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Individual and Organizational Determinants of Wage Disparities in Israel's Local Authorities Rita S. Mano To cite this article: Rita S. Mano (2011) Individual and Organizational Determinants of Wage Disparities in Israel's Local Authorities, Sociological Focus, 44:4, 339-353, DOI: 10.1080/00380237.2011.10571402 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00380237.2011.10571402

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Individual and Organizational Determinants of Wage Disparities in Israel's Local Authorities Rita S. Mano* University of Haifa

In this study I compare hypotheses derived from a resource-based view of management with those based on an institutional perspective to test whether wage levels in local authorities are more likely to reflect technical or allocative efficiency measures, the former deriving from "autonomous" revenues from private sources, the latter from policy-based allocation of resources. A focus on wage variations for 5,033 employees from 83 local authorities shows that the level of autonomous revenues lowers the wages for women and Arab employees but not for men and Jewish employees. The results suggest that local authorities use a differential wage allocation, probably indicating increased access to privatized and outsourced employee recruitment. Moreover, the results show that equal opportunity notions, presumably inherent in social policy guidelines, do not ensure interorganizational homogeneity in wages: metropolitan and larger local authorities are more likely to use technical than institutional measures of organizational success. I conclude that neoinstitutional hypotheses that focus both on the competitive and institutional aspects of governance are differentially applied in regard to wages.

This study analyzes how technical and allocative definitions of performance factors affect wages in local authorities. More specifically, I seek to show how (1) technical efficiency, i.e., autonomous, and (2) allocarive efficiency, state-allocated resources, of performance affect wages (Bosch, Pedraja, and Suarez-Pandiello 2000:71). This distinction is important because market-based pay in services provided by local authorities fluctuates more than in other public sector organizations because of increased outsourcing practices (Leavitt and Morris 2008). Such practices that originally led to extensive political and economic debate have been the sources of increasing disparities in wages (Galnoor, Rosenbloom, and Yaroni 1998). Conventionally, wages in the public sector in most Western countries have been determined as a function of individual-level, human capital variations, such as

"E-mail: [email protected]. The author is grateful for the research support provided by the Sapir Center for Social and Economic Studies, Tel Aviv University.

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education, tenure, and occupational variations (Solga and Diewald 2001). The wagesetting process is uniformly applied to public sector employees based on their collective bargaining agreements (Boyne, Poole, and Jenkins 1999; Farnham and Horton 1996). As employment continues, a gradual progression from a lower salary level to the next is guaranteed, almost automatically, up to retirement. The wage variations that occur reflect human capital differences in tenure, rank, and extent of employment. This institutionalized, tenure-based, wage allocation system is now being challenged by recent shifts toward increased organizational efficiency. This approach implicitly links some aspects of organizational performance, such as quantity and quality of services, to the level of wages (Bridges and Villamez 1994). Theoretically, this conceptualization is provided in the neoinsriturional approach where the mixture for business-like methods and social goals is possible. Yet, according to Goldmann and Renaud (2006) questions may be raised about the application of the neoinstitutional approach, where the "logic of appropriateness" is set against a "logic of expected consequences" as suggested by the technical approach. The most obvious application of this contradiction has been evident in the new public management philosophy, which assumes that organizational performance is relevant in determining the success of public organizations (Galnoor et al. 1998:394), and this assumption has been adopted in Israel as well as in other Western societies (Mascarenhas 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). This new perspective draws on the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and focuses on the technical aspects of performance, suggesting that organizational resources are pivotal to organizational performance (Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker 2003; Priem and Butler 2001), and that the criteria in the public sector should be similar to those in the for-profit markets (Davis and Gabris 2006; Pollitt 1993; Reilly, Schoener, and Bolin 2007). The present study examines how wage levels in local authorities are affected by organizational efficiency (technical organizational criteria of performance) and allocative efficiency (institutional criteria of performance). More specifically, this study asks two questions: 1. How do individual-level variations in human capital affict wages in local authorities? 2. Do organizational-level variations in technical and allocatiue efficiency affict wages, controllingfor human capital variations?

LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ISRAEL Local authorities in Israel, like those in other Western societies, support political and social policy at the national level, implementing and advancing overall goals of national level policy makers and collective bargaining agreements. At the same time, local authorities recognize differences and provide necessary opportunities for differentiation within the overall consensus, considering opportunities and constraints presented at the local level. In that sense, local authorities, by definition, represent the periphery, but their power and legal framework of operations are derived from the center in many respects.

INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DISPARITIES

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The law recognizes three types of local authorities: municipalities, which provide the framework for urban centers with populations of over 20,000; local councils, which manage towns with populations of between 2,000 and 20,000; and regional councils, which are responsible for several villages grouped within a certain radius. Each local authority is administered by a mayor or chairperson and a council. Currently there are 57 municipalities, 145 local councils, and 55 regional councils. Financing for local authorities comes from local taxes as well as allocations from the state budget. The former are negotiable and provide a major source of resources that allow for further negotiations in terms of oursourcing and wages. By contrast, the latter are bound to regulations as they are defined by the state. As a result, Israel has a far less centralized structure because through informal processes, local officials have been able to gain a great deal of freedom to maneuver and control local affairs. This, however, does not solve the very real problems of jurisdiction in terms of employment and wage allocation, problems that must be dealt with to make possible not only a more effective local self-government but a more "efficient" one as well. A possible example of this is that the Union of Local Authorities in Israel has warned that it could be compelled to fire 6,000 employees if the state budget is passed in its present form. The budget contains drastic cuts in equalization grants that the government transfers to local authorities. These funds are transferred by the Ministry of Interior to cover the shortfall between a local authority's revenue and expenses. This means that a stronger link between allocative and technical efficiency considerations is needed to enable the efficient management of resources in local authorities.

THEORY In the 1990s, emphasis on organizational efficiency in public sector organizations has increased owing to unresolved dilemmas (Kettner and Martin 1996; Osborne and Gaebler 1993) regarding budget cuts, on the one hand (Korpi and Palme 1998; Wade-Benzoni et al. 2002), and increased demand for public and local services, on the other (Kopf 1997). This, in turn, has augmented uncertainty in the public sector. Conspicuously, local authorities have been driven toward autonomous, nonbudget resources and the adaptation of cost-effective management strategies (Menefee 1997). This has increased the need to balance between technical and allocative efficiency criteria, which, according to Hofler and Polachek (1985), cause wage variations even to homogeneous markets. Hereafter I present the difference between the resource-based view (RBV) and the institutional approach.

The Resource-Based View: Performance-Related Technical Efficiency The resource-based view, deriving from the need to control environmental uncertainty, is closely related to the question of access to resources, performance, and, ultimately, measures of efficiency. RBV theory links performance to the organizational ability to identify, nurture, and mobilize rare, inimitable and unique resources (see Conner 1991; Peteraf 1993). As resources often determine performance, and as specific

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SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS

resources are rare and valuable, organizations compete to gain increased access to them (Marcus and Geffen 1998). Thus, despite classical concepts about the "nonmarket" character of the public sector, exposure to major cutbacks in budgets forces public organizations to consider the scarcity of environmental resources (Schulze 1992) and to endorse "technical" efficiency measures (Bosch, Pedraja, and Suarez-Pandiello 2000) as a means of enhancing alignment between organizational inputs and outputs. This ultimately enables public sector organizations to more accurately measure performance (Kettner and Martin 1996; Markham, Johnson, and Bonjean 1999) leading to "quasimarket" considerations in wage allocation. Indeed, according to the RBY, wage differences are expected to stem from differences in organizational resources and processes mainly in organizations that wish to be sustainable in the long run, despite budget cuts (Alexander 2000).

