. The 19th century naval professor and geostrategic Alfred Thayer Mahan, while explaining the sea power, emphasized the importance of sea power on the long-term success of a country's international relations. In tune with Mahan more recently Geoffrey Till (Till 2009), in his book 'Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century' acknowledged the importance of sea power. According to Till there are four key and interdependent 330



attributes of sea power. These are, the sea as a medium for trade; the sea as a resource in terms of what lies within, as well as underneath, its waters; the sea as a medium for informational and cultural exchange; and finally, but perhaps most importantly, the sea as a medium for domination. In the light of above factors, the South China Sea exemplifies almost all of the above said attributes. For China the sea serves as the only maritime way out for its naval forces as well as for its finished products to the international market. Secondly, the potential of a huge reserve of natural resources including a lucrative amount of natural gas and petroleum have added to the importance of the sea in China's thinking, particularly if looked through the prism of its dependence on energy imports (Kaplan, 2010, Kaplan, 2012). For the Southeast Asian nations, more specifically for the countries bordering the sea, the sea is not only a huge dividend in terms of its natural resource potential lying within as well as unearthed it's sea bed, earning thousands of billion dollar of remittances from the sale of these natural resources, but is also important for their respective tourism sector which attracts hundreds of thousands of tourists every year. The critical reliance of the people for their food and sustenance living within more than 1 million square kilometers of its (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2010).So far India is concerned, the reverberation of developments in the South China Sea has been felt by India too. Although, not a claimant to any territory in the sea, the region gains prominence for India for its maritime trade and more specifically for its energy security transiting through the sea(from Vietnam, Indonesia and Australia) for its booming economy, which is passing through a crucial phase of industrialization.

South China Sea: Highlighting Importance A100 miles coastline of South China Sea is home to at least 500 million people, most of which are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the sea for their food, shelter and sustenance (Rosenberg, 2011). The sea holds nearly 30% of the world's coral India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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reefs (ibid), which provides for the breeding and development of maritime flora and fauna. The sea is also a home to nearly 25 per cent of the world fish stock and is the most productive source of shrimp and tuna. It provides the habitat and spawning grounds for the world's most productive source of shrimp and tuna. It also has a remarkable amount of biological diversity and immense genetic resources, including over 30 per cent of the world's coral reefs. Apart from the above said import resources that the sea holds, the sea known for other equally and even more import reasons, some of them are as following: a. Natural Resources The SCS is endowed with a huge stock of natural resources including hydrocarbon (Oil and gas), sea foods including fish and other marine produces used as food, gems and stones including rare earth matters. Though there is no unanimity on exact amount of Oil and natural gas underneath the sea because of the underexploration and territorial disputes. However, the US EIA, on the high end of the estimates, claims there could be 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserve (US EIA 2013). Another US analyst has put the amount of petroleum to be somewhat around 15.6 billion barrels, of which 1.6 billion barrels are recoverable (Costlow, 2012). However, in contrast to these estimates Chinese National offshore oil company claims that the area holds 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 tcf of natural gas, much higher than the US estimation (The Diplomat, 30 January, 2014; Buszynski, 2013). These numbers represent both proved and probable reserves and hence, are subjected to variations, until the actual survey of the sea is not conducted. In the light of economic development of China, along with, the Southeast Asian countries, which are believed to have brought significant changes in the living standard of the people with a subsequent impact on the food-habits of the people. Now fish and other sea-food are preferred over the conventional foods, as these sea foods contains good amount of protein. On the other hand, SCS is one of the world's richest fishing regions, regarded by 332



Chinese and Vietnamese fisherman as a traditional fishing zone. The University of British Columbia's Fisheries center estimated that catch statistics in the SCS have increased from 4.7 million tons in 1994 to 5.6 million tons in 2013, averaging about 5 million tons (Buszynski, 2013). If we believe the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources, “the SCS holds one third of the entire world's marine biodiversity and provides about ten percent of the world's catches” (American Security Project, 2012). So, these changes have further increased the importance of the sea. b. Trade and Commerce Apart from the oil, natural gas and other sea-resources, the sea also serves as a medium of maritime transportation. Owing to its SLOC importance, the sea has been regarded as the 'maritime highway' of Asia, as the sea is a major connecting link between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Almost 50% of the global trade passes through the region (US EIA, 2013). Eastbound maritime trade through the SCS passes through the Strait of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok. Although, there are few detailed sources on traffic volume, however, a Japanese study in 2006 conducted by Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) estimated that almost that out of 607,000 global oceanic vassal movement, 94,000 vessels of 100 gross tonnage or greater passed through the strait of Malacca in 2004 or 15 per cent of the world's total vessels passed through the Malacca strait alone, which rose to 117,000 in 2010. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) review of the global maritime transport estimation, the total volume of maritime transport was 8.4 billion tones out of which 4.7 billion tones passed through the sea alone, which suggests that more than half of the annual merchant fleet tonnage passed through the straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok in 2010 (ibid). The SCS provides the shortest possible route between Africa and Persian Gulf suppliers and Asian markets. According to an estimate nearly 15.2 MMBBL/D of oil passed through the Strait of India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Malacca in 2011. A significant amount of this crude arriving in the strait goes to terminals in Singapore and Malaysia, where it is processed and shipped out again as refined petroleum products and the rest of the inflow, which is as high as 12.8 MMBBL/D, continues on through the SCS to China and Japan, the largest energy consumers in Asia (US EIA, 2013). Apart from the above imports the oil also comes from inter-Southeast Asian regional trade, particularly from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia (ibid) Among the imports, apart from Oil, a significant amount of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is also shipped through the sea. An EIA estimate puts the figure at around 6 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf), or over half of the global Source: http://valueofdissent.blogspot.in/2012/04/ LNG trade passed south-china-sea-mare-nostrum.html through the SCS in 2011. Out of this import, approximately 56 percent of LNG were shipped to Japan (56 percent), Korea (24 per cent), and 19 percent to China. Following the Fukushima crisis, Japan increased its LNG import. In the first half of the 2012, the sea accounted for about 58 percent of the global LNG trade (ibid).

Major Problems at the Sea The South China Sea is very much important for a number of activities that extends to trade and commerce, energy security, food security (fish stock and the sea foods), natural resources and provides job opportunities to the people who lives in its extended coastal areas. However, at the same time, the sea is home to a number of major problems extending from, territorial conflict, piracy, terrorism, trafficking in human to the drugs and fire-arms and ammunitions trafficking. Some of the major problems are as following: 334



1. Territorial Disputes Historically, the dispute over the South China Sea has evolved in an action-reaction consequence, as one country's action has always generated a counter-response from other countries involve in the conflict. This action-reaction conflict dates back to the Chinese Qing dynasty who protested against the French intrusion into the area over 1884-5. It is important here to note that the Chinese concern at that point of time was Paracels and not Spratlys (Buszynski). However, there are evidences showing Paracels as being regarded as the southern border of the country and its interest in Spratlys was in response to the French intrusion in 1930. Meanwhile, on 23rd April, 1930 France annexed the Spratlys and hoisted the tricolour 'the French flag' over the islands between 7th and 12th of April 1933. The French action drew an immediate response from China, who protested against the French move into the Spratlys and instituted a Land and Water Maps inspection committee, which drafted a map of the South China Sea which included a U-shaped line with eleven dashes (ibid.). However, there is ambiguity about the authorization of the map, since there is no evidence providing information, which authorized the map and why this took the present shape? Later on, this map was published by the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese communist party govt) in 1948 and was, subsequently, inherited by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) (ibid). Although, two dashes from the original eleven dashed U-shaped map was removed in 1953 as a concession to Vietnam, the map still remains intact as the basis for the Chinese historic claim in the sea (ibid). Meanwhile, the starting of World War II in 1939 between the allied and axis powers at the global level had direct bearing on the region as well with the Japanese involvement in it. In 1939 Japan moved into the area and declared the occupation of the Prats islands, Paracels and Spratlys. However, the Japanese occupation did not last long. The end of the war brought an end to the Japanese occupation of the islands too. In the immediate India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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aftermath of the war, the San Francisco Conference, convened in 1951, which was instituted to decide the disposition of territories conquered by Japan, declared the renunciation of all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Island [Article 2(f), San Francisco Conference] (ibid). The vacuum created after the renunciation of Japanese claim, presented an opportunity before China, which was excluded from the conference, and thus Zhou Elai, the Chinese foreign minister, claimed the sovereignty over whole South China Sea on 15th August 1951. The Chinese action met with an immediate reaction from Vietnam, who, through its representative Tran Van Huu, asserted its own sovereignty in the conference over the same groups of islands on 7th September. The claims and counter claims by China and Vietnam, followed by the inability of the conference in identifying where sovereignty laid opened the door to competing claims that exist even today. Each claimant country presents different set of logics and facts in support of their claim. For China, it's their historical right available in the form of the Qing dynasty map, for Vietnam and Philippines it's their Source: http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/ right as 'colonial succe48951000/gif/_48951920_south_china-sea_ ssor state', as decolon1_466.gif ization enforced by the Geneva Conference of 1954. Malaysian claim came as a stimulus to the Marcos declaration and the Philippine occupation of the eight islands in its claim zone. The Malaysian claim, which was based on the continental shelf, was published in a map in 1979. The Malaysian claim overlaps with the Philippine claim and the problem with this claim is that the continental shelf claim is for 336



resources, and not for islands on the basis of which it occupied three islands in 1983 and another two subsequently. The Brunei's Claim to the EEZ overlaps with Malaysia's and was the case of several later disputes over the allocation of oil exploration rights (ibid). China's voracious appetite for energy to feed its continued economic development will become increasingly important as the state continues its transition into an industrial powerhouse. In 2009, China just barely overtook the United States as the largest consumer of energy in the world; by 2025, its energy consumption is projected to eclipse the United State by nearly 50%. In order to secure access to the energy resources it needs to fuel its economy, Beijing is developing a broad range of energy sources, including investments in solar technology. The competition for oil and gas became an important factor in the dispute in the 1970s. Surveys undertaken in 1969 indicated reserves of oil and gas, but the technology for off shore drilling at depths below 600 meters where the reserves were located was only developed in the late 1970s (Buszynski, 2013). Further, the 1973-74 oil shock proved stimulus for the exploration activities in the area, and in March 1976 the first commercial field began operation off the Philippines island of Palawan at Reed Bank, involving a consortium of three Swedish and seven Philippino companies. Malaysia's Petronas is the major oil produce in the area, and in 2011 produced 500,000 barrels a day and 600 billion m3 of natural gas.

2. Piracy Seaborne trade has doubled every decade since 1945, and shipbuilding tonnage worldwide has doubled since 1990. It is estimated that 80 percent of all world trade, or about 5.7 billion tons of cargo, is transported by sea (). However, the most important factor is the growth of intra-Asian trade, which is growing more quickly than transpacific trade. For example, in 2003 South Korea's trade with China surpassed its trade with the US for the first time. In 2004, Japan's trade with China surpassed India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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its trade with the US for the first time. In 2004, Japan's trade with China surpassed its trade with US for the first time. More and more Asian states are reorienting their trade flows toward China. The several explanations for this trend include the recovery of Asian economies from the 1997 economic crisis, the dynamic China market, and trade-opening agreements between China and Southeast Asia. Of the world's twenty busiest container-handling ports in the past five years, Asian ports accounted for the top six: Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai, Shenzhan, Busan, and Kaoshing. The top twenty busiest global ports generally also include port Kelang and Tanjung pelepas in Malaysia, Tanjungpriok in Indonesia, Laem Chagang in Thailand, and manila in Philippines. However, irrespective of the above developments, recent upward movements in the pirate activities are quiet a cause for concern. International legal definition of piracy, as put forward by the IMB, is the act of both theft on the high seas as well as armed robbery or theft in the territorial waters or parts of coastal states (UNDOC 2014). Piracy is not a new phenomenon; in fact, it is an ancient, persistent, and elusive phenomenon. It is equally true for the South China Sea. Although, the number of pirate attacks on the commercial vessels were very few before, however, in the recent times, particularly in last 2-3 decades it has gone up substantially, leading to a renewed interest in piracy and its possible nexus with maritime terrorism, especially after the 11 September 2001 attack on the USA. The following chart shows the global pirate activities and compares it with the Southeast Asian case.

Actual and Attempted piracy attacks: ICC IMB piracy and armed robbery against Ships- JanuaryDecember, 2008-2012 and January -March 2013 (Southeast Asia)

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Table 1. Comparison of countries in terms of national power Southeast Asia

Indonesia

2008

65

28

-

293

2009

69

15

13

410

2010

114

40

31

445

2011

103

46

13

439

2012 2013

111

81

2

297

30

25

1

66

(January to March)

South China Sea

Total

Year

Source: ICC IMB Piracy and armed robbery against ships 1st January to 31st December- 2012 and January to March, 2013 report (Southeast Asia).

The above table shows that, the pirate attacks have been increasing worldwide, with 406 incidents recorded in 2009 alone. The most dramatic of these were the ship hijackings by Somali pirates, including the seizures of the Ukrainian MV Faina, with its cargo of heavy tanks and weapons, in September 2008 and the fully laden Saudi-owned tanker Sirius Star 2 months later (Rosenberg, 2011). The response of the international community was quick. The United Nations passed resolutions on piracy, that was followed by the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) authorized the deployment of multilateral counter-piracy forces, and several countries contributed naval resources to anticipate international community responded quickly. Hundreds of pirates have been captured by these prompt responses of the international community within 2 years. However, only a few among them have been brought to trial, and many managed to get released without prosecution. The immediate and apparent impact of these pirate activities are reflected in the maritime insurance premium increase, delayed deliveries of the products, fatal in terms of perishable items, trade rout change leading to delay and extra cost in the transportation of the product…etc, therefore causing an increase in the price of the product transported. However, a hidden but more serious and dangerous impact of the piracy can be traced in the form of linkages between piracy and terrorism. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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3. Trafficking: Drugs, Humans, and arms and ammunitions. Drug trafficking is a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition law (UNODC, 2013). UNODC is continuously monitoring and researching global illicit drug markets in order to gain a major comprehensive understanding of their dynamics. The use of drugs is a source of a number of personal, in terms of health deterioration, addiction, and social as well as economic evils. Because of its ill effects the United Nations has banned its use, except for the medical purposes. However, the use of drugs has been on rise, destroying millions of lives and families. It accounts for almost $400 billion just behind the arms industry in terms of annual turnover. According to the Interpol, the trafficking of these illicit drugs is being run like multinationals. These vast 'enterprises' are being run by most experienced and 'organized crime groups based in different parts of the word, encompassing cocaine cartels based in Colombia and Mexico; triads in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China; the Yakuza in Japan; the Sicilian Cosa Nostra; la Cosa Nostra based in New York and Mafia groups in Russia and some other eastern European and Southeast Asian countries (UNODC, 2011). Some research suggests, such as UNESCO's MOST programme, that the overall production of these drugs has increased significantly on vertical as well as horizontal axises after the end of the cold war. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the global opium production has increased by 80% between 1998-2009. The UNODC report suggests that nearly all of the world's illicit opium and heroin production is concentrated in “Afghanistan, Southeast Asia (mostly Myanmar) and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia).

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The fact is that China and India remains the direct recipient of such illicit drugs from the two major sources, the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand) and Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Source: World Drug Report 2014; Drug Trafficking, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; Link: Pakistan and Iran), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/ both in Asia. The primary source of foreign-made drugs in China is Golden Triangle transported through Myanmar-Yunnan-Guangdong route, which is the traditional trafficking route. Recently, 'possibly because of increased law enforcement efforts at the China-Myanmar border,' the China-Vietnam border has become an increasingly important international drug trafficking route once again. Most of these trafficked drugs are locally consumed in the Southern China or may be trafficked onward to interior provinces.

Human trafficking Human trafficking is nothing but the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them. The smuggling or trafficking of a human involves the procurement of humans for financial or other material benefits of illegal entry of a person to a state of which that person is not a national or resident (UNODC, 2013). Almost all the countries in the world are affected by this crime. The act of human trafficking is just contrary to the individual rights prescribed under the United Nations Human Right Council, (UNHCR) which grants every human being has an equal right for a dignified life that one gets by just getting birth as a human being. Thus, the cooperation between India and China in South China Sea will not only check the inflow-and-outflow of illicit drugs, India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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human trafficking or illegal arms trafficking but will also provide an opportunity for both the navies to use such platforms for a more mature ties based on the elimination of mutual suspicions and disbelieves, thus, providing an environment for a mutually peaceful coexistence.

4. Terrorism Terrorism, as defined, is an act to get your voices heard with the use of violence. In the case of South China Sea, which is a major connecting link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, which has been rightly dubbed as the “maritime super-highway” the risk of terrorist attack, becomes more pronounced (UNODC, 2014). This becomes even more imperative in the light of the fact that the sea is home to thousands of small islands and islets, which provides a safe haven for the terrorists to hide. Although, till date the incidences of maritime terrorist attacks or threats - politically or ideologically motivated - have been relatively minimal around the South China Sea, with those few that have occurred falling within the territorial waters of coastal states. To mention a few, the attempt by terrorist to attack visiting US naval vessels using a smaller boat rigged with explosives in 2002 which the Singapore authorities foiled (ibid). The most notable maritime attack to date was carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group on Super-ferry 14 in Manila Bay in February 2004, with 116 people killed or missing and presumed dead (Rosenberg, 2011). However, it would be on the basis of the occurrence of very few instances of terrorist attack insane to get complicated and believe that the sea is immune to the attacks. Rather, this can be just the tip of the iceberg with more disasters waiting to happen, if adequate measures are not adopted. Rather, it becomes even more important for the countries of this region to work together in tandem to ensure that any unwarranted events from occurring. To maintain this record of a vibrant high seas route free from any foreseeable and potential danger would in fact add to their record of credibility and is a bonus point in its track-record.

