Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality - PhilPapers

Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality Author(s): Patricia Springborg Source: Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 537-556 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191498 . Accessed: 19/04/2013 10:39 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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KARL MARX ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, VOTING, AND EQUALITY PATRICIA SPRINGBORG of Sydney University

HHE CONCEPT OF democracyraisesperennialdivisionsamong inthefollowingway. itsadvocatesand criticsthatmaybe characterized Defendantssee itas a complexofprinciplesand proceduresdesignedto justicerealize certainvalues-those of liberty,equality,fraternity, such thatit constitutesa uniquelyfavoredspeciesof politicalpraxis. Criticsof democracy,in sharpcontrast,tendto see it as nothingmore thana setoftechniquesdesignedto ensuretheruleofthemostpowerful undertheguiseofpopularconsent.Amongitscritics,thereis a further to be madebetweenthosewhoseedemocracyas a necessarily distinction corruptformofrule,a politicalapparatusdesignedto ensuretheruleof etc.),and (a numberof Marxists,Leninists,anarchists, specialinterests thosewhosee thereductionofdemocracyto suchtermsas a lamentable departuremade necessaryby mass politics,the military-industrial complex,etc. (Schumpeter,Bachrach,Pateman, C. B. Macpherson, more or less fittinginto this category). Far from believingthat democracyis corruptsui generis,theselattercriticscondemnrepresentativedemocracyas a departurefromthedirectdemocracyofantiquity form. and reservehope for a returnto a-purer,more participatory An examinationofMarx'sownviewson democracyshowsthatheby no meansfitseasilyintothepositionsofeitherthequalifiedorwholesale criticsofdemocracyand thathe sharesmorein commonwithclassical political philosophers,notably Plato, Aristotleand Hegel, on the subjectofpoliticsand democracythanis commonlyassumed.' Marx's viewson democracycall intoseriousquestionthe(revisionist)Marxist thepoliticalepiphenomenon of assumptionsthatdemocracyrepresents a specificeconomicsystemand,consequently, constitutes no morethan a set of practicesor proceduresto translateeconomicsintojuridicalpoliticalterms.In addition,Marx,followingHegel,convictsadvocates of participatory critics)of radical democracy(democracy'sreformist POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 12 No. 4, November1984537-556 K 1984Sage Publications,Inc.


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individualismforassumingthatparticipationentailstheparticipation ofeach and everyindividualratherthanparticipation bythecommunity as a wholethroughrepresentatives. In responseto thefamiliarcriticisms of democracy,one can elicitfromMarx's quite passionatedefenseof The firstis thatdemocracybearsa democracythreemajorarguments. peculiarrelationto politicsas "theessence"ofthepolitical,or as genus to whichall otherformsofconstitution arerelatedas species.Not onlyis democracynot seen by Marx as merelythe political effluxof a circumscribedset of economicconditions,but he makesthe positive case fordemocracyas bearinga peculiarand intimate relationto politics and itsemergence as a historically specificculturalcomplex-a uniquely intimaterelationshipthat is not shared by other regimessuch as monarchiesand aristocracies.It is clearthatdemocracyas understood in thiswayas a uniqueexpressionofthepoliticalconstitutes a complex ofideas,values,and institutional thatcannotbe reduced arrangements to a mere set of proceduresor practices.Marx's special case for democracyrestspreciselyon theclaimthatdemocracyrepresents more thana set of legal formsor procedures,realizing"theessenceof every state"in sucha waythatotherconstitutional formsappear bycontrast as merelyjuridicalentities. Second, Marx makestheexplicitargument thatdemocracydoes not requiretheparticipationofall membersofsocietyas individualsin the decision-making processand that,therefore, thedebateovertherelative meritsof director representative democracyis misdirected. Third, Marx argues that politicalparticipationturnsnot on the functionofdeputiesor representatives butratheron politicalsuffrage. Voting,"consideredphilosophically... is theimmediate, thedirect,the existingand notsimplyimaginedrelationofcivilsocietyto thepolitical state,"he maintains,and the unityof the social and the politicalis symbolizedbyuniversalsuffrage. Indeeditis thestruggleforuniversal thatbringsabout thedissolutionofthedualismofcivilsociety suffrage and thestate. To takeeach ofthesearguments in turn,Marx's case fordemocracy as the authenticexpressionof the politicalis at once startlingand conventional.Itis startling becauseMarxmakesa case fordemocracyin termsalmostidenticalto those made forcommunismas a privileged social formin the1844 Manuscriptsone yearlater.In thelatterwork communismis the resolutionof the antithesesbetweenessence and existence,formand content,individualand species;it is theriddleof historysolved and knows itselfto be that solution,whereasin the


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Critiqueof Hegel's "Philosophyof Right,"democracyis all of these.2 Democracyis the"genericconstitution" to whichmonarchystandsas species;"democracyis contentand form"becausethestateis essentially thedemos and democracyis thegovernment of thepeople; democracy is thecoincidenceof essenceand existence,thestatein and foritself: Democracyis theresolvedmystery ofall constitutions. Here theconstitution not only in itself,accordingto essence,but accordingto existenceand actualityis returnedto itsreal ground,actual man,the actual people,and establishedas its own work.The constitution appearsas whatit is, thefreeproductof men.3

Marx draws a parallel betweendemocracyand Christianity."In a certainrespect,"he says,"democracyis to all otherformsof thestate whatChristianity is to all otherreligions.Christianity is thereligionkat' exochein,the essence of religion,deifiedman under the formof a particularreligion.In thesame waydemocracyis theessenceof every politicalconstitution, socialized man underthe formof a particular constitution of thestate."4 Thiscomparisonmaycastdoubton theseriousressofMarx'sdefense ofdemocracy.Is notdemocracy,likereligion,yetanotherepiphenomenon or ideologicalformunderwhichrealitymasquerades?This we knowis not Marx's viewof religion(althoughthatof some Marxists), whichhe sees as a genuineexpressionof the humanconditionand a crucialobjectification ofthehumanessenceat a givenhistoricalstage. Democracyis a similarexpression,also to be transcendedwhen the unityofindividualand species,privateand political,formand content, of whichit is expressive,is finallyachieved.Thus Marx continues: [Democracy]standsrelatedto otherconstitutions as thegenusto itsspecies;only herethegenusitselfappearsas an existent,and therefore opposed as a particular speciesto thoseexistentswhichdo notconformto theessence.Democracyrelates to all otherformsofthestateas theirOld Testament.Man does notexistbecauseof the law but ratherthe law exists for the good of man. Democracy is human existence,whileintheotherpoliticalformsmanhas onlylegalexistence.Thatis the fundamental difference of democracy.5

