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RESEARCH ESSAY

Interpretive accounts and fairy tales: a critical polemic against the empiricist bias in interpretive IS research Bernd Carsten Stahl Department of Informatics, De Montfort University, UK Correspondence: Bernd Carsten Stahl, Critical Research in Technology, Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, De Montfort University, Faculty of Technology, Department of Informatics, The Gateway, Leicester, LE1 9BH, UK. Tel: þ 44 116 207 8252; E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract In 1995, Geoff Walsham wrote one of the most important and most widely cited papers on interpretivism in information systems (IS). Walsham’s paper, along with his further work, represents a cornerstone of the discourse surrounding interpretive research. It has set the tone for further publications in the area and has more recently been followed up by a detailed practical account of how to undertake interpretive research by the same author. Using Walsham’s position as a starting point, the present paper questions some basic assumptions of interpretivism. Drawing on the philosophical background of interpretivism in hermeneutics and phenomenology, the paper questions the status of empirical research in the interpretivist tradition. Using quality criteria of different research streams related to interpretivism, the paper compares the role of empirical data in different types of research accounts with fairy tales, noting that interpretive IS research shares at least as many quality features with fairy tales as with positivist narratives. The paper concludes by discussing which consequences this position has for interpretive and other research in IS. European Journal of Information Systems advance online publication, 12 February 2013; doi:10.1057/ejis.2012.58 Keywords: interpretivism; critical theory; hermeneutics; phenomenology; empiricism; fairy tales

Introduction

This paper contributes to the Contrarian Series and is followed by Walsham’s response. Received: 29 June 2009 Revised: 9 February 2010 2nd Revision: 8 November 2010 3rd Revision: 21 June 2011 4th Revision: 9 January 2012 5th Revision: 12 November 2012 6th Revision: 17 November 2012 Accepted: 20 November 2012

Almost 20 years ago, Geoff Walsham (1995a) wrote a hugely influential paper on interpretive case studies in IS research . This paper is by far the most cited paper ever published in the European Journal of Information Systems with 1830 citations according to Publish or Perish and the next most highly cited paper receiving 483 citations, 17 November 2012. According to the ISI Web of Science database, it is the second most cited work by Walsham. The paper has shaped the debate surrounding interpretive research in IS and has developed standards for other scholars to follow. More recently, Walsham (2006) has published a follow-up paper that gives some more concrete guidance on the details of conducting interpretive work. The present paper argues that Walsham’s position represents core elements of current interpretive IS research. Some of these core elements are problematic because they are based on empiricist assumptions that are inconsistent with the philosophical roots of interpretivism. The present paper aims to be contrarian by questioning the foundations of empiricism in interpretivism. Very briefly, the argument is that interpretivism renounces the idea of objectivity of research, and reinterprets the act of doing research as the development of useful narratives. Such a contribution

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is measured according to the criteria that are established in the community of participants. The present argument is that current criteria are difficult to justify from the interpretivist position. If interpretivist research is about reconstructing other people’s constructions, as Walsham paraphrases Geertz, then it is difficult to see why these particular constructions, namely the ones that are collected via empirical data collection methods, are given preference over alternative constructions. The present paper suggests a different view of research. Researchers are storytellers who construct arguments to help their audience understand a particular point. This, in turn, is useful for the audience because the research narratives help them navigate their personal, social and organisational lives. The sources of these narratives may come from structured research, from personal experience, armchair philosophising or elsewhere. What renders them useful is not their origin but the way in which they shape the audience’s world view and thereby the options that are open and actions they can take. Such a view might be heretical to a traditional objectivist and positivist position, but, as this paper will argue, it is consistent with the philosophical tenets of interpretivism. It therefore raises the question as to which role empirical data can have in interpretive research and will require interpretivists to consider their empiricist leanings. The paper uses Walsham’s view of interpretivism and interpretive case studies as a starting point to explore the principles of interpretivism in information systems (IS). Its main aim, however, is not to critique Walsham or his personal position but to provide a general critique of the empiricist assumptions of interpretivist IS research. Such a critique is necessary because the reliance on empiricism in the interpretive tradition of IS research impoverishes its output and decreases its potential contribution and impact. By relying unreflectedly on empiricism, the community of interpretivist IS researchers misses the opportunity to develop different and more exciting narratives whose relevance to our understanding of IS phenomena may surpass what is possible under current views of what constitutes interpretivism. Overall, the paper thus supports Rowe’s (2011) call to enrich the field of IS by rethinking its boundaries and conventions and make it more interesting and relevant.

