Land Dispossession and its Impacts on the Bako

Volume 21, Number 2

November 2014

Publication of the Oromo Studies Association

The Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS) is a leading scholarly publication of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA). Issued twice a year, the journal publishes articles pertaining to all areas of Oromo Studies past, present and future, including topics related to the Oromo diaspora worldwide. Its interdisciplinary scope and revisionary approach offers readers a critical view of the socioeconomic, political and cultural achievements of the Oromo people in their interactions with the people of the Horn of Africa and beyond. Reflecting the diverse interests of OSA members, the journal emphasizes multidisciplinary and embraces variety by publishing articles that allow both the specialist and the general reader to gain far-reaching insights and a thorough understanding of the Oromo people, the Horn of Africa and the international community of which they are a part. All manuscripts submitted for publication consideration must be original work that has not been published previously and is not currently being considered by any other publication outlet. Submitted articles are evaluated by scholars who are experts in the field. The journal's editorial team is committed to communicating editorial decisions within a reasonable period to authors. Published articles do not necessarily reflect the views of OSA or its officers. Individual authors are responsible for the views, data and interpretations presented in the articles. ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES Individual $35 Institutional $55 Single Issue $20 Add $15 annually for shipping. Send in US currency payments and subscription requests to: Oromo Studies Association P.O. Box 32391, Fridley, MN 55432, (USA). Make checks or money orders out to the Oromo Studies Association.

Table of Contents Articles Introduction by Ibrahim Elemo, MD, President of OSA of Dr. Gudata Hinika, to deliver Keynote Remarks at the 2014 Annual Conference of OSA, held August 2-3, at Howard University School of Medicine, Washington, DC ................... 1 BUILDING MEDICAL CAPACITY IN OROMIA Keynote Remarks, Presented by Gudata Hinika, MD, FACS Oromo Studies Association Annual Conference, August 3, 2014 Howard University School of Medicine, Washington DC .... 5 Featured Remarks by Tesfaye Geberab Delivered at the 28th Annual Conference of the Oromo Studies Association August 3, 2014, Howard University, Washington, DC ........ 13 State of Oromia’s Interest in Addis Ababa (Finfinnee): Undelivered Constitutional Promises .................................... 23 Fekadu Nigussa Geleta

JOURNAL OF OROMO STUDIES

Land Dispossession and its Impacts on the Bako Woreda Oromo Community of Western Oromia, Ethiopia ............... 63 Yonas Tesema Amaya Acknowledging Genocide against the Oromo ...................... 91 Habtamu Dugo, Joanne Eisen & Dr. Paul Gallant Transnationalism, Networks and Remittances among Eritrean Refugee Communities in the Town of Kassala, Eastern Sudan .......................................................................... 101 Saida Hassanen

Book Review My life, My vision for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia, by Bulcha Demeksa (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2013), 281 pages ..................................................... 123 Mohammed Hassen

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Introduction by Ibrahim Elemo, MD, President of OSA of Dr. Gudata Hinika, to deliver Keynote Remarks at the 2014 Annual Conference of OSA, held August 2-3, at Howard University School of Medicine, Washington, DC Ibrahim Elemo* I am delight to introduce to you Dr. Gudata Hinika, keynote speaker for OSA‘s 2014 Annual Conference. He is truly an inspiration to many Oromo and African born immigrants in the Diaspora. His achievements are stellar and his commitment to empower the Oromo people and other peoples of Ethiopia is commendable. Reviewing the full and impressive profile of this Distinguished Scholar, Surgeon, Physician and Philanthropist Dr. Gudata Hinika, I will share only some highlights with you. Throughout his distinguished career, Dr. Hinika has dedicated his life to reaching out to those who suffer and alleviating adverse health conditions in underserved communities. His commitment extends far beyond hospital walls – locally and globally. Dr. Gudata S. Hinika has traveled a long way and back again to *

Ibrahim Elemo, MD, is adjunct professor in biology at the city colleges of Chicago. His area of study is reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. He is the immediate Past President of the Oromo Studies Association.


attain remarkable achievement wherever he turns his energy. Dr. Hinika‘s concerns focus on introducing and partnering to reach sustainable solutions for communities in need, both in the United States and in his native Oromia, Ethiopia. Born in rural Oromia, Ethiopia, Dr. Gudata was raised by his grandmother in the hinterlands of southern Oromia, in a village called Gode. As a child, he lived through the strife of starvation, drought and communist occupation. Educated in the US, Dr. Hinika received his medical degree from Loma Linda University. He completed his General Surgery residency at Martin Luther King Hospital. He is Board Certified in his specialty and is a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons. As a young physician, he quickly attained the distinction of serving as a chief surgical resident at King/Drew University Hospital in Los Angeles. Since 2004, he has served as the Chief of Trauma, General and Critical Care Surgery at California Hospital, the busiest private trauma center in Los Angeles. Seeing similar alarming disparities in health, wealth and education, Dr. Hinika has been delivering sustainable solutions in rural Ethiopia and South Los Angeles. In 1995, Dr. Hinika started his work in Gode, the rural village in Ethiopia where he was raised by funding college scholarships that enabled deserving high school students to pursue their college education, all expenses paid. This commitment evolved into the construction and development of elementary, middle, junior high schools, and most recently, the first high school in the area. Gode High school has been cited by the Ethiopian Ministry of Education as a model of public-private collaboration. In 2007, Dr. Hinika founded Ethiopia Health Aid, a not-forprofit organization that is dedicated to providing access to care from rural villages, townships and cities in remote areas in Ethiopia. He currently leads the development of a Health Village composed of a hospital, medical school and satellite clinics in the rural township of Arsi Negele, to provide basic hospital care and education to a population of 1.2 million – that is currently bereft of resources. To bridge the continuum of healthcare access, Ethiopia Health Aid has also developed a unique Knowledge Exchange Program in collaboration with the prestigious Adama General Hospital and Medical College, a tertiary care facility midway between rural Ethiopia and the country‘s capital city. This Knowledge Exchange Program sponsors medical professionals at all levels (physicians, 2

INTRODUCTION BY IBRAHIM ELEMO

nurses, technicians and administrators) to mentor and learn from each other through actual site visits (medical missions) and virtual communications (telemedicine and webinars). In the US also, Dr. Hinika worked for many years in the healthcare-challenged community of South Los Angeles. In 2008, he established Crenshaw Medical Center, a multi-specialty health facility that provides access to primary and specialty care to the underserved. He has been recognized for his outstanding community service. As he served as the head of Trauma, General and Critical Care Surgery at California Hospital Medical Center, Dr. Hinika became instrumental in establishing the hospital as a vital force in trauma care. In 2010, Dr. Hinika received the Treasure of Los Angeles award for his leadership in trauma care. In 2011, under his exemplary leadership, California Hospital received its third consecutive rating of ―Zero Deficiencies,‖ the highest quality rating awarded to trauma centers by the American College of Surgeons, a status held by a select few in the USA. Dr. Hinika is a recognized speaker and educator, working with both the American College of Surgeons in the US, and the International College of Surgeons to promote advances in general and trauma surgery. He is also recognized for his work with Adama General Hospital and Medical College as well as the Ethiopian Medical Association. The recipient of many distinguished awards, a highlight came in September 2012, when the United Nations Association recognized Dr. Hinika‘s work by presenting him with their highest honor, the Global Citizens Award. Dr. Hinika is the author of Healer’s Light: Achieving the Impossible, published by Tate Publishers in 2014. It is a great honor and privilege for me to present to you our 2014 keynote speaker, Dr. Gudata S Hinika.

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BUILDING MEDICAL CAPACITY IN OROMIA Keynote Remarks, Presented by Gudata Hinika, MD, FACS Oromo Studies Association Annual Conference, August 3, 2014 Howard University School of Medicine, Washington DC Gudata Hinika* Friends, it is a tremendous honor to be here with you today, not just because of the collective brainpower in this room, but because today I am standing before an audience that holds the future of a potent and powerful society ready to blossom. We are here today because, as it is in Gadaa, we are called when the time is right. Friends, our time is now. I am here to speak on Medical Capacity Building in Oromia. Our talk today focuses on the core philosophy and formula that my team and I have fine-tuned in successful mission work in Oromia since 2003. I will take you through the E-H-A concept of education, health *

Gudata Sado Hinika, MD, FACS is a physician and surgeon with a medical practice in the Los Angeles, California area. He is also the founder of Ethiopia Health Aid with work in rural Ethiopian communities to build locally sustainable health care and education systems.