Organizational Size and Structure Organization analysts consider size as a key variable, providing a clue to such organizational features as resources, efficiency, and survivability (Meyer, Goes, and Brooks 1995; Peters 1992). These studies show that larger organizations are more likely to effectively grapple with a variety of environmental perturbations by expanding their range of activities and by adding new products or services and by seeking new markets. Organizational size is also an indicator of the extent of the tasks that need to be coordinated (Pugh and Hickson 1976) and often generates large numbers of more managerial positions leading to greater variation in wages (Scott 1995). Size is, therefore, considered a proxy for technical efficiency (Haveman 1993) in for-profit settings (Zabojnik and Bernhardt 2001), but size has been demonstrated to cause variations among public sector organizations where it shows organizational "strength" (Kalleberg, et al. 1996; Marro-Negrin 2004; Moon and deLeon 2001; Stone, Bigelow, and Crittenden 1999) and attracts the attention of institutional stakeholders (Idson and Feaster 1991; Kalleberg et al. 1996; Waddock and Graves 1997). As a result, size can, indeed, cause differences in wage levels between otherwise similar organizations (Belman, Heywood, and Voss 2002; Brown and Medoff 1989). Hypothesis fa: The higher level ofpublic resources (PRE) will not affect wages, controllingfor human capital variations (age, education, seniority, extent of employment, and occupation).

By contrast, Hypothesis fb: The level ofprivate/autonomous resources (PrRE) will increaseperformance and affect employee wages, controllingfor human capital variations (age, education, seniority, extent ofemployment, and occupation).

Hypotheses Ia and Ib attest to the importance of accessing appropriate resources for organizational survival, considering the size and structure of organization. The basic theme prevailing in the Aston studies considers here how the costs associated with the proper "running" of an organization should be reflected in the employment relations and the level of wages. Whenever gaps between income and expenses and/or costs and revenues occur, levels of technical efficiency are low. Outsourcing services is

INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DISPARITIES

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one way to lower expenses and increase technical efficiency. Services are provided by subcontractors, who, in contrast to the public sector, do not provide health and tenure-benefits. As a result, technical efficiency may rise, but collective bargaining agreements, a basic attribute of the strength of public sector unions, no longer apply. This decision counterbalances the main mission in public sector employment, which sees the provision of services in local authorities as a main carrier of the institutional nature of public sector employment associated with the implementation of the institutional approach.

The Institutional Approach: Allocative Efficiency Performance Institutional theorists endorse the view that institutional environments provide expectations concerning the appropriateness of organizational processes, outcomes, and goals. Social units, including organizational settings, conform to their institutional frameworks to increase their odds for survival by adopting structures, processes, and outcomes befitting their normative environment. Normatively, then, public sector organizations are viewed as a specific type of "institutionalized" organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Complying with institutional forces in regulative, normative, or cognitive ways, they are able to shape organizational processes and outcomes (Scott 1995) and to increase visibility of the system (Wade-Benzoni et al. 2002:47). For public sector organizations, the institutionalized environment imposes constraints about the way the organizations operate because social and cultural frameworks emit signals indicating the degree of legitimacy that reflects expectations from various stakeholders who wish to supervise activities, influence decision-making, and shape policies (Mitroff 1983); they often express conflicting expectations (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Kaplan and Norton 1992) from public sector institutions (Moon and deLeon 2001; Stone et al. 1999) requesting regulations and normative forms of employment to be applied (Wade-Benzoni et al. 2002) where the "decommodification" principle sets social principles apart from profit based principles to ensure equal opportunity and employment practices (Beggs 1995; Esping-Andersen 1990; Fine 1992; Korpi and Palme 1998); Goldmann and Renaud (2006) describe this as setting a "logic of expected consequences" against a "logic of appropriateness." This "logic of appropriateness" points out that social and political considerations of "inclusion" of weak groups, expensive or economically unreasonable as it may sound, is nevertheless necessary to accomplish and implement the policy protecting weak groups from exclusion in the labor market. Following this "decornmodification" principle (that disconnects utility from social outcomes) is possible only when there is a consensus between central government policy and local authorities. In that case it can be accepted that

