Transport Policy 63 (2018) 131–140
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Transport Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tranpol
Knowledge that matters for the ‘survival of unfittest’: The case of the new Brussels' rail junction Nicola Francesco Dotti a, b, * a b
ICITE, Universite Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium ISPOLE, Universite Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Policy knowledge Megaproject Decentralisation Brussels Cognitive monopoly
The construction of a large metropolitan infrastructure, like other megaprojects, requires advanced technical expertise, capacity to manage complex procedures and planning processes as well as capacity to deal with conflicting interests. For the case of megaprojects, overestimation of benefits and underestimation of costs and risks is a common problem all over the world, leading to the ‘survival of the unfittest’ (Flyvbjerg, 2009). The main causes were identified in the optimism bias, strategic misrepresentation, path dependency leading to lock-in and poor oversight; however, the ‘survival’ of these causes is still unclear. For this purpose, the survival of the unfittest megaprojects is re-conceptualised into a proper cognitive-evolutionary framework. By introducing an innovative taxonomy of policy knowledge, this paper aims to argue that a specific policy community can ‘survive’ by strategically using a ‘cognitive monopoly’ of some of the relevant policy knowledge for megaprojects. Based on the case of the new ‘Watermael – Schuman – Josaphat’ rail junction in Brussels, findings show the critical role played by the Federal Ministry for Communications thanks to a long-standing and context-specific know-how on underground works. While missing knowledge was outsourced and instrumentally used to overcome potential lock-in, the Ministry was able to build the only new large metropolitan infrastructure of Belgium during a period of high uncertainty due to decentralisation. The paper concludes discussing the effects of preserving this policy knowledge as well as negative issues related to this ‘cognitive monopoly’.
1. Introduction The complexity of project management and the importance for urban and regional development makes the new Brussels rail junction in Brussels part of the debate on megaprojects (Dimitriou et al., 2013, 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2007; Kennedy, 2015; Salet et al., 2015). The exponential growth of megaprojects all over the world is associated with growing scepticism due to a persistent problem of overestimation of benefits and underestimation of costs and risks, the so-called ‘survival of the unfittest’ determined by optimism bias, strategic misrepresentation and politicaleconomic lock-in (Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2009, 2014). Acknowledging the complexity of megaprojects (e.g. Dimitriou et al., 2014), this article aims to investigate the role of knowledge for large metropolitan infrastructure to contribute to the debate on why the causes of the ‘survival of unfittest’ megaprojects persist. To integrate the notion of ‘survival of the unfittest’ (Flyvbjerg, 2009), a cognitive-evolutionary approach will be introduced focusing on policy community and policy paradigm (Hall, 1993; Slembeck, 1997). In this framework, the focus is
on the common understanding of a policy issue (the so-called ‘policy paradigm’) shared among the policymakers involved in this issue (the policy community). The literature on policy transfer has already pointed out the importance of external experts and consultants for the global diffusion of megaprojects (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Prince, 2012), while clarifying also the crucial importance of context-specific knowledge. However, the persistence of the optimism bias was not (yet) related to the notion of policy paradigm (Borraz and John, 2004; Dotti, 2016; Wohlgemuth, 2002). In policy studies, the ‘strategic misrepresentation’ of megaprojects leading to the survival of the unfittest has been framed as an example of the instrumental use of policy knowledge (Hoppe, 2005). Building on these contributions, the cognitive-evolutionary approach aims to integrate the mainstream literature on megaprojects providing a common framework to explain the persistence of the causes identified by Flyvbjerg. Specifically, the optimism bias and the strategic misrepresentation ‘survive’ because political actors mobilise only for issues they can ‘understand’ within their policy paradigm, while they tend to reject what questions their core beliefs and preferences. This self-reinforcing
* Universit e Libre de Bruxelles, Building H, Office H4.239, Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 42, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. E-mail address:
[email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.12.022 Received 20 September 2016; Received in revised form 20 December 2017; Accepted 21 December 2017 Available online 30 December 2017 0967-070X/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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mechanism leads to path dependency because “[it] is particularly difficult to unlearn successful habits of the past, and institutions may be retained and sometimes even aggressively defended long after they have been made redundant by internal or external events” (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006, p. 6). The common understanding shared by policymakers (i.e. the policy paradigm) shapes their preferences and beliefs, and works like a filter on what they can learn: external sources of knowledge can be ‘understood’ and accepted as long as these do not question core beliefs and preferences. Within this framework, the external views, suggested by Flyvbjerg, to solve the survival of the unfittest, are likely to be accepted (rejected) if they confirm (question) the political preferences and beliefs of the policy community. Lastly, the strategic misrepresentation can be seen as an effective survival strategy for a policy community aiming to preserve a dominant position, yet the capacity to use this strategy is a relevant policy knowledge as such. The construction of a large metropolitan infrastructure, like other kinds of megaprojects, is a major policy challenge: design, construction, and implementation require the capacity to deal with conflicting interests, to solve technical problems, to manage lengthy procedures as well as dealing with high degrees of uncertainty. Some of this policy knowledge might be already available locally or acquired externally, yet, they are not equivalent. For this purpose, a new taxonomy for the different types of policy knowledge is proposed based on the distinction between context-specific know-how and potentially transferable knowwhat. This new taxonomy aims to identify whether a policy community is able to create and benefit from a ‘cognitive monopoly’ as a survival strategy to keep a dominant position. The cognitive-evolutionary approach is applied to the case of a new large metropolitan infrastructure, the Watermael-Schuman-Josaphat (WSJ) rail junction in Brussels. This case study presents two interesting features. First, the Belgian Corps of Engineers has a long-standing knowledge of underground works in Brussels (Zitouni and Tellier, 2013); nonetheless, since the 1980s only one megaproject has been built, namely the WSJ junction, making Brussels (and Belgium) being against the global trend of megaprojects. Second, since the 1980s Belgium went through a major process of institutional decentralisation threatening the existence of the policy community established for underground works in Brussels. While the mainstream literature has devoted limited attention to the link between megaproject and decentralisation, in cognitive-evolutionary terms, this case provides the opportunity to investigate the survival strategy adopted by the corps of engineers based on their cognitive monopoly. The paper is structured as follow. The next Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the cognitive-evolutionary approach and a new taxonomy of policy knowledge. Section 4 discusses the link between megaprojects and decentralisation, referring to the case of Brussels. Section 5 describes materials and method used for the case study. Section 6 presents the analysis of the WSJ rail junction case, while Section 7 proposes some general reflections with a specific focus on the notion of cognitive monopoly. The last part concludes with remarks for future research.
