Knowing, Believing, and Understanding: What Goals ... - Springer Link

Science & Education 13: 553–582, 2004. © 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Knowing, Believing, and Understanding: What Goals for Science Education? MIKE U. SMITH1 and HARVEY SIEGEL2

1 Department of Internal Medicine, Mercer University School of Medicine, Macon, GA, USA, E-mail: [email protected]; 2 Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA, E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. What is a teacher to do when confronted with a student who says “I understand that theory (e.g., evolution), but I don’t believe it”? The purpose of this article is to provide a rationale for answering this question. First we describe the various ways in which the terms know/knowledge and believe/belief are used and summarize the distinctions commonly used to differentiate between these terms. Second, we propose that the primary goal of science education should be student knowledge and understanding, which we will argue typically (but not always) involves belief and typically (but not always) guides action. In those instances where a student evidences a meaningful understanding but still disbelieves, we further propose that the appropriate goal is for students to believe that the theory in question affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena based on the available empirical evidence. Third, we evaluate instructional procedures for addressing the issues of knowledge, belief, and understanding recommended by recent authors before providing our own suggestions to teachers that we hope will be both more philosophically sound and more effective in the classroom. Key words: Knowledge, belief, understanding, goals, evolution

“Rabbit’s clever”, said Pooh thoughtfully. “Yes”, said Piglet, “Rabbit’s clever”. “And he has a brain”. “Yes”, said Piglet, “Rabbit has a brain”. There was a long silence. “I suppose”, said Pooh, “that that’s why he never understands anything”. (Milne 1950, p. 129)

1. Introduction The proper role of knowledge and belief in science instruction has received increasing attention of late. Some have argued that this issue lies at the heart of an understanding of the nature of science, which is a central aim of recent standards documents and recommended curricula both in the U.S. and elsewhere, but

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classroom teachers typically find themselves ill prepared for addressing the philosophical issues involved. The call to address issues concerning knowledge and belief resonates with life science teachers in particular for very practical reasons. Not infrequently, students (and sometimes parents or even school board members) will flatly declare that they “don’t believe in evolution”. (For example, 41% of undergraduates surveyed by Bishop & Anderson (1990) either did not “believe the theory of evolution to be truthful” or were “unsure”.) Physical science teachers may also encounter such disbelief in their students. Arons (1990) noted, for example, that “although they have been told that all bodies when left unsupported, fall together – and they are able to spell out exactly the law – in fact, they have never believed it” (p. 131). What is a teacher to do when confronted with such disbelief? The purpose of this article is to provide a rationale for answering this question. First we will describe in some detail the various ways in which the terms know/knowledge and believe/belief are used, both in the scholarly literature and in ordinary discourse, and summarize the distinctions commonly used to differentiate between these terms. We do so with some trepidation, recognizing that “[t]hese questions touch on some of the most perplexing problems in the theory of knowledge” (Scheffler 1965, p. 75), and that in addressing them we are handling hot wires . . . . Live currents are involved. We are dealing with one of those complexes of issues that call on the deepest intellectual and spiritual convictions of scholars . . . . Our intellectual culture remains profoundly divided over . . . what to believe and what is believable, how belief is or is not knowledge. (Shea & Huff 1995)

Second, based in part on this analysis, we will propose that the primary goal of science education should be student knowledge and understanding, which we will argue typically (but not always) involves belief and typically (but not always) guides action. In those instances (such as teaching about evolution) where a student evidences a meaningful understanding but still disbelieves, we further propose that the appropriate goal is for students to believe that the theory in question affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena based on the available empirical evidence. Third, we will evaluate instructional procedures for addressing the issues of knowledge, belief, and understanding recommended by recent authors before providing our own suggestions to teachers that we hope will be both more philosophically sound and more effective in the classroom. 2. Knowing and Believing 2.1. USE OF THE TERMS knowledge AND belief BY PHILOSOPHERS It is uncontroversial that education aims at the imparting of knowledge: students are educated in part so that they may come to know things. The familiar parent question, “What did you learn in school today, dear?”, is readily interpreted in terms of knowledge, i.e., “What did you come to know in school today?”, and

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children’s answers equally so: “I learned/came to know . . . ”. This general point is straightforwardly applicable to science education as a special case: we want science education to result, among other things, in student knowledge, e.g., knowledge of the properties and other features of atoms, chemical reactions, genes, ecological systems, environmental hazards, the behavior of moving objects, and so forth. How is knowledge of this sort to be understood? To ask this question is to ask for a theoretical account of knowledge: what is it?; what conditions are necessary and sufficient for something being, or counting as, an item of knowledge? What conditions must be met in order for some particular knowing subject S to know some particular proposition p? Since Plato, the ‘standard’ account of knowledge has been that knowledge is justified true belief; these conditions – justification, truth, and belief – being individually necessary, and jointly sufficient, for knowledge. Before addressing some problems with this account, let us briefly consider the reasons that have led epistemologists to regard these as the conditions of knowledge. Belief is perhaps the least controversial condition of knowledge. Suppose you were told by your daughter Mary’s elementary school teacher that “Mary knows that the Earth revolves around the Sun, but she does not believe that it does”. Would you think, on the basis of this remark, that Mary knows that the earth revolves around the sun? Virtually all philosophers seeking to analyze knowledge have answered the last question in the negative, concluding that one can know only what one believes – that is, that what one knows is a proper subset of what one believes. While nothing has been said about what a belief is (a disposition? a psychological state? a brain state? something else?), it is as universally agreed as anything is in epistemology that belief is a necessary condition of knowledge. Consider next the truth condition. Can a person know something that is false? For example, could Mary know that the Earth revolves around the Sun, if the Earth did not in fact so move? Since Plato, most philosophers have regarded it as uncontroversial that this question must also be answered in the negative. If p is false, I cannot know that p. Of course, there is nothing problematic about the idea of a false belief, or even of a justified false belief. Thus I can believe, falsely, that p is true, when p is false; my false belief that p may even be justified, despite being false. But if it is false, I cannot know that p. Consequently, truth is also a necessary condition of knowledge. Finally, consider the justification condition. Suppose that a high school principal, Dr. Jones, believes that hiring a new biology teacher for the science department will lead to personality conflicts among the teaching staff. Suppose as well that this belief is true. Suppose, finally, that Jones has no reason to believe it; she does believe it, but she has (and so can offer) no evidence for the claim. She has not met the prospective teacher, or spoken to anyone who has; she hasn’t read the teacher’s application or file – she just “has a feeling about it”. She just believes it, and it happens to be true. Does Jones know it? Plato, and the tradition his work spawned, thought not. Philosophers in that tradition regarded cases like this one as instances, not of knowledge, but of ‘lucky’ true belief. What turns true belief into

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knowledge is a ‘tether’, or, in more contemporary language, reasons (evidence) that justify(ies) or provide(s) warrant for belief. If this is correct, then justification is also a necessary condition of knowledge. There are major philosophical controversies concerning all three of these putative conditions of knowledge. The very notion of truth, and so the truth condition of knowledge, has come in for serious criticism in recent philosophical (and other) scholarship. There are also important controversies concerning the justification condition. There are, moreover, important controversies among philosophers concerning the adequacy of the standard “justified-true-belief” account of knowledge more generally. These controversies remain ongoing; no immediate resolutions are in sight. Despite these controversies, however, it is not philosophically controversial that belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, i.e., that a knowing subject can know something only if she believes it. It is also uncontroversial that belief is not a sufficient condition of knowledge, i.e., that believing something is not tantamount to knowing it. It is only this uncontroversial point that we will embrace and exploit in what follows.1