Marx's defenseof democracyis in the contextof Hegel's case for constitutional monarchyas theultimatedevelopmentof thestateand "achievementof the modernworld."6Hegel rejecteddemocracyas a candidateforthishonor,eventhe"beautifuldemocracyofAthens,"7 on the grounds that none of the pure forms of regime,monarchy, aristocracyor democracyexhibitedthe capacityfor differentiation,


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and self-consciousness durability exhibitedbyconstitutional monarchy as a complexpoliticalform.8Democracyis based on the principleof virtue,Hegelmaintained, followingMontesquieu.Itdepends,therefore, on sentiment and a senseofduty,a fragilerelationshipthatconstitutes the formal weakness of democracy such that its extremeform, of people,is a formalabsurdity: sovereignty The sovereignty ofthepeopleis one oftheconfusednotionsbased on thewildidea ofthe"people."Takenwithoutitsmonarchand thearticulation ofthewholewhich is theindispensableand directconcomitantofmonarchy, thepeopleis a formless mass and no longera state.9

ConsistentwiththeParmenideanaphorism"therationalis thereal (wirklich),"which Hegel adopts as the foundationof his logic, he maintainsthatthestateas an idea and a formalprinciplehas a greater reality(wirklichkeit) thanthepeople,itscontent.In somerespectsthis view accords withthatof the greatdefendersof absolutemonarchy, Hobbes and Bodin,of whomHegel's languagein his discussionof the persona of the monarchis evocative: "It is only as a person, the monarch,thatthepersonality ofthestateis actual[ i.e.,actualized],"he points out, "and that a people ceases to be that indeterminate abstractionwhich,whenrepresented ina quitegeneralway,is calledthe people."10In other words, the state as a corporationor juridical entityexistsformally byvirtueofempowering a representative, and the sovereign,moreparticularly themonarch,embodiesthatfunction. It is thisveryformalism ofwhichMarx is critical,and hisrebuttalof Hegel'scase formonarchyis inthetermsofclassicaltheoriesofpopular sovereignty. The logicalformofthestateas a juristicexpressionis that inwhichtheformalqndmaterialprinciplescoincideand thepeoplerule and are ruled." Under the aegis of democracy,firstthe abstract distingtion betweencivilsocietyand thestateand secondthestateitself as an abstractionare surpassed.Thus "in truedemocracythepolitical state disappears."''2This is because democracyas unityof particular and universal,part and whole,is no mereconstitutional formbut a systemwhose principlesactually govern. It follows thereforethat inall statesdistinctfromdemocracythestate,thelaw,theconstitution is dominant withoutreally governing,that is, materiallypermeatingthe contentof the remainingnon-politicalspheres.In democracytheconstitution, thelaw,thestate, so faras it is politicalconstitution, is itselfonlya self-determination ofthepeople, and a determinate contentofthepeople. Furthermore itis evidentthatall formsof thestatehavedemocracyfortheirtruth,and forthatreasonarefalseto theextent thatthey.arenotdemocracy.13



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Althoughabjuringtheformalism orabstractionofHegel'sargument, Marx at the same time avoids the methodologicalindividualismof radicaldemocracy.Whenheturnssome90 pageslaterintheCritiqueto the question of participation,he does so withexplicitreferenceto a passagefromtheremarkto paragraph308 ofthePhilosophyof Right: To hold thateverysingleperson should share in deliberatingand decidingon politicalmattersofgeneralconcernon thegroundthatall individualsaremembers ofthestate,thatitsconcernsaretheirconcerns,and thatitis theirrightthatwhatis done should be done with theirknowledgeand volition,is tantamountto a proposal to put the democraticelementwithoutany rational forminto the organismofthestate,althoughitis onlyin virtueofthepossessionofsucha form thatthestateis an organismat all. This idea comesreadilyto mindbecauseitdoes notgo beyondtheabstractionof"beinga memberofthestate,"and itis superficial thinkingwhichclingsto abstractions.'4

Marx seizeson severalideas here,beginning withHegel'snotionthat the demand for the participationof all in decision makinginvolves conflatingthe privateand political realmsand admittingsocietyto politicswithouttheformalmediationofrepresentatives. It is due to this categoricalmistake,Hegel argues,thatthemerefactofmembership in thestateis consideredgroundsforpoliticalparticipation, as ifthestate were not a complex organizationwithdifferentiated functions,but simplytheshadowof societyat large. Hegelwas right,butforthewrongreasons,Marx argues.It is notthe demandforparticipation inthestatebyvirtueofmembership insociety thatsignifies"superficialthinkingwhichclingsto abstractions,"but ratherthe artificialdistinctionbetweencivilsocietyand the state on whichHegel'spositionis predicated.If"noteverysinglepersonshould share in deliberatingand deciding on political mattersof general concern," it is not for the reasons Hegel gives. To say that "the democracticelementcan be admittedonlyas a formalelementina state organism"merelybespeaksthe"formalism ofthestate,"5 Marx argues. In a reallyrationalstateone could answer,"Noteverysinglepersonshouldsharein deliberatingand decidingon politicalmattersof generalconcern,"because the individualsshareindeliberating and decidingon mattersofgeneralconcernas the "all," thatis to say,withinand as membersofthesociety.Not all individually, but theindividualsas all.'6

The problemof politicalparticipationframedas the alternativesof director representative democracyis theproblemfalselyposed, Marx