guarantee funding for megaprojects, though this is definitely not a Pareto-efficient solution. While improved cost-benefit analysis could fix technical reasons, he identifies in the optimism bias, the strategic misrepresentation by political actors and the lock-in determined by path dependence as the psychological and political-economic causes for the survival of the unfittest megaprojects (on these issues, see also Flyvbjerg, 2014). The optimism bias and the capacity for strategic misrepresentation can explain the persistence of cost overrun and overestimation of benefits and risks, but little is said about why these two causes ‘survive’ causing path dependence which might end up in political-economic lock-in. In principle, once these two causes are identified, it should be possible to solve them, and Flyvbjerg already suggests some solutions such as enforcing external views. However, this does not seem to happen. In the literature on megaprojects, policy knowledge is usually conceptualised as ‘knowledge-on-demand’: external experts are involved as ‘consultants’ providing advice for pre-defined policy issues at stake (Cantarelli et al., 2010a, 2010b; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Giezen et al., 2015; Innes and Gruber, 2005). More recently, an alternative mode has emerged based on the notion of ‘co-production’ among policy-makers, experts and stakeholders, including citizens (Armitage et al., 2008; Garmendia and Stagl, 2010). Although co-production is getting growing attention in urban planning and governance of common resources (Healey, 2008; Innes and Gruber, 2005; Newig et al., 2016), the literature on megaprojects clearly shows the predominance of the first mode (see also Dimitriou et al., 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2014; Kennedy, 2015). The role of external experts and consultants providing knowledge for megaprojects has been widely analysed in the literature on ‘policy mobility’ as a by-product of globalisation (McCann, 2011; Park et al., 2014; Peck, 2011; Peck and Theodore, 2010; Prince, 2012; Smith, 2013; Theodore and Peck, 2012). In this field, the Dolowitz-Marsh model provides a complete framework to analyse ‘policy transfer’, including policy mobility (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). This model provides an analytical framework articulated around six key questions: why does policy transfer happen? Who are the key actors? What is transferred? From where? What are the degrees of transfer? How is policy transfer related to policy ‘success’ or ‘failure’? This model states that not all the relevant policy knowledge can be transferred, and the receiving context is crucial to make the policy transfer happens (see also Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012). Nevertheless, both internal and external knowledge suffers the same optimism bias, while policy transfer can be just part of a strategic misrepresentation. In policy studies, the involvement of external experts and consultants is a well-known political tactic (cf. Dente, 2014; Hoppe, 2005; Peters, 2015). External knowledge is commonly used to substantiate predefined preferences and to legitimise the position of a political actor against opponents (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006; Capano, 2003, 2009; Kay, 2009; Krause, 2010; Marsden et al., 2011). The instrumental use of knowledge raises two main issues on the role of external experts and consultants in megaprojects. First, Dolowitz and Marsh have already clarified that not all the relevant policy knowledge for megaprojects can be transferred; however, they do not enter into the discussion on different types of policy knowledge (I will come back to this point in the next Section). Second, external knowledge requires some ‘internal’ actors able to instrumentally use it, presumably someone with the context-specific policy knowledge that cannot be acquired from outside. Even assuming an external coercion imposing the construction of a megaproject, the literature has already highlighted the importance of the context due to the high complexity and uncertainty that are by definition associated with megaprojects (Dimitriou et al., 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Locatelli et al., 2017b). Therefore, the interaction between internal and external policy knowledge should be explained discussing how the optimism bias always ‘survive’ in both directions. For this purpose, urban studies have studied the role of ‘urban leaders’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to mobilise contextspecific knowledge, turning this into successful political/policy initiatives (Block and Paredis, 2013; Boal and Schultz, 2007; Borraz and John,
2. Literature review on policy knowledge for large metropolitan infrastructure The new rail junction of Brussels is an example of a megaproject (Flyvbjerg, 2014) due to the long planning horizons, complex and challenging management as well as relevance for urban and regional development (see also Dimitriou et al., 2014; Flyvbjerg, 2014; Locatelli et al., 2017a; Salet et al., 2015). A global trend of increasing investments in megaprojects was observed during the last decades with growing scepticism due to persistent cost overrunning and/or benefit shortfalls as well as systematic underestimation of risks (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Kennedy, 2015). In a seminal contribution, Bent Flyvbjerg (2009) explains ‘why the worst infrastructure gets built’: overestimation of benefits and underestimations of costs and risks is the formula to 132
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whether they are able to survive jointly or separately. After having clarified the key concepts of the cognitive-evolutionary approach (bounded rationality, policy paradigm and preservation), it is now possible to go back to the Flyvbjerg's contributions to explain the persistence of the causes determining the ‘survival of the unfittest’ megaprojects. First, a policy paradigm tends to reject deviant policy knowledge questioning core beliefs and preferences (cf. Giezen et al., 2015). Therefore, external sources of knowledge criticising a megaproject (i.e. the external views suggested by Flyvbjerg) are likely to be rejected because of the optimism bias affecting the dominant policy paradigm. A policy community is likely to call only external experts and consultants that are in favour of a project in which they have engaged (i.e. they call experts sharing the same optimism bias). Second, a policy community is likely to share the context-specific knowledge needed for megaprojects only if this helps to preserve their dominant position. Not only they call external experts and consultants sharing the same optimism bias, but they also ‘instrumentally use’ them to preserve their dominant position (i.e. the strategic misrepresentation). While this kind of knowledge is relevant as such, it requires the presence of context-specific urban leaders and policy entrepreneurs able to use it. According to this framework, the survival of the unfittest megaprojects would be the outcome of a survival strategy implemented by a policy community. The capacity to use knowledge instrumentally and to strategically misrepresent a megaproject can be a successful strategy to preserve a dominant policy community, especially in the case of megaprojects when specific and advanced policy knowledge is needed. The tendency to preserve both policy community and paradigm leads to path dependency keeping the memory of ‘successful’ past megaprojects (the dominant policy paradigm), calling external experts to substantiate predefined preferences (the instrumental use of policy knowledge), rejecting deviant knowledge (the external views) and reinforcing the cognitive monopoly of a policy community able to do