insight

INSIGHT ---------------- T U R K E Y

----------------

E D IT O R -IN -C H IE F

Talip Kiiîikcan Marmara University A S S IS T A N T E D IT O R S

B O O K R E V IE W E D IT O R S

Muhittin Ataman

Galip Dalay, SETA Mehmet Ozkan, SETA

Abant izzet Baysal University

Kadir Ustiin

A R T D IR E C T O R

SETA DC

Mustafa Fuat Er, SETA

K 1I19 B u g r a K a n a t Pennsylvania State University

S U B S C R IP T IO N M A N A G E R

M A N A G IN G E D IT O R

G R A P H IC D E S IG N

Ali Unal, SETA

Ferhat Babacan

Umare Yazar, SETA

P U B L IS H E R

SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research

E D IT O R IA L B O A R D M eliha Altum îk Middle East Technical University, U m it C izre Istanbul Sehir University, Ali (ârkoglu K05 University, H atem E te Yildirim Beyazit

University, M etin H ep er Bilkent University, K em al tn a t Sakarya University, Ib rah im K ah n Office of Public Diplomacy, § ab an K arda§ TOBB Economy and Technology University, F u a t K eym an Sabanci University, K em al Kiri^ci Brookings Institute, Stephen L arrab ee RAND Corporation, Ian L esser The German Marshall Fund, A k ira M atsu n aga Sasakawa Peace Foundation, B ash eer M . Nafi Aljazeera Centre for Studies, Z iya Oni§ K05

University, Ergu n O zbudun Istanbul Sehir University, M esut O zcan Center for Strategic Research, T ah a O zhan SETA, W a lte r P o sch SWP Berlin, T obias S ch u m ach er College of Europe, O m er Ta^pinar National Defense University, D m itri T ren in The Carnegie Moscow Center, R am azan Y ild irim Istanbul University

p r in t in g h o u s e : Turkuvaz

Matbaacilik Yayincilik A.$„ Akpmar Mah. Hasan Basri Cad. No: 4, Sancaktepe, 34885 / Istanbul

On behalf of SET VAKFI tktisadi l§letmesi (2008) owned by Taha Ozhan / ISSN 1302-177X A ll Rights Reserved.

In s ig h t T u rk e y is a peer-reviewed journal indexed by the following databases and indexes: Bibliography of Asian Studies, Columbia

International Affairs Online (CIAO), EBSCO, Elsevier Bibliographic Databases, European Sources Online (ESO), GALE-Cengage, Gender Studies Database, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR), International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ), Interna tional Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), Lancaster Index to Defence and International Security Literature, Left Index, Middle East & Central Asian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences Bibliographies, Scopus, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, World Affairs Online (WAO).

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 CiOP Cankaya, 06700 Ankara/Turkey Tel: +90.312.551-2100 • Fax: +90.312.551-2190 ed itor@ in sigh tturkey.com • www .insightturkey.com

Contents FALL 2013

•

V O L U M E 15

NO. 4

Editors Note 4

COMMENTARIES Gezi Park Revolts: For or Against Democracy? AT iLLA YA YLA

7 Political Culture and National Identity in Conceptualising the Gezi Park Movement TAH iR A B B A S

19

Ergenekon: An Illegitimate Form of Government M A R K A R ESAYAN

29

Democratization and Relations with the EU in the AK Party Period: Is Turkey Really Making Progress? PAUL K U B IC E K

41

A New Challenge for Turkey: Civil War in Syria N U R §iN A T E§O G L U G U N E Y

51

Military, Political Islam, and the Future of Democracy in Egypt A. K A D iR Y IL D IR IM

61

Insights for Egypt’s and Tunisia’s Islamists from Turkish Experience of Democratic Transition A H M E T U Y SA L

69

ARTICLES Euro-Turks in the Contemporary European Imaginary R A Y M O N D T A RA S

79

Constitutional Amendments Under the Justice and Development Party Rule V A H A P C O SK U N

95

The Turkish Economy During the Justice and Development Party Decade ERDALTANASKARAGOL

115

Civil-Military Relations During the AK Party Era: Major Developments and Challenges M UGE AKNUR

131 Turkeys Education Policy During the AK Party Era (2002-2013) Z A F E R ?E L iK an d BEK iR S. G U R

151 After Gezi: Moving Towards Post-Hegemonic Imagination in Turkey ALi M U R A T YEL an d A L P A R S L A N N A S

177 Kyrgyzstan: In Search for Stability Y. E M R E G U R B U Z

191

BOOK REVIEWS Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century " EBRU CANAN-SOKULLU Reviewed by M ustafa Kibaroglu

207

Muslim Youth: Challenges, Opportunities and Expectations FAUZA A H M A D and M O H A M M A D SIDD IQ U E SEDDO N Reviewed by Dr. John Mattausch

221 Turkeys European Future: Behind the Scenes o f Americas Influence on EU-Turkey Relations

Church, State, and the Crisis in

NATHALIE TOCCI Reviewed by Yaprak G ursoy

American Secularism

210

BRUCE LEDEWITZ Reviewed by Laura R. Olson

223 The Emergence o f M odern Istanbul: Transformation and Modernisation o f a City

Jews: The Making o f a Diaspora People

MURAT GUL Reviewed by Esra Akcan

IRVING M .ZEITLIN Reviewed by Harvey E. G oldberg

212

225

Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible

Habermas and European Integration: Social and

DANIEL FINKE, T H O M A S KONIG, SVEN-OLIVER PROKSCH, and GEORGE TSEBELIS Reviewed by Sen e m A ydin -D u zgit

