Journal of Public Relations Research

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The Orientation of Organizations to their Environments: Functions of the Unconscious Mind C. M. J. van Woerkum a; M. N. C. Aarts a a Wageningen University, The Netherlands Online Publication Date: 01 April 2008 To cite this Article: van Woerkum, C. M. J. and Aarts, M. N. C. (2008) 'The Orientation of Organizations to their Environments: Functions of the Unconscious Mind', Journal of Public Relations Research, 20:2, 180 — 206 To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/10627260801894314 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10627260801894314

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Journal of Public Relations Research, 20:180–206, 2008 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1062-726X print/1532-754X online DOI: 10.1080/10627260801894314

The Orientation of Organizations to their Environments: Functions of the Unconscious Mind C.M.J. van Woerkum and M.N.C. Aarts Wageningen University, The Netherlands

This article focuses on the unconscious processes involved in dealing with the environment of organizations, a main concern of public relations. To do so, we analytically distinguish between 3 types of relationships: those based on rules, those based on profitability, and those based on values. We explain how the unconscious mind affects one’s perceptions, interactions, and decision making. Next, we present our central model, consisting of 4 modes: sending, giving off, interpretation, and resonance. Combining these modes leads to 4 types of communication that are elaborated in more detail. Finally, we ask how organizations can deal with their own unconscious reflexes and suggest a more in-depth reflection on current practices.

The public relations function mediates between organizations and their environment. The assumption is that this interaction can be improved by the input of public relations professionals. As in many other fields, this profession is culture- and time-bound. In the last decennia, there has been a movement away from the approach of delivering information to create favorable impressions (the smart message approach) to a more interactive approach, in which good listening (and watching) have become important tools of communication, and being influenced by others is as important as influencing others (L. A. Grunig, 1992b). Moreover, the level at which this function must be undertaken has expanded to include internal and external communication, and it is geared to the broader concept of how to position an organization in its environment, whereby public relations deliver not only the means (messages) but also the strategy: how to connect an organization to its stakeholders (Ledingham, 2003; Gronstedt, 1996). From this perspective, pubCorrespondence should be sent to C.M.J. van Woerkum, Professor, Wageningen University, Communication Management Group, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]


THE ORIENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONS TO THEIR ENVIRONMENTS

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lic relations practitioners are also (co)responsible for the support and evaluation of the external communication activities of other members of the organization. The interactive approach also means that communication is not only needed after an organization has made decisions, such as those related to products and services or to their social behavior, but also has a function during the process leading to decision-making. Exactly this stresses the strategic function of public relations, to keep an organization in tune with its environment. Interaction is the way to know what is going on out there to be able to adapt an organization in the right way and at the right time (Sutcliffe, 2001). This is the starting point for both our contribution and any informed public relations strategy. But knowing the environment to stay in tune is, perhaps, not as obvious as it appears at first glance. One cannot measure an environment in its breadth and depth, and therefore, although a lot of data may be assembled, much of what happens must remain unknown. Besides, where data exist, their meaning is, in many cases, not at all apparent. Perceptions of the environment are heavily influenced by the frames or perspectives from which they are viewed (Hallahan, 1999). Whether practioners like it or not, an environment is not simply there to be discovered, but, rather, it is a construction of organizational members (Weick, 1995), guided by their specific ways of looking at things, sometimes deliberately, but often unintentionally and unconsciously. It is precisely this fact that shows the necessity of interaction by which possible pitfalls in the construction of an environment can be discovered and dealt with. The task of public relations officials is to guide this interaction process aimed at a better orientation, not only for themselves but for the organization as a whole, including related disciplines, such as marketing, that can learn from this broad focus on the environment of organizations (Thorson & Moore, 1996). This approach, which is aimed at interaction as the basis of orientation processes of organizations, greatly differs from the PR tradition in which the planning of communication programs is the central concern (Cutlip et al., 1994; Oliver, 2001; Smith, 2002). Instead, we are more inclined to look at the process in which organizations engage in contacts with their stakeholders, the way certain images develop in relation to the environment, how organizations look at each other. We agree with L. E. Grunig, J. A. Grunig, and Dozier (2002), who viewed good reputations of organizations not as a stand-alone objective, but as the desirable outcome from these same relational processes. In a sense, public relations is not a management tool to create a communication product, just as one creates a new car for consumers or a new IT-system for internal communication, but it is a way of analyzing and improving relationships. Therefore, keen insight into the processes of relating is essential. An important presupposition here is that two-way communication or the stress on interactions to develop good relationships and an improved orientation are, as such, no guarantee at all that this outcome will be achieved. First of all, one has to accept that (good) dialogue can only be achieved by dialogue


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(L’Etang, 1996). In other words, it has to be developed over time. Second, one must be heedful of Cheney and Christensen’s (2001) warning: “Communication scholars who study organizations and their interactions with the environment … should be aware of the possible limitations to the ideals of dialogue and responsiveness advocated so strongly today within public relations …” (p. 257). In approaching their environment, organizations cannot easily escape from how they have constructed their own environment. Interaction may create many opportunities to correct certain frames or perspectives, but this is by no means an automatic mechanism of adaptation. The built-in tendency for self-referentiality of organizations can only be corrected by critical reflection on their own communicative behavior (the self-reflective approach; see Tench & Yeomans, 2006). Self-referentiality means the tendency to (a) see the world around according to certain perspectives and (b) having these perspectives without being aware of them. It is the inherently restricted and taken for granted way of looking outward that has to be dealt with. Here we enter a domain that has not received much attention: the role of the unconscious mind in the orientation process. Our assumption is that the unconscious mind has a significant impact on one’s orientation (we explain this later on) and that, by accepting this phenomenon, raises serious questions about how those in public relations deal in practice with the outside world. First, we present a simple model that reflects our view on how the environment of organizations can be structured. Then we explain our general approach to unconsciousness, including how it is related to perception, human interaction, and making choices. A distinction is made between the conscious and unconscious sending and receiving of organizations and actors outside. Next we analyze which factors influence the unconscious orientation toward the different actors. We illustrate our ideas with a case concerning the way livestock farmers in the Netherlands deal with their changing environment. We conclude with a discussion about strategies that may be useful to achieve more effective interactions, realizing that any orientation is, in the main, an unconscious affair. As we said in the beginning, the profession of public affairs is culture- and time-bound. Perhaps it makes sense to describe the specific Dutch context from which we take our case and a lot of examples. Dutch people have been heavily influenced by their history of fighting against a surplus of water (the most crowded part of the Netherlands is below sea level), which has lead to a strong tradition of deliberation and cooperation on common issues, known as the so- called polder model. Although this model has been somewhat contested in recent years (Delsen, 2002), a lot of problems are still solved by talking with others, by interactive planning, and by making use of different kinds of participatory approaches. Many PR officials are active precisely in organizing such processes. We now start with our first theme: the environment and its stakeholders.


