Infrastructure Pricing in US

Topic Code: H6 Margaret O’Mahony and Phil Blythe Charging for Road Use

Abstract A more interesting variant of road tolling is charging for road use as a traffic demand management measure. By its very nature, this is a complex albeit interesting policy and currently enjoys much debate, primarily in Europe and the USA. If one delves into the way this issue is evolving in both continents one can observe differences in the approach. In the USA, the High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) approach hinges on a policy that offers the individual a choice, i.e. one may use the HOV lane if one has a passenger on board but if this is not the case, one uses another car based route. In the case of Europe, the approach is to charge for car use with a higher premium placed on the use of congested roads such as roads in the CBD but unlike the USA case, an alternative car route would generally not be an option. More examples of HOV lanes in the USA exist, (and its variant the High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane) than road use pricing examples in Europe. One might therefore put forward the hypothesis, correctly or incorrectly, that the USA approach is more acceptable, certainly to policymakers. The paper will examine this hypothesis by using examples from both continents and by exploring similarities and differences in the two approaches with the aim of understanding more fully the critical parameters required to make charging for road use work as a policy.

Charging for Road Use

Dr. Margaret O’Mahony Transport Study and Research Group Dept. of Civil Engineering Trinity College Dublin Ireland

Phil Blythe Transport Operations and Research Group Dept. of Civil Engineering University of Newcastle upon Tyne U.K.

1. Introduction Tolling for use of a given piece of infrastructure is a policy that has been adopted widely and is more generally used when the infrastructure cannot be afforded using public payments or in cases where the delay to implementation of the structure is lengthy, if public funds are required. In these cases, private operators build the infrastructure and charge for its use to pay back loans borrowed for the construction costs and the on-going maintenance and operational costs of the infrastructure. This is usually done through a concessionary arrangement where a DBFO operator is allowed to operate the toll-facility for a given period of time. The economic basis for road use pricing is grounded on the fact that on congested road networks, each vehicle on the network imposes a cost on other vehicles. This cost is additional to the cost the motorist (trip maker) pays for the trip. The motorist incurs journey time and money costs, when undertaking the trip. The money costs include fuel and other vehicle operating costs. In congested conditions, the time and money costs may be substantial but the trip maker will undertake the journey if the value of the trip outweighs the costs or the viability of selecting another mode/time/route of travel. The cost that a vehicle imposes on other vehicles in congested conditions is normally referred to the marginal cost of a trip. The presence of the vehicle on the network reduces the speed of other vehicles on the network. If the private cost of the trip to the trip maker and the marginal cost are greater than the value of the trip to the motorist, then users of the network are worse off. If the trip maker was made to pay a charge equal to the cost imposed on other vehicles on the network, the trip maker would only make the trip if its value exceeds the sum of the private cost and the additional charge. The consequence of such a charging system would in all likelihood reduce some demand on the network and in the process decrease travel times for those remaining on the network. Other external costs that could conceivably be priced into such a charge include pollution, accidents and noise. 2. Application of Road Use Pricing in US Current US policy has encouraged the design and implementation of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes for use by carpoolers. HOV lanes are usually separated from the general traffic and allow vehicles that meet the required occupancy level to avoid congestion and to travel at a faster speed than their counterparts in the normal lanes. Over 700 miles of HOV lanes are in operation today in the US and several more are in various stages of planning and design. In some cases, HOV lanes are under-utilised while the adjacent regular freeway lanes are congested for many hours of the peak period. Some HOV-2 systems (two individuals in the car) have traffic levels such that speeds are below free-flow and this reduces their attraction (Parkany, 1998). High Occupancy/Toll (HOT) lanes have proved a useful answer for non-efficient use of HOV lanes. The idea behind them is to convert under-utilised HOV lanes allowing congestion

