State initiatives to fight insurgency and restore law and order in the ... Nagaland
and Assam, Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh and a 20 km.
Innovative Methods in Fighting Insurgency in North-East India Ministry of Home Affairs (Mha), Government of India State initiatives to fight insurgency and restore law and order in the North-Eastern region of the country has experienced a paradigm shift. The concerns with security and the erstwhile socio-economic conditions which prevailed over the democratization processes in the state bringing more powers to the police and the Army were diluted towards citizens’ satisfaction. In contrast to the Armed Forces Special Powers Act an innovative initiative has addressed the problem of insurgency through positive means of partnership of the government with people on one hand and with related government agencies on the other. The focus of fighting insurgency has shifted from merely arming the state machineries to a strategy of agreements and negotiations alongside improved counter-insurgency measures. It is with these innovative methods in fighting insurgency that the State aims to restore normalcy in the region. The regional challenges to the innovative strategy: The North Eastern region of India, occupying 8.06% of the Indian landmass, comprise of the eight States of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura. Except for the States of Mizoram and Sikkim, the North East is widely known as one of the most disturbed areas in the country. The whole of Manipur (except Imphal Municipal area), Nagaland and Assam, Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh and a 20 km. belt in the States of Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya having common border with Assam have been declared ‘Disturbed Areas’ under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 as amended in 1972. The Governor of Tripura has declared the areas under 28 Police Stations in full and part of the area under 6 Police Stations as ‘Disturbed Areas (Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report -2008). Thus, in the remaining North Eastern states, fighting insurgency constitutes the priority of governance. Origin of the initiative The initiation of the innovative methods in fighting insurgency in the North-East can be traced to the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah)/ NSCN (IM). Since then, Ceasefire Agreements have been signed with: • •
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah)/ NSCN (IM) on August 1, 1997. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)/ NSCN (K) on April 28, 2001.
Like the Ceasefire Agreement, similar armed suspension agreement framework termed the Suspension of Operation (SoO) has been initiated. Suspension of Operation (SoO) has been signed with: • • • • •
Kuki National Organization (KNO), Manipur in August 2008. Tripartite agreements between the Government of India, the Government of Assam with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) on April 24, 2005. Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) Meghalaya on July 23, 2004. Dima Halam Dagoah (DHD) in the North Cachar Hills area, Assam since January 1, 2003. United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS – in the Karbi Anglong Area of Assam) on August 1, 2002.
Problems addressed: The signing of the Ceasefire Agreement or the Suspension of Operations indicates very important developments. As the name suggests- Ceasefire Agreement or Suspension of Operations- once signed between the State and the insurgent outfit or a tripartite agreement between the Government of India, the State Government and the insurgent outfit, a certain code of conduct or ground rules is agreed upon. The code of conduct entails that: •
The insurgent groups will not engage in violent armed conflict,
•
live in designated camps or cordoned off sites mutually agreed by both the State and the group,
•
Not engage in any illegal activities like extortion, kidnapping etc., and put weapons in double-lock mode.
Thus, the agreement provides the State Government with opportunities such as: •
Firstly, the air of uncertainty as to when and which armed group is going to attack or pose threat to the people is cleared to an extent.
•
Peace process is initiated with the insurgent group,
•
Increase counter-insurgency measures on the other militant groups operating within the State.
•
Maintain vigil over the outfit currently observing ceasefire/suspension of operations.
•
The State can focus attention on the more important and pressing needs for development
The New Samtal area in district Chandel in south Manipur, which had continued to be infested with insurgency, was largely cleared during the year, and action is underway to reactivate the civil and developmental administration and activities in this area (Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report -2008) The enforcement of the ground rules under the Ceasefire Agreement or the Suspension of Operation necessitates certain arrangements: Institutional: Certain institutional mechanisms are set in place to ensure that sustained dialogue is possible. Like in the state of Nagaland while at the level of the State, a State Level Strategy Group is formed under the Chief Secretary, at the district, the District Level Monitoring Groups, comprising of civil society representatives like the church are established. Similar other institutional mechanism like the Unified Command under the Chief Minister is formed in the States of Assam and Manipur, respectively. Organizational: The implementation of the code of conduct is also periodically reviewed by a Joint Monitoring Group comprising representatives of the Government of India, State Government, Security Forces and the concerned outfits. For example, while a Ceasefire Monitoring Group headed by a Retd. General as Chairmen is set up for monitoring developments of the NSCN (IM) agreement, in the case of the NCSN (K) a Ceasefire Supervisory Board, comprising of members of the different NSCN factions and State Forces. Likewise, similar other supervisory boards are respectively established.