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THE ENVIRONMENT: A MODEL What do we mean by the environment of an organization? Clearly, we are speaking here in abstract, rather than concrete, terms. The basic criterion is the interrelationships at stake: in as much as an agency is helping or hindering the functioning of an organization, it is part of that organization’s environment. This is a broad definition that includes not only stakeholders that bring in certain resources (money, knowledge) but also those who, for instance, can deliver useful information (Sutcliffe, 2001). It does not extend, however, to those groups that are affected by an organization but whose responses do not have any noticeable influence on the possible functioning of the organization, as is encompassed in the last part of Freeman’s definition (“any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by the achievement of a corporation’s purpose;” p. VI). It is also, in a sense, an amoral definition, because the self-interest of the organization is the leading criterion, and not a variety of ethical concerns (in the well-being of the community, “the ecological condition of our planet”). We view these considerations as (more and more) important, in as much as they affect an organization in its functioning, but not per se (see, for an extended treatment of this point, Friedman & Miles, 2006). Nor do we encompass a viewpoint in which “in a democratic society all those affected by the activities of corporations (all stakeholders) have some representation rights” (Deetz, 2001, p. 38). But again, these rights are increasingly being acknowledged and form a part of the institutional context of organizations. We adhere to the biotope metaphor of organizations by emphasizing that they are, in mixed ways, completely dependent on their environment to survive. Our definition would be: Stakeholders are groups of people “whose collective behavior can directly affect the organization’s control” (J. E. Grunig & Hunt, 1984, p. 297). So, we take a pragmatic perspective and include only what really counts and can be dealt with (see also Clarkson, 1994, or Greenley & Foxal, 1997, for a discussion). Other typologies are, in our view, either too restricted, because they do not include the government or media ; or too extensive and enumerative, naming all kinds of groups without distinguishing sufficiently between types of relationships (for instance Cook, Hunsaker, & Coffrey, 1997; Thorson & Moore, 1996; Vos & Schoemaker, 1999). Our model is closest to the power-based typology, based on Etzioni (1964), with the three categories of coercive power, utilitarian power, and power based on symbolic resources (see also Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). It is a condensed version of the Esman model, as cited by J. E. Grunig and Hunt (1984), which has as an extra agency (diffused linkages) and makes a distinction between input groups like employees and consumers (which they call output groups despite consumers paying money, which is a much needed input) and place stockholders under the category of enabling agencies (they are, in a sense, but for us the main thing is that they invest financially). We choose to adhere to the basic Etzioni dis-



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FIGURE 1

Types of relationships.

tinction. Pursuing this line, we arrive at three types or sets of relationships (see Figure 1). Enabling agencies set an organization’s conditions of operation, the right to develop and sell products and services in certain places (the local and national government). Input agencies offer certain inputs (money, knowledge, and energy, or material assets) in exchange for money and other incentives (shareholders, personnel, customers). Normative agencies relate to an organization in a normative sense; those who can affect the reputation of an organization by saying good or bad things (the media, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], political parties, unions). The relative impact of these relationships is an interesting point to consider. Of course, the customers are an extraordinarily important group and deserve a lot of attention, also from public relations officials (corporate image campaigns, issue management, etc.), but they do not merit all the attention of an organization, because other groups may have a decisive influence in certain situations, as



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well. This, then, is the main reason for the development of the concept of public relations and from which it derives its value, by its broad scope, encompassing a multitude of these relationships and the linkages between them. This last point should not be underrated: It is precisely these interactions that create much of the dynamics in the environment. The media, for instance, may disseminate harmful messages about the misbehavior of a firm with regard to environmental matters; this in turn may effect the decision of the local government to renew permission for a controversial production process. It may also affect the image customers have of a company, and this in turn may influence product image and eventually the willingness of customers to buy. (Within a group there is also a lot of interaction. It may be that new personnel cannot be attracted into an organization because of bad prospects, perhaps due to problems on the stock market caused by falling sales.) A distinction has to be made between the three types of relationships shown in our model, because of their difference in orientation, based on different types of interrelationships. Enabling agencies can punish a company by using legislation; input-delivering agencies can directly help or hinder the functioning and the profits of an organization, and normative agencies can affect its reputation. Hence, an organization has to deal with quite different groups and often contrasting perspectives. The perspective of enabling agencies is based on rules. An organization is supposed to conform to what is agreed upon in state legislation. This appears a simple task: You only have to do what the government demands. In reality, the relationship is rather complex. Not all the rules are implemented straightforwardly; one has to look at the jurisdiction in a given area, especially at how the rules are applied in practice. Probably more important is the fact that one has to anticipate future legislation in long-term decision making, and can try to influence this process from a public relations orientation. The perspective of input-delivering agencies is based on cost-benefit thinking. It is about transactions in which the market (for products, shares or personnel) is engaged. What does one give; what does one get? This will mostly be regulated by money, although money is not the only incentive. Employees may be attracted by other benefits as well, such as an attractive place to live or good opportunities for a professional career. The perspective of normative agencies is grounded upon values. Is an organization doing well in an ethical or prosocial sense? Does it care for all the people that work for it; does it care for the environment? Does it have a positive reputation regarding the way it treats minorities? How does it cope with technological risks? In certain cases, such as the treatment of animals in meat production, this perspective has special features that make an organization vulnerable to issues in the realm of public opinion, brought to the fore by NGOs and media. This perspective requires that public relations officials have a broad insight into cultural normative trends.


