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Freie Universität Berlin Master Programme: International Relations Online, 10th run Module: Lost in Transformation Final Assignment
Intricate transformation of foreign policies: The cases of Poland, Ukraine and Egypt Instructor: Andrey Makarychev Student: Peter Bleckmann Berlin, Oct 29th, 2016
Mass-scale pro-democratic movements and foreign policies: The cases of Poland, Ukraine and Egypt This essay examines changes of foreign policies in Poland, Ukraine and Egypt. Like other countries in East-Central Europe, the post-Soviet space and the Arab region, the three countries experienced mass-scale pro-democratic uprisings between 1980 and 2014, resulting in – partly multiple – regime changes. In their respective regions, Poland, Ukraine and Egypt are the largest countries. While the outbreak of the protests was usually triggered by domestic conflicts, external relations played an important role, as well. In some cases the protesters fought for fundamental changes of the foreign policy orientation. In some cases regime change was facilitated by external powers, particularly when superpowers dropped support for formerly allied autocratic regimes. The purpose of this essay is to describe and analyse the role of external affairs and the changes of foreign policies in these three countries. First, I will look at the three cases separately and describe the dominant paradigms of foreign policies before, during and after the uprisings. On this basis, I will try to extract some factors on geopolitical and domestic levels that can help to better understand the intricate transformations of the foreign policies in the three countries.
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Poland Cold War During the Cold War, Poland’s foreign policy was determined by the bipolar geopolitical coordinates of that time. Poland stuck by a forced alliance with the Soviet Union and the socialist ‘camp’, while relationships with the West were marked by enmity. In contrast with stricter regimes like Czechoslovakia, Poland maintained significant trade relationships with Western countries so as to ease its multiple supply problems. The official pro-Soviet policy stood in contrast with predominantly adversarial feelings among the Polish population. This was the case in many socialist countries, yet in Poland it had a specific historical connotation because of the divisions of Poland in the 18th century and the ‘Hitler-StalinPact’ of 1939. Resulting from these experiences, there were not only anti-German emotions amongst the population– which could be exploited by the official narrative –, but also anti-Russian / antiSoviet sentiments. Massive strikes – 1980-1990 In 1980, the independent trade union Solidarnosc was established in Gdansk. Starting from there, massive strikes spread over the country. The protests were an expression of wide dissatisfaction because of the denial of basic rights and the frustrating socio-economic situation. The opposition also encompassed a nationalist current aiming at independence from the Soviet Union. This current was intensified by a religious dimension: while the socialist regime aimed to restrict the role of religion, Solidarnosc accentuated Catholicism as a central part of its identity. The election of the first Polish Pope in history obviously strengthened this dimension further. When the government declared martial law in 1982, the opposition movement was temporarily curtailed. But in the late 1980s, the new Soviet doctrine changed the coordinates by 180 degrees. Gorbachev’s renunciation of violence against the opposition in Warsaw Pact states and outright support of democratic processes paved the way for Poland’s Round-Table talks in spring 1989 during which multi-party elections and other key features of the democratic transformation that was to follow were determined. Western integration (1990 til present) After 1990, Polish external policies had one clear direction: As far away from the Soviet Union and Russia, respectively, and as closely tied with the ‘West’ as possible. This direction was supported by the vast majority of the Polish population although some worries about Germany’s role remained, triggered by scattered revisionist voices in Germany reclaiming territories which Germany had had to cede to Poland after WWII. These concerns were quietened by the German-Polish neighbourhood treaty in which territorial claims were ruled out. Poland is an exemplary case of Western integration. It joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. Within these structures, Poland’s foreign policy is determined by four pillars: first, Poland supports the transatlantic union with the USA in a stricter loyalty than some other EU countries. Second, Poland is a strong advocate of articulating a proactive EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours and positions itself as an internal advocate of countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. To strengthen this pillar, Poland initiated the Eastern Partnership Programme, together with Sweden. Third, Poland assesses Russia’s external policies a potential security threat and therefore supports an uncompromising policy of strong hand. It also calls its allies for investing in their military capacities.