that. After having integrated the survival of the unfittest megaprojects with the cognitive-evolutionary framework, I would like to move one step forward reflecting on the different types of policy knowledge for large metropolitan infrastructure, and in general for megaprojects. According to the Dolowitz and Marsh model, not all policy knowledge can be transferred, and the transfer depends on the receiving context. On the other hand, policy studies have explained that urban leaders and policy entrepreneurs are able to use external knowledge instrumentally. Finally, the cognitive-evolutionary approach makes clear that external knowledge can be acquired depending on the dominant policy paradigm. All these elements pose two intertwined questions on the type of external knowledge that can be acquired from external sources (and what cannot be acquired) and about the kind of context-specific knowledge needed to do it. For this purpose, I propose a new taxonomy of policy knowledge based on the well-known distinction between know-what and know-how and then further articulated on the common distinction between technical and political dimensions. While other types of knowledge exist such as ‘know-why’, ‘know-who’ and ‘know-when’ (cf. Foray, 2004; Hulme, 2014), the proposed taxonomy already provides a fertile framework. To the best of my knowledge, it has not yet been applied to the case of policy knowledge for megaprojects. The ‘know-what’ is the policy knowledge that can be transferred, according to the Dolowitz-Marsh model; the know-how is context-specific and commonly used by urban leaders and policy entrepreneurs within a given context (Croenewegen and Steen, 2007; Mintrom, 1997). Specifically, the instrumental use of external knowledge requires the presence of a political actor having the knowhow to acquire external know-what, whether this is missing. Clearly, a megaproject requires both types of policy knowledge, yet know-how is context-specific, while external knowledge sources can provide only know-what as long as this fits in the dominant policy paradigm. In this perspective, a policy community can survive as long as they preserve their context-specific know-how (including capacity for strategic
2004; Dotti, 2016; Huitema and Meijerink, 2010; Mintrom, 1997; Steyvers et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2011). Whether interested in general or specific policy issues at stake (respectively, urban leaders or policy entrepreneurs), the presence of actors able to mobilise context-specific knowledge is crucial and shapes policy knowledge dynamics, though this literature has not (yet) related to the capacity of strategic misrepresentation in the case of megaprojects. 3. A cognitive-evolutionary approach to explain the ‘survival of the unfittest’ The persistence of the optimism bias, the strategic misrepresentation, the path dependence and the poor oversight determining the survival of the unfittest megaprojects can be explained by assuming a proper cognitive-evolutionary approach as proposed, among others, by Tillman Slembeck (1997) (see also Croenewegen and Steen, 2007; Dotti, 2016; John, 2003; Uyarra, 2010; Van den Bergh, 2007; Wohlgemuth, 2002). Although Flyvbjerg already uses an evolutionary terminology, the cognitive-evolutionary approach goes even further to explain the persistence of the main causes for the survival of the unfittest megaprojects by shifting the focus from megaprojects as such to the dynamics of related policy knowledge. The starting point for the cognitive-evolutionary approach is the notion of bounded rationality of political actors (cf. Simon, 1991): individual political actors mobilise for collective issues depending on their capacity to perceive it as a problem, depending on available information as well as their preferences and beliefs. Second, those actors interact with other relevant actors turning individual perceptions into a political issue. This mobilisation leads to policy intervention, while this process of sharing relevant knowledge and experiences leads to the creation of a common understanding of the policy issue at stake, the so-called ‘policy paradigm’ (Hall, 1993, 2013). A ‘policy paradigm’ works like a Kuhn's paradigm (Kuhn, 1962): it shapes the definition of political goals based on shared preferences and beliefs, and it is the outcome of multiple collective interactions and experiences (see also Baumgartner, 2014; Capano, 2003; Daigneault, 2014). Similarly to Kuhn's paradigm, a policy paradigm is a self-reinforcing mechanism facilitating the processing of new information based on learnt lessons, yet it tends to reject ‘deviant’ knowledge questioning core beliefs. Referring to the case of megaprojects, a policy community affected by the optimism bias is likely to understand and accept only external sources of policy knowledge that share the same core beliefs and preferences (including the same optimism bias). The ‘filter’ imposed by the policy paradigm further narrows down the already limited transferability of policy knowledge, as identified by the Dolowitz-Marsh model. This double constraint facilitates the strategic misrepresentation by those actors able to monopolise this policy knowledge, even more in the case of smaller policy community such as in a metropolitan area like Brussels. These bottlenecks contribute to explain path dependence. For the purpose of our discussion, the other key concept from the cognitive-evolutionary approach is the notion of preservation, which is articulated along two different dimensions. First, political actors tend to be rent-seekers: once they become part of a dominant policy community (and related paradigm), they put in place survival strategies to defend their dominant position. Second, political actors do have memory, and this is a double-edged sword: memory is a powerful mechanism to preserve knowledge over time, though it is very difficult to ‘unlearn’ it when circumstances have changed (Lebel et al., 2006). The policy community and dominant paradigm survive differently. A policy community can replace some individuals as well as dealing with internal tensions, while policy knowledge is just one of the resources to be combined with political consensus, economic resources and legal power (cf. Dente, 2014). A policy paradigm is shared among individuals and can be improved through learning as long as core beliefs and preferences do not change. In both cases, the notion of preservation leads to path dependence (and potential lock-in) for both policy community and dominant paradigm, 133
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mention ‘decentralisation’ as an issue referring to megaprojects (cf. Davis and Dewey, 2013; Trapenberg Frick, 2015). On the contrary, decentralisation is a common trend all over the world since the 1970s, though with some current signs of U-turn (Dotti and Bubbico, 2014; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). In the debate on decentralisation, infrastructures and megaprojects play a major role because lower tiers of government have difficulties in managing largescale investments (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008; Gil Canaleta et al., 2004; Prud'homme, 1995). Specifically, the transfer of civil servants (with their policy knowledge) from national to sub-national administrations has shown to be a particularly critical issue (cf. Azfar et al., 1999; RodriguezPose and Gill, 2005). In cognitive-evolutionary term, decentralisation is of particular interest because the transfer of policy competences might threaten the existence of the related policy community. In the case of Belgium, rail policy was one of the few competencies left at the federal level, and the ‘famous’ corps of engineers kept in the Ministry of Communications (henceforth, the Ministry). In a very detailed