and action and will very clearly show you how these three, when taken together, can uplift a society. I believe when applied on a larger scale, this methodology will create sustainable medical capacity for the entire region and ultimately the nation. I‘d like to start from the perspective that we in the diaspora and in the rest of the world are familiar with. Let‘s look at Ethiopia‘s place in the world today. On the world stage, Ethiopia has gained much recognition for becoming an economic success story. The African Economic Outlook and African Development Bank report that in the past decade, Ethiopia has made rapid progress. It has maintained a robust, real GDP growth average of 10.9%. Ethiopia ended the last fiscal year with an economic growth rate of 9.7%, with agriculture as the economy‘s largest contributor. Ethiopia is the 12th fastest-growing economy in the world.1 How was this achieved? Well, to move the nation forward, government vision focused on agriculture — specifically by moving away from subsistence agriculture to commercial farming for local consumption as well as for export.2 As we all know, Oromia is the nation‘s food belt. So many of these plans impact Oromia; specifically, Oromo farmers, whose lives are tied to the land. This strategy also hits home for those of us whose villages, relatives and history are in Oromoland.  Despite this brisk economy, Oxford University‘s 2014 Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index cites Ethiopia as the second most-destitute country in the world. The country‘s national average shows 58% living in severely poor and destitute conditions. Perhaps even more distressing is that Oromia, the nation‘s agricultural ―hope‖ is also the nation‘s the second-poorest region, where 90% of Oromos live in severe poverty and destitution.3 Is this possible? Can both these contrasting situations exist in the same area at the same time? Can both be true? Unfortunately, my friends, the answer is yes they do. The inequitable distribution of resources speaks for itself. Construction, paved roads and new infrastructure dot the landscape in major cities. Meanwhile, more than 80% of Oromo households do not have access to electricity or sanitation; more than 75% do not have access to potable drinking water. It is possible to enumerate even more facts but these will suffice for our purposes here. I realize the root cause of this unfortunate situation is based in 6

BUILDING MEDICAL CAPACITY IN OROMIA

what I call the ―Inequity Triad‖ — referring to the unholy trinity of illiteracy, poverty and disease. Combined, these three spark a host of causes and effects. And in their worst form, they breed ignorance, desperation and greed. The more important question, then, is this: How long will we watch in silence? What actions can we take toward sustainable, constructive change? Upon examination of other nations that have transitioned out of poverty, patterns of success emerge, primary of which is the involvement of multiple sectors — not just government. Countries such as China, South Korea and Singapore take this thinking a step further by encouraging, harnessing and maximizing efficiencies and capabilities of the private sector. Clearly, the private sector and we, in the diaspora, play a significant role in building capacity in Oromia.4 How then, do we bridge the gap between us, here in the diaspora, and our brothers and sisters back home to generate productive, collaborative action? First, we must work harmoniously to promote the equitable distribution of resources. Second, we must strive to provide access to opportunities in education, health and community engagement. Third, we must collaboratively encourage the community‘s full participation in the decisions that affect them. So, as we speak up against inequity, let us also act with responsibility. Together let‘s make our voices louder, stronger and undeniable. There is power in a unified voice and even more power in unified action.  We are now at a crossroads and our challenge is to make the leap from ―Yes we can,‖ to  ―Yes we do.‖ We know that life-saving resources in Oromia are scarce. We know that medical capacity is limited. Who is better equipped than we, the Oromo diaspora, to create change? We represent the most powerful engine for advancements in science, technology, medicine, education and business. And let me assure you, for any efforts you invest, the returns far exceed expectations. Oromia is rich with opportunity. Community spirit is ripe with anticipation. With one call for action, many will respond. Did you know that the average drop-out rate in rural Oromia from grade school to high school is nearly 90%? Why so high? And how do we change this trend? It‘s because schooling stops when there are no accessible schools, libraries, or technology to help most of these kids — especially girls.5 The starting point, therefore, is education. Education is what 7


enables literacy and enlightenment. It opens the doors of comprehension and abstract reasoning. It dispels myths and prejudices. It breaks the shackles of ignorance and allows us to participate more deliberately in the world. ―Education,‖ as Nelson Mandela has said, ―is the greatest weapon we can use to change the world.‖6 I know this to be true because this is what my wife, my team and I have been doing in rural Oromia since 2003. We have been able to build schools and libraries and provide scholarships to elite institutions so that deserving students can pursue their studies toward productive and lucrative careers in medicine, law, business, engineering, nursing and more. The hopes and dreams of rural families burn bright in their children. Unfortunately, in most of rural Oromia, that opportunity is distant; prosperity is dim and the path is rocky. But it‘s there. All we need to do is shine a light. Let‘s shape the future beyond primary grades and past high school. Let‘s ensure kids stay in school with scholarships. Let‘s inspire them to set their sights higher — on university education and beyond. Let‘s cultivate a range of careers to plug the brain drain. The country needs all sorts of professionals, working from within to improve and harness our resources. And then, let‘s set our sights on becoming a resource for brainpower for the rest of world, just as India and China and even Mexico are doing. The gains made in education will automatically extend to health because an educated household is a healthy household. The World Health Organization, in its constitution, asserts that health is not a privilege. It is a basic human right and everyone is entitled to enjoy the highest standards of health regardless of race, religion, political belief or human condition.7 And if we believe we are doing right by providing only subsistent, survival-oriented care, we are grossly misguided. It is vital that we — as providers and as recipients of care — strive for the highest standard of health, because, ―Of all the injustices,‖ as Martin  Luther King, Jr. said, ―injustices in health care are the most shocking and inhumane.‖8 The context in which Dr. King made this declaration is even more extraordinary because he said this at a time when people of color were lynched for the most mundane activities, such as watching a movie or crossing the street. So, for Dr. King to call out health 8


access as the most shocking and inhumane, at such a time, is a wake up call for us today who benefit from the opportunities these heroes fought and gave up their lives for. In our experience, the success of health policies – disease control, health promotion and the provision of patient-centered care – is vitally dependent on the people who provide the services. No amount of regulation will make a difference if the care providers themselves do not have the proper understanding, skills or training to provide a higher standard of care. Understanding this, our task is to ensure that we cultivate, train and sustain the potential of every member of the health care team, from the lowest in rank to the highest — i.e., from aide to expert. These aspects are what my team and I focus on as we transfer knowledge and develop curricula in collaboration with our partner schools, hospitals and clinics. It‘s not enough to grow in principle; it is vital to address the substance of the daily health activities happening now — on the frontlines. In her keynote address to the World Health Organization Conference of European  Ministers, Dr. Gro Brundtland, former Head of the World Health Organization and former Prime Minister of Norway stressed what we in rural Oromia know so very well. She said, ―There can be no real growth without healthy populations. No sustainable development without tackling disease and malnutrition. No international security without assisting crisis-ridden countries. And no hope for the spread of freedom, democracy and human dignity unless we treat health as a basic human right.‖9 Unfortunately, the health disparities in rural Oromia and her urban neighbors are so vast, that there are not enough community health workers to address rural needs. Many of the people we served during our last mission had not seen a doctor in their entire lives. And often, many patients die just trying to get to the hospital because emergency care and transport are scarce.10 To address this, we are developing a ―Health Campus‖ in Negele Arsi to bridge this gap in care. At the heart of the campus is an acute care hospital that will provide general medical, surgical and emergency care to a radius of 100 kilometers, and a service area of 1.2 million people. The campus will also be home to a College of Health Sciences, which includes nursing, midwifery, pharmacy and medical schools. Graduates are expected to serve the community for 9


a minimum of three years. This, we believe, is a viable way to address the brain drain that has been plaguing rural Oromia for generations. This effort has already brought progress and opportunity never before experienced in this area. The hospital campus itself was a trash dump in the middle of a shantytown. Clearing it sent a message to the community that they had more dignity than to live in squalor. Construction of the hospital brought jobs; and even more jobs came with the development of hotels and other commercial establishments. The government also did their part by putting in roads and utilities. My friends, this is hope in action. We have succeeded in creating an environment where health, opportunity, progress and education are thriving. These efforts are not just ideas. They are rooted in sustainable results. So I invite you to consider the possibility of turning a dream into a cause — and a cause into a movement. I am very aware of how ambitious these initiatives are. I know that these are daunting tasks. And perhaps these may be impossible plans from which to expect results. But I am no stranger to impossible dreams. My approach is proof of my grandmother‘s belief that if you want to go fast, you go alone, but if you want to go far, we go together. I believe that my impossible dream would have remained just that if I had continued on a lone journey. But when taken up by just one other person, one other believer, that dream became a cause, and that cause — which was soon owned by others who cared — became a movement.  Today, schools and computers and roads exist where none existed before, a trash dump is now a health campus with a hospital ready to serve. Thanks to many of you Oromo in the diaspora, I have learned that… when we fight for health care and education as the fundamental rights of every human being, when we redefine our personal and professional values in favor of making long term commitments to the greater good, when we choose to leave our narrow, immediate comforts and expand our vision to include societies in need we plant the seeds of transformational change.

As someone who has taken the same journey as many OSA members have taken, I know how hard we have all worked and continue to work to get ahead on the fast track to success. Now that 10


we‘ve achieved it, why not expand our reach? Why not go farther together and change the world? I invite you to re-envision our future, a future that will take us far, because we‘re better together. As I have demonstrated, the model of Education, Health and Action has been very effective. But what we‘ve managed to accomplish is just a beginning. Let us replicate this model throughout Oromia, reaching every corner. I ask you, as the Gadaa of today — to come together and forge a legacy of hope for Oromia, one that will live on and flourish for generations.