Hypothesis IIa: The larger theproportion ofweak social groups, the higher the wages, controllingfor human capitalvariations. By contrast, however, if local authorities adopt an organizational-level logic of increased efficiency, then weak groups' inclusion in the system should be "penalized." This should confirm Fine's (1992) hypothesis of public sector employment as a form

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of "cheap" labor. More than that, though, this direction would confirm the basic assumption of the resource-based view of organizations. This suggests that organizations strive for a maximum utilization of resources. Large organizations, where the extent of services provided is extended, will affect the degree of inclusion of weak groups and their wages: a higher proportion of weak groups necessitates that lower wages are paid to attain maximum technical efficiency (Barney and Arikan 2002; Farnham and Horton 1996). It could be postulated, therefore, that

Hypothesis lIb: The larger theproportion ofweak social groups, the lower the wages, controllingfOr human capitalvariations.

METHODS Data Sources The database that we used is composed of individual-level data and two organizational-level data sets: the physical and financial data of Israel's local authorities (Central Bureau of Statistics 2005). The Central Bureau of Statistics data set of individuals consists of a 25 percent representative sample. Individuals employed in local government (education, welfare, health, and community positions) aged 25-64 years (N = 35,902) were first selected. Then, for the present analysis, this data set was further restricted to local government employees (N = 5,033) employed in localities with more than 10,000 residents. Two additional data sets were incorporated into the individual-level data, including organizational-level information, using the local authority code to combine individuals employed in the local authorities and respective organizational-level information. 1 A description of the correlations between variables is provided in Appendix 1.

Measures Individual-level variables. Wages is the continuous natural logarithm (In) measuring the midpoints of employees' gross monthly earnings (in New Israeli Shekels). This variable was generated using 11 ordinal caregories.i Predictors in the individual-level data set include: age-measured as the midpoints of the reported age-group brackets; marital status (l = married; = unmarried); education-years of formal schooling; work hours-number of weekly work hours in four hourly categories: 10, 20, 30, and 40; occupation-a set of dummy variables: 1 = scientific/academic; 2 = semiprofessional/technical; 3 = managerial; 4 = clerical; 5 = sales/services; 6 = skilled; and 7 = unskilled employees (omitted category). Work experience (potential) was computed as: age - (education + 6) (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1994).

°

Organizational-level variables. To capture the relative effects of the resources based view and the institutional approaches in the prediction of wages, we aimed at distinguishing between technical vs. allocative efficiency effects. A common distinction between technical and allocative efficiency relates to the difference between a meas-

INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DISPARITIES

345

urable utilization of technicalltechnological resources that are autonomous and reflect organizational resources not dependent on state budgets.

Technical efficiency. I distinguish between public vs. private autonomous sources (Ali and Byerlee 1991). It includes: (1) Public resource efficiency: inputs/outputs ratio where inputs equal the level of budgeted jobs and outputs equal the level of expenditures in local and public services. The generated PRE measure ranges from 3.24 to 16.66. (2) Private resource efficiency (hereafter PrRE): inputs/outputs ratio where inputs equal the level of autonomous income and outputs equal the level of expenditures in local and public services. The generated PrRE measure ranges from 0.27 to 1.46. Allocative efficiency. This measures the effect of the proportion of "weak" groups whose inclusion reflects the interference of the state in the determination of wages. It includes the proportion of (1) Arab and (2) Jewish female employees relative to the total number of employees.

FINDINGS The analysis proceeds in the following steps: First, mean values will be presented to describe the study's variables. Then, regression estimates (b's) are examined to show the direct effect of each added unit of the independent variable in predicting variations in wages among the examined organizations when individual level effects are not present. Finally, a second set of regression models is used, including both employee variations in skills and demographic characteristics and organizational-level effects to examine the differences in wage levels (see Table 1). Next, I distinguish between three models where Model 1 denotes human capital variations, Model 2 denotes technical efficiency effects, and Model 3 denotes allocative efficiency variables. For each model, I compare the effects on wages, controlling for human capital variations (see Table 2). First, variable 1 (the set of variables in this case) is entered to the regression (naming the first model) and a squared correlation is calculated (r\). Next, the second

Table 1. Descriptive and FStatistics for Technical and Allocative Efficiency Effects

Technical efficiency Public resource efficiency Private resource efficiency Allocative efficiency % Arab female employees % Female employees Note: N = 4,971

Mean

S.D.