Procedure for the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement:
One such important accomplishment of the agreement is the singing of the memorandum of settlement between the Government of India, the Government of Assam and the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) in February 2003, which led to the laying down of the arms by the outfit The initiative has many breaks from the past; Partnership: Partnership - between the Ministry of Home Affairs, State Government, paramilitary forces and even the willing insurgent group - plays a pivotal role for the success of the Ceasefire Agreement or the Suspension of Operations. Though the basic law and order maintenance is entrusted and carried out by the State authorities the Ministry of Home Affairs provides all needed support, whether infrastructure, financial, manpower or guidance to the State, to maintain law and order . Further to help the State maintain law and order in the region 40 Indian Reserve Battalions have been sanctioned. • • • • • •
Of the 40 India Reserve Battalions (IRB) sanctioned 8 each for Assam and Tripura, 7 for Manipur, 5 for Nagaland, 4 each for Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, 3 for Meghalaya and 1 for Sikkim.
The State Government through the local media and civil society actors and groups calls the willing insurgent group to come forward for peaceful talks and redressal of grievances. This olive branch is then accepted and welcomed by any interested insurgent party. Transparency: The process of dialogue creation and the signing of the Agreements/Suspension of Operations are open to public viewing. The presence of a strong effective press/media and civil society pressure groups also reinforces transparency in functioning.
Replicability: The first ceasefire agreement was singed with the NSCN (IM) in 1997. Since then, similar framework of agreement like the Ceasefire/Suspension of Operations has been introduced in the other states- Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura. Sustainability: The aspect of sustainability varies. While with the NSCN (IM) the Ceasefire Agreements have been sustained over the years the issue of sustainability arises with the other groups. One such example is with the UNLF in Assam - in 2006 the Suspension of Operations was utilized by them for consolidation and reorganisation of their cadres, there was an increase in violence, particularly in areas of upper Assam and Guwahati city (Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2008). However it would be wrong to completely state that such talks are not sustainable as the on-going talks between the NSCN (IM) and the constituted Group of Minister (GoM- assisted by Shri K. Padmanabiah, Government of India’s representative) point to the sustainable nature of dialogue generation. Innovativeness: Fighting insurgency is a prolonged continuous exercise. However, with the adoption of two pronged approach- of fighting the insurgents and engaging in dialogue with the interested groups - the new strategy offers the space for peace initiatives. Challenges for Implementers: The initiation of talks and the signing of Ceasefire Agreements and of the Suspension of Operations however does not imply that long lasting peace efforts prevails. Sporadic instance of violent armed conflicts do arise. Thus, there are both improved changes as well as setbacks. However, it is important to note here that the nature of violence has changed. Armed conflict between the State forces and the insurgent group party to the agreement is relatively reduced. Therefore it would be erroneous if the opportunities provided and secured by the agreements and talks are ignored. Such agreement’s act as a breather for the State forces, the Union Government and the insurgent group. It allows the space for re-organization, for developing new improved strategise for law and order maintenance, engaging in counter-insurgency operations against other warring groups and importantly, brings the party insurgent groups within the ambit of State purview. Many challenges and anxieties are mentioned below; •
The framework of negotiation can be introduced only if the insurgent groups are interested.
•
Scope of civil society or citizen participation in the operational framework of the agreement is limited. Presently, such participation is in the form of pressure groups.
•
Better policing strategies based upon collaborative plan actions involving civil participation must be adopted.
•
The agreements do not address the issues of increasing inter-factional conflict. Such as, factional fights between the NSCN (IM) and the newly formed NSCN (U) are on the rise or even the attacks on civilians by the insurgent groups.
•
Governance and capacity building mechanism need to complement the initiatives to improve the overall state of insurgency and development.
•
The signing of Ceasefire agreements or of Suspension of Operations is based upon mutual acceptance of the ground rules and the willingness of the insurgent group. Hence, it cannot be impressed upon the group by the State, as seen in the case of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) - who could not be swayed even after three rounds of talks were held with the People’s Consultative Group (PCG) and the Government.
Road ahead and lessons learnt: Despite the limitations these innovative method towards fighting insurgency in the North East however requires replication and sustained administrative efforts. This is possible only if the following requirements are taken care off: •
Further, awareness generation amongst the school children and women need to be initiated.
•
Extensive modernization of the police force is required in all the North Eastern states as new team of insurgents with refined devices are always taking over.
•
To sustain the efforts of dialogue generation in Manipur it is envisaged that vulnerable groups within the society, like the businessmen, doctors, engineers and others will be taken confidence so that problem sharing will be relatively easier.
•
In Manipur, the strength of women commando and the constabulary force will be increased and efforts are underway to establish an All Women Police Station.
