There is some evidence in the U.S. that having brothers reduces other sibling's chances for family financial support of higher education (Powell and Steelman.
Intra-household Exchange Relations: Explanations for Gender Differentials in Education and Migration Outcomes in Thailand1
Sara Curran Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology University of Washington
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Acknowledgements
Direct correspondence to Sara Curran, Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology, Box 353340, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3340. The research for this project was generously funded by a number of different sources, including: a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology at the University of Washington, a Rockefeller Population Sciences Dissertation Fellowship, Mellon and Hewlett Research Residency (for the field work) through the Carolina Population Center (CPC) at the University of North Carolina and the Institute for Population and Social Research (IPSR) at Mahidol University, Nakhom Prathom, Thailand. I also want to thank Dr. Avery Guest, Dr. Judy Howard, and Dr. Barbara Entwisle for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. IPSR and CPC generously released the panel data for the purposes of this research and Dr. David Guilkey (at CPC) graciously provided the multinomial logistic estimation program. The qualitative field work for this study could not have been accomplished without the generous and capable research assistance of Miss Namnarong , MA Anthropology student at Mahidol University.
Abstract This study is an analysis of the simultaneous choices of education and migration for young adults in a rural Thai setting. The primary foucs is upon the role of both gender and sibling oder as they characterize the most important elements of intra-household relations in this context. The study develops a theoretical perspective about exchange relations and the risk environment surrounding decision making to describe the dynamics of internal household relations and to predict education and migration outcomes. Results show that one of the sources of the paradox of women's status in Thailand is the exchange relations between daughter's and parents as they are conditioned by the risks to farming and labor.
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Introduction Intra-household allocation of opportunities and resources has received increasing attention in a variety of literatures over the last decade. Importantly, households are recognized to be more than just “black boxes” but important social structures within which power and status are defined through exchanges and allocation of resources. Thus far, attempts to theorize and predict outcomes have been frustrated due to a lack of adequate data and very demanding theoretical models. The theories range from altruistic models, to cooperative models (reciprocity models), to conflict models, to game theory or noncooperative bargaining models. This paper takes one step back from bargaining or game theory models to suggest a more simple, testable model of household relations which requires the definition of exchange relations between household members and the level of risk associated with decisions where both individual and other household members’ interests are at stake. The study is an analysis of the simultaneous choices of education and migration for young adults (age 12-21 years old) in a rural Thai setting2. The primary focus is upon the role of both gender and sibling order as they characterize the most important elements of intrahousehold relations in the rural Thai setting. Migration in this study refers to seasonal, ruralurban migration. Education refers to the decision to go beyond the mandatory schooling of 6 years to the secondary level. Thailand is an interesting case for such an analysis because of its rapid economic growth in the last twenty years and the paradox of women’s status. Rapid economic growth provides an opportunity to examine the impact of social change in a short period of time. The paradox of women’s status in Thailand deserves attention because it is not
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unusual in other parts of the world, especially in more developed countries. The results of the analysis show that the character of intra-household resource exchanges within Thai households are important explanations for the paradox of women’s status. There are three objectives in this paper. The first objective is to explore the gendered dynamics of the household “black box.” The analysis looks inside the household to learn about the character of exchange relations between parents and children, especially as they are differentiated by gender and sibling order. These exchange relations are expected to be important determinants of education and migration decisions. Explicating intra-household exchanges reveals the contents of the "black box" contributing to recent literature about household dynamics (Fapohunda 1988; Wolf 1994). The second objective is to examine the consequences of this dynamic for choices regarding education and migration. The allocative process for each outcome is expected to be related but not the same. In both cases, the returns such as income, goods and employment security are significant for the sending household. Additionally, young people yearn for and appreciate the opportunities for expression and independence offered by education and migration. The alternative, to remain on the farm, is also a possibility. Parents need to rely on at least one child to take care ofthem in their old age and to provide important farm labor. This choice represents a risk to young people, given the decreasing productivity of farm land and the unpredictability of weather in the region (increasing frequency and length of droughts). Reliance upon children for help and the offering of opportunities to children are what define the exchange relations within the household. 2
Combining the two outcomes in one analysis also incorporates concerns about endogeneity bias because
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The third objective is to examine the role of risk in modifying household exchange relations. Risks to farming and labor needs in the household of origin are expected to modify exchange relations (e.g., the relationship between the internal gendered dynamics of the household and the outcomes of education and migration) because the decision to migrate or gain education means that these farming households will lose access to farm labor either permanently as with the decision to invest in education or temporarily as with the decision to migrate (which will sometimes lead to permanent loss to labor). The definition of risk is therefore parameterized by the type of decision to be made and the the potentially conflicting or coinciding interests of the individual and other household members. Research Motivation The contributions of this study are several and are the primary reasons motivating the research. First, the paradox of women’s status in Thailand is puzzling and is only just beginning to gain attention both in Thailand and elsewhere (Yoddumnern-Attig et al. 1992; Richter and Havanon 1994; Tantiwiramanond 1995) Although Thailand is still considered a less developed country, this paradox of women's status also resonates in more developed countries where women's status is at once better but continues to be constrained by glass ceilings. A study of gender relations in Thailand provides insights for a broader context. Women in Thailand are considered to have relatively high status compared with women in other developing countries (Richter and Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). However, more recently this characterization has been challenged as it is apparent women
of suspected simultaneity of choices.
