Knowledge Moves

Muntigl, P. (2009). Knowledge moves in conversational exchanges: Revisiting the concept of primary vs. secondary knowers. Functions of Language 16(2): 225-263.

Knowledge moves in conversational exchanges Revisiting the concept of primary vs. secondary knowers* Peter Muntigl University of Salzburg Short title: Knowledge moves in conversational exchanges Email contact: [email protected]

Full Reference of article: Muntigl, P. (2009). Knowledge moves in conversational exchanges: Revisiting the concept of primary vs. secondary knowers. Functions of Language 16(2): 225-263.

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Abstract

In Berry’s (1981) classic work on exchange structure, it was argued that knowledge exchanges consist of some conversational participant who already knows the information and some conversational participant to whom the information is imparted. The former participant is commonly termed the primary knower, whereas the latter is termed the secondary knower. What is missing in Berry’s model (and work that has extended Berry’s model), however, is 1) an explanation of how rights and access to knowledge can be claimed or resisted on a turn-by-turn and move-by-move basis, and 2) a more elaborated conception of knowledge that goes beyond a sender/receiver model of information. Drawing from a corpus of spoken conversation from diverse sources, I extend Berry’s model by showing how a participant’s ‘knower status’ is often negotiated within an exchange. As an interpersonal resource, knowledge can be asserted, challenged, resisted, accepted, expanded, upgraded, downgraded, etc. Furthermore, I argue that ‘knowledge’ should be given a social/practical epistemological interpretation; from this perspective, knowledge is associated with a speaker’s degree of access information and with a speaker’s rights and obligations to know.

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Knowledge moves in conversational exchanges Revisiting the concept of primary vs. secondary knowers

1 Introduction

The concept of negotiation in systemic functional linguistic (hereafter SFL) theory is most explicitly dealt with in what is termed the interpersonal metafunction of language. Halliday has argued in numerous papers that negotiation is an interpersonal construct in which meanings are given or demanded through propositions or proposals. Central linguistic resources of negotiation include mood at the level of the grammar and speech function at the level of the semantics. To illustrate how mood and speech function are negotiated within conversation, consider Ex. (1), which is taken from a couples therapy session.1 Unless indicated otherwise, all examples follow the transcription notion of Atkinson and Heritage (1984:ix-xiv). A summary of the transcription symbols used is shown in Table 1.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In this example, the therapist (symbolized as ‘T’) begins the exchange by asking Dave (symbolized as ‘D’) a question and D answering the question (note that the relevant speech functions are symbolized as: Q=Question; A=Answer; Dis=Disagreement). Following this, Lisa (symbolized by ‘L’), who is D’s spouse, disagrees with the answer. At the level of speech function, negotiation involves T

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demanding information, D then giving the information, which is followed by L challenging the information.

(1)

23/2

Q

288

T:

h- how are you feeling a- about (0.5) missing your father

A

289

D:

um (0.5) sa:d and I miss him but

290

T:

mm hm

A

291

D:

I’m not really: (1.0)

A

292

like I’m upset

A→

293

but I’m (.) (I gu-) I guess I just don’t show it

294

T:

mm hm

A

295

D:

[(like I

Dis→

296

L:

[oh no you do] (.)

Dis→

297

you do

298

you’ve been crying

299

and you’re upset

300

and that’s all (

)]

) you know

We can get an even better handle on what is being negotiated if we examine the mood structure of the arrowed clauses in lines 293, 296 and 297. In effect, by reversing the polarity of D’s clause of line 293 and by keeping D as the modally responsible element of the clause (i.e., the Subject), L is able to contradict D’s assertion that “I just don’t show it.”

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Halliday’s general model of negotiation has seen various kinds of developments over the years. One of the most influential came from Berry (1981a), who proposed a level of exchange structure that comprises sequences of knowledge or action moves. Central to Berry’s model is the claim that exchanges contain constellations of patterned moves that interlocutors regularly and predictably co-produce. The question-answer sequence of Ex. (1), for instance, would be analyzed using Berry’s model as a knowledge exchange in which T, as a secondary knower (hereafter SK), seeks to gain knowledge from D, the primary knower (hereafter PK). Furthermore, L’s disagreement would mark the beginning of a new exchange by which L positions herself as a PK. As will be made clearer later in the paper, this analysis brings with it certain difficulties, especially if we reflect on the relationship between D’s and L’s turns. The main difficulty is that the analysis does not capture how this 2-turn sequence (D’s answer and L’s disagreement) initiates a negotiation of who has primary access to D’s personal experience. First, by contradicting D’s answer, L challenges D’s rights to claiming knowledge about what he experienced. Second, by claiming in line 298 that D can and did show his feelings by crying, L positions herself as having superior access to D’s feelings. With respect to having rights and obligations to personal knowledge, L’s utterance performs two functions. It works to resist D’s positioning of himself as PK of own experience and it helps L to take over as PK of D’s experience. I argue that Berry’s model (and later work that has developed Berry’s model) cannot take account of this dynamic negotiation of rights and access to knowledge. To a large degree, knowledge is given a relatively static ‘sender-receiver’ interpretation in Berry’s framework. Changes in primary and secondary knowledge states can only occur in a new exchange. An exchange, therefore, is relatively fixed with respect to how

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knowledge is distributed. What is missing is an explanation of how rights and access to knowledge can be claimed or resisted on a turn-by-turn and move-by-move basis. I propose that an SFL model of conversational exchanges should treat knowledge as a socially distributed interpersonal construct, which is dynamically negotiated over the course of an exchange (and over exchanges). As an interpersonal resource, knowledge can be asserted, challenged, resisted, accepted, expanded, upgraded, downgraded, etc. For the remainder of this paper I show how knowledge exchanges can be modeled dynamically. I begin by reviewing some of Berry’s central concepts and work that has extended Berry’s model. I then discuss some of the problems surrounding the current model of exchange structure. Following that, I propose some ways in which the model can be improved. And lastly, I propose a redefinition of some of Berry’s key terms.

2 Exchange structure in SFL theory

Berry’s (1981a) work was one of the first attempts in SFL to model conversational exchanges as sequences of moves. She took as a point of departure previous research done by the Birmingham School in the 1970s (e.g., Sinclair and Coulthard 1975; Burton 1978). Although various developments to Berry’s exchange have since then been proposed, the basic model has been virtually left intact (see Martin 1992, 2000a; Muntigl 2007; O’Donnell 1990, 1999; Ventola 1987). Although much work in the past seems to have been dominated by an interpersonal view of exchange structure (for a notable exception see Martin 2000a), it is worth pointing out that Berry (1981a) had originally modeled the exchange with

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respect to all three Hallidayan metafunctions (interpersonal, textual and ideational). Berry argued that the interpersonal mode was responsible for negotiating the transmission of information, the textual was responsible for enabling turn-taking and the ideational for organizing how propositional information gets completed. Our focus for this paper, however, is on the interpersonal mode, because it is this mode of meaning that gives us insight into how knowledge is exchanged. Some of Berry’s more significant contributions to exchange structure modelling stem from her proposal that 1) exchanges consist of sequentially patterned functional slots or moves; 2) these functional slots coincide with how speakers take up primary and secondary roles with respect to knowledge; and 3) certain exchange structure patterns directly relate to the production of consensus type moves. I address each of these important points in the following subsections.

2.1 Moves as functional ‘slots’ within an exchange

There are three aspects to Berry’s model that are especially noteworthy: First, there are a limited number of move types; second, moves unfold in sequence and only certain move combinations are permissible; and third, all but one move can be optionally produced. These insights have been expressed as a structure potential, which is represented below (‘( )’=optionality; ‘^’=is followed by):

((Dk1) ^ K2) ^ K1 ^ (K2f)

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From this structure potential, we can see that there are a total of four move types: K1 (the only obligatory move), K2, Dk1 and K2f. Knowledge move sequences, taken from Berry (1981a:126-127), are shown in examples (2)-(4). Note that, as shown in Ex. (2), a ‘complete’ exchange may consist of only one move, provided that the move is a K1.

2) K1

Guide (conducting party round cathedral) Guide:

Salisbury is the English cathedral with the tallest spire

K2

Son:

Which English cathedral has the tallest spire

K1

Father:

Salisbury

K2f

Son:

oh

Dk1

Quizmaster:


K2

Contestant:

Salisbury

K1

Quizmaster:

yes

3)

4)

The ‘core’ slots of an exchange consist of K1s and K2s: K2 ^ K1 sequences are considered eliciting exchanges, whereas K1 ^ K2f (or simply K1) sequences are considered informing exchanges. K-moves are defined with respect to a speaker’s knowledge role, with K1s being taken up by PKs and K2s by SKs. Berry’s (1981a) definitions of K1 and K2 are given below:

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K1 Slot A slot in the exchange where the PK indicates that he knows the information and

•

where he consequently confers upon the information a kind of stamp of authority. (Berry 1981a:126)

K2 Slot Slot in which the secondary knower indicates the state of his own knowledge in

•

relation to the information. (Berry 1981a:126)

Dk1s and K2fs are realized at exchange boundaries. A Dk1 is a move in which the primary knower delays the production of a K1 until some point later in the exchange, and a K2f is a follow-up move produced by the secondary knower. The assignment of knowledge moves is predicated on the type of exchange speakers are producing. There is no possibility in this model for the assignment of two K1s or K2s. Instead, each move type can only occur once within a single exchange. If, for example, an analyst would identify two K1s in conversational sequence, the analyst would have to divide the sequence into at least two exchanges. As Berry (1981a:129) argues:

I would claim that each of the four functions can occur only once in an exchange. Any recurrence of a function should be taken as indicating at least a new bound exchange, if not a new free exchange.