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So, different types of dependencies accompany the different perspectives that have to be coped with. If one accepts the complex and dynamic character of the environment in these three dimensions, one can get a picture of the orientation work that has to be done. A well-documented example of a failing balanced orientation towards these three types of relationships is the experience of the Shell group when confronted with the so-called Brent Spar case, about the sinking of an oil storage and loading station into the sea. Shell did have the permission of the British government to do this (enabling agency) but neglected and underrated the importance of normative agencies (Greenpeace) that greatly affected input agencies (consumers), and in the end the political system as well. Learning from this experience, Shell adopted a much broader and more interactive orientation to its stakeholders (Van Riel, 1997). Another example that demonstrates the need for a balanced orientating concerns the case of biotechnology. Biotechnology industry faces governments (enabling agencies), NGOs, media (normative agencies), and consumers (input agencies), who interact in a way that is difficult to predict. Again, severe cases of neglect and undervaluation of the power of stakeholder groups can be reported (e.g. the Monsanto case; Monsanto is at this moment fully aware about what went wrong; see Krueger, 2001). Industry has learned to cope better with the often not so clear-cut way that these agencies perceive the issue of biotechnology (Sagar, Daemmrich, & Ashiya, 2000). Precisely in such cases, we assume most attention to unconsciousness will make sense. We move now to the unconscious mind as an indispensable part of the orientation towards the environment. First, some basic theoretical notions about the nature and functions of the unconsciousness are introduced. We then return to our subject: the organization and its environment.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS: A THEORETICAL REFLECTION The main function of the unconscious mind seems to be to make life easier. If I know how to drive my car without paying conscious attention to all the necessary operations, such as watching other cars or the traffic signals, and without having to be aware of the movements needed to steer the car, I will be free to think about other things or even to talk with my passenger. Generally, the conscious part of one’s thinking is reserved for more difficult, relevant, or delicate issues; one’s behavior in new situations; one’s relationships toward others; or one’s performance of an important task. It is tempting, therefore, to put as many behavioral elements as possible into the domain of the unconscious, so that they can be dealt with routinely, without concern. According to Whitehead (cited in Thayer, 1990), in this shift from the conscious to the unconscious lies the real base of the processes of



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civilization (and not in more conscious control, as is assumed). More civilization means “increasing the number of operations people can perform without being conscious of them” (Thayer, 1990, p. 335) (Baars & McGovern, 1996). This function of unconsciousness can also be looked upon from the viewpoint of efficiency in responding to the environment. If someone walks through a city, there are literally thousands of signals around him or her. This person could not proceed if he or she was unable to filter out things below a certain level of significance. Only the objects that really matter are consciously noticed, the rest is taken for granted or dealt with routinely. From this point of view, conscious thinking or perceiving is a special way of being in contact with reality. The function of unconsciousness, to preserve of the conscious for more important things, can be illustrated by three human activities: (a) perceiving, (b) interacting with others, and (c) making choices. In all activities, the unconscious mind plays a vital role in making life more efficient. Let us look at perceiving. That perception can occur without any awareness is a well-documented research finding (Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). However, analyzing the subject is far from easy. In reality, visual orientation is a highly complicated process depending on many factors, such as the existence of a purposeful intention to select certain features of one’s environment Lambert, 2003). If one focuses on everyday situations, such as going to work (by car, bike, or foot), where such clear intentions do not dominate, one perceives this process in the following way:

• One’s senses are in contact with the environment around him or her. • Certain parts of the environment, thus available for the person, correlate with certain parts of the unconscious. We call this resonance.

• Based on resonance, the individual focuses on those parts of the environment that are of special relevance.

• One sees these parts, consciously or unconsciously. • Most of what the observer sees in this way is dealt with below the level of consciousness, because he or she can react to it routinely, according to existing scripts. • Only some parts of the environment are dealt with at a conscious level. These deserve special attention. So, what one consciously sees is the outcome of an interaction process in which the unconscious mind is the guiding factor. It organizes the perceptual field, separating stimuli into figure and ground (Safran & Greenberg, 1987). As Marcel put it, in the words of Lashley (1958), “Processes that realize percepts … are not themselves conscious” (Marcel, 1988, p. 123). The result of this is a treacherous image of what one (consciously) sees. Of course, one knows what one is seeing, but does not know why he or she is seeing this. People are not aware that their perception of


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reality is not a picture of reality but only a picture of what their unconscious minds feel is relevant for them. The second activity in which the unconscious is strongly involved is human interaction. Human interaction depends on verbal, as well as on nonverbal, signals and on certain rules to structure the process from beginning to end (Hartley, 1993). The codes for both verbal and nonverbal interaction are available for individuals, so that people can deal with each other in most situations in a more or less comprehensive and comprehensible way. Individuals learn to use these codes during their socialization period. Their meaning is socially preconstructed, allowing people to interact without problems and in a routine fashion. If people had to be constantly aware of the meanings associated with their words and gestures, they could only talk about very simple things (Garfinkel, 1967); but in routine situations they take for granted that meanings are common. They are part of an unconscious learning process that humans use without awareness. Only in special cases, when spontaneous interaction fails, are people forced to think about them. If, for instance, a waiter does not come to take one’s order, the script (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) has not been performed and one starts wondering. However, people normally consider these encounters unproblematic. The same holds true for rules of interaction, how one starts interaction, and the whole turn-taking machinery (for a discussion about the conscious and strategic part interactions, see Hopper, 2005). Third, the unconscious is important in the ability to make choices. If one had to think consciously about all the consequences of all the alternatives in a situation of choice, e.g., buying a present for a son or daughter, it would be a truly burdensome task (Zizzo, 2000). Instead, people look at a few possibilities, until they find that a certain choice feels good or they are moved to buy (Clore, Storbeck, Robinson, & Centerbar, 2005). Afterwards, they can formulate the arguments; but the choice itself is made in large measure on the basis of unconscious processes or our unconscious mind (Dumasio, 1994; Uhlman, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2004). Based on an extensive review, Fitzsimon, Hutchinson, and Williams (2002) stated “that the degree to which unconscious processes influence the consumer choice is much greater than most choice researchers belief” (p. 270). Simon (1976) argued that any choice people make will be subjected to a number of conscious and unconscious influences. In making the choice, people will only reflect on those influences that they are aware of, and thus arrive at rational arguments for making the specific choice. Simon introduced here the term bounded rationality. According to Mandler (1975) “the mechanisms of choice … are not conscious. It is presumably the operation of these mechanisms in the conscious state that gives the epiphenomenal experience of free choice, the appearance that someone (the agent) is doing the choosing” (cited in Mandler, 2003, p. 24). Free choice with controlled information processing is an illusion (see also Verijzer, 1999. These three basic human activities can easily be applied to our stakeholder-scheme. Organizations and stakeholders are in each other’s environment,