SHIVDEEP GREWAL Reviewed by Unal Eri§

Cultural Modernity Beyond the Nation-State

227

215 Foreign Policy after Tahrir Revolution: A Muslim Mystic Community in Britain: Meaning in the West and for the West

(Re)-D efining the Role o f Egypt in the Middle East

TAYFUN ATAY Reviewed by Ali Murat Yel

M EH M ET OZKAN Reviewed by Muzaffer §enel

217

229

W riting Muslim Identity GEOFFREY NASH Reviewed by M o h a m m a d Siddique Sed do n

219

ARTICLE

Kyrgyzstan: In Search for Stability Y. EM R E G U R B U Z

In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan has searched fo r stability while swinging on a pendulum between democratic reforms and suppression o f democracy. Political changes in Kyrgyzstan started with the liberal dem ocratic promises o f President Akayev in 1990 and President Bakiyev in 2005, but they both ended with disillusionment. The states capacity had to be reestablished in the post-Soviet period, which was sought to be in stitutionalized by authoritarian measures. The failure o f the authoritari an path proves that the people o f Kyrgyzstan are more open to a parlia mentary democracy, where the multiplicity o f interests in society can be represented. Stability, however, does not only rest upon the representation o f different groups’ interests but also on increasing economic resources to redistribute wealth across society. a b s tra c t

yrgyzstan achieved its independence in 1991 and entered a new phase of state-building. Over the years, it struggled to adjust to a liberal econom ic and political system, both of which were considered indispensable for stability. Kyrgyzstan borrowed an established state apparatus from the Soviet system but it had to be restructured to m eet the needs of a pluralistic dem o cratic system in accordance with the market economy. The heavy burden on Kyrgyz authorities was not only a shift in the econom ic and political structure but also the centralization of state functions in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. The adjustment had to be achieved successfully in order to improve the states capacity for its survival in the post-Soviet world. In the last two decades fol lowing independence, failure to improve state capacity resulted in a permanent search for stability.

K

In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan sought to expand state capacity and estab lish stability by both authoritarian and non-authoritarian measures. Kyrgyz stan also tried soft and hard authoritarianism under different presidents. Re cently, Kyrgyzstan is one o f the rare examples o f a post-Soviet republic trying

* Departm ent of History, KyrgyzstanTurkey M a nas University Insight Turkey Vol. 15 / No. 4/ 2013, pp. 191-205

2 0 1 3 Fa l l 1 9 1

ARTICLE

Y. EMRE GURBUZ

In the last two decades, Kyrgyzstan sought to expand state capacity and establish stability by both authoritarian and non-authoritarian

to solve the problem o f stability by non-authoritarian measures. The first years o f independence also started with non-authoritarian hopes for a pluralis tic democracy under President Askar Akayev, which was later transformed into soft authoritarian rule. Increasing authoritarianism led to his overthrow by a popular revolt. Despite expectations, his successor President Kurmanbek Bakiyev moved from soft to hard authoritarianism, which was terminated by an other popular revolt.

m © a SU r e S

During the authoritarian regimes, state capacity was sought to be achieved through “despotic power.”1 Two popular revolts, however, proved the failure o f authoritarianism for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan can employ “infrastructural power,” which refers to the “capacity o f the state to actually penetrate to the society.”2 The recent Kyrgyz government aimed to establish a pluralistic, dem ocratic and parliamentary system, which required an increase in econom ic re sources and their redistribution. Authoritarian measures can be replaced by negotiation with different groups, which can be achieved by an increase in resources and their fair allocation.

A UN report underlines that “[a]uthoritarian approaches to building political capacity are ... unsustainable.”3 The report also argues that “poverty has been reduced the most in states where effective government power rests on a broad political base. In such cases, rulers have minimized the hold of upper classes on the state, successfully organized the middle and lower strata into an effec tive power bloc, and then used this power to channel resources to the poor,”4 which is a key factor for state capacity. For Kyrgyzstan, where public protests are a daily routine and ousted the president on two occasions, the allocation of resources through these channels is o f utmost importance. The two uprisings in Central Asia are generally explained within the context of the “Great Game” between Russia and the USA, denying the role o f domestic conflicts and networks. Some other works examine the role o f interest groups, coined as “elites,” “clans,” “tribes” or “interest groups,” as the main mobilizers of society. The state then becomes just an arena for the struggle between different groups in Kyrgyzstan.5 Both factors have some explanatory use in understand ing the reasons beyond the “revolutions”6 in Kyrgyzstan. In this paper, however, the aim is to understand the recent process in Kyrgyz stan, which focuses on the shaky position of the state. The failed attempts at authoritarian rule have proved that Kyrgyzstan has to be an open, democratic society that shares resources within a wider society. However, a loose politi192 In s i g h t T u r k e y