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2.2 Primary vs. secondary knowers

As discussed above, knowledge moves are defined with respect to who has primary and secondary knowledge. Berry draws this distinction, in part, from Labov’s (1972:303) claim that conversational exchanges may be categorized as ‘A-events’ or ‘B-events’. For A-events, speaker A has the knowledge (and by implication is a primary knower) and B does not (therefore a secondary knower), whereas for B-events the reverse holds. Berry’s definitions of primary and secondary knowers are given below:

Primary Knower (PK) •

Someone who already knows the information; (Berry 1981a:126)

Secondary Knower (SK) •

Someone to whom the information is imparted; (Berry 1981a:126)

In Ex. (2) the guide is a PK because he or she has the requisite knowledge of the city and conveys this information to the over-hearing tourists. In Ex. (3) the son is the SK because he is seeking information from the father, who, because he possesses this knowledge, is cast as the PK. Ex. (4) illustrates an exam-type question in which the quizmaster is testing the contestant’s knowledge. Since the question is not seeking knowledge in the way shown in Ex. (3), it cannot be coded as a K2. This is because the quizmaster presumably already knows the answer. The third move is coded as K1 because it is in this slot that the quizmaster places a ‘stamp of authority’ on the exchange, signaling that, in this case at least, the contestant answered correctly.

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Berry’s interpretation of knowledge seems to derive from a sender-receiver perspective in which information is transmitted from one speaker to another. Two basic interactional scenarios can be crystallized out from the above discussion: Primary knowers transmit information to secondary knowers (or test their knowledge); or secondary knowers seek out information from primary knowers. It is important to bear in mind that the term secondary knower does not necessarily imply a lack of knowledge on the part of the speaker. Berry was careful to point out that a K2 slot within an exchange is associated with different available options, by which a SK can make different claims to knowledge. These options are represented as either positive or negative (i.e., +/- knowledge). For example, the SK in (3) can be analyzed as indicating ‘- knowledge’ (realized by the speaker’s production of “oh”) and the SK in (4) as indicating ‘+ knowledge’ (the contestant has, after all, answered correctly). But basically, the sender-receiver model of knowledge still holds, with the one caveat that the ‘receiver’ may already possess the information. In a longer unpublished version of the exchange structure paper, Berry goes on to argue that ‘+/- knowledge’ options are also available at K1 (see Berry 1981b:16). A PK’s selection of ‘+ knowledge’ in a K1 slot is shown in (3), when the father answers the son’s question with “Salisbury”. Compare this with the claim of ‘- knowledge’ at K1 in (5). (5)

Berry 1981b:17

K2

Son:

Which English cathedral has the tallest spire?

K1

Father:

I don’t know.

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Berry suggests that claims of ‘- knowledge’ at K1 yield “ungrammatical discourse”, since both interactants would be dissatisfied with the conversational outcome, presumably because there has not been a successful transmission of information. On the surface, it would appear that Berry’s proposal that ‘+/- knowledge’ options are available at K1 is incompatible with her view that the PK is “someone who already knows the information.” After all, selecting ‘- knowledge’ at K1 indicates that the PK does not know the information, or at least is making a claim of not knowing (i.e., perhaps the PK knows, but does not wish to tell). Although Berry does not allude to this potential problem, she does suggest a solution when she states that “Certainly one tends to feel rather a failure if, after having been cast in the role of primary knower, one has to admit that one doesn’t know” (Berry 1981b:17, italics mine). This suggests that PK status is not determined by whether or not we have knowledge. Instead, it is sequential positioning, the functional slot we are cast into, that lends us PK or SK status. A question places the addressee in the expected role of knower, irrespective of whether the addressee is able to provide the information. This important aspect of PK vs. SK status will be elaborated upon in the section dealing with the problems of Berry’s model (see Section 3).

2.3 The role of Consensus-Collaboration

The structure potential for exchanges and the examples shown in (2)-(4) are predicated on what Burton (1978:140) calls the “polite consensus-collaborative model” of conversation. In this model, speakers tend to support each other’s social actions by

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responding with acts of agreement or compliance. But as Burton (1978) has pointed out, the degree of consensus among interlocutors often found in classroom talk is not always (perhaps even rarely) found in everyday talk. Instead, a speaker may challenge a previous speaker’s expectations, for example, by disagreeing with a prior statement or refusing to comply with a request. Berry (1981a), of course, was aware that speakers do not always demonstrate compliance, and for this reason she incorporated Burton’s concept of challenge in her exchange model. A challenge is defined as the withholding of an obligatory move such as a K1 (Berry 1981a:136). Berry argues that exchanges involving challenges are illformed, mainly because an essential component of the exchange has not been realized. In such cases, a challenge will most likely work to initiate a new exchange, leaving the prior exchange as ‘incomplete’. Unfortunately, Berry does not provide any examples of exchanges that contain challenges, and so it is difficult to know for certain what types of moves may constitute a challenge and how a challenge will affect the unfolding of the exchange. Various extensions and/or improvements to the Berry model have been suggested, especially in the area of non-consensus oriented moves. In the following section, I make brief mention of some of this work.

2.4 Extensions to Berry’s model

The modeling of exchanges presented so far has been restricted to ‘minimal’ exchange sequences that consist solely of four moves. A more complete picture of exchanges, however, also needs to account for additional moves that in various ways work to expand on the core structure of the exchange. These types of moves are sometimes

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inserted within an exchange in order to seek clarification or challenge a previous move or they are appended to the end of an exchange in which they most often create a sequence of follow-up moves. These extensions to the model have come from various sources, including research on service encounters (Ventola 1987), on discourse semantics (Martin 1992, 2000a) and on the dynamic modeling of exchanges (O’Donnell 1990, 1999).

2.4.1 K1f: An additional slot in the exchange

One of the earliest extensions to Berry’s model came from Ventola (1987:100) and Martin (1992:48), who suggested that exchanges may be realized by an additional closing move, a k1f, bringing the total number of move types to five. A K1f always follows a K2f. An example would be the PK’s production of an “okay” (= K1f) following the SK’s prior “okay” (=K2f), giving a sequentially unfolding okay-okay exchange.

2.4.2 Expansion sequences

Berry (1981a:136) noted that some moves are unique in that they ‘upset’ the smooth, consensus-oriented unfolding of an exchange. The first type of move she termed query and the second she termed challenge (challenges will be discussed in 2.4.3). Queries may be better known as clarification-seeking or confirmation-seeking moves in which a next speaker needs to check his or her understanding of what was just said before responding. In Berry’s view, a query has a core textual function: to query what someone

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had said essentially meant beginning a new exchange. An example of how Berry would represent an exchange containing a query is shown in (6):

(6)

Berry (1981a:138)

K1

Father:

Salisbury is the English cathedral with the tallest spire

K2

Son:

is it

K1

Father:

yes

K2f

Instead of taking up a K2f slot, the son produces a K2 move that queries the father’s statement. In essence, by virtue of producing a query, the son has begun a new eliciting exchange. O’Donnell (1990) offers a slightly different perspective on queries. He argues that queries tend to suspend, not terminate, an exchange that is underway. Once the suspending exchange containing the query is complete, the main exchange is then resumed. Consider Ex. (7).

(7)

O’Donnell (1990:302)

K2

B:

Are you busy?

K2

A:

Why do you ask?

K1

B:

I need your help.

K1

A:

In that case, I’m free

K2f

B:

Great.

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A’s query of “why do you ask” temporarily suspends B’s initial question if A is busy. Following the answer to A’s query, the speakers then go on to produce a K1 and K2f that ties back to B’s initial K2 Martin’s (1992:67) view on queries (he termed them tracking moves and included additional types such as backchannels and repair moves), on the other hand, differs in a number of respects. According to Martin, one of the main functions of a query is to interrupt the unfolding of an exchange in order to create (or re-establish) a shared understanding of events. Furthermore, queries are not embedded ‘K’ exchanges, but constitute unique forms of paired moves that are labeled as confirmations (cf-rcf), checks (ch-rcheck), clarifications (cl-rcl) or replays (rp-rrp). Consider the example of a service encounter taken from Ventola (1987:108):

(8) K2

Client:

What time flights then go to Sydney tomorrow

cf

Server:

tomorrow…

cl

Server:

er morning or afternoon now [tone 2]

rcl

Client:

uh mid-morning, early afternoon

K1

Server:

uh well, you’ve got a 9:30 and 10:15… and a 10:55 … and nothing then until 3:40 tomorrow

In this example, the Client is seeking information about when flights leave for Sydney on a certain day. The following two moves, labeled cl (clarification) and rcl (return clarification), constitute the query sequence. In order to be able to answer the client’s question appropriately, the server needs to know at what time during the day the client

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wishes to fly. Upon receiving this information, the server then proceeds to take up a K1 slot. One of the advantages of Martin’s representation of query moves is that their unique labeling suggests that they are different in kind from the standard K1, K2, etc. moves. For instance, it is somewhat difficult to imagine the server’s cl-move “er morning or afternoon now” as constituting a typical K2 eliciting move that occurs at the beginning of an exchange. The ellipsed form of this move strongly suggests that it is tied to a preceding move. Other commonly produced queries such as “what?”, “who?”, “it is?” also imply that they do not constitute the main business of the exchange. One of the disadvantages of this new labeling, however, is that no mention is made of how exactly they differ from the other moves initially proposed by Berry. For example, how do clarifications, checks, etc. relate to primary vs. secondary knowledge? What is their function with respect to the negotiation of knowledge?

2.4.3 Challenges Some important critical discussions of Berry’s exchange model are found in O’Donnell (1990, 1999). In brief, O’Donnell’s aim was to extend Berry’s original work in such a way that it could dynamically model a range of as yet unaccounted for conversational phenomena. His work on contradictions sheds some light on how challenges can be coded within an exchange. In contrast to Berry, O’Donnell (1990:300) argues that “contradictions … introduce the possibility of recursion into the exchange—some elements may occur more than once.” This can be seen in Ex. (9), taken from O’Donnell’s (1990:299). Here, A takes up another K1 slot in the third turn in order to contradict B’s previous contradiction.

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(9) K1

A:

Rome is the capital of Italy

K2f

B:

No its not!

K1

A:

Yes it is.

K2f

B:

Oh.

Another example that shows how a contradiction can realize a K1 move within an already unfolding exchange is illustrated in (10), taken from O’Donnell’s (1990:299). This suggests that the “stamp of authority” produced by a K1 can involve either agreement or disagreement with B’s answer. (10) dK1

A:

What is the capital of Italy?