Walsham and interpretivism This contrarian paper uses Walsham’s (1993, 1995a, 2001, 2006) position as a starting point but it aims to expose a weakness in the assumptions of interpretive IS work in general. Myers & Walsham (1998, p. 233) underline that interpretivist research is characterised by its philosophical assumptions. ‘Interpretive studies generally attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them’. To put this into philosophical terminology, interpretivism is built on hermeneutics and phenomenology. This section provides the basis for the later critique of interpretivism by providing a brief

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overview of definitions of the term and offering an account of its two main philosophical roots, namely hermeneutics and phenomenology.

Definitions of interpretivism Interpretivism is frequently viewed within the community of IS scholars as a research ‘paradigm’. Its two most widely recognised alternatives are positivism and critical research (Chua, 1986).The value of the distinction of these paradigms has been questioned elsewhere (Weber, 2004). Walsham (1995a, p.76) therefore rightly emphasises that ‘researchers need to reflect on their own philosophical stance, which should be stated explicitly when writing up their work’. It is thus appropriate to take him by his word and explore the fundamental assumptions behind the interpretive approach. Burrell & Morgan (1979, p. 31) trace the roots of interpretivism to Kantianism, German Idealism and Romanticism (see also Chua, 1986). Given that none of these philosophical traditions are particularly well known in IS research, interpretivists require more guidance on the meaning and practice of the approach. This is offered notably by Klein & Myers (1999) who discuss a number of characteristics of the approach. Central assumptions of interpretivism include that knowledge is gained through social constructions, that it does not include predefined dependent and independent variables, that it focuses on sense making in complex and emerging situations and that it attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings assigned to them by individuals in situations. These main principles of interpretive IS research are all directly related to hermeneutics and phenomenology as will be discussed in the following subsections. Interpretivism developed as a reaction to the dominant positivist tradition in IS and social sciences more generally. Interpretivists reject the notion that complex social phenomena such as the ones related to IS can be objectively and comprehensively described by referring to an observer-independent reality. Interpretivists aim to ‘piece together people’s words, observations and documents into a coherent picture expressed through the voices of the participants’ (Trauth & Jessup, 2000, p. 54). The focus of interpretive investigations is on understanding the meaning that individuals ascribe to their environment including organisational structures, technological artefacts and their relationship (Schultze & Leidner, 2002). Interpretivists try to make sense of the world by understanding how other people make sense of their world. To return to Walsham (1995a, p. 79), interpretivists are not saying ‘that they are reporting facts; instead, they are reporting their interpretations of other people’s interpretations’. Paraphrasing Van Maanen, one can speak of second-order constructionsbased respondents’ first-order constructions (or ‘data’, in ordinary IS terminology). The recognition that interpretations of phenomena are not completely determined by the object of interpretation leads interpretivists to reject the realist ontology of

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positivism and to embrace alternatives, often called constructivism (Talja et al, 2005) or constructionism (Gergen, 1999). It is important to note that interpretivists question ontological realism and therefore need to provide answers to the question on how research that does not claim to objectively describe a given reality can raise claims to truth. In order to do this successfully, interpretive scholars need to draw on different ideas of what research is and what its aims and objectives can be. To put it differently, interpretivists have to con sider which epistemological approach is appropriate for their non-realist ontology and their enterprise of creating narratives on the basis of other people’s narratives (Michael D Myers & Avison, 2002). This is where the two important roots of interpretivism come in: hermeneutics and phenomenology (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004).

Hermeneutics in interpretive IS research Hermeneutics refers to the correct interpretation and exegesis of (originally Scriptural) texts (Rathswohl, 1991). The struggle for the ‘right’ understanding of a text has led to the realisation that a ‘true’ representation of a text is never possible. Author and reader never share enough of a background to ensure complete overlap of meaning. Modern hermeneutics therefore has developed beyond the hope for a true understanding and addresses the unbridgeable divide between reader and author. Much of this current development of hermeneutics is credited to Gadamer (1990) who established that hermeneutics must incorporate the cyclical relationship between prior knowledge and understanding of a text, which then influences the knowledge of the reader. In the discourse surrounding hermeneutics, two German verbs are frequently used to denote the difference between natural and social sciences. Where natural sciences aim at erkla¨ren, literally ‘to explain’, which means that they give causal explanation that are useful for predicting future events, social sciences can choose to aim at verstehen, literally ‘to understand’. Hermeneutics as the art of understanding is suited for the social sciences (Lee, 1994) that aim to understand human activity, not necessarily to explain or predict it. Interpretive IS researchers therefore typically base their work on hermeneutics (Butler, 1998). A core question of hermeneutics is to which degree the object of understanding (the text) determines the process and result of understanding in the reader or observer. To put it differently: Is the meaning that emerges from hermeneutic activity determined by the object of cognition, and if so to what degree? This is a fundamental philosophical question that goes far beyond the current paper. Suffice it to say that views on the degree to which meaning ‘drifts’ are divided. An extreme view here would be that meaning drifts unlimitedly. The present paper does not require such a view. A more nuanced understanding that sees meaning as beyond control, even if there may be an underlying transcendental meaning