KYRGYZSTAN: IN SEARCH FOR STABILITY

cal structure with a m inim al role for the state also has its deficiencies. Ethnic clashes between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in June 2010 and the cleavage between the North and South o f Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the need to form an effec tive state apparatus. Thus, stability will be achieved not only by an increase in resources and their allocation, but also by improving state capacity, which ne cessitates the establishment o f a certain level o f state autonomy as mentioned by Michael M ann.7 Autonomy o f the state refers to its “ability to formulate interests o f its own, independent o f or against the will of divergent societal interests.”8 According to Theda Skocpol, the state can act against the needs o f classes, interest groups and other groups in society. It has an autonomous power because it is the only institution which can control the society within its boundaries, keep an army and enact taxes. Only the state can know where the dangers are because only the state possesses information about international affairs and internal condi tions. No other social group can compete with the state in these spheres, which the state can use or abuse for its own benefit.9 According to Mann, the power sources o f the state are econom ic, ideological and military but the states autonomy does not just rely upon these m onopo lized functions. The autonomy o f the state is the outcome o f the states ability to maneuver in a multifunctional environment and between cross-cutting social groups, who are in need o f a state and regulations regarding the “protection o f life and property.” The state functions o f “the maintenance of internal order,” “military defense/aggression,” “maintenance of communications infrastruc ture” and “econom ic redistribution” renders the state indispensable, and its monopoly on these functions creates the source o f its autonomy.10 In Kyrgyzstan, however, these functions are not fully carried out by the state yet, which will be discussed and exemplified in this article. This paper will argue that one of the main reasons o f this failure is the scarcity o f the states econom ic resources, which is also a reason behind the application o f despot ic power that led to authoritarianism. The multi-vectored11 policy in Kyrgyz stan’s international relations could give the state some autonomy above interest groups in society. These agreements are also the basis of new financial resourc es, which Kyrgyzstan needs for investment. Thus, international agreements are not only for the benefit o f the state but also for interest groups and the general public. This paper will first summarize the tenures o f President Akayev and Bakiyev to illustrate the transition from democracy to soft and hard-authoritarianism. Then, the multitude of differences in Kyrgyzstan will be explained. Although these factors weaken state capacity, some o f them could also force Kyrgyzstan to establish a pluralistic, democratic government. Additionally, this article will 2 0 1 3 FALL 19 3

A RTICLE

Y. EMRE GORBOZ

describe the states attempts to increase resources with foreign assistance and create a stable government, noting the expectation that the search process for stability will increase the states capacity in the end.

Akayev Years: From Democratic Promises to Soft-Authoritarianism The authoritarian understanding aims to construct the state as an autonomous body o f administration, which is an unquestionable employer of physical force and the prime mover in society separated from interest groups.12 The deposed presidents of Kyrgyzstan also sought to use the state as a physical force. Al though the first years o f independence started with great hopes for democracy in Kyrgyzstan, it shifted to authoritarianism as a result of the failure to enlarge and allocate resources. Kyrgyzstan’s first attempt to restructure its dysfunctional econom ic system was through a “shock therapy” o f privatization and other market reforms. W hile Kyrgyzstan is not rich in natural resources, it has neighbors like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with abundant hydrocarbon deposits. Market reforms and the formation o f a trustworthy and stable banking system were expected to turn Kyrgyzstan into the “Switzerland o f Asia.”13 During the Soviet period, Kyrgyz stan was dependent on the financial support o f Moscow.14 Although industry was developed in Kyrgyzstan, resources came from neighboring republics.15 The collapse o f the USSR meant the end of the transfer o f resources. The Kyr gyz state could not even pay the subsidies for kolkh ozes (collective farms), sovkhozes (state farms) and factories.16 It was clear for President Akayev that the farms had to be privatized and foreign investment needed to be attracted to rebuild production.17 The swift reforms created an economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan, leading to the col lapse o f the economy. GDP growth rate between 1991 and 1995 was -55.7% .18 Industrial production was especially effected by the collapse and the share of the industry decreased annually by 20% .19 Furthermore, the inflation rate was 920% in 1992 and 1,211.5% in 1993.20 In 1994, President Akayev suspended the parliament on the justification that Kyrgyzstan needed protecting and con tinuing reforms under the authority of a resolute president, and an immediate transition to democracy was not feasible.21 W ith the 1995 Parliamentary and Presidential elections and amendments to the constitution in 1996, President Akayev consolidated his power. The next ten years under President Akayev were known for widespread cor ruption and nepotism. Privatization created new sources for potential mag nates o f Kyrgyzstan and the interest groups around Akayev were the most advantageous in the process. The decision to protect the beneficiaries o f the 194 In s ig h t T u r k ey


reforms escalated the authoritarian rule o f Akayev and the withering o f de m ocracy until 2005. The opposition and the media, however, were not totally suppressed, enabling them to criticize the government for corruption, which invited more author itarian measures. Still, the regime under Akayev was not totally tyrannizing the opposition and Kyrgyzstan was evaluated as a “soft authoritarian” regime.22 In 2005, the elite in opposition23 were able to organize a mass revolt with the assistance o f NGO’s and trainers supported by American N GO’s. W ithout the tension within the elite and the masses, this foreign initiative would not have been able to trigger a successful uprising.

Bakiyev Years: Renewed Promises for Democracy and Hard-Authoritarian Attempt Between 2005 and 2010, Kyrgyzstan was governed by President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, under whose rule Kyrgyzstan quickly returned to a corrupt country with growing authoritarian measures against the media and the opposition. The increase in authoritarianism can be understood as an outcome o f the dis tribution o f scarce resources among new potential elites from southern Kyr gyzstan. Most o f the political elite and public were excluded from the close circle of beneficiaries. President Bakiyev may have considered the reason for Akayev’s failure to be the insufficiency of his soft-authoritarianism, which led Bakiyev to move to hard-authoritarianism.