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predominate in the low wage, low skill sectors of the economy as well as being under represented in the seats of power in Thai society (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992; Thitsa 1980; Sussangkarn 1993; Suvannathat 1989). Some examples of women’s higher status include their very high labor force participation rates (65.5% (Phananiramai 1993)), literacy, control over reproductive behavior, and accounts of their egalitarian relations with husbands. In 1990 women 15 years and older had rates at least 30% greater than other coutnries in Southeast and East Asia, except for the People’s Republic of China. Women’s labor force participation rates are at least 50% greater than countries in South Asia (Tantiwirimanond 1995). Literacy is close to universal for women of reproductive of age (Richter and Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). Also many historic and ethnographic studies describe women’s relations with their husband’s as egalitarian (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 1987). It is often said that women “hold the purse strings” within the household in Thailand (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). Women also have control over their reproductive behavior (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 1987; Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). Much of the dramatic decline in women’s fertility3 in Thailand is largely attributed to this combination of factors (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya 1987). And, finally women’s participation in rural-urban migrant streams is considerable, reaching as high as 60% (Tantiwiramanond 1995; Chamratrithirong 1995). These rates are only surpassed in Asia by the migration rates of women in the Philippines and in Japan (Tantiwiramanond 1995). It is important to note that these moves are sometimes associational but are primarily are for jobs for the women themselves (Guest et al. 1993). 3
Total fertility rates have dropped from 6.0 in 1970 to 1.8 in 1990 (Hirschman et al. 1994).
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These positive characterizations of women’s status are increasingly questioned by recent scholarship. These research note that women predominate in the low wage, low skill sectors of the economy, including low wage service jobs, prostitution, agricultural wage labor, and low skill manufacturing (like textiles, parts assembly for electronics, and food processing plants) (Tantiwiramanond 1995). Importantly women consistently earn one-third to one-half as much as men in similar occupations (Tantiwiramanond 1995; Phananiramai 1993; Richter and Havanon 1994). Women are much less likely to continue schooling and graduate from secondary schools than men, especially in rural areas. In the context of Thailand’s rapidly growing economy this has put them at a severe disadvantage to men, because they cannot take advantage of the increasing returns to education. Finally, of the three pillars of Thai society and power: the monarchy and govenrnent, the military, and the monastery, women are barely represented. This paradox of women’s status in Thailand is partially explained by the gendered dynamics within the household. This does not diminish the importance of larger socio-economic or macro contexts upon women’s status. Rather, the rapid industrial development and the resulting structure of the labor market was facilitated by the gendered dynamics of exchange relations between parents and children. Besides the paradox of women’s status in Thailand, this research is motivated by current literatures in gender studies, household economics, migration, and the sociology of education. In particular, this study addresses theory about the determinants of migration and education. Literatures in both areas suggest that more work needs to be done to integrate intra-household dynamics into predictions about education or migation.
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These dynamics are expected to clarify linkages between individual characteristics and larger macro-structural influences upon these two outcomes. The social construction of gender differences is rooted in different sources and at different levels of analysis (for a discussion and review of literature see Mason 1986 and Blumberg 1991). Households and families have always been a particular focus for sources of gender stratification. Here, I draw upon theoretical developments in the household and family literature (Dasgupta 1993 chapters 9, 11, 12; Folbre 1988, 1986; Fapohunda 1988; Greenhalgh 1988; Berk and Berk 1983; Schmink 1984; Becker 1981; Sen 1990; Zelizar 1994) and demographic and stratification literatures (Kertzer1989; Blake 1989; Powell and Steelman 1989; Lauby and Stark 1988; Massey 1990; Sen 1990, 1992; Blumberg 1991) to specify the underlying household processes that result in gendered differential access to resources or opportunities. My perspective is that the household or family is the most proximate social institution to the individual and is itself a source of stratification as well as a mediating structure for larger outside sources of gender stratification. The literature on internal household dynamics has moved from black box characterizations, to indistinguishable models of either altruism, reciprocity, or conflict, to bargaining/game theory. I step back from the bargaining or game theory approach to a more testable middle ground that distinguishes two factors of import: degree of balanced exchange between members and assessments of the risk environment associated with farming and labor needs. Explanations about the way households function depend on assumptions about the nature of internal dynamics within the household. Some approaches assume altruistic
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behavior among all household members (e.g., Becker 1981), others assume reciprocity (Schmink 1984), self interest (Berk and Berk 1983), or differential power and resulting conflict (Folbre 1986). Under certain conditions households may give individuals access to some resources but limit access to others. If households are important mediating institutions between the individual and society, the nature of the internal dynamics of households is one of the keys to understanding that process of mediation, and thus the ultimate distribution of resources and opportunities across individuals. The preceding literature suggests two extreme ideal types of intra-household relations. In reality neither extreme is true, the home is not necessarily "home sweet home" nor is it a microcosm of warfare. Reality probably lies somewhere in between. Self-interest is tempered by reciprocity, differential power asserts itself through bargaining, and moral altruism may assert itself as a result of socialization. Sen (1990) succinctly describes the dilemma of understanding household relations in a discussion about gender and households: "the members of the household face two different types of problems simultaneously, one involving cooperation (adding to total availabilities) and the other conflict (dividing total availabilities among the members of the household). Social arrangements regarding who does what, who gets to consume what, and who takes what decisions can be seen as responses to this combined problem of cooperation and conflict." (Sen 1990, p. 129). It is the negotiations and bargaining between individual members and the varying requirements and benefits of cooperation that place households along a continuum between altruism and conflict. This helpful diagnosis of the dilemma does not shed light on the underlying dynamics of the negotiation and bargaining process. Instead one needs to turn to two