F

Sig.

6.12 1.009

1.2495 .2286

122.3 523.09

.000 .000

.7946 1.277

71.3 416.4

.000 .000

.1234 .6728

-2017.384

-1.699 1816.520 880.493 3777.634 712.197 2177.106 1320.819

115.585 40.898

B

.518 .150

B 18.639 11.642

T

218.576

.272 -

-9.230

.122 -.394 -13.923 160.405 .164 11.325 180.496 4.878 .066 156.563 .344 24.129 88.134 .129 8.081 165.992 .179 13.116 128.832 .145 10.252

6.201 3.513

E

Notes: Omitted category for occupational group: unskilled employees. N = 4,560

-

Human capital Age Extent of employment Experience Scientific/academic Semiprofessional Managerial Clerical Sales/services Skilled Technical efficiency Public resource efficiency (PRE) Private resource efficiency (PrRE) Allocative efficiency # Employees % Female employees % Arab female employees Constant R2 R2 Change

Model 1

.122 160.088 180.027 156.372 88.137 165.752 128.486 28.836 154.912

-28.200 581.306

6.189 3.506

SE

-1.695 1787.237 889.232 3800.596 720.960 2194.408 1318.758

114.921 40.636

B

.000 -2509.965 326.763

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

.000 .000

Sig.

18.569 11.590

I

.277 .005

.048

-.013

-7.681

3.752

-.978

-.393 -13.920 .162 11.164 .067 4.939 .346 24.305 8.180 .130 .181 13.239 .145 10.264

.515 .149

B

Model 2

.508 .136

B

18.460 10.608

I

338.357 .290 .013

-4.952

.000

.000 -9.093

30.640

-.134 -278.597

.007 .026

.021

2.687 -2.233

-2.302

.00542 .020 .065 -288.692 129.266 -.092

-.031

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

.000 .000

Sig.

1.317 .188 171.360

29.337

.121 -.401 -14.303 159.306 .175 12.155 178.583 .074 5.485 .347 24.537 155.162 .172 10.507 90.725 164.733 .179 13.200 .136 127.971 9.688

6.149 3.490

SE

.019

225.668

-67.520

-1.728 1936.292 979.552 3807.142 953.241 2174.467 1239.817

113.501 37.025

B

.000 -1675.448

.000

.328

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

.000 .000

Sig.

Model 3

Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Individual (Model 1), Technical (Model 2), and Allocative (Model 3) Efficiency Effects on Wages

w

~

O"l

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347

model includes the squared correlation of variable 1 with Yand partial correlation of variable 2 with Y, in which variable 2 has been adjusted to variable 1 (r 2 y(2.1) ) and so on (Hays 1994). The analyses of the variance attributed to organizational effects (R 2 estimates) indicate that technical and allocative efficiency significantly predicts wages. Human capital variations (Model l) account for the greater part of wage variance (R2 = .27); technical efficiency (Model 2) contributes an additional low but significant change in wage variance (R 2 = .28). Finally, the addition of allocative efficiency explains more variance in wages, amounting to R2 = .29. This effect is almost three times higher (R 2 Change = .013; P < .00l) than that of the technical efficiency (R 2 Change = .005; p < .00l). These results indicate that there is an empirical justification in combining individual- and organizational-level variables in predicting wages and in distinguishing the technical and allocative efficiency performance effects.