Market reforms and

During the Bakiyev period, the President’s position the formation of a as the head of state was at the very center of the po trustworthy and stable litical system. Practically, there was no separation o f powers. The Prime M inister was appointed by banking system were the President and the Prime Minister had to leave expected to turn his/her party to becom e a “neutral” apparatchik o f Kyrgyzstan into the the state, which was also the case for ministers. The government was not following a party program and "Switzerland of Asia" members were not supported by their party. This “neutrality” limited the power o f the parliament and the government, which should function as balancing powers against the President. Another leg of the separation o f powers, the court, was also under the control o f the President. As the head o f the state, the President had the duty to appoint the judges. In deed, all members of state institutions including governors, university rectors and chief physicians in hospitals were approved or appointed by the President. Although the system was actually in continuity with Akayevs period, Bakiyev was less limited by balancing powers. 2 0 1 3 FALL 1 9 5

ARTICLE

Y. EMRE GURBUZ

People on Ala-Too Square in Bishkek on Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day. RIA Novosti

The revolt o f 2010 once again confirmed that Kyrgyzstan is different than other Central Asian republics.24 Neither “hard” nor “soft” authoritarian regimes seem to be durable in Kyrgyzstan. The solution most likely lies in finding a political structure fashioned for the representation of the multiplicity o f interests in society, which could be a parliamentary democracy with separation of powers. Furthermore, an important trigger factor for those revolts was the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan. Econom ic resources are too small to be shared among the elite and the people. In both revolts widespread corruption and seizure of econom ic resources by the President and his close circle incited public anger. In order to establish stability, the econom ic structure should also be improved together with political restructuring.

Multiplicity in the Kyrgyzstan: Clans, Regionalism, Ethnic Groups The multifaceted social structure of Kyrgyzstan is the main reason behind the democratic demands. The econom ic situation and corruption, which led to popular revolts, is not unique to Kyrgyzstan, but what differentiates Kyrgyz stan from other Central Asian republics is related to its long historical back196 I n s i g h t T u r k e y


ground and geographical features. Geographically, Kyrgyzstan is a m ountain ous region with 25 peaks over 4,000 meters and more than 2,000 rivers cutting through valleys,25 where the clans were living untouched by authoritarian rul ers in the past. Kyrgyz are historically known as people without khan s but with biys or m an ap s,26 whose family background was less determining than khans and a leaders authority was limited to the support of the clan that chose to follow them. The mountainous terrain helped them to live without the protection or coercion o f khans. Thus, social networks always had a crucial role in Kyrgyzstan. Most studies on Kyrgyzstan stress the core role of clans or tribes in shaping the recent political structure and the misnom er “tribalism” is often used in analyzing the nations politics. Tribalism explains the Kyrgyz society as functioning according to tribal networks, which is a hindrance for the formation of an institutionalized, formal political structure. John Anderson argues that “one of the key problems facing the development o f a civil society, and the evolution o f a ‘modern polity throughout Central Asia, has been the continued strength o f informal politics rooted in what some have described as ‘tribalism.’”27 In spite o f the fact that “tribe” connotes a kinship-based organization, the term is used in its modern application for a group “partially extended beyond a narrow sense o f related people with shared genealogies to include members o f other clans and ethnic groups who have been effectively coopted.”28 These interest groups were created in Akayev s period in order to build “an al liance with regional bosses.” They in turn “utilised their position to aid Akayev in the dissolution of parliament and in ensuring satisfactory results during ref erenda, and in return enjoyed considerable leeway in the governance o f their own territories. Yet this policy only reinforced regionalism, allowing local pa tronage networks to consolidate and to manipulate political life.”29 Regionalism was also reinforced by the political structure. The election sys tem was based on small precincts, where only one candidate with the most votes was elected. In precincts, local networks were a greater determinant than political programs, which undermined the institutionalization of parties with nation-wide programs. The political system was revised by the Constitution of 2010. Currently, the President appoints the leader o f the electorally successful political party to form the government and the members o f the government are not expected to resign from their parties. However, local leaders are still important and there is great fragmentation in the political arena, as noticed during the parliamentary elections in 2010. The forerunner o f the election, which was known as a party 2 0 1 3 FALL 1 9 7