pricing to be introduced gently. HOT lane projects include the 91 Express Lanes in California, the I-15 reversible lanes in San Diego and the Katy Freeway in Houston. Some of the public have been unhappy with the conversion from HOV to HOT. Their argument is that investment in HOV lanes was sold to the public on the basis of increased capacity but also as a means of reducing cars on the network while maintaining similar levels of people movement. When a HOV is converted to a HOT, individuals who can afford the single occupancy rate can use the new infrastructure whereas other lower income groups may not have the choice. There is some concern over whether HOT lanes will discourage car pools if people can pay for the same time savings that carpoolers receive. On the other hand there may be an incentive to form a 3 person car pool to avoid paying the toll. An example of a HOV facility in California is described below. 2.1 SR91 Express Lanes The SR 91 Express Lanes, (four lanes – two in each direction) a privately funded and operated 10-mile toll facility built in the median of State Route 91 in Orange County, California, opened to traffic in late December 1995. It is located on one of California’s most congested highway corridors and offers a faster alternative to motorists who are willing to pay a toll that is varied by time of day. In 1997 the tolls were $2.75 for travelling in the peak periods and this was raised to $3.20 in 1998. Under the existing schedule, late night and early morning tolls remain at 75¢, while toll prices for most other time periods range from 1.25$ - 4.25$, depending on time and direction of travel. Tolls for the four busiest hours on the 91 Express Lanes, which are eastbound on Thursdays between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. and eastbound Fridays between 4:00 and 7:00 p.m. are $4.25 per trip (California Private Transportation Company (CPTC) (2000). As an incentive to carpools with three or more occupants who currently pay between $1.45 and $1.65 per trip for their morning commute, the 91 Express Lanes will lower the toll price to $1.00 per trip during the morning rush hours of 5:00 to 8:00 a.m., Monday through Friday. It should be noted that originally cars with 3 or more passengers travelled free. The purpose of SR 91 Express Lanes is to reduce corridor congestion while generating revenue to finance deployment of electronic toll collection systems and operation of the toll lanes. It has been noticed when tolls are increased a temporary drop in demand follows although generally demand is increasing but not as much as expected. The introduction of the Eastern Toll Road has resulted in a noticeable drop in demand. 50% of users use the facility only once per week. HOVs accounted for 40% before imposition of tolls but this has decreased as a result of the tolls. 30% of low-income users frequently use the service compared with 50% of high-income users (low proportion of low-income households in the area). Surveys indicate that two-thirds of users are male and younger and older people are less likely to use it. A major benefit in terms of acceptance is that users pass non-users of express lanes waiting in congested parallel lanes and the operators suggest that this helps them market the service more effectively. Most people using the service save 12-20 minutes although they tend to overestimate their savings when asked. It is worth noting that at the start public approval was not forthcoming although approval has increased with time.

33% of regular users in a sample taken by Parkany (1998) were found to car pool but only 20% of infrequent users car carpoolers. She also found that nearly 40% of HOV-2s never use the Express Lanes which is less than the 50% of solo drivers who never use the Express Lanes. 10% of the solo drivers and 25% of the drivers who always drove in a two-person carpool increased the number of passengers in their vehicle between November 1995 and Summer 1997. However, it was found in the regional surveys other car pools reduced the number of passengers in the eighteen month period; by 40% of the cars that had been previously travelling with 3 or more per vehicle.

Figure 1a, HOV Lane, California

Figure 1b. HOV Enforcement Camera, Dallas

The Eastern Toll Road is 17 miles of tolled highway in the Riverside area of California. The opening of the road meant that 41.5 miles of toll road now exist in California and the new facility offers two additional lanes on the Riverside Freeway. The cost of the Eastern Toll Road was $765 million. The price of a single trip is $3.25 and the travel time savings are 13 minutes each way during normal conditions. The system uses FasTrak antennae read transponder and the driver’s prepaid account is charged. Lane entry sensors determine the toll by weight and type of vehicle. If a toll is paid the signal turns green. If a vehicle leaves while signal is red, a camera photographs the licence plate. Violaters are ticketed by mail. 3. Application of Road Use Pricing in Europe Two cases will be considered in examining the progress of road-use charging in Europe. The first case is that of Norway where a number of cities have introduced successfully both electronic and manual forms of cordon charging since the early 1990’s. The second case is in the UK where legislation has now been passed to allow local authorities to introduce both congestion charging and workplace charging as a means of managing traffic demand and the generation revenue for investment in other forms of transport to meet the objectives of transport integration. 3.1