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avers."Hegel presentshimselfwiththedilemma:eithercivilsociety(the many, the multitude)shares throughdeputies in deliberatingand decidingon mattersofgeneralconcernor all [as] individualsdo this."'"7 But "the question of whethercivil societyshould participatein the legislatureeitherbyenteringitthroughdeputiesor bydirectparticipationofall as individualsis itselfa questionwithintheabstractionofthe political state or withinthe abstractpoliticalstate; it is an abstract political question.""8 This is because within the frameworkof individualism,representation by "all" or "not-all"makesno essential difference. Marx turnsagainstHegeltheveryargument thatHegelused in thestateconstituting againstmembership groundsforparticipation in decision making.It restson the followingabstraction:"Thus, the basis whichHegel himselfdesignatedas external-the multiplicity of members-remains thebestreasonagainstthedirectparticipation ofall." In its properform[accordingto Hegel] the oppositionis this' the individuals participateas all, or theindividualsparticipateas a few,as not-all.In bothcases allnessremainsmerelyan externalpluralityortotalityofindividuals.Allnessis no essential,spiritual,actual qualityof the individual.It is not somethingthrough whichhewouldlose thecharacterofabstractindividuality. Rather,itis merelythe sumtotalofindividuality. One individuality, manyindividualities, all individualities.The one,themany,theall-none ofthesedeterminations changestheessence of thesubject,individuality.'9

The questionofrepresentative versusparticipatory democracyis thus a spuriousquestion,Marx argues.Eitherthepeoplearean integralpart ofthestateor theyare notand "iftheyare an integralpartofthestate, then it is obvious that theirsocial existenceis alreadytheiractual participationin it,"and thisbyvirtueofthefactof membership ofthe state.20 The falsealternatives ofpoliticalparticipation eitheras "all" or "notall" is predicatedon theabstractseparationofcivilsocietyand the state,whichin turnfalselypresumesthepoliticalto be constituted by singlepoliticalacts performed by individuals,focusingexclusivelyon thelegislatureas thelocus of popularparticipation. [If] politicalmattersof generalconcernare theconcernof thestate,thestateas actualconcern,and "deliberation and decisionis[sic]theeffectuation ofthestateas actualconcern[then]itis tautology[to say]thata memberofthestate,a partofthe state, participatesir. the state,and that this participationcan appear only as deliberationor decision,or relatedforms,and thusthateverymemberofthestate aretakento be thefunction sharesindeliberating and deciding(ifthesefunctions of actual participationin the state) the political mattersof general concern.2'



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"On theotherhand,"Marx pointsout,"ifwe aretalkingaboutdefinite concerns,aboutsinglepoliticalacts,thenitis again obviousthatnotall individualsaccomplishthem.Otherwise,the individualwould be the truesociety,and would makesocietysuperfluous."22 Let us notethatalthoughMarx dism'issesthetraditionalconceptof withsovereignpowerthatcan represent the stateas a real collectivity he thenotionof societyas a collectivity in retains and be represented, whole sum of its One of his objections parts. is than the greater whichthe to the possibilityof all participatingin politicaldecision makingas individualsis thatthispropositionis based on a radicalindividualism ofthe thatfailsto see societyitselfas a corporateentityrepresentative oftheindividualswhoconstitute it."The questionwhetherall interests as individualsshould share in deliberatingand decidingon political mattersofgeneralconcernis a questionthatarisesfromtheseparation of thepoliticalstateand civilsociety.",23 Once thisis seen, power.Here the legislativepoweraltogetherloses the meaningof representative legislatureis a representationin the same sense in which everyfunctionis in so faras he For example,the shoemakeris myrepresentative representative. fulfillsa social need,just as everydefinitesocial activity,because it is a speciesof a determination represents onlythespecies;thatis to say,itrepresents activity, of theother.Here,he is myown essencethewayeveryman is therepresentative notbyvirtueofsomethingotherthanhimselfwhichhe represents, representative but byvirtueof whathe is and does.24

This is an argument, itshouldbe noted,againstall attemptsto impose therubricof strictequalityin such a way thatfunctionalsubstitution as a person.Such leveling becomesthetestof an individual'sintegrity thataimsto makeall is premisedon radicalindividualism egalitarianism personsfeaturelessmonads, alike in the samenessand incapable of thathumannaturepromises. actualizingtherichrangeofpotentialities forsomeofthecampaignsfor has seriousimplications Marx'sargument equality waged in the name of Marxist humanism,feminism,etc., theprerequisites which,as he predicted,merelyreproducevoluntarily for a higherstage of capitalismthat devours women and children, etc. in thebattleto of gender,race,ethnicity, allowingno distinctions breakdown "all traditional,confined,complacent,encrustedsatisfactionsofpresentneeds,and reproductions ofold waysoflife"and "[tear] down all the barrierswhichhem in the developmentof the forcesof production,the expansion of needs, the all-sided developmentof


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production,and theexploitationand exchangeof naturaland mental forces.'25 -Does Marx'sargument thateachinhisdistinctive praxisis representaofall ruleouta specialrepresentative tiveofthespecies-essence function Not at all. Marx accordsita forthelegislatureas a politicalinstitution? specialistfunctionbeyondtherepresentation of thewholebythepart thatis characteristic ofeveryhumaninstitution and social role(i.e., the shoemaker,etc.). Marx attachesparticularsignificanceto legislative powerand thestruggle to achieveitas expressiveina fundamental sense ofthepoliticalwillof civilsociety: inthelegislature That all as individualswantto participateintegrally is nothingbut the will of all to be actual (active) membersof thestate,or to givethemselvesa itas such.... politicalexistence,orto provetheirexistenceas politicaland to effect The fact,therefore, thatcivil societyinvadesthe sphereof legislativepoweren masse,and wherepossibletotally,thatactualcivilsocietywishesto substitute itself forthe fictionalcivil societyof the legislature,is nothingbut the driveof civil society,to give itselfpoliticalexistence,or to make politicalexistenceits actual existence.The driveof civilsocietyto transform itselfintopoliticalsociety,or to makepoliticalsocietyintotheactualsociety,showsitselfas thedriveforthemost fullypossibleuniversalparticipation in legislativepower.26