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Drivers for Cooperation between the two countries China India relations have resumed after a long period of hibernation, followed by the India-China war of 1962. Recent visits by the head of the states and high level official visits have started a new chapter in the relations between the two countries. Now both countries have sound economic relations, with burgeoning two-way trade and commerce. What adds to the renewed cooperation is a cooperative and pragmatic government on both sides, who are eager to extract the most from this goodwill and cooperation. This cooperation can be seen in a number of areas, like that of defense, economic, security as well as in the restructuring of the new world order. This includes, Indian guarantee to China that It has absolutely no intention of joining any multilateral strategic organization in order to “contain” China, Indian withdrawal from Vietnam's joint oil exploration in SCS and not counting UNA while pursuing 100-odd fighters, cancellation of joint military exercise in the neighboring of Guan in the pacific ocean with the navies of the USA and Japan (China Military Online, 22nd October, 2013). These assurances have enhanced the confidence among the Chinese that India is not at all interested in short of starting a “Cold-War' Asia. Apart from the above activities, the cooperation extends to the military and naval cooperation and joint exercises, joint antiterror training session with a live fire drill, operation “hand-in hand”, in Southwest China's Sichuan province that ended on 13th November 2013, with the memories of two previous such operations (Xinhua, 14th Nov. 2013), a joint army training operation “hand-in-hand” planned to be held in 2014 (Xinhua, 17th Feb. 2014), maritime cooperation, code named “Maritime Cooperation 2014, started on 23rd April, 2014, are some of the good examples of such cooperation. Wang Baofu, a professor of military strategy with the National Defense University of China's People's Liberation Army, said, “The Drills are symbols of deepened mutual trust among all sides” (China Daily, 17th Nov. 2013). India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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These joint operation exercises are intended to enhance understanding, consensus, mutual trust and friendship between Chinese navy and the Indian Navy, explore the joint search and rescue organization and practice among the navies of various other countries and promote the pragmatic communication and cooperation between various navies in safeguarding marine security, thus laying a solid foundation for timely handling of the maritime emergency in the future (China Military Online, 23rd April, 2014). Clarifying its intentions, Wang Guanzhong, a senior PLA officer said that “China always pursues a defense policy that is defensive in nature, and the PLA of China is endeavoring to contribute to maintaining regional security”. “The robust military cooperation among major powers plays an important role in maintaining regional security”. “We are actively engaged in security cooperation with Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the conference on interaction and CBM in Asia, ADMM (ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting) plus, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and China-ASEAN framework”. However, mistrust still exists between the diplomatic communities on both sides, which are the major impediments in the functioning and progress of a good and healthy relation between the two countries. According to the china military report, published on 22nd October, 2013, the obstructions in the IndiaChina relations are mainly in the field of security strategy. Insufficient trust in this respect has affected the overall relationship between the two countries. It further claims that the negative attitude of the Indian media can also be blamed for a negative attitude of the people towards China, however, at the same time it states that China, has always taken care of the interest of Indian interests. However, the news also sees some positive developments from the Indian side. According to the news, “a group of influential thinkers and statesmen in India have used new methods to think about the relationship between the two countries. (China Military Online, 22nd October, 2013). Further, there is a change in the 344



government in Delhi in a recently concluded 'grand Indian election' and in which BJP emerged as a single dominant party led by Mr. Narendra Modi as its leader and now Prime Minister of the country. There are certain facts that we will have to keep in mind, that Mr. Narendra Modi had visited China for almost four times during his tenure as Chief-Ministers of Gujrat. The level of enthusiasm he received during his visits has certainly an impact on his posturing towards China, which will be beneficial for further strengthening of the relations between the two countries.

India -China cooperation: A win-win situation for all 1. Territorial conflicts in South China Sea can be managed, if not resolved completely, with the help of the regional multilateral institutional architecture, only when the contesting parties sit together and thrash out the issues. Furthermore, in the light of this issue of exploration and utilization of the natural resources can be done amicably in a very systematic but sustainable way so as to maintain the ecological balance at the sea. 2. While China stands to benefit with Indian involvement as a neutral player, without the US influence, on the contrary, India stands to benefit in terms of the natural gas and oil, which is crucial for its increasing energy deficit industrial sector, which has registered a significant growth after 1990s, more precisely after 2000s. Thus, it's a win-win situation for both. 3. Since both India and China aspire for the global power status and have accordingly invested huge amount of their respective GDPs in the Defense sector. This has led to the development of a capable navel force, which can watch over the security of the straits which means a lot for their emerging economies, in terms of assurance of protection. 4. The counter piracy measures adopted has ironically led to the raise of a more sophisticated form of Pirate activities who are now better equipped to dodge all the counter security measures taken, which has become a major threat that demands immediate attention. Thus, no matter how effective the counter measures India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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that are adopted by a single country, for instance, the US would not be efficient and at times lacks the vote of confidence among the countries surrounding the SCS. Thus, a combined effort especially on the part of China and India, which have their reservations about US, would go a long way in help checking these activities. 5. Piracy shares a direct link with terrorism. Confiscation of firearms and weapons can end up in the hands of wrong elements or terrorists. This is further complicated by the fact that owing to the size and number of islands, EEZs and continental shelves that the Southeast Asian states possess, it becomes almost an impossible task for the small states with marginal GDP to manage security in its geographic territory. Indonesia is the most apt example of this particular case. It has more than 17,500 small islands (Case 2001; Darkeley, 2005). And managing all these small and tiny islands is not an easy task. In fact, country has drawn the attention of the international community, including the shipping companies to share its burden in providing the security, but the initiative meet a cold response from the above parties. Japan is the only country, involved in the security management of the sea. Hence, here it becomes important for India and China to take the initiative, as their navies have already been operational in the region. 6. When mishaps like that of the disappearance of flights or ships occurs in the high seas a combined effort of information sharing and joint sea combing operations can go a long way in clocking for a higher rate of successful search and rescue operations. Now, since both the counties are equipped with ample aircraft carriers they can work together at crucial time where for instance there is an occurrence of natural disaster like Tsunami. This combined immediate relief work can be more effective in saving valuable life and so reduce the impact of such natural disasters.

Conclusion 1990s brought significant changes in the internal as well as 346



international relations among the countries of the Southeast Asia. Persistent economic growth of the Asian tigers brought significant changes in the living standard of the people in the internal domain of the countries, the persistent high GDP growth allowed the countries to think beyond the mere livelihood and sustenance. At the same time, the two major and largest countries of Asia, India and China, too brought significant changes in their respective economies. Where the Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization with a more open and democratic and liberal governmental setup, was the driving force behind the Indian economic performance, the industrial revolution and relinquishing the old socialist pattern of government proved crucially important for the rise of China as not only a economic powerhouse, but also a heavyweight in terms of its abilities in getting its national interest fulfilled. However, the persistent impressive performance has a direct relation with the energy consumption, where both the countries have to rely mostly on the imported oil and gas. The energy requirements of both the countries are mostly fulfilled by the hydrocarbon imports from Africa and Gulf countries. Here emerges the major difference between the two countries, where a major portion of Chinese imports are shipped via South China Sea, the Indian reliance on the sea is mostly for its recent acquisitions of the oil and gas blocks in the coastal areas of the Vietnamese EEZ and its continental shelf and recently concluded India Australia nuclear ties for selling uranium to India. Apart from the energy imports, the sea serves as a major sea route for the Indian imports and export to the ASEAN countries that occupies the second place in terms of India's total trade relations. The sea is not only important for India and China alone, it is equally vital for the other countries in Asia like Japan, which is almost entirely dependent on the sea for its energy imports, after the Fukushima incident, and exports of its finished goods to the international market, so is the case of other ASEAN member countries.


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References : A Global Problem: Illicit Firearms as a Threat to Global Security.World Drug Report, 2014. United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed on 14/07/2014; Available at: https://www.unodc.org /unodc/en/firearms-protocol/introduction.html American Security Project; Resources in the South China Sea; Dec. 04, 2012; accessed on 14/07/2014; Available at : www.americansecurity project.org/resources-in-the-south-china-sea/ Case, William. 2001. “Indonesia”. In Heenan, Patric and Monique Lamontagne; The Southeast Asian Handbook. London, Chicago. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. China daily. 14th jan., 2014. China builds army 'with peace in mind. Accessed on 23/06/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/topnews/201401/14/content_4484486.htm China military online. 22nd october, 2013. Chinese expert: china-india friendship is basis for new order in future of asia. Accessed on 22/06/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/opinion/201310/22/content_4471914.htm China military online. 21st april, 2014. Twenty five countries to participate in wpns. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/defensenews/201404/21/content_4504508.htm China military online. 23rd apr, 2014. “maritime cooperation 2014” multinational maritime joint exercise kicks off. Accessed on 24/07/2014. Available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/homepicture/201404/23/content_4505011.htm Darkeley, Steven. 2005. “Introduction”, in The Greenwood Histories of The Modern Nations: The History of Indonesia.” Westport, USA. Greenwood Press Djalal, Hasjim. 2010. “Indonesia's maritime challenges and priorities”. In Ho, Joshua and Sam Bateman, 'Maritime challenges and priorities in Asia: Implications for regional security' Drug Trafficking. World Drug Report, 2014. United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed on 14/07/2014; Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html Garofano, John. 2008. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Problems and Prospects” in Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes, 'Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy'. London, Praegar Security International. 348



Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling. World Drug Report, 2014. United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed on 14/07/2014; Available at: https://www.unodc.org/ unodc/en/human-trafficking/index.html?ref=menuside Human trafficking, country profile: south asia, east asia, and the pacific; world drug report, 2014. United nations office on drugs and crime (unodc). Accessed on 14/07/2014; available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/glotip/country_profiles_south_asia_east_asia_and_pacific.pdf IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. Accessed on 25/07/2014. Available at: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre. Kaplan, Robert D. 2010. “Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the future of American power” New York. Random House Publishing Group --------.2012. “The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells us about coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate”. New York, Random House Publishing Group Koo, Min Gyo. 2010. “The Island and Maritime Dispute in the South China Sea”, in Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a rock and hard place. London, New York. Springer. Korea Foundation, Liss, Caroline. 2013. “New Actors and the State: Addressing Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia”, in Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 35, No. 2, PP. 141-62 Muhibat, Shafiah F. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia Prescott, Victor. “1996. Indonesia's Maritime Claims and outstanding Delimitation Problems” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Winter 1995-96 Rosenberg, david. 2011. The maritime borderlands: terrorism, piracy, pollution, and poaching in the south china sea. In clad, james, sean m. Mcdonald, and bruce vaughn (eds.). The borderlands of southeast asia: geopolitics, terrorism, and globalization. Ndu press; washington, d.c. Scott, dr. David. 2007-08. India's drive for blue water navy. Journal of military and strategic studies, vol. 10, issue 2 Till, Geoffrey. 2009. “Theory and Practice: the Asia-Pacific region”, in Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Second Edition). London and New York. Routledge


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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Terrorism Prevention. World Drug Report, 2014. United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Accessed on 14/07/2014; Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/index.html US Energy Information Administration, South China SEA, Feb. 7, 2013; accessed on 14/07/2014; available at : www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics.cfm?fips=scs Xinhua, 30th aug, 2013. Asean defense minister's meeting-plus ends, joint declaration signed. Accessed on 13/07/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/intlmilitary/2013-08/30/content_4463947.htm Xinhua. 4th nov, 2013. Cooperation needed in terror fight. Accessed on 23/06/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/opinion/201311/04/content_4473607.htm Xinhua. 14th nov, 2013. China, india end anti-terror joint training. Accessed on; 23/06/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/topnews/201311/14/content_4474856.htm Xinhua. 1 januaryu, 2014. Chinese military endeavors to contribute to maintaining asia-pacific security: officer. Accessed on 24/07/2014. Available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/topnews/201406/01/content_4513418.htm Xinhua. 27th feb, 2014. China, india agree joint military training. Accessed on 23/06/2014. Available at : http://eng.mod.gov.cn/topnews/201402/27/content_4493271.htm Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. 2010. “The Red Star over Pacific”. Naval Institute Press. USA

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India-China Entanglement in Myanmar: An Energy Prespective Saheli Bose School of International studies, JNU, New Delhi

1. Introduction Often the 21st century is lauded as the Asian century; truly Asia today seems to be a formidable power challenging the potentials and well crafted altars of the West. In most of the Asian countries the wave of liberalization has set in and has ushered them to in an era of high economic performance and growth rates. In most of these economies circle of poverty has been broken and growth rates often reach double digit. Among the important Asian players which have marked their presence in the world due to their tremendous economic potential and performance is India and China. Traditionally India and China have been linked historically, culturally and anthropologically but today they represent one of the most fascinating parts of the world. They bring together one of the most populous and economically fascinating zones of the world. In 2009, according to World Bank estimation, the Asia-Pacific region accounted for almost one-third of global GDP, while 54% of the region's GDP came from China and India alone. 'Both of these countries are leading changes in the world industrial activity, being a source of not only low cost sourcing , but of high value manufacturers.'(Hong, 2012).Therefore rapid industrialization, urbanization and improved lifestyles have been the major focus of these countries. This has led to a substantial rise in the energy demands in both of these countries. Huge population size and the desire to maintain a steady growth rate also have added to the extra push for surging energy demands. It is also important to note that the issue of tackling energy demand and supplying adequate energy has become one of the important developmental challenges in these countries. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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The International Energy Outlook 2011, projects that both India and China together will consume 31% of the world's energy in 2035, up from 21% in 2008. China is likely to surpass United States as the world's largest energy consumer. By 2035, China's projected energy consumption will be 68% higher than U.S. energy consumption. The US Energy Information Administration, points that China and India are the largest and second largest energy consumers in the world. The energy consumption scenario of India and China can be demonstrated by figure I which shows the rising energy consumption of India and China along with other countries of the world. Figure I .Global energy consumption (quadrillion Btu)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Outlook 2011. (http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3130#)

It is also a fact that both India and China are heavily dependent on energy imports, this has put both of these countries in an uneasy position with regard to their developmental plans, as any disruption in energy supply can be a cause of concern. Therefore supply and source of energy has become one of the strong agenda both in India and China. Perhaps this too is too simplistic as there are many undercurrents which determine the supply and the demand of energy across the world. It is pertinent at this point to understand the concept of energy security and the associated risk that may arise due to reliance on energy imports. The concept of 352


India-China Entanglement in Myanmar: An Energy Prespective

energy security has been variously defined. It has multiple dimensions to it. Narrowly it means the availability of sufficient energy supplies at affordable prices. International Energy Administration defines energy security as uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable, while respecting environmental concerns. The World Economic Forum says that energy security is an 'umbrella term' that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power. The energy security perspective varies depending upon one's position in the value chain. (World Economic Forum,2006). Similarly Ebinger (2011) points that there is no consensus on the definition of energy security but the problem that arises is that the concept of energy security depends on where in society one sits. He points that the concept has different meaning and implication to a government of a country, to a man on street and that too it may differ in rural and urban areas. The government may be concerned with macro-economic policies and need for a standby measure to mitigate disruption, while to a man on street it means availability at affordable price. Daniel Yergin (2005), also states that energy security can be defined as the security and integrity of the whole supply chain and infrastructure from production to the consumer. The Integrated Energy Report, published by the Government of India, which is perhaps the first comprehensive report on the energy scenario of the country, states that: 'We are energy secure when we can supply lifeline energy to all our citizens irrespective of their ability to pay for it, as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy their various needs at competitive prices, at all times and with a prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected.' Therefore, whatever the concept of energy security mean, it is today one of the vital issues around the world and every nation wants to enhance and manage its energy security in effective way. Hong (2012) provides a very effective account of the consequences that may arise in the situation where nations rely on India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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import for their energy needs. Firstly, Hong points that energy 'import dependence can have a souring effect on International relations in different ways'. The importing and the exporting nations both may exert pressure tactics on each other to achieve their political and economic motives. Therefore energy recourses get converted into a means of weapon to extract things. Secondly tension may develop as a result of competition between importing countries to control the energy recourses itself or to control the vital supply routes. Thirdly in his analysis he points that under the liberalized regime, when the prices of gas and oil fall exporters may suffer internal political and economic instability. This instability might just not affect the respective countries involved in the energy trade but also can lead to the instability of the region. Apart from these reasons, the political instability in the oil and gas rich countries of the world like in the Middle East, Libya can create serious problems to the energy importing countries. Therefore the energy importing countries around the world have to understand these equations when they engage in energy trade with any other energy rich countries of the world.

2. India 's Energy Profile According to the Integrated Energy Policy Report, published by the Planning Commission of India, the country faces a formidable challenge in meeting its energy requirements and providing adequate amount of energy to the users in a sustainable manner. Meeting the energy challenge is of most importance to continue India's economic growth. (Planning Commission, 2006). India's largest energy source is coal, followed by petroleum and traditional biomass and waste. Since the beginning of the New Economic Policy in 1991, India's population increasingly has moved to cities, and urban households have shifted away from traditional biomass and waste to other energy sources such as hydrocarbons, nuclear, bio-fuels, and other renewable. The following figure II shows the energy mix of India.

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Figure II : India's Energy Composition ( in percentage)

Source: US Energy Information Administration, International energy Agency, BP Statistical Review. (http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/India/india.pdf)

On analysing the energy scenario prevailing in India there appears to be some glaring contrasts. Though placed as the fourth largest consumer of energy in the world, it has one of the lowest per capita energy consumption in the world, it is nearly one-third of the global average, indicating that it has far long way to meet its energy saturation. (International Energy Administration, 2012).India is also highly dependent on energy imports. India meets about 75% of its oil need from imports. Coal which is most important in the energy mix of the country is also dependent on imports. 14% of coal demand in the country has been met through imports and is expected to rise to 30% by 2020. (Ibid). Natural gas nearly makes up 7% of the energy mix of the country and the production has failed to satisfy the demand in the country, it is estimated that India will import 70% of its demand for gas by 2017. (Ibid). The ratio of availability of commercial energy resources is also highly screwed in favour of the urban areas, as rural areas have been left to depend mainly on biomass and waste to meet their energy demands. Therefore it can be inferred that India faces a formidable challenge in managing its energy security, both in terms of availability and accessibility. The Planning Commission's 12th Five year plan reports points, that India should acquire assets overseas to address its energy security concerns. Therefore, India has been purchasing oil and gas assets India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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overseas on the rationale that whether these resources are physically shipped home or sold on the international market, they belong to the country, which has paid for these resources as per international prices, thereby mitigating some of the cost of energy imports. (Dadwal,2012). Myanmar happens to be one such destination. In the following section a detailed discussion on India-Myanmar relation and energy cooperation has been made.