DISCUSSION New public management practices in recent decades have prompted public sector organizations to improve services and boost organizational performance. Under the pressure for "efficiency-oriented" conduct and performance ratings, new public management advocates have adopted for several public sector functions a philosophy of "fit" between organizational inputs and outputs (see Moon and deLeon 200l). At the same time, local authorities have been historically viewed as an example of institutional effects because public sector organizations enable the application of universal principles of full incorporation and employment equality of the weak groups in the labor market. The recent "clash" between such institutional forms of employment and new public management practices resulted in wage disparities (Leavitt and Morris 2008): local authorities in Israel introduced technical-based criteria of performance in the definition of wages in order to enhance organizational competitiveness. To examine the way this clash affected wages it was proposed here that wage variations reflect both interorganizational differences in technical and allocative efficiency measures of performance. Controlling for human capital factors, I distinguished between two sources for variations in technical efficiency performance: public budgets and autonomous resources and used a series of allocative efficiency measures. First and foremost, the findings support the study's basic assumption that combining variations in human capital on the individual level and variations in performance at the organizational level is useful in estimating wage variations in the public sector. A full model of wages in local authorities incorporating organizational-level variations accounts for a part in the wage variance. The results indicate, as well, that it is the low level of human capital rather than organizational-level effects that account for the overall lower effect of the full model on wages. Finally, possible sources for variations in wages come from public budgets and autonomous resources. Accordingly, two efficiency measures were defined: public and private. The results indicate that the higher the authorities' level of technical efficiency, that is,

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SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS

autonomous resources, the higher the wages controlling for human capital variations. No effects are detected for public resources. This suggests that the importance of technical efficiency in predicting wages reflects mainly the centrality of autonomous rather than public resources. Second, the findings provide mixed results concerning the institutional perspective approach with respect to wage variations. Although employing women in public sector jobs may be indicative of the institutionalized nature oflocal authorities (e.g., the inclusion of weak social groups), it appears that there is a high price tag for a massive presence of women in the public sector. The higher presence of women decreases wages as expected, confirming the cheap labor (Fine 1992) and devaluation hypotheses (Ospina 1996). Surprisingly, this effect applied only partially in the case of ethnic minorities. The findings suggest that if such weak groups as Arabs are employed in remote localities where the market potential is lower, they should not be "punished" by lower wages. Indeed, this research shows that the effect of the Arab ethnic group on wages in larger localities is insignificant and negative, but in smaller localities it becomes significant. This, in fact, corroborates the insight of Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov (1994) concerning the "institutional discrimination" hypothesis, suggesting that ethnic minorities may be better off in "excluded" labor markets where they do not compete with the "strong" (Jewish) groups. Third, as to the position of women in Israel, the results suggest that the sheltered employment thesis advanced by DiPrete (1989) and the "cheap labor" hypothesis corroborated by Fine (1992) cannot be detached from the more radical concepts of women's "decommodified" employment in Israel's public sector. The results support the point that, at least to some extent, institutionally established norms necessitate the public sector to formulate employment patterns, even at the costs of women "paying," through lower wages, to gain the "sheltered" benefits of public sector employment. Summarizing these results, we may conclude that Israel's public sector behavior uses "mixed" employment practices that provide flexibility in the determination of wages, questioning traditional concepts of public sector homogeneity in wages and assessing classic studies indicating that public sector organizations become highly diversified according to economic constraints imposed by specific conditions in their technical and institutional environment (Bridges and Villamez 1994).

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES The study focuses on the importance of considering organizational outcomes in the public sector in light of their newly shaped role as technically efficient organizations. The study points to several empirical shortcomings. First, more subtle definitions of performance-related variables are needed to capture the effect of additional wage aspects in the public sector, such as health and pension benefits. Second, future studies should consider longitudinal data where explanatory variables would be invariably measured prior to the measurement of efficiency indicators and preferably measuring

1. Wages 2. Age 3. Extent of employment 4. Experience 5. Scientific/ academic 6. Semiprofessional 7. Managerial 8. Clerical g. Sales/services 10. Skilled 11. Unskilled 12. Public resources efficiency 13. Private resources efficiency 14. Nemployees 15. % Arab women 16. % Women