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(Eco, 1993), will suffice for the argument. Such a view leads to questioning the relationship between the object of observation and the understanding that is derived from observing it. This hermeneutic emphasis on understanding rather than explaining has a number of consequences for the research process. It means that the research does not need to look for universal laws (Giddens, 1984). A further implication is that the distinction between data collection and data analysis that appears evident in natural sciences becomes much less clear(Myers & Avison, 2002). The role of the researcher is central to research findings. The researcher is the one whose understanding of primary constructions translates into texts, which then contribute to understanding on the part of the readers. In addition to the central role played by the researcher, hermeneutics also implies that a crucial aspect of research is the language in which it is conducted. Language is not a neutral tool for conveying facts. Rather, it is the medium in which meaning is socially constructed. But what are the entities whose meaning is explored? The answer to that question points towards phenomenology.

Phenomenology Phenomenology is a somewhat ambiguous concept that can refer to any first-person description of human experience. However, in a more specific sense that is typically implied in interpretive research, phenomenology stands for methods analysing consciousness that go back to Edmund Husserl (Beavers, 2002) and which were further developed by Heidegger and others. Etymologically, phenomenology stems from the Greek verb for ‘to show oneself’ (Moran, 1999, p. 229). Heidegger (1993, p. 28)defined the term phenomenon (Pha¨nomen) as ‘that-which-shows-itself-on-itself’ or the evident (das Offenbare). Phenomenology emphasises the immediacy of perceptions. Instead of seeing the world as an objective and detached entity, phenomenology underlines the importance of human perception. This perception is always embedded in a social context. It is linked to embodied human beings and precedes abstract and formal ways of describing the world. Instead of working with abstract models of social and organisational reality, phenomenology encourages us to reflect on the way we interact, which includes evidence, intuition and empathy. Phenomenologists question the idea of neutrality of observation and argue that the division between object and subject is problematic (Moran, 1999). The content of consciousness is not a reflection of an external reality but the result of an intentional engagement with an object of cognition. This does not imply that there is no external world to engage with, which would be an idealist or rationalist position. It does raise the question, however, how the relationship between consciousness and phenomenon is to be conceived. And, following the Kantian tradition, one can ask what is the relationship between the phenomenon (the content of consciousness) and the

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thing as such. Again, these are fundamental philosophical questions going beyond the present paper. In the social sciences, these questions have been discussed under headings such as ‘definition of situation’ (Thomas, 2002) or ‘frame analysis’ (Goffman, 1975). For our purposes, it is simply important to keep in mind that the relationship between external reality, phenomenon and observer is not easily determined and subject to discussion. It is clear from this brief description that phenomenology offers an account of IS that differs radically from the mainstream positivist description. Phenomenology shows the everyday lives of the manager ‘which is made up of frustrations, accomplishments, gossip, confusion, tinkering, joy and desperation’ (Ciborra, 2004, p.19). Managers are no longer the objective heroes of the organisation but embodied and embattled individuals who are trying to make sense of their environment (Introna, 1997). Phenomenological accounts of IS cover concepts such as management fashions (Introna & Whittaker, 2002), artificial intelligence (Dreyfus, 1992) and even ethical issues related to computing (Capurro & Pingel, 2002). In current social science, a strong relationship between phenomenology and hermeneutics has been established (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Berger & Luckmann, 1991). While hermeneutics originally concentrated on easily recognisable texts, the concept of text has been broadened to cover other social entities (Ricoeur, 1995), such as organisations or IS. These can be seen as embodying meanings that need to be decoded by others, which renders them relevant to hermeneutics. As Walsham (1993, p. 9) puts it, ‘hermeneutics can be thought of as a key strand of phenomenology since the interpretation of texts is an important part of the search for meaning and the essence of experience’. Phenomenology and hermeneutics refer to one another and both are fundamental to interpretivism (Boland, 1985). This brief outline of the conceptual basis of interpretivism will suffice to develop the critique of its empiricist leaning.