Havingestablishedthatthesignificance ofthelegislature is notto be construednarrowlyin termsof its representation of individualsand theirinterests, but ratheras an articulationof thepoliticalwillof the community as such,Marx thengoes on to arguethatnotadmissionto thelegislatureas such,butthewideningofthefranchise constitutes the criticalelementin representation-anargumentconsistentwith his democraticpredilections.Universalsuffrageis the expressionof the ultimateunityofpoliticaland civilsociety,thebreakingdownofthose artificialbarrriers thathithertopermitted theirseparation,by making thecompositionof civilsocietyand thestateco-extensive: It is not a question of whethercivil societyshould exerciselegislativepower throughdeputiesor throughall as individuals.Rather,it is a questionof the extensionand greatestpossible universalizationof voting,of active as well as passivesuffrage. Thisis therealpointofdisputeinthematterofpoliticalreform, in Franceas wellas in England.27

Votingwidelychallengedby moderncitiesof representative democracyas a meaningless exercise,is seenbyMarx,as itwas bydemocratic



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theoristsof antiquity,as "the actual (wirklich)relation of.-.civil element." society... to therepresentative thatis,notintermsofitspropernature,if Votingis notconsideredphilosophically, itis consideredinrelationto thecrownorexecutive.The voteis theactualrelation of actual civil societyto the civil societyof the legislature,to the representative element.In otherwords,thevoteis theimmediate,thedirect,theexistingand not goes simplyimaginedrelationof civil societyto the politicalstate. It therefore withoutsayingthatthevoteis thechiefpoliticalinterestof actualcivilsociety.In bothactiveand passive,civilsocietyhas actuallyraiseditself suffrage, unrestricted to politicalexistenceas itstrueuniversal forthefirsttimeto an abstractionofitself, ofthisabstractionis at once also and essentialexistence.Butthefullachievement itspoliticalexistence oftheabstraction.In actuallyestablishing thetranscendence establisheditscivilexistence,in as itstrueexistencecivilsocietyhas simultaneously fromitspoliticalexistence,as inessential.And withtheone separated, distinction ofvoting theother,itsopposite,falls.Withintheabstractpoliticalstatethereform advances the dissolutionof this politicalstate,but also the dissolutionof civil society.28

valueof ofthequestionofequalityas a constitutive Marx'streatment of.the treatment his to similar respects in all important is democracy Once and voting. of the role legislature, the of questions representation, but he maintains, is which right, position, theHegelian againhe affirms same the takes about equality argument Hegel's reasons. forthewrong The argumentforeconomic formas his argumentabout participation. like theargumentforequal equalityor an equal divisionof property, thefactthatas its as justification indecisionmaking,takes participation human beingsare individuals, membersofthestate,as undifferentiated is equality individuals equal. Butthisequalityas mutuallysubstitutable beings human about byvirtueofa falseabstraction.For whatis crucial cultural The is thevarietyand plenitudeoftheirtalentsand functions. richnessand depthof societyis a reflectionnot of merenumbersof butoftheopposite.Thus to fix individuals,equal and undifferentiated, that on equalityas a criticalconceptis a signofintellectualmediocrity cannot cope with the problem of unity and difference,the old Parmenideanproblemof the one and the many that societyposes. ofwhichthewholeis greater Society'suniqueproblemas a collectivity thanthesumofitspartscomesabout becausetherelationofsocietyto a totalitymade up of its membersis not atomisticor arithmetical, units of equal value. Rather societyas a complex undifferentiated unitsof varyingfunctions totalityis made up of highlydifferentiated


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and values. In thecourseofhisfamousdisquisitionon propertyin the Philosophyof Right,Hegel observed: If at this stage we may speak of more persons than one, although no such distinction has yetbeenmade,thenwe maysay thatin respectoftheirpersonality personsare equal. But thisis an emptytautology,forthe person,as something abstract,has notyetbeenparticularized or establishedas distinctin somespecific way. "Equality"is theabstractidentity oftheUnderstanding; reflective thoughtand all kindsOfintellectual mediocrity stumbleon it at once whentheyare confronted by the relationof unityto a difference. At this point,equalitycould only be the equalityof abstractpersonsas such,and therefore thewholefieldof possession, thisterrainof inequality,fallsoutsideit. The demand sometimesmade foran equal divisionof land, and otheravailable resourcestoo, is an intellectualism all themoreemptyand superficial inthatat the heartofparticulardifferences thereliesnotonlytheexternalcontingency ofnature but also thewholecompass of mind,endlesslyparticularizedand differentiated, and therationality of minddevelopedintoan organism. We may not speak of the injusticeof naturein the unequal distributionof possessionsand resources,sincenatureis notfreeand therefore is neither just nor unjust.That everyoneoughtto have subsistenceenoughforhis needsis a moral wishand thusvaguelyexpressedis wellenoughmeant,butlikeanything thatis only wellmeantit lacks objectivity.29

Marx reproducedthis argumentin its fundamentals, maintaining thatequalityas suchfocusedon externals,irrelevant fromthepointof view of an essentialhuman nature actualized in the full range of differences of particularindividuals.He gave depthto the Hegelian thephenomenonofexchange,and notmerelythe analysisbyperceiving arithmetical abstractionofsocietyas a collectionofindividuals,as the basisforequality.30 He was thusable to interpret theold socialistslogan demandingjusticeaccordingto need notas theexpressionofequality, pace Hegel, but as its opposite, a formulatailoredto the specific of needand capacitycharacteristic differences ofindividuals.When,in the Critique of the Gotha Programme,he boldly proclaimedthat distribution accordingto need,ratherthanstrictequality,wouldherald the crossingof "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right,"31 Marx meantwhat he implied:thatequalitywas an extrapolationfromthe presuppositions ofcapitalism.He had said as muchin TheHolyFamily, declaringthattheidea of" 'equal possession'is a political-economic one and therefore stillan alienatedexpression.32 In theGrundrisse, Marx elaboratedmorefullytheargument thatthe principleof equalityis at once the juridical expressionof the pre-