2.2. USE OF THE TERMS knowledge AND belief BY EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHERS

2.2.1. Science Educators Like most academicians other than philosophers, educational researchers have rarely been explicit about the precise meaning of the terms knowledge and belief in their writing. As a group, science educators tend to view knowledge as “evidential, dynamic, emotionally-neutral” in contrast to belief which is described as “both evidential and non-evidential, static, emotionally-bound” (Gess-Newsome 1999, p. 55). Knowledge is “understood to be based on an assessment of evidence (in the case of scientific knowledge, the evidence would be judged using scientific epistemic criteria), whereas belief does not have the same empirical requirement” (Southerland et al. 2001a, pp. 337–338). Most modern science educators, of course, also accept fallibilism, recognizing that certainty is not a condition of knowledge . . . . Science educators using a fallibilist epistemology of science attempt to draw tight distinctions between knowledge and belief . . . to qualify as knowledge, a proposition, must represent the best, albeit limited, approximation of reality employed by a wider community, and the learner must have valid reasons to justify or provide warrant for the proposition (typically relying on an objective, rational appraisal of support claims) . . . . Knowledge claims . . . have to be open to public scrutiny and examination, using agreed methodological criteria for their evaluation, and with nature being recognized as the final arbiter (Southerland et al. 2001a, p. 339).


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2.2.2. Educational Psychologists Hofer and Pintrich (1997) note that belief is a “particularly slippery” term in the psychological literature (p. 9). For many psychologists, and educational psychologists in particular, knowledge encompasses “all a person knows or believes to be true, whether or not it is verified as true in some sort of objective or external way” (Alexander et al. 1991, p. 317). As Southerland, Sinatra, and Matthews note, in this definition knowledge and beliefs are not clearly distinguished . . . there is no distinction to be made between studying the processes whereby sense and nonsense are learned. Astrology is not, in principle, distinguished from astronomy . . . science is not distinguished from ideology. (Southerland et al. 2001b, p. 9)

2.2.3. Constructivists Constructivist science educators tend to maintain that knowledge and belief are inextricably intertwined, that “for all practical purposes belief and knowledge both represent what one has reason to believe is true or valid” (Cobern 2000, p. 235), implying that all attempts to distinguish the two should be abandoned. 2.2.4. Conceptual Change Educators Among the views of science educators, those of teachers and researchers who are guided by the conceptual change model of learning deserve special note here for two reasons. First, researchers who have focused on students’ pre-instructional conceptions frequently call these often erroneous ideas naïve, experiential, or non-scientific beliefs. (Others prefer the terms alternative conceptions or misconceptions.) Usage of the term belief appears to be preferred by some because it implies that the student’s view is not strictly empirically based, not consistent with scientific knowledge (see Southerland et al. 2001a for more on this issue.) Second, the conceptual change term plausibility is closely related to believability. According to conceptual change theory, in order for a new conception to be adopted, four conditions must be met, one of which is that the new conception “must appear initially plausible . . . [i.e., it must not be] counterintuitive” (Strike & Posner 1985, pp. 216, 220). Among the reasons that a person may judge a knowledge claim to be plausible is that he/she finds it “consistent with one’s current metaphysical beliefs and epistemological commitments, that is, one’s fundamental assumptions” (Strike & Posner 1985, p. 220). This meaning of the term plausibility is clearly similar to some of the vernacular meanings of the term believe in the continua in Table 1 below. Thus, conceptual change adherents appear to distinguish between knowledge and belief.

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2.2.5. Teacher Education Researchers Teacher educators are another special case in point. These researchers often appear to view the terms knowledge and belief as synonyms and thus employ them interchangeably in their writing. Southerland, Sinatra, and Matthews (2001a), however, maintain that teacher educators are not explicitly arguing for the equation of belief and knowledge on theoretical [/philosophical] grounds . . . . Much of the thinking they focus on – what a teacher knows of her practice – must be defined in highly subjective, personal terms and thus would be considered beliefs. However, teacher thinking can also have a significant empirical component and so could be considered knowledge. (pp. 346– 347)

In teacher research, knowledge and belief can be very difficult to distinguish because one teacher’s knowledge (non-emotional, empirically-derived, based on outside research and personal data) can appear to be largely equivalent to another teacher’s belief (emotionally laden, subjectively-derived, based on significant teaching episodes). (Southerland et al. 2001b, p. 347)

2.3. COMMON USAGE : SYNONYMS , ANTONYMS , OR OVERLAPPING CONSTRUCTS ? The terms knowledge and belief have different meanings for different people and in various contexts today. The terms are primary currency, both in modern vernacular and in research. Sometimes speakers use the terms as synonyms; other authors understand them as antonyms (“denoting orthogonal dimensions of human understanding”) (Alexander & Dochy 1995, p. 415); some authors even imply both meanings, sometimes within a single paper. 2.3.1. Nine Continua of Meaning An extensive review of both popular and educational research literature suggests that it may be useful to understand the usage of the terms knowledge and belief along nine continua: objective/subjective, rational/irrational, public/personal, verified/unverified, verifiable/unverifiable, certain/tentative, static/dynamic, not a basis for action/a basis for action, implying low commitment/implying high commitment (see Table 1, p. x). Belief is more likely to be identified with the terms to the right in the table (subjective/value-laden, irrational, personal, etc.). Knowledge is more likely to be identified with terms to the left (objective/empirical, rational, public, etc.). Understanding the meaning of any given usage clearly requires being able to recognize where the author intends the term’s meaning to lie on these continua. The examples provided in this table amply demonstrate the multiple and potentially confusing meanings commonly ascribed to these two terms. Körner (1966) has identified such terms as “inherently inexact”.


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2.3.2. Contrary Vernacular Usages People also sometimes use the terms know and believe in ways that are exactly opposite to those in Table 1. For example, people sometimes say they know things that are subjective and unverifiable. This use of the term usually implies great strength of commitment to the claim (e.g., “I know that my Redeemer liveth”). Conversely, people sometimes say they believe propositions that are objectively testable; these beliefs can also be well reasoned/rational. (“I believe that brushing our teeth is good for our health”.) Similarly, people may say they do not believe in an apparently objective proposition, using the term to suggest their position that the matter requires a subjective/personal evaluation, not an objective/ publicly validated one. ("I do not believe in evolution”.) Sometimes such statements are also made for the purpose of implying that the speaker does not consider the evidence for the claim to be verifiable. (“I don’t believe in evolution because no one was around to see it happen”.) Not all beliefs, of course, are irrational. Individuals also hold many beliefs that they have well-developed reasons for holding; such beliefs are sometimes called reasoned beliefs. (“Based on an extensive reading of the research, I believe that nuclear power causes fewer deaths than coal-produced energy”.) Note that it is also possible to believe things that may be entirely reasonable and well supported but that the individual has little knowledge of. (“As a biologist, I believe that quantum mechanics is a valid description of the behavior of subatomic particles, but I don’t know much about it”.) Thus, a single claim (such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle) could be called knowledge for one person (a particle physicist) and a belief for another (a non-scientist). Although some beliefs are uncertain “mere opinions”, individuals often report that they are very certain of the truth of their religious beliefs. (“I believe in God – I’d stake my life on my faith”.) Such beliefs are typically very resistant to change. (“I don’t believe in evolution. I will never believe in evolution”.) Contrary to the commonplace understanding of knowledge, of course, scientists, science educators, and philosophers of science recognize that scientific knowledge is tentative (e.g., the evolving understanding of the causes of dinosaur extinction). Finally, not all beliefs lead to action (“I believe that HIV can be transmitted by unprotected sex, but I still do it”). Sometimes people even act in keeping with things they do not profess to believe (e.g., not walking under a ladder, tossing spilled salt over the shoulder, etc.) Also, individuals can believe things that are widely recognized as false (as noted earlier) (“I believe the earth is flat”. “I believe that the Holocaust never happened”). Confusion often arises when people use the terms know or believe as in the examples in the preceding three paragraphs where they intend meanings that are at the ends of these continua opposite from what would be expected in common usage. In most of these cases, however, confusion is avoided because we understand the meaning in context. For example, although there was considerable discussion of