A RTICLE

y. e m r e g

Or b Oz

o f the South, received only 8.9% of votes. The second party’s stronghold was in the North and it had 8.4% o f the vote.30 These poor election results reflect the power o f regionalism in Kyrgyzstan.31 The main cleavage in society is related to regionalism. North and South Kyrgyz stan are divided by mountains, which were surpassed by motorways less than a decade ago. The geographical division and lack o f cultural contact with different societies separated the Kyrgyz in the South and North. In daily conversations, comparisons based on “the others” general features are very frequently ln order to establish stability heard. The overthrow of President in Kyrgyzstan, the economic Bakiyev, who was from the South, and his replacement by Presidents structure should also be Otunbayeva and Atambayev - both improved together with from the north - intensified the dif political restructuring ferentiation. The failure to prevent ethnic clashes in the South demon strated the limits o f the states capacity governed by politicians predominately from the North. After the clashes, the President sought to remove the national ist Mayor o f the southern city Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, from office. However, the President was unsuccessful in stripping the Mayor of his duties due to the strong reaction o f his supporters in Osh, which is the second largest city in the nation. The failure further demonstrated the incapacity o f the government in Bishkek, as the mayor is still on duty and the influence of the capital is weak. The lack o f a comm on state ideology is one of the main hindrances o f the Kyrgyz states power, as mentioned by Mann. In 2011, President Otunbayeva declared that producing a Kyrgyz national ideology was unsuccessful. She presented the epic hero Manas as “one o f components o f the Kyrgyz ideology as it reflects the history o f the nation” and as the main source o f the Kyrgyz national ideology.32 Only two months later, the “Freedom Monument” in the main square o f Bishkek was removed with a rushed Parliamentary decision and replaced by a statue o f Manas as the highlight o f the 20th anniversary of independence.33 In January 2012, a big statue o f Manas was opened in the city of Osh. W ith a height o f 24 meters, it is one o f the biggest monuments in the world. It is probably no coincidence that it was built in the South.34 Another potential source o f democratic conflict is the multiethnic demog raphy o f Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has a very diverse population with 71.2% Kyrgyz, 14.3% Uzbeks, 6.9% Russians and 1.1% Dungans. The percentage of Uighurs, Tajiks, Akhyska Turks, Kazakhs, Tatars, Ukrainians, Koreans, Azer baijanis, Germans and Turkmens is between 1% and .1%.35 There are over 90 ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan and the right to preserve, learn and develop their native language is protected bylaw (article 10/3). Most ethnic groups have cul198 I n s i g h t T u r k e y


tural associations that work with the Kyrgyz parliament through the Assembly o f Peoples of Kyrgyzstan. They also have schools educating in their native lan guage in continuity with the Soviet period. The textbooks of these schools are sent from the related republic. Thus, students are taught courses like geogra phy and history with books that have the geographical features and history of other republics. The protection o f cultural rights, including education in native language, can consolidate loyalty to the state. Yet the employment of books from different countries can also damage loyalty to Kyrgyzstan. The significance of state capacity was realized once again when the ethnic clashes of 2010 between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek in southern Kyrgyzstan erupt ed. Although similar clashes were seen in 1990, it was thought that the 1990 confrontations were unique and the two groups could live side by side. Howev er, the clashes in 2010 showed it was not a bygone problem. The main problem arose when the USSR entered a controlled market economy during the Gor bachev period, which led to the enrichm ent of the Uzbeks in southern cities through trade. The Kyrgyz on the other hand were living in kolkhoz or sovk hozes, which collapsed due to the restructuring of the economy and pushed the Kyrgyz to migrate to cities. The clashes of 1990 were sparked by a fight for land between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz. The problem only intensified in the last two decades. The number of both Kyrgyz and Uzbeks increased in cities due to high birth rates and migration. The cause o f the conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek can be compared to a scissor between political rights and econom ic opportunities: The Uzbeks enjoyed the benefits of the market econ omy but after the Soviet period they lost their political position to the Kyrgyz and demanded more cultural and political rights; whereas the Kyrgyz gained more political and administrative posts in the South but the economy based on collective farms was in ruins and they wanted to profit from the market economy. This imbalance between the economy and politics triggered bloody clashes between the two groups in 2010. W hile there are conflicting specu lations about the trigger factor, the undesirable “division of labor” could be considered the main factor. In 2011, President Otunbayeva denounced the policy o f “Kyrgyzstan - our com m on home” and declared that it is false to hope “for another Soviet inter nationalism.” She also stated the “Kyrgyz language ... must be the language of interethnic communication [instead o f Russian]... the Kyrgyz history and culture are important educational components.” For Otunbayeva, the failure o f unification triggered ethnic clashes and unification was expected to be achieved around the culture of the titular nation, as it was the case in European countries.36 Therefore, a solution was to consolidate the state ideology. In 2011 and 2012, some Uzbek schools shifted their education to the Kyrgyz language. Only courses of Uzbek language and literature are taught in Uzbek. 2 0 1 3 FALL 1 9 9

ARTICLE

Y. EMRE GURBUZ

Uzbek school directors declared the move was in response to the demand from parents, who do not consider any future for their children through education in Uzbek.37 Another hindrance o f state capacity is that the media is under the influence o f different countries. Mann considers media to be a source o f a states infra structural power. In Kyrgyzstan, we cannot talk about a unified territory for media. Broadcasts watched in the North are generally from Russian or Kazakh channels, while Uzbek channels have broad coverage in the South. Because of the mountainous terrain of Kyrgyzstan, northern channels cannot be watched in the South and vice versa. Thus, the cleavage between the North and South is also reproduced through broadcasts.38