Sources 1. Ethiopia is 12th fastest-growing economy in the World. African Economic Outlook. Admit Wondifraw Zerihun, Haile Kibret, James Wakiaga. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/ countries/eastafrica/ethiopia/ Smith, David. The Guardian, ―Ethiopia hailed as 'African lion' with fastest creation of millionaires.‖ www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/ethiopia-fasterratemillionaires-michael-buerk African Millionaires chart. NW-Wealth.com 2. Agriculture is largest growth contributor in Ethiopia http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/ethiopia; http://www.ata.gov.et/about/ 3. Ethiopia ranks second-poorest nation in Poverty Index Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2014). ―Ethiopia Country  Briefing,‖ Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank. OPHI, University of Oxford.  Available at www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-2014/ 4. Case studies of Economic Growth in Asia Stimulating Economic Growth. World Economic Forum. Posted April 20, 2012.  www.weforum.org/issues/stimulatingeconomic-growth. 5. Education Inequities in Rural Ethiopia Ministry of Education (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) and Section for  Teacher Development and Education Policies (THE/TEP) Division for Teacher Development and Higher Education (ED/THE) and UNESCO International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa (UNESCO IICBA) and 11


6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

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UNESCO Office (Addis Abba). UNESCO Needs Assessment Report. April 2013. www.en.unesco.org Mandela Quote about Education Mandela, Nelson R. "Lighting your way to a better future,‖ Speech delivered by Mr N R Mandela at launch of Mindset Network," July 16, 2003) Definition of Health Equity WHO. Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 1922 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948. MLK Quote on Health Inequities as Social Injustice King, Jr., ML. Speech to the Medical Committee for Human Rights. 1966 Dr. Gro Brundtland Quote on Health as a Basic Human Right   Dr. Brundtland, G. 7th Conference of European Health Ministers - Keynote address. Oslo, Norway,12 June 2003. www.who.int/dg/brundtland/speeches/2003/ ―Health Disparities between rural and urban Ethiopia,‖  Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2014). ―Ethiopia Country  Briefing‖, Multidimensional Poverty Index Data Bank. OPHI, University of Oxford.  Available at www.ophi.org.uk/ multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-2014/ http://www.unicef.org/Ethiopia_wes.pdf Edelstein, B. ―Water Poverty in Rural Ethiopia: Effects on Women, Health and the Poverty Cycle.‖ Global Majority E-Journal. Vol.4, No. 1., June 2013, pp. 40-53. www.american.edu/cas/economics/ejournal/

Featured Remarks by Tesfaye Geberab Delivered at the 28th Annual Conference of the Oromo Studies Association August 3, 2014, Howard University, Washington, DC (Original delivered in Amharic) *

Tesfaye Geberab At the outset, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) for inviting me to speak at its 28th Annual Conference. I would like specifically to thank Dr. Ibrahim Elemo, Prof. Mohammed Hassen and the entire OSA Board of Directors. I am not a historian or a political commentator. Earlier on in my career, I was a journalist. In the last ten years, I have been a writer of historical novels. In addition, I have occasionally presented written *

These invited remarks are published as presented at the 2014 annual conference, without passing through the Journal's peer-review process. Its content reflects the opinion of the author, and should not be construed to reflect a position of the Board of OSA or editors of the Journal of Oromo Studies.


commentaries on various issues concerning politics in the Horn of Africa. In this paper, I will focus on two points. The first relates to the story of Chaltu Midhaksa. In Chapter 7 of my book titled Memories of an Exile, I narrated the account of a young Oromo woman who changed her name to Helen and fell into the abyss of identity crisis. I will briefly discuss aspects of Chaltu‘s story. The second point pertains to problems besetting the Horn of Africa and the fate of that region. Specifically, I will offer my personal views on the Oromo question. Here is the first point. Once upon a time, a young Oromo woman named Chaltu lived in a village called Qoftu happily and peacefully, proudly and honorably. She died unexpectedly at the age of 25. She wasn‘t killed by anyone. She didn‘t commit suicide. She was not swept away by a flash flood. Chaltu was killed by terror that was spawned by a racist and chauvinist system. Chaltu died silently, not knowing who killed her. She didn‘t want to tolerate a life of disgrace. She died shriveled and shrouded in bitterness. Today, I have come across the Atlantic to Washington DC to say a few words about Chaltu Midhaksa. Chaltu‘s story is about a history of oppression. Many Oromos of our time have traversed the thorny road linking rural areas to urban centers that Chaltu had frequented walking back and forth to school. They have confronted all of Chaltu‘s predicaments. Some have overcome the challenges. Others have fallen short and returned to their villages. Still others have lost their lives. Chaltu was a victim of ignorance. The monument of her inner strength was broken. The day they took away her identity as Chaltu and clothed her in Helen‘s garb, they stole away the horse of life she rode on, and instead gave her high heels and an old hand bag. That was the day that Chaltu really died. To be sure, Chaltu has not remained dead. She has risen. Midhaksa‘s daughter has come back to life and has begun riding her horse named Guracha. Hereafter, it is impossible to keep Chaltu silent. Her spirit speaks in the voice of others. Obbo Geresu Tufa deserves appreciation for recounting her story to me on a bus ride from Amsterdam through Belgium to the French border. When he told me the circumstance of Chaltu‘s death, my mouth was filled with a bitter taste. I couldn‘t continue to listen to Chaltu‘s story soberly. I am not Oromo. I am Eritrean. But Oromia is my country of birth. Chaltu is my childhood friend. She was perhaps only three years 14

FEATURED REMARKS BY TESFAYE GEBERAB

older than I am. We grew up in adjacent lands. Our coming up was similar. Growing up, we breathed the same air. It was inevitable that I was intimately attuned to Chaltu‘s heart. When Geresu Tufa finished telling me Chaltu‘s tragic story, I said to him, ―I will write it down.‖ I did as I said. From now on, Chaltu will rest in peace. But her story will live on. When the Oromo achieve self-rule, a proud equestrian statue will be erected for her in Finifinne, in the same place where once Benti Demo‘s granddaughter was not allowed to raise her head up. I wish the caption under the statue reads: ―To Chaltu Midhaksa, Victim of Systemic Terror.‖ Chaltu symbolizes the Oromo situation at one time. I know that Chaltu‘s aspirations and regrets were once ensconced in the heart of every Oromo. To be sure, one doesn‘t need to be Oromo to know the passion that had precipitated Chaltu‘s death. One only needs to be human. As I think about it, Chaltu‘s story continues to be a thorn in my side that keeps on puncturing and causing my own heart to bleed. When Chaltu suddenly woke up from her long slumber, her real identity was no longer with her. She couldn‘t live as Helen. Unable to know who she was, she found herself already dead. Sometimes death can be a solution. Just simply breathing cannot be the only measure of life. The recent uprising in Oromia was a movement to protect the participants‘ identity and honor. Many young people have paid the ultimate price, not because they hated life but because they acknowleded that death is the price to be paid for one‘s national identity and dignity. Oromos of our time have come to understand that the same systemic terror the impacted Chaltu is manifested in several iterations and swirls around the site of Dhaka Araara (the headstone of reconciliation). These Oromos have successfully avoided Chaltu‘s fate. One such Oromo is Asli Oromo. Asli Oromo is one crazy lady who is quite adept at firing rounds of ammunition until her rifle goes aflame in her hands. Had Chaltu been not encircled by her enemies and killed, she would have been an untouchable tigress just like Asli. She would have been a good example for why the Oromo national movement must mobilize Oromo women and make them an integral part of the struggle. There has been no liberation struggle that succeeded without the full participation of women.