Norway

The main objective of the introduction of cordon tolling in Oslo, Trondheim and Bergen was to raise revenue to fund a range of improvements to the local transport system. This included new road construction (increased road capacity), improvements to facilities for pedestrians and cyclists and enhanced priority and segregation for public transport. Road-use pricing was not

an objective in any of the cities. Consequently, the schemes were designed to minimize the impacts on traffic. The low level of the toll fee is seen to have contributed immensely to the successful implementation of the schemes. In the case of Trondheim it took 4 years from the time of conception to implementation of cordoning. Although not introduced for traffic demand management purposes, the Norwegian toll rings are the closest Europe has come to implementing charging for infrastructure use on a city-wide basis. More detail on the Trondheim toll ring is given below. 3.1.1 Trondheim (Hoven, 1996 and Ramjerdi, 1994) The system in Trondheim was developed as a low cost system for the collection of toll charges. Unmanned toll stations fulfilled the requirement of a low-cost system. A passive invehicle transponder (called a Q-Free tag) that enables vehicles to be detected is used and the toll is charged as the tag crosses the toll ring at speed. The core of the toll ring originally consists of 11 toll stations, 9 of which are unmanned with 2 having provision for both automatic and manual payment. The number of stations was increased to 17 during 1998. The manual payment stations allow access for non-local traffic; which totals a significant amount during holiday periods. The toll ring operates Monday to Friday, from 0600 to 1700 and collects revenue from inbound traffic only. The basic toll level was originally set at NOK 10 per crossing for light vehicles but is now NOK 11 (with total weight < 3.5 tonnes) and was originally NOK 20 for heavy vehicles but is now NOK 22. Public transport vehicles and motor cycles are exempt from tolls. Drivers can choose to pay either manually (with coins at one of the manned toll stations or at an unmanned station by using an automatic ticket machine which accepts coins or special magnetic-strip cards) or subscribe to the Q-Free System. Subscribers receive a tag free of charge and have the option of using it in several payment arrangements, prepayment units of NOK 500, 2500 or 5000, or direct debit monthly from a bank account. Subscribers get a discount for each crossing depending on their selected method of payment.

Figure 2a. Antenna from a Toll Gantry, Figure 2b. Single lane Electronic Toll Trondheim Collection, Trondheim

In Trondheim the average violation rate in a non-stop lane is about 0.3% and this is higher than the 0.2% Oslo rate. The accuracy of the systems in Oslo and Trondheim is higher than 97%. Vehicle type differentiation and period differentiation are available in Trondheim and Oslo. In the period from 1990 to 1992, there was a decrease of 5.6% in the number of car trips in the Trondheim area. This was less than the total decrease in trips in Norway. This would indicate that the toll ring leads to no significant decrease in car use in the Trondheim area. The decrease in traffic registered passing the toll ring was 3.8% which is less than the general decrease. There are, however, variations depending on when trips are made. During toll ring opening hours (0600 – 1700 during weekdays) a 10% decrease was registered in the period from 1990 to 1992, while an 8% - 9% increase was registered during the period when no charging was applied (i.e. on weekdays between 1700 and 0600 and on Saturdays and Sundays). It would appear from these results that the toll ring has caused a transfer of some trips from the charged periods to the uncharged periods. There is some indication from traffic data that changes in travel behaviour and attitude were more pronounced during the period directly after opening and this adjustment period seems to have lasted 3 – 4 months from opening day. A toll fee of NOK 10 could be considered fairly high and one might have expected a larger impact on travel behaviour. However, as a marginal cost, this should be compared with the running cost of a car. The cost of petrol in October 1990 was more than NOK 7 per litre. The average parking cost in the central part of Oslo is about NOK 31 per day. The low level of elasticities obtained is more than likely due to the low level of the fee compared with other components of the marginal private cost. The implied direct demand elasticity of the private marginal car costs is about –0.7 to –0.8. Additionally, car ownership expenses in Norway are amongst the highest in Europe. With the high level of fixed car cost in Norway, a higher marginal cost can be justified for using the car. The level of service of public transportation i.e. as an alternative to the car, has been another factor that explains the low impact of the toll. Public transportation costs are comparable to the car running costs in most respects, with higher door-to-door time i.e. including walking time, waiting time and transfers. The number of public transport trips through the Trondheim toll ring have increased compared with public transport trips in the city as a whole. This indicates that the toll ring may have been a contributing factor to the increase. However, several improvements to public transport took place in parallel with the introduction of the toll ring. The increase in public transport usage was particularly significant on weekdays between 1000 and 1700 while little change was noticed between 0600 and 1000. This implies that working trips were not influenced significantly by the toll ring. The average number of vehicles tolled during the operating hours of the scheme is 40,455 (252 days in 1992). The annual gross revenue in 1992 was NOK 71 million while the annual operating cost was NOK 7 million (Tretvik, 1993). Capital costs for the system in Trondheim were NOK 45 million. The annual operating costs and capital costs (at 7% interest over 15 years) are about NOK 11.95 million. This is about 17 % of net revenue. The cost per

