Institutional Development in the Face of Complexity ...

P1: IZO Human Ecology [huec]

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Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999

C 2004) Human Ecology, Vol. 32, No. 3, June 2004 (°

Institutional Development in the Face of Complexity: Developing Rules for Managing Forest Resources1 Amy R. Poteete2,4 and David Welch3

The ability to develop institutions is constrained by human capacity to cope with complexity. But complexity is multidimensional and it is not clear which forms of complexity present the greatest challenges for institutional development. In the context of natural resources, the predictability of resource availability affects expectations that an individual or group will be able to capture the benefits of management. In addition, incomplete understanding of cause-and-effect relationships creates uncertainty about the consequences of alternative management options. These features influence calculations about resource management. The importance of resource complexity relative to various social, political, and institutional factors known to influence collective choice remains an open question. We evaluate the relative importance of several forms of resource complexity and characteristics of resource users for the development of rules for management for forest products in Indiana. KEY WORDS: complexity; forests; institutions; natural resource management; Indiana.

INTRODUCTION When renewable natural resources are held collectively, their management becomes an exercise in collective institutional development. Institutions, often described as commonly understood “rules of the game” (North, 1990), define actions that must, may, or must not be taken under 1 An

earlier version of this paper was persented at the 60th Annual National Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 25–28, 2002. 2 University of New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Drive, New Orleans, Louisiana 70148. 3 Indiana University, 408 North Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, Indiana 47408. 4 To whom correspondence should be addressed; e-mail: [email protected]. 279 C 2004 Plenum Publishing Corporation 0300-7839/04/0600-0279/0 °


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particular circumstances (Ostrom, 1990). Whether formal or informal, institutions gain their social significance by constraining social action and shaping expectations about social interactions. Both the nature of the collective problem and the characteristics of the group trying to solve that problem affect prospects for collective action, and thus affect the development of institutions. Challenges associated with coordination, conflicts of interest, or excludability become more difficult to overcome when the nature of the collective problem itself is not well understood. The complexity of natural resources hinders management, both by raising risks and creating problems of cognition.4 Current levels of use and other management activities directed at a particular resource represent only a small fraction of the many factors influencing future availability of that resource. Weather patterns, natural disasters, pollution levels, shifts in the abundance of other plants and animals, the introduction of exotic species, the spread of disease, and interactions among aspects of the ecological system all influence the availability of particular resources. Ecological interactions represent a natural source of variability in resource availability — and, to the extent these interactions are predictable, of risk. In economic terms, risk exists when multiple outcomes are possible, all possible outcomes are known, and probabilities can be assigned to each possibility. When an individual faces decision-making under risk, the expected utility of a course of action is calculated by summing the value of each possible outcome multiplied by the probability that it will occur. Risk has the effect of decreasing willingness to invest in management activities and encouraging a variety of risk-spreading strategies.5 Complexity also affects the ability of resource users and managers to understand how their actions affect the future availability of particular resources or the health of the resource system of which they are a part. Extreme complexity stymies the ability to assign probabilities to alternative outcomes, or even to identify all possible outcomes. Cognitive challenges arising from resource complexity are particularly problematic for collective management of shared natural resources. Given the externalities associated with many localized forms of resource use, even management of resources on privately owned land often has a collective dimension. The more complex 4 This

paper focuses on decision making by private citizens, but see Wilson (2002) for an examination of how policymakers have reacted to natural complexity associated with fisheries management. 5 For example, if planting seeds from a rare plant has a probability of 0.35 of yielding new plants worth $100 and a probability of 0.65 of yielding nothing but costing $10 in effort, the expected utility of planting those seeds would be ($100 × 0.35) + (−$10 × 0.65) = $28.50. Whether an individual would decide to invest in planting seeds for this rare plant depends upon the opportunity costs of forfeiting alternative activities.


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the cause–effect relationships affecting natural resources, the more likely individuals are to have divergent assessments of alternative management strategies. Ambiguity about the benefits associated with alternative management strategies increases the difficulty of collective action, the importance of learning, and the importance of knowledge transfers. Complexity represents an important obstacle to resource management. But how important is the complexity of a resource for collective action relative to other factors? This paper examines the relative importance of resource complexity for collective action to manage forest resources. We draw upon data on collective management of five forests in southern Indiana. In each case, a group of people jointly manages forested land and uses a variety of forest products. These groups have developed commonly understood rules or institutions that guide the use of each of these forest products. Comparisons of the rules of use adopted by each group for three different forest products make it possible to distinguish the effects of resource complexity from other aspects of the collective action problem. A very large body of literature documents the influence of demographic, economic, social, and institutional factors, as well as resource characteristics, upon the likelihood that a group of resource users will act collectively to develop institutions for resource management.6 If resource characteristics influence institutional development independently of other social and institutional factors, variation should be observed in the development of institutions for different products from the same resource system by the same set of people. If institutional development varies more markedly across groups of resource users than across resources with different characteristics, we should question the relative importance of resource characteristics. But neither resource characteristics nor social characteristics are expected to account for variation in institutional development on their own. Rather, we expect to find evidence of the influence of both sets of factors, in the form of variation in institutional development across user groups and across products harvested by the same user group from the same resource system. The next section provides an overview of the research program from which we draw our data. We then discuss particular dimensions of resource complexity widely recognized as problematic for management. The forest products of interest in this study, firewood, ginseng, and morel mushrooms, feature various degrees and forms of complexity. After describing key characteristics of these forest products, we compare management rules developed by each user group for these three products. The final section evaluates our findings and identifies points for closer consideration. 6 See

review and synthesis in Agrawal (2001).


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METHODS AND DATA The data for this study were collected as part of the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) Research Program. IFRI researchers use a common set of interdisciplinary methods to study forests, the people who use forest resources, and their institutions for managing those resources (IFRI Research Program, 2001; Ostrom and Wertime, 2000; Poteete and Ostrom, in press). Demographic, economic, and institutional data are collected using a combination of participatory group interviews and semistructured individual interviews. Archival or legal documents provide supplemental data for some sites. IFRI researchers evaluate forest conditions by collecting biophysical data from a sample of forest plots. A network of collaborating research centers participates in the IFRI research program. Each center develops criteria for site selection. A longstanding interest in the survival of collective forms of resource management among researchers at Indiana University guided the selection of the five IFRI sites in southern Indiana. All five sites encompass forests that are owned and managed by a group of people. The five sites have well-defined user groups involved in the management of clearly demarcated forests. Each group manages its forest collectively, albeit through a variety of arrangements. None of the groups relies upon its forest for subsistence. All use a variety of forest products. The term “community” presents numerous conceptual problems (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). In discussions about natural resource management, the community (e.g., for community-based management) is often assumed to be equivalent with the residents in geopolitically defined settlements. Yet the term implies self-identification as well as common residence. If defined in terms of self-identification, communities need be neither geographically concentrated nor exclusive. Multiple communities—religious, ethnic, or whatever—coexist in many settlements, and many communities have members spread over numerous settlements. Although selfidentification provides a basis for expecting internal policing, some degree of spatial overlap with resource systems is helpful for understanding resource management. In each IFRI site in southern Indiana, individuals acquired land together to pursue shared goals, including privacy, the creation of a spiritual refuge, securing a gathering place, and recreation. Formation of a group was a conscious act, entailing identification with the group.7 The level of individual investment required to join differs across groups, and group 7 Groups

that form in order to create community are often referred to as intentional communities (e.g., Brown, 2002; Shenker, 1986). See also the Intentional Communities website (http://www.ic.org/).