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The struggle continues. Oromos are picking up arms against the systemic terror that keeps changing its face to maintain its hold on power. Some engage in the struggle in exile. The Oromo who remain in the country, on their land and in their homesteads, continue to pay the precious life of their children to push the struggle over the finish line. As the saying goes, ―it is impossible to arrest an idea whose time has come.‖ Indeed ―Burqaa’s Silence‖ has run its course. There are signs that indicate ―Burqaa’s Silence‖ has ended. It is true Burqaa’s Silence is a novel. Its main characters, Anoolee Waqoo and Hawaanii Waqoo, are creations of my imagination. The history of the blameless Oromos who were massacred by Emperor Menelik‘s army at Anoolee, is not a fairytale, however. Denying the truth of what happened is not the best solution to the challenges of living together. Eyewitnesses to the mutilation of breasts and limbs have lived until recently. Many who have heard first-hand accounts of the massacres and mutilations are still alive. It is indeed necessary to make right the distorted history of Ethiopia. While it is true that the Oromo People‘s Democratic Organization (OPDO) is an instrument of the TPLF system, it should be thanked, not condemned, for erecting a monument that memorializes the victims of Anoolee. It should also be noted here that the Oromo people do not need the counsel of their neighbors to decide what monument to erect or which one to tear down. I am aware that many of my friends will be offended by this statement. I can‘t help them. It is the truth. Once, Dr. Negasso Gidaada [former President of Ethiopia, an Oromo himself] said about me, ―he feels that he is more Oromo than Oromos themselves.‖ Some groups have rewarded him with thunderous applause for his remarks. Oromos, however, haven‘t heard the applause. The Argentinian Che Guevara has struggled and paid with his life for the emancipation of the people of Congo, Bolivia and Cuba. Many Oromos, Amharas and Tigrayans have sacrificed their lives for Eritrea‘s liberation struggle. Standing for and with oppressed peoples should be a reason for honoring someone, not for denouncing him or her. We know that there were several white Westerners who struggled alongside the Oromo people. Jews who support Palestinians are more than a few. Noam Chomsky is a good example of this. Wasn‘t Alan Paton, the author of the book, Cry, the Beloved Country, a white South African? He wasn‘t denounced for being ―blacker than blacks.‖ There were many Anuak, Shinasha, Komoo 16


and Somali fighters in the Oromo Liberation Army who fought, commanded troops, and died for the liberation of the Oromo people. Perhaps it might be difficult to find individuals among Amhara settlers on Oromo land who have fought for the liberation or citizen‘s rights of the Oromo. But it is not possible to assert categorically that there were absolutely none. In any case, my psychological make-up is deeply intermingled with the Oromo people. I was born in Bishoftu and grew up among Bishoftu Oromo. Yerer Mountain is Oromo. Lake Bishoftu is Oromo. The dense forest of Chuqalaa is Oromo. All of these have shaped who I am today. The fact that I am Eritrean by lineage is not sufficient to prevent me from struggling for the emancipation of the Oromo people. I have no doubt that my participation in the Oromo struggle will be a history that I will be proud of. I will therefore forge ahead. Let me tell you something startling. I am glad we live in a time when we scramble to become Oromo. Let‘s rejoice that we are fortunate to witness Amhara politicians striving to win over Oromos by saying ―my wife is Oromo.‖ The era when Oromos deny their Oromoness is buried forever. This is a great victory. I am proud to have been a part of the struggle that brought us to this victory. Let me thus conclude what I set out to say in connection with Chaltu Midhaksa. Chaltu doesn‘t need me anymore. She can tell her own story. We might even watch Chaltu on Hollywood‘s big screen riding her horse Guracha along the Chuqalaa escarpment and hear the echoes of her laughter penetrating the Bilbilo forest. So let me proceed to my second point. The Horn of Africa is a region entangled by political intrigue. The regional problems are extensive. Demands for unity and freedom abound. Oromos, including those in Kenya, might imagine Greater Oromia. Ethio-Amharas have a perennial claim, ―Asab is ours.‖ Somalis perpetually dream of recovering the Ogaden. Political scientists have continued to put forth their solutions to these demands. Clearly, our region is not characterized by stability. As an important part of the Horn, Ethiopia now constitutes the core of the regional problems. It is not a mistake to think that ―resolving the problem in Ethiopia could also be a solution to the regional problems.‖ And it is indeed the case that ending group dominance 17


and asserting the rule of law will reduce tensions and resolve problems. TPLF‘s ethnic federalism hasn‘t worked. It was subverted from the very beginning because it wasn‘t founded on the basis of genuine ideology. When the TPLF came to power, it accepted Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the peripheral regions (Afar and Somalia) as administrative zones. In the southern regions, the principle of ethnic federalism encountered insurmountable challenges. The effort to combine Wolayita, Gamo Gofa and Dawaro into a new ethnicity called ―WeGaGoDA‖ failed miserably. Contrary to the principle of ethnic federalism, the TPLF forced several nationalities in southern Ethiopia into an artificial administrative zone. The question of the rights of other nations within the Tigray and Amhara zones was passed over without mention. Unable to resolve this particular issue, the government suppressed it. No official was able to explain why the Awramba, Falasha, Argoba, Agaw, Qimant, Kunama, Saho, and Jabarti weren‘t granted the same self-rule granted to the Harari. When the Falasha were airlifted to the ―mother land,‖ the remaining nationalities were divided up and absorbed into the Amhara and Tigray Zones. The revolutionary democracy-led TPLF federalism was reduced to one group‘s instrument of domination and was effectively dead on arrival. After the passing of Meles Zenawi, even revolutionary democracy was sent to the abyss and ―Meles‘s Vision‖ became the guiding principle of national policy. There is one truth on which all can agree. From now on, it is impossible to crush and rule the Oromo and Oromia in the old way. It is clear that it is impossible to continue to entomb the Oromo people‘s demand through the old method of mass asphyxiation. It might require one tough slog but the Oromo people will get to their ultimate destination. What is not clear at the moment is the method by which they will get to their destination. If not managed well, it is conceivable that the eventual goal could be costly. The 2014 Oromo uprising could be the foretaste of the big one to come. I believe it is possible to forestall a catastrophic eventuality. I also believe that we can imagine the tough times ahead and take steps to minimize the human toll that might result from a spontaneous regime collapse. If we agree that the edifice of ―Ethiopianism‖ in which Abyssinian rulers have taken turns to rule has entered an irreversible stage of dissolution, it is possible to work together to obviate the impending bloodshed. It is imperative to 18


allow the Oromo a chance for self-rule but also to ask them that they take responsibility for the well-being of other peoples in Ethiopia and devise workable solutions to the problems besetting the country. It is time to respect the fact that the Oromo are the majority. It will be impossible to gloss over and delay the bitter truth of what is coming. Oromos have repeatedly shown their disappointment with Ethiopianism. They have demonstrated their disapproval of the endless intrigues of northerners. When national soccer teams of Ethiopia and Nigeria played in the World Cup qualifying match, young Oromos in Adama were reportedly rooting for the Nigerian team. I have seen videos of some Oromos lowering the Ethiopian flag and burning it. Even more startling is that non-Oromo Ethiopians were watching from the sidelines when the Ethiopian flag was being burned down. This event signifies not only that Oromos have rejected imposed Ethiopian-ness but also that non-Oromo Ethiopians have accepted the reality of Oromo-ness (Oromummaa). Further, it shows that no one wants to claim ownership of Ethiopianness or the Ethiopian flag. The TPLF itself has now gotten to a stage where it cannot control the OPDO, the very vehicle it had created to smother and rule the Oromo. As Jawar Mohammed correctly pointed out, the May 2014 Oromo uprising had strong OPDO support. Just like any Oromo, OPDO members experience the oppression perpetrated against the Oromo. Consequently, except for a handful individuals in the upper crust of its leadership, the majority of OPDO members are now beyond TPLF‘s control. This raises the question of whether the ―TPLF is actually alive‖ if it cannot control the OPDO. Overall, as one can gather from reading various publications, many have now raised questions about the existence of an effective government in Ethiopia. We also read in these publications that ―the basic political question now is not how to overthrow the EPRDF government. The more daunting issue is the nature of the government that should be in place in post-EPRDF Ethiopia.‖ Ethiopia is not an isolated island. Ethiopia‘s problems affect the surrounding countries. This means we should seek comprehensive solutions for the region. We must try to do this before the whole region has drifted into a point of no return. What is the solution?

19


I point out in the ―memoir‖ I recently published that the people of our region must build a unity that is based on common interest. I emphasize that, if regional solutions are not sought, there will be no end to the countries of the Horn coming apart along the obvious fault lines. Once we end up creating micro-states like Djibouti, we will be a lucrative market for arms dealers. Our region is endowed with natural resources. Our mineral resources have not been exploited. The region has geo-political significance. The people are enterprising and patriotic, and they value honor. If we dig a little deeper into our ancestral past, we find that we all originate from the same source. If we engage in dialogue without mixing it up with arrogance and hatred, it is not difficult to find solutions to the problems that beset us. Why is it that we don‘t have a regional vision? What is the source of our incessant conflict? What is the reason for partisan negotiators dominating conflict resolution efforts? Who is responsible for our plight? Ourselves or others? I believe that the countries of the Horn can begin to pave the way for regional solutions by issuing to the 150 million residents of the region passports stamped with ―Horn of Africa‖ and begin to use the same regional currency for commerce. What prevents the people of the Horn countries (Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya etc.) and even the contending nations of Ethiopia (Ogaden, Sidama, Oromia, Amhara, Tigray) and the other peoples of the Horn from imagining solutions outside the confines of their national borders? There must be a better way. I believe we must forge a regional identity. I stress that we must be able to create a new Horn-wide or East Africa-wide identity. We can elevate the ceiling of our imagination to have a broader and longer vision. It is nearly impossible to think of enduring peace and sustainable development while the region is consumed in conflicts over clans and language groups, ports and borders. The people of the Horn must find common economic, political and social interests. The nations and countries of the Horn must be able to create a legal framework that will serve as a basis for regional integration. If we continue along the path we are on, we will all be losers in the end. One cannot sleep in peace while the neighbor‘s house is on fire. The flame will turn into a conflagration that will consume everything. This is a historical fact. 20