transaction is about NOK 1.17, slightly lower than in Oslo. The toll revenue will contribute to about 60% of the total package estimated at NOK 2.3 billion. The Trondheim toll ring was aligned so that about 60% of the inhabitants in the city live outside its boundary but the majority of jobs, shops, recreational and other public services lie inside, at or near the city centre. The consequence is that a majority of the inhabitants need to cross the toll ring at some stage in the performance of their normal activities. One month after opening a survey was performed amongst motorists crossing the toll ring once or several times a week. 90% stated that the collection system worked well. The results from a survey conducted six months before opening indicated that 72% of those questioned gave a negative reaction to the introduction of the toll ring, while 8% were positive. Two months after implementation a surprising result from another survey showed that 48% considered it to be negative and 19% positive. More recently a survey indicated 36% negative, 32% positive and 27% indifferent. Hoven (1996) attempts to explain the substantial change in attitude. He suggests that people were opposed to the introduction before implementation because they perhaps thought there was still a chance that it might not go ahead if public resistance was strong enough. After installation they may have become more resigned to it. Surveys show that motorists are more negative than others which is an understandable finding. Men appear to be more positive than women. Another interesting finding was that those people living outside the toll ring have a more positive attitude compared with those living inside it. This could be explained if they see the toll ring as a means of improving traffic flow. Strict demands on privacy in Norway necessitates that information cannot be stored about when and where the individuals enter the toll ring. All recorded data is immediately deleted after the charge has been entered in the subscriber’s account. 3.2

United Kingdom

Charging for use of roads has featured in Europe and elsewhere since the Second World War. Many countries charge for the use of their principal over-land routes and many, including the UK, charge tolls for the use of expensive infrastructure such as estuarial crossings and major tunnels. Traditionally such charges are a simple means of financing roads and road infrastructure. More recently, growing problems of congestion and pollution caused by increasing levels of vehicle and principally private car use have led to charging being viewed as an potential means of traffic management. This section describes UK experience in relation to both these approaches. 3.2.1 Charging as a road financing mechanism Renewed interest in direct charging came in May 1993 when the then Government published a consultation document, Paying for Better Motorways: Issues for Discussion, on new ways of meeting the cost of maintaining and improving inter-urban roads. Key issues included the relatively low marginal costs of vehicle use, the different costs which different types of users imposed on the road system, other impacts (e.g. on congestion and environmental effects), the

extent to which these issues had to be addressed from the standpoint of an international network, and the methods that are available for charging road users. In 1996, trials of multi-lane technology were undertaken at TRL (Transport Research Laboratory) as the first step towards studying the feasibility of implementation. 3.2.2 Road user charging for traffic management During the trialling period a General Election was held which returned a new administration in May 1997. The Government subsequently announced that it was going to carry out a fundamental review of all aspects of transport policy with the aim of developing an integrated transport strategy. As part of the review a public consultation was held seeking views on a broad range of policy issues and ideas for improvement including the scope for making greater use of the price mechanism, for instance through road user charging, to influence travel choice. Over 7,000 responses were received to the consultation. The Government subsequently published a White Paper on A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone (Cm 3950) in July 1998. In his foreword the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, said that: “There is now a consensus for radical change in transport policy.” “This White Paper fulfils our manifesto commitment to create a better, more integrated transport system to tackle the problems of congestion and pollution we have inherited.” “The main aim of this White Paper is to increase personal choice by improving the alternatives and to secure mobility that is sustainable in the long term.” “We have had to make hard choices on how to combat congestion and pollution while persuading people to use their cars a little less - and public transport a little more. And we have devised imaginative new ways of raising money from transport for better transport.” 3.2.3 Legislating for Change The White Paper recognised that simply improving public transport and introducing related traffic management measures were not on their own sufficient to alleviate the problems caused by road traffic. It made a number of commitments to redress this situation. A key feature of the White Paper is that revenue raised from these new charges will be recycled into providing improvements to local transport services and infrastructure. 3.2.4 Road user charging demonstration Although early charging schemes are likely to be cash or paper-based, the White Paper also recognised the potential role for electronic charging systems, particularly on trunk roads and