K2

B:

Madrid?

K1

A:

No its not.

K2f

B:

Oh.

A somewhat different perspective is found in Martin (1992:71), who defines a challenge as prompting an interpersonal disruption in such a way that the exchange becomes suspended or aborted. An example of a challenge using Martin’s approach is given in (11), which is a reanalysis of Ex. (9). Notice that B’s and A’s challenge moves serve mainly to suspend the production of a consensus-oriented K2f. For Martin, challenges do not initiate new exchanges, but function in general to prevent the resolution of a consensus-oriented exchange.

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(11) K1

A:

Rome is the capital of Italy

ch

B:

No its not!

rch

A:

Yes it is.

K2f

B:

Oh.

The downside of Martin’s representation is that, as with query moves, there is no mention given to how challenges play a part in how knowledge is being negotiated. A label such as ch tells us little about how issues of who has rights and access to knowledge get played out. By returning to Ex. (1), we can see that, as an interpersonal move, L’s challenge is publicly displaying her knowledge about D’s feelings, showing that, contrary to what might be expected, not only D has privileged access to what he feels. What is desperately needed in the Berry model, therefore, is a way of incorporating non-consensus knowledge moves into a more general framework that sees knowledge as negotiable and locally negotiated among conversational participants.

3 Problems with the exchange model

In the remainder of this paper, I will argue for the position that knowledge is a dynamic construct that is constantly being nudged in different directions by speakers who are taking turns at talk. Because knowledge moves are discourse structures in the sense of Martin (1992:21) and therefore form cohesive ties with the surrounding co-text,

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knowledge should also be examined with respect to its retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence. In other words, the meaning of a conversational move is sensitive to its position within a sequence of moves; its meaning is realized by the way in which the move links back to what was meant (retrospective) and forward to what can possibly be meant (prospective). My suggestion is to abandon the views that knowledge may only be imparted and received and that it is a resource which speakers do or do not possess, and to instead argue that knowledge is a resource that can be strongly or weakly claimed or disavowed during speakers’ interactions with each other. Researchers within the general area known as social or practical epistemology (Heritage & Raymond 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006; Roth 2002; Sidnell 2005; Whalen & Zimmerman 1990) have been working with much more ‘elaborated’ concepts of knowledge. They argue that claims to knowledge (or epistemological claims) involve the degree to which speakers can access knowledge, a speaker’s rights to make a knowledge claim and the linguistic means through which speakers display their alignment to having or not having knowledge. This view is summed up in Heritage & Raymond (2005:16) who claim that, “the distribution of rights and responsibilities regarding what participants can accountably know, how they know it, whether they have rights to describe it and in what terms is directly implicated in the organized practices of speaking.” The sender/receiver view of knowledge and the view that knowledge is possessed by certain speakers and not by others has been reinforced by the almost exclusive focus on data stemming from pedagogic contexts (e.g., quiz shows, classroom interaction) or on invented data that serve mainly to support the proposed model rather than point out inconsistencies in the model. Although there is nothing generally wrong with using

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these kinds of data in one’s analysis, the problem is only that they may lead to a onesided view of how people interact. A more productive method would be to examine interactions from a variety of contexts, taking into account the specific details (grammatical, phonological and kinesic) of speakers’ meaning making activities. For knowledge to be given a more comprehensive and dynamic reading, three problems areas need to be addressed. These are 1) broadening our scope of what gets negotiated during a ‘knowledge’ exchange; 2) representing the negotiation of knowledge dynamically; and 3) showing how the use of different linguistic resources may affect how knowledge roles are claimed and disawoved.

3.1 Knowledge as social epistemology

If we focus only on moves that try to elicit information from an addressee, test someone’s knowledge or inform someone about something that is especially newsworthy, we may become deceived into thinking that propositional exchanges mainly involve the passing of information from one speaker to another. But if we examine other contexts of speaking, we quickly see that ‘information’ is not the relevant resource that is placed under negotiation. Consider the arguing exchange in Ex. (12) between a mother (M) and a teenage daughter (D). In this brief exchange, M and D are arguing about D’s curfew. It begins with M taking up a K1 slot in which she proposes a time for D’s curfew (“I I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in”), followed by a justification of why this curfew should gain acceptance from D (“seems half way between your present curfew and your friends’ some of your

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friends’ curfew”). In the following move, a K2f,2 D responds by challenging M’s claim (“Yeah but its its still not, hhhh (.8) what I like.”). M, in turn, challenges D’s challenge in the third and final move (“Well, its not exactly what we like”). (12) K1

M:

I I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (1.3) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends’ some of your friends’ curfew.

K2f

D:

Yeah but its its still not, hhhh (.8) what I like.

K1f

M:

Well, its not exactly what we like.

Although Ex. (12) is an exchange of propositions, the truth of each of these propositions is not what is at stake. For example, D is not denying that M does not have an objection to an eleven-thirty curfew and nor is D denying that an eleven-thirty curfew is in some way illogical or nonsensical (i.e., that it is not possible to set a curfew at eleven-thirty). Instead, the negotiation revolves around personal interests and who has the right to set the curfew. By stating that she does not like M’s proposed curfew, D is trying to promote her interests (i.e., negotiating a later curfew or a later telephone call) and she is trying to exercise her right in deciding the time of her own curfew. That this right is under negotiation can clearly be seen in M’s next move, in which she emphasizes the parent’s interests in having an eleven-thirty curfew (“its not exactly what we like.”). In this subtle manner, M is able to draw on the majority (mother and father vs. daughter) in order to resist D’s attempt at claiming a right to set the curfew agenda. Because many exchanges do not simply involve the transmission of information, I suggest that knowledge be construed in terms of Heritage & Raymond’s (2005) social

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epistemological approach; that is, when speakers make knowledge claims, what is at issue is not just whether they know. Instead, a whole range of epistemological issues may become relevant and negotiable such as: •

A speaker’s right to claim knowledge

•

A speaker’s degree of access to knowledge (i.e., how knowledgeable is s/he?)

•

A speaker’s interest in ensuring that the proposition gets accepted

Any examination of knowledge exchanges, therefore, must be sensitive to these epistemological issues. This will help broaden the scope of an analysis to include as many interpersonal meanings that are up for negotiation as possible.

3.2 A dynamic representation of knowledge

In order to model knowledge dynamically, the sender-receiver model of knowledge in which information is transmitted from a primary to a secondary knower should be abandoned. This is not to say that certain exchanges do not mirror a predominantly oneway flow of information, as for example, certain instructional texts might do. The emphasis is instead placed on the dynamic unfolding of knowledge, its logogenesis, and the way in which speakers regularly deploy and use knowledge to construct their social lives. The position put forward here is that knowledge can be claimed, challenged, resisted, disavowed, upgraded, downgraded, etc, on a moment-by-moment, move-bymove basis. Berry (1981a) offers a good starting point for modeling the negotiation of knowledge claims. As pointed out previously, Berry argued that a given move is associated with a choice of [+/-k] options. If we return to Ex. (12), we could expand our

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analysis by matching each move with the speakers’ selections of [+/-k]. This analysis is shown in Ex. (13), in which M chooses [+k] by making a statement. By disagreeing with M in the subsequent move, D also claims primary epistemic rights (i.e., D claims a right to determine her own curfew), and in this way also selects [+k]. The argument continues in the subsequent move with another disagreement in which M reinforces her primary epistemic status through a [+k] selection. (13) K1

+k

M:

I I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleven-thirty come in (1.3) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends’ some of your friends’ curfew.

K2f

+k

D:


K1f

+k

M:


By adding another layer of analysis into the exchange model, we are able to show how speakers are selecting primary or secondary epistemic rights through selections of [+/-k] options on a move-by move basis. What is still missing, however, is the sense that epistemic rights are being negotiated. The analysis in Ex. (13) shows that each speaker has claimed primary epistemic rights, but it does not show how secondary rights are resisted and how primary rights are taken over. It is important, therefore, to identify the meaning relations that a move makes with the preceding and subsequent move of the exchange. In this way, a knowledge claim involves not only the specific knowledge role a current speaker takes up when making a conversational move, but also how the current speaker responds to the prior speaker’s positioning of self and how the current speaker positions the next speaker.

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A more dynamic representation of knowledge claims may be achieved if, in addition to showing how current speaker selects primary or secondary epistemic status, the way in which the next speaker’s epistemic positioning is projected by current speaker is also shown. Let us return to Ex. (13), which has been reanalyzed in Ex. (14). In the first move, M positions herself as a primary knower ([+k]) and projects D as a secondary knower ([-k]). In the second move, D claims primary knower status (thereby resisting M’s positioning of D as [-k]) and, in turn, positions M as having secondary epistemic rights ([-k]). Finally, M resists D’s positioning of her as [-k] and re-assumes primary epistemic rights.

(14) Move M’s D’s role role K1

+k

-k

M:

I I haven’t got an objection to a ten-thirty phone and eleventhirty come in (1.3) seems half way between your present curfew and your friends’ some of your friends’ curfew.

K2f

-k

+k

D:


K1f

+k

-k

M:


This prospective-retrospective sense of occurrence of an epistemic claim highlights the dynamism involved in making a conversational move: A speaker’s knowledge claim is shaped by the prior speaker’s move, transforms prior speaker’s claim to knowledge (if non-supportive) and also shapes next speaker’s potential contribution by positioning next speaker as a [-k] or [+k]. This clearly demonstrates that

25


knowledge is not static and neither is a knowledge role. The modelling of knowledge should therefore highlight the negotiability of this resource and the epistemic rights associated with knowledge moves rather than a move’s static representation in terms of pre-determined, unchanging knowledge roles. We saw in Ex. (14) that by disagreeing with M’s claim, D not only challenges M’s [+k] status (i.e., a disagreement implies that the disagreeing speaker is claiming greater epistemic rights), but she also takes over as [+k] by attempting to gain control over the time of her curfew. Coding D’s move merely as a ‘challenge’ misses out on the delicate interplay of how M’s initial knowledge claim undergoes a fairly radical transformation. Ideally, we want to be able to model transformations in knowledge, or better, how epistemic rights and claimed access to knowledge undergo shifts and how these shifts impact on a participant’s knowledge role positioning (i.e., a move’s retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence). For this to happen, non-consensus moves should be built into the exchange model. Not merely as challenges that interpersonally suspend or abort the successful closing of the exchange, but as epistemic transformations.