I am aware that the idea of regional integration is not new. Many have studied and proposed it in the past. But these studies are collecting dust on shelves and in drawers somewhere. Because the idea has never been bought into, we continue to suffer recurrent problems. In the end, it is necessary to reconcile ourselves with the existing reality. The solutions based on domination will inevitably entail dangerous consequences. We must come to the negotiating table sincerely to seek solutions based on common interest. To achieve regional peace and sustainable development, we must come to confront our good and bad past and come to national reconciliations. This is the only remaining solution. Thank you

21

State of Oromia’s Interest in Addis Ababa (Finfinnee): Undelivered Constitutional Promises Fekadu Nigussa Geleta*

Abstract Addis Ababa emerged as the capital city of the Abyssinian Empire, Ethiopia, in the heart of Oromia. In the period prior to Menelik’s conquest of the center and the south, the Tulama, who were gradually evicted from their homeland, inhabited Finfinnee. This eviction continued as the city experienced rapid population growth and physical expansion. Consequently, Addis Ababa’s demand of ecosystem services has increased more rapidly. It gets major ecosystem services from the surrounding Oromia areas. The 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s Constitution granted the city the right of self-government. Equally important is that the State of Oromia’s interest in Addis Ababa is to be respected. Article 49(5) states that “The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, *

Fekadu Nigussa Geleta, MA, is a lecturer at Ethiopian Civil Service University offering different environment and climate change management modules to MA students. Also a co-ordinate the elearning module entitled Public Service Ethics and Change Management in the Institute of Urban Development Studies.


shall be respected.” However, this promise has not been kept. This study employs historical institutionalism to investigate the denial of constitutional rights to the State of Oromia. It argues that the denial of rights to the Oromo nation witnesses the continuation of the century-long action of the exploitative political and economic institutions of the Amhara-Tigrian ethno-national groups. Hence, political power symmetry is more vital than ever in Ethiopia in order to implement constitutional rights and develop inclusive institutions that will benefit the Oromo and other captured nations. And, Addis Ababa should adopt a city within state governance arrangement in the face of the State of Oromia’s interest in the capital. It is only via such mechanisms that Oromia’s interest in Addis Ababa will materialize and be protected. Key words: State of Oromia, Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, Oromo national interest, Tulama Oromo, and city within state

Background Addis Ababa emerged in the heart of Oromia as the capital city of Ethiopia. Between 1886 and 1897, Menelik II built the city on the place known by the Oromo name, Finfinnee. This city became the capital of the newly created empire in 1891 (Pankhurst, 1985). Prior to Menelik‘s conquest of the center and the south, the Tulama Oromo, who had their own autonomous local government, inhabited Finfinnee. As the Oromo population increased and their territory expanded between 1522 and 1618, different Oromo branches instituted local gadaa governments that were accountable to the overall gadaa government (Asafa 2008; Tsega 2008). In his latenineteenth century conquest, Menelik and his officials destroyed the gadaa government and killed or expelled the Tulama Oromo in order to transfer their lands, on which Addis Ababa was founded in the late 19th century, to the Amhara colonial settlers (Pankhurst, 1985). There the army commanders established camps for their relatives, followers, and war captives (Getahun 2000). Most of the Tulama Oromos were evicted and forced to migrate to far places as far as Arsi, Bale, and Hararghe. Others were permanently marginalized and turned into servants and laborers (Getahun 2000). Asafa (2010a) also indicated that some Europeans and others had obtained Oromo lands from Menelik before the merchandization of land under the proclamation of October 27, 1907 by giving him gifts, and later through purchase. It was in the face of such contending political situations that the administrative, political, 24

STATE OF OROMIA‘S INTEREST IN ADDIS ABABA

and diplomatic center of the city of Addis Ababa was established. By 1910, Addis Ababa hosted an estimated population of around 70,000 permanent and 30,000 to 50,000 temporary inhabitants (Pankhurst 1985). During the reigns of Haile Selassie I and the Derg, the exploitation of the Oromo steadily increased. Mohammed (2008) commented that during the imperial (to 1974) and the military (19741991) periods, the Oromo were evicted from adjacent lands to make room for the expansion of Addis Ababa. The year 1991 was a critical juncture in Ethiopian history, signified by the drastic changes that were subsequently introduced in the economic field and in the political arena. The short-lived transitional government‘s charter, in the aftermath of overthrowing the Derg regime, laid the foundation for the establishment of the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The 1995 Constitution boldly addressed the major questions that had been driving the politics of Ethiopia. Accordingly, based on Ethnonational-Federalism, nine states and two city administrations with self-rule status were established. Addis Ababa was granted the right of self-rule under article 49 of the constitution. And article 49(5) states: ―The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, shall be respected.‖ It also states that a subsequent law shall determine the particulars of the arrangements. UN-Habitat (2008) reported that Addis Ababa‘s population has nearly doubled every decade since the first population and housing census. In 1984 the population was 1.4 million and by 1994 it was 2.1 million. UN-Habitat (2008) estimated the population of Addis Ababa at 4 million in 2008. The same source indicated that the size of the population would continue to rise, reaching between 7.5 and 12 million in 2030. Similarly, the area of the city has doubled over the last 22 years and has now reached 540 Sq.km. (Feyera & Degefa 2011). The rapid population growth has put tremendous pressures on the city and the surrounding area, resulting in the eviction of the Oromo inhabitants and environmental degradation. Furthermore, river, soil, air and water pollution as the result of economic activities and poor infrastructure are growing problems for Addis Ababa and surrounding Oromia special zone. Addis Ababa is dependent upon its surrounding rural areas for 25


its major ecosystem provisioning services. It imports water, food products and other raw materials (Zeleke et al. 2007) from the surrounding areas of Oromia. As for its water supply, all of Addis‘ surface water sources are reservoirs situated in the state of Oromia special zone. The water is supplied by three reservoirs (80 percent) and one well system (20 percent) with a total volume of 210,000m3/day or 77 Million Cubic Meters (MCM)/year. The reservoirs supplying Addis are the Legadadi and Dire Dams (about 30 km northeast of Addis), the Gafersa Dam (≈20 km northwest of Addis) and the Akaki Wells (10 km south of Addis). All of the water in the reservoirs is allocated to provide water to Addis and all the available water is being used. Expansion of the existing water supplies and plans for new water supply dam construction projects from the neighboring Abay Basin—Sibilu and Gerbi Dams (30 km north of Addis) (Tahal 2005) have been intensified. On the other hand, much of the wastewater, both domestic and industrial, produced in the urban area of Addis Ababa reaches the Awash River in Oromia, untreated and seriously polluting local water sources. Since the downstream river water is used for various purposes such as drinking water supply and irrigation, public health risks are high and not only in the urban area. As the wastewater treatment capacity of the city is very limited, wastewater is discharged directly into the natural water source of the Akaki River, which eventually joins the Awash River. The Akaki River is an important source of water for small-scale farmers in and around Addis who produce vegetables and fodder for livestock. The River serves as an important drainage system that disposes of the abundant runoff and wastewater into the Awash River (Van Rooijen & Taddesse 2009). Despite the rights and interests of the state of Oromia as outlined in the FDRE Constitution, the current city-hinterland relationship with Oromia is negative and exploitative. Indeed, the promised interest of the state of Oromia has been ignored. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate the implications of the denial of constitutional rights to the state of Oromia. The paper is organized into five parts. The first part is a historical account of the Oromo in Northeast Africa followed by the major events that have taken place since the 16th century including the conquest of south and the major resistance to that conquest. The second part presents methodological and theoretical narratives. The third part explains the process of the development of Addis Ababa as the main urban center in Oromia 26


and Ethiopia and its impact on indigenous inhabitants. The fourth part identifies potential reasons for denying article 49(5) of the FDRE‘s Constitution within the framework of historical institutionalism. Finally, the paper describes an inclusive political system and capital city within state governance model to implement FDRE Constitution article 49(5).