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identification is also likely to vary.8 Nonetheless, there is some group identification in all five sites. Because these groups formed around the acquisition of land, a clear link exists between group members and natural resources. We focus on firewood, ginseng, and morel mushrooms, forest products that are widely used in southern Indiana, and throughout the American Midwest. Two of these products are harvested in all five of the sites in southern Indiana. The third, ginseng, is harvested in four of the five sites. Many in the region use firewood as an important source of heating; some residents in our study sites relied solely upon firewood for heating. A local delicacy, morel mushrooms elicit considerable enthusiasm. Interest in herbal medicines such as ginseng varies among residents of southern Indiana, but is strong among certain subpopulations. Ginseng is one of the most highly valued medicinal plants. In addition to their importance as products of interest locally and regionally, these forest products vary along the dimensions of resource complexity discussed below: identification risk, resilience, scarcity and abundance, variability and predictability, the viability of storage, and the availability of substitutes. Comparable ecological conditions hold across all five sites. The study sites lie within the central hardwoods region of Indiana dominated by broadleaf deciduous tree species (Hicks, 1998). Rolling hills and dissected ridges of siltstone, shale, and limestone characterize the geomorphology of this area (Gray, 1981). The tree diversity of these forests is quite high (ranging from about 20 to 40 species) with dominant species typically being oak (Quercus), maple (Acer), and tulip poplar (Liriodendron tulipfera). It is unlikely that any differences in natural resource management reflect ecological variation across sites. The sites vary along a number of other dimensions, including group characteristics commonly expected to influence the success of collective action. In the presentation of data, we emphasize differences in group origin, size, heterogeneity, and the presence of disruptive conflicts, as summarized in Table I. Despite continuing debate about thresholds and possibly curvilinear relationships, the conventional wisdom predicts that the prospects for successful cooperation in the management of shared resources increases as group size decreases, group age increases, and heterogeneity decreases (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Kitts, 2001; Poteete and Ostrom, in press). Effective mechanisms for conflict resolution help prevent conflicts from becoming disruptive, and thus from interfering with collective endeavors. Numerous studies have validated the importance of these factors (Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 2000 [1996]; Ostrom, 1990) and we do expect outcomes in our sites to be influenced by them. By comparing 8 See

site summaries below for more detail.


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Poteete and Welch Table I. Forest Communities in Southern Indiana

Community

Origins

Goals

Size

Oak (O)

Early 1970s

10

High

Maple (M)

Mid-1970s

30–40

Relatively low

Box Elder (BE)

Early 1980s

Twin Oaks (TO) Tulip Poplar (TP)

Mid-1970s Early 1970s

Community Gathering space Community Back-to-the-land Spiritual Gathering space Privacy Residential development Recreation

a Box

20a 200a 4 1000

Conflict

Moderate Low Moderateb

Elder has a small group of active members, but many less-involved members. Poplar’s conflict was over infrastructure rather than forest management.

b Tulip

rules for the management of three resources developed by five groups that vary along social dimensions of known importance, we can evaluate the relative importance of resource complexity and social factors. If social factors are the most important, we should see more variation in rules across groups than across natural resources. If resource complexity is more important, variation should be stronger across resources than across groups. Because we do expect both sets of factors to influence the development of rules, we do not expect to find a perfect relationship. Throughout, we protect the confidentiality of our respondents by using pseudonyms to refer to the sites. We have retained pseudonyms adopted for two of the sites in an earlier publication: Oak and Maple (Gibson and Koontz, 1998). Twin Oaks, a pseudonym assigned for database purposes to the forest at a third site, is used for that entire site here. Names of other tree species common in southern Indiana, Box Elder and Tulip Poplar, were selected as pseudonyms for the other two sites. We supplement data in the IFRI database with information gleaned from site reports and field notes in the IFRI archives.9

COMPLEXITY IN FORESTS AND OTHER NATURAL SYSTEMS Particular aspects of resource complexity are expected to influence collective action for resource management in predictable ways. We focus on the implications for the development of quantity restrictions and rules restricting access to resources. Continued availability of renewable resources requires some form of restriction on extraction, which may be obtained 9 The

IFRI archives are maintained at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.


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by setting ceilings on the quantities extracted or by restricting the number of individuals involved in extraction. Rules affecting quantities and access are thus essential to effective management of renewable resources. We also touch upon the implications of complexity for information sharing, but do not address this interesting phenomenon in as much detail.10 Quantity restrictions range from nonexistent, through norms and loose rules of thumb, to tighter and more specific limitations. Examples of common rules of thumb from our cases include prohibitions against collection of forest products for sale, limitation of harvesting for self-consumption, and requirements that any products harvested must be consumed on the property. These rules do not specify maximum quantities, but the restrictions on who may consume products, where, and for what purpose effectively limit quantities extracted. The most restrictive quantity rules tend to be more specific about maximum quantities, or may involve blanket bans. The midlevel rule of access limits use of forest products to members of the community of resource owners and managers. Communities sometimes allow more open access, by granting permission to extract resources to nonmembers or failing to deny permission to encroachers. The most restrictive rules of access deny or limit use among members. We parameterize complexity using several characteristics of these resources: difficulties associated with identification, the rate of recovery, abundance, variability and predictability, the viability of storage, and the availability of substitutes. These factors directly affect assessments of risk and the severity of cognitive challenges.11 We consider the abundance of the resource to be an important control factor that affects the value of the resource, and as an element that affects complexity in combination with variability. Product Identification, Species Diversity, and Local Knowledge A fundamental aspect of a resource that a user must consider is distinguishing the species of interest from others. Difficulty of identification increases the difficulty of recognizing patterns in the timing and location of availability, as well as the possibility of wasting effort or possibly endangering oneself by harvesting incorrect species, and of overlooking harvesting opportunities by failing to recognize species. Identification risk should not directly affect restrictions on access or quantities harvested, but may indirectly affect 10 The

implications of resource characteristics for information sharing are taken up by DysonHudson and Smith (1978) and addressed in depth by Ruttan (2001). 11 We acknowledge the influence of interactions within ecological systems, although we do not evaluate the influence of this aspect of resource complexity in this analysis


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the development of such rules by decreasing the predictability of resource availability. When resource managers lack the local knowledge needed to accurately identify species, they are less likely to develop effective rules for their management. The stakes associated with accurate identification depend upon the product and the use to which it will be put. Correct identification is obviously crucial for medicinal herbs, other edible plants, and mushrooms. Misidentification of a tree species may affect the rate at which wood is burnt or the sturdiness of construction, but is unlikely to imperil anyone’s life. Difficulties of identification, especially if combined with high risks, should influence willingness to share information about a resource. When resources are valuable but difficult to identify, access to local knowledge will influence the productivity of harvesters.12 The importance of access to information for improving the probabilities of accurate identification creates opportunities to restrict access to resources by restricting access to information. Resilience: Regeneration and Rates of Recovery The resilience of a species refers to its ability to return to a former state after experiencing some sort of disturbance. Resilience incorporates ease of regeneration or recovery from harvesting pressure and the rate of regeneration. The degree to which resources can renew themselves varies considerably due to differences in reproductive capabilities. Depending upon the species, plant regeneration may occur through regrowth, rhizomes, runners, seeds, or some combination of these processes. The probability of regeneration varies considerably. A plant that only regenerates by seeds that can germinate under narrow conditions is generally less resilient than more weedy species that produce many seeds and can reproduce vegetatively. Resilience tends to increase with the variety of means of regeneration. Rates of regeneration determine the lag between reductions in harvesting intensity and improvements in resource availability. People discount the value of resources in the future; slower rates of recovery decrease the likelihood that discounted rewards in the future will compensate for reductions in current consumption. A curvilinear relationship between resilience and the development of institutions for resource management seems likely. The future availability of resources with low resilience depends upon limitations on harvesting intensity and may be increased by investments in propagation. Slow rates 12 Cf., Johnson and Libecap’s (1982) discussion of the importance of access to information about

the behavior of fish, especially in terms of favored locations, for the productivity of fishers in the Gulf of Mexico (p. 1011).


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of regeneration, however, imply that discount rates must be relatively low to justify reductions in current consumption.13 Species with high resilience recover quickly and easily in the absence of management efforts by resource users, so adoption of management rules is less likely. Between these two extremes, future availability of resources depends upon management efforts but more rapid rewards to management effort means that discount rates become less of an obstacle to the adoption of management rules. Moderate resilience may be a necessary condition for the adoption of rules for resource management. Given the number of other factors affecting the cost-benefit analysis, moderate resilience is not predicted to be a sufficient condition for the development of rules for resource management.