research, Celine Tellier (2012) reconstructs the whole history of this corps, specifically focusing on Brussels (for a synthesis in English, see Zitouni and Tellier, 2013). According to Tellier, the ‘success’ of this corps is based on a three-step strategy: the ‘box’, the ‘pipeline’, and the ‘trap’. She found that these engineers have a ‘box’ full of projects ready to be used when right conditions are in place. Once a project is seen as politically irreversible, it enters into a ‘pipeline’ to be approved and implemented. If a project falls into a ‘trap’ (e.g. an endless political conflict), it is never discarded, but simply sent back to the ‘box’ until a new opportunity emerges. Lastly, they keep the box always full of projects to be used depending on political conditions (cf. the notion of resilience in Giezen et al., 2015). This strategy was developed by the corps of engineers after the conclusion of the North-South Junction to avoid the risk of being disbanded. Thanks to this strategy, they were able to keep a dominant position in the Belgian public administration. The impressive underground network built in Brussels from the 1950s–1980s is the tangible outcome of this successful strategy (see also the technical/bureaucratic style in Innes and Gruber, 2005). In cognitive-evolutionary terms, the ‘box-pipeline-trap’ strategy puts in place by the corps of engineering is an example of a successful survival strategy to avoid the risk of being disbanded as policy community. While the box is a way to preserve policy knowledge, the capacity to make projects ‘surviving’ in the pipeline is associated with their political knowhow learnt over decades of underground works in Brussels. While uncertainty determined by decentralisation prevented the intervention of external actors unable to access context-specific knowledge, the case of the WSJ junction is the only Belgian megaproject that ‘survived’ during decentralisation. Brussels is the main urban area of Belgium with a population of about 1.5 million (in 2016), although its functional boundaries are still debated (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013; De Maesschalck et al., 2015; Dijkstra and Poelman, 2017; Dotti et al., 2014; Dotti and Spithoven, 2017). The Brussels-Capital Region (BCR) encompasses 19 municipalities and is an enclave in Flanders. The BCR is the core of a metropolitan area also extended in the other two Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia). Brussels is the core of the Belgian rail network, and it constitutes a major hub for Europe with connections to the Netherlands, Germany (namely, K€ oln), Luxembourg, France (Lille and Paris) and the UK (London). Geographically, the city centre is located at the bottom of the Zenne river valley, while the geomorphology is characterised by several other valleys of tiny tributaries making underground works particularly complex (on the geomorphology of Brussels, see De Bondt and Claeys, 2011). This geomorphology determines the backbone of the Brussels (and Belgian) rail system: the Brussels-North station links the capital city with the north and the east of the country (e.g. Leuven, Antwerp, and Liege), while the Brussels-South station with the rest of the country (west and south). The North-South Junction links these two stations and is by-far the busiest rail line in Belgium (Frenay, 2009; Hubert et al., 2013), while the whole metropolitan area suffers major problems of congestion since long-time
Table 1 Types of knowledge for policymaking. Types of knowledge for policymaking
Technical (About objects)
Political (About subjects)
Know-what
Architectural, design and engineering knowledge Procedural knowledge
Mapping knowledge Strategic knowledge
Know-how
misrepresentation), which cannot be externalised. If the context-specific know-how is lost, external experts and consultants cannot be called to implement a megaproject. The second dimension is rather descriptive: technical knowledge refers to the megaproject as such (the ‘object’); political knowledge refers to actors and stakeholders associated with it (the ‘subjects’). The combination of these two dimensions determines four types of knowledge, as shown in Table 1. 1. ‘Architectural, design and engineering knowledge’ refers to the capacity to conceive and design a large metropolitan infrastructure (as well as other types of megaprojects). This knowledge can be codified, outsourced and transferred. 2. ‘Procedural knowledge’ is the capacity to manage all the formal steps needed to build a megaproject such as planning permission, legal issues, and administrative procedures. Despite being largely codified, procedures for large metropolitan infrastructure are often unique and context-specific. 3. ‘Mapping knowledge’ refers to knowing the constellation of actors and stakeholders interested by a megaproject. This type of knowledge can be codified and transferred, though it tends to be just descriptive. 4. ‘Strategic knowledge’ is the capacity to interact with other political actors during the decision-making process. Differently from mapping knowledge that can be easily acquired, strategic knowledge is rarely codified and mainly learnt-by-doing. Although all types of knowledge are relevant for large metropolitan infrastructure, procedural and strategic knowledge are of decisive importance to guarantee the survival of a policy community. External experts and consultants usually provide architectural, design and engineering knowledge and the mapping of political actors and stakeholders is a relatively easy exercise, though this does not guarantee capacity to interact with them. Finally, this taxonomy does not pretend to be exhaustive, though it aims to solve the open issues highlighted in the literature. 4. Megaproject under decentralisation: introducing the case of Brussels The literature on megaproject has identified a growing trend all over the world, from the US and China to developing countries (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2014); nevertheless, Brussels and Belgium are never mentioned for being part of this exponential growth of megaprojects. This fact is even more surprising considering the long-lasting experience of megaprojects in Brussels: the North-South Junction built in the first half of the XX century is the most famous case that made the Belgian corps of engineers renowned worldwide (Tellier, 2012; Zitouni and Tellier, 2013). Nonetheless, after the 1980s only one megaproject has been built in the whole Belgium: namely, the Watermael-Schuman-Josaphat (henceforth, WSJ) rail junction. The ‘disappearance’ of Belgium from the list of countries involved in megaprojects coincides with the period of institutional decentralisation determined by the political conflict between the Dutchand French-speaking communities and culminated with a major Constitutional reform adopted in 1989. In the literature on megaprojects, the link with decentralisation seems missing. Despite having discussed the importance of institutional and political factor extensively, to the best of my knowledge, very few articles
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certain confusion to communicate the project broadly. In comparison to other megaprojects (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2014), the WSJ is a relatively small project that ‘only’ costs 537 million euros, of which 365 just for the Schuman-Josaphat tunnel (Infrabel, 2017). Nonetheless, the WSJ junction fits the definition of megaproject due to long planning horizons, the multi-actor process for decision-making and the non-standard technology (for more information, see Vanderhaeghe et al., 2013). Although the budget is less impressive in comparison to other megaprojects in China and the US, the WSJ project is a megaproject considering the size of Belgium (Flyvbjerg, 2014).
