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Insurgencies in Northern Mali: A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict

Insurgencies in Northern Mali: A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict

By

Priscyll Anctil Avoine

JEFCAS Working Paper nº 5

1

Insurgencies in Northern Mali: A Tentative Assessment on the Current Conflict

By Priscyll Anctil Avoine

JEFCAS Working Paper nº6

Published by: John & Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFCAS) – University of Bradford, UK.

For more information visit our website at www.brad.ac.uk/africa or our blog at http://jefcas.wordpress.com/

Email for correspondence for this paper: [email protected]

2

Table of Contents Historical Background: The Socio-political Context of Northern Mali............................................... 5 Present Conflict: A Tentative Assessment ............................................................................................ 7 Geopolitical Puzzle .............................................................................................................................. 9 The Dilemma of Intervention ............................................................................................................. 11 Voices from Victims ........................................................................................................................... 14 Concluding Thoughts ......................................................................................................................... 16 Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................... 17 Bibliography....................................................................................................................................... 18

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Introduction

“I know I’m going to die anyway, so at least I want it to be for the sake of God.” -Ahmed Ag Mohamed Al Ansari, a Tuareg Mujahideen (Welsh, 2012)

dilemma of intervention, regional countries are unable to fix the situation that is getting worse. The security vacuum has favoured the religious fundamental rebel group to gain power and capture more territories at the expense of the Tuareg rebels. In the middle of

Recently, the Sahelian belt attracted the

those multiple insurgencies, the civilian

attention of international media due to the

population is the habitual and immediate

phenomenal

West

victims of the conflict. Besides drought which

regarding international terrorism and their

afflicts the Shael the region this summer and

links with rebel groups from the Sahel. At

other war related sufferings, it is estimated

present, it is estimated that about 20 European

that up to 200, 000 people have been

nationals are still held in captivity (Alvarado,

displaced (AJ, 2012) during the insurgency.

propaganda

of

the

2012, p. 7); this picture reinforces the Is Mali the next “Afghanistan of the

concerns about the regionalization of the

Sahel” (Belmadi and Youcef, 2012) as most

activities of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

of the Western countries seem to think? In this

(AQIM). In 20012, the security situation in

paper, we attempt to nuance this widespread

the Shael region became even worse with the emergence

of

irregular

insurgencies

belief that Mali is the new safe haven for

in

terrorism by analysing the root causes of the

Northern Mali. On 6 April 2012, the Tuareg rebels

of

the

Mouvement

National

present conflict. We thus aim to foster

de

preliminary answers on the current situation

Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and some

in Northern Mali and to evaluate the broader

jihadists from both Ansar Dine and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le djihad en

implications of the conflict by looking at the

Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) declared the

regional and global trends. Obviously, we do not

Northern Mali as an independent state. The

pretend

to

offer

an

exhaustive

investigation of the conflict since at the time

insurgents benefited from both the regional

of writing this article, the situation is still

context of the collapse of the Gadhafi regime

unpredictable and the regional countries are

and the military coup that ended what used to

literally facing a geopolitical impasse. Also,

be a stable regime of Amadou Toumani Touré

we are conscious of the methodological

(ATT) (Alvarado, 2012, p. 1). While the

obstacles because the literature on the subject

international community (IC) is facing the 4

is still embryonic and we had to carefully

particular

analyse the newspapers to come up with a

sovereignty throughout all of its territory. The

judgment on the current crisis while paying

northern part has been particularly marked by

attention to the ambiguous role played by the

troubles on the part of the minorities,

media. An example is the role of Agence

especially the Tuaregs. They constitute a

France Press (AFP) regarding the high

nomadic group of approximately 1.3 million

tendency to qualify MNLA as part of AQIM

people crossing “southern Algeria, southwest

(Alvarado, 2012, p. 7) which shows a

Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali” (Cline,

dangerous lack of fairness.