Abundance The concept of abundance incorporates frequency, density, and the idea of superabundance. Frequency is the number of times one sees the species in question based on a sampling scheme. A species with a high frequency is generally evenly distributed throughout a forest. Density refers to the number of individuals per unit area. A species generally exhibits high density, high frequency, or both if it is abundant. Scale is an important factor here as well. Globally, or nationally, a species might be very scarce, but in a limited area, the species might be quite abundant. Superabundance occurs when a very large number of individuals are available, usually for a relatively short time period. Cicadas, for example, have a life history strategy that makes them superabundant every 13 or 17 years. Predators cannot consume all of the hatchlings and therefore many survive to reproduce. Scarcity relative to demand endows resources with value. When demand is sufficiently high, the abundance of a resource in terms of frequency, density, and superabundance has implications for management strategies. Scarcity, in terms of low frequency, provides an incentive to invest in propagation and in maintenance of individual specimens by restricting both access and harvesting levels. Low density, however, raises the costs of managing and defending scarce resources. Several studies note the association of less restrictive rules of access with low density of valuable resources (Baland and Platteau, 1998; Netting, 1981). Resources characterized by patchiness also tend to be managed more communally (Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999). High density of a valuable resource, however, is not always associated with more restrictive rules of access. Restrictions are 13 Institutions

affect discount rates by influencing the certainty a resource user has of capturing the returns to management effort


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rarely adopted for resources characterized by temporally restricted periods of superabundance (Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978). Scarcity, abundance, and superabundance affect the form of resource management both directly and in conjunction with several dimensions of spatial variability and predictability, as discussed below. Variability and Predictability Variability in the availability of resources decreases the effectiveness of uniform management. The need to adapt practices to variable conditions raises the costs of developing effective systems of management and increases the importance of local knowledge. Variability also makes accurate prediction of the quantity and location of forest resources difficult for users and managers. If predictable, resource users can develop strategies to compensate for variability; unpredictable variability is a much more challenging management problem (Halsted and O’Shea, 1989b). Predictable variability presents resource users with risk; they can assign probabilities to the likelihood of particular levels of resource availability and discount the value of the resource by the probability that it will be available. Efforts to manage variable resources become more likely as their value increases, whether for subsistence or as a major source of income, and as the probability of availability increases. Predictable variability in the availability of resources prompts resource users to invest in risk management as much as resource management. Unpredictable variation decreases the probability of any form of management. The cognitive problems are too severe, and the probability of reaping the benefits of management efforts is too low. The availability of a species may vary temporally, spatially, or both spatially and temporally. Temporal variation in availability may be seasonal or interannual. Some species exhibit marked seasonality. The availability of a resource may be spatially variable either because the resource is mobile (e.g., animals, water), ephemeral (e.g., grasses or fungi), or characterized by patchiness. The predictability of mobile, ephemeral, and patchy resources cannot be ranked a priori. Mobile resources can be predictable, as with animal species that favor particular habitats and engage in particular activities at predictable times. Seasonal streams and rivers may be ephemeral, but flow through predictable channels. The difficulty of capturing the full benefits of management efforts, plus the difficulty and expense of understanding sources of temporal variation in spatially variable resources, lowers interest in the management of spatially variable resources. Schlager et al. argue that when resources are mobile or


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migratory resource users are less likely to adopt quantity restrictions as a means of resource management (1994, p. 302). This also holds true when spatial variability occurs for reasons other than mobility, as with herbaceous plants or fungi, if the scale of the resource’s spatial variability exceeds the territorial range of the resource users. Communal systems of management have been predicted for resources with low density and those characterized by patchiness (Baland and Platteau, 1998; Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978; Netting, 1981; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999). Patchiness discourages restrictive access only if the location of patches is unpredictable (Ruttan, 2001). Spatial variability represents a severe challenge for resource management, unless users of the resource are also able and willing to either physically move or match their territorial range to that of the resource. Local knowledge can convert unpredictable variability into predictable variability, moving resource users from a situation of decision making under uncertainty to one of decision making under risk. Local knowledge can also affect the number of outcomes considered to be possible and the assignment of probabilities to alternative outcomes. The cultivation of local knowledge thus enhances the probability that management rules will be developed for resources characterized by moderate to high levels of variability. Risk may be reduced through mobility, diversification, exchange, or, if physically possible, storage; each strategy responds to particular dimensions of resource variability — temporal, spatial, or in terms of severity (Halsted and O’Shea, 1989b). These strategies attempt to smooth consumption by either lowering dependence upon any single source or regulating consumption of the resource. We focus on the viability of storage because mobility, exchange, and diversification of activities are less important for management of the forests under examination. Resource users in southern Indiana do not engage in much beyond gift exchange with friends and neighbors. Their sources of livelihood can be considered diversified in the sense that none of them rely primarily upon forest resources. Mobility appears to be limited to visits to state and national forests. When feasible, storage can compensate for temporal variability in resource availability (Halstead and O’Shea, 1989a). Harvesting levels would vary with the availability of the resource,14 but storage of products during periods of abundance and drawing down the stock during periods of shortage smooth consumption. The viability of storage depends upon the nature of the resource and available technology. When produce needs only to be kept cool, dry, and safe from rodents, other pests, or theft, the storage technology required should be readily accessible. However, not all 14 Variability

in harvesting intensity can create problems related to the allocation of labor or other harvesting inputs.


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resources can be stored, at least not in forms acceptable to or preferred by consumers. Even if storage is technically viable, choosing a level of storage capacity is itself risky, as is the choice of a rate of use from the stored resource. Storage can only compensate for temporal variability of resource availability up to a point, since while it nearly eliminates the risk associated with predictable seasonal variability in annually predictable plant products, it does little to address more severe and longer-term fluctuations. When possible and effective storage raises the confidence of resource users that they will benefit from management efforts, and thus makes investment in such efforts more likely. The logic of stockpiling discourages quantity restrictions, since the value of storage depends upon high rates of extraction during periods of abundance. Restrictions on access are more likely. Equally, resources characterized by relatively brief periods of superabundance and minimal possibilities for storage are typically associated with less restrictive harvesting practices (Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978). Availability of Substitutes Decisions about resource management are based not only on assessments of costs relative to benefits but also on assessments of opportunity costs. The availability of substitutes for natural resources offers alternatives to management of those resources. Substitutes for natural resources, in the form of identical products from alternative sources, similar products from any source, or synthetics, are in many cases imperfect, and comparisons of quality can be quite difficult. Nonetheless, the availability of substitutes— especially at low cost—reduces the likelihood that people will invest in the management of natural resources. Implications of Multiple Dimensions of Complexity for Resource Management We have identified five aspects of resource complexity that are expected to influence the development of quantity restrictions. Q1: Quantity restrictions are least likely for resources characterized by superabundance. Scarcity makes quantity restrictions more likely. Q2: Quantity restrictions are more likely for resources characterized by moderate resilience. Q3: Spatial variability over time reduces the likelihood that quantity restrictions will be adopted, especially if variability is unpredictable.


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Q4: Inability to store a resource reduces the likelihood that quantity restrictions will be adopted. Q5: The availability of substitutes reduces the likelihood that quantity restrictions will be adopted. Five aspects of resource complexity are expected to influence the development of access restrictions. A1: Scarcity makes rules of access more valuable, and thus more likely. A2: Rules restricting access are more likely for resources characterized by moderate resilience. A3: Spatial variability over time makes rules of access more costly, and thus less likely, especially if variability is unpredictable. A4: Low density or unpredictable patchiness encourages more communal (less restrictive) property rights. A5: The availability of substitutes decreases the likelihood that rules of access will be adopted. More generalized complexity, for example associated with difficulties of accurately identifying products or successfully propagating species, increases the importance of local knowledge. In the absence of local knowledge resource users are unlikely to adopt management rules of any variety, but those who acquire such expertise can use it as a means to control access to valuable forest resources.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREST PRODUCTS IN SOUTHERN INDIANA Overall, we find that firewood presents the fewest obstacles to resource management, but also offers limited rewards. Features of ginseng make collective management relatively more difficult but also more valuable. The characteristics of morel mushrooms present insurmountable challenges for resource management, whether on a collective or individual basis. General lack of understanding of the temporal availability of morels, a patchy distribution that is relatively unpredictable, seasonal superabundance, and relatively high risks associated with misidentification make this forest product a challenge for resource users to locate, much less manage. High yearto-year resilience lowers the stakes of failing to develop restrictions on harvesting, further decreasing the probability that such restrictions will be developed. We thus expect the greatest elaboration of management rules for ginseng and the near absence of management rules of morel mushrooms,