(see also Courtois and Dobruszkes, 2008; De Witte and Macharis, 2010). The fundamental idea of the Watermael – Schuman – Josaphat junction (WSJ) is to link two secondary and under-exploited rail lines in the eastern part of the BCR (namely, lines 26 and 161, see Fig. 1). This new large metropolitan infrastructure aims to improve accessibility from Flanders and Wallonia to the European district (i.e. the Schuman station), and from the Schuman station to the Brussels airport. Indirectly, this project aims to reduce congestion on the North-South Junction in the city centre. The WSJ project is articulated in four parts: - Upgrade of line 161 from two to four tracks between the Watermael and Schuman stations; - Renovation of the Schuman train station and connections to the local underground station; - Construction of a new tunnel between the Schuman and Meiser stations linking the two lines (length about 1,25 km); - Renovation of the Meiser station.
5. Materials and method The methodology for the case study is based on fourteen in-depth semi-structured interviews with policymakers, researchers in the field (often involved as policy experts) and consultants who worked on the project. Each interview lasted about one hour, and it was carried out in person in French or English (depending on the interviewees) between September 2014 and January 2015. Interviews were recorded, transcribed by a professional agency, and translated from French into English by the researcher when needed. Interviewees provided hard copies of official materials cited in the text, for which a digital version often does not exist (e.g., many reports from the 1990s were never digitalised). The only documents that were not possible to access are the anti-explosives and anti-terrorism technical construction details, which are naturally under military secret. The list of interviews and results were validated with key-experts.
In a first version of the project, the tunnel should have connected the Schuman and Schaerbeek-Josaphat stations, and this explains why the project is commonly known as “Schuman-Josaphat”. To make works shorter, less expensive and technically less complicated, the Ministry promoting the project decided to build the new tunnel only until the Schaerbeek-Meiser station, which is smaller and less known in Brussels. The first dossier was named referring to the Josaphat station and changing the name would have implied to restart the administrative procedure. This detail already shows the procedural knowledge by the Ministry to keep the project in the pipeline, though this has determined
Fig. 1. The Brussels' rail network (Source: Infrabel, 2008). 135
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6. Analysis
because it seems to contribute to the solution of metropolitan mobility, while other actors have no reasons to be against it. The federal administrations (the Ministry as well as Beliris and the SNCB group) are interested in keeping a role on Brussels; Flanders and Wallonia see an opportunity for their commuters, while the construction industry aims to restart its business that was blocked by the decentralisation. On the other hand, the BCR is in a difficult position: it cannot refuse a project in its territory paid by the federal government, though benefits for the region are left unclear, especially the management of long works in a critical area of Brussels. The Ministry does not provide information on the exploitation scheme for the WSJ junction to avoid potentially interregional conflicts, while the BCR has no experience in this field to propose any counterargument. Finally, the Ministry presents the WSJ project as a way “to build Brussels as the capital of Europe” by improving connections from the European district to the airport (Infrabel, 2008). This narrative is seen as more neutral hiding potentially conflicting interests behind a European frame.
6.1. Coming out of the box When the first idea for the WSJ junction was put into the ‘box’ is unknown, probably back to the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, the SNCB (the Belgian public rail company) proposes a metropolitan rail service for commuters in and around Brussels, the so-called ‘RER’, to compensate a general loss of passengers at the national level. This issue was highlighted by a study made by Stratec (1988), a well-known transport engineering company. This was the first time that the WSJ junction was introduced in a policy debate (for a complete review, cf. Damay, 2014). Nevertheless, a new metropolitan rail service across the three regions was (and still is) conflicting with the ongoing process of decentralisation. In the meanwhile, the European district around the Schuman station is dramatically growing with many new offices, causing an increasing demand for mobility in the eastern part of the BCR. In 1989, a major constitutional reform is adopted transferring most of the policy competencies to (often newly established) regional administrations, although rail policy is kept at the federal level within the Ministry for Communications (which changed the official names several times). During the same period, the national railway company is split in three: the SNCB as a service provider, Infrabel in charge of the infrastructure and TUC Rail as an engineering company. Despite these organisational changes, these three public companies still refer to the Ministry. Furthermore, the federal government establishes a special program called ‘Beliris’ to support ‘Brussels as Capital of Belgium and Europe’ with a dedicated administration and budget. The rationale for Beliris is that Brussels is still a national issue, despite regionalisation, and the WSJ project perfectly fits with this scope. Despite institutional decentralisation and administrative reorganisation, the corps of engineers specialised in underground works is not disbanded, but kept within the federal government, mainly in the Ministry of Communications. The process of decentralisation is associated with growing conflicts among regional stakeholders. Thus, the Ministry has to conceive the WSJ project to overcome opposition and potential ‘traps’. From a national perspective, the Ministry can use the Beliris budget to invest in one of the few competencies left (railways) supporting its own national rail companies (SNCB, Infrabel and TUC-Rail) which are losing passengers. From a Flemish perspective, the proposal by the Ministry improves access from Flemish Brabant and Antwerp to the growing European district, dramatically improving accessibility for Flemish commuters. For Wallonia, the WSJ proposal has similar benefits for commuters from Liege and eastern Wallonia to the European district; while commuters from central and western Wallonia (mainly, Namur) already had access to the European district by the line 161. Nevertheless, the WSJ would provide direct access to the Brussels airport, mainly from central and western Wallonia. For Brussels, the proposal is harder to judge: even though the WSJ junction is an investment in the region paid by the federal government, the impacts on the intra-regional mobility is left unclear. The Ministry does not provide any information on the exploitation scheme, and the regional administration does not (yet) have the capacity to develop an independent understanding of the issue at stake. Again, the Ministry shows the capacity for strategic misrepresentation taking advantage of the limited policy knowledge within the regional administration. Besides institutional positions, private companies are lobbying to restart underground works blocked by decentralisation (they are also aiming to survive, preserving their business). Until the 1970s, these companies were flourishing thanks to major underground works in Brussels, yet decentralisation blocked their business. After the 1989's decentralisation, the WSJ project is seen as an excellent opportunity to restart public works supporting a labour-intensive industry in a city that is chronically affected by a high unemployment rate. Finally, European institutions see the opportunity to improve connections with the Brussels airport, though they are reluctant to engage in local issues. The project coming out of the box of the Ministry is well-conceived
