Review Reviewed Work(s): Korea's Future and the Great Powers by Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings Review by: Timothy C. Lim Source: Korean Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), pp. 279-284 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23718907 Accessed: 04-04-2018 16:26 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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BOOK
REVIEWS
279
Korea's Future and stadt and Richard Asian
Research
ington Korea's
Press,
Future
Nicholas
and
Eberstadt
dressing
[a]...
in
2001
th
and
large
la
respect, the book is wr Korean studies than for "to
assess the strategic collectively, in making
policies"
ican
(p.
study
affairs;
4).
To
group
eminent
ernment;
finance;
do
studen
authorities
seasoned
number of and
policy,
th
with
on
anal
distinguish intelligence
impressive. From Rob Marcus Noland, Herbe others),
bunch.
there is nary As was no dou
authors
almost
automat
bility as a serious volu together a collection of hands" is not always a g newer hands, if only to analysis, debate, and di I
say
the
this,
Great
five
chapters
informs, contend
(pp.
and
with
17-18).
that
the
linked
the
in
large
Powers
are
with
qu
(chapters
also the
For
confi
possib
exampl
"tortuous
United
pa
the
deve
comple
States,
the
exhibited a mixture of 51). Lee goes on to prov
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280 KOREAN STUDIES, VOL. 25, NO. 2 relations vis-à-vis the two Koreas, followed by
ing scenarios" for future relations between Seou constructive engagement, war, or absorption. He
analysis of policy options after Korean unificat
this chapter is generally solid, it is really nothi what even the most casual followers—and I coun international relations of the two Koreas already
ever, that such repetition is necessary for thos
completely unfamiliar with the two Koreas. Fair
the same information from a plethora of other s
Chapter 3 by, Chuck Downs, does not suffer
tion; in fact, of the five chapters in the section context, his is the most interesting and original
chapter, the author's goal is to discern North Kor
Downs does this by drawing upon the evidentiar
tiations, beginning with the North-South Comm with the inter-Korean summit of 2000. His con the past has advanced few, if any concrete steps
served the North's interests by aggravating polit
exciting Korean nationalistic zeal, portraying th
able of advancing reunification, and characterizin troops as the single most important obstacle to
Downs suggests, moreover, that this is not likely
those who think otherwise are just fooling them
surprising is how frequently and how easily analy
performance and lull themselves into a false imp reassuring gestures actually constitute genuine cation" (p. 103). Downs may be right, but ironical
his chapter is placed), his pessimistic conclusion
the changing historical and political context in w
In other words, one cannot simply extrapolate from
which is what Downs ends up doing. Thus, whil reading, it is ultimately unsatisfying.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 cover, respectively, the and Russia toward the two Koreas and the issue of reunification. As with chapter 2, however, there is very little said in any of these chapters that has not
already been said, discussed, or written about elsewhere. Consider, for in stance, Scalapino's analysis of China's policy. He concludes that China does not want heightened tension on the Korean peninsula or a collapsed North Korea. "Further, China would not view with pleasure a unified Korea border ing the Yalu River under the aegis of the South." Nor, Scalapino continues, "does China want a nuclear DPRK.... [instead] China desires a DRPK that
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BOOK
REVIEWS
evolves
in
with the stability, (pp.
the
nor
fication
There
are
of
example,
cess nese
Rather,
of
foreign a
election
of
After
is
con critica
so
it
is
more
policy
Kim
a
Northeast Ellison's intends to
ge
chapte
largely
descr
The
analy
very
general c pursue an ene
Northeast
conclusion
in
Daejung),
Asia.
in
l
as
interestin
Ellison's
offers
no
authors
more
Herbert
and
of
any
reunification
provide
6)
are
there
Korea."
the
reunification role.
fashion
Communist Par but progressive
120-21).