Variable

3

.17*" .20'" .002

2

-.002 .87*" -.04'"

4

-.12'"

.14'" .004 .00

5

-.03" -.06'" -.05'" -.06'" -.19'"

-.13'" -.21'" -.17'" -.22'"

-.05'" -.02 -.05'" -.07'" -.06'"

.00 -.02 -.02

11

-.13'" -.17'" -.50'" -.14'" -.20'"

-.Og'" -.27'" -.08'"

.22'" -.16'"

-.25'" .12" , -.10'"

-.07'"

.05'" -.08'"

10 .03" .00 .03"

8

9

7

.Og'" -.04'" .03"

6 .36'" -.08'" .Og'" -.13'" .05'" .04'"

Appendix 1. Correlation Matrix for Examined Variables 12

.03' .00 -.01 -.02 -.00

.01

-.02 -.02

-.02 -.01 .00

13

.01 .02 .00 -.00 -.04'" -.Og'"

-.00

.05'" .04"

.07*" .07*" -.01

-.13'"

-.35'" .11" ,

.020 -.03' -.04" -.02 .07'" .24'"

-.31'"

-.13'"

.21'"

-.07*" .31' " -.07*" -.18'" -.15'" .02'

-.004 -.04'" -.08'" -.04" .02 .10'" -.18'"

-.01

.00

-.14'" .03"

.04" .03"

-.01 -.02

16 -.17* " -.14'" -.Og'"

15 -.05'" -.05'" -.02

14 .05'" .03" .03'

w .j:>.

co

350

SOCIOLOGICAL FOCUS

several-rather than one-point in time. Finally, attention should be paid to the sources of wage variations related to outsourcing practices. Rita S. Mano chairs the Department of Human Services at the University of Haifa in Israel, where she is a senior lecturer. She teaches organizational theories; organizational behavior; management; sociology; and interdisciplinary approaches to employment and work, including turnover, managerial behavior, performance, and work policy. She engages in the study of management in nonprofit organizations and has published a book on nonprofit management and performance. She also studies inequality and public sector management.

NOTES 1. We initially attempted to tap the organizational-level differences but there was less than 10 percent explained variance between organizations that justify the use of HLM. We therefore used regression analysis. 2. Although interval scales for the earnings were available in the original census, they were not provided for the present study to prevent violation of privacy rights. The following categories are used in the study [(1 = 1,000); (2 = 2,250); (3 = 2,750); (4 = 3,500); (5 = 4,500); (6 = 5,500); (7 = 6,500); (8 = 7,500); (9 = 8,500); (10 = 9,500); (11 = 10,500)].

REFERENCES Alexander, Jennifer. 2000. "Adaptive Strategies of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations in an Era of Devolution and New Public Management." Nonprofit Management and Leadership 10:287-303. Ali, Mubarak and Derek Byerlee. 1991. "Economic Efficiency of Small Farmers in a Changing World: A Survey of Recent Evidence." Journal ofInternational Development 3: 1-27. Beggs, John J. 1995. "The Institutional Environment: Implications for Race and Gender Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market." American Sociological Review 60:612-634. Belman, Dale, John S. Heywood, and Paula B. Voss. 2002. "Public Sector's Earnings Comparability: Alternative Estimates for the U.S. Postal Service." Industrial Relations 57: 687-711. Bosch, Nuria, Francisco Pedraja, and Javier Suarez-Pandiello. 2000. "Measuring the Efficiency of Spanish Municipal Refuse Collection Services." Local Government Studies 26:71-90. Boyne, George, Michael Poole, and Glenville Jenkins. 1999. "Human Resource Management." Public Administration 77:407-420. Bridges, William P. and Wayne J. Villamez. 1994. The Employment Relationship: Causes and Consequences ofModern PersonnelAdministration. New York: Plenum. Brown, Charles and James Medoff. 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect." Journal of Political Economy 97:1027-1059. Central Bureau of Statistics. 2005. Census 2003. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics.

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