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NASA scientist David McKay’s use of the term believe (“There is not any one finding that leads us to believe that this is evidence of life on Mars"), both scientists and non-scientists alike generally understood that he was referring to a critical analysis of the empirical evidence, not a faith-based religious conviction. Similarly, listeners would likely recognize that a minister who says “I do not believe in evolution” is making a statement of faith, not a statement about the adequacy of the experimental evidence (unless otherwise indicated). Confusion is likely to result, however, when the context does not provide adequate cues for the listener to understand which ends of the continua are being referred to. We maintain that this lack of clarity in context is one of the things that makes misunderstanding likely when a classroom science teacher says “I do (or do not) believe in evolution”. Students who hear such statements need more cues before they can understand what meaning of the term believe is intended. 2.3.3. Believing in vs. Believing That Several of the statements included thus far have used either the phrase “I believe in . . . ” or “I believe that . . . ”. Although most non-religious readers will likely see these phrases as equivalent, it is important to acknowledge here that the distinction between these two phrases is important for the adherents of many religions. For such individuals, the phrase “believe in” typically implies a strong personal commitment to a belief system or a proposition. As Clouser (1991) notes, belief in something signifies “openhearted acceptance of, and reliance on, what is believed” (p. 32). (“I believe in God”. “I believe in communism”.) In contrast, the phrase “believe that” is more typically used “with respect to belief which has undergone reflective judgment” (p. 32). (“I believe that I will fail the final exam because I have failed all the exams to date”.) “Belief that” also often implies less commitment (“I believe that exercise is good for you, but I don’t do it”). A verse from the Bible makes the point clearly that belief that God exists is less than belief in God: “You believe that there is one God. Good! Even the demons believe that – and shudder” (James 2:19). This distinction is important in the current context, because statements such as “I want you to believe in evolution” are especially prone to being interpreted by religious students as asking for a faith-based personal commitment. 2.3.4. Self-Reports of Meanings of the Terms Alexander and Dochy (1995) surveyed the meanings given to the terms knowledge and belief by 120 university undergraduates, graduate students, and content experts in the United States and the Netherlands. The majority of the respondents in this study “perceive knowledge and belief to be overlapping ideas that still retain some unique dimensions” (p. 438). Only 4% of the respondents saw the two concepts as “inseparable”; 6% of the sample held that the terms were totally “separate”. Furthermore, the variability of meanings held for the terms increased for respondents as expertise increased. Knowledge was generally viewed as “formally constructed


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as in the case of schooling, as opposed to beliefs which were seen as the outcomes of one’s everyday encounters” (p. 424). Alexander and Dochy also demonstrated that the conceptualizations of knowing and believing for American undergraduates seemed rather rooted in religious issues . . . knowledge was little more than declarative information for these students, memorized and regurgitated in schools, whereas beliefs were more often cast as important religious truths held with strong convictions. (p. 427)

Furthermore, Alexander and Dochy concluded from an analysis of the open-ended responses of the American undergraduates in this study that it was “a sign of moral character for an individual to resist information or experiences that would challenge their beliefs or a ‘faith that should be not explored or doubted’ ” (p. 437). Beliefs in this sense are strongly held positions that are vital components of the adherent’s worldview and personhood, not ephemeral, groundless preferences (see the high/low commitment examples in Table 1). The difference between these two views of belief mirrors the difference between scientists’ views of the term theory as an overarching and well-supported explanation and those who speak of evolution as “only a theory”. Conflation of these two meanings of the term belief is a particularly troublesome finding because of the central value of skepticism in science. An error of such consequence could, with some justification, be called an “epistemic sin”. [See also Bishop and Anderson (1990) and Oliver and Koballa (1992) for similar findings in more limited samples.] 2.4. INTERIM SUMMARY 1. Most philosophers view knowledge and belief as distinct but related terms. Belief is taken by them to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge. Science educators and other scholars use the terms in a wide variety of ways that are often inconsistent both with that philosophical usage and with one another. 2. As with most English words, there are multiple vernacular meanings of the terms know and believe. 3. In common usage, knowledge tends to be perceived as more objective; beliefs tend to be understood as more subjective/value-laden, calling for high levels of commitment and action. (At least in the United States, belief tends to have meanings rooted in religion, and students often value the fortitude of those who refuse to examine such beliefs.) 4. Very few people view the two terms as synonymous. Most people view the terms as overlapping but not identical. Therefore, for most people the terms maintain some important unique and separate meanings. 5. These multiple overlapping meanings can lead to crucial misunderstandings when meanings are implied that are not parallel with common vernacular distinctions, especially when there is inadequate context provided to clarify the intended meaning.

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6. Communicating clearly when using the terms knowledge and belief is crucial in the science classroom because these concepts are central to understanding the nature of science.

3. The Goals of Science Education How then should we translate this analysis of the various meanings of the terms know and believe into appropriate goals for science instruction? In particular, if belief is a necessary condition of knowledge and science education aims at fostering student knowledge, does it follow that science education aims at fostering belief? As a matter of logic, the answer must be that it does. But this simple answer is problematic. We next seek to address this problem by urging that a further aim of science education, complementary to that of fostering student knowledge, is fostering student understanding. 3.1. UNDERSTANDING We take it as uncontroversial that a primary aim of science education is the fostering of student knowledge of science content. In our view a second, crucially important goal of science education should be to foster student understanding of the content of science – the claims and theories of science, the current best explanations of how things work – as well as the nature and methods of science.2 Understanding is a difficult notion to define, but we find Gauld’s (2001) definition a practical starting place: “Understanding of some notion is made up of the ideas which are linked together and the connections which define the relationships between these ideas” (p. 5). Gauld’s second definition of understanding is similar to the first but more global: “Understanding is . . . ‘making sense’ of something or attributing meaning to it” (p. 5). Science educators will recognize this criterion as akin to “plausibility” in conceptual change theory (Strike & Posner 1985). To these criteria of connectedness and sense-making we would add a third that focuses more on application: A person can be said to understand a concept or idea if he/she can apply that understanding appropriately in both academic and non-academic settings (such as problem-solving situations). In this respect understanding is, as Scheffler says, “inherently general” (1965, p. 72). Finally, understanding must involve a coherent appraisal of at least some of the reasons that justify a claim, i.e., those considerations that render the claim worthy of belief. The educated student must be able to judge the adequacy of the evidentiary support for a claim. (Notice that this criterion is one that flows from the aim of knowledge as well as the aim of understanding. It is, moreover, central to the educational aim of critical thinking (Siegel 1988, 1997)). As Dewey said in 1910, it is the business of education to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that


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are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual’s working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. (Dewey 1910, pp. 27–28).3