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conditionsof exchangeand foundedon theabstractrelationbetween individualsaggregatedby a reciprocityof interests.This artificial of individuals. equalityhas itsbasis in thenaturaldifference betweentheirneedsand betweentheirproductiongivesriseto Onlythedifferences are exchangeand to [men's]social equationin exchange;thesenaturaldifferences oftheirsocial equalityintheactofexchange,and ofthis theprecondition therefore relationin general,in whichtheyrelateto one anotheras productive.Regarded betweenthem,individualA existsas fromthestandpointofthenaturaldifference theownerofa use valueforB, and B as ownerofa use valueforA. In thisrespect, intotherelationofequality.In againputsthemreciprocally theirnaturaldifference withone to one another,butintegrate thisrespect,however,theyarenotindifferent another,haveneedofone another;so thattheystandnotonlyinan equal, butalso ina social relationto one another.Thisis notall. The factthatthisneedon thepart ofone can be satisfiedbytheproductoftheother,and viceversa,and thattheone is the capable ofproducingtheobjectoftheneedoftheother,and thateachconfronts otheras ownerof the object of the other'sneed,thisprovesthateach of them reachesbeyondhisownparticularneedetc.,as a humanbeing,and thattheyrelate is acknowledged to one anotheras humanbeings;thattheircommonspecies-being by all.33

of fromthereciprocity inference In otherwords,equalityis an irrelevant need, whose deeper significanceis the need for societyitself.Neveron whichthemodernstateis predicated"and theless,it is an inference bourgeoisdemocracyevenmorethanthebourgeoiseconomiststakes refugein this aspect." 34 For "in so far as the commodityor labour is conceivedof onlyas exchangevalue, and the relationin whichthe variouscommoditiesare broughtintoconnectionwithone anotheris conceivedas theexchangeoftheseexchangevalueswithone another,as theirequation,thenthe individuals,the subjectsbetweenwhomthis process goes on, are simplyand only conceived of as exchangers." Bourgeoissocietytakes"theformalcharacter"of individuals"as they standto one anotherin theexchangerelation"as theindicatoroftheir social relation: Each ofthesubjectsis an exchanger;i.e.,each has thesamesocial relationtowards theotherthattheotherhas towardshim.As subjectsofexchange,theirrelationis therefore thatof equality.35

Ifequalityis one principleextractedfromthefactsofexchangebased of need,freedomis another: on thereciprocity In so far as these natural differencesamong individuals and among their oftheseindividuals,fortheir commodities... formthemotivefortheintegration as exchangers,in whichtheyare stipulatedforeach otheras, social interrelation


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and prove themselvesto be, equals, thereenters,in additionto the qualityof equality,thatoffreedom.AlthoughindividualA feelsa needforthecommodityof individualB, he does not appropriateit by forcenor vice versa,but ratherthey recognizeone-another as ptoprietors, reciprocally as personswhosewillpenetrates theircommodities.Accordingly, thejuridicalmomnent ofthePersonentershere,as wellas thatoffreedom,in so faras itis containedintheformer. No one seizeshold ofanother'sproperty byforce.Each divestshimself ofhisproperty But voluntarily. this is not all: individualA serves the need of individualB by means of the a onlyinso faras and becauseindividualB servestheneedofindividual commodity A bymeansofthecommodityb, and viceversa.Each servestheotherin orderto servehimself;each makesuse oftheother,reciprocally, as hismeans... Out ofthe act ofexchangeitself,theindividual,each one ofthem,is reflected inhimselfas its exclusive and doininant(determinant)subject. With that,then,the complete freedomoftheindividualis posited:voluntary transaction;no forceon eitherside; positingoftheselfas means,or as serving, onlyas a means,inorderto posittheself as end in itself,as dominantand primary;finally,theself-seeking interestwhich bringsnothingof a higherorderto realization,the otheris also recognizedand acknowledgedas one who likewiserealizeshis self-seeking so thatboth interest, know the common interestexists only in the duality,many-sidedness,and autonomousdevelopmentof the exchangesbetweenself-seeking interests.The generalinterest is preciselythegenerality ofself-seeking interests. Therefore, when theeconomicform,exchange,positstheall-sidedequalityof itssubjects,thenthe content,theindividualas well as theobjectivematerialwhichdrivestowardsthe exchange, is freedom. Equality and freedomare thus not only respectedin exchangebased on exchangevalues but,also, theexchangeofexchangevaluesis theproductive, realbasisofall equalityandfreedom.As pureideas theyaremerely the idealized expressionsof thisbasis; as developedin juridical,politicalsocial relations,theyare merelythisbasis to a higherpower.36

Marx contrastsfreedomand equality as juridical expressions of relationsofproductionundercapitalwith"freedomand equalityin the worldofantiquity, wheredevelopedexchangevaluewas nottheirbasis, but where,rather,the developmentof that basis destroyedthem. Equalityand freedom(undercapital) presupposerelationsof productionas yetunrealizedin theancientworldand in theMiddle Ages." 37 There is here,it mustbe noted, an implieddistinctionbetweenreal equalityand freedom(realizedin antiquity?)and thespuriousfreedom and equalityon whichcapitalismis predicated.Marx notes of those engagedinexchangethattheother's"equalitywithmeand hisfreedom" arise from his "indifferenceto my need as such, to my natural 38 The systemof exchangein factrestson compulsion; individuality." each partner,drivenbythe"totalityof[his]needsand drives"exercises "compulsion over the other [by] driv[ing]him into the exchange system."39 Since moneyis onlytherealizationof exchangevalue,and since the systemof exchange values has realized itselfonly in a developedmoneysystem... the moneysteamcan indeedonlybe the



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realizationof this systemof freedomand equality."40 The logic of exchange is such that "even inheritanceand similarlegal relations, whichperpetuatesuchinequalties,do notprejudicethisnaturalfreedom and equality."4' Nevertheless, thisfreedomand equalityis a system, and notindividual,relatedto and partof"bourgeoissocietyas a whole.... [It] appears as thesurfaceprocess,beneathwhich... /in thedepths, entirelydifferent processesgo on, in whichthis apparentindividual equalitylibertydisappear."42 Exchangevalue"as theobjectivebasis of thewholesystemofproductionalreadyinitselfimpliescomplusionover theindividual,sincehisimmediateproductis nota productforhim:and since the individualhas an existenceonly as a producerof exchange value,hence... thewholenegationofthisnaturalexistenceis alreadyimplied; . . . he is thereforeentirelydeterminedby society."43 Marx castigatesthe"foolishnessof thosesocialists(namelytheFrench,who want to depictsocialismas the realizationof the ideals of bourgeois societyarticulatedby the Frenchrevolution)who demonstratethat exchangeand exchangevalue etc.are originally(in time)or essentially (in theiradequateform)a systemofuniversalfreedomand equality,but thattheyhave been pervertedby money,capital,etc."44 The properreplyto themis: thatexchangevalue or, moreprecisely,the money systemis in factthe systemof equalityand freedom,and thatthe disturbances whichtheyencounterin thefurther developmentof thesystemare disturbances init,aremerelytherealizationofequalityand freedom, whichproveto be inherent inequalityand unfreedom.45