6.2. Surviving in the pipeline The combination of different interests requires a long period to turn the initial idea into the final project (i.e. making the project surviving in the pipeline). Following the emerging debate on the RER (Damay, 2014), the Ministry commits a series of studies to back its proposal using a knowledge-on-demand approach. The first known study is made in 1993 by a group of engineering firms, only on the Schuman-Josaphat tunnel (unfortunately, it was not possible to retrieve it). A second and more complete study is delivered again by Stratec (1995), the same engineering firm supporting the Ministry for the whole RER discussion. Between 1996 and 1998, the Ministry asks two more feasibility studies to Stratec, on the WSJ and a new high-speed rail station in Schaerbeek-Formation (Stratec, 1998). While the former just aims to consolidate the idea for the WSJ junction, the latter is an entirely new proposal to re-convert a brownfield in northern Brussels (named, Schaerbeek-Formation) into a new high-speed rail station. Both proposals aim to reduce congestion on the North-South junction. This long list of feasibility studies follows a knowledge-on-demand approach: all of them are positive and supportive of the WSJ project, clearly showing an instrumental use of knowledge to substantiate a predefined preference. Although a political decision for the WSJ is not yet reached, the Ministry already asks a preliminary planning permission: knowing complexity and uncertainty of procedures for large metropolitan infrastructures, the Ministry is trying to speed up the process (procedural knowledge). This permission is delivered in 1996, under the condition of providing a complete technical plan within two years. This act is of particular importance because it is the first of its kind since the 1989's regionalisation: regional administrations do not yet know how to deal with such an ambitious project requiring multiple planning permissions. Two years later, the Ministry publishes the first technical plan for the WSJ, which is prepared by a non-Brussels engineering firm (outsourcing of architectural, design and engineering knowledge to external experts). The steering committee severely criticises this plan and rejects it for lack of technical definition and superficial knowledge of Brussels (lack of context-specific knowledge). Nevertheless, the Ministry discards this first plan and asks for a second opinion to ARIES, a well-known Brussels-based engineering firm (ARIES Group, 1999). This second opinion is accepted and becomes the final technical plan. Again, the Ministry shows strategic knowledge avoiding the first block by instrumentally using other experts to pursue a predefined goal. In 1998–1999, the Ministry has two projects in the ‘pipeline’: the WSJ and the high-speed rail station in Schaerbeek-Formation. The WSJ has already received a preliminary planning permission, is backed by several feasibility studies, of which one of them already received a positive evaluation by the steering committee. The second project is still in a very early stage. Nonetheless, a final decision between the two projects is not yet taken. Until 1999, the Ministry benefits from the support of the Federal 136
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dealing with extremely complex and uncertain procedures, avoiding any trap. Local authorities took from 1996 to 2004 to deliver planning permission due to the uncertain legal framework determined by decentralisation. The EU Commission had a specific and unique procedure to authorise works under the Berlaymont building, even accepting the destruction of some underground parking. Other embassies were in similar situations: despite their support, complex formal agreements were needed. The WSJ project presented two more constructive problems (for technical information, see Vanderhaeghe et al., 2013). First, the area around Schuman is crucial for EU institutions as well as traffic in Brussels, and then the construction yard has to keep full functionality for the entire area. Second, the presence of EU buildings and embassies requires military protection in case of an explosion and other attacks, implying extra security measures both structurally and during the construction phase. For this purpose, the Ministry has to involve Belgian military engineers with their specific knowledge. Although it was not possible to know more on this part due to obvious military secret on construction details, this element adds an extra layer of complexity to the WSJ project. Again, this is an example of knowledge-on-demand outsourced to context-specific experts, with whom the Ministry had a long-standing shared experience due to previous works. During the construction phase, only two elements are contested: inhabitants claim for more anti-nuisance measures, and a local committee opposes the construction of a train station under the Jamblinne-de-Meux square (between Schuman and Meiser stations, along the main tunnel). First, the size of the WSJ construction yard determines quite significant nuisances due to trucks and works for the tunnel (noise, pollution, and vibration) as well as concerns about future noise by train traffic. Despite being a predictable issue, Infrabel (the SNCB company in charge of works) is taken by surprise and has to call communication experts to deal with citizens. Some anti-nuisance measures for both construction yard and train traffic are introduced during the construction phase. Although the Ministry and Infrabel were able to demand the needed knowledge to deal with inhabitants, it is rather surprising the underestimation of these issues that were highly predictable (weak mapping knowledge). The second contested issue is the train station under the Jamblinne-de-Meux square, halfway between the Schuman and Meiser stations. This train station was planned to improve accessibility in a residential neighbourhood without underground and tramway connections, but inhabitants see the risk of ‘gentrification’: improved accessibility with the European district would imply stronger interests to transform this residential neighbourhood into another office area. Backed by the Schaerbeek municipality (where both ministries, Onkelinx and Durant, have their constituency), inhabitants obtain the cancellation of the station, though this does not change the whole project substantially. In fact, it is impossible to evaluate the impact of this decision on the overall project because the exploitation scheme was never published. In December 2015, after thirteen years of work, the WSJ junction is completed with a delay of about two years. While some works are still ongoing to connect the underground station with the new WSJ station in Schuman, the new rail junction is ready.
Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, a Flemish Christian-Democrat. He is very much interested in the WSJ junction since his constituency is in Vilvoorde, one of the Flemish municipalities directly benefitting from improved accessibility to the European district. In July 1999, a new federal government is formed without Dehaene (he will become mayor of Vilvoorde later in 2000) and with two new politicians directly interested in the WSJ junction. Laurette Onkelinx from the French-speaking Socialist Party is in charge of Beliris, while Isabelle Durant from the Green Party is the new Federal Minister of Communications. Both Onkelinx and Durant have their constituency in Schaerbeek, one of the two BCR municipalities directly involved in the WSJ as well as the high-speed train station. Despite being in the same government, Onkelinx and Durant are competitors to become mayor of Schaerbeek (though neither will succeed). In this political scenario, the Ministry proposes the two projects (the WSJ and the high-speed rail station) to the newly appointed ministers. Unsurprisingly, the federal government accepts the WSJ junction discarding the high-speed rail station, considered unfeasible and out of budget. From a political viewpoint, the Ministry obtains political support for the WSJ project from opposing political parties across linguistic cleavages, namely Christian-democrats (Dehaene), Socialists (Onkelinx), and Greens (Durant). The tactics adopted by the Ministry was to propose two ideas to get at least one accepted, though only the WSJ was welldeveloped with already some planning permissions. All these elements show the advanced strategic knowledge of the Ministry overcoming lack of engineering knowledge (outsourced) and benefiting from an advanced capacity to interact with other political actors (strategic knowledge). 6.3. Avoiding the traps In 2000–2001, the federal government formally accepts the WSJ proposed by the Ministry, yet the construction phase has a long way to go. The opportunity to start arrives in 2002 when the EU Commission decides to remove asbestos to its main headquarter, the Berlaymont building that is located in the Schumann area. The Ministry proposes to start works also on the WSJ tunnel, which has to pass under the Berlaymont building. In the area, there is already a car tunnel and the tube line (both under the Schuman station), plus geomorphological conditions are particularly complex. However, the two municipalities directly affected by works (Brussels-city and Schaerbeek) have not yet delivered a formal planning permission. The planning permission requested in 1996 is still in the pipeline because the supervising regional administration has not yet clarified the legal framework due to the recent transfer of competencies. Furthermore, the recently adopted Nice Treaty (2001) does not clarify the legal status of the Berlaymont building between an embassy (i.e. under European rules) or a government building (i.e. under Belgian laws). To overcome this lock-in, works under the Berlaymont building are classified as if this was an embassy (not a government building), thus requiring only an agreement with the EU Commission (though this is not the case for other EU buildings). Only two years later, the two municipalities deliver their planning permission to avoid any potential legal issue. Again, the Ministry is able to deal with complex and uncertain procedures (procedural knowledge), also because it is backed by a strong coalition of interests and no opponents (strategic knowledge). The situation is repeated in the surrounding area where the embassies of Portugal, Austria, Cyprus and Luxembourg are located. For each embassy, the Ministry has to ask the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate international agreements with each country, since embassies are, legally speaking, out of the Belgian jurisdiction. The most complicated case is the Embassy of Luxembourg, where works even requires destroying some marginal parts. All the four countries are in favour of the WSJ project because they see the opportunity to improve the connections between their embassies and the Brussels airport. Nevertheless, an international agreement is formally needed because the WSJ tunnel has to be built under their jurisdictions. All these facts show the advanced knowledge of the Ministry in
7. Discussion The WSJ project can be described as the ‘survival of the only one’ since not any other megaproject was built during the period of Belgian decentralisation, despite the long-standing tradition of underground megaprojects in Brussels. As other megaprojects, the WSJ rail junction shows significant cost overrun, mainly to limit delays. In the first version (Stratec, 1995, 1998), the WSJ was expected to cost about 5–6 billion francs (equivalent to about 125–150 million EUR in 2017), and, in the end, it cost 537 million EUR (Infrabel, 2017). The WSJ junction was completed in 13 years with about two years of delay (about þ10%). As said, the exploitation scheme was not specified ex-ante, then the real benefits cannot be adequately evaluated for eventual overestimation. In 137
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crucial area of Brussels (the Schuman station is the core of the European district), the construction had to be completed as soon as possible. By exploiting this lock-in, the policy community could easily justify cost overrun limiting time delays, thus weakening any potential opposition. The ‘box-pipeline-trap’ strategy explains the survival of the corps of engineers as dominant policy community in Brussels (and Belgium). They have accumulated and preserved this knowledge over decades. Nevertheless, the key factor is not just having a box full of projects, but also the capacity to use this box and make projects surviving in the pipeline. This know-how allows calling external experts to substantiate predefined preferences as well as dealing with underestimated issues (e.g. the opposition of local committees for the lack of anti-nuisances measures). This cognitive resource is even more valuable since the corps of engineers monopolises it. In fact, not any stakeholder was able to propose an alternative to the WSJ junction. While the project was positive for federal, Flemish, Walloon and private stakeholders, benefits for the Brussels region and local stakeholders are still unclear. This cognitive monopoly is further facilitated by the small size of Belgium and the uncertainty determined by decentralisation (e.g. during the 1990s, the BCR was setting up the regional administration). From a more general perspective, this cognitive monopoly is positive and negative at the same time: the Ministry was the only actor able to preserve the policy know-how needed for such a large metropolitan infrastructure; on the other hand, it used this to defend its position as dominant policy community. Although the political level had the right for final approval, the Ministry shaped the policy discussion, overcoming political fragmentation and institutional instability to pursue the goal of restarting megaprojects in Brussels, thus reinforcing their dominant position. Although democratically elected politicians had the responsibility to decide what-to-do, the Ministry took advantage of the fact of being the only political actor able to understand the complexity of a megaproject. This ‘cognitive monopoly’ guaranteed the survival of a rent-seeking policy community, as predicted by the cognitive-evolutionary approach. Yet, the key success factor is the fact of monopolising only some types of policy knowledge, namely the context-specific know-how, leaving other actors (i.e. democratically elected politicians) to have a voice on the ‘what-to-do’. Coming back to the initial issue of the survival of the unfittest, the optimism bias, the capacity of strategic misrepresentation and taking advantage of path dependence are part of the context-specific policy know-how, which in this case was learnt over decades and strategically monopolised by the Ministry. The context-specific know-how can be acquired only through learning-by-doing, as the corps of engineers did it thanks to decades of underground works in Brussels; while, competitors could acquire only know-what from external sources of knowledge. In a relatively small city-region like Brussels, competitors have almost no possibilities to develop alternative know-how on megaprojects, while the uncertainty determined by decentralisation further reduced space for exogenous interventions since context-specific policy knowledge becomes an even more scarce resource. Furthermore, a potential competitor located in Brussels has an indirect and general interest in having a large metropolitan infrastructure like the WSJ junction improving local mobility, while an external competitor would need someone having this context-specific know-how to challenge an established cognitive monopoly. The cognitive monopoly of policy know-how opens the issue of how to overcome the problem of the survival of the unfittest megaprojects. Dismantling a dominant policy community, which is affected by the optimism bias, would imply losing context-specific know-how, which is often tacit knowledge. This approach would result in blocking any infrastructural investment like the WSJ junction. The external views suggested by Flyvbjerg seem a valid solution, yet they have to deal with the dominant policy paradigm: external knowledge questioning a dominant policy paradigm is likely to be rejected, especially by monopolists of the context-specific know-how that are trying to preserve their dominant position. On the other extreme, a policy community is likely to