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and unconscious processes operate in the perception of these environments much more than people are aware of. When organizations and stakeholders interact, much goes automatically (good or bad) and the choices that are made are only partially on a conscious level. The consequences for the practice of public relations are dealt with later in the article, after we have presented a model with which we can analyze these processes more systematically. Summarizing Unconsciousness and Consciousness Unconsciousness is an important fact of life. On the other hand, we cannot neglect the realm of the conscious and its dynamics. During thinking processes, people construct ways of acting that solve many of their problems. Such behavior is not unrelated to their unconscious thinking, although it is, at least partly, autonomous. People know that Homo Economicus is an imaginary personage who does not exist, but yet they grant that type of conscious thinking a certain role. Many technical problems are also solved by conscious thinking when people are fully aware of what they are doing (Diener & Perner, 2002). In Western culture, conscious reflection upon one’s activities is, generally speaking, seen by many scholars (as well as the average person) as a correction to the impulsive, emotional, and often irrational unconscious. Without this faculty, an orderly personal or social life would be impossible. In everyday life, people would physically attack or even try to kill their enemies and steal from or betray people close to them if their feelings urged them to do so, and so on. It is not surprising that this way of thinking is heavily attacked by modern psychology, for the unconscious is by no means irrational. On the contrary, people can and do use it as a source of understanding of their environment and themselves. It has its own merits (Frijda, 1986). We might speculate about the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious mind, such as the question of which comes first? As we have shown, the unconscious mind guides one’s conscious perceptions. In general, research findings have suggested that “consciousness is the consequence or product of the extensive unconscious neural processing that preceded it” (Reed & Johnson, 1998, p. 261). On the other hand, a lot of unconscious, automatic processes are started at a conscious level, like car-driving or learning a foreign language. The unconscious mind can also be triggered by conscious efforts. For instance, in the classical literature about creative problem solving it is assumed that, after a conscious phase of deliberate problem solving, the unconscious plays an important role (incubation, leading to illumination), after which one consciously reflects on the value of the outcome (verification) (Wallas, 1926). In line with this way of reasoning, the conscious sets the agenda for the unconscious. It seems safe to adopt an interactive perspective about the relationship between the two. They are linked. The one influences the other (see also Bowers, 1987). And in one and the same activity, like


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driving a car, both processes appear. Generally, driving is done automatically, but it can be interrupted by conscious monitoring and making choices (Kunda, 1999). The conscious is important, moreover, because people refer to it in their communication. In handing over a present to a child, one might also give one’s arguments concerning the choice.

A Typology of Organizational Communication To clarify how organizations orient to their environment, one could wonder how the conscious, as well as the unconscious, sending/receiving of messages could be analyzed. For this reason, we constructed a model that accounts for both modes of communication on both sides (Figure 2). In this way we arrive at four types of situations.

FIGURE 2

A typology of communication situations.



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In this model, the conscious and the unconscious are separated. In reality, they continuously influence each other, as we have argued. The distinction is made for analytic reasons. On the source side, the conscious activity is called sending. This is what is mostly described in process models of communication (a process, in which a source selects a message, etc.; see McQuail, 1994). The unconscious activity, as it appears in many signals, and certainly in non-verbal signals, is called “giving off” (Goffman, 1959). On the side of the receiver, we have chosen the word “interpretation” to symbolize conscious activity and “resonance” to indicate what happens unconsciously. So, we arrive at four types of communication:

• • • •

Type a: Sending—interpretation Type b: Giving off—interpretation Type c: Sending—resonance Type d: Giving off—resonance

We explore the particular features of these four types separately. First, we review the current literature on the subject. Then we consider its application to the field of public relations, both in public relations’ communication role vis-à-vis the environment and in its supportive and evaluative role regarding the way in which other members of the organization communicate with the world outside the organization. Type A: Sending—Interpretation This type has been present in communication theory since the days of Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) mathematic theory of communication. The assumption is that a sender gives information to reduce the uncertainty of the receiver, who must “structure or organize some aspects of his environment that are relevant to a situation in which he must act” (Schramm, 1973, p. 39), or that “communication occurs when humans manipulate symbols to stimulate meaning in other humans, whereby the receiver interprets the message deliberately, recognizing the intention of the sender” (Infante, Rancer, & Womack, 1993, p. 10). Part of this tradition is the research on the comprehensibility of messages (Robinson, & Davis, 1967; Trenaman, 1967). A lot of public relations work is just informational, with deliberate and intentional activities on the part of the public relations official and deliberate interpretations on the part of the others. If the organization stresses its identity of transparency and clarity (such as, for example, the Dutch multinational, Philips, which sells all kinds of electronic equipment and has “Sense and Simplicity” as its slogan), the public relations practitioners should monitor how understandable the