3.3 Upgrading, downgrading and challenging knowledge moves

Another weakness of the exchange model is that there has so far been little attempt at linking the linguistic construction of a speaker’s move with the degree to which the speaker is claiming primary or secondary epistemic rights. For example, challenges may differ with respect to how strongly one is taking over as primary knower. Recall in Ex. (14) that D’s disagreement does not merely oppose M’s claim, but it also accounts for

26


why D disagrees (“Yeah but its its still not, hhhh (.8) what I like.”). Such an account strengthens D’s position, precisely because it demonstrates a certain argumentative line; that is, in setting D’s curfew, the parents should include D’s wants and needs. Furthermore, D’s disagreement also contains an agreement component (“yeah but”), which reduces the oppositional force directed against M. For this reason, we would want to say that M’s [+k] status is not cancelled, but perhaps only downgraded. Disagreements are classic ‘non-consensus’ moves and tend to play a direct role in transforming the epistemic statuses of the speakers. The negotiation of epistemic status, however, is also often done in more subtle ways, especially in contexts involving consenting actions. Here, changes may involve the subtle upgrading or downgrading of a speaker’s epistemic status. Consider an example in which a speaker answers a question, but hedges the answer with “perhaps”, “maybe” or “I think”. Although in this case the answerer would be taking up the expected primary knower role, it would still not appear entirely correct to claim that the answerer simply selected [+k]. A better analysis would be one indicating that the answerer’s [+k] rights were in fact downgraded through the weakened epistemic frame surrounding the ‘answer’. Basically, our exchange model needs to take into account how these kinds of linguistic selections (e.g., modality, accounts, prefacing agreements) are subtly nudging or radically transforming the speakers’ epistemic statuses in these different directions.

3.3.1 Non-consensus moves Non-consensus type moves in the current exchange model are given differential treatment from consensus type moves. The former are termed challenges and are often considered aberrant in ways that negatively affect the smooth functioning of an

27


exchange. Berry (1981a:135), for instance, argued that “the main way of making a challenge would be by producing an ill-formed exchange, particularly an exchange that was ill formed through the withholding of a function which was obligatory under all circumstances.” A similar reading of challenges is given by Martin (1992:71), when he claims that a challenge “not only has the potential to suspend, but in fact to abort the exchange.” A challenge may be realized by a variety of social actions. These include, among others, disagreements, denials of knowledge, refusals (following invitations or requests) or simply not responding to a previous move. In order to explore how the making of a non-consensus move may affect the distribution of knowledge roles among speakers, it is instructive to draw from research in conversation analysis (hereafter CA) on adjacency pair organization. The CA claim is that for any given ‘initiating’ speech function such as a question, request, offer/invitation, etc., next speakers may respond from a set of alternatives. The initiating speech functions are referred to as first parts and the responses as second parts. Furthermore, second part alternatives are differentially coded with respect to the concept of preference, with consensus-collaborative speech functions termed preferred and non-supportive speech functions termed dispreferred. A summary of first and second parts with preferred and dispreferred alternatives, taken from Levinson (1983:336) is shown in Table 2.

[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The term preference in CA is not a psychological concept in which speakers necessarily prefer a certain social action over another (e.g., agreement over disagreement). One can

28


well imagine certain situations in which one actually preferred to disagree with someone’s opinion rather than remain quiet or refuse a request rather than comply with it. Instead, preference is a structural notion that corresponds to how these second parts tend to be formulated in conversation. Whereas preferred second parts tend to be formulated in a short concise manner immediately following a first part, dispreferred seconds tend to be more linguistically complex, usually consisting of more than one speech function, and tend to be prefaced by pauses, aspirations and various discourse markers (for discussions of the term preference in CA see Bilmes 1988; Levinson 1983:332; Heritage 1984:265). By transferring these insights into an SFL framework on exchange, it would seem that initiating moves sequentially implicate a choice among a set of alternatives for next speaker. This means that next speaker has the choice of producing a consenting or nonconsenting move, and that the choice of next move will have differing implications for the interaction. As already indicated, the structure of a non-consenting (i.e., dispreferred) move tends to be more complex. As much work in CA has already shown, dispreferred seconds often contain accounts of why a preferred action was not undertaken (see also Martin 1992:71). An example in which a speaker accounts for why she has disagreed (or cannot agree) is shown in (15), which is taken from Ex. (1).

(15) 23/2

disagree

293

D:

but I’m (.) (I gu-) I guess I just don’t show it

294

T:

mm hm

295

D:

[(like I

296

L:

[oh no you do] (.)

)]

29


disagree

297

you do

account

298


account

299

and you’re upset

account

300

and that’s all (

) you know

Accounts have been given varying interpretations in the SFL literature. One position is that an account realizes a separate move because, as in the case of Ex. (15), it contains a clause (or a series of clauses) that selects independently for mood (for a discussion see Martin 1992:57). Ventola (1987:111), however, claims that moves can also be realized by move complexes that are realized by either hypotactic or paratactic clause complexes. I would argue that accounts be analyzed along Ventola’s lines, as forming a move complex, for two reasons: First, it is possible to re-interpret the account as being hypotactically linked to the contradiction through the implicit conjunction marker “because” (e.g., “you do [because] you’ve been crying…”). Second, the account is not just any expansion of the disagreement. Rather, it is a social action that predictably and expectedly follows the disagreement component of the move. It therefore seems to make good sense to analyze the [contradiction] + [account] as forming a unit, instead of splitting them up just because both components may select independently for mood. Another problem in exchange structure modeling is that dispreferred nexts are not treated by some researchers as knowledge moves in their own right, but as moves that prevent or suspend a consensus-oriented ending (see Martin 1992; Ventola 1987). Such a view, unfortunately, misses the important observation that the production of a nonconsenting move (a dispreferred next) tends to have profound implications for the negotiation of epistemic rights. In Ex. (15), L’s account strengthened her claim to

30


primary epistemic rights by pointing to an instance in which D was able to display his feelings (D had just previously denied having done so). Through this account, L has demonstrated that she has specialized knowledge of (or access to) D’s personal experience. For this reason, in order to get a better understanding of the epistemic implications of non-consenting moves, the dispreferred structure surrounding the nonconsenting action must also be included in the analysis.

3.3.2 Linguistic resources for upgrading and downgrading epistemic claims

Recent work by Heritage & Raymond (2005) and Raymond & Heritage (2006) on assessment sequences has exemplified the ‘micro’ interactional resources that speakers use to upgrade or downgrade their assessments. They argue (in ways that are strikingly similar to Berry) that these sequences contain first position and second position assessments and that first position assessments are associated with primary epistemic rights (cf., Berry’s primary knower) and second position assessments with secondary epistemic rights (cf., Berry’s secondary knower). An example of an exchange in which epistemic rights become upgraded and downgraded is shown in (16), which is taken from Raymond & Heritage (2006:687). In this example, Vera and Jenny are making assessments about Vera’s grandchildren. In line 01, Vera makes a positive assessment of the grandchildren (they w’rr ez good ez go:ld) and later in 05, Vera produces a downgraded assessment (Yihknow ah’v hehrd such bad repo:hrts.about them). This downgrade is accomplished by the use of the evidential “hehrd”, which indexes second-hand information that Vera had received from a third party. In other words, because Vera had not actually been a witness to this bad

31


behaviour and because this ‘news’ is a report from an outside source, Vera’s degree of access to this negative claim (and the degree of veracity associated with the claim) is mitigated. It could be argued that through this practice of downgrading the assessment, Vera is also distancing herself from it. Jenny’s responding K2 move in line 06 seems to corroborate this view by disagreeing with the “bad reports” and by making a positive assessment that the children were “smashing”. Raymond & Heritage (2006) argue that although Jenny’s position within the exchange is associated with secondary epistemic rights, she works to successfully upgrade these rights by demonstrating independent access to the children’s “smashing” behaviour. They claim that the oh which prefaces the assessment functions uniquely to upgrade one’s epistemic status. In particular, “speakers counter the downgraded rights associated with producing a second assessment by establishing that the position they report had been arrived at prior to, and independently of, the current circumstance of its production” (Raymond & Heritage 2006:692).

(16) [Rahman:14:1] 1

Ver:

D’you know theh- He wz- they w’rr ez good ez go:ld,

2

Ver:

(.)

3

Jen:

Yes: [:

4

K1

Ver:

5

K2

Jen:

[Yihknow ah’v hehrd such bad repo:hrts.about them. Oh:: they w’smashi:ng.

Raymond & Heritage (2006:685) identified a number of linguistic resources that are commonly deployed in upgrading or downgrading first and second position

32


assessments. In first position (i.e., K1), assessments may be downgraded through evidentials such as I think, it seems, it sounds like, or through assessments that are followed by tag questions. Second position assessments (i.e., K2), on the other hand, are rarely downgraded, but commonly upgraded. Some resources used to upgrade include a confirmation followed by an agreement token (e.g., they’re not, no) or, as was already shown in (16), an oh followed by an assessment. Because upgrading and downgrading one’s epistemic rights is intimately tied to a host of linguistic resources, it becomes necessary to perform a fine-grained linguistic analysis of each move. In this way, we will be able to ascertain the degree in which a speaker attempts to strengthen or weaken the epistemic status associated with a given move. The linguistic resources identified by Heritage & Raymond to upgrade and downgrade epistemic rights stem largely from Chafe & Nichols’ (1986) work on evidentials. A comprehensive list of so-called evidentials and related interpersonal resources is also provided in SFL, especially in the areas of modality and appraisal (see Halliday 1994 and Martin 2000b).

4 Modelling the negotiation of epistemic claims in conversational exchanges

So far I have been repeatedly making a case that current models of exchange structure can lead to a static view of negotiation. The unique contribution to dynamic modeling made here focuses specifically on ways in which moves can be represented to describe moment-by-moment shifts in knowledge or epistemic positionings. By epistemic positionings I mean how speakers position themselves and others with respect to knowledge and how subsequent speakers accept, resist or appropriate epistemic claims.