3. Trajectory of India-Myanmar Relations and Energy Cooperation India - Myanmar relations are rooted in historical, cultural and spiritual connections. Both the countries have undergone the scourge of foreign rule and the miseries that are brought along with it. Naturally it was expected that these countries would be cultivating extreme good relation with one another after their independence. So did it happen, as India and Myanmar entered into a Treaty of Friendship in 1951. Important political leaders like Nehru and U Nu shared common views on many issues regarding the conduct of international politics and also pioneered the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). (Yhome,2009). These honey moon period of India-Myanmar relation, was however short lived and things began to change from late 1950s finally in 1962 General Ne Win, Chief of Staff of the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) overthrew Prime Minister U Nu in a coup in 1962.As a result of the coup, Myanmar was converted into an autocracy state. Ne Win's nationalization policy resulted in eviction of the people of Indian origin who had made Myanmar their own country and were economically prosperous than others in the country. However the new regime truly intended to 'Burmanise' the country and remove all the outer elements away. 'Ne win deliberately isolated the country and Myanmar became closed behind a real “bamboo curtain”. Myanmar was named the Socialist Republic of Union of Burma and thereafter all links were cut off with its neighbours. (Egreteau,2003). Further India-Myanmar relations under SLORC further deteriorated due to India's support to the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar led by Aung San Suu kyi. 356



However from the early decades of nineteen ninety the Indian policy makers opened a new diplomatic door and officially put an end to the Indian stand that advocated the radical isolation of Myanmar. (Ibid). According to J.N Dixit (2001) there were certain factors which influenced India to revive its relation with Myanmar, prime among them is the geo-strategic importance of Myanmar. Myanmar constitute a tri-junction with Bangladesh, China and India's northeast, its boundary with Bay of Bengal is important from the point of view of maritime linkages too, especially with regard to India's trade with Southeast Asia and far East. Secondly he points out that India-Myanmar cooperation was vital to check the smuggling and narcotic trade that was developing in the Northeast of India and the Indian government was eager to cooperate with Myanmar to normalize life in Northeast. Third factor which Dixit points out that it is “clinically rational” that though India remains committed to the idea of democracy and related values but there seems to be no reason for India to unilaterally assume the responsibility of creating democracy in the other countries. This showed that India was not ready to interfere in Myanmar's internal affairs, reflecting that India would now count on a pragmatic approach rather than an idealist one. (Dixit,2001). The “Look East Policy” adopted by India since 1991 is also important factor that led to improvement in India-Myanmar relations. As Myanmar shares a natural link with Indian mainland, it became imperative to India to engage in a “Constructive Engagement Policy” with the military government, to ensure a gateway to Southeast Asia. The realist turn in India-Myanmar relation has paid off well as has been indicated by increase in trade and bilateral negotiations. The trade between the two countries has also increased. At present India at present is the 3rd largest export destination for Myanmar and 5th largest source of imports into Myanmar. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2014).The economic and the political reforms undertaken by Myanmar from 2011 have made possibilities of expanding the country's available potential. According to an estimate Myanmar is expected to grow at 7%8% India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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per year for a decade or more and raise its per capita income to $2,000$3,000 by 2030. (ADB, 2012).Therefore it provides reasonable ground for India to increase its engagement with Myanmar. As far as energy cooperation is concerned Myanmar is important regionally as a gas producer. However till 1985, Myanmar did not have any coherent policy in its energy sector. It was 1985, that the Ministry of Energy (MOE) was established as a separate administrative unit. When the military regime came to power in 1988, a serious effort was made at opening Myanmar's economy, leading to the growth of the energy sector. (Muni & Pant, 2005). However allegations remains that it is hard to say that the opening up of the economy was for the development of the country or for the sustenance of the regime. (Ibid). It was in 1989 that the MOE was reconstituted with one Department (Energy Planning Department) and three states owned enterprises, viz Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Myanmar PetroChemical Enterprise (MPE) and Myanma Petroleum Products Enterprise (MPPE)(Than,2005). More recently a National Energy Management Committee (NEMC) and an Energy Development Council (EDC) are created from January 2013 to strengthen and coordinate energy policies among the various energy departments. (World Economic Forum, 2013). Myanmar is an important gas producer in Southeast Asia. (EIA, 2014). Myanmar has 17 sedimentary basins supposed to contain oil and gas reserves in them, however, not all of them have been successfully explored and exploited. At present it has twenty oil and gas field that are producing oil and natural gas. (World Economic Forum, 2013) Myanmar has proven gas reserves of 11.8 trillion cubic feet and gas production in 2011 was 1.2 billion cubic feet per day. Myanmar's oil production onshore reached 7,600 barrels per day in 2011, in addition to offshore gas fields that produced 11,600 barrels per day of condensate. (UNDP,2013). Though the energy sector was opened by the military regime during late eighties, but India's support to the democracy 358



movement kept India away from exploiting Myanmar's energy potential. It was only in 2001 during the visit of then Foreign Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh that India started the negotiations about buying gas from Myanmar. Oil and natural explorations were part of the other negotiations regarding infrastructure projects such as joint construction of road with General Than Shwe. (Lall,2008).Further negotiations were consolidated in 2003. India's interest in Myanmar's natural gas can be attributed because of few reasons important to India. Natural gas is often used as a substitute for the coal. (IEA, 2014). It is a much cleaner source of energy contributing less of carbon dioxide emission. The Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 report indicates that natural gas should be India's preferred source of energy. The demand for natural gas has increased in the last two decades at the global level. In India too, the natural gas has gained importance, particularly over the last decades and its being termed as the fuel of the 21st Century. (Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, 2014). India's major focus was on the A-1 Block northwest of Myanmar. In 2002, India's ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) purchased 20 per cent and GAIL 10 per cent each of the equity stakes in the A-1 Block in Myanmar. A-1 extends over an area of 2,129 sq. km of Rakhine Coast in Arakan offshore in north-western Myanmar nearer to India.OVL and GAIL purchased the 20 percent and 10 percent from Daewoo International (of South Korea) which holds 60 per cent of the stakes in the project. (Shwe Gas Movement, 2014)1 Though at present the consortium in the A-1 block consists of OVL-17%, Daewoo-51%, Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS)8.5%, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) -15%, GAIL 8.5% (ONGC, Government of India, 2013). In October, 2004 Daewoo and OVL signed an MOU to jointly explore gas in the A-3 Block off the Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal. Thereafter Myanmar signs energy contracts with Indian 1

For further information see, Shwe Gas Movement available on http://www.shwe.org/chronology/


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Essar Oil Ltd., allowing the Indian company to explore for oil and natural gas at offshore and onshore blocks in western Rakhine State. Further in 2006 GAIL signed a 30% stake in a production sharing contract with the regime for exploration rights in Burma's A-7 offshore block, but in 2007 GAIL claims that it will not buy from Burma's A-7 block as its prospects are poor.( Shwe Gas Movement,2014).There is also a midstream project which is a part of the combined development of A-1 and A-3 blocks, The project consist of construction of offshore pipeline from Shwe Offshore Platform to land fall point at Ramree Island. Here too OVL and GAIL has 17% and 8.5% stake respectively.(ONGC, Government of India,2014) Recently in 2013, OVL and ONGC have won bidding in two more oil blocks in Myanmar, strengthening its presence in the south-east Asian nation. The firm got Blocks B-2 (Zebyutaung-Nandaw) and EP-3 (Thegon-Shwegu), according to the list of winners released by Myanmar's Energy Ministry. Other companies Cairn India, Oil India Ltd (OIL), Jubilant Offshore Drilling and Prize Petroleum drew a blank. (The Hindu, 2013 a). An ambitious project to bring natural gas from Myanmar to India was mooted in 1997. It was an idea that was raised by a private Bangladeshi company, Mohona Holding Limited. There were three possible pipeline routes chalked to bring gas from Myanmar to India. The first was to lay the pipeline along the Kaladan river of Myanmar, which has tributaries in India's north eastern state of Mizoram. The other route talked about an offshore connection between Sittwe port in Myanmar near the A-1PSC exploration block, to point in West Bengal and from there link it to the national network. (Muni &Pant,2005). However a third route was finally selected for the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India (MBI) gas pipeline. Under the third choice, the pipeline would run through Arakan state in Myanmar and then enter the Indian state of Mizoram and Tripura before crossing Bangladesh to enter Kolkata in West Bengal. This was the shortest and economically most rationale route in comparison with the other options. It was expected that in addition to transporting gas from Myanmar, the pipeline 360



would also link up gas reserves in Assam and Tripura, in northeast India, allowing distributing to rest of India. Negotiations among the energy ministers of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar started in 2005, where an agreement between all three countries for constructing the pipeline was reached. The expected cost of US $1 billion was to be mostly borne by India and private sector partners, whereas Bangladesh would receive US $125 million in annual transit fees. While gas would mostly be fed to the Indian market, Bangladesh would also be able to make use of gas imports from the pipeline should its own indigenous sources become scarce. (Chandra, 2012). Bangladeshi Government wanted the pipeline to be laid along Bangladesh's existing roads and highways to make it easier to manage. It also wanted India to allow it to use the pipeline to export gas to India or import gas from Myanmar. Whilst India would be responsible for building the US$1 billion pipeline, Bangladesh's state-owned Gas Transmission Company would be responsible for managing the part of the pipeline based in its country. (Lall, 2006). Figure III: Proposed route of the Myanmar-India-Bangladesh Gas Pipeline Route

Source: http://www.irgamag.com/analysis/terms-of-engagement/item/6622-the-myanmarpipedream-myanmar-bangladesh-india-pipeline

Unfortunately the negotiations stalled because of additional conditions by Bangladesh during the bilateral negotiations. Bangladesh wanted the facilitation of importing hydroelectricity India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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from Bhutan in addition to the reduction of tariff barriers and its trade deficit as other preconditions. All these conditions were not acceptable to India due to the following reasons. The Indian Government has till date opposed these conditions, as it does not want to make bilateral issues part of a trilateral agreement. (Ibid). It was also strategically unviable for the Indian government to accept Bangladesh's additional conditions fearing that this would set a precedent in all future bilateral negotiations as India at that time was also exploring other options, including the possibility of other pipeline projects such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project. (Chandra, 2012). Lastly if India were to bypass Bangladesh's involvement in the pipeline project it would substantially increase the cost of the project. Therefore further negotiations for the pipeline project have been shelved and no further negotiations were undertaken. Only recently some efforts were shown from the Comptroller and Auditor Office of India as it enquired from the Petroleum and Natural Gas Ministry over the inadequate progress made in execution of transnational pipeline projects like the MBI. (The Hindu, 2013 b).

4. China - India Entanglement on Energy Front: More of India's Frustration Before reflecting on the energy dimensions it is important to understand the importance of Myanmar to China. The geostrategic position of Myanmar at a cusp of South, Southeast and East Asia and its rich energy potentials has made Myanmar one of the areas of Chinese strategic interest. Through Myanmar China is trying to get access to the Indian Ocean and avoid the Strait of Malacca which is over congested. This has special implications for China's security and energy dimensions where majority of China's oil shipment comes through this strait and bypassing this strait can reduce about 3000km in reaching the Bay of Bengal. (Ibid). More over the Yunan province of China which borders Myanmar is one of China's least developed areas and therefore China can develop this area economically with supportive cooperation from Myanmar. The stoppage of Official 362



Development Aid (ODA) along with western sanctions and severe constrains on human and financial resources forced Myanmar to depend on the Chinese to a large extent.(Hong,2008). Both India and China are late comer to the Myanmar's energy sector. Though Myanmar is not a major energy supplier to China, but Chinese National Oil Companies (NOC) has shown increasing interest in this Myanmar's energy development in the recent years. (Ibid). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have all started oil and exploration project and today constitute one of the most important forces in Myanmar's energy sector. The talk for the feasibility of a gas pipeline from Myanmar to China began in 2004.It was in 2008 that CNPC and Myanmar Ministry of Energy signed an agreement to build a US $ 2.3 billion crude oil pipeline and US 2 billion natural gas pipeline. (Hong,2013). The dual pipeline runs from Myanmar's deepwater port of Kyaukphyu (Sittwe) in the Bay of Bengal with Kunming in Yunnan province of China. The construction of the above said gas line has been completed in October 2013 and it is expected that the gas pipeline, which can transport 12 billion cubic metres of gas annually to China.( The Hindu,2013 c).The pipeline is expected to diversify China's energy basket and energy route. The pipeline is also expected to generate significant revenue for Myanmar. In accordance with International practice , a 16% value added tax will be levied on the crude oil transported through pipeline, raising US$ 900 million .A further US$ 900 million is expected to arise from the sale of natural gas to China over the next thirty years.(World Economic Forum, 2013). Therefore it is evident that while China is able to bring out a desired outcome, India has met with failure in its energy ambitions in Myanmar. The Government of Myanmar withdrew India's status as preferential buyer on the related blocks of its offshore gas field as India was not able to figure out the route to deliver Myanmar's gas on time and hence Myanmar decided to sell its natural gas to China. This deal took India by surprise as India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Myanmar made way for the Chinese to buy gas, which will be produced by India and Korea. Therefore China has proved its ability to swiftly gain a strategic advantage in Burma while India had to face setbacks. Figure IV: Map of the Myanmar-China gas and oil pipeline

Source- Shwe gas movement,( http://www.shwe.org/shwe-gas-project-maps/)

In the case of hydel power cooperation also there has been set backs as very recently India scrapped two of the hydel power projects that it undertook to complete in Myanmar. These projects include the Tamanthi project and the 642 megawatt Shwezaye project on the Chindwin river. (The Indian Express,2013).

5. Conclusion After all said, it is important to look at some of the challenges that both China and India can face in Myanmar. Myanmar till recently was a country which faced severe sanction from the western and other international bodies due to its human rights violation, and therefore these sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the technological and economic development of the country, therefore this can act as a deterring factor for further investment. It is also pointed out that oil and natural gas can generate high revenues for Myanmar, but as pointed out that through the years 364



these revenues have not been used for the country's development as lack of transparency and management has left Myanmar with some of the worse development indicators.(Arakan Watch,2012). Egreteau also points out that the eagerness to enter the Burmese energy market showed by both India and China has given the impression that two giants were not only vying for political influence in Burma but also trying to secure resources before the other rival gained them, but this is partly true as far as competitive dimensions of Burmese energy sector is concerned. The rivalries between the Thai, Malaysian, Singaporean, Korea and long with the western like that of American, French and Russian in the Myanmar's offshore and onshore oil and gas fields are much more 'Perceptible and effective' than the single bilateral competition between the two giants .(Egreteau, 2008). Further political unrest, low human development along with slow pace of reform has made matter worst. It needs to be pointed that as Myanmar opens for economic and political reforms, post 2011, there are huge chances for India to engage in Myanmar much more aggressively than before. India has to understand the dynamics of the changing situation and then move. Further Myanmar would never like itself to be a pawn of China as it acknowledges the risk of being so. It is this area that India should bank upon. More so certain external factors have produced advantageous position for India to take its firms step on Myanmar. First being the fact that China's FDI in Myanmar since 2011 have drastically cut short in Myanmar,(Sun, 2013) India has a chance to fill this gap and engage in much more penetrating dialogue. Secondly the transition from the military rule to the civilian one is expected to give Myanmar much more credibility in international scenario as it will no longer be considered as a pariah state. Lastly India's constructive engagements in Myanmar, like construction of roads, telecommunication and educational services have left a positive impact on the country. Therefore its time that India should realize the true value of Myanmar. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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References : Arakan Oil Watch, “Burma's Resource Curse: The case for revenue transparency in Oil and Gas Sector, Myanmar,2012 Asian Development Bank , Myanmar in Transition, Manila, 2012. Chanadra, Kesav,Varigonda, (2012), “India's Myanmar Fascination” Journal of Energy Security [Online Web] Accessed on 20th April 2014, [URL: http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article &id=381:indias-myanmar-fascination&catid=128:issuecontent&Itemid=402] Government of India (2014), “Assets of ONGC Videsh” ONGC Videsh, [Online Web] Accessed on 23rd April 2014, [URL: http://www.ongcvidesh.com/Assets.aspx] Government of India (2014), “Availability and Utilization of Natural Gas”, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas [Online Web], Accessed on 25th April 2014,[URL: http://petroleum.nic.in/ng.htm] Government of India (2014), “Bilateral and Economic Relations”, Embassy of India in Myanmar, Ministry of External Affairs [Online web] accessed on 2nd April 2014, [URL:http://www.indiaembassyyangon.net/index.ph p?option=com_content&view=category&id=21&Itemid=122&lang=en Government of India “Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee” Planning Commission of India, New Delhi. 2006 Government of Myanmar (2014), “Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE)” [Online Web] Accessed on 12th March 2014,[URL: http://www.energy.gov.mm/index.php/en/about-moe/menumoge] Government of India, (2011), “Expansion of North East India's Trade and Investment with Bangladesh and Myanmar” Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region & RIS. International Energy Agency (2014), “Share of India's Total Primary Energy Supply in 2011” [Online Web] Accessed on 4th April 2014, [URL: http://www.iea.org/stats/WebGraphs/INDIA4.pdf]. International Energy Agency “Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policy Players and Issue”, International Energy Agency, France. 2012 J.N Dixit, India's Foreign Policy and its Neighbours, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2001. K. Yhome, India- Myanmar Relations (1998-2008): A decade of Redefining Bilateral ties, ORF Occasional Paper no.10, ORF, New Delhi, 2009.