We therefore recognize four (admittedly overlapping) criteria for understanding: connectedness, sense-making, application, and justification. 3.2. SHOULD BELIEF BE A GOAL OF SCIENCE EDUCATION ? 3.2.1. A Case Example Some in the science education community have proposed that changing student beliefs should also be a goal of science education (see for example the statements by Lawson, Weser, Alters, and Good below). We ourselves might appear to be advocating this view as well, since we are urging that science education aim at fostering student knowledge and understanding of scientific content and belief is a philosophical condition of knowledge. But here an important ambiguity lurks that can best be explained with an example. Consider a high school physics class learning about the second law of thermodynamics. When we say that we want students to know and understand that entropy increases (in closed systems), what exactly do we want them to believe? Let us take these italicized terms one at a time. Because justification is a condition of knowledge, knowing the second law of thermodynamics involves appreciating its justification: that is, why we take the law to be (approximately) true. As with most important scientific content, in this case the considerations that justify the second law are diverse, involving (among other things) its derivation from higher level physical theories, the observational and experimental evidence that confirms it, and its application to real systems (e.g., steam engines), etc. Knowing the second law involves more than simply writing “entropy increases” on the exam; it involves student appreciation of at least some of the reasons that justify it, i.e., render it worthy of belief. But of course what we’ve just called “appreciation” is related to understanding. For a student to understand the second law, she must appreciate the evidence for it – not just be able to identify on a test what the supporting evidence is, but understand why that evidence counts as evidence that supports the second law. Without such understanding, the student can’t be said to know the law at all, because she has no reason for thinking it true (other than that the teacher said so). In keeping with our criteria above, understanding the second law requires, first, that students can identify and define the concepts involved in entropy (order, molecules, temperature, heat, etc.) and can provide rich and appropriate explanations of the interconnections among these concepts. Second, the student who understands the second law can also “make sense” of it, i.e., can explain how it applies in a variety of concrete situations. Third, if he/she understands the second law, the student can appropriately apply it to previously unencountered contexts and problems. Fourth, the student appreciates at least some of the reasons why the second law is held to be true (reasons that render it worthy of belief), i.e., understands why

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those reasons count as evidence that supports the second law and can appropriately evaluate the merits of that evidence. Few science educators would likely disagree with these goals for teaching the second law of thermodynamics. But the question concerning belief has yet to be addressed. Let us face it squarely now: If students know and understand the second law, must they believe it? Here we come to the central question. There are certain propositions such that, if students understand the second law, they will believe them: that the second law mentions the term entropy; that that term is defined in terms of increasing disorder; that the law applies only to closed systems; etc. If students do not believe such claims, we would have no reason to think that they either know or understand the second law. But what about the second law itself: must students believe it? That is, if students know and understand the second law, must they believe that entropy increases in closed systems? The answer here is, unfortunately, not straightforward. On the one hand, if students know and understand the second law, and if (as argued above) such knowledge and understanding involves appreciating its justification, then they appreciate the reasons for regarding it as worthy of belief. If they agree that those reasons render it worthy of belief, then their appreciation of the epistemic force of those reasons will lead, in normal circumstances, to belief. Here belief is not something requiring some extra effort or commitment; it is simply what results when cognitive agents appreciate the force of relevant reasons for the candidate belief in question. For example, once one appreciates the reasons for believing that touching a hot object can cause pain – in the usual case, by touching one and feeling the pain – one typically believes it (and acts accordingly). Similarly, once one appreciates, by working through them, the proofs of familiar mathematical claims such as that a 2 + b2 = c2 (for Euclidean systems) or that there is no highest prime number, one typically simply finds oneself believing those claims. In the same way, once one appreciates the reasons for believing typical scientific claims of the sort taught in school (for example that smoking causes a variety of diseases, that atoms combine in particular ways, that cells divide, and so on), one normally believes them. In brief, understanding typically yields belief (Adler 2002; Evnine 2001). Belief does not, however, always follow understanding; that is why the qualifier “typically” is necessary. A case in point is the obvious one, the subject of much discussion (and hand-wringing) in the science education literature: the creationist student who can demonstrate a meaningful understanding of the tenets of evolutionary theory and the relationship of those tenets to the biochemical, ecological, paleontological, statistical and other evidence that supports it, yet fails to believe that evolution occurs. The reasons for such a response to the evolution instruction can vary but might involve a worldview that includes a deep distrust of science (and other things secular), a particular philosophical view about the relationship between science and religion, and/or a rejection of the epistemological presuppositions underwriting the claim that the reasons/evidence just mentioned actually


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constitute good reason for belief. In such cases, knowledge and understanding of evolutionary theory and the evidentiary support for it do not yield belief. In cases like this, in which students master the relevant scientific content but do not believe it, how should teachers respond? Should they understand their task to be that of changing student beliefs? Should we regard their teaching as deficient if students know and understand a theory but nevertheless do not believe it? In such situations, we maintain that teachers ought not to strive to shape directly the content of student belief – striving to do so is the mark of the indoctrinator rather than the educator. In a crucially important sense, what students believe must be up to them. In such cases we maintain that an appropriate goal is for the student to recognize the scientific status of the theory in question, i.e., believe (in the nonreligious sense) that the theory affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena based on the available empirical evidence. Instruction must provide students with an understanding of the evidence related to the theory, but in the end the student must judge for himself/herself the merits of the theory’s claims. Anything less amounts to a failure to treat students with respect as autonomous agents (Siegel 1988, 1997). In those cases where belief does not follow from knowledge and understanding, knowledge and understanding alone must, and should, suffice. In particular, if students continue to disbelieve evolutionary theory in favor of religious belief, despite having knowledge and understanding of the theory, the science teacher should be content to point out that, regardless of whatever can be said in its favor, religious belief simply cannot be scientifically sanctioned. It is not part of the teacher’s task to demonstrate that a religious belief is false – after all, whether science and religious belief are compatible is itself a controversial question. Neither is it the science teacher’s task to judge the epistemic status of the students’ religious beliefs. If a student has mastered the content of evolutionary theory and appreciates its scientific credentials, the teacher has admirably accomplished her task – whether or not the student believes the theory in the end. Indeed, the teacher herself may also understand but not believe, i.e., not believe that evolutionary theory is true. Knowledge and understanding are a sufficient goal for both student and teacher. To insist upon student belief in evolution, i.e., belief that it is true, however, is to overreach. We maintain that in special circumstances a person can indeed understand a theory and simultaneously refuse to believe it. Notice that in the case in which a student understands a theory (such as evolution) but does not believe that that theory is true, what he/she understands about the theory is not identical with what he/she refuses to believe. (If these were identical, belief could not be a necessary condition of knowledge.) Thus the student might know, and so believe, that

p : according to evolutionary theory, speciation is a complex, lengthy process that typically takes place in contexts of geographical isolation,

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but not believe that q : speciation is a complex, lengthy process that typically takes place in contexts of geographical isolation. This case is like the one mentioned above concerning the second law of thermodynamics, in which understanding does not require belief. In that case, the student who understands the second law knows and believes that r : according to the second law, entropy increases in closed systems, but need not believe that s : entropy increases in closed systems. The difference between the two cases is this. In the thermodynamics case, it is unusual for a student’s distrust of science or view of the relationship between science and religion to interfere with her understanding of or with her belief in the claims understood. But in the evolution case, such interference is much more common. Thus biology teachers regularly encounter students who understand evolutionary theory but do not believe that it is true, while physics teachers much less frequently encounter students who understand the second law of thermodynamics but do not believe it. Nevertheless, the cases are on a par: in both, the primary aim should be for students to know and understand the relevant science. If understanding is achieved, belief will typically follow, barring some specific barrier. Whether or not it follows, the science teacher has done her job well if her students acquire the relevant knowledge and understanding. (A crucial word of caution is needed here. When dealing with students who have fundamentalist religious views or who come from cultures (e.g., parts of the southern U.S.) where such views are prominent, the mere use of the word believe in the same sentence with the word evolution is likely to raise a red flag in the minds of many. Such students have been taught that one cannot “believe in God and evolution” and that evolutionist biology teachers will try to turn them into atheists. When we say that we aim for students to “believe that the theory of evolution is the best current scientific explanation based on the available empirical evidence”, fundamentalist students may simply shut out the rest of the sentence after the word believe is uttered. Our experience suggests that teachers would be well advised in these situations to use the term accept instead of believe in this goal statement to reduce the likelihood that the student will misunderstand.)4 Classroom teachers will also be familiar with another type of case in which understanding does not involve belief. Science education often asks students to understand historically significant theories and explanations although they have been supplanted by more recent theories. A person can clearly understand the principles of Ptolemaic astronomy or Lamarckian inheritance but not believe them to be true. Similarly, a person might understand the teachings of the Buddha, but nevertheless