The role of empiricm in interpretivism Having outlined the philosophical roots of interpretivism, the paper is now in a position to ask what role empirical data can have in interpretivism. After briefly introducing the concept of empiricism, the paper will ask what is the purpose of empirical accounts from the perspective of interpretive IS research. Empiricism can be defined as the ‘doctrine that experience rather than reason is the source of our knowledge of the world’ (Morick, 1980, p. 1). Or, expressed in a slightly simpler way, empiricism holds that all knowledge derives from experience. To many, this may seem like unquestionable common sense. One needs to realise, however, that this is a particular philosophical position that has been debated for centuries. It can be seen as the counter position to rationalism, which could be

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described as stating that all knowledge derives from the human mind. There has been much debate about these positions and the possibly most influential attempt to reconcile them has been undertaken by Immanuel Kant (1995, p. B75) who held that theory without experience is empty and experience without theory is blind (Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind) . Empiricism is so widely spread in most sciences including social sciences and IS that it is hard to find direct references to it. A look in any of the mainstream journals will support the contention that research that reports empirical work is privileged. Even theoretical pieces are typically supported by examples or vignettes, which serve the purpose of demonstrating the empirical validity of theories. Publications that do not refer to empirical research are often labelled ‘opinion pieces’. Another indication of the prevalence of empiricism is the ongoing discussion of methodology. Methodology plays a central role in the introspection of the IS discipline and ongoing debates about legitimacy of different approaches (Straub & Ang, 2011). One needs to see, however, that any discussion of methodology is premised by the assumption that empirical research is undertaken. Empiricism is so deeply ingrained in IS research that it is hardly ever questioned. This might be acceptable if empiricism were an integral part of interpretive research. The earlier description of interpretivism and its roots in hermeneutics and phenomenology show, however, that this is not necessarily the case. Phenomenology was developed in explicit opposition to ontological realism and epistemological empiricism. Instead of providing an objective and empirical description of the world, phenomenologists argue that the individual perception of reality precedes any objective description. While phenomenology’s slogan is to go back to the things themselves, these things are not objective entities but individual experiences. Hermeneutics is similarly removed from empirical research in the sense of objective data collection and analysis. It is concerned with the cyclical process of understanding texts. Data in the original sense of the word (from Latin: given) does not hold a privileged position. The text is not given but needs to be appropriated by the audience which will never lead to completely reproducible or objective representations of its meaning. The general description of empiricism as pervading interpretivism is reflected in Walsham’s work. While not all his work reports empirical research (the two famous 1995 papers (Walsham, 1995a, b) being a case in point), he draws heavily on his own and other researcher’s empirical findings. His two widely read and cited books (Walsham, 1993, 2001) as well as much of his further work (Barrett & Walsham, 1999; Walsham & Sahay, 1999; Walsham, 2002) rely on empirical data to construct the narrative. This is not to accuse Walsham of naı¨ve acceptance of a realist ontology. In fact, he is open about the role of empirical material as a means to make

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‘a coherent and interesting story for the reader’ (Walsham, 2006, p. 327). While Walsham and many other interpretivist IS scholars seem to be aware of the problematic value of empirical research in interpretivism, they do not openly question it. This leads to the question why interpretivists rely on empiricism. The answer to this question touches on pragmatic considerations of the academic system (e.g., what counts as a good publication?). In order to understand these questions, one can ask what are established criteria of good interpretivist research and how do they relate to empiricism. This question will now be discussed.

Theoretical views on the evaluations of interpretive data Walsham is not the first interpretivist, and IS is not the first field of study that has made use of interpretivist ideas, as has become clear in the earlier discussion of the theoretical roots of interpretivism. It is thus of general interest to look at what interpretivists from other and related fields have said about the role of empirical data. This will allow comparing different theoretical and disciplinary approaches to interpretivism. Such a varied and broad theoretical perspective is important in its own right, but it is especially important for a contrarian paper such as the current one, which is based on theoretical reasoning and therefore needs to provide particularly strong theoretical evidence in order to successfully challenge established conventional wisdom (Nandhakumar & Baskerville, 2011, p. 691). The strong position of empiricism in interpretive research indicates that it fulfils a need perceived by the authors who follow it. In order to understand what this need is and how empirical work can fulfil it, one can look at the criteria for good and successful research. If Walsham and other interpretivist undertake empirical research, they presumably do so in order to improve the quality of their work against such criteria. This section will therefore discuss some such criteria from fields that are adjacent to or closely related to interpretive IS research. A good starting point that offers a contrasting view of the criteria to be used to evaluate interpretive research would be that of positivism. Very roughly, one could say that positivism is based on a realist ontology in which an independent researcher observes external phenomena with a view to coming to generalisable predictions. This implies a correspondence theory of truth where a true statement is one that describes the phenomenon as accurately as possible. One could argue that this view is naı¨ve and does not capture the nature of positivist research, for example, because the positivist researchers realise that they have not direct link to an external reality (Weber, 2004) and that successful rhetoric may be more important in determining successful research than truth (Benbasat & Weber, 1996). However, this view represents a public understanding of research. It also explains why