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messages that the organization, as a whole, are, e.g., in manuals, of course, but also in all kind of broader contacts in which clarity counts, for instance regarding technological risks. Unintentional aspects are never far away, however. Take, for instance, the situation where the operating instructions for a particular product are so perfect that the receiver unconsciously forms a favorable impression of the client-centered attitude of a firm; or an opposite situation where glossy corporate magazines destined for external consumption are (unconsciously) experienced as a blatantly obvious attempt to create a positive impression. We can look at the same relationship from the opposite angle. In this scenario, the agencies in the environment are the informing sources and the organization that the receiver who interprets. Generally, the strategic thinking about the communication of organizations overstresses its sending part, with a relative neglect of reflections on what comes in. If, however, one takes an interactive or transactional perspective ; , one must pay attention to the information others give and how to process this information throughout the organization, whether it be statements by normative agencies, new policy of enabling agencies, or customers’ questions or complaints. Type B: Giving Off—Interpretation In the literature, this type of communication is mainly described under the heading of nonverbal interaction, where the spontaneously given signals are interpreted as meaningful for a better understanding of the person encountered, or as a way of checking his or her deliberately sent messages. In their messages, people give off (a part of) their personality. They talk about themselves in every sentence. However, they usually do not reflect on these hidden messages about themselves. Severin (1988) used the concept of unconscious projection to deal with this phenomenon, “a lack of awareness that one’s statements are to a degree statements about ourselves” p. 61). The other person uses these signals to find out what kind of person he or she is talking to. One of the questions that can be solved in this way is what distance should be kept in a specific situation. According to the German sociologist Von Wiese (1933), the distance between people cannot be fixed. There are only movements to close or enlarge the gap (Abstandsverschiebungen). Whether one decides to come psychologically nearer or further away from the other person depends on the signals he or she gets, the unconsciously-delivered signals together with the consciously-put messages, and how one constructs meaning out of these. Organizations deliver many signals, usually more than they are aware of, that are used by different groups. Employees speak in or outside their working time with many others about the organization for which they are working. The impressions others get from such informal interactions can seriously influence the image of the organization in vocational or local networks and can find their way to NGOs



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and the media. The monitoring, analysis, and support of these interactions, to make them more effective, are a main task of public relations officials (see Cheney & Christensen, 2001). The phenomenon of interpreted signals can also be found internally, however. Often, the upper echelons of a firm fail to see how the unconscious processes in their own organizations are at work, after all (Buckle, 2003). They have to learn to understand why their employees are reacting in a certain way, e.g., how they adhere to the officially-stated mission of the organization, or to themselves as its leaders. If we look at it the other way around, agencies in the environment also give off signals that are used consciously by organizations. To be able to anticipate, organizations try to make sense of what they feel concerning the way that the government or the media or consumer groups are moving. They try to grasp changes in climate, favorable or unfavorable. If a Prime Minister speaks about the economy as his biggest concern at that moment, they know that severe environmental measures are probably not under way. If they are active in the agri-food chain, for example in pig breeding, they can interpret the extensive media coverage of the scandals in the chicken industry as a sign of a growing concern for animal welfare. One of the functions of public relations is to help an organization to grasp the (hidden) dynamics in the environment as a prerequisite to being in tune.

Type C: Sending—Resonance In respect of this type of communication, we find a lot of theory and research in the literature on advertising, and, more generally, in the literature on persuasive communication. Individuals receive an enormous flow of information daily. Only part of this is decoded consciously, that is, the part that reaches and exceeds a certain level of significance. The rest people undergo unconsciously. The effectiveness of advertising about daily consumer goods depends, in large part, on resonance. The same holds true for many public relations campaigns. The influence of messages is held to be stronger if (a) the frequency of this message is higher; (b) there is a (hidden) connection with existing intentions, emotions, or cognitions; and (c) the relevance for the decisions that are affected is low. These ideas are in line with our assumption that the conscious is preserved for more important things. People let it happen, because they are unable to reflect on all the information that confronts them. The same mechanism can be found in the literature on image-formation. Images are networks of associations around persons or organizations, used by people as a simple (or even primitive) method of decision making on fundamental dimensions such as good–bad, active–passive, or strong–weak (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). With very little empirical information, people know how to place a person or organization on a scale based on these dimensions. Comparable


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analyses are to be found regarding the images of products or product designs (Verijzer, 1999). The application of this kind of insight to the way an organization deals with its environment is usually a key task of public relation agencies. It is well known that distorted images easily lead to distorted encounters, which again are a source of (new) distorted images. Countering this unproductive spiral is the preserve the communication specialist. The converse viewpoint is interesting: how others try to inform or to influence an organization, and what happens if only part of this stream is decoded on a conscious level. Consumers ask for information or complain, NGOs have their concerns, and opinions about the organization are voiced in the media. These messages are, positively or negatively, interpreted on a conscious level, but they also affect an organization on an unconscious level. For instance, organizations may feel that negative remarks are unjustly directed at them and can tend to follow the closing-the-ranks approach. Their pride is at stake, and they start creating—unconsciously—images of the criticizing others, ascribing meanings to them that are not checked. These images play a role in the interaction with these parties and can easily lead to distorted communication. In Dutch debates about animal welfare in agriculture, big breeders often fail to grasp the meaning of criticism because of the images they immediately create of their opponents: antiindustrial, not knowing or willing to understand what farming is all about, and so on. Direct contact could easily correct these false impressions and bring to the fore the essential point: a difference in perceptions of what animal welfare is, linked to health (the farmers’ perspective) or to natural behavior and conditions (the perspective of the opponents; Te Velde, Aarts, & Van Woerkum, 2002). It is precisely these unconsciously formed images about the others and their intentions that make constructive interaction between different stakeholders problematic.