Table 2 Types of knowledge showed by the Federal Ministry for Communications. Types of knowledge
Architectural, Design and Engineering knowledge (technical know-what) Mapping knowledge (political know-what) Procedural knowledge (technical know-how) Strategic knowledge (political know-how)
Level of knowledge in the federal ministry for communications Outsourced
Weak Yes, advanced Yes, advanced
general, cost overruns and time delay are lower but proportional to other megaprojects (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2014). The key factor for the WSJ junction is the corps of engineers within the Belgian federal administration, especially within the Ministry of Communications. Thanks to their previous experiences, they demonstrated advanced capacity to deal with conflicting interests, to solve technical problems demanding external knowledge when needed, and to manage lengthy and complex procedures. This capacity goes beyond the Flyvbjerg's notion of strategic misrepresentation to include a broader array of policy knowledge, especially the know-how to deal in a context of high uncertainty. Referring to the taxonomy proposed in Section 4, Table 2 provides an overview of the different types of knowledge used by the Ministry. Architectural, design and engineering knowledge was outsourced to different Brussels-based engineering companies, such as Stratec and Aries Group. While non-Brussels-based engineering companies failed to provide adequate knowledge, the Ministry had no difficulties in finding other experts with context-specific knowledge, and used their knowledge instrumentally to substantiate a predefined policy preference. Regarding procedural knowledge, the Ministry showed outstanding knowledge since the very early demand for a planning permission paving the way for the whole project. Furthermore, the Ministry was able to manage complex international agreements for works under EU buildings and embassies. Mapping knowledge is somewhat fuzzy: the Ministry was able to deal with institutional, political, and economic stakeholders conceiving a proposal without real opponents, but it had significant difficulties in interacting with inhabitants on predictable issues such as anti-nuisance measures. Regarding strategic knowledge, the Ministry was able to conceive the WSJ project creating a winning coalition, to avoid any potential opposition by abstaining from a discussion on the exploitation scheme as well as juggling across different political parties and politicians. A good example of this strategic knowledge is the proposition of a second instrumental project in Schaerbeek-Formation to get the first one approved. The outstanding capacity of the corps of engineers regarding procedural and strategic knowledge explain the ‘success’ of the WSJ junction and, even more, the survival of this policy community. The WSJ junction is definitely in line with the dominant policy paradigm based on underground works (for a historical analysis of one century of underground works in Brussels, see Tellier, 2012; Zitouni and Tellier, 2013). The ‘boxpipeline-trap’ should be seen as a successful survival strategy developed by the corps of engineers to survive over decades, and, even more, when decentralisation threatened their existence. This survival strategy based on policy knowledge goes even beyond the notion of strategic misrepresentation proposed by Flyvbjerg: hiding the exploitation scheme to avoid potential traps is an example of strategic misrepresentation, while the capacity to carry out complex procedures is something different, and part of the context-specific knowledge needed for megaprojects. While cost overrun confirms the presence of the optimism bias, the capacity of strategic misrepresentation is part of the survival strategy of the WSJ once it has entered into the pipeline. Finally, the policy community was able to take advantage from path dependence: once the works started in a 138
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use external knowledge sharing the same paradigm by calling experts affected by the same optimism bias. Therefore, the optimism bias would survive and external views instrumentalised by the dominant policy community. The adoption of the cognitive-evolutionary approach suggests to find a way between these two extremes: the Flyvbjerg's external views should find a way to constructively dialogue with the dominant policy paradigm avoiding the risk of being rejected a priori.
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8. Conclusions In the debate on megaproject, the case of the new Watermael–Schuman–Josaphat (WSJ) rail junction in Brussels was presented and discussed using a cognitive-evolutionary approach. This case showed the importance of context-specific know-how for megaprojects, while other types of knowledge can be outsourced to external experts and consultants, and then instrumentally used. By assuming a proper cognitive-evolutionary approach, the issue of the survival of the unfittest megaproject was reconceptualised as a self-preservation strategy for a policy community, while the new taxonomy on policy knowledge allowed for the identification of a cognitive monopoly. Specifically, the corps of engineers working mainly in the Federal Ministry of Communications showed outstanding know-how in dealing with complex procedures and strategically interacting with other actors, while instrumentally using external sources of knowledge. Although the WSJ junction was the only megaproject realised during a period of decentralisation and political uncertainty, it suffers the same problems of cost overruns of other megaprojects, confirming the presence of an optimism bias. By taking advantage of a cognitive monopoly learnt over decades of underground works in Brussels, this policy community kept a dominant position surviving to the uncertainty determined by decentralisation. Based on these findings, three issues can be suggested for future research. First, the identification of a cognitive monopoly is an open field of research, both theoretically and empirically. The taxonomy of policy knowledge proposed in Section 4 is not meant to be exhaustive, and it should be validated in other fields. More theoretical and empirical works are needed on the dynamics of policy knowledge because the ‘boxpipeline-trap’ strategy developed by the corps of engineers is just one of the possible alternatives. Second, future research should compare different policy communities to understand how they develop policy knowledge (especially, the context-specific know-how) and what happens where this is not available. Third, the governance of the various types of knowledge for large metropolitan infrastructure (and in general for megaprojects) questions the knowledge-democracy nexus. The emerging issue of the governance of knowledge for policy-making, already developed in the field of sustainability (Van Kerkhoff, 2013), should be further developed in the literature on megaprojects. The know-what can be easily acquired, but those monopolising the know-how often instrumentalise it. This issue raises important theoretical challenges on how to recognise a cognitive monopoly and what to do to overcome it. Acknowledgements Innoviris supported this work under the grant “Prospective Research for Brussels” (2013–2016) for the project on the “Europeanization of Research and Policy Innovations in Brussels”. The author is thankful to Joachim Bergerhoff, Bruno Clerbaux, Frederic Dobruszkes, Sara Rizzo, Celine Tellier and Bas van Heur as well as the two anonymous reviewers and the editor who helped very much to improve the various revisions. The usual disclaimers apply. References Annoni, P., Dijkstra, L., 2013. EU Regional Competitiveness Index RCI 2013. EU Commission, Ispra. ARIES Group, 1999. Liaison Ferroviaire Watermael-josaphat: 2nd Opinion. Rapport Final. Minist ere des Communications et de l'Infrastructure, Bruxelles. 139
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