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notions such as rigour or validity are important. The present paper is primarily concerned with the nature of interpretivism and therefore may use an oversimplified view of positivism as a theoretical alternative without losing its academic contribution. As it is usually impossible to directly verify the truth value of a description of a phenomenon, positivist research has developed concepts that will help it to ascertain whether a piece of research is of acceptable quality. This is achieved mostly in a procedural fashion where ideas such as validity, reproducibility or rigour describe characteristics of good research. Independent of potential disagreements with aspects of this description, it gives a clear understanding of why empirical data are required. Without the observation of external phenomena, no truthful statements about them can be made. For interpretivist research, given its non-realist ontology and its rejection of correspondence theories of truth, other criteria of good research have to be found. This section will briefly outline the criteria developed in ethnography, narrative research and critical research. As a brief disclaimer, it will of course not be possible to do justice to these three streams of research. The aim of the subsections is to raise some ideas of research quality that will allow an appreciation of the role of empirical data on assessing research quality.

Quality criteria of ethnographic research Ethnographic research is based on a detailed observation and immersion in social phenomena. It aims to understand cultures and phenomena that are usually alien to the researcher, and it is therefore strongly embedded in the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions of sense-making. Golden-Biddle & Locke (1993) underline that researchers do not aim to discover a truth waiting to be discovered but to reflect on the world of the worlds of those involved, including the readers, those who are researched and the researchers themselves. In order to achieve this, the first task of the account of the research is to convince the reader. Convincing the reader is accomplished by ensuring authenticity, plausibility and criticality of the text. Authenticity stands for the successful attempt of establishing the author as an authority in the field. This serves as a guarantee that the author understands the meanings of phenomena as perceived by those who are involved (Trauth & Jessup, 2000). In addition to being authentic, the account has to be plausible, that is, it has to create a relationship between the world of the reader and the world of the researched. Plausibility requires the author to understand the way in which the reader can appropriate the text. In addition to authenticity and plausibly, the text should also display criticality, that is, allow the readers to question their own assumptions. Criticality is achieved not only through the substance of the text, but also through its form and rhetorical style. Ethnographic work following these suggestions will not only be informative but also provocative. It aims to lead to reflexivity, understood as the ability to question one’s

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own assumptions and preconceptions (Marcon & Gopal, 2008). The way in which these different and possibly contradictory aims of ethnographic research can be achieved is through both substance and form of the text. The reader can be convinced if the text is well crafted and easy to follow if it links with the reader’s expectations and experiences and if it uses appropriate rhetorical devices. However, it needs to go beyond a pleasing narrative and provoke the readers; it can surprise them to force them out of their comfort zone and provoke reflexivity.

Quality criteria of narrative research Another genre that influences interpretive IS research is that of narrative research. Narrative research includes ethnographic and interpretive (and arguably positivist) IS research in so far as it concentrates on narratives as written or spoken text that gives an account of events or actions or events (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004, p. 17). There are different types and genres of narratives ranging from realist (van der Blonk, 2003), which are closer to positivist accounts to subjectivist ones, which are closer to the interpretivist work of interest in this paper (Wagner, 2002). For the purposes of identifying criteria of evaluation, the paper concentrates on the Narrative Paradigm as proposed by Fisher (1984). This is a research paradigm based on the recognition of the nature of humans as storytellers who communicate through narratives. The idea behind it is that the homo narrans requires not only the argumentative aspect of narratives to understand and interact but also a literary or aesthetic aspect. The author or storyteller has a central role in this understanding of communication, which is akin to that of a teacher or a sage. He or she tries to impart knowledge on the audience but is then subjected to the audience’s criteria of what counts as a good story. The question of the evaluation criteria of interpretive research and the role of empirical data in it can then be transformed into the question of what makes a better and more satisfying story than another one. Fisher suggests that the criteria are those of logic of good reasoning and attention to reasons and values. These are then broken down into two main criteria: narrative probability and fidelity. These are explicated by Stutts & Barker (1999) as assessing the internal consistency and coherence of a story (probability) and its external plausibility, its truthfulness (fidelity). These criteria have found broader resonance in narrative research where problems of the correspondence theory of truth have led to a reinterpretation of evaluative concepts such as reliability or validity have linked these to consistency, coherence or plausibility (Czarniawska-Joerges, 2004). Quality criteria of critical IS research A final genre worth exploring is that of critical IS research (Pa¨iva¨rinta, 2001). Critical research is closely related to interpretive research in IS and the term of ‘critical interpretivism’ (Doolin & McLeod, 2005) characterises much of Walsham research

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appropriately. Myers & Klein (2011) have recently suggested a set of six criteria or principles for the evaluation of critical IS research. Following Stahl (2008), one can argue that the difference between critical and non-critical IS research is located in the motivation for undertaking the research. Critical work seeks to promote emancipation, whereas non-critical work aims at description. Myers and Klein’s six principles can then either be explained by the need to justify the emancipatory intention or as a consequence of this desire. Following this line of thought, one can argue that the main evaluation criterion of critical research is its success or at least attempt of promoting emancipation. Emancipation raises a host of epistemological and practical problems, so that in practice other criteria of successful critical IS research have been suggested, including those suggested by Klein and Myers. A core aspect that links to the other genres outlined above is that of reflexivity. Critical research promotes reflexivity with a view to helping both researchers and their respondents to question their own position and thereby improve their status (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2011).