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sources for insight. The first source is work by Sahlins (1972) and more recently applied to Taiwan gender differentials in education by Greenhalgh (1988). The concept is the degree of balanced exchanges of resources between members and the consequences of this for women and men (or sons and daughters). Exchanges are described as either balanced (equivalent values exchanged over a relatively short period), generalized (not necessarily equivalent values exchanged over a longer period of time), or negative (unequal exchanges or no exchange). In the case of Taiwan, the social cultural norms surrounding marriage and filial obligation mean that women get some higher education but only enough to ensure a good marriage, and in the time prior to marriage, a good job to help support the household economy and their brother's education (Greenhalgh 1988). In turn, a brother or son is supported for more education in order to get a good job that will enable him to support his parents in their old age. The intergenerational exchanges between daughters and parents is balanced, and between sons and parents is generalized. Although this work is primarily a description about the outcome of decision-making it is useful because adequate description requires uncovering the cultural and social context affecting the character of exchanges. The second source of insight is Dasgupta's work on well-being (1993): What is it about the cultural and social context that creates these different types exchanges? Dasgupta explicates the social and cultural context of the exchange relations by suggesting that it is the degree to which risk averse behavior is required because of the context surrounding a particular decision (or goal) and the decision (or goal) itself. This risk averse behavior might be risk pooling or risk spreading. For example, explanations for different marriage systems in India are the degree to which the social and
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environmental context requires risk pooling (see pp. 201-204, 322). And, explanations for diversified household activity are in response to the needs to spread risks (not a new concept, especially in the literature on seasonal migration (Stark 1991) or agricultural technology adoption). Thus, the risk environment affects the nature of exchanges and the resulting types of relations within and outside the household. This argument for a connection between risk and exchange relations is compelling, however, Dasgupta's explanations are all ex post facto theorizing. The linkage has not been tested prospectively. Before doing so, a brief review of the relevant literature about education and migration is necessary. Going to school beyond the mandatory level in most less developed countries and rural agrarian settings is a costly endeavor. The costs include the direct school expenses and current opportunity costs. Just as important may be the future opportunity cost of permanently losing the individual to the urban labor market. The decision is surrounded by risk assessments both current and future. These costs and the varying current and future roles of household members make continued education a resource that may not be shared equally among all members. Throughout the world women are usually disadvantaged with regards to education. The current literature on gender and education emphasizes the structural determinants of gender stratification: women derive most of their status from relative economic power which can vary at both the micro- (households) and macrolevels (the state or market) (Blumberg 1984). Relative economic power is defined in terms of relative control over the means of production and allocation of surplus. The sources of this economic power depend on women's leverage in the labor force (indispensability),
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the extent to which the kinship system facilitates their acquisition of property, and the larger society's stratification system. Implicit in this argument is an assessment of the risk environment with regards to choices about women's lives, made by themselves or by others. Throughout the literature on gender and education in developing countries (see Stromquist 1989 for a review) one of the primary determinants of female education is the economic condition of the household. Implicit in all discussions is that resource rich households have greater control over the risk environment. What is interesting is that resource limitations are more important for girls than for boys. A study in Nepal shows that boys from both poor and rich households gain access to education, however, only girls from rich households gain access to education in order to improve their marriage marketability (Ashby 1985). Similar results are found in Egypt and Bangladesh (Papanek 1985), and Taiwan (Greenhalgh 1988). This type of finding is not limited to the developing world. There is some evidence in the U.S. that having brothers reduces other sibling's chances for family financial support of higher education (Powell and Steelman 1989). Although recent evidence contradicts this finding (Butcher and Case 1994), definitive conclusions cannot be drawn because the research in the developed world on within household sources of gendered education differentials is very limited (Ganzeboom et al. 1991). Recent developments in the migration literature suggest that concepts of risk avoidance, levels of uncertainty, and reciprocal relations within households and migrant communities in places of destination provide useful explanations of migrant behavior. Household migration strategies are attempts to mitigate the local risk environment (Massey 1990; Stark 1991; Stark and Bloom 1985; Lauby and Stark 1988; Wood 1981;
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Arizpe 1981) and decisions to migrate are related to the risk associated with migration (Findley 1987; Bilsborrow et al. 1987; Mukras, Oucho and Bamberger 1985). Of particular interest are the findings from a study in the Philippines. Within rural Filipino households younger women members are preferred migrants because they are more likely to remit wages (Lauby and Stark 1988). Their explanation stops short of explaining why household influence varies among household members. One possible explanation is the structure of the urban labor market destination, where younger women's dependency on the origin household is a result of their position in an unstable urban labor market which requires remittances to insure a place back at home. Given this situation, other household members may be more likely to let younger women go, since the household will continue to have access to their earnings and control over the younger women's lives. Based on this background review there are several statements to be made. The degree to which there is differential access to resources within a household is a result of two inter-related dynamics: the exchange relations between members and the risk environment surrounding the allocative decision. Findings reported in current literature support this statement. However, there has been little formal testing of this perspective. Central to this paper is whether changes to one of the dynamics necessitates changes to the other. Do differences in the risk environment modify (reinforcing or reducing the importance of) the traditional relations of exchange within rural Thai households? To answer this question the rest of the paper will focus on Thailand, the data for this study, and discuss the results from the analyses in light of the preceding review.