here,
281
Asia
hardly
more
bespea
and policymakers would should stress, that the c are not worth reading. C
Asian politics (which ma policymakers), each of t ground reading and rela rary politics related to th for undergraduate studen to Korea specialists and Asian politics. Fortunately, the two r Powers have much more especially nomic
true
issues
financial
of
that
chapte
Korean
institutions,
an
unification. In chapter 7 of these issues. He begin cessfully Not
pursuing
surprisingly,
a
dom
his
pr
genuinely "reformist" le indigenous economic ref What
might
happen
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if
t
282 KOREAN STUDIES, VOL. 25, NO. 2
Indeed, his analysis is based on the premise tha
some "noncataclysmic fashion" and will be abso
from this carefully delimited (but justifiable) p
nicely argued and well-balanced assessment of t
to face a united Korea. Thus, while he points out
he also zeros in on a number of less-discussed p
that the "key point overlooked in most discussion
is that efficiently allocated investment yields re
He also takes great care to consider the politica
cations of unification. One of the most importan
ment of deep cleavages, including (but not limit
the North and the South and another within Sou
labor. These cleavages, which would be difficult
stances, can nonetheless be exacerbated by the "w
the key issue in reunification is less economic t
his analysis this way: "The key finding is that t the residents of North Korea are the main determi
(p. 221). This issue, to my knowledge, has not rec
Gifford Combs extends Noland's argument b cance of international finance in Korean economi
cation (chapter 8). This is also a generally ign critical issue. For, as he argues, "South Korea socialize the cost [of unification] and spread i
through economic policymaking as Germany di ment will require explicit grants and loans from amounts of capital" (p. 231). The key question, th attract enough foreign capital to make unificatio according to Combs, is "no." That is, unless Sou ture their economy—with reform of the financ
task—there is almost no hope that internationa
ments, bankers, or multilateral aid organizations)
necessary capital for South Korea to successfull makes a convincing argument—one that is worth
novices alike. In the end, though, he is only rei
mists and financiers have been saying for a
nomic structure is an inefficient, corrupt mess.
Combs puts it, "South Koreans must embrace co
(p. 244). Unfortunately, this is not telling us
the question is not what the problem is (by now answer), but how to deal effectively with the p tably, Combs has very little to say.
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BOOK
REVIEWS
The
last
examines phasis on
283
section the the
of
chapters, Michael who have
McD
writers
concerned strategy
with
of
K
strategi implicat
the
spec
the
pr
peninsu
of
work on unificatio that focuses on explaining ... the plau
Work
studies the
that
examine
presumption
of
t
un
national security stra 253). Such studies are well-thought-out
McDevitt's ented
chap
argument.
approach
unification
forces
proceeds
matters;
the longer the framework can be mai
In
chapters
number
of
voluntary
pages short the
more
South 1990s. book's
notes,
of
in
Galluc
their
boo
interesting,
Korean, In
and
a
Jap
the
final cha them or exacerb
recurrent
cooperation
in,
no
length it
and
reunificatio
with
include
10
diplomatic
and
some
influenc
of the previous chapt the foreign policy-lead that
is,
their
interests" trian
assess two
in
(p.
that
the
conceptio
317).
they
Th
rely
interests
Koreas,
Japan,
an
Ru
macy of power and events" (p. 319). On
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th on
284 KOREAN STUDIES, VOL. 25, NO. 2
but, on another level, it is important to recogn
realism, as a theoretical framework, suffers from
that the authors had not only acknowledged th them more seriously in their analysis. For, in so
have given us a more comprehensive and balanc
tary, economic, political, ideological, and histor
Instead, we are treated to banal warning about th
tion will result in unbalanced power relations in aggressive China.
The shortcomings in the concluding chapter r
with Korea's Future and the Great Powers, whic analysis, debate, and discussion are too limited
tive. This could have easily been avoided if the e
of the "usual suspects." Why didn't the editors, f
contribute a chapter examining national interes tive? A few new voices—"new blood"—may also
improve the perspective of the book. There are
scholars and specialists who could have made
ing" contributions to Korea's Future and the Gre
There are, I should note, a few minor editin
and the Great Powers. The most obvious appears the editors misidentify chapters 4 and 5. In the Scalapino and chapter 5 by Armacost and Pyle. stadt and Ellings reverse the order. Speaking of
point out that this is a very long chapter—forty so long is the editors provide very detailed sum
ing chapters (in one case, their summary is a third
in total, more than half the introduction, twent
(excluding chapter notes), is devoted to summari
almost makes reading the remainder of the book
Despite its limitations, Korea's Future and th would recommend. The first section has little of
provides a nice overview of past and current eve
peninsula. This section, however, would be extr
Koreanists, be they students, scholars, or policym
sections, by contrast, offer something for every
these chapters are much more original and insigh
ters, and they are all written in a highly readable m
Timothy C. Lim
California State University, Los
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