2007, p. 891). In this paper, we analyse the

and

social

situation

maintain

its

Gyldenholm, 2012, p. 24) that compose

in Northern Mali, we will first comment on political

to

minority of 10% of Tuaregs (Bondersholt and

In order to portray the current conflict

the

difficulties

Northern Mali (NM) but the readers must

that

keep in mind that other tribes, such as the

characterized the region before engaging in

Arabs and Peuls populate NM as well. These

the analysis of the present conflict. Then, we

tribes neither agree with Bamako nor with the

will try to contextualize this crisis in the

full idea of full secession (Ngachoko, 2012).

regional and global frameworks in order to

Thus, this article focuses on the complexity of

understand the dimensions that are currently

the Tuareg ethnic population in NM with a

worsening the conflict. In the fourth place, we

special focus of their struggles dating back to

will question the dilemma of intervention to

French

present the various obstacles confronted the

colonization

in

order

to

fully

comprehend the current crisis. This section is

peace process in Mali. Finally, we aim to

an attempt to trace these root causes in

study the consequences of this conflict on the

history.

civilian population so to render the reader conscious of the real impacts of this

The

Tuaregs

mainly

practice

a

geopolitical power game over this Sub-

moderate but conservative Sufi Islam (Cline,

Saharan country and its neighbours.

2007, p. 892) and the allegations of Wahhabi preaching are completely new and far from being proven. Therefore, the suppositions

Historical Background: The Socio-political Context of Northern Mali

regarding the evolving threats of terrorism in the current crisis need to be nuanced as “past

Mali has long been considered a good and

stable

“democracy”

in

the

and current insurgencies of the Tuaregs in

Sahel

Mali emanate from a number of historical and

(Ngachoko, 2012) even if it faced some 5

current circumstances, some of which date

2012; Cissoko, 2011, p. 15). This may suggest

back to the pre-colonial era” (Zounmenou,

that, while marginalized by the central

2012).

government, the Tuaregs were also part of their own marginalization (Ngachoko, 2012)

In Mali, the French utilized a “divide-

as a vicious cycle of colonial consequences

and-rule” strategy as they organized the state

and misconceptions about cultural differences

to function in relations to the Tuaregs which

continue to be reinforced.

were the first to be under French rule (Cissoko, 2011, p. 8). From the early years of

The first uprising which occurred

independence, both the Tuaregs and the

between 1962 and 1964 (IRIN, 2012)

central government entered into a conflictual

mirrored the systemic challenges that were

relationship since the former complained

responsible for polarising the Malian society.

about lack of infrastructure and the latter

The rebellion reached its climax in 1963

viewed

as

before the government troop completely

development

crushed it within a year. The Mali government

obstacles

nomadism

and

to

national

pastoralism

(Zounmenou, 2012). Consequently, since

counter-insurgency

Mali's independence, the Tuaregs opposed the

Tuaregs communities destroying their sources

central government of Bamako by demanding

of subsistence (IRIN, 2012; Alvarado, 2012,

better integration or autonomy. On the one

p. 3) left the poorly armed Tuaregs with abject

hand there were stark regional inequalities

poverty and with no social base and power

between the North and South Mali – wealth

among the population. Furthermore, the

was concentrated in the South while the north

1970s and 80s were economically difficult

remained in abject poverty (Cissoko, 2011, p.

period for the northern rural populations since

9). On the other hand, integration of the arid

extreme drought displaced many and affected

region of the north with the rest of the coun

all the pastoral communities like the Tuaregs

try has remained a major challenge for the

(IRIN, 2012).

country which lacks institutional capacity to

which

targeted

the

The second Tuareg uprising began in June

do so. In addition, it is argued that the cultural

1990 and was “triggered by an attack on a

differences in the country have always been

police post in Menaka ordered by Iyad Ag

an obstacle in the process of national

Ghali” (Alvarado, 2012, p. 3) who created the

integration since the Tuaregs are perceived by

Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad (MPA) in

the rest of Malians as violent, unpatriotic and

Libya two years earlier (IRIN, 2012). Unlike

as having a slave mentality (Zounmenou,

the first insurgency, the second one was 6

proved more difficult to handle as the rebels

Thus, the conflict in NM did not seemingly

were better armed. The conflict resulted in

emerge from nowhere as Laurent Bigot

significant losses to both sides of the

asserts in his video presentation that the

belligerents and so were the impact on the

Western countries just decided to close their

number of displaced civilians. On 11 April

eyes on the structural and recurrent corruption

1992, a National Pact that ended the conflict

behind a façade democracy (Bigot, 2012).