It is themistakeofsuchsocialiststo assumethattheconceptsoffreedom and equalitycan in some way be purifiedor restoredto an otherthan juridical status.As he arguedin "On the JewishQuestion"and The Critique of the Gotha Programme,"equal rightis . . . a rightto inequalityin its contentlike everyright,"firstbecause it presupposes inequalityand second because eo ipso it ignoresessentialdifferences. Onlyin a higherphase ofcommunistsocietywillequalityas thebasis of bourgeoisjusticebe transcendedin favorofjusticeaccordingto need.46 In otherwords,equalityis a superficial inference fromthereciprocity of needs. Because Marx's viewson democracyare onlyintimatedand never fullyexpounded,and becauseoftheircontext,embeddedina critiqueof Hegel, theyare open to dismissal-quite wrongly,I believe-as neo-


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Hegelianrelicsofthemetaphysical baggageofhisyouth.Marx'sspecial case fordemocracyis one thattakesfarbetteraccountofthehistorical specificity and uniquenessofpoliticsas a phenomenonthananyofthe revisionistpretendersand is consistentwith his most mature and sophisticatedviewson theideationaland practicalcomplexityof any givenculturalformation.47 It is surelyno accidentthatdemocracyas a concepthas such wide reference thatitsvarioususages suggestit to be nothingmorethan a termof approbation.Thus Americanpoliticalscientistsof the 1950s dignified formsofrepublicanism thatextendevento oligarchywiththe name democracy,as indeed championsof the republicanideals of liberty, fraternity, and equalityhavedone sincethedays oftheRoman Republicand itsstoicalcritics.The peculiarresonanceofdemocracyas a termof approbationfromthe earlymodernperiodon is due to the simultaneous,and in somerespectsidentical,emergenceofdemocracy withthe conceptof the political.The historicalprocessthatsaw the expansion of the referenceofpolis as a termfromthe citadelof the Mycenaeankingsto thecommunity ofthecitystateis thesameprocess thatsaw theever-widening dispersalof politicalpowerfromtheroyal householdto thelimitedparticipationofall male membersofeventhe lowestclasses. Justas the conceptof the political,as such, involved creatinga publicspacebeyondthedivisiveconstraints ofprimordialties of tribe,clan, and family,so peoplingthatspace involvedconferring social poweron individualsin combinationwiththeirpublicactivities. The morethesphereofthepoliticalwas enlargedto coverwiderareasof communalactivitythegreatertheamountof politicalpowerthatwas generatedand distributed. This processwas,properlyspeaking,one of whichsaw thesuccessiveexperienceofthethreepure democratization, typesof regimein Greekexperience,beginningwiththe Mycenaean kingship,throughthe Homeric aristocracy,and culminatingwith Periclean democracy.Each phase representeda wider dispersalof power and, at the same time,the expansionof conceptsof likeness; spiritualkinship,moralequality,and thosepresuppositions ofpolitical participationthatwe associate withthe termdemocracy.It is in this sensethatdemocracyrepresented theuniqueexpressionofthepolitical: the sense of semanticidentity.For democracyin thissense connotes nothingless than the totalityof presuppositionsof politics as a historically specificphenomenon.



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It mayseemparadoxicalto suggestthatMarx deemsdemocracythe uniqueexpressionofthepolitical,on theone hand,and yetdenigrates freedomand equalityon the other,whichwerevalued as inseparable fromthe concept of democracysince the time of Cleisthenesand explicitlydefinedas suchbyThucydidesin thefamousfuneraloration of Pericles.It is fairlycertain,however,fromMarx's phraseology, that he distinguishesbetweenthe different contentsin different historical epochsofthesehistorically rootedconcepts.Thushe contrastsfreedom and equalityas thepresuppositions ofexchangeas "exactlytheopposite of thefreedomand equalityin the worldof antiquity.""8 Freedomin antiquitywas theantithesisofslavery,and theslave"in Roman law,the servusis ... correctly definedas one who maynotenterintoexchange forthe purposeof acquiringanythingforhimself."49 Equality,as we know fromThucydidesand othersources,was typicallydefinedas equality before the law, a negative conception that presupposed inequalityand excludedthosebeyondthereachof thelaw, i.e., slaves and foreigners. In Plato's phraseology"justiceconsistsofgrantingthe equalitythatunequalsdeserveto get,"granting"muchto thegreatand less to theless great."'' Thus in antiquitythesystematic separationof manualand mentallaborthroughtheinstitution ofslaveryand equality beforethelaw as a privilegeofthefreegave to theconceptsoffreedom and equality a specificcontentthat is sharplycontrastedwith the content of bourgeois freedomand equality as presuppositionsof economicexchangethatis based on the(hidden)compulsionof need and the economicnecessityof labor. To characterizethe contentsof these concepts in antiquityand modernityas opposites does not, however,ruleout a processby whichtheformermaydevelopintothe latter."Equalityand freedompresupposerelationsofproductionas yet unrealizedintheancientworldand intheMiddleAges,"Marx argues.51 Once thoserelationsofproductionemergedtheconceptslosttheirold content,butitwas preciselytheconceptsin theirancientformthatlaid straightthe path for the subsequenteconomic developmentsthat transformed them.Thus, althoughRoman law as a legal system correspondsto a social state in whichexchange was by no means developed, inso faras itwas developedina limitedsphere,itwas able to develop nevertheless, the attributesof the juridical person, preciselyof the individualengaged in exchange,and thusanticipate(in itsbasic aspects)thelegalrelationsofindustrial society,and inparticulartherightwhichrisingbourgeoissocietyhad necessarily to assertagainstmedievalsociety.But thedevelopmentof thisrightitselfcoincides completelywiththedissolutionof the Roman community.52