Methodological and Theoretical Narratives This paper draws on the historical institutionalism approach to investigate the reasons for the denial of the constitutional right of the state of Oromia found in article 49(5). Historical intuitionalism, as a Western political science method, is considered irrelevant for the understanding of African politics because of its alleged normative focus on formal institutions (Erdmann et al. 2011). This assertion assumes that informal institutions dominate African politics. This claim cannot be sustained as formal institutions have become more important than they were in the past. In addition, as Africa is often characterized by political instability and frequent change, this appears to be unsuitable to historical institutionalism. There are three types of institutional analysis in the social sciences today: rational choice, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. Common to all the three is the idea that institutions influence the structure of behavior. Institutions can be both formal and informal. Formal institutions are the rules and procedures—usually taking the form of legal acts—that are socially created, formally communicated, enforced through officially sanctioned channels, and widely accepted. Informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke et al. 2006). Rational choice institutionalists think that institutions frame the individual‘s strategic behavior to maximize their individual gains. According to sociological institutionalism, humans are neither as self-interested nor purely rational but are ‗satisficers‘ who act habitually or follow the ‗logic of appropriateness.‘ In between these two views, historical institutionalism considers human beings as norm-abiding, rule-following, self-interested rational actors. It primarily attempts to understand and explain specific real world political outcomes. Historical institutionalists seek to know why a certain choice is made and/or why a certain outcome has occurred. Of course, it helps to investigate whether rule following or 27


self-interest maximizing has to play a significant role for a certain political outcome to happen (Thelen & Steinmo 1992; 1998; Hall 1996; Steinmo 2001; 2008). It is vital to scrutinize the implication of the denial of constitutional rights to weaker political institutions in the current Ethiopia, and the relationship between the dominated peoples, in this case the Oromo people, and the northern Amhara–Tigrian ethnonational groups. Historical institutionalism is, therefore, the most appropriate theoretical frame to explain the specific issues and real world political outcomes that can be seen in the asymmetric relationship between the state of Oromia and the city of Addis Ababa. The northern dominated and imposed institutions have deprived the dominated peoples, such as the Oromo, of their cultural, economic, and political rights. Hence, the undelivered constitutional promises are not independent of the cumulative events that have occurred in present-day Ethiopia, since the late 19th century. Let me situate these issues in the historical and political economy of the formation of contemporary Ethiopia.

Oromo in North East Africa Region It is impossible to discuss the lack of enforcement of constitutional provisions with regard to the state of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa without considering a brief history of the Oromo in the region and the major political developments of 19th century Ethiopia. This section will, therefore, briefly present a historical account of the Oromo people. Due to the sheer historical bias of several European and Ethiopian accounts, the Oromo are depicted as a people who did not arrive in the Ethiopian highlands before the 16th century (Jeylan 2006; Tsega 2010). Tsega (2010, 88) indicates that several historical accounts of other European travelers, missionaries, and diplomats who lived among the Oromo in the 19th century reported that the Oromo were one of the earliest inhabitants of the region, stretching from today‘s northern Sudan to the entire Horn of Africa region. As Darrell Bates (1976,7) writes: ―The Oromo were a very ancient race, the indigenous stock, perhaps, on which most other peoples in this part of eastern Africa had been grafted.‖ Garison (1896, 295) also portrays the Oromo people as the older and true indigenous Cushitic group of Northeast Africa. Further evidences from various scholars show that the Oromo formed part of the ancient Egyptian civilization. Flinders Petrie 28


(1939) reveals that the Oromo established the Tenth Dynasty, and first settled at Qua before having their own dynasty. Similarly, Henry Tomkins (1889) indicates that some of the inhabitants of ancient Egypt might be [Jaarso Oromo], an Oromo clan. There is also another suggestion that the group called Arma who reportedly presented themselves before Queen Hatshepsut corresponds to Orma or Oromo. Cultural and linguistic resemblances of Oromo with the ancient people of Egypt and today‘s West Sudan‘s Tibu, also called Tida, group reaffirms the long-term presence of the Oromo in Northeast Africa. Trimingham (1952) and Huntingford (1955) also indicate that the Oromo, Somali, Afar, and Saho lived in the Horn of Africa before the Semitic speakers‘ migration from Southern Arabia began. Cushitic peoples, of which the Oromo are to be counted, settled the central Ethiopian plateau as early as 5000 BC (Ehert 1976), and the Oromo communities lived in Shawa by about the 9th and 10thcenturies and around Lake Tana by about the 14thcentury (Greenfield & Mohammed 1980). Others, such as Pauitschke (1889) cited in Feyisa (1998), reported that the Oromo were in Northeast Africa during the Aksumite period (200 B C – 800 AD). Against this background, Jeylan (2006) states, ―The Abyssinian chroniclers (most of whom were court historians and monks) were at the centre of the dissemination of antipathy against the Oromo. One of these was Alaqa Taye whose portrayal of the Oromo is outwardly negative… [and] stated the Oromo migrated from Asia and Madagascar and reached the region [East Africa] via Mombassa.‖ Ethiopianist historians and others have beat the drum of this biased and Ethio-centric view. Most Europeans scholars were more influenced by Habasha chroniclers and the ruling classes than the Oromo people. Although, for political reasons, the issue of the origin of Oromo is still controversial and subject to debate in certain circles, it cannot be denied that they have been a major Cushitic group among the indigenous peoples of Northeast Africa since antiquity.

The Oromo Nation since the sixteenth century One of the critical junctures in Oromo history happened between the 16th and early 17th centuries. It marked the Oromo movement in which huge areas were recaptured (Baxter 1978; Asafa 2010). The indigenous system of structurally assimilating, through the process called moggasa, those whom they met on their way enabled the Oromo 29


people to increase their number and control vast areas (Blackhurst 1996; Mohammed 1990) within a short period of time. Jeylan (2006,258) indicates ―…some European writers rate the Oromo movement of the 16th century as a sudden and an aimless human stampede or explosion which the savage nomads inflicted on the Christian Kingdom using as the opportunity the political gap created by the Muslim-Christian War during that time. [However,] [t]he Oromo used their indigenous institutions and peacefully incorporated the non-Oromos into their social, cultural, military, and political lives.‖ According to Oromo law, strangers who were willing to be adopted via moggasa were treated in the same way as any Oromo. There is an adoption ritual led by abba bokku (president) of the Gadaa (an indigenous Oromo democratic governance system) government. The Oromo movement went to the area of highland Christian settlers and went as far as the southern part of today‘s Tigray. Nonetheless, the Oromo demographic impact on the whole Horn of Africa is regarded by certain authors as ―a nomadic, destructive and purposeless force‖ (Mesfin 1972 cited in Jeylan 2006). Aleqa Atsme, a chronicler of 20th century, describes the Oromo movement as a ―Flood River‖ that could have ―devastated‖ the region. Hultin (1996) states the Oromo movement was not considered as an invasion of the Christian kingdom, but rather ―a natural disaster,‖ a sort of ―human flood that was damaging to both Christians and Muslims in the country and was impossible to control.‖ Hence, checking and counter-checking became duties of the Christian Kingdom. The Oromo were long in conflict with the Abyssinian states. The case in point is the frequent clashes in the northern Oromia, Wollo. As Wollo separated the southern Abyssinians from the rest, the emperors whose seat was Gonder negotiated with the autonomous rulers of Wollo for access to Shawa. Nonetheless, the Wollo Yejju Oromos have also been influential in the Abyssinian politics since the sixteenth century. In 1855, a bandit by the name Kassa Hailu came to power and was enthroned as Emperor Tewodros II. He perceived the presence of Oromo in Gonder during the era of princes (1769 to 1855) as ‗intruders‘ and ―a spearhead of a Muslim attempt to take over Ethiopia‖ (Mekuria 2005). Mekuria further notes that Tewodros‘ campaigns against Wollo and Shawa were frightening. The mutilation of war captives and the destruction of property were features that characterized the campaigns. Following in the footstep of Tewodros II, Kassa Mercha 30


of Tigray, crowned as Emperor Yohannes IV, enacted a policy of baptizing the Shewan and Wollo Muslims and followers of other religions. The religious conversion and cultural assimilation processes had two options, either to be baptized or to be exterminated in the case of refusal (Atsme Giyorgis 1905/1987 cited in Mekuria 2005). While the Oromo defended themselves from the Christian and Muslim empire builders for many centuries, by the mid-19th century the expansion of European imperialism into the Horn of Africa, by siding with Abyssinian ruling class, changed the balance of power between the Oromo and the Amhara-Tigrayan ethnonational groups as we shall see below.

Major Developments since the late 19th Century The late 19th and early 20th centuries were characterized by economic and social underdevelopment, political scuffles, and imperial expansion. Menelik II was in the process of becoming Emperor of Ethiopia following the death of Emperor Yohannis IV in the mid19th century. His Emperorship soon followed with an aggressive south, southeast and southwest ‗expansion‘ and took part in the ‗Scramble for Africa‘ along with the European colonizers (Gebru 1996; Atsme Giyorgis 1905/1987 Bahiru Tafla). He conquered the vast lands of the Oromo and the other ethno-national groups. Unlike his predecessors, Menelik‘s territorial ambitions were not limited to the Abyssinian heartland. He was regarded by a generation of Ethiopian rulers and intelligentsia as a national icon who realized Tewodros II‘s dream of ―unifying Ethiopia.‖ To the conquered peoples, including the Oromo, Menelik II was a colonizer who led a mass massacre, mutilating the hands and breasts of hundreds and thousands of Oromos, Keffa, and Wolita. In addition, Asafa & Schaffer (2013:281) succinctly indicate: ―The destruction of Oromo lives and institutions were aspects of Ethiopian colonial terrorism [led by Menelik II] and genocide. The surviving Oromo who [previously enjoyed] an egalitarian democracy known as the Siqqee/Gadaa system were forced to face state terrorism, political repression, and an impoverished life.‖ Menelik‘s relationship with European colonizers, including France and Britain, was helpful and enabled him to access modern firearms. This played an instrumental role in Menelik‘s success, despite the fierce and tireless resistance he faced as he fought to occupy the Oromo lands. The Tulama Oromo of Shawa was not 31