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Marie, Lall “India-Myanmar relations- Geopolitics and Energy in Light of the New balances of Power in Asia” ISAS Working Paper, NUS, Singapore. 2008 _____ “Indo-Myanmar Relations in an era of Pipeline Diplomacy” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs”, 28(3):424,2006. Renaud Egreteau “India-China Vying for Influence in Burma-A new Assessment” Indian Review,7(1):38-72, 2008. ______ Wooing The Generals: India's New Burma Policy Author press Global Network, New Delhi, 2003. SD Muni and Girijesh Pant, India's Search for Energy Security: Prospects for Cooperation with Neighbours Rupa & Co.New Delhi, 2005. The Indian Express (2013), “India scraps two hydel projects in Myanmar”, 6th June 2013, New Delhi [Online Web] Accessed on 5th October 2014, [URL: http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/India-scraps-twohydel-projects-in-Myanmar/2013/06/06/article1621605.ece]. The Hindu (2013 b), “CAG raises queries on delay in pipeline projects”, 24th September, 2013, The Hindu, New Delhi, [Online Web] Accessed on 14th March 2014 , [URL: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cagraises-queries-on-delay-in-pipeline-projects/article5160885.ece] The Hindu (2013 a) , “ONGC Videsh wins two oil blocks in Myanmar” October 13, 2013, The Hindu, New Delhi [Online Web] Accessed on 2 3 r d M a r c h 2 0 1 4 , [ U R L : http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/ongc-videsh-winstwo-oil-blocks-in-myanmar/article5231625.ece]. The Hindu (2013 c), “Myanmar pipeline to diversify China energy supply”, 30th October, 2013, The Hindu, New Delhi [Online Web] Accessed on 2 0 t h A p r i l 2 0 1 4 , [ U R L : http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/sinomya nmar-gas-pipeline-becomes-fully-operational/article5254374.ece]. United Nations Development Programme “Accelerating Energy Access for All in Myanmar”, Yangon, Myanmar, 2013 US Energy Information Administration, (2014), “Country Analysis: India” [Online Web] Accessed on 6th April 2014, [URL: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IN]. US Energy Information Administration, (2014), “Country Analysis: Myanmar” [Online Web] Accessed on 8th April 2014,[URL: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=BM&trk=m].


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US Energy Information Administration, (2014), “Country Analysis: China” [Online Web] Accessed on 14th April, 2014. [URL: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH&trk=m] World Economic Forum “New Energy Architecture: Myanmar” Geneva, Switzerland, 2013. Yun Sun, Chinese investment what lies ahead, Issue Brief no. 1, Stimson Centre, Washington 2013. Zhao Hong “China and India: Competing for Good Relations with Myanmar” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 22(1):175-194, 2008. _________ China and India: The Quest for Energy Resources in the Twenty-First Century Routledge Publications, Oxon, 2012. __________ “China-Myanmar Energy Pipelines: Risks and Benefits” Institute ISEAS Perspective #30, Singapore, 2013.

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India-China: Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability Tumtin Sonmang Koren Research Scholar, Department of Geography North Eastern Hill University (NEHU), Shillong, (Meghalaya) E-mail ID: [email protected]

Abstract Energy prices play an important role in political and economic life because it can threaten economic, environmental and national security. Hindrance in energy supply can also lead to rise to various geopolitical risks that include delivery of the service, changes in executive and legislative power, labour union activities, internal politics and regulatory stances, as well international relations of a country. India is a sixth largest energy consumer and it is estimated that each year the energy consumption of India is likely to increase by 5%. The main reason in this government imposes control on petroleum products such as diesel, kerosene and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) as to help millions who live on less than $1 a day other than remaining in power and to check the inflation. The Indian government spent more than $9 billion on fuel subsidies, added to the country's budget deficit. (Mehrotra, 2009). India's and China's dependency for energy are more or the less same. To neutralise supply and demand ratio both countries rely on others energy export nation under economic and political cooperation. India is undergoing tremendous economic growth, second only to China, yet its galloping population, together with poor policy and insufficient infrastructure, threaten environmental debacle that could end up this growth. With a smaller land area than China and a population over 1.1 billion-on the verge of becoming, or perhaps already, the world's most populous nation. India might be the ultimate test case of how many people can squeeze into a given area and still provide a decent, modern lifestyle. In 2012, India ranks 125 out of 135 countries on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). India with its soaring population, faces increasing stresses to its air and water; its future energy and resource use is uncertain, and its agricultural productivity is at risk. Both the countries initiated countless schemes to fight against climate change and environmental degradation through implementing various green projects. Key Words: Energy, Hindrance, Subsidies, Dependency, Petroleum products, Environmental Disaster, Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), Climate Change.

Introduction India and China are the important emerging nations of the world. They eye on economic and infrastructures development in their India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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respective financial statement. Much emphasis on development led to forget the principles of sustainability. India-China relation on energy security and environmental sustainability is more or less significance as the two countries always develop traits on political and border issues since 1962 Indo-China War. Energy prices play an important role in political and economic life of people because it can threaten economic, environmental and national security. Energy Security is not only about the risks of fuel supply disruption; it pertains to fuel price was so volatile, unpredictable and cause economic activity to decline (TERI). Despite, ecological balance is very imperative for human survival; such balance can be created only by protecting contiguous environment. Though, India and China are known for their explosive growth rates and impressive achievements in social and economic development, more of the world continues to watch with apprehension as growing industry in both nations diminish natural resources and ecosystems. India is undergoing tremendous economic growth, second only to China, yet its galloping population, together with poor policy and insufficient infrastructure threaten environmental disaster that could end up this growth. But, with a smaller man-land ratio than that of China and population over 1.1 billion-on verge of becoming, or perhaps already, the world's most populous nation, Indian policy makers lay emphasis more on 'inclusive growth'. Various poverty eradication and employment generation schemes in India and farmer's and agriculture protection schemes in China were initiated/implement by investing billions of dollars in their state exchequer. The significance of such projects was witness insignificance as both the countries record high rate of population growth that neutralised the economic growth. On the other hand, energy plays a vital role in country's economic development. But, if the country depend as on others countries mainly for petroleum products rob the economy at the same time. India and China are blessed with high concentration of minerals resources. But, high rate of demand and consumption make them depend on minerals rich nations. In this regard, China accessed more than India due to 370


India-China: Energy Security and Environmental Sustainability

their diplomatic co-operations and strategic location to the outside world. In some points, India-China shared common goals to solve the energy crisis and environmental sustainability through institutional research, knowledge exchange and participation in the global arena. At government level, both the countries agreed on helping each others in fighting energy crisis. This paper will focus on the overall joint energy security measures and sustainability issues that India and China took up together. An attempt will be made to compare between two countries in term of environment governance and global participation for energy security and environmental sustainability.

Background of the Study India-China exhibits much commonness in their national energy security and environment sustainability strategies. Being country of different capacity, India and China adopts different policies in implementing energy and environment security measures within the state or through bond and co-operation with others country. At national level, these appeared to be a positive developmentenvironment relationship. They believe that natural resource endowments and environmental governance appeared to be more important than development level in determining areas sustainability. Two countries being part of alliances such as the BRIC and BASIC can co-operate on technology and adaptation issues. As responsible nation in South East Asia Region, various projects were taken up at national level to consider each others in term of energy and environmental sustainability. Being the fast growing economy in the world, the problems encounter are more or less the same. In the name of sustainability and self-reliance, billion of dollar is invested at local and national level. But, changes were insignificance as the growing population dilute the progresses. Rapid urbanisation, economic growth and lifestyle changes make neglect in protecting environment as rapid loss of green cover for farmland extension and settlement was reported.


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India-China responses to climate change are also value- India's National Action Plan on Climate Change and China's National Climate Change Programme as examples. After Copenhagen pledges- the two nation promise in reduction in CO2 emissions intensity (per unit of GDP) by 2020 as compared to 2005 levels through domestic mitigation actions. But, Bina, 2010 has noted that the fate of China's experiment with green accounting is exemplary of the tension between environment and economic (and political) objectives and the impacts of the lack of a long-term strategy for Environment Protection Integration (EPI). Considering one of the strongest EPI measures available, Green Accounting System in China is now on hold, for mixture of methodological and political (opposition by some local authorities) reasons. In dissimilar to environmental issues, the last decade has witnessed a substantial increase in the world's oil demand, primarily because of the dramatic economic growth in the developing countries, India and China in particular. As late as 1993, China was self-sufficient in their domestic oil supply and demand. Since then, its GDP has almost tripled and its demand for oil has more than doubled. Today, China imports 3 million barrels of oil per day, which accounts for almost half of its total consumption. China's share of the world oil market is about 8 percent, but its share of total growth in demand since 2000 has been 30 percent. India's oil consumption is currently less than 40 percent of China's, but because India has now embarked on what the economist Vijay Kelkar calls the 'growth turnpike', its demand for oil will accelerate. Ironically, India's current high growth rates were partly triggered by the spike in oil prices since 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. The resulting balance-of-payments shock left India with almost no foreign currency reserves. The impact of growth in China, India and elsewhere on the global energy demand has been far-reaching. In 2011, for the first time ever, Asia's oil consumption exceeded North America's. However, Asia's growing impact became widely apparent only in 2004, 372



when the best global economic performance in a generation translated into a 'demand shock' that is unexpected worldwide growth in petroleum consumption level.As Yergin, (2006) found out that China's demand in 2004 rose by an extraordinary 16 percent compared to 2003, driven partly by electricity bottlenecks that led to a surge in oil used for impoverished electric generation. Therefore, there is need of taking into account, challenges and initiatives that took up by both the countries to uphold balance.

India's Challenges The challenges that India countenance for its energy security and environmental sustainability are large in number. Major challenges were highlight below: India energy import vulnerability and increases dependency is estimated 88 percent on Oil and 72 percent on Coal by 2013. It is a big challenge to the India policy maker to minimize the estimated import percent by reducing per capita consumption rate. Use of commercial energy increasing rapidly to residential and commercial sectors as estimated 1727 mtoe in 2031 against 284 mtoe in 2001. Such rapid change in the consumption rate envisages threat to the India's energy security policy. Poor electricity status- Over 287 million people without access to electricity (74 million households) and over 31,000 villages are yet to be electrified. Electricity supply plagued with 'Black-Outs' and 'Brown-Outs' India's energy demand is growing as per capita consumption increases against availability. India-Iran pipeline project was withdrawn as Pakistan being the geographical barrier in the construction of pipeline. Unplanned urbanisation and extensive industrial development associated with rapid social life style changes resulted into environment destruction beyond replenishment.


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Rapid rate of population growth due to lack of family planning among the society.

China's Challenges As a communist giant, Chinese government visage more challenges to feed its huge population in the same time to protect the environment from rampant destruction from urbanisation and industrialisation. Few important challenges were briefly listed: China imports 3 million barrels of oil per day, which accounts for half of its consumption since 2010 that challenge the Chinese economy development. International observers project China will import 5.9-6.9 million barrels per day by 2020 as per the increases in the per capita consumption level which is of great challenge to the Chinese government. China's share of world oil market is about 8 percent, but its share of total growth in demand since 2000 has been increased to 20 percent. India's oil consumption is currently less than 40 percent of China's. According to IEA statistic 2012, China coal dependent in terms of total energy by source is 70 percent against 55 percent for India. Since 2000, China alone has accounted for two-thirds of the global growth in CO2 emissions and has sixteen of the world's twenty most polluted cities. China's environmental crisis is one of the most pressing challenges to emerge from the country's rapid industrialisation. Billions of dollars have been spent to fight against the environmental related problems. According to World Bank, environmental degradation cost the China roughly 9 percent of its Gross national Income in 2008.

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India's Initiatives Since independence, Indian government took up different initiation for its energy security and environment sustainability. Few are listed below: By latest, India total budget outlay for the power (electricity) sector is Rs 60,384.02 crore (2014-2015) which is still less as compared with the requisite. For the same year, India's total outlay in Petroleum and Atomic Energy Research is Rs 80,677.82 and Rs 3430.00 crore. In addition to this, government imposes control on petroleum products like kerosene, diesel, and LPG prices apart from settling up of Kerala's Kudankulam Nuclear Plant with Russia. India National Oil Companies like ONGC Videsh Limited (ONGC: IN) have been engaged with large investments in countries such as Sudan, Angola, Russia etc. India-Vietnam co-operation on oil exploration mission in South China Sea. Environment Protection Act, 1986 and Directive Principles of State Policy of India constitution mention on protection and safeguarding of environment as duties to every citizen of India. National Environment Policies, 2006 and 'Green India' mission of India government adopted vital policies on conservation of environment and extend of forest area. The paper to the 12th 5-Year Plan talks of a scheme to fund states that bear the 'cost' of forest conservation. From present 21 percent, the planned proposed to make 33 percent of India geographical area under forest cover. The Fig: (1) shows India government budget outlay for the energy sector (2014-2015). Petroleum sector with Rs 80,677.82 crore occupied the top position. Government outlay another Rs 60,384.02 crore for electric, Rs 12,561.00 for Coal, Rs 8,213.42 for Nuclear, Rs 5,519.00 for renewable, and Rs 3,430.00 for Atomic India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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energy. Taking into account of high per capita consumption rate on petroleum products, India government put more importance on development of petroleum sector to reduce the import dependency. Fig: 1 India Budget Outlay on Energy Security (2013-2014)

Source: India Budget (2014-2015)

Fig: 2 Total Primary Energy Supply Mix in India

Source: IEA, 2009.

According to the total primary energy supply mix in India (Fig: 2), coal supplied the maximum energy used by India as comparing to the others energy sources. Here, the question could be arising that does the India own enough coal to provide energy in the future? It was followed by biomass and waste as the majority of the India population reside in the rural places based on biomass and waste for the energy. As per the sector wise energy consumption in India (Fig: 3), the 376



highest energy goes to industry sector. Industry sector is followed by residential and commercial sector as the change in social life style and introduction of various machines to cope with the modern era that consume energy in all sphere of activities. Fig: 3. Sector wise Energy Consumption in India:

Source: TERI, 2012.

China's Initiatives Chinese Government aware of increased energy consumption and environment threat. The major important measures that government initiated to control its increase energy demand and environment degradation were outline below: The China West-East energy pipeline project from Kazakhstan to Shanghai via Xinjiang was one of the biggest energy security projects that Chinese government ever step in. China target to cut its energy intensity 16 percent below 2010 levels by 2015 through implementing various course in her energy policy. In 2011, China Council approved to spend USD 372 billion on cutting energy use and pollution reduction by 2025, particularly to look into industry sector. Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) have invested over 200 energy projects in more than 50 countries that worth $ 50 billion to reduced her energy dependency on energy rich nation.


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Since early time, Articles 26 and Agenda 21 of the Chinese constitution deal with fortification of Environment and Sustainability as propaganda to all citizens of People's Republic of China. As early as India, the first Chinese Environment Protection Law was passed in 1979. National Environment Policies, 1980 and Green Accounting System, 1980 (UN SEEA-model) was implemented in the same year to implement policies for conservation and protection of the environment. Recently, Eco-Communities were set up in difference provinces of China mainland with active participation of the communities in conserving the nature. (E.g. Jiangsu province)

India-China Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI): Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is a comparative analysis of the environmental achievements, challenges and priority that indicate state's general environmental conditions capturing both historical resources endowments and achievement of policies and strategies undertaken by various stakeholders in conserving natural resources. Index reflect, anthropogenic activities of production, consumption and distribution that exert pressure on the environment, state air quality, water quality, land use and agriculture and forest and biodiversity, state of the environment and resource extraction on ecosystem and human health and lastly, policy response and society's effort to preserve environment. India's rank 101 out of 146 countries ESI report in 2005 and rank 125 in 2012 out of 132 countries. But, China's rank 116 out of 132 countries in 2012 that is much better than India. Both India and China formed many agencies to monitor the environment degradation at the state or global level. China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) formed in 1992 to participate globally to fight against the environment degradation. With the same purpose Indian 378



Council on Sustainability Development (ICSD) was formed in 2007. Various studies estimated economic costs linked to environmental degradation for China 1.8 to 3.05 percent of GDP and India 3.5 to 7.5 percent of GDP were invested to protect environment. Table: 2 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) for Indian States: ESI groups Most sustainability states (80-100 percentile)

States in ESI 2011 Mizoram Arunachal Pradesh Sikkim Nagaland Manipur Himachal Pradesh

States in ESI 2009 Mizoram Arunachal Pradesh Sikkim Nagaland Manipur Uttarakhand

More sustainability states Meghalaya (60-80 percentile) Tripura Uttarakhand Assam Odisha

Meghalaya Tripura Himachal Pradesh Kerala West Bengal

Moderately sustainability states (40-60 percentile)

Kerala Tamil Nadu Goa Karnataka Andhra Pradesh Maharashtra

Assam Chhattisgarh Goa Karnataka Odisha Tamil Nadu

Less sustainability states (20-40 percentile)

Chhattisgarh Jammu & Kashmir West Bengal Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan

Andhra Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra

Least sustainability states Bihar (0-20 percentile) Gujarat Haryana Punjab Utter Pradesh Jharkhand

Bihar Gujarat Haryana Punjab Utter Pradesh Rajasthan Source: CDF, Chennai, 2011


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The above Table: (2) shows the fluctuation in the performance of Indian States in regard to their investment for the Environment Sustainability. Among the 80-100 percentile group of states, Himachal Pradesh which was among the 60-80 percentile in the 2009 survey came up to 80-100 percentile indicating higher investment that replace Uttarakhand and vis-in-vis. Mizoram top the table and states like Bihar, U.P, Gujarat etc. remain among the 0-20 percentile as a least sustainability states. Similarly, Jharkhand which was among the 20-40 percentile in 2009 survey slip down to 0-20 percentile in 2011. Table: 3 State wise Standardized Scores on Environmental Budget

Source: CDF, Chennai, 2011

From the above Table.3 Standardized Scores shown at Kuznets's Environment Curve Table suggested that except West Bengal and Jammu Kashmir, most states with higher ESI score reveal higher allocations of environment in their budgets. States like Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim have the highest expenditure on environment as a percentage of net state GDP whereas, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are very badly in the area of expenditure on renewable energy as percentage of net GDP of the state.