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Table II. Characteristics of Forest Products in Southern Indiana and Predicted Institutional Development Indices for Resource Management Characteristic

Firewood

Identification risk Low Resilience Low Scarcity/Abundance Abundant Temporal variability Low Predictability High Storability High Spatial variability Over time? Low within forest Patchy? No within forest Niche issues? No Predictability High Substitutability High Predicted institutional development indices Quantity restrictions Moderate Restrictions on access Moderate

Ginseng

Morels

Moderate Low/Moderate Scarce Moderate High High

High High Superabundant High Moderate Low

Moderate Yes Yes High Moderate

High Yes Yes Moderate Low

High High

Low Low

with the complexity of rules affecting firewood falling in the middle. Table II summarizes the characteristics of these products and our expectations about the adoption of quantity and access restrictions. The rarity and commercial interest of ginseng spurred its listing in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Appendix II in 1973.15 Following the CITES listing, scientists (Anderson et al., 1993; Carpenter and Cottam, 1982; Charron and Gagnon, 1991; Lewis, 1984; Nantel et al., 1996) have focused on phenology, population, and environmental correlates to discover where ginseng occurs in forests, how abundant it is, and how it may vary within a season and between seasons. There appears to be less of a research effort on the ecology of morel mushrooms as compared with either ginseng or timber resources. A large body of literature about the ecology of various tree species is available; as argued below, the characteristics of particular species is less important for firewood. Firewood Firewood is intrinsically less complex than the other resources in this discussion. Many species of trees in Indiana are suitable to burn for heating, although oak, hickory, and other hardwoods are typically preferred. The ubiquity of this product in the forests of Indiana equates to a high abundance, 15 Appendix

II listing includes species that might become threatened with extinction if trade is not regulated.


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with little spatial and temporal variability. Additionally, the availability of substitutes for heating and cooking fuel ensures that communities would not tap this resource exclusively. Although rates of regeneration are slow, the ready availability of low cost substitutes makes resilience less of a factor for the short-to medium-term timelines. Lastly, if stacked, firewood can be stored for a relatively long period of time. The resource characteristics of firewood thus present few obstacles to the development of rules for its management. The relative abundance of firewood and the availability of low cost substitutes, however, decrease the rewards to intensive management of the trees that yield firewood. We expect the adoption of moderate to tight quantity restrictions for firewood along with moderately restrictive rules of access.

Ginseng Ginseng is a generic name for several different species that occur in Asia and North America. American ginseng (Panax quinquefolium) is the most common type growing wild in the United States (Gleason and Cronquist, 1991). Identifying the plant requires some knowledge, but conspicuous features like the presence of five compound leaves (usually three large and two small) and bright red berries help the harvester. Widespread belief in ginseng’s properties as an aphrodisiac, an energy booster, and medicine has placed enormous pressure on wild populations. Anderson et al. found that patches of ginseng in protected areas have greater numbers of individuals of all ages compared to harvested stands (1993). Other studies noted harvesting activities of varying levels in wild stands (Anderson et al., 1993; Carpenter and Cottam, 1982; Lewis, 1984). Following the stipulations of the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), some U.S. states have begun ginseng monitoring programs. There is some evidence suggesting the declining abundance of ginseng in North America: specimens collected have been decreasing in size (McGraw, 2001), and current harvesting levels compare unfavorably to accounts of large ginseng harvests during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the eastern United States (Pritts, 1995). American ginseng ranges from Quebec to Minnesota, South Dakota, Arkansas, and Georgia (Gleason and Cronquist, 1991). It tends to grow on cool, moist, and shady slopes, but studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 1993; Carpenter and Cottam, 1982; Lewis, 1984) do not provide consistent or statistically significant correlations of physical conditions with occurrence. Part of the difficulty involves the small number of ginseng sites as well as variability in the sites. For instance, in Illinois, the tendency for ginseng to grow within


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particular physical parameters is different in northern and southern parts of the state (Anderson et al., 1993). Folk knowledge on the location of ginseng echoes the formal ecological studies and also places the presence of ginseng with other types of forest herbs and tree species (Murphy, 2000; Pritts, 1995). Studies on ginseng have noted variability for the emergence and the development of mature fruit between years (Anderson et al., 1993, p. 364; Carpenter and Cottam, 1982), and determined that in some years some plants may not produce leaves or may die back early (Carpenter and Cottam, 1982). Simulations based on field data found that harvesting less than a quarter of a population every 3 years would allow continued expansion (Nantel et al., 1996), but the probability of a bad year reduces the reliability of these findings as guidelines for management. Ginseng rhizomes can be dried and ground into powder, or preserved in alcohol. In fact, most trade in ginseng probably involves the powdered form. While proponents of natural medicines attribute energy enhancement, curative powers, and aphrodisiac effects to a range of medicinal plants, the combination of properties associated with ginseng and the widespread confidence in it implies that other natural products are inferior and form partial substitutes. Ginseng can be propagated, although its sensitivity to the mix of sunlight and shade, soil conditions, and moisture levels means that it requires intensive management (Grieve, 1995). Consumers perceive significant differences in the quality of domesticated and wild ginseng so that although market demand is strong enough to support domesticated ginseng production, the premium for wild ginseng encourages both nurturing of and poaching from ginseng patches in the wild. The characteristics of ginseng favor the development of both quantity and access restrictions. Ginseng distribution is moderately patchy but not ephemeral; patches can be maintained long enough for the benefits from management investments to be captured. Availability can be enhanced by maintenance activities such as planting seeds or thinning roots. The possibility of preservation enhances the prospects of benefiting from investment activities. Its moderate scarcity and the availability of only imperfect substitutes encourage restrictions on harvesting and access to maintain and increase breeding stock. Uncertainty about sustainable rates of harvesting under data-rich conditions and the difficulty of regeneration, on the other hand, imply that individual decisions about the intensity of use and management must be based on estimates rather than sound understanding of resource dynamics. Different assessments of the degree of restriction required for sustainable harvests can be expected to increase the difficulty of developing management rules.


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Morel Mushrooms Although the taxonomy is unclear, there are generally three accepted species of morel mushrooms in the United States (Morchella spp.): the black (M. angusticeps), the white, (M. esculenta), and giant (M. crassipes), which appears last (Lonik, 1984). Mushrooms are more problematic for resource users than the other forest products under consideration. True morels (from the Morchella genus) do not have any known toxic effects, but two types of mushrooms, false morels (from the genus, Gyromitra) and species from the Verpa genus, which do bear some resemblance to morels, do cause sickness and possible death (Lonik, 1984, p. 33; Thompson, 1994), and therefore represent a significant risk to consumers (Christensen, 1943; Kuo, 2001; The Western Montana Mycological Association, 2000). Even experienced morel hunters often confuse Verpa with morels, as demonstrated by the frequent appearance of poisonous varieties mixed in with morels at morel festivals (Lonik, 1984). These uncertainties and the associated health risks make local knowledge more important for the harvesting of morels. The availability of morel mushrooms is not well understood. Harvester accounts refer to harvests in a single season that have exceeded 800 pounds; in some forests, morels have been so abundant the collecting seemed more of a job than a pastime (Thompson, 1994, p. 17). Towns in Illinois, Michigan and Indiana have annual morel mushroom festivals in April or May, indicating a generous supply in these areas. Some of these festivals in the Upper Midwest feature morel hunting contests where competitors collect more than 200 morels in 2 hours (Schaechter, 1997, p. 129). General beliefs and experience regarding the reproduction of fungi suggest that harvesting does not appreciably affect the survival of the organism; it is understood that the morels are the fruiting bodies of an underground network of microscopic filaments, or hyphae, (Huffman et al., 1989; Schaechter, 1997). Just as picking apples does not affect the survival of the apple tree, picking morels should not appreciably affect the survival of the mycelium.16 This relative stability implies that this species is highly resilient.17 Most information about where morels occur is anecdotal and is based on the local knowledge of mushroom hunters. Generally, morels are found on dryer slopes, associated with rotting elms, and trees that have rough 16 The

term mycelium refers to the accumulation of hyphae. findings suggest, however, that numbers of morels have decreased in the past 25 years due to harvesting practices that do not encourage the spread of spores from the harvested mushrooms, though using mesh bags should allow spores to spread (Lonik, 2002).