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The fourth pillar has emerged after the victory of the Law and Justice Party in national elections in 2015: repelling Germany’s dominance and building counter-alliances. This pillar has become more and more visible, yet it remains to be seen how sustainable it will be. While in the 1990s, there was the vision of a threefold European centrepiece, composed of Germany, Poland and France instead of the traditional Franco-German dualism, this has not come true. Rather, Germany has evolved as single informal leader of the EU, and Poland does not act on equal footing, partly because Poland could not distinguish itself as leading nation among the diverse East-central European countries. However, Poland gained profile on the international arena because of its initiatives on European and global level.
Ukraine After independence: East or West? (1991-2004) After independence, Ukraine found itself in an unforeseen situation of having a choice between two alternative foreign strategies: East or West. Much spoke for a strategic alliance with Russia because of similar historical and cultural legacies; both ‘shared a collective history of hardship’1 as well as the memory of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Furthermore, many Ukrainians were Russian speakers. Nevertheless, Ukraine chose Westernisation as its predominant external policy orientation because this seemed a more promising path towards better living conditions: ‘the West’s victory in the Cold War was comprehensive: it was moral, economic, social, political and technological’2. But this choice was accompanied by fears about Russia’s reactions and a feeling of vulnerability, which was further intensified by Ukraine’s renunciation of the nuclear weapons from its territory. Also, as it became obvious soon, the West was not prepared to allow Ukraine entrance to its institutions soon. As a consequence, the exclusive orientation towards the West was replaced by a so-called ‘multivector’ policy during Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2004). Officially, the USA, the EU and Russia were equal points of reference. In reality, strengthening ties with Russia became the dominant feature of Ukraine’s foreign policy, while association talks with the EU were continued with reduced priority. Ukraine and Russia settled controversial issues such as the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the use of Sevastopol’s ports. In 1997, both parties mutually recognised the inviolability of the existing borders. Kuchma could rely on Russia’s support, even when he faced a sharp decline in popularity in 2000 because of a leaked tape recording in which he apparently ordered the assassination of a critical journalist. Protests for Europeanisation: Orange (2004/05) and Euromaidan (2013/14) revolutions The presidential election of 2004 was represented a choice between Ukraine’s two foreign policy routes: one candidate, Yushchenko (‘Our Ukraine’), favoured the orientation towards EU and NATO, while the other, Yanukovych (‘Party of the Regions’), stood for deepening the alliance with Russia along Kuchma’s lines. Yanukovych was declared victor, but the overwhelming observations of systematic election fraud triggered the ‘Orange revolution’ mass-scale protests. After several weeks
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Wolzuk 2003 p. 159 ibid.
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of protests, the election was repeated, following a Supreme Court rule. Yushchenko won 52 % to 44 %. In an immediate reaction, the European Parliament declared its willingness to support Ukraine in crucial issues such as visa facilitation, acceptance as market economy, access to WTO, and recalled that ‘EU membership is an option for all European countries that satisfy the relevant conditions and obligations’3. After assuming office, Yushchenko declared his ‘rejection of “multi-vector” foreign policy and called for the implementation of a single strategic goal—membership in the EU.’4 The following years brought only limited success in this respect. Positive achievements like the access to WTO, launch of negotiations on visa regime and association agreement were overshadowed by Ukraine’s frustration about fading EU membership perspectives. The EU, in turn, viewed Ukraine’s internal political turmoil and slow progress in implementing its reform agenda with increasing scepticism. So, initial enthusiasm on both sides dropped – as did Yushchenko’s popularity who was entangled in internal party conflicts. In 2010, Yanukovych was elected president, to the surprise of some Western observers. In 2013, he refused to sign the negotiated association agreement with the EU, apparently reacting to Russian huff. This decision triggered a new wave of mass-scale protests, the ‘Euromaidan’ – a clear indication that Ukraine’s Westernisation was still a heartfelt wish of many Ukrainians. Yanukovych was voted out in a turbulent parliamentary act and left the country immediately. His pro-Western successor assumed office in February 2014. Russia observed the change of government with discontent. Shortly afterwards, it annexed Crimea, and separatists launched civil war in Eastern Ukraine, allegedly supported by Russia. Recent developments (2014-present) After the change of government, relationships between EU and Ukraine were continued in a pragmatic fashion. In June 2014, the association agreement including the DCFTA was signed. Ukraine met the requirements of the visa liberalisation action plan in 2015, but so far, the EU did not decide in favour of visa liberalisation. Relationships with Russia are tense. The Minsk agreement between Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany aimed to end the civil war, but its implementation stagnates and the conflict goes on. This situation represents a continuous security threat and hinders Ukraine’s development on many levels.