Environmental Governance In regard to environmental governance, both the state set up difference department or agency to look after the management and monitoring of environment Issues. India and China as a member of UN participate in the world wide efforts to preserve 380



and protect the environment. Comparative governance structure and participatory status were given below: China is a Socialist state-Resources governed as state, union and concurrent list while India a Sovereign Socialist Republic Secular Democratic-Resources governed at all levels: provincial, city and country level. Ministry of Environment Protection is the apex government ministry to look after the issues of environment in China and Ministry of Environment & Forests is the vital ministry of the government in India to deal with the environment related issues. Enhancing participatory approaches were introduced in both the countries from grass roots level to make people aware of catastrophic causes by the ecological collapse. Policies on limited use of economic and fiscal instruments to incentivize sustainable production and consumption are introduced at ministry level. India and China cooperate regarding building of 'global' as well as 'bilateral' institutional architecture for environmental governance like IPCC to encounter with global warming and climate change.

Forestry and Environment outlay of India budget: The plan outlay of Ministry of Environment and Forest is Rs 2,043.00 crore. (2014-2015). Out of Rs 2,043.00 crore, Rs 873.80 crore is allocated for Ecology and Environment and Rs 75.00 crore for environmental monitoring and governance. The fund allots will be utilised in research, establishment of institution, functioning and management of the various government department WHO pact with the protection and conservation of environment particularly forestry activities.


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China Environmental Development In support of environment protection in China, Li Keqiang, the then Chinese Prime Minister said that “It is no good having prosperity and wealth while the environment deteriorates”. The “airpocalypse” injected a new urgency into local debate about the Chinese environment protection issue in 2008. Since that, China started it is first carbon market. Companies and government spend $ 275 billion over five year cleaning up the air after “airpocalypse”. China ranks 116 out of 135 countries in ESI, 2012. That indicates high performance in the field of sustainability as compared with the previous index. Introduction of Eco-communities in number of Chinese provinces and Green Accounting System for all development related projects to underscore the impacts on environment.

India- China Response to Climate Change: India's National Action Plan on Climate Change, 2008. China's National Climate Change Programme, 2007. Post-Copenhagen pledges reduction in carbon dioxide emission intensity (per unit of GDP) by 2020 as compared to 2005 levels through domestic mitigation actions (China by 4045% & India by 20-25%) Post Cancun-bilateral cooperation regarding climate change adaptation and mitigation Two Asian giants being a part of alliances like the BRIC and BASIC can cooperate on technology and adaptation issues Joint research on Environment and Development under TERI and CAEP

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Comparative Comments on India-china Environmental Issues 1. Water: Both the countries' report shows declining in per capita water availability and deteriorating water quality especially in urban area. Low waste water treatment efficiency and limited use of economic instruments such as water pricing, pollution discharge cess and water right policies Access to potable water and sanitation facilities is still a key concern in India in both rural and urban areas, but China show better report in this regard. Table: 1 Declining Per Capita Water Availability ('000 CU.M)

Source: http//www.cwc.nic.in/

2. Forest: Forest cover in both countries is similar - China (18%) and India (21%) and forest resources largely controlled by government in the two countries. Degradation is a key issue in terms of quality of resources and land conversion as demand and supply gap resulting in unsustainable exploitation of the natural resources. All thought, in term of ownership and management; participatory approaches followed in India involve communities; e.g. 28% forest area under Joint Forest Management (JFM). Such cases are very rare in China.


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Shifting (jhumming) cultivation is a key threat to forest resources in India; illegal conversion of forestland (for development purposes) is a greater cause of concern in China. 3. Land: Deteriorating quality of land: 1.75% of global degraded land is in India and 7.6% of global degraded land is in China. China ranked first and India ranked second in terms of rural population affected by land degradation. Similar causal factors: natural, population and economic pressures resulting in unsustainable land utilization and management. Land reforms have been more successful in addressing the issue of distributive justice in China than in India as India has followed participatory approaches to address land issues through large scale programmes like MGNREGS and Joint Forest Management.4. Solid Waste: Growing industrialization and urbanization resulting into increasing industrial and municipal solid wastes (MSW) 960 MTPA industrial waste and 57 MTPA MSW in India; 1.76 BTPA industrial waste and 148 MTPA MSW in China. There is no segregation of waste at source leading to reduced efficiency of treatment facilities; rising levels of waste mismatched by inefficient collection, processing and disposal. Recently, India launched National Urban Renewal Mission to improve efficiency in urban infrastructure including waste management in 63 cities. Pollution of land and water resources has been noticed due to open disposal in both the countries. Overall waste generation is much higher in China (15-16% as against 1.5% in India), although China has a better database for monitoring waste generation as compare with that of China.

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Fig: 4. Ecological Footprint: China and India

Source: GFN and CII, 2008

According to the Fig: (4) in term of individual nation, USA led the three top position, China ranks 2nd and India ranks 3rd (in terms of total ecological footprint). As compared to world ecological footprint average (2.2 global hectares), China and India represent 1.6 and 0.8 global hectares that are very low per capita ecological footprint indicating un-efficiency of its resource and energy use.

India's Energy Security: India government implement varied measures and policies to fight against the energy shortage. Few strategy areIndia budget outlay on Energy Security is Rs 1, 70,785.26 crore (2014-2015). Indian Government spends more than $ 9 billion on fuel subsidies-2009. To help millions who live on less than $ 1 a day, government imposes control on petroleum products like kerosene, Petrol, Diesel etc. India taken up various strategies planning with International Energy Agency (IEA) and diplomatic cooperation with energy rich countries for her long term energy secure.

China's Energy Security: China government too approved to spend huge amount of money to encounter energy shortage and environment degradation. Best efforts and policy are discussed: India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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China spending to developed renewable energy total 1.8 trillion yuan ($294 billion) in the five years through 2015 as part of national efforts to counters Climate Change. China invests another 2.3 trillion Yuan in key energy saving and emission reduction projects to minimise the intensity of import dependency. China views its 'me first' mindset toward secure energy resources as prudent. Taking advantage of its geographic position, China makes a long-term bilateral relation and co-operation with her neighbouring countries for its energy strategy. Lastly, China as a watchdog over International Energy Agency (IEA) strategy for her energy policies and secure.

India-China Joint Venture In the most recent development in a trend of co-operation between India and China on energy security phrase that has slowly emerged over the past few years. On June 19, 2012 India's Oil and natural Gas Co-operation (ONGC) and the China National Petroleum Co-operation (CNPC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) intended to strengthen existing exploration and production (E&P) operations in Burma, Sudan and Syria. They discuss to look ahead making joint bids on foreign oil and gas fields for E&P in the future. In this regard, D.K. Saraff, Managing Director ONGC Videsh Limited having said that, “We should collaborate and bid together; there is no point in raising prices” First India-China energy project started in 2006 when ONGC and CNPC signed bilateral oil cooperation and joint crude purchases. ONGC and CNPC signed MoU to strengthen exploration and production operations in Burma, Sudan and Syria on 19 June, 2012. The Energy and Resource Institute (TERI) and China Academy 386



for Environmental Planning (CAEP) joint research on Environment and Development: India and China 1997-2007, that emphasis on development through sustainability criteria. The India-China pipeline project across the Burma from the Bay of Bengal to Southwest China as an integral part of China's plan to diversify energy trade routes and will significantly shore up China's energy security. The New School's India-China Institute (ICI) was established to address issues of resource management and environmental sustainability in 2012 to exchange technology and knowledge between the two biggest economies in Asia.

Rivalry Although, India and China developed political rivalry since the 1962 Indo-Chinese War. Beside, political milieu they always compete for the energy self reliance. Few can be mentioned that led to their rivalry: China's interference on India-Vietnam South China Sea oil exploration mission that triggered the bilateral relation between the two nations. In fact, the genesis of the rival goes back to China claim of South China Sea as a part of their maritime territory which was against the Vietnamese Government. The US-Indian 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement platforms for India energy security interests that hedging against China. Competition and high energy prices presage rising tensions between China and India, as they rely on others for their energy supply, on other hand, they are emerging economy in the world. China's efforts to mitigate its 'Malacca dilemma' over Indian Ocean to enhance the PLAs Navy capacity for 'far sea defence' which is a threat to the India maritime security. China's activities in the Indian Ocean has inevitably stirred Indian fears of Chinese 'encirclement and geo-politics'. India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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Recurrent China PLAs intrusion/incursion at international border area of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir that make Indian defence policy commotion.

Solutions Owing to increase in population and changing lifestyle and the development in the field of science and technologies consumption of energy resources and environmental issues is rapidly increasing in the world. To maintain renewable and nonrenewable resources and our environment for our future generation (i.e. sustainable development) must do focuses on the following points especially for India and China and other developed countries: India and China must drastically change their energy strategy towards renewable energy. The government of both countries must commit huge resources for rapidly up scaling infrastructure and supply of technologies for energy security. A radical change must make in energy sector's institution structure. Local entrepreneurs must be encouraged via technical and financial support mechanisms. Greater effort must make to draw China and India into global energy governance institutions like IEA. India and China should look forward to creating “Asian Union” focus for cooperation to ensure energy security rather than conflict.

Conclusion India and China reliance on coal for its maximum energy consumption and huge import of petroleum based energy sources. High dependencies on non renewable energy resource are the main challenges of both the energy and environment in both developed and developing countries of the today's world. To secure and to accomplish sustainable development, the energy 388



resource and environment and also to reduce the dependency on imported fossil fuels use of alternative source of energy i.e. renewable energy source like solar, wind, hydro etc are very much desirable. Moreover, in the case of India and China, they have to chart out a course of action that meets its growing energy needs in a sustainable and environmentally benign fashion. Effective laws and public participatory approach from the grass roots level measures should be implementing in protecting environment in the earliest. On the other hand, Joint research for better management on environment and development highlight positive result inviting further cooperation and both countries must be serious for long-term projects for energy security and environmental sanctuary.

References : Ardhendu Sen: “Nuclear Deal and Energy Security”, Economic and Political Weekly, 41, (16), pp. 1490. (2006). Andrew Phillips: “China and the Challenges of Energy Security and Strategic Stability”. (http://www.eastasiaforum.org) ANU- Australia National University. 2011. Andrew Phillips, Chindia and the challenges of energy security and strategic stability, East Asia Forum. 9 May 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/09/chindia-and-the-challenges-ofenergy-security-and-strategic-stability/ 3 July, 2014. Beina Xu: “China's Environment Crisis”, Council of Foreign Relations Publications. 2014. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmentalcrisis/p12608 3 July, 2014. “China and India's Growing Energy Rivalry”, Businessweek. (http://www.businessweek.com). 2014. China and the environment: “The East is grey”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worstpolluter-largest-investor-green-energy-its-rise-will-have 23 September 2014 China to spend $372 billion on cutting energy use, pollution, Reuters 23 September 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/22/us-china-energyidINBRE87L01920120822 . India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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China's Spending on Renewable Energy May Total 1.8 Trillion Yuan Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-30/china-s-spendingon-renewable-energy-may-total-1-8-trillion-yuan.html 23 September 2014. Daniel Yergin: “Ensuring Energy Security”, Foreign Affairs, 85 (2). Council on Foreign Relations Publications, pp. 71-72. (2006). Elizabeth, C: Economy, “Environmental Governance: The emergence economy dimension”, Environmental Politics,15. (2). pp-173. (2006). Ethan Goffman: “India and the Path to Environmental Sustainability”, ProQuest Discovery Guides. 2008. Erica S. Downs: “The Chinese Energy Security Debate”, The China Quarterly, No. 177, Cambridge University Press Publications, (2004). pp-21-41. Gao, M., Zhou, J and Xu, J: “Framework of Green National Accounting System in China” Report. Statistics School, Renmin University, China (2006). Pp-1. Herman Daly: “Definition of Sustainability Environment”, 1990. Indian Expenditure Budget Vol.I, 2014-2015, p-31-33: Online accessed on 23 September, 2014. Ingmar V. Homeyer. Epigov Common Framwork, Berlin-Institute for International and European Environmental Policy, EPIGOV Paper No.1, 2006. Is China the global game-changer for sustainability? Guardian Sustainable Business, theguardian.com, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/china-development-renewables-sustainability 23 September 2014. Kent Calder: “Asia's empty gas tank”, Foreign Affairs, 75, (2), pp. 22. (2006). Kwang Ho Chun: “Analysing China's Energy Security: A source for Conflict?”, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 23, (1) pp. 89-114. Institute for National Security (1998). Lee Liu: “Sustainability Efforts in China: Reflections on the environmental Kuznets Curve through a locational Evaluation of “Eco-Communities””, Annals of the American Geographers 98 (3) pp-624 (2008). Lee, J: “China and India's Growing Energy Rivalry” Businessweek (2010). Mansi Mehrotra. “India's energy Security Interests in Central Asia”, The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). Article No:1431, 2009. Nandakumar, J.: “India, China and Energy Security”, Speaking Freely (www.atimes.com), 2014.

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Olivia Bina “Environmental Governance in China: Weakness and Potential from an Environmental Policy Integration Perspective”, China Review,10 (1) (2010). http://www.jstor.org/stable/23462248 30 June, 2014. Published on the Obele Oil Corp's website. http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/dec2010/gb20101215_79506 5.htm Rosalind Reischer: “China and India Unite on Energy”: The Diplomat, (2012). Rahul Pandey: “How Can India Achieve Energy Security”? Economic and Political Weekly, 41. (4). pp-305.(2006). RK Pachauri: “Environment and Development: China and India”, Workshop of CAEP-TERI study, Beijing. 27 December, 2010. TERI, “India's energy security”, New Delhi, 2000.


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India, China and the Asian Energy Security C. Vinodan Assistant Professor &Chair, Centre for Strategic and Security Studies, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India Email: [email protected]

Abstract The events of recent years have brought Asia into the international limelight with serious challenges and opportunities for cooperation and conflict. The rise of China and India as major players in the evolving global politics is a significant development with long- term geo-strategic implications in the new century. How these new rising powers especially China contributes their respective capabilities will critically shape international relations in the twenty-first century.Asian countries are now reshaping the international system. The conditions for international relations are changing to the advantage of large countries with a strong state, and China plays an important role in this process. Yet these two Asian great powers demonstrate sharp contrasts in terms of their political systems, economic models, and social structures, despite their common aspirations for greater stature on the world stage. They have also maintained a very complex relationship that is weighed down by history but also offers promising opportunities in an era of globalization. This paper examines the changing role of rising powers in international relations and the key factors influencing the foreign policies of India and China to meet their growing energy needs. Energy security has been more and more important in Asia as well as in the world today. It is more and more difficult for a single country to make sure of its own energy security in the globalized world now. In this backdrop, this paper explored how the quest for energy security has transformed both countries' foreign policies. The paper argues that energy and resource security have become critical issues on the economic and strategic agenda in Asia as demand and dependence on imported supplies grow. Major Asian powers are now redefining their foreign policy to meet the growing energy needs. This is most evident from the grand strategy adopted by China since 1991. As a rising power and global aspirant India is also evolving its energy strategy to meet the growing energy needs. China and India are becoming major energy investors in Central Asia, Africa, West Asia and other energy rich regions. This changing scenario is feeding geopolitical rivalries among major global players. In recent years, Asian countries have made some progress in bilateral and multilateral dialogue, cooperation and coordination in energy field. However, they are still far away from a regional architecture of energy security. The paper further argues that formulation of a grand strategy for India and China is an imminent reality to meet their growing energy needs. This is especially significant in the realm of global energy governance.

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India, China and the Asian Energy Security

Introduction The events of recent years have brought Asia into the international limelight with serious challenges and opportunities for cooperation and conflict. The rise of China and India as major players in the evolving global politics is a significant development with long- term geo-strategic implications in the new century. How these new rising powers especially China contribute their respective capabilities will critically shape international relations in the twenty-first century.Asian countries are now reshaping the international system. The conditions for international relations are changing to the advantage of large countries with a strong state, and China plays an important role in this process. Yet these two Asian great powers demonstrate sharp contrasts in terms of their political systems, economic models, and social structures, despite their common aspirations for greater stature on the world stage. They have also maintained a very complex relationship that is weighed down by history but also offers promising opportunities in an era of globalization. This paper examines the changing role of rising powers in international relations and the key factors influencing the foreign policies of India and China to meet their growing energy needs. Energy security has been more and more important in Asia as well as in the world today. It is more and more difficult for a single country to make sure its own energy security in the globalized world now. In this backdrop, this paper explored how the quest for energy security has transformed both countries' foreign policies. The paper argues that energy and resource security have become critical issues on the economic and strategic agenda in Asia as demand and dependence on imported supplies grow. Major Asian powers are now redefining their foreign policy to meet the growing energy needs. This is most evident from the grand strategy adopted by China since 1991. As a rising power and global aspirant India is also evolving its energy strategy to meet the growing energy needs. China and India are becoming major energy investors in Central Asia, Africa, West Asia and


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other energy rich regions. This changing scenario is feeding geopolitical rivalries among major global players. In recent years, Asian countries have made some progress in bilateral and multilateral dialogue, cooperation and coordination in energy field. However, they are still far away from a regional architecture of energy security. The paper further argues that formulation of a grand strategy for India and China is an imminent reality to meet their growing energy needs. This is especially significant in the realm of global energy governance.