17 Recent


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bark, such as tulip poplars (Liriodendron tulipfera) or black cherry (Prunus serotina) (Kitzmiller, 1996; Lonik, 1984). Lonik cites over 50 general (often contradictory) locations that mushroom hunters mentioned varying from “open fields to dense woods, as far from civilization as possible, to the backyard or golf courses” (1984, p. 35).18 Some published reports on morels have stated that hunters can find them anywhere (Lavanier, 1973, in Weber, 1995), while others have related a particular species of morels with ash (Parker, 1984). The only agreement among morel hunters and mycologists is that their locations are unpredictable. Every spring mushroom hunters comb the eastern hardwood forests for morels during a season that typically lasts 2–6 weeks. The short season and the difficulty of predicting exactly when morels will appear contribute to the complexity of managing this resource. Similarly, harvesters claim that particular weather conditions favor finding morels, but there is little evidence beyond anecdotes to support the existence of any general pattern within the season (Lonik, 1984; Schaechter, 1997; Thompson, 1994; Volk, 1997). Drying morels is common (Kitzmiller, 1996; Lonik, 1984; Schaechter, 1997) but respondents from four of our five sites in southern Indiana indicated no knowledge of this or any other storage techniques. Generally, fresh morels are favored, even though if dried properly, the flavor of morels can be intensified (Schaechter, 1997). Fresh morels are only rarely available in local markets in southern Indiana although dried morels are fairly common in specialty stores (Lonik, 1984). Other wild and domesticated mushrooms are readily available but are not considered substitutes for what many deem as “land fish” and the “best aroma on the planet” (Kitzmiller, 1996). With high identification risks, short periods of superabundance, high resilience, high levels of unpredictable spatial and temporal variability, limited storage, and few substitutes, morel mushrooms present immense challenges for resource management and, perhaps more importantly, few rewards. We therefore expect few if any efforts to develop rules that limit the quantities harvested or the people allowed to participate in the hunt. Somewhat predictable patchiness19 and scarcity do provide some basis for restrictions on access. Yet superabundance, unpredictable availability, and the inferiority of substitutes suggest that any limits should be far less restrictive than those observed for other forest products. 18 The

term hunt is used rather than gather, both in this literature and by respondents from our five study sites. noted that morels tend to reappear in the same places from one year to the next, although the timing of their appearance is variable.

19 Respondents


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RESOURCE COMPLEXITY AND MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN INDIANA Evidence from the five sites in southern Indiana provides partial support for the influence of resource complexity on institutional development.20 All of the study communities have developed at least minimal rules restricting the quantity of firewood harvested, typically by banning harvesting of live trees, and all allow fairly unrestrictive harvesting of morels. To the extent that restrictions on access have been adopted, they appear to be motivated as much by the desire to protect privacy as an effort to manage the morels. The evidence related to ginseng is more ambiguous. Residents at only one (Maple community) of the five sites expressed a strong interest in ginseng, and they have developed very restrictive rules to limit access to community members and to restrict quantities harvested. Two members of the Twin Oaks community demonstrated considerable knowledge about ginseng, but only one individual had any interest in managing it. Although aware of his efforts, the community as a whole had not developed management rules. At the other three sites, community members often mentioned ginseng, but familiarity with this product was generally lower. Community members at these sites either extended general norms for forest use to ginseng or appeared to be early in the process of developing more restrictive rules. Less consistency in the development of management rules for ginseng is consistent with our predictions based on the combination of scarcity with greater complexity. Oak Oak community was founded in the 1960s by a couple who purchased over 1000 acres in order to form a community that represented an alternative to the materialistic and individualistic ideals of traditional American society. During its first decade, the community membership rose as high as 300 and sometimes fell below 50. After a few years, the founders decided to sell approximately half of the original tract and endow the rest to the community, and the members formed a church that could serve as a legal, tax-exempt entity to hold the property collectively. Membership stabilized to approximately 40 individuals in the mid-1970s. During this period, the degree of cooperation in the Oak community was relatively high: members met every 6 weeks to discuss community concerns and cooperated in a number of different enterprises to support the welfare of the community. 20 As

noted in the introduction, institutions may be formal or informal. Informal institutions include norms. Thus, the development of rules encompasses the evolution of norms as well as more explicitly stated rules.


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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Oak community entered a period of internal conflict when leadership struggles arose, at least in part from differences over community goals (Gibson and Koontz, 1998). Difficulties in obtaining insurance and a general lack of maintenance of community property prompted arguments for privatization of community land. Many members opposed privatization, equating it with a loss of community and divergence from the original communal spirit. Irreconcilable differences and the development of factions within the community eventually led the two sides to the courts to determine who had decision-making authority over community assets. This conflict and its resolution in favor of privatization led to an exodus of a relatively large proportion of the membership in the early- to mid-1980s. Rules changed to allow the purchase of homes and small plots surrounding them at below market prices. This created new incentives to join, but several individuals withdrew from the community organization after purchasing land (Gibson and Koontz, 1998). Abuse of the provision generated further conflict within the community and between the current and former members. On one of the privatized parcels, the owner cleared mature trees. The community again sought recourse through the courts, but was not successful in controlling activities on former communal land. Repeated reliance on the courts suggests the severity of the conflicts and indicates the limits of internal mechanisms for conflict resolution. The series of conflicts spurred Oak community to become more cautious in selecting its members. Now, a prospective member must be sponsored by a current member for at least 6 months before admittance to the community, and a two-thirds majority of community members must approve any new member. A person must live with the community for 5 years before becoming eligible to purchase communal land. This provision discourages individuals from joining simply for the opportunity to buy inexpensive land. There are no formal rules addressing the use of forest products. But informal rules or norms exist and are commonly understood, guided by a hands-off, preservationist orientation focused on the health of the forest. The community accepts extractive use of deadwood, mushrooms, and medicinal plants as long as the level of extraction is not perceived to be disruptive or unsustainable. Unlike some of the other communities discussed below, there is no ban on the sale of these forest products by community members; community members in the past have used nontimber forest products in a variety of ways to supplement their incomes. Nonmembers are allowed to collect deadwood, mushrooms, and medicinal plants although they must ask permission and use the products only for personal consumption. Members expressed concern about the poaching of ginseng but were equivocal over whether to restrict access to ginseng by nonmembers. An informal norm


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prohibits the cutting of live trees, but some inconsistencies exist within the community about this practice. Some mentioned the cutting of undesirable trees for firewood. Otherwise, the informal rules do not distinguish much among forest products. Many of the norms and practices of Oak community have relied upon the premise of “like mindedness,” and upon norms rather than formal or codified rules to govern individuals’ activities. Conflicts arose because individuals acted in ways counter to the collective spirit. More recently, more formal rules for admission to the community have been instituted in an effort to avoid future conflicts by ensuring that all individuals living in the community share similar values. Oak community has emphasized the use of informal means rather than a structured set of rules to regulate dayto-day living and the use of natural resources. It appears that they value individual freedom over structure; the lack of explicit rules allows for flexible governance.