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Data and Dependent Variable Two sources of data are used in this analysis. The first data source is longitudinal panel data from 51 villages in one district in northeastern Thailand4. The data include information about villages, households and individuals and are unusual for migration research because they allow for a prospective study of migration behavior. The second source is qualitative data from seven months of field work in the study region, conducted by the author four years after the second survey panel data were collected (in 1992). The quantitative data include 3,412 young people age 8-17 years old during the first wave of data collection and 12-21 years old during the second wave. The sample was also limited to: children of the household head (not grandchildren) with 2-6 years of education (in order to only choose those at risk of getting more than primary schooling) and those who were current household members in 1984 (not seasonally absent). The sample was further limited to those young people with mother's age 20-44 years old in order to increase the likelihood of capturing full sibling sets as of the first wave of data. Based on these criteria, 81 percent of the cases were matched. The bias introduced as a result of these lost cases is not expected to affect the outcomes of interest but is expected to reduce the variation in the independent variables, and perhaps diminish statistical significance. The qualitative data are an important component of this study because the panel data were not originally designed to measure and analyze intra-household resource allocation, or the degree of balance in the exchange relations between members. The 4
The panel data were collected by the Institute for Population and Social Research (IPSR), Mahidol University for the purpose of establishing baseline data in 1984 prior to an NGO’s economic development intervention. The second panel was collected to evaluate change in contraceptive behavior between 1984 and 1988 and was part of a collaborative project between IPSR and the Carolina Population Center at the
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ethnographic data are used to provide adequate description of internal household relations with regards to the decision making process surrounding choices about education and migration in rural Thai farm communities. Text analysis of interviews and observations provide critical information for conceptual development and measurement, analytical models, and interpretations of results. The qualitative data include texts from in-depth and focus group interviews. The in-depth interviews were conducted while living in one of the study villages for five months. Twenty interviews were conducted with young people who would have been in the sample at the time of the two waves of survey data. Individuals were selected after conducting a household census and choosing individuals based on household characteristics, sibling composition, and individual characteristics (education and migration experience). Five of these interviews were conducted with migrants at their destination (Bangkok). Another ten interviews were conducted with parents of some of the original twenty interviewed young people. Finally, sixteen focus group interviews were conducted in eight other villages during my six month stay. Villages were selected based on the 1984 village data varying village migration rates, village post-primary education rates, distribution of land, and location in the district. Within each of the eight villages two focus groups were conducted, one among gender segregated young people (16-25 years old), and one among gender segregated older villagers (representative of parents age 40-55 years old). In each village, the genders of the two focus groups were never the same and the interviews were conducted right after each other in order to limit cross group contamination. The focus group data were
University of North Carolina. Data in 1988 were collected in all 51 villages but only from households where there had been a married woman of reproductive age (15-44 years old) in 1984.
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collected with the assistance of a research assistant, as were the in-depth interviews during the first two months. The same research assistant transcribed all the interviews. The dependent variable for the analysis combines information about educational attainment and migration behavior. Since 1978, mandatory primary schooling in Thailand is completed after six years (Richter 1989). In this analysis, those young people who have more than six years of education are distinguished from those that seasonally migrate (and do not get more than six years of schooling) and those who remain in the household (and do not get more than six years of schooling). Further, the seasonal migration category is divided into those who remit wages or goods and those who do not. Remittances are considered to represent a committment to the origin household's economy (current and future) and a demonstration of stronger ties and obligation. There were very few respondents who occupied both the schooling category and the seasonal migration categories (2.5% of those remitting, 5.3% of those not remitting). If respondents occupied both then they were included in the secondary schooling category. Seasonal migration is defined by the household head who reports on currently absent members who have been gone from the house for 1-12 months. Anyone gone longer than 12 months is reported to have permanently moved out. It should be recognized that this measure of seasonal migration is an undercount of seasonal migration for individuals (who might have left several times during the time period between the four years) or at the household level where seasonal migrants during the past year may have already returned to the household and are counted as current members. The latter case is unlikely since the survey was conducted at the end of the dry season before migrants were expected to return to work on the farm.