Energy Security in the Emerging Asia Over the past decade, Asia has emerged at the center of global energy and commodity markets as demand for these commodities has accelerated due to the region's rapid economic growth. This trend is particularly salient in the case of energy. Rapid industrialization, a massive scale of urbanization, rising per capita income, and increased levels of transportation and motorization have all stimulated demand for oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity. Although the boom in energy has been centered in China, regional demand for other raw materials and commodities, including iron ore, copper, aluminum, and rare earth minerals essential for a range of high-tech products and defense applications, has also skyrocketed. Owing to Asia's relatively limited resource base in many of these raw materials, the region's import dependence for critical energy and industrial inputs is rising dramatically. Moreover, the geographic distribution of resources Asia needs to fuel economic growth is highly uneven, particularly in the case of energy. A rapidly rising share of Asia's petroleum will need to be imported long distances from the Persian Gulf and Africa, historically unstable regions of the world. Consequently, there is a profound and growing sense of insecurity across the region over the reliability of future energy supplies and fears that shortages or disruptions could become severe bottlenecks to continued economic growth and political stability (Aaron 2010; Lord Malloch 2010). For most Asian governments, particularly in China, economic performance and 394



job creation are seen as ensuring the bedrock for political legitimacy and stability. Similar anxieties are beginning to affect markets for and investments in other key raw materials. For example, concerns over supplies of rare earth minerals have begun to intensify competition to lead the way in high-tech clean energy products while heightening the potential national security consequences of shortages of materials necessary for critical military applications. Consequently, energy security and security of supplies of other key raw materials have increasingly become a matter of the “high politics” of national security rather than just the “low politics” of domestic energy and economic policy.1 The Asian region accounts for a large and growing share of the world's energy-demand growth. With imports rising faster than consumption, the region is rapidly becoming the new centre of gravity for global energy markets (See figure 1). Such dynamics have made energy security a key policy concern for Asian states. The naval capacities of these countries are also growing swiftly, prompting some analysts to ask whether an arms race has begun (Till 2012). Although no one would suggest that this build-up of naval power is primarily driven by the need to secure energy supplies, the Chinese and Indian governments have identified energy and resource security as one rationale for developing maritime power, particularly blue-water capabilities.2 Conventional meaning of energy security is fast changing to accommodate the new world realities. Energy security can be defined as a condition in which a nation and all (or most) of its citizens and industries have access to adequate energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future, free from serious risks of major disruption of service (Hancher and Janssen 2004). Insecurity can arise from various causes, such as geopolitical instability, natural disasters, terrorism, poor regularity designs, or a lack of investments (Redgwell 2004). The literature on energy security suggests that different countries have developed different strategies for securing their energy supply.3 Many aspects of modern life, economies, and the relations between India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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states are shaped by the development of energy resources and technologies. Figure 1: Primary Energy consumption

The reliance on energy in every field of life has made energy security tremendously important for states and societies. Especially for modern militaries, securing energy resources has become of utmost importance since the beginning of the twentieth century.4 The modern concern with energy security began with the ArabIsraeli war of 1973-4 and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)'s use of the “oil weapon.” OPEC's boycott of major energy-importing countries in Europe and the US has shown how important it is for modern societies to secure their supply of energy; it became clear that an energy crisis can hurt everyone in society, including government, business, and individuals. Consequently, securing energy resources has become a key aspect of foreign policy making of major powers since 1970s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the concerns for energy security acquired a new dimension: The newly independent energy-rich ex-Soviet republics in the Caspian basin have become a playground for great-power rivalry. The US and EU, both having suffered from dependency on Middle Eastern energy in the 1970s, have begun increasing 396



their political and economic influence on the region to gain access to energy resources. “The New Great Game” was coined as a term to describe the rivalry between the Western powers and a weakened Russia for the control of the Eurasia region and its energy resources (Kleveman 2003). Since energy-hungry China has begun pursuing aggressive foreign policies to secure the supply of energy to its growing market, this rivalry has taken a “tripolar” shape. Large-scale reliance on imported energy is not a source of energy insecurity in itself. For most countries, most of the time, imports are a reliable solution to the economic challenge of fuelling growth. Specifically, access to seaborne energy markets appears to significantly increase an economy's ability to cope with energysupply crises. Moreover, there is no evidence that any country needs military or diplomatic capabilities to secure all the energy it can pay for. Because hydrocarbons are traded globally, competition for energy resources is dealt with by the price system. The boom in energy consumption from emerging economies, in a context of slow supply growth, has not triggered any wars, but rather has led to a large increase in the equilibrium price of oil. Energy security is a holistic concept which varies from country to country according to need. For the exporting country it implies continuous access of market for the selling of energy sources, whereas, for the importing country, it essentially implies “ensuring uninterrupted supplies of energy to support the economic and commercial activities necessary for the sustained growth of the economy”(Willrich, 1975). The critical relevance of this concept for India and China emanates from a growing imbalance between the demand for energy and its supply from indigenous sources, implying, therefore, growing import dependence for each nation.China's search for energy security has come under close international scrutiny in recent years. This is partly because of the economic impact on other countries most notably changes in the price and availability of some energy resources. But there are also important political dimensions to India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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these debates. For example, supporters of a liberal global order are concerned that China is undermining attempts to pressure authoritarian states to reform. If such states do not like the conditions that accompany aid and economic relations with the West (or more correctly, some in the West), then -if they have things that the Chinese want they can deal with them instead. They might insist that you don't have political relations with Taiwan, and want guarantees that their investments are safe, but they won't pressure you to liberalise your political or economic systems. And as an added bonus, the repayment terms of Chinese development loans are often cheaper than those offered by places like the World Bank.

Changing Energy Geopolitics and the New Energy Strategies of China and India China and India have been witnessing a steady increase in their energy consumption for many years. International Energy Outlook (2013) predicts that by 2040 Chinas energy use will be double the US level (See Figure 2). Increasing economic growth characterized by high industrial activity has been the main reason behind it. China and India are at the stage in their economic development at which oil consumption has started to take off. According to calculations made by the ADB, the income elasticity of oil consumption has historically been about 0.5, so that 1 percent economic growth translates into 0.5 percent growth in oil consumption (ADB 2008). In 2007, China consumed 7.9 million barrels of oil per day, which accounted for 9.3 percent of the world's total consumption; India consumed 2.8 million barrels of oil per day, accounting for 3.3 percent of the world's total consumption (International Energy Outlook 2008). As these economies keep growing, the average annual oil demand growth of China from 20072015 is predicted to be 0.41 million barrels per day, and that of India to be 0.125 million barrels per day (ADB 2008).The increasing demand for oil is mainly due to the expansion of the transportation sector, especially the growth in the number of motor vehicles. Over the past decade, the number 398



of motor vehicles on the road in both countries has increased dramatically. In these countries, the positive income effect associated with robust economic growth is more important than the negative effect of higher oil prices. Thus, in the gasoline markets in China and India, the rise in demand due to large numbers of first-time car buyers more than outweighs the fall due to higher prices. Figure 2: Energy Consumption by select countries

Source: International Energy Outlook 2013

Although consumption of coal accounts for a major share of the total energy use, imported petroleum takes an irreplaceable position in the energy mix of both China and India. Some Western counties criticise that China's and India's growing energy demand is the main factor that pushes up international oil prices. Robust industrial growth and increasing domestic living standards have left China with a nearly insatiable thirst for energy. And oil is playing an integral part in meeting that demand. Although coal remains the chief source of energy, oil fuels China's transportation, plays a crucial role in industry, and is a significant input in agriculture. During the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, China ranked 25th in world oil demand. Today, China is the world's second-largest consumer of oil and the largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels. China's growing demand for oil comes at a time when the India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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petroleum industry is experiencing perhaps the most significant paradigm shift since the OPEC embargo in 1973. High crude prices combined with technological advances are allowing supermajors, petro-states, and independent oil entrepreneurs to unlock a new class of previously unattainable unconventional oils. These oils are globally more abundant and widespread than their conventional predecessors. How China navigates this complex new oil terrain will have far-reaching consequences for domestic affairs, international trade, the environment, and global security. However, unlike their developed country counterparts elsewhere who had achieved their industrialization and urbanization without energy security and environmental concerns, the Asian countries have to face the twin threats of energy security and global climate change in the course of their industrialization and urbanization.5 China and India have been hailed as the fastest growing markets in the world. Although the development of these two economies have taken a totally different path altogether, energy security and independence poses a common threat to both these gigantic nations. At present, both these economies rely on fossil fuels and coal for most of their energy needs which are growing at a hasty pace. Going forward, both these countries will have to rethink their development agenda in the light of the global warming and the approaching peak oil production.6 For most Asian governments, particularly in China and India, economic performance and job creation are seen as ensuring the bedrock for political legitimacy and stability. Similar anxieties are beginning to affect markets for and investments in other key raw materials. For example, concerns over supplies of rare earth minerals have begun to intensify competition to lead the way in high-tech clean energy products while heightening the potential national security consequences of shortages of materials necessary for critical military applications. Consequently, energy security and security of supplies of other key raw materials have increasingly become a matter of the “high politics” of national security rather than just the “low politics” of domestic energy and economic policy.7 400



China has enjoyed rapid economic growth ever since it embarked on reform and opening up to the world in 1979, although the speed has varied from time to time. The surge forward was particularly impressive from the start of twenty-first century until the financial crisis, with the economy zipping along at a doubledigit growth rate. In recent years, its economy has turned into a driving locomotive for the entire Asian continent. Undoubtedly, the country has become an important factor in global politics and economics with a tremendous impact on the political, social and economic development of all other states on our planet. Today's emerging new world order is unimaginable without China playing a crucial role in it. (Hauser and Kernic 2009).China has achieved remarkable economic growth during the past three decades, with Real Gross Domestic Product increasing at an average annual rate of over 10% between 1978 and 2008 (World Bank 2009). China's rapid growth since 1978 has been highly dependent on energy. As its economy has expanded, energy use has increased by over 200 percent and by nearly 150 percent per capita, with over half of this growth occurring in the years since 2001. This tight connection between growing energy use and economic development means that energy policy is a central concern of the government. Following its economic development, China's demand for energy, particularly oil, has skyrocketed. According to IEA research, almost half of global oil demand growth in the next five years will come from China. Looking farther ahead, the scenarios in the IEA's World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, 2010a) show China importing 79% of the oil it consumes by 2030, and accounting for a larger increment in oil demand than any other country. In terms of total energy consumption, oil accounted for 16.6 percent in 1990, peaked at 22.3 percent in 2002, and has gradually declined thereafter to 16.5 in 2010. Coal has always been the main form of energy in China, largely due to its vast reserves (third largest in the world) that are available in varying quality all over the country. Until the 1980s, coal was used in power generation, industry, and transport, but today it is


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almost exclusively used for power generation (accounting for 76.8 percent of total electricity generated in 2010) and in some heavy industries (IEA, 2011a; China Electricity Council, 2011). The country also has extensive hydropower resources, accounting for 16.3 percent of electricity generation in 2010; in the same year natural gas accounted for 1.7, nuclear power for 1.8, and wind and other renewable sources for 1.2 percent. Oil accounted for only 2.2 percent of electricity generation, much less than it did in earlier years (China Electricity Council, 2011). Industrialization and improvement in living standards have entailed a surge in energy consumption. China has surpassed the U.S. to become the world's biggest energy consumer, according to new data from the International Energy Agency, a milestone that reflects both China's decades-long burst of economic growth and its rapidly expanding clout as an industrial giant(Spencer and Oster 2010). China's ascent marks "a new age in the history of energy," IEA chief economist Fatih Birol said in an interview. The country's surging appetite has transformed global energy markets and propped up prices of oil and coal in recent years, and its continued growth stands to have long term implications for global energy security. From 1990 to 2010, oil production rose from 138.3 mt to 204.7 mt but Chinese oil consumption soared from 114.4 mt to 458.1 Mt. While the growth rate of domestic production of crude oil dipped from 1996 to 2000, consumption grew at 8.15 percent, peaking in the 2001-2005 period. As it became more dependent on imported oil, China came under increasing pressure to secure reliable supplies. In 2001, the country devised the zou chuqu (go out, go global) policy, instructing and motivating state-owned and private Chinese enterprises and banks to become closely involved in natural resource procurement and infrastructure development abroad to secure resources that China could not supply itself (Mol, 2010, p. 10). In short, the Chinese government no longer abhors the idea of importing oil, as it can use its enormous foreign exchange reserves (steadily amassed since the 1980s) to help leverage loans 402



for oil deals, such as those negotiated in recent years with Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and Turkmenistan. Between 1993 and 2006, China's oil consumption nearly doubled from 2.9 million barrels per day (b/d) to 7 million, representing an annualized growth rate of 7 % (EIA 2005; EIU 2006). China's coal consumption in 1980 was about 603 million standard coal equivalent (SCE) tons but by 2007 it had grown to 2.655 billion SCE (Bo 2010). China's domestic energy supply has not expanded to keep up with such enormous growth in demand, and by 2009, the PRC was one of the largest net energy importers in the world. Reliance on oil imports has become particularly acute. China became a net oil importer in 1991, and by 2008, it imported about 3.6 million barrels of oil per day (International Energy Agency 2009). By 2020, China is projected to import somewhere between 60 and 80% of the oil it will consume (Downs 2006:1). Chinese demand for imported oil accounted for 4.5% of the global total in 1993, and by 2006, it was the world's second largest consumer, accounting for 8.6% of total demand. Over a third of total global demand growth during the past 5 years has come from the PRC. By 2030, China is expected to be the world's largest consumer of oil, with demand outpacing that of the Japan and Europe combined (Rosen and Houser 2007:28). Domestic supplies of natural gas and coal are more abundant for the PRC. Still, it appears as though China's ability to meet domestic demand for energy will depend on its success in expanding imports for the foreseeable future (Downs 2004). This means that China's energy security strategy plays an incredibly important role in its overall foreign policy approach (Zweig and Bi 2005:25). Internationally, China's energy security strategy is based on the importance of expanding supply access and stability. This leads to four specifi c objectives: Increasing and diversifying overseas investments, building additional import avenues such as transnational pipelines, establishing a strategic petroleum reserve, and engaging in so-called oil diplomacy with important supplier states (Downs 2004:32-39).


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China's New Global Energy Policy The New Energy Security Concept was first raised by Chinese President Hu Jintao in the G-8 Summit at St. Petersburg in July 2006. He said: To ensure global energy security, we need to develop and implement a new energy security concept, (based on) mutually beneficial cooperation, diversified forms of development and common energy security through coordination. We share the same international energy market, the same energy transport routes and the same energy production spots and face high oil price fluctuations. This means there are few countries that can achieve energy security without international cooperation. China's rapid development has drawn worldwide attention and has been referred to as a “peaceful rise” in recent years. The country's booming economy feeds Beijing's insatiable thirst for sufficient, stable, and secure energy sources(Wen-Sheng 2010).China's integration into the global economy has led to a transformation of its foreign policy (Wacker 2006; Scholvin 2007). Traditionally China has tried to remain self sufficient and mainly relied on domestic energy resources to drive its centrally planned economy. Since the economic liberalisation of the Eighties, energy consumption has dramatically increased and domestic supply cannot cover domestic demand anymore. This new situation forced China to adopt new strategies in the energy front. China's new energy policy adopted a multifaceted approach towards energy security to deepen political and commercial relationships with all energy producing nations and to aggressively invest in oil fields and pipelines around the world. Applying this approach to its relations with other states has produced mixed results. While China's energy diplomacy has brought about opportunities for cooperation with some of its neighbors, notably some countries in Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia, it has become a source of conflict with some other neighbors, especially those with border disputes over maritime territories which may have rich natural resources. This is more evident from the recent developments South China Sea and East China Sea. In South

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China Sea, China has developed serious divide with some of its neighbours and in East China Sea the Sino- Japanese rift has widened further. But China has successfully entered the African region and Chin's investment in the energy sector in Africa is growing. The most significant aspect of China's new energy diplomacy is to expand and diversify energy sources to meet the growing gap between domestic supply and demand. In this context the PRC has placed on emphasis on expanding the number and diversity of overseas sources of oil imports. This strategy not only increases the overall supply of energy available to the Chinese economy, it mitigates the effect of country-specific supply disruptions and decreases the political leverage that any single supplier state enjoys vis-a-vis the PRC (Stratford Analysis 2010). China's National Oil Companies are among the world's largest companies. In 2009, at a time when most international oil companies cut back on their investment spending, Chinese NOCs, along with other Chinese companies, invested in 10 overseas acquisitions for a total of USD 18.2 billon. In the same year, China imported just under four million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil, up 14% from 2008, and the first year that China imported more than half (51.3% according to IEA data) of its crude oil consumption. China started to import LNG only in 2006, and began importing pipeline gas in early 2010. To many Chinese policy makers and scholars, this dependence on imported energy is a harsh reality they must face, and a spur to action. The PRC became a net oil importer in 1991 and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) became the fi rst Chinese National Oil Corporation to enter the international market when it purchased an oilfi eld in Peru. Since then, CNPC , Sinopec, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) have made signifi cant equity investments in at least 30 countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, North America, Russia, and Asia (Houser 2008:156). These equity investments guarantee China's rights to specifi c exploration, production, and import India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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rights within the host country. By 2005, the value of overseas investments was approximately $10 billion. Between 2005 and 2009, investments expanded rapidly, fi rst as a result of increasing crude prices and then later because of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities and so-called loans-for-oil opportunities that resulted from the worldwide economic slowdown (Cheng 2008). Despite China's efforts to diversify its sources of energy supply, most of China's projected oil imports will continue to come from a small number of countries. In 2009, the top ten crude oil suppliers to China (in order of import volumes) were Saudi Arabia, Angola, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya and Kazakhstan. As many other net oil importers, especially in Asia, China relies heavily on suppliers in the Middle East with 47% of its total imports in 2009 originating from there. That high degree of reliance is unlikely to change, even though China has been diversifying supply to Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and Russia, where NOCs are seeking to expand their upstream activities. The NOCs most frequently cited objectives for investing internationally are to increase their oil and gas reserves, to expand production and to diversify their sources of supply.8 These goals are now supported at the highest levels of government; when the State Council level National Energy Commission (NEC; authorised in 2008 and formed in January 2010) met for the first time in April 2010, “securing energy supply through international cooperation” was declared to be one of its six major areas of focus. This is the latest expression of the “Going Abroad” policy. This concept dominates the narrative concerning the actions of the Chinese companies, which are seen by many as responding to a political concern with energy security, despite the reforms that have made the NOCs independent entities. By the spring of 2010, Chinese NOCs had made almost 300 overseas equity investments, valued at over $200 billion (Sainsbury 2010). In a single tour of Latin America in 2009, Vice President Xi Jinping signed a deal with Petrobras in Brazil valued at approximately 406



$11 billion and agreed to triple Chinese rights to Venezuelan oil in an agreement with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez valued at approximately $8 billion (Spencer 2009). Prospects for cooperation between the PRC and Venezuela seem favorable down the road, as Chavez declared that, ''all the oil China needs for the next 200 yearsit's here. It's in Venezuela'' (Sainsbury 2010). Outright acquisition of foreign oil companies has been a trickier process for China's NOCs. After CNOOC's very public failure to acquire Unocal in 2005, Chinese leaders were sensitized to the political baggage that came along with the expanding global activities of the NOCs. But the 2008-2009 economic recessions depressed the market value of many fi rms and, looking for a way to invest over $2 trillion in foreign exchange holdings, the PRC decided to redouble its M&Aefforts. Between June 2009 and June 2010, Chinese NOCs spent approximately $25 billion on M&A, accounting for over one-fi fth of the global total during that period. The PRC plans to spend at least $60 billion more on energyrelated mergers and acquisitions in the next 10 years (Wood Mackenzie 2010). The economic downturn during 2008 and 2009 also led to a large number of ''loans for oil'' deals between Chinese NOCs and resource-rich, capital-poor countries. These deals comprised about 70% of the overall investments made by the NOCs in 2008 and 2009 (US Energy Information Administration 2009). Loans were part of the larger deals with Brazil and Venezuela described above, but the PRC also made agreements with Russia ($25 billion), Kazakhstan ($5 billion), Turkmenistan ($3 billion), and Ecuador (Spencer 2009). Altogether, these agreements have given China the rights to import nearly 75 million tons of crude oil every year (Zhang 2010). China's overseas investments are designed to give the PRC access to greater amounts of oil and also to diversify the sources from which it imports. CNPC (and its publicly traded subsidiary PetroChina) is most active in terms of overseas investments with about 80% of total Chinese foreign equity production. According to IEA data, successful acquisitions India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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allowed China's NOCs to expand their overseas equity shares from 1.1 mb/d in 2009 to 1.36 mb/d in the first quarter of 2010. Chinese oil companies are now operating in 31 countries and have equity production in 20, though their equity shares are mostly located in four countries: Kazakhstan, Sudan, Venezuela and Angola. The increased equity oil level is due to the new acquisitions and higher levels of production in Kazakhstan in early 2010.