was finally reached under the leadership of

Moreover, even if some of the Tuaregs were

Algeria (IRIN, 2012).

part of armed rebellions and certainly committed crimes, they suffered a lot from

The 1992 peace agreements were

the brutality of the Malian army during their

never entirely implemented and both parties

engagement

never really respected their full engagement.

in

diverse

rebellions

since

independence. The Tuaregs suffered from

Although the National Pact provided some

“severe government security force operations,

level of autonomy to NM, Bamako never

including destruction of their villages and

became deeply involved in executing its main

reported massacres” (Cline, 2007, p. 891). In

clauses and the Tuareg movement was thus

addition, the integration of the Tuaregs

broken apart in multiples organizations based

remained largely weak since they always

on plenty of cleavages (Alvarado, 2012, p. 3).

lacked

The various initiatives to stabilize and

connections

with

Bamako,

infrastructure and economic development

develop NM became infructuous and tensions

opportunities (Cissoko, 2011, p. 50 & 57).

flared between communities once again. The

While this section attempted to present the

signing of the Accords d’Alger in 2006 was

historical root causes of the conflict, the

aimed at fostering security and economic

section which follows will try to draw the

growth in Kidal but violence never ceased. As

principal lines of the current crisis in NM by

tensions continued to grow from 2011 to

showing how it is much more complex than

2012, well-armed leaders and insurgent

just alleged terrorist threat.

returnees from Libya following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi regime (IRIN, 2012;

Present Conflict: A Tentative Assessment

Alvarado, 2012) contributed to the complex

As

security dilemma of northern Mali.

mentioned

above,

the

contemporary insurgency is not the first rebellion in NM based on Tuareg identity.

Al-Jazeera provides a detailed account

However, what differentiates the present

on how the people of NM endured hardships

conflict from the previous is the fact that, with

prior to the latest conflict (Welsh, 2012). 7

their association with armed religious groups,

quest for independence and ended up in

the Tuaregs succeeded in defeating the Malian

multiple insurgencies since the MNLA made

army and proclaimed independence. The

temporary alliances with the Islamists groups

dynamics of the present crisis are various and

as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West

complex and very much related to the

Africa (MUJAO) and AD. In February, it

geopolitical situation in the Sahel. This paper

began to be clear that ethnicities were being

is written in the middle of this crisis, so the

instrumentalized by the different armed

principal objective of this section is to have

groups and it became possible to establish

an overview on the latest events of this year

links between those groups and AQMI

(2012) as well as to understand the major

regarding logistical support (IRIN, 2012).

components of the conflict.

However, it was the coup d’État, on 21 March

The

present

conflict

has

2012, that facilitated the process through

been

which the insurgencies won against the

nourished by political dissatisfaction from the

Malian

northern peoples of Mali, but has also been

army

in

merely

two

months

(Alvarado, 2012, p. 4). This culminated in the

sustained by the geopolitical evolution in

independence of Azawad, in NM, on the 6th of

North Africa and particularly in Libya. The

April 2012.

fall of the Gadhafi regime provoked a regional destabilization and some of the

In the meantime, the Malian army

Tuaregs who fought for this regime returned

suffered several defeats by the insurgencies,

from Libya around August 2011 (IRIN, 2012).

was humiliated (Keenan, 2012) and, as will be

They arrived in Mali with arms and logistical

argued later on, this is why they are so

support and the government of Bamako didn’t

reticent to an external intervention since it is

do anything to assimilate them into the

matter of national pride as well. On the one

regular army: president Amadou Toumani

hand, it first gave power to the MNLA to

Toure (ATT) completely failed to reintegrate

impose its domination on the three principal

them into Malian society (Keenan, 2012). The

areas in the north (Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao).