Egypt Mubarak era: Alliance with USA (1981-2011) During the autocratic regime of Husni Mubarak, Egypt was a key strategic ally of the USA. Amidst widespread hostility against Israel in the Arab world, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in Camp David in 1979. Since then – and during the entire Mubarak era – Egypt held peaceful relationships with Israel, thus sustaining the alliance with the US which granted financial and military assistance.
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European Parliament 2005 Gretsky 2013 p. 8
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Mubarak skilfully utilized this special relationship for raising ‘rents’ – i.e. international funds that came without any political and economic reform obligations attached to them, and which could be ‘distributed by power-political criteria’5 by the regime and turned out to be a key stabilising instrument. From a Western point of view, Egypt’s geostrategic role and its strategy of containing Islamic movements outbalanced human rights violations and the autocratic character of the regime. Pro-democratic uprisings (2011) When the protests broke out, the mostly young protagonists demanded pluralism, freedom of expression, free and fair democratic elections, and the stepping down of the incumbent regime. The desperate situation of Egypt’s economy was another key issue. The external policy orientation did not play a central role; the protesters’ demands were liberal and democratic, but as the liberal democracies supported Egypt’s detested regime, they were not associated with change. During the uprisings, Western leaders gradually distanced from Mubarak. Obama urged him to support democratic transformation and to ‘follow the call of the people’. Moreover, he declared that US military assistance was at stake if the Egyptian government chose to use force against the protesters. These moves obviously contributed to the military’s reluctance to massively intervene in support of Mubarak. Anyway, the military was critical of some of Mubarak’s recent policies which it viewed disadvantageous for its own economic interests. When Mubarak resigned in February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power. National elections were held in June 2012, following external pressures to accelerate the path towards democratisation. Two regime changes (2012-present) Egypt has experienced two changes of government after the democratic uprisings, from an autocratic regime towards an Islamic variant of democracy and from there back to an autocracy, which, according to some, acts in a more merciless fashion than Mubarak’s ancient regime. The new governments formulated new external policies, as well, although, interestingly, both acknowledged the Camp David Accords and diversified external relations. In 2012, Mohamed Morsi, candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, won the presidential elections. This outcome triggered fear in Western states that Egypt might turn out an enemy of Israel and the West. But Morsi chose a pragmatic course: he acknowledged international treaties, including the Camp David Accords. He ‘maintained good relations with the Gulf states and also reconciled with Iran, but at the same time he greeted Israel, the US and the EU as Egypt’s friends, as well.’6 In 2012, Morsi played a ‘pivotal role’7 in cease fire negotiations between Israel and the Hamas. In Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood built a coalition with radical Islamic parties, thus excluding liberal groups from power. This move annoyed the very motors of the democratic change who were also against the establishment of an Islamic state. For the same reason, the government could not count on the West’s wholehearted support. To make things worse, a conflict of power between government and military emerged. In 2013, a new wave of mass-scale protests broke out. The
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Roll 2016, p. 11, translation by the author Gugan 2013 p 320 7 CNN 2012 6
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military used the opportunity to execute a coup d’état and established a military regime, led by the chief of the armed forces, Abdel el-Sisi. Since then, the main rationale behind the regime’s foreign policy is maintaining power8. Egypt continues its collaboration with Israel in order to sustain Western support. The strategy bore fruit already: the US decided to continue military assistance which was frozen in after the coup. But the regime wants to avoid an exclusive alliance with the US states because of the Western states explicit support of the pro-democratic movement and criticism of human rights violations. Consequently, it seeks to diversify its external relationships. In line with this strategy, Sisi’s first journey abroad was to Moscow. In the Syria conflict, Egypt supports Russia’s position. The regime also strengthened links with Saudi-Arabia, UAE and Kuwait. The three countries support Egypt financially to an amount of at least 25 billion dollar since the coup, thus saving the country from an imminent sovereign debt crisis. Nonetheless, Egypt had to approach the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance in summer 2016. This might be an indicator that the Gulf States are not prepared to sustain the country indefinitely.