In Search for Solutions Econom ic resources are too small to be distributed fairly among the public and are shared by limited members o f interest groups, which led to repeated popular revolts. The Constitution o f 2010 was a response to repeated attempts o f authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption. Now the power is divided be tween the President, Prime Minister and Parliament. The other significant leg o f the separation o f powers, the judiciary, is not well-established yet. The cur rent President is still stronger than the Prime M inister but his power is limited by parliament. Nonetheless, he has to find new ways to consolidate his pow er by consent and improve the state’s capacity to achieve stability. Due to the aforementioned fragmented structure o f Kyrgyzstan, this is a very difficult task and chronic econom ic problems make the solution even harder. An effective tool would be increasing the econom ic resources to be shared. The need for capital for new investment and restructuring is expected to be provid ed through foreign investors. Kyrgyz government authorities frequently visit other countries or welcome representatives from different nations. As a result, Kyrgyzstan has signed agreements on various issues with many countries. In only February 2013, the Kyrgyz President or M inister o f Foreign Affairs met officials from Japan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Italy, Germany, Turkey, the Euro pean Union, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the People’s Republic o f China (PRC) and Malaysia. The results o f this multi-vectored foreign policy are manifested in the “Nation al Sustainable Development Strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic for the Period of 2013-2017.”39 Most o f the investment needed for the realization o f the plan’s projects will come from international financial sources. This plan might help Kyrgyzstan find resources to be allocated, to strengthen the infrastructure of the country and improve state capacity. 200 In s i g h t T u r k e y


The plan is divided to four sections which reflect the priorities for Kyrgyz stan: agriculture, energy, transportation and com m unication, and production and logistics. The state will attempt to revive the collapsed agricultural system with a total budget o f $412.5 m illion for projects to construct plants for fertil izer production, seed and breed farms, build laboratories for certification in international standards, create banks for agricultural credits, finance m achin ery and construct irrigation canals. The financial support for these projects will come from agreements made with USAID, the World Bank, Turkey and the PRC. The largest investment will be made in the energy sector. The high mountains o f Kyrgyzstan provide abundant water sources for hydroelectric power plants. Kyrgyzstan is the most important provider of electricity in Central Asia thanks to a hydroelectric power plant constructed during the Soviet period. Between 2013 and 2017, $5,055 billion will be invested in the energy sector. The main supporters are the PRC, Russian Federation (RF), USA, Turkey, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Bank and World Bank. However, it should be m en tioned that construction o f the new massive hydro electric power plant, Kambar-Ata, which is financed The geographical by the RF, alone has a budget of $3.4 billion.

division and lack of cultural contact with different societies separated the Kyrgyz in the South and North

The projects planned for transportation and com munication have a budget o f $897.5 million. The main idea is to turn Kyrgyzstan into the transit cor ridor between the PRC and the West. Kyrgyzstan shares borders with the PRC, Uzbekistan, Kazakh stan and Tajikistan. The projects will improve roads between the PRC and Uzbekistan, as well as Kazakhstan. The PRC and Asian Bank are financiers o f these road projects but the big project o f constructing a Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek highway is yet to come. In the strategic plan o f 20132017, the PRC plans only to realize the feasibility study on the construction. One o f the projects Turkey will implement is the rehabilitation and construc tion o f roads in Bishkek ($30 m illion). The roads in Bishkek are a matter of serious criticism among city dwellers and the project has great public relations value. Other investors o f transportation and comm unication projects are the Islamic Bank, Saudi Arabia, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, PRC, USA and RF. Nearly half of the transportation and comm unication projects bud get, or $450 million, will pay for a railway construction between the North and South o f Kyrgyzstan implemented by the RF. The fiber-optic backbone in Kyrgyzstan will also be improved. The railroad construction between the North and South and provision of the fiber-optic network will strengthen the infrastructural power of the state and also develop stronger bonds against the N orth-South cleavage.

2 0 1 3 FALL 20 1

ARTICLE

Y. EMRE GURBUZ

The largest investment will be made in the energy sector. The high mountains of Kyrgyzstan provide abundant water sources for hydroelectric power plants

The fourth section o f investment projects is in production and logistics and there are only three projects with a small budget o f $90 million. They are supplementary to other sections o f the strate gic plan and are expected to be financed by private investors.

To summarize, the first section o f the strategic plan, on agriculture, aims to increase agricultural and an imal products; the second section on energy aims to turn the country into a stronger supplier of elec tricity and provide financial sources to the state; the third section on transportation and communication will help Kyrgyzstan to transport its products, gain more from the growing exportation capacity o f the PRC and strengthen the infrastructural power in Kyrgyzstan; and finally, the fourth section on production and logistics will support the logistic demands of increasing commercial relations.

The main threat for the realization o f this strategic plan would be corruption, which can lead to the misuse o f foreign financial sources. The repayment of exploited credits will escalate the econom ic burden on the people. Another danger is created by the inefficiency o f contact groups in allocating resourc es. The allocation process requires civil actors to make contact with the state and ensure accountability for fair redistribution, which are systems not yet formalized.

Conclusion The realization o f the strategic plan - as a result of a successful multi-vectored foreign policy - will increase the economic power and state capacity similar to Mann’s model. The weakness in “the maintenance of internal order” was demonstrated during the ethnic clashes in the South and subsequently by abil ity o f the mayor of Osh to neglect the capital. The cleavage between the North and South is the weakest side o f the states maintenance of internal order, which has yet to be solved. The state function o f “maintenance o f communications infrastructure” is poorly developed but as mentioned above it is being improved. The divi sion between the North and South is related to the limited communication infrastructure. The highway was finished ten years ago and the completion o f new roads is in the strategic plan. In terms o f infrastructure, Kyrgyzstan’s mountainous terrain with hard winters has limited the nation from becoming 2 0 2 I N S I G H T T U R K EY