radicalization of certain parts of the Tuareg

On the other hand, this lasted for a short

movement was then more than obvious in

amount of time since religion took on a

October 2011 (IRIN, 2012). In January 2012,

stronger central role in the crisis, notably due

the National Movement for the Liberation of

to the difficulty for northern Malians to accept

Azawa (MNLA) was ready to engage in the

the democratic model, which failed to provide

rebellion (D’Almeida, 2012) that began as a

answers to their needs (Bigot, 2012). The

8

ideological shock between all the groups

(Castillo, 2012). For the same reasons, the

involved regarding NM's independence and

crisis in Mali is a geopolitical problem as will

the imposition of Shari’a Law is very

be demonstrated in the next section.

important and uneasy to obscure. The MNLA Geopolitical Puzzle

now lost almost all its territory gained in April

The analysis of the Malian conflict is a

to the hands of the Islamists groups (Berthemet, 2012) and it has become a

heavy task since it implies “a clear source of

question of who is going to be the privileged

problem

interlocutor with Bamako (Diffalah, 2012).

for

the

neighboring

states”

(Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). Beginning from 2001,

Currently, it is very difficult to properly predict the next trajectory of the conflict.

the geopolitical situation in the Sahel has been

Nevertheless, it became clear in the month of

facing increasing destabilization. Security is

August

that

the

population

does

not

extremely volatile and the UN estimated in

appreciate the radical interpretation of Islam preached by the MUJAO or the AD. Many

2009 that 21 tons of cocaine worth US$ 900

demonstrations have since taken place which

million

show that the general population resent the

transited

through

West

Africa

(Abderrahmane, 2012). The end of the

violent means of punishments imposed by the Shari’a Law (Idoumou, 2012a) that the

Gadhafi

insurgents have been implementing. Thus, the

geopolitical panorama of the Sahel, giving

conflict is quite difficult to evaluate since it is oscillating

between

insurgencies,

civil

secession

war, and

also

worsened

the

opportunity to criminal groups to obtain arms

guerrilla

more easily. Thus, the conflict in Mali can be

communal

disorders. In

regime

dangerous at the regional level since it can conclusion,

Bamako

did

not

extend itself to other neighboring countries

succeed in re-establishing their control over

(Abderrahmane, 2012) and “the shock wave

NM due to three important factors: the […] could even reach Nigeria” (Alvarado,

Tuaregs formed the MNLA which was much more well-armed in comparison to previous

2012, p. 7).

insurgencies, the coup d’État permitted them The Sahel has always been part of

to declare independence and, finally, because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel

migration

9

processes

and

trade

routes

(Roussellier, 2011, p. 8; Cline, 2007, p. 889).

the threat is considered real, the governments

It is a “confluence of a complex historical and

in the Sahel are also instrumentalizing and

human dynamics” with an increase of arms

amplifying the terrorist threat of AQMI in

and drugs trade during the last decade

order to respond to their interests and grab

(Roussellier, 2011, p. 8). The numerous

attention and funds from the West (Cline,

antiterrorist

stabilizing

2007, p. 891). This is why it is crucial to

interventions completely failed to recuperate

situate the Malian crisis in a wider context

the volatile situation in the Sahel (Roussellier,

since it also plays a part in the general

2011, p. 8) as the Malian crisis risks to

geopolitical imperative.

programs

and

worsen the current situation. In the meantime,

Otherwise, if the indications of the

these regional programs also served Bamako

links between AQMI and AD are still weak, it

because ATT used them as an excuse to get

appears that the US is increasingly present in

economic and military aid from foreign

the Sahel, taking a more extensive role in the

countries. In fact, at “no time did ATT

region (Cline, 2007, p. 893). Is Mali falling in

seriously take on the Tuareg demands, whose

the eternal vicious cycle of the dichotomy

threat he did not hesitate to exacerbate in

US-terrorism (Cline, 2007, p. 896)? It is

order to obtain aid and additional resources

difficult to know for the moment, but what is

for the struggle against terrorism” (Alvarado,

sure, is that the terrorism threat in Mali might

2012, p. 6).