Looking Beyond West Asia: New Opportunities in Central Asia and Africa Chinas new energy policy also gave thrust to looking beyond West Asia and searching for new avenues for energy investment and energy trade. Though West Asian countries continue to be the most important suppliers of almost half of China's imported oil, China has attempted to decrease its dependence on imports from the volatile West Asia through investments in African countries such as Angola, Sudan, Libya, and the Congo; and Russia and Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan. Chinese energy strategists believed that investments in the Central Asian countries can also significantly decrease sea-lane transportation risks. In this context, China turned towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), for its new energy diplomacy in Central Asia. The government in Beijing encourages its state energy companies to invest in new cross-border energy projects and a trans-Asian energy infrastructure. Because many recent oil and gas investments have been in Central Asia and Russia and because it is looking for additional ways to physically transport energy from overseas back to China, the PRC has been expanding both its domestic and international pipeline operations. China has an extensive domestic pipeline network that is growing by about 6% per year (US Energy Information Administration 2009). Although most pipelines are still concentrated in the industrialized Eastern region, the Urumqi-Lanzhou pipeline opened in 2007 and allowed oil to be shipped from Western China and beyond the Eastern markets by both pipeline and rail. 408



However, China's energy rich neighbour, Russia, is also perceived as an unreliable supplier. Many of Russia's energy supply promises have gone unfulfilled with the price of Russian oil imports quadrupling in 2005 from the previous year while the actual delivery fell short by 8 million tons from the promised delivery of 15 million tons. China is also wary of Russia's aggressive and unpredictable oil diplomacy that often caters to the Kremlin's political and economic aspirations. Given China's uncomfortable dependence on the US and Russia, and lack of opportunity in the traditional oil fields in the Middle East, the government has intensified efforts to diversify imports. As a latecomer in the world energy market, China's unpopular energy investments in some of the oil-rich “rogue” states such as Iran, Sudan, Burma and Venezuela (Collier 2005), have spurred international criticism. However, China's subprime investments that exacerbate its relations with the Western countries and undermine UN sanctions are largely inevitable. “In most parts of the world where the biggest [energy] opportunities are, the Western majors are already there,” says Philip Andrews- Speed, a China energy expert at Scotland's University of Dundee in Edinburgh. In addition to the premium that Chinese companies often pay for energy asset acquisitions, China's scramble for energy investment opportunities could undermine the vision for becoming a responsible global power (Lelyveld 2006). Central Asia has increasingly become a corner stone of China's energy security policy. On the diplomatic side, China has emphasized regional cooperation that encompasses Russia and Central Asia on important energy issues. Out in the oil fields, Chinese national oil companies continue to compete fiercely for multi-billion dollar deals to acquire and develop oil reserves. The proximity of the oil fields and relatively weak US presence in the region make Central Asia an attractive energy supplier whose energy interests have not already been dominated by major western oil companies. Compared to China's regional competitor Russia or the politically unstable West Asia, Central Asia could India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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effectively diversify its energy sources and better absorb supply shocks that could threaten China's economic development. For energy rich Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, Chinese investment has been viewed as a potential leverage against Russian control over their access to international energy market. As the Chinese national oil companies construct gas pipelines from the landlocked Central Asia, the region's reliance on Russian pipelines is likely to diminish, thereby undermining Russia's control over the region's energy resources and economic development. As such, China's aggressive energy policy may jeopardize China's relations with Russia, which is reclaiming its international influence in times of high oil prices. To make the emerging situation in its favour China is giving greater significance to regional cooperation arrangements. One example of such increased regional cooperation is the SCO.9 Inside the SCO, China and Russia are the two dominating players. The relationship between both countries can be described as an uneasy mix of cooperation and competition for regional influence. For China, however, oil and hopes for turning the old Silk Road across Central Asia into an “energy road” has increasingly become a priority (Fairclough 2006). Some experts, including Lieutenant General William Odom, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, say that SCO serves as a vehicle for Russia and China to assert their influence in Central Asia and curb US access to region's vast energy supplies (Beehner 2006). But the competition between China, Russia, and other regional powers as India and Iran, for dominance inside of the organization might however hamper its future development into a strong and effective alliance. China's fi rst important transnational pipeline opened in 2006 and connected Xinjiang province to imports coming from Kazakhstan. The project was completed by CNPC and a Kazakh firm called Kaz MunaiGaz (Auyezov, 2009). The pipeline has a current capacity of approximately 200,000 barrels per day, but is being expanded and will be able to transport twice that amount 410



by the end of 2011. This pipeline also connects the PRC to a line coming from Western Siberia. In the Russian Far East, the Eastern Siberia-Pacifi c Ocean (ESPO) pipeline is being completed in two stages and will include a spur line that will link northeast China to about 300,000 barrels per day from Eastern Siberia and offshore fi elds in the Pacifi c. Chinese NOCs have also upgraded their refi ning capabilities in order to widen the range of imported crude that they are able to process. Historically, Chinese refi neries have been designed to accommodate light and sweet crude. This prevented the PRC from relying too heavily on Middle Eastern imports, which tend to be heavy and sour. In recent years, however, refi ning capacity has rapidly grown to accommodate Middle Eastern imports, and also the high-acid and high-sulfur varieties that come from African exporters like the Sudan. A third additional import avenue will be available once construction is completed on a $3 billion oil and gas pipeline that will run from the port of Kyaukryu in Myanmar to the Chinese city of Ruili in Yunnan province. The 1,500-mile pipeline will eventually end in Kunming, allowing about 150,000 barrels of oil per day and natural gas imports from Central Asia and the Middle East to enter China without passing through either the Malacca or Lombok Straits. Further down the road, there has been talk of developing a pipeline through Pakistan to the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. The port, which was fi nanced with over $1.2 billion by CNPC, is currently linked to China via the Karakorum highway, which is notoriously narrow and subject to closures due to cracking or obstruction from landslides. The PRC has invested over $300 million to upgrade the highway, increase rail capacity running to Gwadar, and there is even talk of launching a spur line to Gwadar off of a hypothetical Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (Lai 2007:528).

New Oil Diplomacy and Africa policy Geographical diversity has been an important objective of China's new energy diplomacy. While half of PRC's oil imports come from the Middle East, a full 30% comes from Africa, while only India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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three percent comes from the Asia-Pacifi c region (US Energy Information Administration 2009). China's heavy involvement in oil-rich countries around the world has led to closer ties with some of its most important energy suppliers. Between 2003 and 2007, estimates of China's foreign assistance grew from $1.3 billion to approximately $25 billion. Over half the assistance took the form of government investment, about 40% concessional loans, and about 5% was comprised of grants or debt cancellation (Lum, Fischer, Gomez-Granger, and Leland 2009). Geographical distribution of the assistance was notable, with 44% going to Africa, 36% to Latin America, and 22% to Southeast Asia. China's new Africa policy has been widely discussed in the Western press and development politics. China has been blamed to subordinate democracy and human rights to its economic interests and to back up unsavoury regimes like Sudan with foreign investments as well as by selling weapons and providing diplomatic support. On the other hand, China has become Africa's biggest donor of development aid. African countries like Angola have replaced loans from international donors, e. g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that come with a whole range of governance conditions, with grants from China, that come with no strings attached. Most Chinese development aid goes to countries where Chinese companies invest in resource extraction or other economic interests. Chinese development cooperation and diplomacy has transformed the playing field on the African continent and has pushed other international donors to the side. Recipients of PRC assistance tend to be the same countries that are increasingly important energy providers to China. Approximately 45% of assistance was directed to the natural resource sector and approximately 43% was dedicated to infrastructure projects. In addition, nearly 70% of China's investments in infrastructure projects are in Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Sudan, three of which are major oil exporters to the PRC (Lum et al. 2009:8). These figures all lend credence to the argument that China's energy objectives are guiding its emphasis on developing soft power infl uence in certain countries (Cook 412



2008). The Chinese may also be using arms sales as a way to facilitate energy deals with host states. According to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Myanmar, Sudan, and Venezuela were six of the nine largest recipients of Chinese arms between 2000 and 2009 (SIPRI 2010). Sudan, for example, has purchased Chinese tanks and aircraft and has relied on Chinese assistance to construct small-arms factories (Eurasia Group 2007. China is seen to be the primary military benefactor of other controversial regimes like Myanmar, through which the PRC is currently constructing a massive oil and gas pipeline (Newmyer 2009). It is important to note that many Chinese arms transfer agreements were in place before the PRC began importing oil from the countries in question. Countries like Iran and Angola received large shipments of Chinese weapons well before the 1990s, and for reasons that had more to do with their ongoing conflicts than China's energy needs. The motivation for China's decision to provide defense capabilities to oil exporting countries for at least two reasons related to its search for energy security. First, arms transfers can generate leverage for the PRC if the recipient state becomes reliant on Chinese weapons and/or technology. Second, Chinese weapons may increase the ability of the recipient government to maintain stability within its country, thus protecting existing equity investments made by Chinese NOCs. China's alleged ''oil diplomacy'' is also defined by Beijing's behavior in key international organizations and by high level visits between Chinese officials and various leaders of energy-rich states. Organizationally, Beijing has used its veto-wielding seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a way to delay, and/ or water-down sanctions against both Sudan and Iran. While finally agreeing to a peacekeeping force in Sudan in 2007 and more stringent sanctions against Iran in 2010, the Chinese have used their institutional influence in the UNSC in order to prevent any drastic and potentially destabilizing action against two of their largest sources of imported oil. The PRC has also chosen to India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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use international organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to engage members like Russia and Kazakhstan on energy issues.

Conclusions Energy and resource security have become critical issues on the economic and strategic agenda in the Asian region as demand and dependence on imported supplies grow. Regional powers, most notably China, have responded with nationalistic strategies to secure control over energy and commodity supplies. China, India, and other countries in the region are also becoming major energy investors in Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, and other pariah states.The global energy and raw materials sector was gripped by what many called a “super-cycle” of long-term commodity price increases. While major regional powers seek to ensure access to key commodity supplies, energy and resource nationalism and a “zero-sum” atmosphere over controlling future oil, energy, and commodity supplies have become a source of regional rivalry, tensions, and potential conflict. Competition and national suspicion over control of energy and other resources is spilling over and affecting the tenor of the region's most important strategic rivalriesmost importantly, the rivalry between the United States and China. Driven by needs for energy and raw materials, China is destined to become a significant player in key energy- and resource-exporting regions, such as the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. China's new involvement in these regions could have a powerful impact on the strategic goals of other major power in the world. Moreover, given that Asia lacks a regional architecture and the institutions to manage conflict, such competition has the potential to destabilize the region. Asian stability is central to the global prosperity and security; thus, the potential for conflict driven by energy competition and resource insecurity must become a conscious and carefully crafted dimension of energy strategies of all leading players in the region.

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Notes and References : 1. For an earlier look at the geopolitics of energy security in Asia, see Mikkal E. Herberg, “Asia's Energy Insecurity: Cooperation or Conflict?” in Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 349-78.). 2. Information Office of the State Council, 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces', April 2013, http://eng.mod. gov.cn/Database/White Papers. India's 2007 maritime military strategy includes a chapter on 'Maritime Trade and Security of Energy' in which 'energy' appears 75 times. The 2009 Indian maritime doctrine states that 'security of energy has a strong maritime component'. Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, 'Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy', http://www.irfc-nausena. nic.in/irfc/ezine/maritime_strat.pdf; Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 'Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009', p. 65. 3. The UN-mandated and US-led coalition's campaign to secure Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1990 and 1991 can be understood within this context. The US and others prevented Iraq from becoming the second-largest oil producer in the world, controlling the Persian Gulf transit and threatening Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer, militarily. It is also argued that the US and UK's military intervention in Iraq in 2003 can be evaluated in this context. As the argument goes, especially after the 9/11 attacks, the nature of USSaudi relations has become ambiguous in ways that might have led the US and UK to unlock the Iraqi oil potential for world markets by removing the Baath regime. 4. History proved that First and Second World Wars in the twentieth century were also linked with energy use. Winston Churchill's decision to use petroleum by replacing coal for the British Navy to maintain its hegemony before World War I shaped the course of the war; it also led the Allies to invade the oil-rich territories in the Middle East. Energy resources were even more important in World War II. One of the major reasons that Japan attacked the US was the latter's oil embargo against the former's empire. The Axis powers, lacking substantial energy resources, based their strategies on first gaining access to energy-rich areas, such as Romania and the Caspian Sea. The Allies, on the other hand, “floated to victory on a sea of oil” and used nuclear power for the first time to conclude the war. See Barry Barton(2004) , Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment , Oxford University Press.


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5. Yunchang Jeffrey Bor and ZhongXiang Zhang (eds.) (2010)Energy Economics--Special Issue: Asian Energy in the Context of Growing Security and Environmental Concerns, EWC, WASHINGTON). 6. All of the historical energy data in this section is drawn from “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009,” BP plc, June 2009. There are other good sources of energy data and forecasts, including the annual World Energy Outlook by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the U.S. Department of Energy's annual International Energy Outlook (IEO), and an annual forecast from ExxonMobil. These, however, are primarily forecasts with limited historical and country-by-country data. BP's annual publication is the only consistent and detailed annual countryby-country, fuel-by-fuel source of historical data, and it is also the most widely available. 7. For an earlier look at the geopolitics of energy security in Asia, see Mikkal E. Herberg, “Asia's Energy Insecurity: Cooperation or Conflict?” in Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 34978.). 8. Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese NOCs signed billion-dollar investment deals involving equity ownership of oil resources in countries like Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan (US Energy Information Administration 2009). In other countries like Angola, the PRC subsidized NOC investment with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic assistance (Simao 2008). CNPC, largest of the NOCs, has financed port construction in Sudan, Pakistan, and Myanmar (Niazi 2005; Storey 2006). In 2006, it opened an overland pipeline from Kazakhstan into China through the city of Urumqi and in October 2009, CNPC began construction of a 500-mile overland oil and gas pipeline through from the Myanmar coast to the Yunnan city of Kunming (Blanchard and Aizhu 2010). 9.

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SCO was formed in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan primarily to deal with terrorism and separatist threats in the region. Energy policy and the development of a common infrastructure have become a recent focus of activity.



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Sino-Indian Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century Sriparna Pathak Raimedhi Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Plot Number II, D/18, Major arterial road, Action Area II, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal, Pin Code 700156, India Email: [email protected]

Abstract Interdependence, a key aspect of globalisation has led to states and their fortunes inextricably being tied together. While the underlying objective is self reliance, global economies have and continue to become more interdependent. Relations between India and China, both of which are important players in the 21st century, are characterised by high level of economic complementary. In an era, in which energy security becomes a key challenge, India and China, both net importers of energy sources have more to gain through collaboration and interdependence. China requires access of market for the selling of energy sources, whereas India needs to ensure uninterrupted supplies of energy to support the sustained growth of its economy. The growth patterns in both the countries have led to an energy dependent lifestyle, which in turn has led to a high demand for energy sources. This paper is divided into three thematic areas which circumscribe Sino-Indian energy cooperation in the 21st century. Transactional Cooperation: India and China offer each other large markets and a large industrial base; which can be cross leveraged in order to enhance energy cooperation. Equipment supplies, capital and manpower can create robust and resilient market linkages, including those in solar and nuclear energy. Strategic Cooperation in Supply Chains Both have multiple state oil companies and both regard overseas investment as an integral component of energy security. Both have been increasingly targeting the same assets in the same host countries. Global Partnerships - The Potential for Co-Investments Both India and China have exponentially scaled up their overseas investments over the past two decades. This presents unbounded potential for commercial cooperation, and can strengthen the bilateral relationship. Key Words: Energy, cooperation, competition, manufacturing, development, interdependence.)