Maple Maple community was formed in the mid-1970s as part of the backto-the-land movement. Individuals interested in forming a community to live on the land began meeting at a local cooperative in 1973. Planning meetings continued until the purchase of 304 acres of former farmland in 1975. The Maple community was officially founded in 1976 when the first residents moved onto the property. The Maple community owns its forested land as a private corporation; each share conveys rights to use the jointly held land and participate in decision making regarding its management. More than a hundred people participated in the founding of the Maple community. The number of shares decreased to around 30 within a matter of weeks. To some extent, these early departures probably reflected differences over the details of collective living. For example, current members recall disputes between vegetarians and nonvegetarians over the separation of utensils in the community kitchen. There were also differences over taking jobs in town. Some referred to this dispute as one over the desirability and feasibility of self-sufficiency, whereas others described members who chose not to take jobs in town as freeloaders. These issues suggest fundamental differences over the nature of the community during the early years. The need to pay for the land and the substantial investments of personal time required of participants also contributed to the reduction in the group’s size. After the first year, many members lived in apartments in a community building. In 1980, this burned down and the community decided to move to private residences rather than rebuild it. Membership dropped to around


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10 shares within a year of the fire, either because of the fire or in response to changes in the nature of the community—such as the move to individual housing—that culminated around that time. In the mid-1980s, as the community organized to recruit new members, it was decided to restrict the number of shares to 15, effectively limiting the size of the community to around 40 individuals, including children. The number of shareholders has remained stable since the early 1980s, with population fluctuations reflecting changes in household composition and differences in the sizes of households when shares change hands. Maple community now has in place internal mechanisms capable of preventing, resolving, or diffusing most conflicts (Gibson and Koontz, 1998). The private plots created for the development of residences are tied to membership shares and members who decide to leave the community must give up their residential plot along with their shares. The community has the right of first refusal in any transfer of shares and land. Community by-laws restrict the cutting of trees and other aspects of development. These arrangements raise the stakes of membership and prevent the management of privatized land in ways that violate community expectations. On the other hand, the community has grown more flexible about developments on residential plots over time. When differences arise, they tend to relate to the future of the community as members age and there appears to be little conflict over managing the land and its natural resources. Maple community no longer attempts to subsist off the land. While many members count provision of habitat for wildlife and spiritual inspiration as the most important values of the forest, most members also draw upon forest resources in important ways. Firewood provides the primary source of heating for many and is an important supplemental source of heating for others. Several members are avid morel hunters and a number of them have a strong interest in ginseng, goldenseal, and a variety of other medicinal or edible plants. Formally adopted rules for use of the communally owned forest prohibit the cutting of live trees, whether for firewood or building. Any member can collect firewood from dead wood and trees in the communal forest. The only quantity restriction is a general prohibition on harvesting any forest product for sale in the expectation that each household will consequently restrict harvesting to the amount it can consume in a reasonable period. The formal rules do not specifically address medicinal plants or mushrooms, although the ban on sales applies to them as well and strong norms regulate the use of ginseng and morel mushrooms. Community members are aware of the scarcity of ginseng, as well as its medicinal properties. They seek to prevent harvesting of ginseng by poachers, do not extend access rights to nonmember friends, and expect limited harvesting by fellow members.


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Several members consider ginseng to be off-limits altogether, while others compensate for restricted harvesting by planting ginseng seeds in the forest. Some members also mentioned poaching of morels and efforts to prevent it, but this seemed to be a much lower priority for the community as a whole. Rather, community members often joke about their secret morel spots, and also spoke of morel hunting parties that involved friends and neighbors. Members saw no point in quantity restrictions for morels, noting that any uncollected mushrooms only went to waste and did not contribute in any way to availability the following year. If anything, the norms governing morels promote sharing. Box Elder The Box Elder community is a nonprofit organization of individuals who share an interest in nature-based spirituality. In the early 1980s, the group purchased land as a nature sanctuary and a facility for hosting regular festivals. The Box Elder community is tiered, with rights and responsibilities correlated with each member’s contribution of time and labor to collective activities. Individuals who have been members for at least 1 year and who commit to do at least 28 hours of work for the community each month may join the council and participate in decision making. At the other extreme, many members visit only for festivals and do not contribute any labor to community projects. Only a small fraction of group members live on the land; four households reside on the property throughout the year, with others camping for various periods of time during warmer weather. A small core of approximately 20 active members attends to most of the maintenance and organizational work, and has the most input in decision making. As of 2001, there were approximately 200 members, a decline from earlier levels of around 400 people. Beyond the core members of the Box Elder community, fluctuations in the number of general members and festival participants appear to be common. Internal mechanisms apparently resolve or diffuse most conflicts. Members rely on the embarrassment of public reprimands to discourage minor infractions of rules and offensive behavior. Expulsion can and does occur for more serious offenses. The decision to expel a resident resulted in one conflict that spilled over to the courts, which sided with the community when presented with this challenge to the organization’s authority. Reliance on the general membership for both physical labor and financial support effectively constrains decision making by the council. Since most members, even council members, can exit at low cost, those who are not able to gain support for desired changes usually leave. However, the organization’s reliance on a membership with relatively low costs of exit encourages moderation and


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compromise. On the other hand, higher turnover and the prominence of members with relatively superficial involvement with the community, means that rules must be clear and easy to understand to be effective. Box Elder community values its forest primarily as a spiritual resource and social space. Part of the land is heavily used for activities related to festivals and other collective activities: camping, concerts, meetings, etc. Much of the property, however, is designated as a nature reserve. Members use the nature reserve portion of the forest for meditation and spiritual escape, and harvest a wide variety of forest products. A total ban on the collection of firewood is in force because of concern that the number of campers during festivals would create an unsustainable rate of harvesting, endangering regeneration of the forest. Instead, firewood from outside the property is provided for campers. Members and festival participants may harvest any forest product other than firewood as long as they consume it on the property. Harvest of any forest product for sale is prohibited. An informal norm among more active members also prohibits harvesting of ginseng. Some individuals plant ginseng seeds. But unless a more concerted effort is made to raise awareness about the special status of ginseng among the general membership and festival participants, this set of intermittent resource users is apt to consider ginseng as covered by the guidelines that apply to other nontimber forest products, i.e., not for sale and to be consumed on the property. Twin Oaks Twin Oaks community was formed in the mid-1970s, when two friends decided to combine their resources to purchase property. Another friend bought part of their land a few years later. The three households now own five adjacent parcels of land. Up to six people have resided on the land, with changes in population reflecting changes in household size (e.g., couples forming and breaking up). The two founding households jointly own two of the parcels. Each household also owns one parcel separately. There is a strong informal expectation that, should any of the current landowners decide to sell their property, their neighbors would be given the first opportunity to purchase the land. This land is not legally owned in common, and these friends have not developed a formal organization or rules to govern land use or other interactions. Nonetheless, they share a strong sense of community and cooperative living. The members describe their relationships as those within a family. The two founding households appear to be particularly close, to the point of frequently sharing meals together and engaging in other informal exchanges. Differences do exist. One member has a far stronger interest in nature conservation and appreciation than any of the others, and conflicts sometimes


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arise when another member does something that offends this member’s conservation ethic. Members disagree about the desirability and safety of hunting on the property, and about the desirability of developments such as bringing in piped water. Conflicts are addressed informally and not always resolved. As in a family, members of the Twin Oaks community tend to dredge up old offenses. The member with the strongest commitment to conservation, for example, still refers to the shooting of a doe by another member several years ago. These sorts of references may serve to remind each other of actions deemed offensive, in an effort to prevent future conflicts. Reminders of past conflicts may also offer a way to help maintain some balance in who compromises in current disputes. The existence of this community depends upon each member’s continued willingness to live with some interdependence and to forego some actions and endure other actions out of respect for the priorities of other members. An absence of formal rules and continued ambiguity in norms allows the flexibility and compromise that this community relies upon. Members of Twin Oaks community value living in a natural setting and the privacy offered by the forest. They also use a few extractive forest products. The community allows all members to hunt mushrooms and collect firewood throughout the property. Informal rules prohibit the cutting of live trees for firewood. Deadwood is abundant; the one member who currently uses firewood collects it from the vicinity of his house, on his private parcel. There are no other restrictions on use of these products by community members. No rule prohibits the harvest of ginseng by members, but nobody currently has an interest in collecting this plant. When one of the founding members attempted to cultivate ginseng in the 1970s, poachers took everything in his plot; he considers collection of ginseng too labor-intensive to be worthwhile. Another founding member became aware of the presence of wild ginseng in their forest during the 1990s and is taking measures to encourage its propagation. These efforts are motivated by a concern with preservation rather than an interest in harvesting the roots. Although even he does not claim that there is a norm against harvesting ginseng, it is obvious that he would react angrily should any other member harvest a plant. The other members have no interest in ginseng. The strongest restriction on resource use affects noncommunity members. Other individuals must have permission to hike or hunt on the property. Nonmembers are not granted permission to harvest firewood or other plants; only guests accompanied by their hosts may hunt morels or other mushrooms; and trespassers are asked to leave the property. Community members post “no trespassing” signs along the borders of their property. One member walks through much of the property on a regular basis, increasing the likelihood that trespassers will be noticed.