easily defeated, but unlike the case of Arsi Oromo the divide and rule approach became effective in propelling infightings among the Tulama. Bahiru Tufla‘s work on Atsme Giyorgis 1905/1987 as quoted in Abbas (1995) reveals the fact that ―The [Oromo] of Galan and the Abichu fought for seven years and every time the Galan were the victors. The war began to be of a great interest to Sable Selassie. He allied himself with the Abichu and gave them support. By siding with the Abichu he subjugated the Galan, Gidda, Wabari, Galan, Llamu, Aga, Gerru, Wayyu, Salale." It is in this contentious socio-political context that today‘s Addis Ababa (Finfinnee) was established in the heart of Tulama Oromo‘s land in the late 19th century. Since then, the town has seen unprecedented population growth accompanied by territorial expansion into the surrounding vast agricultural lands. After Menelik II‘s death in the early 20th century, Ras Teferi Mekonnen came to power and later enthroned himself as Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia in 1930. Lij Iyasu, son of the Wollo negus (King) Michael, inherited Menelik‘s throne in his youth but the conspiracy to annihilate people from religious and ethnic backgrounds other than Orthodox Christian and the Amhara-Tigrian ethno-national group finally resulted in his detention and death. He was replaced by empress Zewditu, though more power was concentrated in the hands of the regent (1916-1930), Ras Teferi. Empress Zewditu was married to the Wollo Ras Gugsa Wale, who was later seen as the primary enemy of Ras Teferi. The war that broke out between the two resulted in the defeat of the former, and in the aftermath Empress Zewditu was poisoned and died. Under the long rule (1930-1974) of Haile Selassie I, Addis Ababa city further consolidated its status and became the seat of the Organization of African Union headquarters and other international organizations, and the diplomatic center of the empire. Ethiopia also had its first written constitution in 1931 which seemed to establish a constitutional monarchy. It was revised in the early 1950s but with minor changes like confederation with Eritrea. The constitution placed the control of power in the hands of the emperor. Oromo farmers‘ lands were given to those nearest and dearest to the imperial ruler, followed by the eviction and denial of the economic and property rights of the Oromo inhabitants. The reign of Haile Selassie was marked by the suppression of farmers‘ revolts for freedom and democracy in Bale and other parts of the country. The extractive 32


political and economic institutions put in place further impoverished the masses and aggravated the anti-feudalism and anti-colonial movements. International political events like the decolonization of Africa and the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology, together with mounting grievances from peasants and other sectors of the society, brought about another critical juncture, the 1974 failed Ethiopian revolution. The revolution was successful in dethroning the emperor, but was hijacked by a military junta—the Derg—who ruled the country with terror and blood for seventeen years (1974 to 1991). The birth of ethno-nationalism movements proliferated in the 1960s. The Oromo national movement formally emerged during this decade. The overthrow of the military dictator in May 1991 was the outcome of the ongoing conflict in the countryside, albeit precipitated by the simultaneous attacks on separate fronts that had been planned and co-ordinated by armed forces from Oromia, Eritrea and Tigray (Joireman 1997). The Tigray Peoples‘ Liberation Front (TPLF) took over Addis Ababa in May 1991 with the support of the Eritrean People‘s Liberation Front, and the West, particularly the United States. The episode appeared to accommodate the Oromo nation‘s demand for self-determination although the hope was dashed following the Oromo Liberation Front‘s (OLF) forced withdrawal from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The TPLF orchestrated the formation of Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) with other three satellite parties: Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDEM), Oromo People‘s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and South Ethiopia People Democratic Union (SEPDU) (later renamed South People Democratic Movement-SEPDEM) (Vaguhan 1994; Merera 2002; Abbink 2009; International Crisis Group 2009). The TPLF/EPRDF has led Ethiopia for more than two decades. Nevertheless, no major change has been observed regarding Oromia‘s rights regarding Addis Ababa rather the party has continued the project of evicting indigenous Oromo settlers surrounding Addis Ababa city.

Genesis of Constitutionalizing the State of Oromia’s Interest in Addis Ababa The history of modern constitutions in Ethiopia dates back to the 1931 constitution. It was revised in 1952, but the central theme was found to be the strengthening of the absolute monarchy that ruled 33


the country. The second constitution came forth in 1987 under the military dictatorship of the Derg. In both cases the issues of democracy, self-rule, and self-determination were ignored. The constitutions denied human and democratic rights. There was no room to think about the interest of Oromos as the indigenous occupants on the capital city. In 1992, as part of its pseudoconcessions to the OLF, the TPLF recognized Addis Ababa as the capital of Oromia and promised that Oromia‘s interests in the city would be respected (Getahun 2002). In the Transitional Charter that created the Transitional Government (1991-1995) and later served as the foundation for its constitution, it was stated ―The special national and political interests of the Oromo are reserved over regions 13 [Harari State] and 14 [Addis Ababa].‖ In 1995, Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa was once again recognized by the Constitution that created the FDRE. Addis Ababa assumed a multiple identity: the capital city of the Federal Government of Ethiopia; the seat of the state of Oromia‘s government; and the status of self-government with an elected council and city governor accountable to the residents. However, article 49(3) of FDRE Constitution seems conflicting with sub-article 2. The later succinctly stipulate the self-rule status of the city while the former created a loophole, which gives the federal government/EPRDF power to the extent of dissolving the city council. On the other hand, sub-article 5 served only as a pseudoconcession, which the TPLF made to OLF and it remains nominal. In the last nineteen years, the particulars that would be expected to specify the interest of Oromia on Addis Ababa never happen while the parliament has issued hundreds of legislative acts on other issues. The 2009 attempt to provide particulars of FDRE article 49(5) was not successful as the then government whip noted that the Federal officer who was in charge of presenting a draft for the parliament failed to do so (Capital 2009). The same source divulged that the Oromo based MP (former FDRE President, Negaso Gidada) complained the particulars were overdue and wished to get them implemented soon. However, the parliament was about to finish its term and no further progress was made. The issue seems not to be a priority for the ruling party as my personal communication with an advisor of the PM on legal matters revealed. According to the advisor, it is up to the city administration and the state of Oromia to deal with the matter; however, the city is 34


under the control of federal government. He added that so far no cases had been brought to the federal government. The suggestion of the benefits that satellite towns of Oromia are getting from Addis Ababa has also been noted as a partial implementation of the constitutional promises. Nevertheless, the adviser was humble in suggesting particulars that benefit both the state and the city as he indicates implementing the constitution is a gradual process. How long must one wait to see the constitution fully implemented is a challenging question, yet to be answered? Three of the seven mayors of Addis Ababa since 1991 were from the OPDO, an organ of the EPRDF. This assignment could be misperceived as part of realizing the interest of the state of Oromia. The OPDO‘s dependency syndrome and the fear of intimidation resulted in the failure of the mayors to raise issues of clarifying the particulars of FDRE Constitution Article 49(5). Rather, they negotiated actions that minimize the conflict between Addis Ababa and the surrounding Zone, of course in favor of Addis Ababa. A case in point was the deal Mayor Kuma Demeksa and the president of state of Oromia, Abba Dula Gemeda, made during the 2009 serious border conflict between the Kolfe Keranio sub-city of Addis Ababa and the bordering Oromia Zone. The deal neither came up with a sustainable solution in demarcating the border nor referred the case to the parliament. The Addis Ababa City Administration revised Charter Proclamation No. 361/2003 excluded detailed issues noted in the former charter, Proclamation No. 87/1997. These include Oromia‘s right to make Addis Ababa the capital city of the state; the extension of services that are provided to Addis Ababa residents to the surrounding Oromia zone(s), and seeking consent of Oromia prior to any development activities Addis Ababa intends to carry out that may directly or indirectly affect the surrounding zone(s). Moreover, the 1997 charter indicated that the demarcation of the boundary between Addis Ababa and surrounding Oromia Zone(s) was mandated to the city Administration and that of the state of Oromia. But, the 2003 charter gives the federal government the authority to decide on the boundary that separate the city from the state (Article 5) which heightens the federal government‘s involvement. These are further more paralyzing than paving the road for the delivery of constitutional promises. Successive OPDO-based mayors of Addis Ababa have not made any significant contribution to the realization 35


of the symbolic, cultural, economic, and political interests of Oromia in Addis Ababa city.