33


In order to be able to model knowledge in this way, a knowledge move must be analyzed with respect to its retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence. This means that we need to not only identify the specific epistemic claim taken up by a speaker (i.e., as primary or secondary knower), we need to additionally indicate how the current speaker is positioning next speaker (as having upgraded or downgraded epistemic rights). The system network in Figure 1 attempts to capture a knowledge move’s retrospective-prospective sense of occurrence and the subtle or dramatic shifts in epistemic positioning of self and other that accompany the move.3 To begin, speakers have the basic choice of either INITIATING4 or RESPONDING to a knowledge move (either/or choice is represented by the bracket ‘-[’). When a speaker initiates, the speaker must make three choices (simultaneous choice is represented by the curly bracket ‘{’). The first involves the EXCHANGE TYPE produced, the second involves the epistemic positioning of self (SELF POSITIONING) and the third involves the epistemic positioning of other (OTHER POSITIONING). The choice of exchange type is between ELICIT

vs. INFORM. Eliciting yields a K2^K1 exchange5 in which the K2 slot is

associated with secondary epistemic rights (represented as [-k]) and the K1 with primary epistemic rights (represented as [+k]). Informing, on the other hand, yields a K1^K2f exchange with the same distribution of epistemic rights. The second and third choices involve how self and other are being epistemically positioned. The choices are identical for both systems: One option indicates ‘NO CHANGE’,

which means that the speaker adopts the epistemic position associated with

the initiating move (i.e., K1 = [+k]; K2 = [-k]). The other option indicates that there is a change in which self or other epistemic positioning has been either UPGRADED or

34


DOWNGRADED.

To take an example, recall that in (16), Vera downgrades her epistemic

rights in an initiating move by weakening her claim through the evidential “hear” (Yihknow ah’v hehrd such bad repo:hrts.about them). In this way, Vera has downgraded her primary knower status. Downgrading is represented through a downward arrow as in ‘↓[+k]’. Upgrading, by contrast, would be represented though an upward pointing arrow as in ‘↑[-k]’. A responding move, on the other hand, may realize either CONSENSUS or NONCONSENSUS. ADJUSTING

If consensus is realized, the speaker has the choice of either ACCEPTING or

the epistemic positions set up by the initiating move. By adjusting, the

speaker may upgrade or downgrade epistemic positionings of self or other (see the curved arrow in Fig. 1 that begins at ADJUST and ends before the curly bracket that leads into the choices for SELF/OTHER POSITIONING). An example of an adjustment in the context of consensus was shown in Jen’s K2f move (Oh:: they w’smashi:ng). By demonstrating independent access to knowledge of Vera’s grandchildren through “oh”, Jen was able to upgrade the secondary epistemic rights allocated to her in the K2f move. A non-consensus move tends to bring with it more radical transformations of epistemic positioning. The relevant systems of choices for this move involve ROLE TRANSFORMATION, SELF POSITIONING

and OTHER POSITIONING. Role transformations

create the opportunity for further choices such as RESIST in which speaker B challenges speaker A’s self- and/or other-positioning of knowledge or TAKE OVER in which B seizes a knowledge role previously claimed by A. For example, a disagreement may not only make the claim that speaker A is not a primary knower (thereby explicitly implying that A has [-k] rights), but it may also claim primary epistemic rights for B. Resisting may either occur at the level of move or exchange. In the former, an epistemic

35


positioning or self or other is negated. For example, a response to a question that denies access to knowledge (e.g., “I don’t know”) positions the answerer as a [-k]. Resisting the exchange, on the other hand, means that the speaker is attempting to stop or abort the exchange. The final two systems, SELF and OTHER POSITIONING, contain the same choices as they did for an initiating move. Initiating and responding moves are given a dual coding that specifies how self and other is being positioned with respect to knowledge. In the following subsections, I provide examples that illustrate how moves may be coded from the choices given in Figure 1.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

4.1 Initiating moves

Ex. (17) shows how an initiating move can be represented as additionally having a prospective orientation. By making a claim about her salary, S takes up a [+k] position, thereby projecting T’s knowledge as secondary (i.e., T does not have inside knowledge of S’s financial dealings). Note also that T’s response indicates that he ratifies S’s prior projection (i.e., T’s “wow” demonstrates that this is new information). For 2-party conversations, therefore, each speaker move should be given two codings: the current speaker’s claim to knowledge and current speaker’s projected knowledge position of next speaker. These codings are represented in two columns, one for each speaker.

36


(17) 64/1 Move S’s

K1

T’s

role

role

+k

-k

S:

I was used to making (1.0) between eight and ten grand a month

K2

T:

wow

The system network allows for different combinations of self and other positioning. In Ex. (17), the epistemic roles of self and other simply matched the ones associated with K1 and K2 positions. Some initiating moves, however, allow for the upgrading or downgrading of these epistemic positionings of self or other. Let us reconsider the last two turns of Ex. (16) shown as (18) below. As was previously argued, although Vera selects a K1 move, which aligns her with [+k] epistemic rights, she ultimately downgrades these rights through the evidential expression “hear”, indicating that what she heard was from an outside source. Ver’s downgraded primary epistemic rights are represented as “↓[+k]”.

(18) [Rahman:14:1] Move

K1 K2

Ver’s

Jen’s

role

role

↓+k

-k

Ver:

Yihknow ah’v hehrd such bad repo:hrts.about them.

Jen:

Oh:: they w’smashi:ng.

37


An initiating move that alters the implied epistemic positioning of next speaker is also possible, as Ex. (19) illustrates. Here, the therapist (T) is initiating an activity of exploration in which the client (W) may discover how she is able to have positive days. By eliciting information from W, T is clearly in a [-k] position. However, T also downgrades W’s implied primary knower status in two ways. First, he claims uncertainty on both his and W’s part (maybe we don’t kno::w exactly what s:tarted it.) and second, he mitigates the certainty through which W can know by the expression “do you have a sense about uh…”. A far more direct question form would simply have been: “when did you first notice that the day wuz a positive day”. With this question, W would have been positioned as being expected to know what made that day positive for her. Therefore, by not assuming or asserting that anyone has privileged access to knowledge, the therapist’s question works to cancel the assumption that the client must know, thereby downgrading her epistemic rights (‘↓[+k]’).

(19) Muntigl 2004:251 Move T’s role

W’s role T:

I’m rea::lly curious about how you made that made that happen for yourself. (0.8) how you made that positively happen. .hh now i i i i maybe we don’t kno::w exactly what s:tarted it. (.)

K2

-k

↓+k

do you have a sense about uh

K2

-k

↓+k

when you first noticed that the day wuz a positive day. (4.0)

38


K1

W:

u::m. (5.0) I’ve (.) I I don’t actually. (.) u:m

An initiating move can also alter both self and other’s epistemic position. Ex. (20) is taken from a Canadian provincial inquiry in which several people died in a small Ontario town from drinking contaminated water (Ehrlich & Sidnell 2006). The exchange involves a lawyer (M) and the Ontario Premier Mike Harris (H) who was in power when the tragedy occurred. It begins with an eliciting move in which M asks H a question (Do you regret not taking further a:ctions in explo:ring what the nature of the impacts were which were on that document). As Ehrlich & Sidnell (2006) point out throughout their paper, these kinds of questions involve presuppositions that are expressed through factive predicates such as regret. M’s question, therefore, does not simply attempt to elicit information from M, but it also conveys the (presuppositional) assessment that Harris did not take further necessary actions when he should have. By making an (negative) assessment about M through this presupposition, M has upgraded his epistemic rights. Furthermore, M’s question also downgrades H’s epistemic rights by placing restrictions on H’s response. In order to save face, H must either 1) attend to M’s yes/no question by answering “no” (probably the worst strategy, because then he would be implicitly confirming the presupposition and confirming that he has no regrets); or 2) attend to the presupposition by disconfirming the negative assessment of himself. The presupposition contained in the question and the restricted options available to H when he responds seem to make H’s impending answer subordinate to the accusations being leveled at him. This does not mean that H cannot resist M’s epistemic positioning of him. It means that H must perform a significant amount of discursive work to re-establish his primary epistemic rights.

39


(20) Ehrlich & Sidnell 2006:665 Move M’s

H’s

role

role

↑-k

↓+k

K2

M:

Do you regret not taking further a:ctions in explo:ring what the nature of the impacts were which were on that docume [nt ]

K1

H: H:

[no=

]

I took every action that you would ever expect a- in my view a Premier to take. h ah and-and I can honestly tell you that.

An example of an informing exchange that involves an adjustment of both self and other-positioning in K1 is shown in (21). This example is taken from Heritage & Raymond (2005:20) and involves a two-part assessment sequence. In the first move, Jen makes use of a tag question to downgrade the strength of the assessement (They’re a luvly family now ar’n’t they.). The tag performs two important epistemic functions. First, by inviting a response from Vera, it partially cedes the epistemic right to make assessments about the family to her. In this way, it upgrades Vera’s secondary epistemic rights allocated to K2 slots. Second, the tag mitigates the strength of the assessment, thereby downgrading the force through which “they’re a luvly family” is being asserted. It is for this reason that Jen’s role is coded as ‘[↓+k]’. Raymond & Heritage (2005:20) argue along similar lines when they say “the tag question is positioned so as to invite response as the first matter to be addressed by the coparticipant. In this way, Jenny

40


formulates her turn as (in the first instance) a question to be answered rather than as an assertion to be agreed with; thus she cedes epistemic authority in the matter to her coparticipant.”

(21) Heritage & Raymond 2005:20 Move Jen’s Ver’s role

role Jen: Ver:

K1

↓+k

↑-k

K2

Jen:

Mm [I: bet they proud o:f the fam’ly.= [Ye:s =They’re [a luvly family now ar’n’t [they.

Ver:

[°Mm:.°

[They are: yes.