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Study Site A brief description of the study site and Thailand is necessary in order to clearly understand the risk envrionment, the context of education and migration, and the importance of gender and sibling roles. The site for this research is in the northeastern region of Thailand in Nang Rong district. Although Nang Rong’s economy has not grown as quickly as Bangkok’s, it has changed rapidly as a result of Thailand’s economic growth. The Thai economy has experienced annual averages of 10% growth in GNP over the last fifteen years (Phananiramai 1993). Despite this growth, Thailand remains a rural country with about 70% of its population classified as rural residents in 1990 (Thailand Human Resource Planning Division 1995). Although rural areas have benefitted from the economic expansion, the vast majority of economic growth in jobs is in the Bangkok metropolitan area. This has resulted in tremendous rural-urban migration, with resulting disruption and dislocation for individuals, households, and local governments. Interestingly, the largest proportion of rural-urban migrants to Bangkok are 10-19 year olds (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995). Nang Rong district is located in the middle of one of the southern provinces in the northeast, bordering on the Cambodian border. The main highway between Bangkok and the eastern Thai border runs through the middle of the district. Rice paddies predominate the landscape and are irrigated by rain. Frequent droughts and poor soil quality are severe limitations to the agriculturally based economy. The region, was a frontier until the 1970's (Phongphit and Hewison 1990), however, by the 1980's most arable land had been claimed (Siamwalla et al. 1993. The northeast region is also known for its relative poverty. Because of this fact, past high fertility and limited land to expand into, the
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region has become an important source of migrants, especially young people. Fifty percent of the 10-19 year old migrants are from the Northeast (Chamratrithirong et al. 1995). These same two latter conditions also lead to smaller sized inheritable parcels of land as children come of age and marry, creating less opportunities, unless there are alternative sources of income. So, the context for household decisions is a relatively risky environment, but not without opportunity. Younger Household Member Roles in Northeastern Thailand Both gender and sibling order are important status markers defining roles within households among younger members. This discussion describes the baseline exchange relations as defined by gender and sibling order within households. Again, these relations are expected to change with changes to the risk environment. There are four points to make about gender roles in rural Northeastern Thai households. First, Thai households are matrilocal. That is, a husband moves to the wife's family's house for 2 days to 5 years (usually until the first child is a year old). In the ideal situation the husband provides an important source of farm labor. Sons and daughters inherit equally but sons usually sell out their rights to their sisters or brother's-in-law since they will be moving to their wife's household. Youngest daughters are particularly advantaged with regards to household resources because they often inherit the homestead and a larger portion of the land. This exchange is not without its price. These daughters and their husbands are expected to care for the daughter's parents in their old age. Throughout my field work transcripts, daughters are considered to be better caregivers than sons, and therefore the preferred child to stay at home. Second, although households are matrilocal, men still have considerable authority, if not more than women (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). My observations and text analysis of
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conversations during the field work show that men consider themselves the final decision makers but not without considerable consultation with their wives or other important women in the household. Third, sons are encouraged to develop outside, non-kin based networks and daughters are socialized to cultivate their kinship ties. For men, this cultural emphasis has lead to an interesting phenomena of patron-client relations that cross-cut kinship ties (Limpinuntana et al. 1982; Hanks 1972). The non-kin based network for men provides access to political patronage, jobs, and resources. Increasingly, this has also meant that parents have invested in sons education in order to improve their access to these non-kin networks and to get jobs. These jobs and networks may also create opportunities for parents' households (indirectly through increased social status or directly through better access to credit). Women on the other hand are tied at birth to their parents and particularly, their mother's kin network (Keyes 1987). Women are socialized to help with housework, child care, planting and weeding rice from age 9 and on (Yoddumnern-Attig et al 1992). The important role of women in rice-based economies is widely acknowledged (see Dey 1984 for an example). Their intimate knowledge about their household's rice fields, makes them valuable resources for successful production. Hence, losing daughters to someone else's household and fields would severely disrupt successful household reproduction. Interestingly, in a recent study of old-age, parents will characterize sons as "good" when they fulfill a daughter's role (Pramualrathana 1991). Finally, Buddhism proscribes filial obligation for sons when they are ordained as monks (for 1 week to 3 months at about age 25) and they should give the merit earned in the process to their parents. Daughters, on the other hand, only gain merit by having a son themselves, or by caring for younger brothers who share their merit with their caregiving
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sisters (Keyes 1984). To be a good Buddhist also means to value education. Education means merit gains for young men which are in turn transferred to parents at the time of ordination. Again, this is not true for women. For a Buddhist, merit in this lifetime insures better prospects in the next life. The preceding points suggest several different social contracts between parents and their children. Sons are less tied to their family's kinship network although they are likely to gain through short term investment by the household in their education, in order for parents to gain merit. Daughters are more dependent on kinship ties and have more to lose by disregarding or not cultivating these ties, economically and socially. Also, rural, agricultural, rice-growing, households have more of an interest in controlling women's lives for successful reproduction and survival of the household. When education means movement out of farming this threatens household survival, especially when the education decision is about a daughter. The importance of these social contracts for daughters and parents is most apparent in their remittance behavior. Throughout the field work and in the following analysis daughters were described as being better remitters than sons. A typical discussion follows from a focus group interview with women: One woman explains: "I think girls [send more money] because boys use money for cigarettes, whiskey, 'tiow' [having fun and partying]. Boys use a lot of money. If there is any money left over, they go out again. Girls have chances to 'tiow', but fewer than boys. They must be more responsible than boys." I ask: "Why must they be more responsible?" She responds: "If they are children, like daughters and sons, daughters think more about their future at home because they must wait for money from us."