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not be a Buddhist (not believe in Buddha, or believe that his teachings are true). In all such cases, belief is not an appropriate aim or expectation of public education. If our analysis of these several cases is correct, knowledge and understanding of specific scientific content do not require or entail belief in that same content, and it is a mistake to think of such belief as itself an aim of science education. 3.2.2. Proposals to Adopt or Eliminate Beliefs as Goals of Science Education A careful reading of some authors who state their desire for students to believe in some scientific claim or theory suggests that this phrase could be interpreted as a desire that, in addition to understanding a claim or theory, students should have a commitment to act in ways that are consistent with their scientific understandings. This is the view of belief developed by C.S. Pierce and associated with American Pragmatism. According to this view, “Belief is . . . a disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions” (Scheffler 1965, p. 76). Likewise, Clouser (1991) defines a belief as “an acquired disposition to regard its object as factual and to think, speak, act, or hold other beliefs in ways which suppose the statement of the belief to be true” (p. 30). We certainly aim for our students to avoid unprotected sexual intercourse in keeping with their understanding of the modes of transmission of HIV and other STDs. Similarly, in keeping with an appropriate understanding of evolutionary principles, students should take the full course of any antibiotic prescribed to avoid the potential development of resistance instead of discontinuing medication as soon as symptoms end. But this is a more limited meaning of believe than most students would readily assume, and individuals are clearly free to act in whatever way they choose. The other primary concern raised by authors who aim to change student beliefs is the central question raised in the first section of this paper: what is one to do about the student in biology class who can clearly demonstrate an acceptable level of understanding of evolution (as defined by our four criteria above) but is nonetheless adamant in his/her disbelief of the theory? Good’s (2001) avowal of belief as a goal of science education, for example, is in direct response to a letter he received from a student, which reads in part: I have to disagree with the answers I wrote on the exam. I do not believe that some millions of years ago, a bunch of stuff blew up and from all that disorder we got this beautiful and perfect system we know as our universe . . . . To say that the universe “just happened” or “evolved” requires more faith than to believe that God is behind the complex organization of our solar system . . . (p. 7).

Good accurately points out that “religious habits of mind” such as the reliance on authority and "unquestioning acceptance of predetermined dogma” (p. 5) implied in this student’s letter necessarily conflict with “scientific habits of mind” such as “openness” and “tentativeness” when the former are applied (we would argue inappropriately) to matters of science. Good asks, “Can meaningful learning occur if the learner does not believe that science claims are ‘true’ or even approximately accurate? . . . the answer is probably not” (p. 8). Our contrary position is that

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meaningful learning has indeed occurred when our four criteria of understanding outlined above have been achieved – even if belief does not follow. Alters (1997) argues in even more sweeping terms for directly targeting student beliefs as a goal of science education: Teaching students to just understand the material is not a sufficient goal; the teachers must also attempt to have students believe that what is being taught is correct . . . . Both public and private schools have always had belief as a goal of instruction whether implicitly or explicitly expressed. (pp. 15–16)

As recognized by Alters, however, many people recognize that teaching evolution with belief as a goal is tantamount to proselytizing students. . . The problem for many educators is that evolution is in conflict with some students’ religious beliefs and therefore, by teaching evolution with a goal of belief, the educator is attempting in fact to change the student’s religious beliefs. (p. 16)

Alters identifies this view as a “misconception”, but the only support he presents of his claim that this position is erroneous is his opinion that no curriculum can be religiously inert . . . . No matter what our public schools teach, we could easily be offending someone. The offense taken by students and parents is certainly not intended; it is just unavoidable (p. 16).

We agree that science instruction that opposes no religious beliefs is sometimes impossible (where, for example, religious leaders attempt to convince their followers that religion can answer empirical questions such as the age of the earth), but we strongly disagree that this conclusion demands that we actively seek to attack students’ religious beliefs. More importantly, it does not follow from Alters’ argument that we should aim for our students to “believe that what is being taught is correct” (p. 16) – that they should, in effect, merely substitute one belief for another. Unfortunately, all too often teachers have given students precisely this understanding of their goal of instruction. A far better strategy is to aim at knowledge and understanding of the theory, and let student belief fall where it may. For those who find it inadequate or unsatisfying that the science teacher should leave student belief aside, there is comfort in realizing that belief typically follows understanding, and that, when it doesn’t, that disconnect is usually the result of strongly held convictions that science by itself cannot undermine or adequately address. (For further rebuttal of Alters’ position, see Cooper 2001.) We disagree even more strongly with science educators such as Lawson and Weser (1990) who maintain that a primary goal of science education should be to encourage students to “reject non-scientific beliefs” such as beliefs in God, divine guidance, the soul, etc. (p. 589). Because such claims cannot be evaluated in terms of empirical evidence, it is inappropriate to encourage students to reject (or accept) those beliefs. This is the height of scientism – the position that all of a person’s beliefs should be based on science. A proper understanding of the nature of science – which we want to convey to our students – must include a proper understanding of its limits. Science qua science takes no position whatsoever on such religious issues


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– and this is a crucially important feature of science for students to understand. [For more detail of our arguments against the Lawson and Weser views, see Smith & Siegel (1993).] On a more positive note, we heartily agree with Cobern that evolution education is unlikely to be successful if we do not address the related metaphysical/religious beliefs that are central to our students’ individual worldviews. For example, it is often valuable to preface the presentation of evolutionary theory with an explicit acknowledgement that students may hold religious beliefs that they perceive to be in conflict with evolution but that science qua science takes no position on questions that cannot be empirically investigated (including those concerning God) and thus that the goal of the present instruction is not to get students to reject any religious beliefs. [For an extended discussion of how a teacher could appropriately and productively address student beliefs in the science classroom, see Smith (1994) and Smith et al. (1995).] Students may, of course, raise religious and/or metaphysical questions, but given the non-theistic nature of science, it does not follow that science instruction should seek to answer them. Students may also hold faith-based views that are in conflict with empirical data (e.g., a young age of the earth) – which provides the well-prepared teacher with the perfect opportunity to help students understand the difference between questions science can answer (i.e., empirical questions about the natural world) and questions it cannot. Cobern (1994) also recommends that “belief is the place where instruction should begin” (p. 587), that instruction should “begin with a dialogue on what counts as believable” (p. 583). Specifically, Cobern recommends that evolution instruction should begin “by looking back historically to the cultural and intellectual milieu of Darwin’s day and the great metaphysical questions over which people struggled: [including] . . . . What does it mean to be a human being? [and] In what sense, and to what extent, are human beings different from other living things?" (p. 588). We agree that understanding how people in the 19th century addressed these questions may be of considerable interest to students and provide insight into the response to Darwin’s work (including insights into individual responses in modern times), although we are unsure of the value of expending much instructional time on such questions in high school biology class. With respect to Cobern’s suggestion that science education should “begin with a dialogue on what counts as believable”, we agree that when instruction addresses issues about which students may hold alternative views it is imperative that the teacher address those potential conflicts openly and directly, but obviously much care is required. Addressing student beliefs does not mean that we should use up class time trying to settle the matter of “what counts as believable” nor the issue of whether a given claim is believable or not – let alone attempt to settle the question scientifically. Indeed, it is clear that the matter cannot be settled scientifically, since many religious claims may be thought by students to be “believable” but they cannot be so established scientifically. As earlier, we think it an important task of science education to make clear to students that some claims are supportable on