Quality criteria of interpretive IS research – the purpose of research The preceding brief outlines of evaluation criteria of interpretive research point to one core question that determines the construction of these criteria and thereby the way in which the role of empirical data in such research is evaluated. This question is the one concerning the purpose of research. The positivist view that research provides correct descriptions of reality with a view to developing universal theoretical models (Eisenhardt, 1989) is not tenable for interpretivism. This raises the question as to why interpretivists aim to understand (rather than describe) phenomena. Why, to paraphrase Weick (1989), should scholars be interested in developing accounts or theories that are more plausible and of higher quality rather than obvious, irrelevant or absurd? There probably is no one right answer to this question. However, one can argue that in many cases the understanding of socio-technical phenomena aims to lead to better systems or better usage of systems. This links with the strong tradition within IS to build systems, not just to describe them, which is currently discussed under the heading of design sciences (Hevner et al, 2004). It is therefore not surprising that it has been suggested that reflections on the theoretical and philosophical foundations of IS research should aim at stimulating imagination to help conceive better systems (Lee, 2004). But even where interpretive research does not aim directly at improving systems, it seems to aim at the future in the sense that a better understanding of phenomena will help us to build a better world (Jones, 2001). The normative implications of interpretivism raise significant theoretical and practical issues. Among them is the long-standing philosophical debate about the relationship between facts and norms. Most philosophers

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will agree that the justification of normative statements must be drawn from normative premises and cannot be deduced from observation. This is an idea that is usually linked to Hume (2004) and Moore (1999). Drawing a normative conclusion from descriptive research is often called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. A different way of saying this is that ‘ought’ cannot be deduced from ‘is’. A further problem is the epistemological question how one can know whether a piece of research has made a positive contribution to social realities. This paper cannot engage with this particular philosophical discussion in any depth. It points to an important criterion for the evaluation of empirical interpretive research that is implied in some of the other criteria selected earlier. These will now be applied to interpretive research in the next section.

Interpretivism and fairy tales The preceding sections have led to a set of evaluation criteria of interpretive research that can be used to explore the value and importance of empirical work in interpretivism. In order to understand the relevance of the empirical aspect, it is worthwhile to compare such work with empirical positivist work, on the one hand, and with non-empirical research, on the other. For the sake of clarity of the argument, the paper uses fairy tales as an example of non-empirical work. Fairy tales share some of the normative and future-oriented purposes of interpretive case studies. One can understand the relationship between interpretive work and fairy tales by asking why we tell children (and sometimes adults) stories of bears, dragons, princesses, dwarves and all the other assorted characters of fairy tales. One answer is that fairy tales allow them to develop a differentiated understanding of social situations and also to educate them and modify their behaviour. It is of course worth noting that fairy tales are also hegemonic vehicles for the transmission of ideologies, for example, in the form of gender or racial stereotypes (Tyson, 2006). This does not affect the present argument, whose purpose is to shed doubt on the supremacy of empiricism. Fairy tales can thus be seen as a literary genre (Duff, 2000), which has similarity with the genre of empirical interpretive research. If fairy tales and empirically based narratives are both genres that might promote the aims of researchers then one can ask in what way they differ from the viewpoint of interpretivism. Typically, we differentiate between fairy tales and scientific research using criteria such as objectivity of data, reproducibility of experiments or generalisability of results. Given what was said above, such criteria are not necessarily a part of interpretive research. Not surprisingly, there is a discourse in the philosophy of science that underlines this problem and that points out that the distinction between science and myth is often difficult to uphold. Feyerabend (1980) uses the example of witchcraft, which is a concept that has explanatory power, is widely recognised and otherwise