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This quote highlights several important points raised in the preceding paragraph. First, to 'tiow' means to go away for a visit, but colloquially means going out at anytime to have fun with friends or relatives. This is how young men establish their affective non-kin networks. The skills and friendships developed allow a son to learn to initiate, develop and expand his circle of friends outside of the community. The paragraph also clearly demonstrates the exchange relationship between daughters and parents. The significant difference in gender with regards to remittance behavior is also found in other studies (Arnold and Piampiti 1984; Chamratrithirong et al. 1995). Not only do daughters remit, but they are more likely to return home. Throughout the transcripts daughters rather than sons mentioned wanting to return home, or having to return home. There are several dimensions about education decisions that hinge on gender and exchange relations. As already mentioned, Buddhism promotes education for men. But there are also practical reasons to expect gender differences to emerge with education choices. First, the structure of labor market opportunities means that women are more likely to be employed in low wage, unskilled jobs than men, therefore it may be more beneficial for men to get an education. Respondents during my field work knew this to be true: One 19 year old young woman said in an in-depth interview: "If girls and boys finish 4th or 6th grade, usually girls will find work more easily because they can sew and usually industrial factories have sewing. A boy who finishes at this level will have trouble finding work." Another 24 year old young woman in another in-depth interview: "Most industrial factories want women. They only want men who have a high education, like artisans or
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professionals. They can then find work. Even if they finish 9th grade men have a hard time finding work." More relevant to exchange relations are other explanations for gender differentials with regards to education. These were the concerns expressed by parents about what happens when children gain more education. General concerns were expressed about both young men and women (and by adult men and women) about how children with more education become less obedient and more independent. When respondents were pushed to provide specifics the majority of examples involved daughters. One young woman explained her own situation: "My parents are conservative. They would not send their children. Back then even for 6th grade they would not send us. They said only go to 4th grade. We had already made my school uniform and they said there would not be anyone to work the fields. They said 'you study and then are naughty, you may have a husband too soon. Why should you study?' So, I did not go." In the above example, the concerns are about daughters having boyfriends and getting into trouble (e.g. pregnant and married). In general, the concerns for young men are about having friends that are bad influences (leading the sons to drink and carouse). In both cases the concerns are about decreasing loyalty to the family of origin or decreasing commitment to household goals. However, in the Thai context it is expected that parents are less concerned about sons than daughters. As mentioned previously, such behavior by sons is tolerated because sons are encouraged and expected to 'tiow' and develop a friendship network independent of their kinship network. In addition, given that a daughter's husband usually moves into the household, parents have a lot more at stake when their daughter's marriage and related behavior are at stake. Thus, more schooling appears to be perceived as increasing the
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risks of losing control over a daughter's marriage prospects and the future of the household economy. I do not want to overemphasize the importance of gender differences. Although apparent, there is also another theme running through the transcripts about who receives more schooling. During some interviews I varied gender and sibling order when discussing hypothetical situations to push the consistency of responses. In these situations respondent reactions were the same: they would conclude that the child chosen for more education would be the one with the ability to continue schooling regardless of their gender. For example in a focus group interview among men age 40-55 years old, One man said: "In order to decide which one to send to school, we would discuss it with the teachers at the school and ask for suggestions. Would it be a good idea? Can they do it? If the teachers guarantee it, we might decide to send them. Some homes have money but their children are stupid. If the teacher said that he/she5 was stupid and a poor student, we would not send our son/daughter to school, but have him/her work instead." The notion of ability may vary across gender. In fact, there was general consensus among both young people and parents that girls are more "diligent" students than boys. These three themes about gender and ability -- risks associated with daughters, ability, and diligence--are also found in a study by Knodel (1994). Despite being more diligent, girls may have a higher standard to meet than boys with regards to getting the opportunity to receive more education. This is related to the themes about risks associated with educating daughters. Parents may want to be more sure of a daughter's ability and determination than they might for a son. Plus,
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Note that the him/her designations throughout the text reference the fact that in Thai the third person singular is not gendered. Often the gender is implied by knowing who the respondent is talking about. In this case the discussion was in general and did not refer to anyone or gender in particular.
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young women are better and more reliable contributors to the household economy through caregiving or seasonal migration and/or remitting. Forgoing those benefits and investing in a young woman’s education maybe too great an opportunity cost, especially if education means losing control over a daughter’s life course decisions. Gender relations are also dependent upon sibling order. Traditional Thai models of young people's roles in the household would suggest that youngest siblings are less likely to migrate than oldest and middle siblings (Yoddumnern-Attig 1992). There are several consistent explanations found in the analysis of the qualitative texts. In the abstract, when presented with hypothetical scenarios, parents consistently preferred daughters and youngest children to be the ones to take care of them. I asked in a focus group interview among women 40-55 years old: "Which child stays and takes care of the parents?" One woman replied: "The youngest child." Another followed: "I have to decide if we can rely on them but mostly the youngest one." However, when asked about their own particular situation they consistently mentioned that the one to take care of them would be the one who showed the most interest in the farm and being with them. So in reality there is some flexibility about who stays. Other tradeoffs based on sibling order are apparent with regards to the advantages and disadvantages of being the eldest or the middle child. Being oldest means being the first to take on farm and household chores. This may require less attention to school work and therefore reduce the opportunity for continuation. As these parents explain in a typical discussion:
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One mother explained: "The eldest is always at a disadvantage. The youngest always wins." Her husband explained: "The oldest one has to work, and help the younger sibling first. If the youngest child wants to study and therefore we let him or her study. The elder one will say 'never mind, if the younger one wants to study, let him study'." In another set of discussions, this time among younger adults the roles and duties according to sibling order are described in relation to migration choices. A young woman explains about migration decision making during a focus group interview: "It depends on the child. If they want to go the parents would let them, if they do not worry about the child they will let them go, but if they worry then they do not get to go." My research assistant asks: "Is it usually the oldest one or the youngest one?" She replies: "If the elder one wants to go, they go. But it is mostly the middle one that asks to go." My research assistant asks: "What does the eldest do?" She replies: "Housework. Make the food. And get the jobs in the village." And in another focus group, this time among young men: My research assistant asks: "So which child do parents want to depend on?" A young man replies: "The youngest one because the elder ones are already grown up and will soon have their own family or might want to start their own family. But the younger ones just have to stay and take care of their family. This is the same for both men and women."
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My research assistant asks: "What about the "Wednesday" [middle] child?" Another young man replies: "You cannot depend too much on the Wednesday child because they like to have fun and they like to go out. When they go to work they rarely come back." From the preceding quote it appears that there are certain expectations of oldest and youngest siblings, especially with regards to their obligations towards their parents and immediate family. Middle siblings on the other hand are much more free to leave and find opportunities elsewhere. Middle siblings also may have less to gain by maintaining ties to their household of origin. They appear to be less likely to gain access to parental land and resources through inheritance and more likely to move out. With regards to sibling order and education there was more ambiguity in the qualitative texts than with gender and education. There were a variety of themes that emerged from the interviews. In the abstract most people responded by suggesting that older siblings forgo education for their younger siblings. First, education is considered to be costly and a limited resource as compared with the opportunity to migrate which carries only the price of lost labor (usually only temporarily). When given hypothetical situations where the gender of the sibling set was the same then the youngest was expected to get more education. I asked: "If you have two daughters, who will you send to school?" The husband replied: "It is up to their preferences on who wants to go to school." His wife said: "If the eldest one wants to we will let her study. However, both cannot study because we do not have the money to send both to school."