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Tulip Poplar A developer created Tulip Poplar community in the early 1970s. The community’s property consists mostly of private lots, but also encompasses common land and facilities that members manage through a neighborhood association. Around a thousand people belong to the community and members need the support of a significant portion of other members to gain pursue their goals through the neighborhood association. Property owners are a diverse mix of working families and retirees, year-round residents and weekend visitors. Property owners differentiate among themselves with reference to their location relative to the community’s lakes. With no restrictions on the sale of community assets and the availability of other neighborhoods with similar amenities, discontented residents may choose to move rather than fight. The one exception concerned infrastructure maintenance rather than land use. A dispute over investments related to management of the lakes—an amenity not readily available elsewhere—had to be settled in the courts. Formal rules developed by the neighborhood association for management of commonly held forested land are published in a handbook provided to property owners. Trees within the communal forest cannot be cut unless the board of the neighborhood association grants permission. Otherwise, property owners are expected to use common sense in use of their shared forest resources. Informal rules permit collection of deadwood and fallen trees for firewood. More than two-thirds of the residents use firewood to heat their home. Some use firewood collected from the communal forest, but most rely on their own plots or purchase firewood at local markets. Residents use the communal forest more when hunting morel mushrooms. Residents did not mention ginseng as an important forest product for themselves, but outsiders come to Tulip Poplar community to collect both morel mushrooms and ginseng. Most community members did not mind the collection of forest products by outsiders as long as they respected the privacy of residents. Property owners had turned down requests for permission to harvest ginseng, anticipating the disapproval of the board of the neighborhood association, but it is not clear how effectively Tulip Poplar community can exclude outsiders attracted by ginseng.

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS As shown in Table III, the evidence from the five study sites in southern Indiana provides partial support for predictions about the development


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Table III. Expected and Actual Managements Rules for Firewood, Ginseng, and Morel Mushrooms Quantity restrictions Rules of access Open Moderate Restrictive

Loose

Moderate

Morels Morels (O, M, TP)

Morels (BE) Firewood (O) Ginseng (O∗ , BE-G∗ ) Firewood Firewood (M, TO, TP) Ginseng (TP)

Morels (TO) Ginseng (TO)

Tight

Ginseng Ginseng (M, BE-A∗ ) Firewood (BE)

Note. Product names in boldface type indicate predictions based on resource characteristics. The initials in parentheses represent community names. For ginseng, the Box Elder’s general membership (BE-G) has been distinguished from the Box Elder active members (BE-A). An asterisk (*) appears if there is either contention about a rule or evidence that a rule is in flux.

of quantity restrictions and rules restricting access based on resource characteristics. Three of the five sites adopted relatively unrestrictive rules for morel mushrooms as expected based on their spatial and temporal unpredictability in availability and relatively high resilience; the rules of the other two communities, restricting access to community members in one case and requiring on-property consumption in the other, were only slightly more restrictive. We predicted moderately restrictive rules for firewood collection based on the high predictability of the availability of trees, their relatively low resilience and relative abundance, and the availability of low cost substitutes. Three of the five communities had rules for firewood that conformed to this expectation. One community adopted rules of access that were less restrictive, allowing outsiders to collect firewood from their property. Another community’s rules were more restrictive than expected, barring all collection of firewood. Moderate variability and predictability, relative scarcity, and the lack of perfect substitutes suggested that highly restrictive rules should be adopted for ginseng. The variability and unpredictability in the availability of ginseng, plus relatively poor understanding of its regeneration, led us to expect that resource users would face challenges in developing rules for management of this scarce medicinal plant. All five communities had adopted variably restrictive rules of access, and four also had quantity restrictions. One community apparently had no commonly understood quantity restriction on ginseng, whether formal or informal, although no member of this community actually harvests this plant. With no interest in harvesting, there has been no motivation for the development of rules beyond the general exclusion of noncommunity members. Evidence of highly restrictive rules for


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ginseng existed for three communities. Rules for use of ginseng were either contentious or appeared to be in the midst of evolution in two of the communities, including one of the three with highly restrictive rules. Oak community had begun to discuss restricting access to ginseng but had not reached an agreement to do so. In Box Elder community, although highly restrictive rules for use of ginseng are evolving among active members of the community, the general membership continues to treat this species as any other nontimber forest product. The moves toward more restrictive rules for ginseng in communities that now have unexpectedly open rules, and the contentiousness surrounding those moves, are consistent with expectations that the complexity of this species presents challenges for the development of management strategies. The evidence is somewhat ambiguous. Scarcity and market demand, for example, seem more important in encouraging more restrictive access to ginseng than any other characteristics of the resource. The delay in recognizing this value may reflect the complexity of the resource, or it may indicate the specialized nature of the market for medicinal herbs. Ginseng may not be readily identifiable to somebody who is not looking for it, but information about its physical features is widely available. Not all owners of forested property use or pay attention to ginseng, however. Their lack of attention to this species may reflect its lack of salience, at least until the presence of poachers becomes troubling or residents become aware of ginseng’s status as a scarce species. Concern about poachers often has less to do with an interest in protecting the targeted plants and more to do with maintaining privacy and personal safety. The formal rules and informal norms adopted by Maple community for management of firewood, ginseng, and morel mushrooms conform perfectly to predictions based on characteristics of these resources. Two of the four communities had developed rules for ginseng that were more restrictive than their rules for firewood; in the two cases where rules for ginseng were in flux, those rules were comparable to the rules for firewood. Only Twin Oaks had rules for ginseng that were less restrictive than rules for firewood, although this community harvests no ginseng in practice. The existence of only one instance of a rank ordering of management rules for products that runs counter to expectations provides some support for the hypothesized relationships. Problems with enforcement confronted by two of the four communities and the absence of quantity restrictions for ginseng in Twin Oaks limits the strength of this finding. There is little evidence that the development of rules for resource management can be better predicted on the basis of social characteristics alone. None of the five communities failed to develop management rules that differentiated among at least some of the products under consideration, and


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four of the five developed separate rules for each of the three products.21 This paper thus confirms the importance of resource characteristics, particularly those affecting the complexity of resource management, for the collective development of management rules. This is not to say that group characteristics are irrelevant. Group size and low levels of integration for most of the membership, for example, help make sense of the rules and practices in Box Elder community. The open nature of membership in this community poses an obstacle to the effectiveness of informal norms and management rules tend to be unambiguous and generalized. Thus, the restriction on firewood collection is total, and a rule of thumb guides use of other products. The nature of membership in Box Elder implies that informal norms are unlikely to be effective because they are not easily disseminated beyond the most active members, as demonstrated by the limited spread of new and more restrictive norms for ginseng. Likewise, the absence of any rules allowing nonmembers to harvest any forest products in the Twin Oaks forest reflects that community’s smaller size, origins as a group of friends rather than as a community-building effort, and the greater priority given to privacy by residents. Twin Oak’s lack of quantity restrictions on ginseng makes sense given the lack of interest in using this resource and the very strong and clearly communicated preferences of one of the members. With no interest in harvesting, there is no need for restrictions. Less developed rules for resource management corresponds with Oak community’s reliance more generally on informal norms rather than clearly specified and formalized rules. Considering that conflicts over the very nature of this community have loomed large over the past couple of decades, it is not surprising that members have given relatively little attention to management of their forest resources. We do not claim that institutional development can be understood solely on the basis of resource characteristics. Rather, we argue that both resource complexity and characteristics of the user group affect the development of rules for the management of natural resources. Our analysis has several limitations. The most important concerns the small sample size. The analysis of rules developed by five communities for three products yields 15 cases of management rules. This number is large enough to allow suggestive evaluations of the relative importance of resource characteristics and group characteristics for the development of rules for resource management. The sites were selected purposefully to allow analysis of variable success in collective management. Since all five sites include at least some commonly managed forested land, findings based on this sample 21 Although

Twin Oaks did not have quantity restrictions for ginseng, respondents indicated awareness of its distinctive character.