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serves the same purposes as a scientific explanation. He goes so far as to say that well-confirmed empirical theories can become dogmatic and indistinguishable from myths. Even less radical voices such as Quine (1980) concede that the difference between myth and science is one of degree, not of kind. This situation has not gone unnoticed by interpretive researchers who have used the mythical qualities of IS to develop alternative narratives of the use of ICT in organisations and societies (Hirschheim & Newman, 1991; Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999; Drummond & Hodgson, 2003). Such research relies strongly on the role of metaphors for understanding (Tsoukas, 1991) and therefore falls into the realm of interpretivism. It uses linguistic means to support the hermeneutic cycle. What is interesting to note, however, is that the authors of such research still feel a strong need to provide empirical backing for their narratives. It is a further indication of the dominance of empiricism in IS that even myths, magic or fairy tales would require empirical support. The following table clarifies the relationship between the three genres of empirical by describing which role the evaluation criteria developed above have in the three types of texts (Table 1). This table gives some important insights with regards to interpretive IS research. It first of all shows that interpretive research, when looking at it using the evaluation criteria outlined earlier, displays at least as many similarities with fairy tales as it has with positivist research. This evaluation of the three genres of text depends, and this is the second insight, very much on the way in which the purpose of the text is framed. From the theoretical analysis of interpretive research, one can see that it cannot be aimed at giving a true and generally accepted account of reality. The role of empirical data and its analysis thus has to be different. Following the arguments above, empirical work in interpretive research has the role of garnering plausibility and convincing the reader that the message is relevant. This means that data is only relevant in so far as it allows telling an interesting and unexpected story. In some ways this is what fairy tales do. Whether something is interesting and unexpected does not depend on the data but on the way it is interpreted and relayed to the audience. It is important to be aware of the fact that the researcher filters and changes the narratives of the respondents. Due to the nature of the hermeneutic process underlying interpretive research, any interpretive scholar must concede that the story they tell is not the respondents’ story but their interpretation of the respondents’ story, and Walsham makes this quite clear in his publications. The narrative presented by the research is thus always the narrative of the researcher(s). Whether this narrative correctly represents that the respondents is not for the researcher to determine. The reader may then ask how we can distinguish between interpretive case studies and fairy tales or, to put it in more conventional terms, between factual and

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Table 1

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Comparative evaluation of empirical positivist, interpretive IS research and fairy tales

Criterion

Empirical positivist research (aims to adequately describe and explain a phenomenon)

Empirical interpretivist IS research (aims to understand a phenomenon)

Fairy tale (aims to entertain and teach a moral lesson)

Convincing

Central to building a rapport with the audience

Irrelevant for factual content

Authenticity

Not considered; implied in adherence to methodology and procedures Not relevant

Important to be recognised, achieved through deep familiarity with the subject

Plausibility

Taken for granted

Criticality

Not aimed for

Provocative

Not aimed for

Irrelevant for factual content; important for the success of the moral message Achieved through the consistency of the narrative and link with its prior knowledge Achieved by the construction of the narrative Core component of the narrative

Reflexivity

Not aimed for

Probability (coherence) Fidelity (truthfulness) Emancipation Contribution to a better world

Implied in realist description Not questioned, implied Not aimed for Implied in the scientific system, not individual research

Important for rapport with audience, achieved through interrelation with the audience’s experience Achieved by highlighting unexpected findings Arises from criticality; unexpected empirical data provide basis Unexpected data may force audience to reflect on assumptions Important as rhetorical device, not linked to data Similar to authenticity, given through familiarity Can arise from reflexivity Implied in approach but subject to empirical confirmation

fictional narratives. In a related argument, Law & Singleton (2000) argue that ‘[y] the difference between telling stories and acting realities isn’t so large. It’s a continuum, not a great divide [y]’. Given the precarious relationship between the narrative and the external world, this is a difficult draw, a clear dividing line between fact and fiction. Drawing on narrative theory, Czarniawska-Joerges (2004, p.9) suggests that the difference is the author’s implicit plea to the reader to either suspend (in the case of fiction) or activate (in the case of fact) their disbelief. What difference does the activation or suspense of disbelief make? It seems to relate to the question whether the account in question can raise truth claims. But what counts as truth in interpretivism? In the pragmatist tradition, truth stands for making a difference (James, 1907). Instead of asking whether a research account is true, it would thus be more helpful to ask whether the account contributed to understanding and whether this understanding proved to be relevant. In many cases, this comes back to the question of usefulness touched on earlier. Different types of accounts, for example those that are based on other interventions in the discourse (i.e., the research literature) or on non-related bases (e.g., artistic representations, poetry, fairy tales), will have to prove their usefulness with the audience and it is possible that academic audiences are more likely to prefer particular types of accounts, namely those they are used to. There is, however, at least from the interpretive point

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Not explicitly aimed for; may be implicit in the narrative Required within the context of the narrative Not relevant Not aimed for Implied purpose of the moral lesson

of view, nothing that privileges empirical accounts a priori. A helpful analogy would be that interpretative research relates to fairy tales as photography relates to painting. (I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this analogy.) They can both be meaningful, but we can distinguish between them, most of the times. Both fulfil a similar function by representing particular phenomena. Both have their strengths and weaknesses. Privileging one over the other on a matter of principle is therefore problematic. In some cases, we may require either a painting or a photograph and they are suitable for different purposes. There is, however, a grey zone in between them where it may be difficult to distinguish between them. The upshot of this interpretation of interpretivism is that the proponents of interpretivsim should reconsider their implicit reliance on empiricism. Empirical research is one potentially valuable contribution to researchoriented discourses, but privileging it over other types such as conceptual or reflective research is not warranted. A general acceptance of this will allow for a richer landscape of research in IS.