have been too exaggerated. Those links still

On the one hand, it seems like Mali

must be proven since the rebellion is still

insurgency is now taking the route of a

limited to NM (Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). For the

nationalist conflict that is transforming itself

moment, the Tuaregs are forming tactical

into an ethno-religious crisis, similar to those

alliances with AQMI and enjoying their

in Somalia or Algeria. On the other hand, if

trafficking networks

10

(Zounmenou,

2012;

Roussellier, 2011, p. 8) but we cannot talk

thought that Algeria would be afraid of a

about “terrorism” yet.

more important terrorist threat in the region since there are already seven Algerian

Finally, we need to ask ourselves

diplomats that are captives of the MUJAO

about the role of Algeria, France or the US in

(Belmadi and Youcef, 2012). Also, it was

this crisis. In the case of the latter, Mali is

believed that Algeria would have tried to

believed to be a future site of oil exploitation

affirm its leadership after the fall of Gadhafi

even if this is not confirmed (Cline, 2007, p.

regime in order to appear as the only regional

896). Equally, France has never been an

power (Alvarado, 2012, p. 6). Is this crisis in

impartial actor in Mali and the US is not well

Mali an answer to some long-term interests of

perceived since the increase of its military

Algeria (Keenan, 2008, p. 459)? This

presence in the region. Natural resources such

geopolitical puzzle is thus far from being

as uranium and oil that are found in Niger and

resolved.

Mali are mostly in the areas of Tuaregs. This raises yet another question regarding whether

The Dilemma of Intervention The now recurrent question regarding

the huge militarization of the Sahel is driven

the crisis in Mali is: does it warrant an by natural resource motives. One must thus be

external intervention? If yes, who should be

very careful with the power balance in the

in-charge of the intervention: an African regional force, such as an AU force or an

Sahel, which is way more complex than it is

international one? Who should decide? Is the thought to be. Concerning Algeria, it is even

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which

more complicated to understand its position.

authorizes the supranational entity to send blue helmets to re-establish constitutional

A new state in the region, the Azawad, is a

order, applicable in the Mali case (Gonin and direct threat to the Algerians (Alvarado, 2012,

Pérousse de Montclos, 2012)? It seems as

p. 6). Its reluctance to engage in intervention

though the answer is not so obvious since the Sahel is posing a number of logistical

is surprising because it would have been

problems that are difficult to manage.

11

Moreover, the IC faces a multitude of

Senegalese and Nigerian troops (MICEMA)

intervention problems. While the Somali and

(Gueye, 2012b). However, even if it would be

Afghan cases are still uneasy to manage, the

an African solution to an African problem, the

Congo is in complete ebullition and Syria is

mission raises a number of important issues.

facing a tragic and unprecedented bloodshed while

Russia

is

vetoing

First of all, the NM region offers a

intervention.

hostile condition for intervention due to its

Moreover, the intervention in Libya has been

desert climate, arid terrain and vastness. An

criticized for its numerous civilian casualties

ECOWAS operation is largely destined to fail

while the “responsibility to protect” provoked

in this context without counting on any

even more victims under the auspice of

support from the Malian army. In addition,

NATO. The intervention dilemma is now

ECOWAS’

reaching a climax point in international

logistical

means

for

operationalizing the mission are largely

debates and Mali finds itself at the very heart

insufficient (Alvarado, 2012, p. 2). In the

of it.