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I followed with another question: "If both of them are smart, how will you decide which one will study?" The husband replied: "I will let them both study. I cannot let only one child study." The wife added: "It is up to the oldest child, whether or not she wants to go or stay." The husband continued: "We will let the younger one study. For the older one we will stop [supporting] her. She can help us work." Such quotes suggest that parents want to ensure that at least one child should farm and help the household. An older child is naturally stronger and more capable sooner than younger siblings and takes up the burdens of household chores and farming first. Thus, it might be expected that younger children are more likely to have an opportunity to study. But the quotes also suggest that whichever opportunity the first child takes affects the opportunities for other children. That is the following siblings opportunities are conditional upon the preceding or first child's choice. Of course there were cases, during the field work, where all of the siblings were able to study or where an oldest sibling had the opportunity to study and other siblings did not. Sometimes this depended on child spacing and timing of other siblings' life course events. For example, in an interview with a 20 year old, returned migrant, I asked: "How many brothers or sisters do you have?" The migrant replied: "Six, I am third." I asked: "Did any of your brothers or sisters study in high school?" He replied: "My older brother finished grade 12 while my older sister finished grade 6." I asked: "Why did your brother have a chance to finish grade 12?"
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He said: "Because my sister helped out at home and so my brother could go to school. But since my sister got married and moved away, I now have to do all the work in place of my sister." The preceding quote also highlights the plight of middle siblings (and the omitted category for this analysis). Much of the discussions about sibling order in the transcripts centers around oldest and youngest siblings. Middle siblings are often left out of the picture. "Wednesday's child" (remember earlier quote) has fewer education choices and may be more likely to pick up and leave or have to fill in for older siblings and farm. As the preceding quote suggests, there is a sequencing of decisions that affect middle siblings the most. Their outcomes depend on what their older siblings decide or get to do. Thus, they are likely to not have to work on the farm and be able to finish primary schooling, but they are also less likely to have the opportunity to continue to secondary school. In separate analyses of migration outcomes (Curran 1994) this meant that middle siblings are more free to leave and permanently move out. Here, it means that they have less pressure to quit school early, but have fewer opportunities to continue schooling relative to their younger siblings. They also may be doubly disadvantaged, as the previous quote suggests, that is, an older sibling may get the opportunity for schooling which increases demands upon middle siblings to fill in with labor and contributions to the household economy, foregoing schooling opportunities. The ambiguity with regards to education and sibling order forced a re-examination of the transcripts to get beyond the ambiguity of results for sibling order. When looking at responses to hypthetical situations of male only sibling sets, responses were evenly split between oldest, youngest, or child with most ability. When looking at responses to hypothetical female only sibling sets, parents and young people were more likely to choose the
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youngest or the one with the ability. And, finally, when looking at hypothetical situations of mixed gender examples, the boy would always get access to more education. This suggests a preferences within the household for oldest boys, and then youngest siblings of either sex with regards to education opportunities. In response to these results, the two variables are combined as one in the quantitative analysis in order to better specify the baseline set of status relationships within the household. The combination of gender and sibling order as described by the field work reinforces the idea of an underlying set of exchange relations that are nicely explained by these two dimensions. The next question is to ask how these relations may be diminished or modified by differences in the risk environment which also reflect changes in the larger social context. The baseline model for the quantitative analysis incorporates gender and sibling order as one set of dummy variables omitting the category of middle daughter. This model also controls for age, educational attainment, and sibship size as of 1984. The model also includes measures of the risk environment associated with farming and labor needs. Further models test for the interactions between the risk measures and gendered sibling order, in other words whether or not the risk environment modifies exchange relations. Before discussing the baseline (or first model), an explanation of the set of conditions that are expected to reduce or aggravate gendered sibling order exchange relations within the household is presented below. The Risk Environment In the quantitative analysis two sets of variables are chosen that characterize risks to the farming and labor needs of the rural household. One set is expected to diminish the differences between gender and sibling roles within the household and farm economy. The other set is expected to aggravate or enhance these relations. The variables represent the
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degree of risks associated with the household's labor and farming needs. These variables are chosen based on the preceding discussions and are a test of Dasgupta's (1993) hypothesis about the relationship between risk and exchange relations. Each set is included with the baseline model in order to test their direct effects upon education and migration choices. The models following the baseline include interactions with gendered sibling order and each set of risk factors. In the case of higher risks to farming and labor needs, the gendered sibling order differences in education and migration are expected to be magnified. Whereas for the measures with lower risk when interactions are included then the gendered sibling order effects are expected to diminish. The risk variables are selected based on their negative or positive effect upon the labor needs of rural agrarian households and the possibility of permanently losing control over particular and important household labor. In addition, these variables include village level measures of the risk environment regarding the size of the local labor market, migration experience, and lengthy droughts. For the village variables, the first measure is expected to reduce the demand for household labor, the second to decrease the risks associated with migration and the third is expected to increase the risks associated with farming. For the set of conditions that are expected to reduce the importance of gender and sibling roles with regards to education and migration (the lower risk environment), there are three types of variables. The first type describes the characteristics of the other siblings in the household. These include the gender and educational attainment composition of the other siblings. If some of the other siblings have already received secondary schooling then it is expected to increase the chances of schooling for others in the household and decrease the importance of traditional roles. In addition, if all the other siblings in the household are