Conclusion: non-empirical interpretivist IS research? This contrarian paper aimed to question the long-standing assumption that interpretive research in IS needs to rely on empirical data. It used some of the work undertaken by Geoff Walsham to motivate a broader argument looking at

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the philosophical underpinnings of interpretivism. By discussing hermeneutics and phenomenology, the paper has shown that the fundamentals of interpretivism do not require an empirical basis of research. The spirit of this paper is not to condemn interpretive research or belittle Geoff Walsham’s contribution to it. Rather, it aims to point out an inconsistency in the currently accepted view of interpretivism, one that can affect the legitimacy of the results of the approach. At the same time, the exclusive concentration on empirical research can impoverish the interpretivist tradition and thereby the field of IS as a whole because it forces scholars to expend energy and resources to provide empirical support where the added value of such support may be very limited. The reader who agrees with the argument presented so far may now ask where this will lead. What are the practical consequences, and what is the usefulness of the argument? Very briefly, a broader agreement with the paper should lead to a wider and more varied landscape of legitimate research. This landscape will still include current research, for example, a case study or interviewbased studies, but it will go beyond this. It will include accounts of the use of technology in organisations and society that are motivated and described from a different basis. Possible examples are accounts that may be routed in personal experience, in hearsay or in considerations of general plausibility. It might be appropriate to extrapolate experience or to postulate non-existing situations and undertake thought experiments. If the purpose of such work is to improve the understanding of a phenomenon then traditional conventions of scholarly research may not need to be adhered to. Does a piece of research need a clearly defined and persistent author? It would seem imaginable to launch a multi-authored collaborative project, which captures multiple perspectives and experiences and that remains a dynamic entity with changing authorship. There is no need for research to follow a linear narrative, so long as the audience benefits from whatever it is presented with. Publications do not need to follow a particular format and there is no obvious reason why research output has to be presented in a particular format, order or according to particular methodologies. There are examples of this softening of established rules within the field of IS. Many of the established

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outlets that are open to interpretive work, be it in IS or neighbouring fields, are trying to open themselves up to new formats. They allow papers that experiment with more artistic types of expression (McBride, 2008), that question the relevance of modernist accounts (Cala´s & Smircich, 1999) or that explore non-objectivist methodologies (U. Schultze, 2000). As a matter of fact, the series of contrarian studies of which this paper forms a part can be interpreted as an attempt to break the usual mould of IS publications. So far, such accounts are an exception rather than the rule and they are usually framed in a way to ensure that they fit within the existing conventions of interpretive work. Following the thoughts of this paper would open up the boundaries that separate interpretive IS research from different fields, such as literature, arts, performance, advocacy and others. This is not a call for a free-for-all in which anything goes and all claims of truth and validity are equal. Rather, it is a call for questioning and reconsidering the current validity criteria and engaging with a broader set of stakeholder to re-negotiate the question of what is perceived to be useful and should therefore count as IS research. Such a re-negotiation is difficult and there is no guarantee of success. It would require a new look at all aspects of the way in which research is currently undertaken and evaluated, from research funding to quality control and review mechanisms. This means that it would entail political struggles because it would touch on evaluation of research and therefore institutional and organisational incentive structures. This paper argues, however, that such re-negotiations of criteria of legitimacy are continuous and ongoing processes that accompany research in any event. Rather than ignoring this, it would be better to be conscious about it and shape this process. This thought is mirrored by a recent editorial of the European Journal for Information Systems where the editor Frantz Rowe (2011) calls for ‘greater diversity in writing styles, argumentative strategies and genre of papers’. The paper can therefore be understood as a contribution to such an attempt to redraw the boundaries of legitimacy. If successful, then it should lead to a richer, more colourful, more interesting and more enlightening landscape of interpretive IS research.

About the author Bernd Carsten Stahl is a Professor of Critical Research in Technology and the Director at the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility at De Montfort University, Leicester, U.K. His interests cover philoso-

phical issues arising from the intersections of business, technology and information. This includes the ethics of ICT and critical approaches to information systems.

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