motorways. It said that technical trials of electronic charging systems will continue in order to research their possible effects and how they might be introduced with confidence. The UK Government later announced in September 1998 that it planned to set up a major national road user charging demonstration project at sites in England and Scotland with local authority support. Unlike the earlier TRL trials which took place in a test track environment, the demonstration will take place on real roads including urban and inter-urban roads. A key aim of the demonstration is to ensure that electronic charging systems would be interoperable wherever they might be deployed across the country so that vehicles do not require more than one set of in-vehicle equipment. The sites for the demonstration were announced in June 1999 as Leeds and Edinburgh. These trials (known as the DIRECTS project) would essentially trial the ‘interoperability’ between a number of vendors of DSRC – short range microwave communications equipment for tolling and road-user charging. Each consortium must have at least 4 vendors (2 supplying tags/transponders and 2 supplying roadside communications equipment). In addition a wide-area charging system – such as GSM or GPS-based solution could be offered as an option. Currently 2 consortia have submitted full tenders (July 2000) and a decision is expected before the end of the year. The trials will require that at least 1 million transactions are logged with a central billing system (1 central system shared between Leeds and Edinburgh). The results of the trials will be a UK National specification for DSRC-based road-user charging.

Figure 3a. Gantry from TRL Test Trials of Multi-lane Charging System

Figure 3b. On-Board Unit from TRL trials

3.2.5 Consultation and pilot schemes The White Paper promised a number of ‘daughter’ documents including a consultation paper on its detailed proposals for introducing road user and workplace parking charges. The paper, Breaking the Logjam, was published in December 1998 and invited views on a range of issues relating to how schemes might be designed, implemented and operated. At the same time the Government announced that local authorities in approved pilot schemes will be able to keep all of the money raised to spend on worthwhile local transport improvements for at least ten years. The Deputy Prime Minister later confirmed in July 1999 that all revenue from pilot charging schemes introduced within ten years of legislation receiving Royal Assent will be treated as additional revenue for supporting local transport objectives for at least ten years from the actual date of introduction.

Local authorities have since submitted their provisional Local Transport Plans (LTPs) covering the period 2000-2005. They were asked to indicate whether they intended to make use of the new powers to introduce road user charges and workplace parking charges once legislation is in place and, if appropriate, the likely timetable for scheme introduction, estimate of revenues, and objectives for expenditure. The Government intends to work closely with interested local authorities in developing schemes that are consistent, fair, and tailored to the local transport objectives contained in the LTPs. Local authorities who have formally expressed an interest in Road-User Charging have been invited to join the Charging Development Partnership (Blythe, Walker and Knight, 2001).

Figure 4: HOV Lane, Bristol, England

3.2.6 London In parallel with the activities of the DETR described above, the Government Office for London (GOL) undertook a study in 1998/99 entitled Review Of Charging Options for London (ROCOL). This study looked at the feasibility of both road-user charging and parking-place charging as well as the likely impact on business, locations, traffic and user/business reactions to the proposals for charging. The initial brief wanted to deliver a solution for charging and parking based upon the ‘paper-sticker’ principle (as used successfully in Singapore for more than 20 years) – however after significant debate it was recommended that London should follow a video-based road-user charging system. These recommendations were reviewed by the newly elected mayor earlier this year and a full scale programme towards an implementation target of 2003 is now underway in London.