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Marx's attitudeto antiquityis notwithoutambivalence.The peculiar hold itsvalues exerciseoverus represents quitesimplya nostalgiafor culturein its infancy.He maintains,"Why should not the historic childhoodofhumanity, itsmostbeautifulunfolding, as a stageneverto exercisean eternalcharm?"53The eternalappeal ofthesevalues return, "is inextricablybound up . . . withthe fact that the unripesocial conditionsunderwhichtheyarose and could alone arise, can never return."54 Nevertheless, despitethisapparenttotalreductionism, Marx seemsto attributemorethanapparenttranscendence to thevalues of freedom,justice, beauty,social harmony,etc., which he frequently invokesin his allusionsto the societyof the future.Does he believe, therefore, thattheseancientvalues containarrestedpossibilitiessuch thatundersocialismtheywillbe morethanthemerejuridicalexpression ofthe(bad) capitalistconditionsforexchange?It is entirely consistent forhim to do so. In thiscuriousway Marx can make a case forthe correctformofeach ofthesevaluesthatthinkersbeforeand afterhim have made usingphilosophicalratherthanhistoricalargument. This difference havingbeen noted,the similaritybetweenMarx's view and those of his predecessorson the correctformof equality, justice,etc., is quite striking.Like Plato and Hegel he maintainsthat once thejust measurefor the distributionof social goods has been established("accordingto need") equalityshouldbe proportionaland notstrictly distributed. Andliketheancients,and particularly Aristotle, Marx conceivesoffreedomnot as a conceptdescribing juridicalstatus but as describinga moralcondition:thatof the moralagentwho can subjugateinstinctto reason.55He has scant regardforthe notionof justice and equality as "natural rights,"a concept unknownto the ancientsand deemedbyMarx a bourgeoisfictionextrapolatedfromthe can conditionsofexchange.On this,morethanone modernphilosopher agree.56

of social relationsin Marx's generalnostalgiaforthetransparency antiquityand theMiddle Agescan be construedas a lamentfortheloss of communityin modernsociety.For the substanceof the values of freedomand equalityin antiquityand the Middle Ages, builtas they were on the foundationsof slaveryand serfdom,was nevertheless in the determinedbya systemofcosmicorderthathad itscounterpart and thehighlyspecifiednetworksof social structure ofthecommunity moral and social relationships.The deficiencyof these conceptsin of a social systemin whichonlythe bourgeoissocietyis thedeficiency



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relicsof traditionalcommunallifeand itsframework of cosmicorder areretained.Thatthoserelicsliveon at all is,morever, onlybecausethey are legitimations of theveryactivity(economicexchange)thateroded theirmeaning.Marx'scritiqueofthevaluesofcapitalismis closeintone and substanceto thelamentsofPlato and Aristotleoverthecorruption oftheAthenianpolis and oftheRoman stoicsand theChurchFathers overthedeclineoftheRoman Republic.In each case thecorruption ofa moral communitywas accompaniedby an erosionin the meaningof valuesthathavebeenhandeddownto us as thevestigesofa community and itscosmicsystemthathave been lost.

NOTES 1. Treatmentsof Marx on democracyabound but none,to myknowledge,analyzes closely the passage of Marx's Critique of Hegel's "Philosophyof Right" and the Grundrisseto makethearguments advancedhere.MaximilienRubelin hisintroduction to Volume2 oftheBibliothequede la Pleiddeeditionof Marx's writings (republishedin Englishas Essay 3 of Rubel on Karl Marx, Five Essays,ed. JosephO'Malley and Keith Algozin,CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981)briefly discussesMarx's defenseofdemocracyin the Critiqueof the Philosophyof Right.Rubel's earlieressay"Notes on Marx's ConceptionofDemocracy,"(NewPolitics,vol. 1.,no. 2, 1962,pp. 78-90)shedsinteresting lighton thegenealogyof Marx's conceptofdemocracyas derivedfromSpinoza. Rubel maintainsthat"Marx's conceptofsocialismand communismis derivedfromtheconcept of democracyhe held beforehis conversionto communism"(p. 89). This conclusionis shared,withreservations, byShlomo Avineriin hisstandardaccountof TheSocial and Political Thoughtof Karl Marx (CambridgeUniversity Press,1968),whichgivesa brief account of Marx's viewsin the Critique,focusingon the notionof "truedemocracy" realizing"man's communistessence." In an earlieressay entitledMarx's Critiqueof Hegel's Philosophyof Rightin Its SystematicSetting"(Cahiersde l'Institutde Science EconomiqueAppliquee,Series2, no. 10,August1966,pp. 45-81),Avinerialso focusedon the question of whetherMarx's views marka transitionfromJacobin democracyto communism,placing, it seems to me, undue emphasis on Marx's use of the term "kommunistische Wesen,"whichmightbetterbe translatedas communalexistencethan "communistessence"(pp. 69-75). 2. Referenceto Marx's CritiqueofHegel's"PhilosophyofRight"are to theeditionby JosephO'Malley (CambridgeUniversity Press,1972). Referencesto Hegel'sPhilosophy of Rightare to theeditionbyT. M. Knox (OxfordUniversity Press,1967)and to Marx's Grundrisseder Kritikder PolitischenCEkonomieare to theeditionby MartinNicolaus (Penguin,1973). 3. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 4. Ibid., p. 30. 5. Ibid.