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cannot be considered representative of land management in southern Indiana. Moreover, the sample size is small enough that the robustness of our findings cannot be evaluated even for collectively managed forests. The study also cannot contribute to debates about the security of property rights and its significance for resource management, as all five communities have legally recognized claims to their land.22 Tenure security, for example, would greatly affect management decisions for forest products with relatively low resilience. Most of the literature on the implications of resource characteristics for resource management assumes that the resources under consideration are of crucial importance to the resource users. Many of these studies focus on subsistence lifestyles: hunting, gathering, or subsistence farming (e.g., Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999). In subsistence economies, resource management becomes crucial for survival (Halsted and O’Shea, 1989a). People have to manage risk and resources under such circumstances because they lack more reliable alternatives (cf., Scott, 1976). The communities in southern Indiana face very different circumstances. They differ in the degree of reliance on wage labor, artisanship, or commerce for their livelihoods, but none rely primarily on the forest for their subsistence. This means that the stakes, at least in terms of personal survival, are low. The focus for three of the five is on the creation of community, not forest management, even if members disagree on the ideal nature of their community. Community values affect expectations about land use, but most community members give land use issues relatively low priority. The lack of formal rules for management of forest products probably reflects the relatively low priority given to forest products by several communities. Yet, when communities did develop management rules for forest products, those rules corresponded to identifiable dimensions of resource complexity.23 The association between resource complexity and rules for resource management may not obtain in communities that depend more heavily upon natural resources for their livelihood; other factors may become more important than resource characteristics when the stakes are high. An obvious extension of our analysis would examine this relationship for resources with higher salience for resource users. Many of the members of the communities in this study chose to live in a communal situation to have a more meaningful connection with the land and the forest. They all have an interest in preserving the forest because it plays such an important role in their quality of life, both aesthetically and 22 Plans

for road development posed a threat to one of the five communities that land might be lost to the state through its power of eminent domain. 23 This finding contrasts with Gibson (2001), who argues that dependency upon a resource is a necessary condition for the development of institutions for resource management.


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spiritually. Part of this communion with the forest involves understanding and using the complex components of this natural system. We have described how communities have responded to this complexity by creating institutions to preserve or conserve these resources. The rules and norms that these communities formed for their forests tend to correspond to their interest in and knowledge about the products they use. Even in the special situation whereby the members do not rely on the extraction of these products for their livelihoods, differences in rules emerged based partially on the characteristics of the resources. The differential responses on such a micro-level should inform macro-level policy that tends to approach resources in a simplistic way. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Research associated with the International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program has been supported by grants from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the National Science Foundation (#SBR9521918). We gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of community members in sourthern Indiana who participated in IFRI studies. Comments from Arun Agrawal, John Brehm, Dan Carpenter, Elinor Ostrom, and an anonymous reviewer contributed to the quality of the paper. We would also like to thank Michael Tansey and Kathryn McQuilkin Flinn for commenting on mycological and ecological aspects of this paper. We are fully responsible for any shortcomings. REFERENCES Agrawal, A. (2001). Common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources. World Development 29(10): 1623–1648. Agrawal, A., and Gibson, C. (1999). Enchantment and disenchantment: The role of community in natural resource conservation. World Development 27(4): 629–649. Agrawal, A., and Goyal, S. (2001). Group size and collective action: Third party monitoring in common-pool resources. Comparative Political Studies 34(1): 63–93. Anderson, R. C., Fralish, J. S., and Armstrong, P. (1993). The ecology and biology of Panax quinquefolium in Illinois. American Midland Naturalist 129: 357–372. Baland, J.-M., and Platteau, J.-P. (1998). Division of the commons: A partial assessment of the new institutional economics of land rights. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80(August): 644–650. Baland, J.-M., and Platteau, J.-P. (2000 [1996]). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Oxford University Press, New York. Brown, S. L., ed. (2002). Intentional Community: An Anthropological Perspective, State University of New York, Albany, NY. Carpenter, S. S., and Cottam, G. (1982). Growth and reproduction of American ginseng (Panax quinquefolium) in Wisconsin, U.S.A. Canadian Journal of Botany 60: 2692–2696.


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Charron, D., and Gagnon, D. (1991). The demography of northern populations of Panax quinquefolium (American ginseng). Journal of Ecology 79: 431–445. Christensen, C. (1943). Common Edible Mushrooms, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Dyson-Hudson, R., and Smith, E. A. (1978). Human territoriality: An ecological reassessment. American Anthropologist 80: 21–41. Gibson, C. C. (2001). Forest resources: Institutions for local governance in Guatemala. In Burger, J., Ostrom, E., Norgaard, R. B., Policansky, D., and Goldstein, B. D. (eds.), Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, Island Press, Washington, DC. Gibson, C. C., and Koontz, T. (1998). When ‘community’ is not enough: Institutions and values in community-based forest management in Southern Indiana. Human Ecology 26(4): 621– 647. Gleason, H., and Cronquist, A. (1991). Manual of Vascular Plants of Northeastern North America and Adjacent Canada, 2nd edn., New York Botanical Gardens, Bronx, NY. Gray, H. (1981). Geology. In Thomas, J. (ed.), Soil Survey of Monroe County, Indiana, United States Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service in Cooperation With Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station and Indiana Department of Natural Resources. Grieve, M. (1995). Ginseng. At Botanical.com: A Modern Herbal. Electric Newt http://www. botanical.com/botanical/mgmh/g/ginsen15.html Halsted, P., and O’Shea, J. (eds.) (1989a). Bad Year Economics: Cultural Responses to Risk and Uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, New York. Halsted, P., and O’Shea, J. (1989b). Introduction: Cultural responses to risk and uncertainty. In Halsted, P., and O’Shea, J. (eds.), Bad Year Economics: Cultural Responses to Risk and Uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, New York. Hicks, R. R. (1998). Ecology and Management of Central Hardwoods Forests, Wiley, New York. Huffman, D. M., Tiffany, L. H., and Knaphus, G. (1989). Mushrooms and Other Fungi of the Midcontinental United States, University of Iowa Press, Ames. International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program (2001). Field Manual, Version 10.0, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, Bloomington, IN. Johnson, R. N., and Libecap, G. D. (1982). Contracting problems and regulation: The case of the fishery. American Economic Review 72(5): 1005–1022. Kitts, J. A. (2001). Community Ecology: Organizational Dynamics and the Mortality of American Communes, 1609–1965, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. Kitzmiller, S. (1996). Morel Mushroom: Hunting Secrets, Scott Kitzmiller, Logan, OH. (http://www.users.ohiohills.com/∼kitzmiller/) Kuo, M. (2001). Introduction. In Identifying Morels and False Morels, Online: http://nt2. advant.com/kuocgi2/morels/introduction.html (July 1, 2001). ´ Lavanier, P. (1973). Contribution a l’Etude de la Pousse des Especes ` du Genre Morchella en Gironde. Bulletin de la Sociétèlinéene de Bordeaux 3(9): 195–199. Lewis, W. (1984). Population Structure and Environmental Collaries of Panax quinquefolium (Araliaceae) in Delaware County, New York. Rhondora 86: 431–437. Lonik, L. (1984). The Curious Morel: Mushroom Hunters’ Recipes, Lore and Advice, RKT Publishing, Royal Oak, MI. Lonik, L. (2002). Alert morels are disappearing. In Larry Lonik’s The Morel Messenger, Spring 2002 RKT Publishing, Chelsea, MI. McGraw, J. B. (2001). Evidence for decline in stature of American ginseng plants from herbarium specimens. Biological Conservation 98(1): 25–32. Murphy, L. (2000). Grandfather Ginseng is a Crafty Gentleman, A Digger’s Diary, Lee Murray (treesong-DryaD), Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. Nantel, P., Gagnon, D., and Nault, A. (1996). Population viability analysis of American ginseng and wild leek harvested in stochastic environments. Conservation Biology 10(2): 608–621.


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