The proposed scheme would have the following main features:  Standard charge of £5 per vehicle per day;  Charging hours: 7am-7pm, Monday to Friday;  Charging zone bounded by the Inner Ring Road (which joins Euston Road, Pentonville Road, Tower Bridge, Elephant & Castle, Vauxhall Bridge and Marylebone Road). No charge would be made for driving on the Inner Ring Road – only the area within it;  90% discounts for residents within the charging area;  No charge for motorcycles and mopeds; and  No charge for emergency vehicles and certain NHS vehicles, vehicles used by disabled people, London buses, scheduled express and commuter coaches, London licensed taxis, certain Borough vehicles, and certain ‘environmentally friendly’ vehicles. It has been calculated that this scheme would reduce traffic by 10-15% within the charging area, significantly improving journey times and reliability and offering scope for improving the environment of central London. Complementing the scheme, other measures would be introduced to improve public transport and other alternatives to the car prior to and alongside its introduction. Steps would also be taken to take account of changed traffic patterns. The money raised by a charging scheme must be by law spent on improvements to transport in London for at least 10 years. It is estimated that the proposed scheme could raise some £190m per year which would contribute significantly to improving London’s public transport system thereby further reducing traffic congestion as more people shift from using cars. Concerns are raised about the ‘interoperability’ of the London scheme with those proposed under the DIRECT project (which aims to standardise the specification for how systems interoperate) based upon the DSRC (dedicated short range communications) systems. The idea being that a user has one in-vehicle charging device which can be used at any charging scheme provided the user is registered in some way to use that scheme. In summary for the UK situation, it is clear that a whole package of legislation has been developed to enable local authorities to introduce road-user charging in a variety of innovative ways and which will allow this road-user charging to be integrated with other transport means (primarily a step improvement in the quality of public transport services) as a balanced ‘carrot and stick’ principle. The significance of allowing local authorities to keep the revenue raised cannot be overstated as a forward thinking move which may indeed ensure that authorities do indeed take forward the use implementation of road-user charging and indeed HOV which is being actively promoted in Leeds, Bristol and a number of other locations. 4. Evaluation of Approaches The three approaches HOV, HOT and the road use pricing method are compared below. For the purposes of the comparison each method is defined as follows:

 HOV – high occupancy vehicle lane – additional infrastructure is introduced whereby individuals with more than a prescribed number of people in the car can travel free or by

paying a significantly lower toll than vehicles in the normal lanes, which usually run parallel with the HOV lane

 HOT – high occupancy toll lane – additional infrastructure normally provided for free use by high occupancy vehicles but on which single occupancy vehicles are allowed to travel if they pay a toll.

 Road use pricing method proposed for use in Europe – similar to the Trondheim or Singapore cordon type systems whereby tolling is applied on each artery to a city centre to charge for trips to the city centre. There are clearly several variants of each of the above including how revenue is treated and what ‘other’ measures are also in place as part of the package. The critical parameters required to produce a feasible, acceptable and effective road use pricing scheme are as follows (Oscar Faber et al, 1999): To be feasible the system should be free from fraud and evasion;

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accommodate occasional users; have a credible enforcement regime; utilise mature and reliable technology; fit into the urban environment without detrimental aesthetic or disruption impacts; and be supported by suitable administrative systems to deal with payments/licence issuance and enforcement.

To be acceptable the system should:

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be relatively simple and easy for users to understand; be transparent so that users know what they have to pay and what the revenues are to be used for; provide facilities for both pre-and post-payment; be fair and equitable to ensure that the numbers of ‘losers’ are minimised; be supported by complementary measures that offer viable travel alternatives to users; offer tangible improvements in accessibility so that users can appreciate the benefits of the system; and be supported by appropriate information and marketing measures that raise awareness of the need for the system and the way it operates.

To be effective the system should:

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target the major congestion and environmental impacts; be designed to integrate with other modes;

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impose charges that are sufficiently high to prompt users to reconsider travel choices; impose charges that are not so high as to be punitive and suppress economic activity; and produce a revenue surplus that can be re-invested in improvements to the transport system.

The US HOV and HOT are compared with the European approach on the basis of these criteria in Table 1. The authors assign the ratings on the basis of objective judgement of the issues in hand. One assumption made is that all systems use electronic payment and vehicle identification systems. When comparing the methods on the grounds of feasibility, all are similar in terms of dealing with fraud. This issue is primarily related to the electronic system used and not the design concept. Occasional users can be more easily accommodated in the HOV and HOT options, mainly due to the fact that the facility involves one piece of road pricing infrastructure. Occasional users are more difficult to handle when dealing with road use pricing on a citywide basis. Enforcement methods for all three types of system are similar. Technology is now at a stage where confidence exists in its reliability. However, detection of the number of persons in a car (real persons) in the HOV case may be marginally more difficult than observing the number plate of a violating vehicle. Aesthetic intrusion can be examined in the following way. If one takes into account the land take required to build a HOV lane and its attendant infrastructure, the overall intrusiveness of the facility may be worse than the installation of gantries on existing city streets. The final factor governing feasibility is the administrative system used. There is little difference between the three methods. On the basis of this comparison, the HOT lane method is marginally better than the others in terms of feasibility. Although one could argue that the revenue raised by a road-user charging system should be sufficiently high to cover administrative and operation costs.