a tight-knit econom ic unit. This is also confirmed by the media because the coverage o f broadcasts is limited in Kyrgyzstan and the nation is further frag mented by other countries’ broadcasts. The strategic plan can again diminish this hindrance to state capacity. The next state function o f “econom ic redistribution” cannot be fulfilled b e cause of the lim itations o f the states financial sources. There are very limited resources to be redistributed, which used to be one o f the reasons behind the state’s employment o f despotic power under previous presidents. The state has to first increase resources through the strategic plan. The hydroelectric power plants are o f utmost im portance in improving the financial sources of the state. The function o f the state’s “military defense and aggression” is not mentioned in this paper because this category hardly exists as a determinant function in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan is not founded by wars, where the military plays a determining role and takes a position for future political developments. The absence o f war in the recent past minimizes the significance o f the military role o f the state. The monopoly on international agreements is sustained by diplomatic relations conducted by politicians, which is crucial for the Kyrgyz state in improving state capacity Additionally, the indispensable role of the state in preparing and implementing the strategic plan further consolidates the state’s position. However, this process is open to discussion in the parliament with different parties and through the media with other interest groups. If the state can improve its capacity as the arbiter between different groups, which act as the supplier and allocator o f resources, Kyrgyzstan can achieve stability based on democracy and consent. But still the state will improve its capacity as the arbiter between different groups as supplier and allocator o f resources, can achieve stability based on democracy and consent.

Endnotes 1. "D e sp o tic p o w e r"is used by Michael M a n n to define the authoritarian type of state, w here the state elite w h o p osse ss despotic pow er d o not need to "routine, institutionalized" negotiations with other g ro u p s in society. The state elite can undertake any desired action. M o st historical states possessed unlim ited despotic pow er and the form er Soviet party elites posse ssed so m e despotic pow er (Michael Mann, "The A u to n o m o u s Pow er of the State: its Origins, M e c h an ism s and Results,''Archives Europeennes deSocioiogie, 25 (1984), p. 189). Thus, this is the political structure borrow ed from the Soviet period but could not be m aintained in face of tw o popular revolts. 2. M ann, "T h e A u to n o m o u s Pow er of the State: its Origins, M e c h an ism s and Results," p. 189. 3. U N R ISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Developm ent), Com bating Poverty an d In equality: Structural Change, Social Policy a n d Politics (Geneva: U N R IS D Publication, 2010) p.261, retrieved July

01,

2013,

from

httpy/w w w .unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/httpNetlTFram ePDF?ReadForm &

p a re n tu n id =9 2B 1 D 50 57F43 149C C 125779 60043 4441& p a re n td o ctyp e =d o cu m e n ta u xilia ryp age & n e tit path=80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/92B1 D 50 5 7 F 4 3 1 4 9 C C 1 257 7 9 6 0 0 4 3 4 4 4 1 /$file/PovRep%20 (small).pdf.

2 0 1 3 FALL 203

ARTICLE

y . e m r e g O r b Oz

4. UNRISD, p. 263 5. See for a recent w ork o n the role o f the elite in Kyrgyzstan's m ass protests: Scott Radnitz, W eapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes a n d Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 2 0 1 0). 6. The ch a n ge of president by popular revolts in Kyrgyzstan is often called a "revolution.'This alteration, however, sh ou ld be follow ed by radical transform ations in the political and e conom ic spheres, even affecting social life. In Kyrgyzstan, ch a nge s were limited to the President and so m e adjustm ents in the political system. A lth o u g h the political shifts were important, they were not aim ed at radical m odifi cations to the econom ic structure nor a restructuring o f society. Therefore, the term "revolution" is an exaggeration of the situation. 7. Mann, "The A u to n o m o u s Pow er of the State: Its Origins, M e c h an ism s and Results." 8. Karen Barkey, Sunita Parikh, "Com parative Perspectives on the Stat e " A nnu al Review o f Sociology, No. 17(1991), pp. 525-549. 9. Theda Skocpol, "B rin g in g the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis of Current Research," P. Evans (ed.), Bringing the State Back In (N ew York: C am bridge University Press, 1985). 10. Mann, "T h e A u to n o m o u s Pow er o f the State: Its Origins, M e c h an ism s and Results," pp. 187-188, 196-197. 11. The term "m ulti-vectored" w as first applied by Kazakh President Nazarbayev (Pinar Akâli, "NationState Building in Central Asia: A Lost C a se ?" Perspectives in Global Development a n d Technology, Vol. 2, No. 2-3, (2003), pp. 409-429. 12. M ann, "The A u to n o m o u s Pow er of the State: Its Origins, M e c h an ism s and Results," pp. 186. 13. Central Asia Monitor, N o 5, (1992), p. 14. 14.0. Soylemez, K. G oz (eds.), Salican Cigitovve Dunyasi (Bishkek: Kirgizistan-Turkiye M a n as Universitesi Yayinlari, 2006), p. 229. 15. H am di Alkan, Orta Asya Turk Cumhuriyetlerinde Siyasal Hayat ve Kurumlar (Ankara: Usak Yayinlari, 2011), pp. 216-217. 16. S o y le m e z , Salican Cigitov ve Dunyasi, p. 229. 17. Alkan, Orta Asya Turk Cumhuriyetlerinde Siyasal Hayat ve Kurumlar, pp. 216-217. 18. Paul Kubicek, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1998), p. 33. 19. Abazov, Historical Dictionary o f Kyrgyzstan, pp. 7-8. 20. Alkan, Orta Asya Turk Cumhuriyetlerinde Siyasal Hayat ve Kurumlar, p. 219. 21. Kubicek, "Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure?," p. 37. 22. Turkm enistan and Uzbekistan were evaluated by Treacher as "hard authoritarian." Adrian Treacher, "Political Evolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia,"Democratization, Vol. 3, No. 3, (October 1996) pp. 306-327. 23. See for the role of the elite in Kyrgyzstan's m ass protests: Scott Radnitz, W eapons o f the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes a n d Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 2010). 24. See for an analysis: Pinar Akâli, "Kyrgyzstan: Back to the is la n d of Democracy," Anita Sengupta, Su ch an d an a Chatterjee (eds.), The State in Eurasia: Local a n d Global Arenas (forthcoming). 25. A.O. O sm onov, Kirgiz Respublikasynyn Fizikahk Geografiyasy 8, (Bishkek: Bilim Kutu, 2006), p. 20. 26. The Kazakhs always had khans from the C h in ggisid genealogy, w hich is o ne of the m ain differences betw een the Kyrgyz and the Kazakh. 27. John A nderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island o f D em ocracy (Am sterdam : H arw ood A cadem ic Pu b lishers, 1999), p. 39.