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women, this is expected to decrease the importance of traditional role obligations of the respondent. Household demands for labor and long term caregiving are likely to be met, reducing the demands upon the respondent to fill these roles, regardless of gender and sibling order. A third household composition variable measures the socio-economic status of the household through combining questions about education and occupation. Households where one adult member (older than 17 years in 1984) has more than primary schooling and/or whose primary occupation is outside of farming (a wage labor job not including agricultural wage labor). These households are less dependent upon labor for the household economy and more likely to be interested in either migration or education opportunities for the young people regardless of gender or sibling order. A second type of risk lowering measures are the land resources of the household in combination with the local labor supply available in the village. The first measure compares near landless and landless households with all other households. Near landless is defined as those households with 10 or fewer rai of land (1 rai = .25 acres). The labor supply measure is the distribution of land across households within the village. A greater degree of inequality represents a larger pool of available labor. The important role diminishing effect is in the interaction between the household and the village variable. Landed households in villages with greater inequality are expected to have fewer household demands for labor since there is an available local labor supply outside of the household within the village. Education investments and migration, in so far as they represent opportunity costs of lost labor, may be less of a concern for such households. A final type of risk lowering variable is also a village level measure. This is the seasonal outmigration rate in the village among 13 to 30 year olds in 1984. A higher level of
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outmigration is expected to decrease the risks associated with migration by increasing the knowledge about the process. In addition, since much of the seasonal migration from villages is done only with other villagers, the household ties and networks to the migrant through the village migration stream are expected to be denser and stronger, again reducing risks for both the household and the individual (Curran 1994). The higher risk variables fall into two categories: sibling composition and village measures. The dependency ratio in the household is expected to increase demands upon a young person's labor and diminish available resources for education. The dependency ratio is the count of the very young (less than 5 years) divided by a count of the adults (older than 17 years) in the household. A second sibling composition measure is whether there are no other siblings or the sibling set is a mixed gender set. When there are no other siblings, parents are expected to want to keep their child on the farm and not invest in their education. For a mixed gender set, gender roles will be more clearly defined given the availability of different genders to fill those roles. This is expected to reinforce traditional exchange relations both for boys and girls. The final composition measure is whether or not any of the other siblings are seasonal migrants in 1984. This is expected to increase demands upon household labor and gender and sibling order roles are expected to be more clearly defined and differences greater across migration and education outcomes in 1988. A final set of village variables the agricultural risk environment. In this case, a measure of prolonged drought in 1984, 1988, or 1984 and 1988. Droughts are expected to increase the household risk level and reduce household flexibility regarding gender and sibling status roles and relationships. Thus, droughts are expected to reinforce traditional
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household relations. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the models for the entire sample and across the dependent variable outcomes. (Table 1 about here) As you can see in Table 1 it is apparent that among those young people who were current household members in 1984 most remain in their household without an education in 1988 (N=2817). Looking down each column of outcomes it is clear that the highest proportion of those with secondary education are oldest sons. Middle siblings represent the highest proportion of seasonal migrants (looking at both the remit and not remitting columns together), where middle daughters are the most likely to remit and middle sons the most likely to not remit. The strength of these bivariate relationships are tested below in a multivariate model. Model Estimation The model is estimated using a multinomial logistic regression technique because the dependent variable is unordered with four categories: remain in the household without secondary education, seasonally migrate and remit, seasonally migrate and not remit, obtain a secondary education. The first model of gender and sibling status effects and direct effects of risk (plus controls) is described by the following equation: equation 1: log (p (Mihj=k)/p (Mihj=1))=Xibk+ Hhlk+ Cjak + HhCjdk + mj The dependent variable is the log-odds that an individual i in 1984 in village j decides to migrate or study (decision =k) (remitting, or not remitting, or getting more than secondary education) relative to remaining in the household (decision=1). The first term (Xibk) represents the individual characteristics and their effects upon the outcomes. The second term (Hhlk) represents the vector of household characteristics and Cjak the vector of community
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characteristics. The second to last term in equation 2 represents the interaction of household and community characteristics (in this case, the land ownership variable interacted with the measure of inequality of land ownership at the village level).The last term in the equation represents the unobserved community characteristics which affect a young person's outcomes. The second equation models the individual characteristics and the observed village and household characteristics including interactions with the measure of gendered sibling order: equation 2:
log (p (Mihj=k)/p (Mihj=1))=Xibk+ Hhlk+ Cjak + HhCjdk + XiHh ηk+ Xi Cjνk+ XiHhCj ρk+ mj
The estimation technique adjusts the standard errors of the coefficients for the effect of correlated errors within villages. This is because the data are not a simple random sample of individuals but rather some individuals within specific villages (clusters) and the survey design will result in correlated observation error for individuals within the same village. This design effect will lead to standard errors of the estimated parameters smaller than they should be and result in overestimation of parameter significance (Guilkey 1992). The multinomial logistic regression results presented here adjust for this bias through a correction of the covariance matrix used to calculate the standard errors and t-statistics in standard computer packages (Guilkey 1992). Significance is measured as a two-tailed test and I use a relatively low threshold of significance (p