Table 1. Evaluation of road use pricing schemes Characteristic of Approach

Feasible Free from fraud and evasion Accommodate occasional users Credible enforcement system Use reliable technology Little aesthetic intrusion Supported by suitable administrative systems Acceptable Relatively simple and easy to understand Transparent Flexible payment methods Fair and equitable Supported by viable travel alternatives Offering tangible improvements to the transport system Supported by appropriate marketing services Effective Target environmental and congestion effects Integrate with other transport modes Impose charges that are sufficiently capable to impact on travel choices Impose charges that are not so high to suppress economic activity Revenue generator to fund improvements to the transport system

US HOV

US HOT

European Proposed Road Use Pricing System

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The second criterion is acceptability and here again the three methods are compared in Table 1. All three methods are similar and achieve a high rating in terms of simplicity, transparency and flexibility. The HOV option could be argued to be more equitable than the other two in that there is an option not to pay a toll if required (i.e. in cases where a toll is not paid in the case of HOVs). All three methods are again very similar when examining their contribution to viable travel alternatives, offering tangible improvements to the transport service and supported by appropriate marketing services. In terms of acceptability, one might conclude that the HOV option offers a higher potential for acceptability than the other two methods. However, as shown by the Norwegian and UK case studies, the package of measures set in place around the charging itself may have a marked influence on the acceptability of a workable solution. Finally the effectiveness of each method is evaluated and compared. Road use pricing on a city-wide basis is more likely to address environmental and congestion issues at a broader level than the limited potential on one link. It is also more likely that city-wide road use pricing could be integrated with other modes and in any case could induce a transfer of users to public transport in a way that the HOV and HOT would find more difficult for a similar level of benefit. The HOT and road use pricing alternatives have more scope to charge appropriate levels to impact on travel choice than perhaps the HOV alternative has but it is possible in all three cases to charge price levels so that no impact on economic activity is likely. The HOT and road use pricing methods have the potential to earn higher revenue than in the case of the HOV. In summary, the road use pricing method is the most effective with the HOT method producing the second most effective response. In summary, on the basis of the evaluation used in this paper, the HOT is seen as the most feasible, the HOV offers potentially higher levels of acceptability and the road use pricing method, proposed to be used in Europe, is seen as the most effective. There would appear to be some merit in taking the better elements of each method, where possible, and combining them in one approach – a thought for further research.

5. Conclusions The objective of the paper was to examine more fully the differences between the HOV/HOT method of managing congestion in the US with the method proposed for use in Europe. The three methods were evaluated on the basis of feasibility, acceptability and effectiveness. The findings are as follows:

 The road use pricing method to be used in Europe is likely to be more effective in terms of managing environmental and congestion effects, integration with other transport modes, application of charges that impact on travel choices but do not impact on economic activity and as a revenue generator for improvements for the transport system.

 The most feasible system of the three is the HOT lane in terms of fraud evasion, accommodating occasional users and minimal aesthetic intrusion.

 Finally, it is argued, in terms of acceptability, that the HOV lane method is more acceptable than the others on the grounds of its simplicity and ease of use, its transparency, fairness and equity and its ability to offer tangible improvements to the transport system. In the UK where urban congestion pricing is high on the political agenda the level of acceptance and effectiveness will be very much linked to the hypothecation of the raised revenue to invest in other local transport services. Whether, as has been the case in Trondheim, this makes the whole ethos of road-user charging more palatable to the general public cannot be easily gauged. Clearly the HOT lane and HOV lane derivatives as used successfully in the States promotes acceptance through a different set of carrots (i.e. reduced tolls, or high-quality uncongested lanes) – whether European schemes will learn from these implementations is yet to be seen. References Blythe, P.T., Walker, K. and Knight, P.K. (2001) The Technical and Operational Feasibility of Automatic Number-Plate Recognition as the Primary Means for Road-User Charging. Journal of the Royal Institute of Navigation, Vol. 54, No.3, pp345 -355 Blythe, P.T. (2000) Transforming Access to and Payment for Transport Services through the Use of Smart Cards. Journal of ITS, Vol 6. pg 45-68 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10248070008903682 California Private Transportation Company, 2000. Press release on web, Dec 22, 2000. DETR (1993). Paying for better motorways. Environment, Transport and the Regions, UK.

Issues for discussion.

Department of

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(1999).

Dublin Road Pricing Study.

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Tretvik, T. (1993) The Norwegian experience with cordon pricing: From tolling to road pricing. Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium on Automotive Technology and Automation, Aachen, Germany.