meantime, the Sahelian region continues to The question of intervening in Mali

experience serious security problems and so

poses numerous problems. It is argued that

are countries bordering Mali with “other

the military branch, Cédéao, of ECOWAS is

significant internal security issues” to deal

better placed to intervene in Mali's internal

with (Cline, 2007, p. 891). Therefore, the

security that continues to threaten the entire

ECOWAS security framework fails to offer a

Sahel region. The regional countries, mostly

safe and solid base for a strong consortium to

Nigeria, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, have

intervene. The other problem with the

been contemplating sending a stabilizing

regional tactical force is that it still has not

force of approximately 3,000 to 3,300 men in

received the authorization and legitimation of

an attempt to consolidate the transitional

Bamako. No formal demand has been given

institutions in Bamako and re-establish the

from Mali for them to engage in a military

territorial integrity of Mali (Alvarado, 2012,

operation (Abderrahmane, 2012). This is

p. 2; Gueye, 2012a). However, some heads of

partly why all the regional actors are still

state,

prioritizing political dialogue (RFI, 2012)

such

as

Niger,

view

military

intervention as the only possible solution to

with the different insurgencies in NM.

the conflict (Gueye, 2012a; Idoumou and

However,

Oumar, 2012). It the military mission is to be

the

situation

is

more

complicated as it is difficult to understand

deployed, it would mostly comprise of

which group it is better to talk with. The West 12

African strategy presents a third logistical

whether negotiation is a viable option in

problem: Algeria (Belmadi and Youcef, 2012)

dealing with the insurgents (Le Pays, 2012)?

is totally opposed to the military option yet it

Although the MNLA may be open to

is the only regional power with the capacity to

dialogue, it is adamant to change its decision

respond to the crisis by force. Without

on independence of Azawad. The Islamist

Algeria, the mission is more likely to fail.

groups, too, openly oppose the partition of

Algeria was opposed to the intervention in

Mali yet are determined to unconditionally

Libya, is more than reticent to a military

apply the Shari’a Law to the region (Oumar,

operation in Syria, so it appears to be obvious

2012a).

that the intervention in Mali is not an option

Compaoré’s role as the mediator in the

for the Algerians. Even if the USA and France

conflict catapulted him into international fame

are hardly pushing Algeria to intervene by

and prestige, critics have argued that his

offering logistical support (Belmadi and

agency has instead worsened the conflict.

Youcef, 2012), Algeria is more likely to

seriousness

and

as

Blaise

of caution (Berthemet, 2012), the AU is trying

concludes that the possibility of a regional lacks

much

While Washington is acting with a lot

pursue a political solution. This paper thus

intervention

Moreover,

to support a military intervention with the

has

help of the UN. The UN critically examined

resulted in severe divisions in strategic foci.

the AU military proposals and rejected it

In addition, critics argue that ECOMOG’s

twice on the basis that the text was not precise

previous interventions in Nigeria and Liberia

enough (Guèye, 2012c). It claimed that the

were marred with sexual violence perpetrated

demand made to the Security Council will

by the soldiers who were supposed to restore

need to be more specific regarding material

order (Gonin and Pérousse de Montclos,

and human needs and strategies (Journal du

2012).

Mali, 2012). This is a very questionable The political negotiations to end the

option because of the current situation of the

deadlock have also failed to yield solution to

UN, which faces multiple fronts at the global

the security dilemma in NM as contested

level. The UN also received a lot of criticisms

issues remain complex and barely understood.

regarding the intervention in Libya and its

While the MNLA lost power, the possibility

delegation of the dossier to NATO. The

of holding further negotiations with the

“responsibility to protect” has been largely

religious groups seem predictable (MJAO &

criticized for being a semantic euphemism

AD). However, what is questionable is

(Galy, 2012) to legitimize invasion and killing

13

of civilians. It is also criticized for supporting

civilians suffer from multiple forms of

neo-colonial interests of the superpowers

violence as international organizations face

(Galy, 2012). The AU thus proposes a similar

difficulties in accessing the region. It is not

intervention to that in Somalia, which means

very clear as to which group perpetrates the

that it would receive the financial and

violence, or which group protects the civilians

logistical support of the UN but would

from the other. It seems that the situation

assume the development of the mission on the

more closely resembles a civil war rather than

ground by itself. However, the effectiveness

a political declaration of independence. The

of AMISOM is another debatable issue.

civil

Moreover, since the intervention in Somalia

organizations in the region make an explosive

in 1992, the UN adopted a regional approach

cocktail for the population that is already

by disengaging themselves from directly

confronted with a number of structural

intervening

The

problems. This section explores the different

perspective of an international intervention is

ways in which the population has become the

then also improbable.

victim of the events that have taken place

in

Africa

in

general.

very

reticent

to

an

and

multiple

radical

since the beginning of the year.