The different ways in which speakers may upgrade or downgrade epistemic claims of self and other in an initiating move, based on the examples above, have been summarized in Table 3. The linguistic means by which these epistemic adjustments may occur have also been included. [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

4.2 Responding moves

For responding moves, it is necessary to differentiate between consensus and nonconsensus moves. For consensus moves, the responding speaker may either ratify or adjust the self-positioning and other-positioning roles claimed by the initiating speaker. Non-consensus moves, on the other hand, always involve some form of transformation

41


in which the responding speaker either resists a projected role (i.e., an otherpositioning) or takes over a knowledge role claimed by the prior speaker. For example, a speaker may resist being positioned as a primary knower or may attempt to take over as the primary knower of the exchange. Furthermore, non-consensus moves may also involve an adjustment to self or other epistemic positionings via an upgrade or downgrade.

4.2.1 Consensus moves: Accepting or adjusting knowledge roles claimed by other An ‘accepting’ consensus moves ratifies the self- and other-positioning of prior speaker. This simply means that next speaker will respond by mirroring the knowledge roles that have already been claimed. For example, in (22) B responds by adopting her role as [+k] and ratifying T’s role as [-k]. In the final move T provides further ratification by demonstrating that he has just received new information (“oh okay”).

(22) 10/1 Move T’s

B’s

role

role

K2

-k

+k

T:

so wh:: what attracted you to Kyle

K1

-k

+k

B:

((sigh)) he was the guy on the bar with the blonde hair (.) and the red shirt ((laughs))

K2f

-k

+k

T:

oh okay

A responding move that operates in a context of consensus can also adjust an epistemic position established in the initiating move. Recall from (18) that Jen had to take up a K2

42


slot associated with secondary epistemic rights. Jen, however, was able to claim upgraded rights by demonstrating independent access to the children’s behaviour. The past tense of the clause and the discourse marker “oh” showed that she had witnessed an event in which the children displayed opposite behaviour (i.e., smashing) to that being previously claimed by some outside source. In sum, through these discursive practices Jen upgrades her secondary knower position and ratifies the epistemic position previously claimed by Vera (i.e., Jen agrees with Vera, thereby ratifying the downgraded claim that the bad reports are not ‘reliable’).

(18) [Rahman:14:1] Move

Ver’s

Jen’s

role

role

K1

↓+k

-k

Ver:

Yihknow ah’v hehrd such bad repo:hrts.about them.

K2

↓+k

↑-k

Jen:

Oh:: they w’smashi:ng.

Another example of a responding adjusting move is shown in the eliciting exchange in (23). This exchange occurs during a session of couples therapy in which T, the therapist, asks D how he felt when he shared his feelings with his spouse Lisa (what did that do: in terms of your sense of intimacy$ with (0.5) ºwith Lisaº#). This K2 move involves the ‘standard’ distribution of epistemic options in which T is a secondary knower ([-k]) and D is a potential primary knower ([+k]). In the subsequent move, although D does answer the question, thereby signaling that he is taking up the [+k] option, he mitigates his answer with a number of modal hedges such as “probably” and

43


“I guess”. In this way, D downgrades his epistemic status, demonstrating a degree of uncertainty with respect to whether he actually ‘knew’ how he felt.

(23) Muntigl & Hadic Zabala in press Move

D’s T’s Role Role

K2

-k

+k

T:

did you fee:l$ (1.0) did that (.) did you fee:l$ what did that do: in terms of your sense of intimacy$ with (0.5) ºwith Lisaº# (3.0)

D:

mm hm:# (2.0)

K1

-k

↓+k

D:

probably just m- made us feel closer together I guess?

A speaker taking up a K1 responding move may also adjust other’s epistemic positioning through an upgrade. Consider Ex. (24), taken from a different couples therapy session. This example begins with Doug complaining about his spouse Olga (olga’s goading me on and … (1.0) trying to (0.5) make me (1.0) more angry…). Following D’s complaint, T selects a K2 move in which he asks D to provide him with an example (what would be an example?). At this point, D is positioned as having primary epistemic rights ([+k]) and T and O with secondary rights ([-k]). Instead of answering T’s question in the next move, D puts the question to O (can you think of one?). Here, D is claiming downgraded primary rights ([↓+k]) rather than secondary rights. He has, after all, not stated that he cannot answer the question. Olga’s epistemic

44


rights, in turn, have been upgraded from [-k] to ↑[-k]. This is because D is positioning her as someone who may be able to answer the question and not as someone who must know. Note D’s use of modal can, which prevents a reading of O as primary knower (if D had said “Olga will know the answer to this”, then O’s status would have been given a [+k] interpretation). O responds by denying knowledge, thereby assuming a [-k] role. D then proceeds to answer T’s original question, but does so by downgrading his epistemic status by drawing from modality and mitigating attributes (“well I can’t give you an exact example…”) In terms of exchange structure unfolding, D’s initial K1 (can you think of one?) performs some interesting discursive work. I would argue that it functions as a ‘query’ move that suspends the main exchange. In other words, it also functions as an embedded K2 move that attempts to elicit a response from O. However, because O is not able to provide an answer, D takes up another K1 slot that orients to T’s original K2 move, but this time provides an answer in which he positions himself with downgraded epistemic rights. In sum, D’s query move performs two functions: First, it downgrades his own rights because he does not provide an answer (implying that he is having difficulty in making a claim to primary rights); and second, he is providing O with an opportunity to answer, which upgrades her secondary rights.

(24) Move

T’s

D’s

O’s

role

role

role D:

um so I just I don’t have a lot of patience with regards to (1.0) uh (

) it’s

45


almost at times like (0.5) you know I’m trying to resolve this and olga’s goading me on and (

)

(1.0) trying to (0.5) make me (1.0) more angry but well I don’t start out angry I just get ( O:

((indignant gasp))

D:

((laugh))

)

(2.0) K2

-k

+k

-k

T:

hm (1.0) what would be an example? ((directs question to D)) (4.0)

K1/K2 -k K1

-k

↓+k

↑-k

D:

can you think of one? ((directs question to O))

↓+k

-k

O:

((laugh)) (1.0) no (

)

(1.0) K1

-k

↓+k

-k

D:

u::m (3.0) ((muttering)) (4.5) well I can’t give you an exact example but (1.0) um (3.0) I’ll sometimes say something and olga will interpret it wrong

4.2.2 Non-Consensus moves: Transforming knowledge roles In contrast to consensus moves, non-consensus moves transform knowledge roles either by resisting prior self- and/or other-positionings or by taking over a knowledge role. ‘Resisting’ or ‘taking over’ involves more than upgrading or downgrading self or other’s epistemic rights. If a speaker denies knowledge of the answer in a K1 slot, the speaker has essentially made the claim that s/he cannot fulfill the role of a primary knower. The speaker, therefore, claims [-k] rights, thereby resisting the primary

46


epistemic status associated with K1 slots. Resistance may occur in three different ways: 1) by resisting the choice of self-positioning in the initiating move; 2) by resisting the choice of other-positioning in the initiating move; and 3) by resisting the flow of the conversational exchange.

Resisting the choice of self-positioning in an initiating move: A responding speaker may challenge the way in which the previous speaker positioned her/himself in an initiating move (self-positioning). An example of this type of resistance is shown in (25), which involves an argument between a daughter (D) and her father (F). The dispute centres around D’s curfew and F’s prior request that D come home early one evening. The first move is a K1 in which F makes a claim that asking D to come home early once is not unreasonable (It wasn’t much to ask for you to come in early (.7) just one night. (.7) Nine-thirty, ten o’clock is not that out of line). The distribution of epistemic rights for this move positions F as [+k] and D as [-k]. By way of response, C produces a ‘bare’ contradiction (Yeah, it is out of line.). The contradiction primarily functions to dispute D’s initial epistemic claim that “Nine-thirty, ten o’clock is not that out of line”. The oppositional force of D’s move works to re-position F as having secondary rights [-k]. Put another way, F begins the exchange by asserting that he has a right to request that D come home early. By way of contrast, D argues that F does not have this right, which essentially means that F cannot claim primary rights in this matter. Because D’s move is purely oppositional, D is not claiming primary epistemic rights for herself in this move. However, by making a claim about F’s rights, she does seem to be upgrading her rights as a secondary knower. In this way, D’s move can be interpreted as making a ‘rights’

47


claim, which basically suggests to F that D should be the one deciding when it is proper for her to come home. This is why I have coded D’s self-positioning as ‘↑-k’.

(25) Muntigl and Turnbull 1998:235 Move

K1

F’s

D’s

role

role

+k

-k

F:

It wasn’t much to ask for you to come in early (.7) just one night. (.7) Nine-thirty, ten o’clock is not that out of line. (.5)

K2f

-k

↑-k

D:

Yeah, it is out of line.

F:

No, its not.

It was argued that D’s disagreement does not place D in a [+k] role because she has mainly voiced opposition to F’s claim. D does not, for instance, explicitly state what makes F’s request unreasonable. The suggestion that contradictions do not explicitly position self as a [+k] becomes clearer if we reexamine Ex. (1), now shown as (26). Here, L not only contradicts D’s prior move, but she also accounts for why D is able to show his feelings. She does this by providing examples in which she witnessed D’s expression of emotion (you’ve been crying and you’re upset…). The account is crucial because it demonstrates that, in addition to resisting D’s claim, L is in fact more knowledgeable than D in a discussion concerning D’s ability to articulate his feelings. In sum, bare contradictions merely resist other’s positioning of self and upgrade one’s [k] status, whereas accounts demonstrate that one is taking up a primary knowledge role.6

48


(26) 23/2 Move D’s

K1

L’s

role

role

+k

-k

D: but I’m (.) (I gu-) I guess I just don’t show it T:

mm hm

D: [(like I K2

L:

)]

-k

↑-k

[oh no you do] (.)