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Sino-Indian Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century

Introduction Interdependence, a key aspect of globalisation has led to states being tied in a complex web, wherein functioning solely as envisaged by classical realist theories is no longer possible. As such, currently global economies have become more interdependent, even though the underlying objective is to become more self reliant. The theory of complex interdependence as propounded by Keohane and Nye become important in this context. As stated by Keohane and Nye, states and their fortunes are inextricably tied together. In the current international system, various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between states and societies have increased, as a result of which the use of military force and power balancing are decreasing, even though they remain important. As such the decline of military force as a policy tool and the increase in economic and other forms of interdependence increase the possibility of cooperation among states in the international system. (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 4) The 21st century is often called the Asian century with the roles of India and China increasing in importance at the international stage. The relation between these two Asian players is a mix of conflict and cooperation, as it meanders through a boundary dispute, Buddhist linkages and an increasingly robust trade tie. The paper takes a neo liberal perspective to understanding the complementarities between the two and to further understand the ways in which cooperation between India and mutual benefits. The point to note is that the relations are characterised by high level of economic complementary given similar needs and challenges that the two face. In an era, in which energy security becomes a key challenge, India and China, both net importers of energy sources have more to gain through collaboration and interdependence. China requires access of market for the selling of energy sources, whereas India needs to ensure uninterrupted supplies of energy to support the sustained growth of its economy. The growth patterns in both the countries have led to an India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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energy dependent lifestyle, which in turn has led to a high demand for energy sources. According to the World Energy Outlook, 2012, global energy demand from 2010-2035 will increase by one third, with China and India accounting for 50 per cent of the growth (International Energy Agency, 2012). In 2007, the World Energy Outlook stated that China will need to import 60 per cent of its oil needs, while India will need to import 87 per cent of its total oil needs. ((International Energy Agency, 2007) In this backdrop, there are a lot of factors which call for SinoIndian energy cooperation. The countries' growth rates, similar desires for energy security, increasing imports of crude oil are just a few to name. This analysis is divided into three thematic areas which circumscribe Sino-Indian energy cooperation in the 21st century. Transactional Cooperation: India and China offer each other large markets and a large industrial base, both of which can be cross leveraged in order to enhance energy cooperation. There are many sub sectors where equipment supplies, capital and manpower can create robust and resilient market linkages, including solar and nuclear energy. If we look just at solar and wind energy, it is observed that as China's manufacturing capacity exceeds domestic demands, the need for solar and wind market overseas has become an essential for China. China has provided nearly US$40 billion dollars to other countries' solar and wind industries over the past decade. The governmental policy and financial support, primarily from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are conducive to China's quests for solar and wind markets abroad. If we take a look at solar energy in China, according to the Solar Energy Industries Association global PV module, manufacturing capacity was roughly 70 GW in 2012, while demand was estimated at 31 GW. The country's solar industry expanded in 2004 through the extensive use of subsidies along with US$ 47.5 billion in credit. As a result, manufacturing giants such as LDK Solar Co. (LDK) and Suntech Power Holdings Co. (STP) emerged. Sales soared as 422



Europe and the U.S. offered incentives for renewable energy. However, due to a spurt in building, overcapacity emerged. Also, after the global economic crisis in particular, declining prices for solar products, along with global trade spats took a toll on the solar industry in China, leading to the failure of several firms. Resultantly, almost 200 Chinese companies linked to the solar industry in China either went out of business or merged in 2012. (Jones, 2013) Much of the slack of manufacturing capacity could be absorbed by developing markets such as India. India has the capacity to absorb this excess capacity in China, given the fact that India has a massive solar potential, estimated at 20-30 MW per square km. of land area and plans to install 10GW of solar power in the 12th Five Year Plan period. (Planning Commission of India, 2012) China could facilitate this goal through equipment supply underwritten by concessional lending rates by Chinese State owned banks. Power sector equipment and loans from China can help accelerate India's development and provide revenues to Chinese manufacturing firms. Besides economies of scale, what are also required as a main contributor to any country's lower PV prices are well developed supply chains. Clearly, a supply chain to India can be argued for. Two examples of existing Chinese investments in India are those of Shanghai Electric Group Co. which signed a contract to supply power equipment to India's Reliance Power Ltd. in which the total investment was worth US$10 billion; and the Power Construction Corporation of China which won a bid to build a power plant in India, for India's Infrastructure a Leasing & Financial Services Ltd. The total investment was worth US$2.4 billion in this case. Other laudable agreements include those between Chinese firms such as Sinopech and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) Ltd. on the one hand and Indian firms on the other. China Development Bank has already agreed to provide US$ 2 billion in loans to Indian power generation company, Lanco Infratech Ltd. to buy power India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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equipment. Also, Reliance Power Ltd. had obtained a US$ 1 billion loan from Chinese banks. If such cooperative agreements could be expanded, mutual benefits for the two sides could be increased. Table 1: Loans Received by Indian Companies from Chinese Banks Company Name

Lender Bank

Amount

Year

Reliance Power Ltd.

China Development Bank Bank of China Export Import Bank of China

US$1.1 billion

2010

Reliance Communications Ltd.

China Development Bank Corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

US$ 1.93 billion

2011

Reliance Communications Ltd.

China Development Bank Corporation, Export Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

US$ 1.18 billion

2012

Lanco Infratech Ltd.

China Development Bank

US$2 billion

2012

Essar Energy plc

China Development Bank PetroChina International

US$ 1 billion

2013

(Sources: The Economic Times, 2012; Reliance Press Release, 2011; IBN Live, 2012; The Hindu Business Line, 2012; The Hindu Business Line, 2013)

Also, Chinese companies could take advantage of India's goal to raise the share of manufacturing in the economy from 16 per cent to 25 per cent by 2022. Such a set up would also be beneficial for China if investments into Indian labour intensive businesses increase. Rising wages in China could be tackled by setting up manufacturing facilities in India. Also, infrastructure, which has been an attractive sector for foreign direct investors, could also be an attractive avenue for Chinese investment as India looks to spend US$ 1 trillion over the next five years. About half of this investment is expected to come from the private sector, as the government has announced a series of measures to facilitate the investment. 424



The following table shows the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Indian companies have received from Chinese companies from April 2000 to February 2013 Table 2: Data on FDI Inflows from China into India (between April 2000 to February 2013) Cumulative FDI Inflows (all countries in India)

US$191.76 billion

FDI Inflows Percentage Share of China's Rank in from China Total FDI Inflows India's FDI Inflows

Sectors that attracted FDI Inflows from China

Top FDI Equity Inflows Received from Chinese Companies

US$244.76 million

Automobile Industry (40 percent) Metallurgical Industries (17 percent) Power (7percent) Construction (Infrastructure) Activities (5 percent) Services Sector (4 percent)

Beiqi Foton Motors Co. Ltd. Baosteel Resources Co. Ltd. ZTE Corporation China Railway 18th Bureau Corporation Ltd. Shanghai Electric Group Co. Ltd. TBEA Shenyang Transformer Group Ltd. Chenguang Bio-Tech Group Co. Ltd. Ecoloutions New Energy Investment (Asia) YAPP Automotive Parts Co. Ltd.

0.13

31st

(Source: Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, FDI Synopsis on Country China)

As is clearly visible a lot of potential for further Chinese FDI inflows into India remains. The joint statement following the talks between previous Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his visiting Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang in May 2013, underscored the need for bilateral cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy. India's Integrated Energy Policy outlines that the nuclear energy development plans of the Indian government are contingent upon the import and subsequent indigenisation of light water reactor (LWR) technology. China National Nuclear Corporation has multiple designs for light water reactors and must consider technological development in cooperation with stakeholders in India1. From India's point of view, nuclear power will occupy a larger proportionate share on the energy generation basket in the next two decades.

1 China National Nuclear Corp. and Canada's Candu recently completed a successful two-year test of bundles of alternative fuel in the two grid connected reactors at Qinshan, in which the bundles operated alongside conventional fuel in the same reactor. The alternatives included thorium as well as uranium “waste” recovered from light water reactors.


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In the thermal power sector, Chinese equipment offers significant competitive advantage to thermal power producers. According to some estimates equipment costs per unit of power produced are up to 30 per cent cheaper when imported from China. Moreover, Chinese State owned banks are able to provide credit to large Indian power sector players at much cheaper rates as seen in the following table. Bundled together, the package is very appealing, and certainly offers the Indian private sector in particular, the leverage they require to scale up generation to meet incumbent electricity needs of over 400 million Indians without access to electricity. (National Sample Survey, 2010-11) Table 3: China's Competitive Advantage: Fixed Cost (per unit of power) in INR

Fixed Cost (per unit of power) in INR

Indian EquipmentBharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL)

2

10 - 13

Chinese Equipment

1.4 - 1.5

4-6

Source: Kumar and Thomas, 2011.

Also, the two sides welcome the opportunity for their outstanding scientists to work together in the International Thermonuclear Reactor (ITER) project, which is of potential significance in meeting the global energy challenge in an environmentally sustainable manner. (Singh, 2010:18)

Strategic Cooperation in Supply Chains Both India and China have multiple state oil companies and both regard overseas investment as an integral component of energy security. Both have been increasingly targeting the same assets in the same host countries. Combining investments from the two countries along with technological cooperation will definitely yield better resource outputs. Examples of energy assets acquired by the two countries include Peru, Syria, Sudan, Columbia and Iran. In Iran's Yadvaran Oil field for example, China's participation was through Sinopec, while India's was through OVL. In Sudan's Greater Nile Oil Project, China National Petroleum Corporation's investment was 40 per cent, while that 426



of India's OVL was 25 per cent. Both CNPC and ONGC have expressed interest in constructing an oil pipeline from South Sudan to Kenya's East African coast in order to bypass the traditional export route through the north. In order to achieve strategic cooperation in supply chains, the objective should be to create globally competitive value chains by facilitating trade and investment. Further cooperation could be envisaged within the context of the development of the Chabahar port located on Makran coast of South east Iran. India has played an active role in the development of Chabahar port pledging a substantial US$100 million in May 2013, towards further refurbishment of the port. China too has offered 60 million Euros as credit facility to Iran in July, 2013. While this has generated concern in certain quarters, particularly given the history of Sino-Indian bidding wars the examples of Turkmenistan and Nigeria being examples, China's interest in Chabahar can actually be in favour of both parties, wherein the two can join hands together, instead of competing and pushing up prices further. . Joint bidding will also help in beat competition from others. Both countries have much to gain from collaborative codevelopment of Chabahar. A stake in Chabahar will extend Chinese infrastructure assets Westwards, thus ensuring proximity to the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, Chabahar provides an alternate route for the transport of Chinese natural gas from Turkmenistan through Iran, in case of disruption of the Central Asian pipeline. A stable partnership between India and China in Chabahar would allow the countries to pool their risks in a volatile region. Table: Interconnectedness with the Persian Gulf: Country Oil Demand (2012)

Proportion Imported from the Region

Bilateral Trade with GCC

China

9.5 million barrels per day 70 - 80 percent

US$133 billion

India

3.6 million barrels per day 65 - 70 percent

US$141 billion

Source: World Oil Outlook, OPEC, 2012 India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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The International Energy Agency has projected that Asia could soon account for up to 90 per cent of oil exports from the Middle East. China and India will no doubt account for the largest proportionate shares. Rapid operationalisation of Chabahar could create a systemic hedge against supply chain disruptions which would adversely affect both economies. India could also use the port's potential for Kabul-New Delhi trades. If the two can better align their economic and political interests, more joint exploration projects can clearly be visualised.

Global Partnerships - The Potential for Co-Investments Both India and China have exponentially scaled up their overseas investments over the past two decades. This presents unbounded potential for commercial cooperation, which can create a commensurate ripple effect in strengthening the bilateral relationship. Indian companies have been looking to expand eastwards. Energy giants OVL and GAIL have led this movement by acquiring a stake in the Myanmar-China pipeline with an investment of US$1.33 billion. Private businesses, acting as subcontractors, such as India's Punj Lloyd, have also benefited from such cooperation. Similarly Indian companies including Reliance Industries, OVL and Cairn India are vying for 30 offshore oil and gas blocks that Myanmar has put on offer.2 Chinese oil major CNPC has also been short listed. Myanmar is estimated to have US$75 billion worth of gas reserves and gas is likely to be a key transition fuel for both the Indian and Chinese economies, and joint development of the vast reserves off the cost of Myanmar is certainly an interesting option.3 The two also work together in Syria, where they jointly hold stakes in 36 producing fields, as well as in Sudan. Both CNPC and ONGC are among companies that have expressed interest in 2 Myanmar began reforming its foreign direct investment law and providing greater revenue incentives for international company investments in 2012. 3 Myanmar has 7.8 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, according to BP Plc data, worth about US$75 billion at benchmark prices for gas futures traded in the U.K.

428



building an oil pipeline from South Sudan to Kenya's East African coast, to bypass the traditional export route through the north. (Sharma, 2012) The African continent too provides a fertile landscape for cooperation between the Indian and Chinese private sector as seen in the following table. Indian investments in Africa total roughly US$35 billion, while by late 2012 China had investments totalling roughly US$70 billion. The African labour force is agriculture concentrated and the continent represents one of the world's fastest growing consumer markets. There are numerous possibilities of converging private sector engagements in Africa, particularly in sectors such as energy, infrastructure and telecommunications. Chinese and Indian Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in Africa are increasing their investment into sectors such as telecommunications, food processing, manufacturing, infrastructure, tourism, back offices services etc. Firms from the two countries have similarities in their African operations. MNEs from both have started playing a significant role in facilitating mutually reinforcing links between trade and FDI in Africa. (Broadman, 2011: 3) As such, Chinese and Indian MNEs increasingly in joint ventures with African firms foster exports from Africa to a wider set of markets located outside the African continent. In 2011, Bharti Airtel teamed up with China's Huawei in Africa in US$400 million deal to modernise and expand Airtel's 2G and 3G network infrastructure in African countries. (Baru, 2014) Bharti Airtel has teamed up with China's telecom technology major Huawei in Africa in a US$400 million deal to modernise and expand Airtel's 2G and 3G network infrastructure in African countries. Deals and enterprises like these will further cooperation and mutual benefit.


429


Table: Africa's Rising Spending Capacity: Countries

Population (2009 in millions)

2010 Spending US$ billions.

2020 Estimated Spending US$ billions.

EAC and COMESA Kenya

40

23

37

Ethiopia

83

23

43

Uganda

33

15

30

Nigeria

151

115

167

Ghana

24

15

29

Senegal

13

10

16

South Africa

49

215

315

Angola

19

14

18

Zambia

13

10

23

ECOWAS

SADC

Source: Euromonitor Africa Consumer Spending 2010

Also, the two can look at the possibilities of building pipelines to tap West Asian, Central Asian and Russian energy sources. This would be beneficial to other Asia Pacific countries as well to ensure energy supply. Such a scenario would fall in line with Boillot's and Labbouz's conceptualisations in which the cooperation between the two Asian powers have two possibilities. In the first scenario, there is a high possibility of a continuing expansion in bilateral trade between the two. Through such a mechanism a reduction in the joint pressure exerted on the rest of the world would reduce. This is termed by Boillot and Labbouz as the “Chindia” scenario. In the second scenario, a joint China and India effect would be on third markets, despite tightening of trade links between the two. They add that through this mechanism there would be a strengthening of strong complementarities between the two economies which present fairly similar factor endowments but possess well differentiated economic structures. (Boillot, and Labbouz, 2006: 2893) 430



Thus an expansion in Africa or Latin America would strengthen the complementarities between the two and would also bring about benefits to the third market.

Conclusion: Considerable progress has been made in Sino-Indian relations, as the two move from a more competitive framework of bilateral relations to a more cooperative structure. Energy and foreign trade are the two most important drivers of the complementary relation between the two. In order to ensure continued development of both the countries, further areas of cooperation are being developed, in which transactional and strategic cooperation become necessary. Competition as a lens to perceive the relation between these two important Asian countries is increasingly becoming outdated. Besides furthering the already existing arenas of cooperation between the two, furthering and devising alternative and cooperative strategies becomes necessary as both proceed along the trajectory of development. Trade and two way investments have huge potentials for the purpose and need to be tapped as such. In order to increase the advantages accruing from mutual cooperation, what also needs to be addressed is the deficit of mutual trust. If the string of pearls theory is taken for example, the arguments range from China's attempts to keep India in check to China's need for trade ports for its own security needs. In matters such as these, the need is for more communication, and if the ports built are for common benefits, then both parties need to be taken on board. India's oil explorations in South China sea and its greater levels of friendship with countries such as Vietnam in the region for example, also do not need to be seen as a challenge or a threat to Chinese interests. In such cases, need for greater trust and the fact that both the countries need to ensure uninterrupted supplies of resources such as oil needs to be kept in mind- because the future of international relations lies in economic growth and cooperation between countries to a large extent. This is precisely the reason as to why the 21st century is no longer a hegemonic India and China Relations: Historical, Cultural and Security Issues

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century or characterised by bipolarity between super powers but is known as a multi polar century. Given the competitive advantages the two respectively possess, there is a vast area in the world for common development. India's 12th Five Year Plan, which requires an investment of more than US$ 1 trillion in infrastructure creation, brings opportunities for Chinese companies, which can offset the problems of oversupply in the Chinese market through such an arrangement. Similarly joint ventures in other countries and exploring energy operations collaboratively will also immensely help the two. Interdependence is the focal point of the relations between the two and will help the two in furthering economic development and prosperity. As such complex interdependence is the theme which guides the relationship between the two- wherein a maximisation of economic benefits for the two through cooperation, while protecting their own key national interests becomes the basic strategy for furthering their domestic and international goals.

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