Type D: Giving Off—Resonance This type of communication is probably the most common of all. According to Leeds-Hurwitz (1989), “the majority of communication is unconscious” p. 122). People are, in the main, not aware of what they give off, or of how they experience the signals of others. Theoretically, this field is best covered by studies in intercultural communication, in which the assumption is that individuals, in their daily lives, unconsciously reproduce common values, internalized via problems of socialization. In this way, in thousands of encounters their cultural heritage is shaped (Pepper, 1995; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). They do not perceive the unique character of it



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because it is always there, as an obvious thing, but, when they meet another culture, things can go wrong. We feel, often painfully, that neither culture is in tune. If we apply this to organizations, we can think about three important cultural aspects that will greatly affect the interaction of an organization with its environment. First, there are the values that are shared in one world, but not in the other. An example is the value of profitability, which is an obvious trait of most firms, whereas NGOs tend to look predominantly at quite other values, such as the social profile of a firm or how it cares for the safety and health of its employees. Mrotek (2001) has shown how unconscious processes regarding value orientations in the U.S. health care system have contributed to the problem: how to balance quality and costs. Second, the communication behavior of organizations can differ from that of groups in their environment. For instance, they may prefer a more hierarchical formal style that can be at odds with the more egalitarian, emotion-ridden style of some NGOs. Third, there can be a difference in perception on important issues. Agricultural enterprises consider nature to be all that grows and lives, including crops and cattle. However, for nature organizations, nature is associated with wildness and with pureness, like forests, rivers, and so on, often excluding nature that is created by men. Organizations may be perfectly aware of these cultural differences, but like all living systems they tend to be self-referential, operating as closed, autonomous systems of interaction that make reference only to themselves. The aim of living systems ultimately is to reproduce themselves. Maturana and Varela (cited in Morgan 1998) have coined the term autopoieses to refer to this capacity for self-reproduction through a closed system of relations. As a consequence, organizations have too little (and often distorted) contact with activists, journalists, civil servants, politicians, or even consumers, to be able to see what any differences are and why conflicting ideas exist. This is the big argument for consciously organizing continuous interaction with these groups, and for more intense and personal encounters in which the motives and backgrounds of the others can be dealt with. Self-referential behavior implies that the external social environment does not play a big role in internal deliberations. Members of a self-referential organization simply cannot see others, because they do not have vivid pictures of concrete people in their minds, but only abstract notions of categories far away; and, last, there is a lack of direct feedback. The feedback is relatively strong about sales of products or services to consumers, with clear figures available in a very short time, but weak about how people react as citizens, or how and why NGOs, the media, or policy circles are involved in certain issues. This makes the tasks of public relations practitioners so difficult, but—in tandem with this—so necessary. Of course, if we approach the issue from the other side, the same mechanism appears. The government, the media, NGOs, and consumer organizations are self-referential as well. The self-referentiality of governments is a well-


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documented phenomenon, due to the same factors as those we mentioned, with a hampering feedback instrument as a major cause. Also, NGOs can stick to their own set of beliefs with little feeling for other rationalities. Organizations that would like to improve their contacts with the world outside have to be especially aware of how and why groups outside unconsciously frame issues and situations as compared with how the organization does so. Interaction is presented here as the key instrument used to become aware of the unconscious’ role in perceptions, in making choices, and in the interaction itself. Especially the last point makes it clear that interaction is not a panacea, as we had already stated in the introduction. It only helps if we are reflecting carefully on what happens in stakeholder dialogue.

UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND THE STAKEHOLDER GROUP MODEL We now apply our ideas about the place of unconsciousness in interaction processes to our stakeholder group model. How does it interfere with how we connect to enabling, input, and normative agencies? In our description of enabling agencies, we stressed the point that relating to them is not so much obeying the rules and knowing how these are being implemented, but rather to be able to anticipate what comes next, which means an understanding of the trends towards future legislation in the long run. Depending of many influences trends in political concerns are not easy to predict. To gain feeling for meaningful changes that precede a turn in ongoing policy, one has to read between the lines. The process of policy formation itself is highly structured, and the official statements in the course of this process are well-considered and intentional. But the dynamics behind this process are, on the contrary, often hidden, unclear, and full of ambiguities. Only by valuing certain utterances in more informal contacts with opinion leaders in the political system can one grasp what is going on. For instance a specific phrasing of the (dis)approval of the mission of Al Gore with regard to climate change, also in the Netherlands a real event, can indicate how policy in this field is evolving. Reflection on one’s own unconscious reactions in these encounters can help to foster the relationship in such dynamic environments. A purely one-sided, defensive reaction hinders an effective dialogue. Is the individual able to see what he or she is giving off through the eyes of relevant actors in this field? The decision-making of input agencies is based on cost–benefit thinking, but—as we said—money is not the only incentive here. Shareholders, customers, or employees refer to the reputation, image, or identity of organizations in a way that is far from clear-cut. One has to be able to decode the signals from them to un-



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derstand how they perceive the value of the enterprise for themselves, now and in the future. Take, for instance, reputation, a concept that is applicable to all input-groups. As Davies (2003) repeatedly declared, reputation is a “significant, albeit intangible asset” (p. 65). Reputation can be measured, but to grasp what really counts, and why, frequent interaction is needed, with a keen eye for the unconscious aspects of the partner’s perspective. Moreover, anyone who measures reputations and finds that something went wrong is often too late in redressing the problem. Of course, we can look at same process from the reverse angle. One’s own unconscious reactions form a big part of how employees, customers, or shareholders see him or her. These, often nonverbal, reactions have to fit in with what you consciously are saying, to gain authenticity (which is—by the way—an important element in the creation of a good reputation; see Fombrun & Van Riel, 2004). The importance of a fair acknowledgement of unconscious processes is probably easiest demonstrated by normative agencies. Values lay at the base of many critical remarks by NGOs, the media, or interest organizations, but are—as such—not always visible and therefore debatable. They constitute—often implicitly—content of many messages, taken for granted by the senders, and difficult to address by the organization which it concerns. Many firms do have, moreover, problems with “moral language” (Fineman & Clark, 1996, p. 716). They think it is not business-like to consider this way of talking. The fact that the world of normative agencies is very heterogeneous, sometimes loosely organized, contributes to the danger of a weak orientation. The contacts with these groups are often less developed, compared with input or enabling agencies. The response of organizations to value-ridden messages runs the risk of being influenced by the values of the organization itself, as an integral part of the psychological make-up of it and as unreflected. Here a teufelkreis (devil’s circle) may appear: Wrong interpretations lead to distorted contacts, which lead to an aggravation of wrong interpretations, and so on. Only a conscious effort to deal with the hidden and unconscious aspects of these contacts can lead to a better relationship. An important element in stakeholder theory is the idea of creating value for stakeholders, not seen as isolated entities, but as a system of interdependent groups (Freeman et al., 2004). It will be clear that it is in the interest of shareholders that firms develop good relationships with governments, NGOs, and (of course) consumers. Without this, organizations are at risk. But for consumers, to take another group, effective contacts with the other groups are, in the end, beneficial, partly because of the fact that consumers are, at the same time, citizens. In this view, organizations have to reflect on the unconscious aspects of their relationships vis-à-vis all three types of agencies. A weakly developed contact with one group with a lot of distortion can spoil the whole picture.