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the basis of scientific evidence and inquiry, and others are not – this is a key lesson of education concerning the nature of science. It is neither necessary nor desirable to show that the claim that “God exists” is not “believable”; obviously, for many people this claim is clearly quite believable. Nevertheless, it is not believable on the basis on scientific evidence, since science makes no claims concerning matters that are not open to empirical investigation. In summary, we maintain that we should respond to students who actively disbelieve evolution by making it clear that we: (a) do not want them to reject any religious beliefs,5 but do want them to understand that such beliefs are not sanctioned scientifically; (b) want them to understand that their disbelief is not itself supported by scientific evidence; (c) want them to know and understand the theory of evolution and the evidence that supports it; (d) do not want them to believe in evolution blindly, and (e) do want them to recognize the epistemic status of evolutionary theory, i.e., believe that evolution affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena on the basis of the available empirical evidence. If the disbelieving student whose letter was cited by Good has a full and meaningful understanding of evolution’s tenets and scientific credentials, understands that her rejection of evolution is not itself scientifically based, and believes that evolution affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena available on the basis of the available empirical evidence, then she has achieved our learning goals – goals that are all too rarely achieved. 3.3. COBERN ’ S ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF

As noted earlier, constructivists and others often regard the terms knowledge and belief as equivalent. Elsewhere in the pages of this journal, for example, Cobern (2000) argued that “there is no unambiguous epistemic distinction between knowledge and belief . . . . For all practical purposes, belief and knowledge both represent what one has reason to believe is true (or valid)” (p. 235). Furthermore, Cobern cautioned that any instruction that acknowledges a “distinction between knowledge and belief . . . poses a threat to any meaningful sense of life and Nature for most students” (pp. 240–241). Clearly, a prediction of such dire consequences for those who accept our position merits a close analysis. There is much we agree with in Cobern’s analysis, especially his emphasis on the important place of reasons and justification in the science classroom. Also, we emphatically agree with Cobern that students operate within “different sets of presuppositions”, and that for this reason science teachers “will need to be more philosophically and culturally adroit” (p. 232). We further agree that “education should be much more about reasoning than about categorizing” (p. 236, emphasis


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in original), and that “[t]he more interesting question is not whether proposition ‘A’ is a belief or knowledge, but what are the justifications or reasons one holds for thinking that proposition ’A’ is true or valid” (pp. 235–256). In our opinion, however, these views do not require accepting the equivalence of knowledge and belief, as Cobern suggests. Cobern makes his case for the equivalence of knowledge and belief mainly in terms of a critical reaction to radical empiricism, which he identifies with “the claim that empirical science can be an autonomous, self-sustaining generator and guarantor of [all] knowledge” (p. 231). As he understands it, “The effort to make science autonomous is the effort to achieve meaningfulness, morality, and purpose within science” (p. 231). Like Cobern, we reject such empiricism – especially as Cobern articulates it. (Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a serious defense of such a view in the contemporary philosophical literature.)6 Cobern criticizes this view of radical empiricism by pointing to the allegedly inevitable non-rational basis of the “ontological belief[s]” and “presuppositions” (p. 237) upon which science is based. He argues that the “radical dichotomization of knowledge and belief has proved to be an unstable arrangement because rationality [itself] no longer has any foundation” (p. 229). Here he quotes Hendrick Hart (1980): “The positing of the ultimacy of rationality unmasks itself as a belief that cannot be rationally justified”, i.e., the decision to choose to value rationality cannot be made rationally. Thus, on Cobern’s view radical empiricism and “foundationless” rationality – and thus any distinction between knowledge and belief – must together be rejected. And those who disagree are in Cobern’s estimation “fundamentalists [in the pejorative sense of the word, who] seek to protect science from irrationalism”(p. 232). However, this attempt to tie together radical empiricism and rationality, suggesting that since the former cannot be sustained without appeal to non-empirical considerations, the latter cannot be sustained without appeal to non-rational considerations (p. 229ff.), is in our view quite problematic. Philosophers have worried about such foundational questions for millennia; they are difficult, to be sure. But many philosophers would strongly disagree with Cobern’s assertion that rationality (and thus science) cannot themselves be rationally justified. Cobern writes: . . . the more that scientific fundamentalists seek to protect science from irrationalism the more it appears to their adversaries (and to the public at large) that science is itself being shielded from the same analysis that established the definition of irrationalism in the first place. What is there to hide? What is there to lose? (p. 232)

We agree with Cobern that the question of science’s epistemic status must be addressed squarely; challenges to that status cannot be ignored either by philosophers or by science educators. (And so we are not rightly regarded as “scientific fundamentalists”) . But what Cobern has shown is not that a case for the epistemic merits of science cannot be compellingly made. Rather, what he has shown is that “radical empiricism” cannot make such a case. Since almost no one is a radical empiricist these days, this conclusion is of somewhat limited interest. There are, however, many accounts of science’s rational merits that do not proceed from rad-

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ical empiricist presuppositions. One could argue, for example, that it is rational to adopt the “first premises" of science because the findings of such science have been trustworthy and fruitful (leading to disease cures, space travel, etc.). (Among many others available in the literature, see Siegel 1985; concerning the rational status of rationality itself, see Siegel 1997, Chapter 5). Cobern continues his critique of knowledge and belief by maintaining that belief is always accompanied by what the believer takes to be justifying reasons, and therefore there is no such thing as “ ‘blind belief’ . . . . People simply do not hold beliefs for no reason” (p. 234). Philosophical subtleties aside, we agree with Cobern here. Typically, if a person S believes that p, S takes herself to have reasons that render p worthy of belief, reasons for thinking it true (Adler 2002; Evnine 2001). But Cobern concludes from this that S’s having reasons to believe that p is tantamount to S’s knowing that p – that “there is no immediately apparent difference between belief and knowledge” (p. 234). This conclusion does not follow, however, because the fact that S has reason to believe that p is true is quite distinct from p’s being true (that is, Cobern’s conclusion in effect denies that truth is a necessary condition of knowledge). Moreover, his argument fails to distinguish between S’s taking her reasons to be good ones and their actually being good ones – that is, the argument fails to distinguish between taking one’s belief to be justified and its actually being justified. In effect, then, Cobern’s argument also denies that justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. S’s having reason to believe that p is quite distinct from S having good reason to believe that p, but this distinction plays no role in Cobern’s analysis – despite his valuing of instruction that promotes reasoning, which suggests that the quality of students’ reasoning and the epistemic merits of their proffered reasons should be central both to education and to Cobern’s analysis. If our arguments are sound, then this attempt to establish the equivalence of belief and knowledge fails. The preceding arguments notwithstanding, we want immediately to concede the force of much of this part of Cobern’s discussion. We agree with him that “what is commonly called belief is belief with reason; what is commonly called knowledge is grounded on presuppositions” (p. 235). But we think that both of these claims, though correct, require qualification; let us take them in turn. (a) “Belief is belief with reason”. We agree with this claim in the sense that to believe that p involves taking oneself to have good reason for believing it (see Adler 2002). As noted above, however, taking oneself to have good reason is not tantamount to having good reason. One’s reasons for belief have to pass epistemic muster, so to speak. Learning what counts as a good reason is itself a key aim of education generally and science education in particular (Siegel 1988, 1997), and the quality of the support that a proposition enjoys is a basic means of distinguishing between knowledge and belief. (b) “Knowledge is grounded on presuppositions”. This is a notoriously difficult philosophical matter; in some sense it is obviously true, but in our view particular readings of it are highly problematic. Cobern’s own take on this claim