-k

↑-k

you do

-k

+k


-k

+k

and you’re upset

-k

+k

and that’s all (

) you know

Arguing exchanges clearly are battlefields in which speakers negotiate who has main access to knowledge or who has primary rights and responsibilities to make epistemic claims. It is in these sites of contestation that speakers often attempt to assert themselves as primary knowers, placing others in a secondary knower role. In analyzing disagreements for the way in which they challenge and adjust epistemic positions, it is important to identify: 1) the degree of opposition expressed by the disagreement; and 2) the degree to which the speaker makes an independent and/or alternative claim to prior speaker. Purely oppositional disagreements such as “no its not”, “so what” or “ that’s irrelevant” orient mainly to the prior speaker’s self-positioning and reduce the speaker’s epistemic rights to [-k]. Less oppositional disagreements, such as those involving an account, or those that make alternative claims orient more to the disagreeing speaker’s

49


own epistemic position. As Ex. (26) has shown, these disagreements work to take over as [+k] (for a list of different disagreement types that are categorized with respect to their degree of oppositional or ‘face-aggravating’ strength, see Muntigl & Turnbull 1998).

Resisting the choice of other-positioning in the initiating move: A response move may also resist the way in which the responding speaker was epistemically positioned in the initiating move. A clear example of this is a denial of knowledge, shown in (27). This exchange is taken from a couples therapy sessions and begins with a K2 move in which T attempts to elicit information from the client (D). By responding with “I:’ve no idea.”, M resists T’s positioning of M as a [+k]. Because D’s response claims no access to knowledge of what he would envision happening, D positions himself as having [-k] rights, as not in any way being able to fulfill the conditions necessary for being a primary knower. As a result both speakers end the exchange as secondary knowers.

(27) 64/4 Move T’s

K2

M’s

role

role

-k

+k

T:

what what do you kind of envision happening. (2.0)

K1

-k

-k

M:

I:’ve no idea. hh

K2f

-k

-k

T:

mm hm

50


Another example of a denial of knowledge, shown in (28), illustrates that the ‘answerer’ may attempt to cede primary epistemic rights to another. In this example, the therapist (T) takes up a K2 slot by asking D what happens to him when he withdraws from the relationship (when: (.) when you sort ↑of (2.5) withdra:w↑ a little bit↑ from the relationship? … what h(h)a:ppens for you.). D first responds by resisting the primary epistemic status allocated to him (I don’t know if I do:.), but then upgrades his status by agreeing that he might withdraw (I might- (0.5) but not realize ↑it.). Note that D has not answered the question “what happens…” (and therefore he is not taking up a primary knower role), but merely weakly confirms that he does withdraw or shut down from the relationship. D then makes a query to his spouse L through a confirmation seeking question (do I?). Although D’s query bears resemblance to Ex. (24) in which the client asks “can you think of one?”, D’s confirmation seeking question in Ex. (28) is much stronger in that it positions L as a having primary epistemic rights. In other words, D is making it possible for L to confirm whether D acts in a specific way in the relationship. L, however, resists this positioning by denying knowledge (°I dunno. °).

(28) Move

K2

T’s

D’s

L’s

role

role

role

-k

+k

T:

d-does- do you:. (2.5) is that a time when: (.) when you sort ↑of (2.5) withdra:w↑ a little bit↑ from the relationship? er shut ↓dow:n a little bit↑ from the relationship? er. (2.5) what h(h)a:ppens for you. (0.5) ((D glances at T, then returns gaze at L))

51


K1

-k

-k

K1

-k

↑-k

D:

I don’t know if I do:. I might- (0.5) but not realize ↑it. (2.0) ((D maintains gaze with L))

K1/K2 -k

-k

+k

D:

d’you know what- (.) do I? (1.0)

K1

-k

-k

L:

°I dunno. °

Resisting the flow of the conversational exchange: The final way of realizing resistance occurs when a speaker attempts to abort the exchange, thereby demonstrating the she or he no longer wishes to be a cooperative conversational partner. In Ex. (29), taken from a child counselling session, C (counsellor) attempts to get the child (P, a 6 year old boy) to answer a series of questions to which P repeatedly responds with “don’t know.” Hutchby (2002) argues that P’s ostensible denial of knowledge is not really about P’s knowledge at all. Instead, P’s “don’t know” construction attempts to stop C’s line of questioning. Although P’s first “don’t know” may be coded as a K1 move in which secondary knowledge is realized, the subsequent “don’t knows” are doing different kinds of discursive work. By contrast, these responses are resisting the continuation of the conversational exchange by refusing to comply with the counselling activity. The “don’t know” may be paraphrased simply as “stop asking!” or “I’m not answering!”. In a way, P refuses to take up the K1 move, thus contravening the expectation that P take up an epistemic position. For this reason, P’s moves are coded as ‘Ab’ (=abort) and the epistemic roles are left blank. One piece of evidence for this reading that P has selected an ‘Ab’ move is the way in which P expresses his second “don’t know”. P places extra stress on both “D” and

52


“o”, thereby emphasizing that he will not provide C with the information that he is seeking. Note however that C responds in the final move by orienting to P’s “don’t know” as an insincere denial of knowledge (.h O:h I think you do:: I think you’re playing). By doing so, C appears to transform P’s previous move into a K1 move in which [-k] rights are realized. Furthermore, by claiming that P ‘really does know’, C upgrades P’s epistemic rights (who in C’s words is merely “playing”) and upgrades his own secondary rights because he is, after all, able to recognize P’s ‘game’.

(29) Hutchby 2002:156 Move

K2

C’s

P’s

role

role

-k

↓+k

C:

Why d’you think, (1.8) mum an’ dad said what they said. (0.4)

K1

-k

-k

P:

Don’t know, (4.1)

K2

-k

↓+k

C:

Cuz it sounds like they were a bit cross. (0.6)

Ab K2

-k

Ab/K1 K2f

↑-k

P:

Don’t know,

↓+k

C:

Who d’you think they’re cross with.=

(-k)

P:

=Don’t kno [w.

↑-k

C:

[.h O:h I think you do:: I think you’re playing

53


Taking over an interpersonal position: In responding to a conversational move, a next speaker may attempt to adopt the same knowledge move asserted by the prior speaker. This type of interpersonal negotiation has already been shown in Ex. (26), in which L takes over the [+k] role by accounting for how D has on a previous occasion displayed his feelings. In that example, L first resisted D’s claim to primary knowledge through a contradiction. Following that L constructed herself as a [+k] by accounting for her disagreement. Taking over a knowledge role may also be realized in what Muntigl and Turnbull (1998:231) have termed a counterclaim. These are disagreements that do not contradict the prior speaker’s claim, but rather provide an alternative or contrasting claim. An example showing how counterclaims take over primary epistemic rights was shown in (14). Counterclaims function differently from contradictions because they do not primarily resist the previous speaker’s [+k] status. Instead, counterclaims have an affiliate component to them, in which they disagree without denying the full import of the previous speaker’s claim. In Ex. (14), D’s disagreement that the curfew is not what she likes does not contradict the meaning of M’s statement. Instead, it attempts to seize the right away from M in deciding when to set D’s curfew. For this reason, M’s primary knower status is merely downgraded, and not transformed into a [-k]. Consider another example of an arguing exchange in (30), which involves a different father (F) and daughter (D) arguing over the moral issue of cheating on an exam. In the first move D positions herself as a [+k] by claiming that one should not disclose the names of cheaters. In the subsequent move, F responds with a counterclaim stating that D is not opposed to disclosing the names of cheaters for moral reasons, but because she is a coward (“it sounds to me like you’re basically chicken to do it”). The

54


counterclaim allows F to position himself as the [+k] (i.e., F knows the real reason for D’s actions, which is cowardice) and to downgrade D’s prior [+k] status (i.e., F casts doubt on D’s reasons for not wanting to disclose the names of the cheaters). F uses a number of modal expressions (it sounds like, not necessarily) and descriptive weakeners (basically chicken) to mitigate the disagreement component of the counterclaim. These mitigation devices work to weaken the strength with which F downgrades D’s original [+k] status. If F had countered with contradictions such as “you should say something” or “that definitely is something you must do”, then D’s epistemic status would have been reduced to a [-k]. Note that F’s mitigation devices also function to weaken F’s own claim to primary epistemic rights (compare: “it sounds to me like you’re basically chicken to do it” with “you’re too chicken to do it”).

(30) Muntigl and Turnbull 1998:235 Move

D’s

F’s

role

role F:

Okay now the [other thing is is well say that half a dozen or so got the final

M:

[No, I’m just I’m just curious.

F:

exam and they were able to really do well and they and they penalized the other students. (1.3)

K1

+k

-k

D:

I wouldn’t say anything I would probably let someone else do something,

55


I don’t want to go up that is that is not something to do (.8) I would never do that (1.6) ask any teenager ((laughs)) the [re are K2

↓+k

↓+k

F:

[Well, it sounds to me like its not necessarily the right thing to do, it sounds to me like you’re basically chicken to do it.

The different ways in which speakers may adjust or transform epistemic claims of self and other in a responding move, based on the examples above, have been summarized in Tables 4 and 5. The linguistic means by which these epistemic adjustments or transformations may occur have also been included.

[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

5

Conclusion

By moving beyond a view of knowledge as simply ‘sending and receiving information’ and by trying to model knowledge as a socially negotiable resource, I have been able to extend current models of exchange structure within SFL in two ways. First, I proposed that epistemic claims always bear a sensitivity to how self (i.e., the one making the

56


claim) and other (i.e., the for whom the claim is being designed) are being positioned with respect to epistemic rights, responsibilities and access to knowledge. Second, self and other epistemic positionings can be expressed by various adjustments (i.e., upgrading or downgrading) or transformations (i.e., taking over or resisting a knowledge role) to self/other’s epistemic status. For reasons of space I have mainly focused on 2-move informing and eliciting exchanges. K1f moves and queries (i.e., confirmations, clarifications, etc.) have not been presented within this general model. But the same kinds of options involving self/other positioning, adjustment and transformation would also be available for these moves. The only difference would be that query moves have a suspending function and are therefore embedded within the main exchange (see O’Donnell 1990:302). I have shown how the negotiation of epistemic claims is a locally managed activity that is accomplished move-by-move. Although some of the linguistic resources used to adjust and transform epistemic rights have been presented, this should not be seen as a ‘complete’ list. My analyses have drawn from various social contexts such as everyday assessment sequences, therapeutic interactions, family arguing and courtroom inquiries in which the making of epistemic claims forms a significant part of the interactional business at hand. Other social contexts (and perhaps simply more data) are needed to discover the additional ways in which epistemic claims are locally managed in interaction. The framework for examining the negotiation of knowledge presented in this paper has extended Berry’s model to the point that a re-definition of terms becomes necessary. This is because the way in which Berry originally defined primary knower, secondary knower, K1 slot, K2 slot, etc., which was based on a sender-receiver model

57


of information, can no longer be used as a starting point for the kind of dynamic analysis that I have proposed. For this reason, I propose the following (re)definitions:

K1 slot •

A slot within the exchange that is associated with primary epistemic rights. A speaker may resist or downgrade the epistemic rights associated with this position.