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THE CASE OF LIVESTOCK FARMING In this section, we illustrate our conceptual thinking about the orientation of organizations to their environment with an empirical study on livestock farming in the Netherlands. In addition to the environmental and food safety concerns as negative side-effects of intensive farming, there are ever-increasing concerns expressed by groups in Dutch society about animal welfare in livestock farming (Aarts & Van Woerkum, 2005; Te Velde et al., 2002). Let us consider the main stakeholder groups that are part of the environment of the livestock farmers sector and the way they are related to each other. First, the Dutch government requires livestock farmers to grow and sell their livestock according to specific rules. Millions of animals are continuously reared for food production, including those for export. In the Netherlands, which is home to some 16 million people, 400 million chickens and 22 million cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and horses were slaughtered for food (www.wakkerdier.nl) in 2004. Many Dutch consumers have negative perceptions of the lives of these farm animals. They picture a short and miserable life with no open space, fresh air, or light (Te Velde et al, 2002). Because important groups in Dutch society have been lobbying for more animal welfare in livestock breeding, the government not only enables, but also looks critically at livestock farming practices. Second, several input agencies can be distinguished in the case of livestock farming. There are the retailers, including the slaughterhouses, who ask for animals that have been treated according to specific rules. For instance, to prevent the meat from having a bad taste, pigs are supposed to be castrated. In addition, retailers ask for a constant delivery of cheap meat of sufficient quality. There are also the consumers who demand cheap meat of high quality, produced in an animalfriendly way. The third stakeholder group, the normative agencies (consisting of the media, several NGO’s, and political parties) can seriously affect the reputation of livestock farmers. The media, for instance, regularly report issues concerning agricultural production processes, especially when things go wrong. In recent years, Dutch citizens were confronted with abundant information about swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease, and with horrible pictures of mass killing of infected animals, giving consumers an uncomfortable feeling about livestock farming. NGO’ s such as the Animal Liberation Foundation, the Animal Protection Foundation, or the Friends of the Earth are constantly criticizing Dutch livestock farming because of the consequences for both the environment and animal welfare. Finally, the different political parties have specific ideas about production processes in livestock breeding. This short overview of relevant relationships of livestock breeders shows the complex situation that this professional group encounters, caused by the various, often contradictory, perspectives and demands of stakeholder groups that they



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depend on. In response to this, farmers make an effort to prove that they treat their cattle in an appropriate way. These efforts are part of a public relations offensive consisting of different communication activities. In terms of sending, we can find livestock farmers’ organizations advertising in newspapers and magazines, telling the public that there is nothing wrong with the production process. For instance, in advertisements meant to promote Dutch pig farming we read: The Dutch pig farming industry is one of the most modern ones in the world. Dutch pig farmers combine strict demands for animal welfare, environment and food safety. To guarantee a good life for their pigs they have to meet many legal requirements. In addition, voluntary norms are in force, however not without commitment since pig breeders, retailers and NGO’s collectively agreed upon these. (http://www.devark enshouder.nl/content/dierenwelzijn_main.html)

In addition, many farmers regularly organize so-called open house days during which consumers can visit their farms. Others have put a webcams at specific places on their farm, enabling consumers to visit their farm on the Internet. Besides sending, of course, a lot of giving off takes place. The way that disasters in livestock breeding, such as swine fever or Bovine Spongiforme Encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow disease), are dealt with in the media gives many people the impression that farmers tend to treat their animals as things, as creatures without reason nor feelings. In Dutch debates about animal welfare in agriculture, big animal farmers often fail to grasp the meaning of criticism because of the frames they immediately create of their opponents: antiindustrial; not knowing of, or willing to understand, what farming is all about; and so on. In answer to conscious or unconscious attacks of opponents, including citizens, farmers react by defending themselves with utterances such as, “At least my pigs are better off than pigs in organic farms. In the winter, organic pigs die from cold,” or “They say I should not keep more that six chickens per square metre. At the same time they put way too many people in a little apartment” (Te Velde et al., 2002, p. 2007). Both farmers and their opponents produce and reproduce their specific values (optimal meat production or animal welfare) within their own group. Between those groups, the way issues are communicated (talking about animals in terms of kilograms per square meter or in terms of little darling chickens or lambs) differs considerably as well. Although not always consciously, but nevertheless actively, people construct specific frames in interaction, that fit their interests, convictions, and backgrounds to reach specific goals. As Entman (1993) put it, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). With regards to farm animal welfare,