Additionally, it seems that the Malians are

disorder

international

In the introduction of the present

intervention and are looking for recuperating

work, we mentioned that it is estimated that

their national pride. In that sense, they seem

200,000 people needed to escape from their

not to be interested in waiting for an

homes due to the growing violence between

international or regional operation (Sanou,

the different groups. In Gao alone, 35,000

2012). It is believed that Bamako is trying to

people have fled since January 2012, which

mobilize a special force in order to confront

totals half of the population (Libération,

the crisis in NM (RFI, 2012a). However, this

2012). The people that are still in the region

might also be a failure as they risk their young

of NM continue to face harsh reality. Men,

recruits to confront something similar to

women and children are the victims of what

urban guerrilla.

can be perceived as a mixture of religious and nationalist demands that are less clear each

Voices from Victims

day as the violence is, on the contrary, getting

“War loves to seek its victims in the young.” -Sophocles

worse.

As the insurgencies in NM have

While the civilian men cannot do

become more complex and radicalized,

anything against the violence because the 14

groups are well armed, women and children

moment to determine the number of children

are the primary victims of the conflict.

that have been recruited in the various groups,

Human Rights Watch and UNICEF denounce

but UNICEF claimed that at least 175 of them

the various violations perpetrated by the

already part of the armed group ranks and are

different

Whereas

estimated to be aged between 8 and 12 years

organizations such as UNICEF cannot access

old (UNICEF, 2012). The fact that most of the

the region due to the volatile security situation

schools are closed also worsens child

of NM

recruitment since the children are more

factions

(UN,

conducting

in

NM.

2012),

in

vulnerable when they do not have a

partnership with local organizations in order

productive activity that retains their attention.

to document the abuse. On the one hand, it is

It is estimated that the basic education of over

reported that women are victims of sexual

300,000 students might be in danger and this

abuse. These sexual crimes are committed by

also increases the chance that they will fall

both the Islamists groups and the separatists

victims of armed resistance (UNICEF, 2012).

even if data are still missing to determine

Moreover, the situation in NM is increasingly

exactly how many cases are attributed to each

volatile and the children are also victims of

group (RNU, 2012). The instances of sexual

the collateral damage. Many of them have

abuses are not isolated and are increasing

been mutilated or killed by explosive devices.

throughout

In fact, half of the mutilated victims are

women

diverse

they have been

the

are

investigations

northern

also

region.

abducted

Young

and

raped

children (RNU, 2012).

repeatedly. In Gao alone, 17 cases of violent

To all of this, there is the problem

sexual aggression have been reported and there

is

thought

to

be

many

associated with the intention of the Islamist

more

groups applying a strict Sharia interpretation

undocumented. The abuses seemed to have

to NM. Reported cases of flagellations and

been perpetrated more so by the MNLA in

forced ways of dressing (not usual for the

this region, however, this has not been

ethnic groups in NM since their traditional

officially proven (Marièke, 2012).

dresses do not conform to the rigid Sharia’s

On the other hand, UNICEF, Human Rights

Watch

and

the

UN

cited

requirements) have been seriously taken into

the

account and a number of civilians are fearing

recruitment of children in the militias of the

this sudden change in their way of living

Islamists groups and the MNLA factions (UN,

(Oumar, 2012).

2012; RNU, 2012). It is still difficult at the

15

Finally, it is also difficult to identify

are affecting about 18 million people in the

who is perpetrating the violence. It is argued

Sahel (CARE, 2012). This paints a pretty dark

that both the Islamists of MUJAO and Ansar

and uncertain future for the Northern Malians.