K2 slot (includes K2f) •

A slot within the exchange that is associated with secondary epistemic rights. A speaker may resist or upgrade the epistemic rights associated with this position.

Epistemic Rights •

Includes 1) a speaker’s degree of accessibility to knowledge (to what degree is someone expected to know?); 2) the right to make a claim to knowledge; 3) a speaker’s interest in ensuring that the proposition gets accepted.

Primary Knower (PK) •

A speaker who claims primary epistemic rights or is positioned by another speaker as having these rights.

Secondary Knower (SK) •

A speaker who claims secondary epistemic rights or is positioned by another speaker as having these rights.

58


It may turn out that ‘knowledge’ is too narrow or misleading a term for labelling the type of commodity that speakers place under negotiation during social interaction. In anticipation of this shortcoming, I included the term ‘epistemology’, which is taken from conversational analytic work on social or practical epistemology. Coming from this perspective, the negotiation of knowledge will include ‘the degree of accessibility to knowledge’ and ‘who has rights to know’. But whatever our superordinate term ends up becoming, we should not lose sight of the aims involved in interpersonal modelling, which is to illustrate the manifold realizations of interpersonal meaning within and across discourse structures and the central role that speakers play in co-constructing these meanings.

Notes

*

The research reported on in this article was funded by a Social Sciences and

Humanities Research Council of Canada Standard Research Grant (# 410-2004-1816). Many thanks also go to 2 anonymous reviewers whose comments led me to radically transform (and hopefully improve!) various parts of the original manuscript. 1.

In the segments of transcript presented as examples, the first (leftmost) column

identifies speech functions or moves, the second identifies the line numbers from the original transcript, the third represents the speaker (e.g., T:) and the fourth represents the speaker’s utterance. All utterances have been segmented into clauses, with each clause placed on a separate line.

59


2.

Disagreements have been analyzed as ‘K2f’ or ‘K1f’ moves and not as moves that

begin a new exchange. 3.

For reasons of space, I have restricted the system network to 2-move exchanges

that do not involve suspending moves. Those who wish to see how suspension can be illustrated in a system network may refer to O’Donnell (1990:322). In addition, unlike O’Donnell (1990:322), I have not included the feature ‘keep quiet’ as a separate move option. This is because ‘keeping quiet’ is often interpreted as a non-consensus move. For example, if one keeps quiet after a disagreement, this may be interpreted as agreeing with the knowledge claims realized in the disagreement. 4. In keeping with SFL tradition, a SYSTEM is represented in Small Caps. 5.

Note that I have not included Dk1 moves in the system network. This is because

these moves can be simply be coded as K2. The moves from Ex. (4), could therefore be re-categorized as follows: K2

Quizmaster:


K1

Contestant:

Salisbury

K1f

Quizmaster:

yes

I would argue that the only difference between exam-type questions and informationseeking questions is the third move. The uniqueness of the former is that the Quizmaster also selects a ‘K1’ move (rather than an ‘expected’ K2f, following a K2 ^ K1 sequence), which gives the quizmaster primary epistemic rights to evaluate the answer. 6.

Note that for the initial K1 move, L’s projected [-k] status is only implied rather

than directly asserted. Recall that D’s response originally was to T’s question.

60


Nonetheless, it still holds that, in terms of how D feels in a certain situation, T and L have secondary epistemic rights in this matter.

References

Atkinson, J. Maxwell & John Heritage (eds.). 1984. Structures of social action: studies in conversation analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berry, Margaret. 1981a. Systemic linguistics and discourse analysis: A multi-layered approach to exchange structure. In Malcolm Coulthard & Martin Montgomery (eds.), Studies in Discourse Analysis, 120-145. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Berry, Margaret. 1981b. Systemic linguistics and discourse analysis: A multi-layered approach to exchange structure. Mimeo (a longer version of Berry 1981a). Bilmes, Jack. 1988. The concept of preference in conversation analysis. Language in Society 17(2). 161-181. Burton, Deirdre. 1978. Towards an analysis of casual conversation. Nottingham Linguistic Circular 7(2). 131-164. Chafe, Wallace & Johanna Nichols (eds.). 1986 . The linguistic coding of epistemology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Ehrlich, Susan & Jack Sidnell. 2006. “I think that’s not an assumption you ought to make”: Challenging presuppositions in inquiry testimony. Language in Society 35. 655-676. Halliday, M. A. K. 1994. An Introduction to Functional Grammar (2nd edn.). London: Edward Arnold.

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Heritage, John. 1984. Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press. Heritage, John & Geoffrey Raymond. 2005. The terms of agreement: Indexing epistemic authority and subordination in talk-in-interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly 68(1). 15-38 Hutchby, Ian. 2002. Resisting the incitement to talk in child counselling: Aspects of the utterance ‘I don’t know’. Discourse Studies 4(2). 147-168. Labov, William. 1972. Language in the inner city. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press. Levinson, Stephen. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, J. R. 1992. English Text. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Martin, J. R. 2000a. Factoring out exchange: Types of structure. In Malcolm Coulthard, Janet Cotterill & Frances Rock (eds.), Dialogue analysis VII: Working with dialogue, 19-40. Tübingen: Max Niemezer Verlag. Martin, J. R. 2000b. Beyond exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English. In Susan Hunston & Geoff Thompson (eds.), Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse, 142-175. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Muntigl Peter. 2004. Narrative Counselling: Social and Linguistic Processes of Change. (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 11) Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Muntigl, Peter. 2007. Discourse analysis of spoken interaction: Dynamic vs. synoptic perspectives. In Helmut Gruber, Martin Kaltenbacher & Peter Muntigl (eds.), Empirical Approaches to Discourse Analysis, 17-50. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

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Muntigl, Peter & Loreley Hadic Zabala. in press. Expandable responses: How clients get prompted to say more during psychotherapy. Research on Language and Social Interaction. Muntigl, Peter & William Turnbull. 1998. Conversational structure and facework in arguing. Journal of Pragmatics 29. 225-256. O’Donnell, Michael. 1990. A dynamic model of exchange. Word 41(3). 293-327. O’Donnell, Michael. 1999. Context in Dynamic Modelling. In Mohsen Ghadessy (ed.), Text and Context in Functional Linguistics, 63-99. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Raymond, Geoffrey & John Heritage. 2006. The epistemics of social relations: Owning grandchildren. Language in Society 35. 677-705. Roth, Andrew. 2002. Social epistemology in broadcast news interviews. Language in Society 31. 355-381. Sidnell, Jack. 2005. Talk and practical epistemology. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Sinclair, John McH. & Richard Malcolm Coulthard. 1975. Towards an analysis of discourse. London: Oxford University Press. Ventola, Eija. 1987. The Structure of Social Interaction: A Systemic Approach to the Semiotics of Service Encounters. London: Pinter. Whalen, Marilyn & Don Zimmerman. 1990. Describing trouble: Practical epistemology in citizen calls to the police. Language in Society 19. 465-492.

63

elicit {K2^K1; K2:[-k]; K1:[+k]} EXCHANGE TYPE

inform {K1^K2f; K1:[+k]; K2f:[-k]} initiate

upgrade change downgrade

SELF POSITIONING

no change change KNOWLEDGE MOVE

upgrade downgrade

OTHER POSITIONING

no change accept consensus ‘preferred’ adjust

exchange {e.g., abort}

respond resist non-consensus ‘dispreferred’

move {e.g., disagree, deny knowledge}

ROLE TRANSFORMATION

take over upgrade change downgrade

OTHER POSITIONING

no change change

downgrade

SELF POSITIONING

Figure 1. Move potential for knowledge exchanges

upgrade

no change

Table 1. Transcription Notation Notation Gloss (.) (1.0) [] = : . ? underline CAPS .hh hh () (?) ((cough)) ((laughter)) °  

untimed short pause (less than .5 seconds) timed pause overlapping speech, e.g., A: how was the [movie ] B: [great ] contiguous utterance, e.g., A: how was the movie= B: =great indicates cut-off speech, e.g., I gu- guess extended sound, e.g., we:::ll clause final falling intonation clause final rising intonation emphasis greater emphasis in breath outbreath e.g., t(hhh)ake transcriber’s guess at speaker utterance unidentifiable speaker non-speech vocalizations are placed in double parentheses whispered utterance e.g., I am °whispering° sharply rising intonation sharply falling intonation

Table 2. Correlations of content and format in adjacency pair seconds (Levinson 1983:336) FIRST PARTS: Request Offer/Invite Assessment Question Blame SECOND PARTS: Preferred: acceptance acceptance agreement expected denial answer Dispreferred: refusal refusal disagreement unexpected admission answer or non-answer

Table 3. Initiating moves, epistemic positionings and linguistic realizations Initiating Move Epistemic Position Linguistic Realization K1 ↓[+k], [self] modality, evidentials, [declarative] + [tag] ↑[-k], [other] [declarative] + [tag] K2 ↑[-k], [self] factive predicate ↓[+k], [other] modality, ‘restrictive’ Y/N question

Table 4. Responding moves, [adjusting] epistemic positionings and linguistic realizations Responding Move Epistemic Position Linguistic Realization K1 ↓[+k], [self] modality ↑[-k], [other] passing the K1 slot to another speaker through an embedded query sequence K2f ↑[-k], [self] contradiction, oh-preface ↓[+k], [other] counterclaim, agreement token