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different frames of animal welfare are brought to the foreground by different stakeholders. Whereas farmers associate animal welfare primarily with health, their opponents think of natural behavior and the conditions for guaranteeing such. Neither the farmers nor the opponents are, as a matter of course, aware of their specific way of framing animal welfare. Instead, they take their own frame for granted, but in most cases other frames exist. Direct contact could bring the difference in frames and perceptions to the foreground, including the backgrounds and interests that are connected to these. It is, however, precisely these unconsciously formed frames about the others, their opinions, and their intentions that make constructive interaction between stakeholders problematic. Both groups act in a self-referential way, operating in a closed, autonomous system of interaction, only referring to themselves. Contacts with the assumed opponents (activists, journalists, consumers) are avoided. Furthermore, responsibility is avoided by accusing the others. Our study of discussions about farm animal welfare shows that farmers point at consumers (“If they are willing to pay more, we will be happy to deliver animal welfare.”), or to the retailers (“We will be happy to stop castrating pigs tomorrow, if only slaughterhouses change their demands.”). Consumers, in turn, avoid responsibility for farm animal welfare by pointing at the government (“The government should design sufficient and effective laws for protecting animal welfare.”), and to retailers (“They should offer meat that has been produced in an ‘animal-friendly’ way.”). Finally, the government point at the consumers (“Consumers make the decisive choices with their buying behaviour in the supermarkets;” Te Velde et al., 2002, p. 214). The result is that neither existing images nor existing practices do change. The case of livestock farming makes clear that public relations—in case of conflicting social, economical, and ethical attitudes and behaviours of the different stakeholder groups—goes beyond public relation efforts based on one-sided communication or even bilateral communication between the sector and its stakeholder groups. The only way for the livestock farmers’ sector to (re)gain their reputation is to enter into a dialogue with all the stakeholders involved. In such dialogue, all stakeholders involved can learn to reflect on existing images and practices, including backgrounds and interests. This may mean the beginning of the reframing of all of the stakeholders involved, leading to a better understanding of what is going on, to the willingness to adapt that would result in a better connection of the sector to its environment. This Dutch case seems at odds with the Dutch polder model that we stressed before. However, also related to the issue of animal welfare in livestock breeding, a lot of sitting together and talking takes place—debates are everywhere—that, unfortunately has not lead to agreements, until so far. One of the reasons may be the difficulties of Dutch farmers in accepting the existing dependences, after a long period (since World War II) in which they were generally praised for their social contribution in both feeding the people and creating a viable economic sector. This



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means that (certainly), in the Netherlands, the stakeholder model is well-known and approved, which, however, does not exclude the possibility that, in specific situations, a lot still has to be done at a fundamental level.

DISCUSSION The unconscious part of communication processes is—as we’ve shown—an important, but at the same time difficult, phenomenon to deal with. Organizations that live under the illusion of being in control and having a conclusive picture of their environment must face very controversial arguments against these ideas. The unconscious elements in the perception of external stakeholders are—up to a certain level—recognized and dealt with. Many studies concerning images and image-building are aimed at grasping this hidden dimension of how these agencies think and feel about an organization. Contrary to this, the organization’s own unconscious reflexes are much less noticed. Organizations can (a) neglect their own unconscious responses, (b) try to manipulate them, or (c) use them as a means to discover how their identity fits in with what other people desire. We now discuss these possibilities in greater depth. A complete neglect of unconscious feelings is only possible as long as the reactions of the others are invisible, as in one-sided or mass media contacts, where the representatives of organizations are giving off signals that cannot be noticed by the organization, because there is no feedback. In personal encounters, however, there will always be a reaction. The interaction will be pleasant or unpleasant, dull or creative, provoking more interactions or stopping them. This does not mean that organizational members in their encounters with outsiders are automatically inclined to reflect on their unconscious reflexes. Particularly if unpleasant interactions occur, organizations have strong social mechanisms to legitimate their own contribution to this interaction. Arguments such as “Journalists are looking only at weak spots in a story or at sensational, negative elements” or “Activist NGOs are only trying to get unrealistic things done” are easily agreed upon within the particular group. What is involved here is the shaping of out-groups that accompanies the construction of in-group identities (Turner, 1991). By doing this, the organization’s own contribution to the distorted communication is legitimized. Needless to say, a constructive orientation of an organization toward its environment is blocked in this way, and this, sooner or later, will be harmful. It is the task of public relations officials to unravel this mechanism and to correct wrong tendencies. Another approach is to try to manipulate the unconscious signals that are given off. This can be done in a couple of ways. Service organizations, like McDonalds, have elaborated prescriptions for their personnel to guarantee likable behavior that pleases the customer. At the other end of the organizational pyramid, the manager


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receives media training to obtain insight into how he or she comes across, or to experiment with more effective nonverbal tricks (look at your interviewer in a frank, open way, be composed and do not get angry in any situation, and so on). Public relations can support these initiatives. The problem with this strategy, however, is the impossibility to control everything. In particular, if receivers do not have a positive attitude towards the source, they will be skeptical and look and listen carefully to what is shown more implicitly. A stammer can be interpreted as a problem in dealing with the truth. From the moment that these failing attempts are noticed, the source comes off worse. People do not like to be manipulated. The source can try to work harder on his or her ideal performance, but, unless this is done perfectly, the receiver will look more carefully to discover the real, hidden meanings. In this spiral of controlling/interpreting signals better and better, receivers probably hold the trumps in their search for authenticity, especially if they really are involved and motivated to come to an evaluation. For this reason, this strategy has restricted value. It can be effective, up to a certain point. The third strategy is to critically reflect on problematic interactions with the aim of getting to know yourself vis-à-vis the other. What one is giving off is an important part of one’s identity, perceived (consciously or unconsciously) by others. What is going wrong in interactions is—seen in this way—an important source of information that can be used to think about the intentions and perceptions one brings with oneself to the encounter. What makes these contacts problematic? Was it the different perception of common issues? Was it different interaction rules, or parts in the decision process of both actors that were hidden but played a noticeable role that could not be grasped or understood by the other? The answers are not easy to find. We are “unaware of the programs in our head that keep us unaware” (Argyrus, 1999, p. 128). Accounts of the encounters are, themselves, constructions, often delivered to defend a behavioral strategy. To get a better picture of what happens, people could learn from recent applications in discursive psychology (Potter, 1996; Te Molder & Potter, 2005), a field that is gaining more overall attention, as it is in communication studies (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001). The unconscious elements of interaction itself are especially a central concern in these analyses. Broom, Casey, and Ritchey (1997) rightly stated that the idea of relationship is a key item in process-oriented public relations today, which is referred to by many authors, but is elaborated only at a very low level. We have tried to elicit a part of this relationship concept. These are the unconscious elements in the process of orientation of an organization vis-à-vis their stakeholders; a first exploration of the subject, which—as we hopefully showed—can be a useful instrument for the self-reflective practitioner.


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