204 I n s ig h t T u r k e y


28. Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island o f Democracy, p. 39. The term "clan" is also used as “net w orks based o n the rational calculations o f individuals m ade w ithin a collectivist cultural an d institu tional context, [where]... actual blood ties d o not always exist.” (Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics an d Re gim e Transition in Central Asia (New York: C am bridge University Press, 2006), p. 17) However, the use of the term s"trib e "o r"cla n "is m isleading because these social netw orks are n o w being reproduced within clientelist relations. 29. Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island o f Democracy, p. 41. 30. Tsentral'naya Komissiya po Vyboram i Provedeniyu Referendumov Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, "Predvaritel'nye Rezul'taty," retrieved January 16,2012, from http://cec.shailoo.gov.kg/i-election.asp?ElectionlD= 100& D istrictlD =1380. 31. A s o f 2013, the institutionalization o f the political sphere is far from being established. The political position and ide o logy of parties are vague, a lth o u gh prelim inary chan ge s have been made. Thus, it is high ly possible that in time national program s of parties will consolidate and they will attain nationw ide supporters. 32.T olgonai O sm angazieva,"Y ou Sh o u ld n 't Think M a n as Epic as So m e Tale," 24.kg News A gency (June 28, 2011), retrieved April 6, 2013, from http://eng.24.kg/community/2011/06/28/18933.html. 33. See for an analysis ab ou t the reasons for rem oving the "Freedom M o n u m e n t" on the very day of independence: Y. Emre Gurbiiz, “M a n as as a Saviour in Tim es of Crisis," Anita Sengupta, Suchand ana Chatterjee (eds.), The State in Eurasia: Local a n d Global Arenas (Delhi: KW Publishers, 2013). 34. Actually, this w as not the first time M a n a s w as em ployed for the purpose o f national unity. D u ring A kayev's presidency in 1995, celebrations for the 1000,h anniversary o f M a n as were organized and the "Se ve n C o m m a n d m e n ts of M a n a s" were produced as the new principles of a unifying id e o logy for the peoples of Kyrgyzstan. The first principle is called "U nity an d C o hesio n of a Nation" and the second is "International Concord, Friendship and Cooperation." W h e n reciting the epic, the close friendship of M a n as with a person from the nation in enm ity is told and also it is underlined that "h e created a hom e for different peoples". 35. Natsionalniy Statisticheskiy Kom itet K yrgyzskoy Respubliki, "Kalktyn Uluttuk Kuramy: Natsionalniy Sostav Naseleniya," retrieved April 17, 2 0 1 2 , from http://www.stat.kg/stat.files/tematika/,qeMorpa4>/ Kbiprbi3craH%20B%20L|M (|)pax/fleM o7.pdf.

36. AkiPress, "O tunbayeva: Children o f all nationalities after the prim ary school should have the Kyrgyz language,"(June 1 8 ,2 0 1 }); Centrasia,“O tu n b ayeva:"N ikakikh d rugikhgrazhdanskikh o so b ykh prav i kyrgy z o v n e t"(K yrgyz have no O ther Civil Rights), (Speech at the Congress), (June 18,2011), retrieved M a y 7,2013, from http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=13 0 8 3886 20. 37. RFE/RL,"N ew sline Ethnic Uzbeks Push for Switch to Kyrgyz Lan gu a ge Schools,"(July 1,2011), retrieved M a y 7,2013, from http://ww w .rferl.org/content/ethnic_uzbeks_push_sw itch_to_kyrgyz_language_in_ schools/24252883.htm l. 38. For an analysis o f this problem see Y. Emre Gurbiiz, “The W eakness o f National Broadcasting as a Factor against Nation-Form ation in Kyrgyzstan," 1st International Sym posium on Media Studies, Akdeniz University, Antalya, Turkey, 21-23 Novem ber, 2013 (forthcoming). 39. Strategiya Ustoichibogo razvitiya Kyrgyzkoi Respubliki na period 201 3-2 017gody, (January 21,2013).

201.3 F a l l 20 5