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is unclear. Occasionally he suggests that presuppositions are themselves open to critical assessment and evaluation of their “epistemological soundness” (2000, p. 235); in other places he suggests the contrary, claiming that the untestability of basic assumptions means that “all knowledge is a matter of faith” (p. 231). Our own view is the former (Siegel 1987, 1997). We agree with Cobern that the central presuppositions of science “cannot be proven empirically” (here citing Michael Ruse, p. 235), but we disagree with his suggestion that these presuppositions cannot be rationally supported at all. We think that they can, in the same way that Cobern himself endeavors to support his own philosophical claims concerning knowledge and belief. In summary, we maintain that Cobern has failed to show that a case for the epistemic merits of science cannot be compellingly made. Rather, what he has shown is that radical empiricism cannot make such a case. Regardless of the merits of Cobern’s argument for the equivalence of knowledge and belief, should we heed his warning that any instruction that acknowledges a “distinction between knowledge and belief . . . poses a threat to any meaningful sense of life and Nature for most students” (Cobern 2000, pp. 240–241)? This claim is based primarily on the following parable, which merits close analysis: A fifthgrade girl finds a dead bird in the schoolyard and asks her teacher, “Why did this bird have to die?” Cobern proposes that the teacher should not merely answer the “empirical question about how death comes about”, but “the metaphysical question about why things die” (p. 236). If the teacher does not, (1) The student will not be satisfied with the teacher’s answer. (2) The student will not be helped to understand how reasoning works in different disciplines like science and the humanities. (3) The teacher will have done little to foster within this child a positive attitude toward science, and perhaps done great harm. (p. 236)

Presumably, the student now has a negative attitude toward science because science cannot answer all her questions. Several issues need to be addressed in this deceptively simple and appealing story, but first we will put this example in contrast to two others. Suppose a high school student is conducting a science fair project whose purpose is to test the hypothesis that exposure to the electromagnetic radiation under power lines is dangerous. He puts a dozen rats in cages underneath a power line and keeps a dozen controls at home. One day he finds one of his animals under the power line dead. The first question the student must now answer is “Why did this rat die?” Or, for a second example, suppose a surgeon whose patient died under his knife is asked by the hospital review board, “Why did the patient die?” Will the science fair judges award the student a blue ribbon for discussing “the metaphysical question about why things die?” Should the surgeon start explaining his personal understandings about the meaning of life and death? Obviously not. The first point about Cobern’s dead bird story therefore is that context is extremely important. As Cobern notes, the teacher is probably not being asked a scientific (Cobern says “empirical”) question at all. The teacher is responding as

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an elementary school teacher, not as a science teacher. Elementary teachers are not just science teachers and often get asked questions outside of science. How silly it would be for the teacher to give only a scientific answer – just as preposterous as giving only an answer from the mathematics she teaches the student! Of course the child would not be satisfied. This is precisely the reason that this elementary playground scenario is inappropriate here. This context is not analogous to a science class, where students must learn how to ask and answer scientific questions analogous to those asked in the student science fair project or in the medical review board above. Moreover, we question how Cobern’s proposal of discussing the non-scientific question of “why things have to die” would help students in the science classroom understand “how reasoning works in different disciplines like science and the humanities”. In our opinion, addressing both scientific and metaphysical questions can be appropriate and is sometimes necessary in the science classroom, but only if the discussion explicitly compares and contrasts science and non-science. In the science classroom, teachers need to focus on helping students understand that scientific questions are different from non-scientific questions and that different kinds of information are used to address each. For science teachers in countries that espouse the separation of church and state, a second crucial issue involved in Cobern’s parable is the question of which/whose answers to those metaphysical questions will be provided by teachers. Christians are certainly not going to allow their children’s science teacher to started spouting Buddhist or new age (or whatever) doctrine concerning the meaning of life and death, nirvana, the existence of supernatural beings, etc. This recommendation from Cobern therefore assumes that the teacher’s metaphysical beliefs are the same as his own, but in today’s pluralistic societies teachers hold a wide variety of beliefs that individual parents may or may not want them to share with students. Third, Cobern claims that not answering metaphysical questions in science class will foster a negative attitude towards science because students will be disappointed that science cannot answer all their questions. Quite to the contrary, our position is that it is vitally important that we actively dissuade students from the common misconception that science should be able to answer all questions. Students must understand, whether it fosters a “positive attitude” toward science or not, that science only answers questions that can be empirically investigated. To maintain that science answers all questions is, of course, quintessential scientism. Finally, in support of his version of science instruction Cobern also quotes Noddings (1993) who has “recommended not only that [religious and metaphysical questions] be treated wherever they arise – in say, math or physics classes – but that teachers . . . should plan their lessons to include such material” (p. 132). Noddings, in fact, goes so far as to propose that both creation and evolution be taught in science classes – which has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court!7 In such classrooms, teachers would then “let students weigh the evidence or decide consciously to reject it in favor of faith” (p. 135; italics added). But in science


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“evidence” must be empirical, and by definition matters of faith are based on “the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1).8 Noddings even argues against drawing any distinction between science and non-science: “We do not have to say: This explanation is science, and that one is religion” (p. 7). As noted earlier, we recognize the value of addressing religious issues when they arise in science class, but we maintain that the purpose of such instruction must be diametrically opposite of what Noddings (and Cobern) propose – the goal must be to help students appropriately understand the nature of science and how it differs from non-science. Setting aside the legal issues, our principal concern with the Noddings/Cobern approach is that students who receive such instruction in science class are likely to develop improper understandings of the nature of evidence and the nature of science itself. Thus, despite the clear strengths of his discussion, we conclude that Cobern has failed to show that belief and knowledge either cannot or should not be distinguished.

4. Knowledge and Belief in Classroom Practice 4.1. SUGGESTIONS FOR CLASSROOM TEACHERS The preceding discussion leads to the following suggestions for classroom science teachers: 4.1.1. Explicitly Share Your Instructional Goals with Your Students Make it clear that you will not challenge their religious beliefs (except perhaps those of “young-earth” literalists or other empirical claims camouflaged in religious language). 4.1.2. Acknowledge the Preconceptions and Current Worldviews of Your Students Listen to their views. Find out what they know about your topic (including misconceptions) and what beliefs they hold that may influence their willingness to participate fully in the instruction. Address student misconceptions and beliefs directly. [For further discussion, see Smith et al. (1995).] 4.1.3. Strive for Understanding Rather than Belief Knowledge and understanding of the content, processes, and nature of science, as defined by our four criteria above, should be the primary goal of science education. Belief in that science, particularly leading to actions in keeping with appropriate scientific understanding, will typically follow knowledge and understanding. When it does not, knowledge and understanding must and should suffice. Belief may be desirable but need not and should not be an explicit aim of education.

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4.1.4. Seize Opportunities where the Topic of Belief Arises to Focus on Student Understanding of the Nature of Science Even Cobern (2000) and perhaps even Alters (1997) appear to agree that what is important is understanding the nature-of-science issues – how science differs from non-science, the nature of evidence in various disciplines, how reason is employed differently in various fields, and (we would add) what kinds of questions can be addressed with scientific approaches and which cannot. What is important is what counts as evidence in science, not what counts as believable. Help students learn to distinguish between questions or claims that are more scientific or less scientific. Explicitly address the kinds of evidence that are being considered and how appropriate each is or is not to apply to the current question. [For more on this approach, see Smith and Scharmann (1999) and Smith et al. (1995).] 4.1.5. Focus on the Tentativeness of Each Claim and the Evidence For and Against It Teachers should be clear about the tentativeness of various claims and, wherever possible, students should see the evidence both supporting and undermining those claims. Students should have the opportunity to analyze the strength of the scientific evidence relevant to questions of personal importance and should practice building and presenting reasoned evaluations of scientific claims, focusing on appropriate warrants for those claims. Such an approach is more likely to promote understanding because it expects students to build connections between knowledge claims and evidence, between their understandings of scientific and non-scientific disciplines.