Dine, and the nationalists of MNLA are Concluding Thoughts

implicated in violence and acts of terrorism.

At the time of compiling this paper,

However, the military forces and the central

the political crisis in Mali was far from being

government in Bamako are so weak that they

resolved. On the 14th and 15th of August 2012,

cannot respond to this juridical problem, leaving

the

perpetrators

the Malian government and its army met the

unpunished.

heads of state of the Cédéao in order to

Consequently, Bamako is seeking the help of

establish a concrete plan that would be

the International Criminal Court (ICC) in addressing

the

problem

since

implimented under the auspice of the UN

severe

(Kamguia K., 2012). The outcome of the

violations of International Humanitarian Law

meeting was not successful since the Malian

have been perpetrated within the past months

government did not accept one of the three

in NM. The ICC has been asked to investigate

proposals of the plan. Mali did not accept the

the war crimes occurring in the Sahel on the

fact that external actors would take charge of

basis of a number of allegations of human

the transitional institutions of Bamako. To the

rights violations denounced by various NGOs and

international

organizations

Malian army and government, this is a war

(Gueye,

that nobody can conduct except the Malians

2012a). In addition to the insecurity, an

themselves (Kamguia K., 2012). However,

outbreak of cholera has been reported in Mali:

they accepted the logistical support offered by

out of the 34 reported cases, at least 2 known

the Cédéao with the aim of reorganizing the

fatalities have been recorded (RNU, 2012). In

military forces and reconquering the northern

general, the population suffers from the

part

absence of the state to ensure their most basic

of

the

country

that

is

currently

monopolized by Tuareg Islamists.

rights. The hospitals lack medical supplies and most of the furniture they receive from

The most recent data concerning the

the International Committee of the Red Cross

displaced people are even more alarming.

is given to the combatants and not the

More than 436,000 people fled from their

civilians (Idoumou, 2012). The appalling

homes due to the crisis and around 140 cases

sanitary situation coupled with food crisis

of cholera have been documented with 11

aggravated by the worst drought since the

deaths (AFP, 2012). A rapid solution is

beginning of the insurgencies in January 2012

necessary in order to avoid a degradation of 16

the situation as was the case with Somalia.

(Castillo, 2012) and this is why this paper

The good news is that, at least, the extremist

chose to discuss multiple insurgencies. Mali is

groups are not enjoying a lot of credibility

confronting a very fragile and volatile

among the Sufi culture that characterizes

situation that is geopolitically not easy to

Mali's population. In fact, the Islamists are

manage. The truth is that, even if a regional

having trouble in convincing the population

approach might be the best solution, the

that their ideology can be an alternative to

Malians still face a huge and unanswered

democracy and are thus trying to reach new

question regarding democracy.

sections of the Malian society in order to gain ACRONYMS

support, but in vain (Idoumou, 2012a). Moreover, the population in NM is now

AFP Agence France Presse AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ATT Amadou Toumani Touré AU African Union CÉDÉAO Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest IC International Community ICC International Criminal Court MNLA Mouvement national de Libération de l’Azawad MPA Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad MUJAO Mouvement pour l’unicité et le djihad en Afrique de l’Ouest NM Northern Mali UN United Nations

organizing itself to protect people from the exaction

perpetrated

by

the

insurgents

(Powelton, 2012). The unique preoccupation would be that the links between AQMI, AlShabaab or Boko Haram become more pronounced (Griswold, 2012) to the point that they could be involved in huge criminal activities such as drug trade to finance their organisations or through kidnap. What should be done in Mali? Is an international

or

regional

intervention

necessary? Is the Malian army giving too much of a chauvinist connotation to the crisis by prioritizing the pride over the security of the civilians? Why is Algeria so reticent regarding intervention? Why is the Cédéao so insistent? This paper was an attempt to portray the actual situation in Mali and to open up new avenues to understand the crisis. It is important to specify that the Tuaregs never formed a united political entity

17

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