Cross-cutting issues A comprehensive analysis of all reasons for these diverse processes and outcomes would go beyond the scope of this essay. However, I would like to mention a few cross-cutting issues which come to light when looking at the three cases in a synopsis. Obviously, in the three countries differed both on geopolitical and domestic levels and factors for more or less linear transitions seem to have interacted in all three cases. Let us therefore examine the diverse conditions at these two levels. Geopolitical level The acting of global and regional powers such as USA, Soviet Union/Russia respectively, EU, and the Gulf states has had a tremendous effect on the stability or instability of the regimes of the three countries at stake. The collapse of the Polish regime occurred when the Soviet Union withdrew its unquestioned support for the regime and ruled out the use of force against the opposition. In Egypt, the fall of Mubarak’s regime gained momentum when the USA withdrew its support. Looking at the developments in Egypt after the first regime change, the least one can say is that there is a correlation between the lacking support of the Morsi regime by an external power and its instability. Ukraine benefitted from the new Soviet policies insofar that these allowed for Ukraine’s independence; but Russia could and cannot go as far as accepting Ukraine’s integration in Western structures. Also, the US’ and EU’s positioning towards Ukraine is more ambivalent compared to their approach towards Poland, partly because of security concerns and wish to avoid provoking Russia, partly because of the internal challenges (financial crises, Brexit, and conflicting approaches regarding the advent of refugees); and partly because of the impression of cultural and political
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Roll 2016
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distance, in spite of the pro-European demonstrations on the streets. In any sense, these geopolitical constraints can help to explain why Poland and Ukraine developed differently. Consequently, Egypt’s military regime has a point in trying to avoid unilateral dependence from one external power because this has proved a fatal strategy for previous authoritarian regimes, both in Egypt and in other countries. Domestic conditions At the domestic level, the most striking difference is between the relative societal homogeneity in Poland during the transformation period9 and the comparatively more fragmented societies in Egypt and Ukraine. This applies to predominant mind-sets in society and division of power. When the socialist government in Poland factually resigned, there were no relevant societal group and powerful institution left to oppose Westernisation. By contrast, the Ukrainian society was and is divided between radical Ukrainian nationalists, Soviet and Imperialist traditionalists, and pro-European liberals, not to mention differences of religion and language, – with different, partly opposing views on internal and external politics. Egypt is fragmented between radical and moderate Islamic groups and liberal, partly secular groups; plus, there was a conflict of power between the military and the civil authorities. The societal fragmentation became salient because the pro-democratic uprisings represented only a limited fraction of society, but neither the ‘silent majority’ nor opponents of democratic change. Then again, the elected government excluded the main protesters of Tahir square. These conditions, taken together, made things more difficult in Egypt. Wrapping up Summing up, one can say that domestic and geopolitical conditions interacted in all three cases and either reinforced each other or jointly created obstacles to a straight-lined transformation. In Poland, domestic and geopolitical conditions reinforced each other and jointly facilitated the transformation towards Western integration and internal democratisation. In spite of a number of similarities between the neighbouring countries, the situation in Ukraine differs in some critical points so that the domestic pro-European drive is slowed down by less supportive conditions in Russia and the EU and, compared to Poland, a more fragmented society. In Egypt, existing chances of a linear democratic transformation were missed due to interlinked internal and external developments: the formation of the government increased internal turmoil and kept Western states at a distance – thus creating a situation which the military exploited to execute a coup. Had the Muslim Brotherhood government stabilised, Egypt might have become an exemplary case of a democratic order in a predominantly Muslim society, led by a moderate Islamic party. In external relations, Morsi’s mediation between Israel and Hamas is just a glimpse of the constructive and respected role which Egypt potentially could have adopted on regional level. But things turned out differently. Today, Egypt is far away from obtaining a – presumably aspired - leading role in the
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Today, Poland’s society has definitely become more heterogeneous than it used to be in 1990, but this does not speak against the argument which focusses on the main transformation processes which occurred in the 1990s.
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Arab world, not only because of its miserable economic situation, but also because the military regime lacks soft power. In spite of the obvious differences between the three scrutinised cases, it is striking that the importance of the geopolitical climate and the acting of global and regional powers appear to have played such a decisive role in all three cases. However, rather than answering all questions, these observations call for further examination of the exact nature of domestic and geopolitical influences on transformation processes and their implications on foreign policy agendas.
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