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6. Hegel, Philosophyof Right,remarkto para. 273, p. 176. 7. Ibid., additionto para. 279, p. 288. 8. Ibid., remarkto para. 279, p. 183. 9. Ibid., remarkto para. 279,pp. 182-183,reproducedbyMarx in his Critique,loc. cit.,p. 29. 10. Marx, Critiqueof Hegel's "Philosophyof Right," p. 29. 11. Ibid., p. 30. 12. Ibid., p. 31. 13. Ibid. 14. Hegel,Philosophyof Right,p. 200, Marx's Critique,p. 115. 15. Marx's Critique,p. 116. 16. Ibid., p. 117. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., pp. 117-118. 22. Ibid., p. 118. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., pp. 119-120. 25. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 409410. 26. Critiqueof Hegel's "Philosophyof Right,"pp. 118-119. 27. Ibid., pp. 120-121. 28. Ibid., p. 121. 29. Hegel,Philosophyof Right,remarkto para. 49, p. 44. 30. Hegel'sattackon strictor arithmetical equality,likethatof Marx,bearsstriking parallelsto thedistinction made byAristotlebetweentwokindsofequalityderivedfrom the Pythagorean,Archytasof Tarentum.The distinction,forwhichthereare mathematicalformulae,as set out by Aristotlein theNicomacheanEthics(V, iii,7-12, 1131a 30-1131b10), is thebasis forhis theoryof economicexchangeon thebasis of need,his theoriesofdistributive, and commutative corrective, justice,and hisdistinctions between For a usefulexpositionofthetheorysee: F. D. Harvey, "equal" and "unequal"friendships. "Two KindsofEquality,"Classicaet Mediaevala (vol. 26, 1965),pp. 101-140.Treatments of Aristotle'seconomictheorythatalso discussthe legacyof ArchytasincludeJoseph Soudek,"Aristotle'sTheoryofExchange,"AmericanPhilosophicalSocietyProceedings (vol. 96, no. 1, 1952),pp. 45-75;B. J. Gordon,"Aristotleand theDevelopmentof Value Theory,"QuarterlyReviewof Economics(vol. 78, 1964),pp. 115-128;and thearticleby CorneliusCastoriadis,"From Marx to Aristotle, fromAristotleto Us," Social Research (vol. 45, 1978),pp. 667-738. 31. Critique of the Gotha Programme,Marx/Engels Selected Works, Vol. 3 (Moscow: ProgressPublishers,1966),p. 19. 32. The Holy Family(London: Lawrenceand Wisart,1956), p. 60. This has been noted by Agnes Heller in her excellentstudyThe Theoryof Need in Marx (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), p. 123, who cites this translation.For a slightlydifferent translationsee the Marx/EngelsCollected Works(Moscow: ProgressPublishers,1975, vol. 4), p. 43.



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33. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 242-244. 34. Ibid., p. 240. 35. Ibid., p. 241. 36. Ibid., pp. 243-245. 37. Ibid., p. 245. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., p. 246. 41. Ibid., p. 247. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p. 248. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid., pp. 248-249. 46. Critiqueof the Gotha Programme,loc. cit.,p. 19. 47. Marx'sdoctoraldissertation and theresearchinpreparationforitdemonstrated a competentclassicalscholaras judgedbyhisacademicpeers(see CyrilBailey,"Karl Marx on Greek Atomism," Classical Quarterly,vol. 22, 1928, pp. 205-206); but more importantly, classicalwritersand themescontinuedto exerta profoundinfluenceon the formation ofhisconceptslongafterhe had departedfromthefieldofancientphilosophy. For instance,I am surethatMarx's thesisofclass struggle, consideredto be his generally unique contributionto a science of politicaleconomyotherwiseheavilyindebtedto eighteenth-century sources,is in factderivedfromthe Thrasymachanthesisof Plato's forpowerinwhichtheruling Republicthatsocietyis orderedbytheoutcomeofa struggle class rulesin itsowninterests. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix,in hissuperblife'swork,The Class Strugglein theAncientGreekWorld(London: Duckworth,1981),althoughnotgoingso faras to makethisclaim,emphasizesAristotle'spreoccupationwiththeThrasymachan thesis,withwhichAristotlemoreorlessagreesbyvirtueofaccordingproperty ownership thecentralrole in determining theclass interests of a regime(Ibid., II, iv,p. 71-76).Ste. Croixremindsus,at thesametime,ofMarx'sindebtedness to Aristotle, whomherefers to variouslyas "theacme ofancientphilosophy"(Marx/EngelsCollectedWorks,vol. I, p. 424), "thegreatestthinkerofantiquity," "a Giantthinker," etc.(Capital,vol. 1,London: Lawrence& Wishart,n.d., pp. 384, 64-66).AlthoughMarx wroteno extendedworkon antiquityafterhis doctoral dissertationof 1840-1841he rereadthe classical authors, in 1855 to his revisionof Roman usuallyin the original,throughouthis life,referring historyup to theAugustanperiod,in 1861to hisrereadingofAppianon theRomancivil warsin theoriginalGreek,and again in 1861to hisrereadingofThucydides.He made a careful study of Roman Republican historyusing Neibuhr, Mommsen, and other contemporaryauthorities,and his works are full of allusions to Greek and Roman authors,as Ste. Croixnotes(Ibid., I, iv,p. 24). Different aspectsofMarx's relationto the ancientworldfromthestandpointofhis laterwritings, in particularthe Grundrisse and theEthnologicalNotebooksof 1880-1883(Assen:Van Gorcum,1974),areinvestigated in Patricia Springborg,"Democracy: Method or Praxis?", Thesis Eleven (no. 9, forthcoming),and "Marx, Democracyand the AncientPolis," CriticalPhilosophy(vol. 1, no. 1,forthcoming). 48. Grundrisse, p. 245. 49. Ibid.


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Penguin,1970),p. 230. 50. Plato's Laws, 757 (Harmondsworth: 51. Grundrisse, p. 245. 52. Ibid., pp. 245-246. 53. Ibid., p. 111. 54. Ibid. 55. Marx,Economicand PhilosophicalManuscriptsof1844,Marx/EngelsCollected Works,Vol. 3, p. 276. 56. AlasdairMaclntyre,AfterVirtue(London: Duckworth,1981),p. 67ff.

and PatriciaSpringborgis a Senior Lecturerin the Departmentof Government of Sydneyand was from 1980-1982a at the University Public Administration of Pennsylvania.She is VisitingLecturerinpoliticalphilosophyat the University authorofThe ProblemofHumanNeedsand theCritiqueofCivilization(London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin,1981) and has publishedarticlesin PoliticalTheory, PoliticalStudies,and otherjournals.