4.2. THE ROLE OF AUTHORITY IN THE SCIENCE CLASSROOM Finally, it is important to keep these suggestions completely grounded in the real world. Although in an ideal world students should be able to carefully evaluate the evidentiary strength of all claims they encounter, in the classroom – and indeed in the real world outside the classroom – there is rarely adequate time, energy, or expertise to do so. In practice then, every person makes judgements about which claims he or she is willing to accept on the recommendation of experts or authorities and which are important enough to analyze personally. This reality also means that, in addition to being able to analyze arguments and evidence, students must also learn how to identify appropriate authorities (e.g., physicists vs. ministers concerning the age of the earth), to decide when it is or is not appropriate to accept the word of an authority, and to ascertain the level of commitment appropriate to accord to such received (vs. examined) knowledge.

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Table I. Nine continua of meaning in the vernacular usage of the terms knowledge and belief. Statements intended to illustrate the use of the terms with meanings at the extremes of each continuum are presented. The statements were mostly taken verbatim from various sources – including religious liturgies. Some statements can easily be construed as appropriate examples of extremes of more than one continuum. (For further explanation, see text.) Knowledge Objective I know that the planets travel in elliptical orbits around the sun.

Belief Subjective

I believe that homosexuality is wrong. I believe there should be no private ownership of firearms. Rational I know it is not dangerous to hug someone with AIDS. All matter is made up of particles that are too small to be seen, even with the most powerful microscope.

Irrational

I believe fortunetellers can accurately tell one’s future. I don’t believe in the big bang theory, though I don’t really know much about it. Public I know that in 1492 Columbus discovered islands off of the Americas.

Personal (including religious)

I believe in the Virgin Birth. I believe that Jesus is the Son of God. I believe with perfect faith that the prophecy of Moses is absolutely true. I believe with perfect faith in the coming of the Messiah. I believe that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet. I believe that the Bible is God’s holy word. I believe life begins at conception. Verified We know that the boiling point of water is 100◦ Celsius. The square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.

Unverified

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Table 1. Continued

Verifiable We know that the dark reaction of photosynthesis also occurs during daytime periods.

I believe that UFOs have landed on Earth and have temporarily taken humans for examination. Unverifiable

I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth. I believe that nature operates uniformly. Certain I know that 1 + 1 = 2. There is no way to know that reality exists.

Tentative

I believe I was about 10 years old when that happened. I believe that enrolling in chemistry will lower my GPA. Static We know that F = ma. That understanding of the relationship between force and mass has not changed in many years.

Dynamic/Changing

Last year I believed that all government was evil. Today I don’t. Not a basis for action I know that cell membranes are semipermeable.

A basis for action

I am helping this person because I believe that we should all do our part to make this world a better place. Low commitment I know smoking is bad for your health, but of course I haven’t quit smoking.

High commitment

I believe in God. I have invested my life in serving Him. I believe in heaven and hell; that’s why I try to live a good life.


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5. Summary We began by asking what a science teacher should do when confronted with a student who does not believe the science content he/she has learned. Our answer is: strive for student knowledge and understanding and let belief fall where it may. Typically belief will follow such knowledge and understanding; when it does not, that disconnect is usually the result of strongly held convictions that are themselves extra-scientific and so beyond the ability of science and science education to resolve. Students who raise such questions in the classroom present the teacher with an opportune setting for teaching about the nature of science, and science teachers should grasp this opportunity to help students carefully distinguish among knowing, believing, and understanding, and, in particular, to stress the empirical nature of scientific inquiry and the limits of such inquiry. As the discussion above makes clear, there is considerable variability in the science education literature (and in ordinary usage) in the way the central terms knowledge and belief are understood and used. We have argued that the latter should be understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition of the former. We have, however, distinguished between knowing (and so believing) that a theory (such as evolution) includes a particular set of tenets and affords the best current scientific account of the relevant phenomena based on the available empirical evidence requires belief that such is true on the one hand, and knowing (and so believing) on the other hand that the theory itself is true. This interpretation is consistent with knowledge and understanding rather than belief as appropriate primary goals of science education. We have also argued that recognition of the scientific status of a theory may be an appropriate alternative goal in cases where students understand but do not believe. Finally, we have offered some practical suggestions for science teachers that flow from our views of science education and its aims.

Notes 1 This section is adapted from Siegel (1998), to which the reader is referred for a more detailed and

qualified exposition. 2 By emphasizing understanding, we mean to distance ourselves from views of science education

that emphasize the rote memorization of definitions, terms, category schemes, and ‘facts’, which is easy to test for but which has little else to recommend it. 3 For more on justification as a criterion for understanding, see Lehrer (1990, p. 8 ff.). 4 Those familiar with our work may know that we have, in fact, recommended in other places (Smith 1994; Smith et al. 1995) that teachers should encourage students to “accept” that evolution is the best current scientific explanation based on the available empirical evidence. Some (e.g., Alters 1997) have questioned our preference for the word accept over the word believe, given that the two are often used synonymously in the vernacular. In fact, as evidenced by our use of the term belief here (in a clearly non-religious context), we have little opposition to substituting one term for the other as long as the entire phrase is used (as in “We want students to believe that the theory is the best current scientific explanation based on the available empirical evidence”.) and as long as we are not dealing with students who are likely to misconstrue this phrase to have connotations of religious-like faith,

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as noted in the text. It is crucial to note, however, that we are firmly opposed to asking students to “believe in evolution” (see Section 2.3.3 Believing in vs. believing that). 5 We would argue that the belief in a relatively short-lived earth held by the so-called “young earth creationists” is not exclusively a religious belief because it addresses an empirically answerable scientific question. Teachers should point out this infringement of religion into science as a means of explaining the nature of science. 6 Since we both reject radical empiricism, there is little point in criticizing Cobern’s depictions of empiricism and positivism, which we think are problematic. But we should note at least the following: (a) generally, neither the empiricists nor the positivists Cobern mentions held that belief implies doubt (p. 220) or uncertainty (p. 227); (b) nor did they hold that knowledge implies certainty (p. 227). (In fact Cobern’s discussion systematically conflates two quite distinct senses of ‘certainty’: a psychological sense, according to which a certain belief is one believed very strongly, and an epistemological sense according to which a certain belief is one that cannot be mistaken.) (c) Positivists did not regard belief (but not knowledge) as a matter of faith, as Cobern asserts (pp. 221, 227), for the simple reason that they regarded belief as a necessary condition of knowledge – for them, as for us, if one knows that (e.g.) the sun is hot or that cells divide, one typically believes it as well. Cobern is only slightly incorrect when he says that positivists held that “only that which can be investigated empirically has any cognitive meaning” (p. 227) – this is incorrect because they held that analytic claims, for example logical and mathematical claims, were also meaningful – but he is right that that view ultimately collapsed under its own weight, since it is itself without empirical (or logical) basis, and so by its own lights must be meaningless. 7 Noddings herself recognizes that this pedagogical approach is “unimaginable” (p. 17). 8 For further discussion of the non-theistic nature of science, see (Smith et al. 1995).

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