Addis Ababa and its Impacts on the indigenous inhabitants Addis Ababa's physical expansion shows rapid horizontal expansion, both planned and unplanned. Informal and squatter settlements, by claiming larger areas of land on the city‘s periphery, are major contributors to the unplanned horizontal expansion of Addis Ababa. This is primarily facilitated by the availability of land on the periphery for continued housing development (Kenate 2008). The expansion has happened on the vast agricultural land of Oromo peasants beginning with the haphazard and extended early settlement of military camps and landlord‘s occupation, sefer, to the current size. The physical expansion of the city has grown from 21,800 ha in 1961 (OPHCC 1987) to 54,000 ha in 2005 (CSA 2004). Within a decade (1984 to 1994) the area of the city increased from 22,204 ha, to 53,021 ha. The period between 1984 and 1994 was the time when the large areas of land, held by about 25 peasant associations, were incorporated into the municipal areas to obtain space for the establishment of housing cooperatives (Feyera & Degefa, 2011). The expansion since 1996 has been a period of time in which the administration of the city restructured it into sub-cities and kebeles, authorized by proclamation number 311/1995. In this period, 23 Peasant Associations (Kebeles) with a combined total area of 37,564 ha were annexed into the city (ORAAMP 2002). This rapid horizontal expansion created formidable problems for the Oromo farmers: the deprivation of livelihood, the lack of access to essential basic services, and inadequate income for their survival (Tegenge 2000; Kenate 2008; Feyera & Degefa 2011). Background studies for the currently prepared Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia Special zone ―Integrated Development plan‖ (2014-2038) reveal the five eras of Addis Ababa city expansion. These are early settlement (1888-1935), the Italian period (19351941), the post-Italian period (1941-1974), the Derg era (1974-1991) and the post-Derg era (1991-2013) (see Fig 1); but ignore the sacrifices of the Oromo people in the urbanization process of the city. The overall expansion directions were primarily southwards, eastwards, and westwards along four outlets of the city (excluding the Fiche road, in large part due to its topography). 36


Fig 1 Addis Ababa City expansion since early settlement

Legend Early settlement (1988-1935) Italian period (1935-1941) Post-Italian period (1941-1974) The Dergera (1974-1991) Post-Derg era (1991-2013) Source: Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Plan (2014-2038); Draft Executive Summary June 2013 The making of Addis Ababa has perpetuated the eviction and denial of rights of the indigenous inhabitants. Cognizant of this, the State of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa is particularistic (Nugent 2009) and content wise covers economic, political, cultural, environmental, and symbolic issues. To justify these interests, knowing the history of Addis Ababa‘s urbanization and the sacrifices of the Tulama Oromo is imperative. During the first settlement period and onward, many Oromos were physically removed from the Addis Ababa city and its environs. In the following two regimes, Haile Selassie I and Mengistu Haile Mariam, government education 37


and language policies, focused on Amharizing the Oromo in the name of forging a ―national‖ culture, effectively purged the city of its Oromo residents and culture and made it impossible for Oromos to succeed both individually and corporately (Getahun 2002; Mohammed 2008; Pausewang 2009; Van der Beken n.d.). Anyone who wanted to advance in the administration, had the goal of obtaining a position in the court or, service in the military of the Emperors had to speak Amharic fluently. One may pass as an Amhara by adopting the observances of the Coptic Church, an Amharic name and life-style, and by using the Amharic language as one‘s first tongue (Baxter 1987; Pausewang 2009; Shack 1973). The current government has taken steps that follow the pattern set by its predecessors, but with the aim of replacing hegemony of one ethnonational group by another (Getahun 2002). Demographically, unlike other African cities of similar location within the heart of a given ethnonational group like Lagos, Kumasi, and Ougadogou, settlers from the North, primarily the Amhara,have dominated Finfinnee. The Yoruba in Lagos, the Asante in Kumasi and the Mossie in Ougadogou are numerically dominant ethnic groups in the cities located in the midst of their own ethnonational homeland (Getahun 2002). Major Ethnic groups in Addis Ababa are Amhara (47%), Oromo (19.5%), Gurage (16.3%) and Tigray (6.2%) (CSA 2007). Getahun argues that numeric dominance in a city located away from one‘s own ethnonational base really requires an active support from the ruling elites and is accompanied by the imposition of the settlers‘ political will, culture, and social values on other ethnonational groups. Getahun (2002, 118) indicates that the numerical preponderance and the politico-cultural hegemony of the northerners in Addis Ababa made adopting their way of life the only avenue for upward mobility, to which all others had to conform. Moreover, the indigenous inhabitants of Oromo clans like Gulale, Eekka, and Galan Abichu, the 12 counties or districts established and led by local clan chiefs like Tufa Muna, Duta Harra, Jimma Jatani, Guto Wasarbi, Jimma Tikse, Abebe Tufa, Ware Golole, Tufa Araddo and Mojo Botora can hardly be found today. However, the Ahwanee‘s principle (1991) as indicated in Frumkin et al. (2004) boldly illustrates that materials and methods of urban construction should be specific to the region and exhibit a continuity of history and cultural compatibility with the locality. Some of the names of places that have vanished are Ganda Hurusa Rare, Ganda Sulula Garbi, Ganda Garbi, 38


Ganda Hurufa Rare, Ganda Sokoru, Ganda Gersa, Ganda Boru Korma, Ganda Golba, Ganda Adami, Ganda Didimtu, Ganda Qalle, Ganda Karra, Ganda Harbu Irrecha, Ganda Dire Arara, Ganda Burqaa Ejeree, Ganda Baddaa Ejersaa, Ganda Rumaa, Ganda Birbirsaa, Ganda Kersa, Ganda Dhoke Bore, Ganda Lubu, Ganda Oda, etc (Betru, 2011). As the names indicate, some of the places were named functionally. For instance Ganda Dirree Araaraa refers to the place where indigenous conflict resolution had been practiced. Except for the few names (Boolee Bulbulaa, Labuu, Kolfee, Gulallee, Karra Qoree, Makanniisa…) that have survived as they were, Addis Ababa does not reflect the culture of the indigenous inhabitants. Both the national and city administrations‘ cultural centers reflect a century-long dominance of the northerners, and, of course, there is not level playing field for other cultures to revive their presence as the system has been orchestrated by the Amharan artists. There is little or no effort to restore the culture of indigenous inhabitants. For instance, the process of building the Oromia cultural center in Finfinnee has taken years to finalize. Had it been not for northern cultural domination aimed at suppressing others cultures, the city would have been a museum of the indigenous Oromo. Recent studies (Kenate 2008; Feyera and Degefa 2011; Betru 2011) reveal that the unabated expansion of Addis Ababa, both planned and unplanned, has been devastating to the economic, cultural, social, and environmental aspects of the farming households. The majority of the youth and women are jobless. They are not in a position to put their labor into productive activity. The losses of fertile agricultural lands, financial assets, degradation, and the lack of training as strategy for human capital development are problems worthy of mention. Similarly, the city‘s expansion destroyed Oromo social institutions such as Dabo and Jigi that brought the people together to work. Other institutions like Jigi Mallaqa (financial contribution for security in case of death of oxen and fire hazard or disaster on property) and Jigi Farada (horse owner groupings in support of each other to own a horse for transportation and for the horse racing ceremony during festivals) have been abandoned. The expansion failed to protect areas that have historical, social and cultural significance to the community. In Bole Bulbula, the community asked the concerned implementing body to preserve the Abu Bulbula community centre. However, their appeal was ignored and the place was subdivided into parcels residential construction for individuals. 39


Besides high competition for jobs, loss of mutual trust and understanding among the members of the community, increasing loss of identity and culture, and livelihood crises are other major negative consequences of the expansion of Addis Ababa (Kenate 2008; Feyera & Degefa 2011). Currently, one can barely find the border signifying the demarcation between Addis Ababa and the surrounding Zone. Attempts made by the Finfinnee Surrounding Special Zone Office of Land and Environment Bureau in 2012 were in vain. Neither the political elites of the OPDO nor the city administration of Addis Ababa were supportive. This becomes a loop-hole allowing Addis Ababa‘s continued to encroachment on the surrounding farm-lands by uprooting Oromo farmers. Addis Ababa city‘s massive housing projects are borderless. A case in point is the Jamo condominium site II, which was built within Finfinnee surrounding special zone but claimed city services as if it were within the Addis Ababa city limits. It has also been a source of contention that lands leased by the State of Oromia to investors have been often claimed by Addis Ababa city Administration. Due to the lack of a clearly demarcated boundary, most of the residents on the edge have a difficult time gaining access to public services. Hence, the reluctance in demarcating the border seems deliberate in order that Addis Ababa can continue to expand; it demonstrates the extension of the systemic uprooting of the Oromo from their historic lands and communities.

Ecosystem damage and threat to health Asafa & Schafer (2013) indicate that the Menelik-led war on the Oromo and others not only killed, terrorized, and repressed the colonial subjects, but also depleted natural resources and destroyed the environment and natural beauty of the colonized areas. In addition, the unhealthy relationship of Addis Ababa with the surrounding Oromia zone has resulted in environmental and health threats along with an increasing marginal social cost. A number of studies have indicated that of the industries located in Addis Ababa, 90 to 96 percent discharge their waste, without any form of treatment, into the nearby water bodies and open spaces (Zerayakob & Zeru 1999; Mohammed 2002; EPA 2005; Tamiru et al 2005; Dubalie et al. 2010; Zerfe 2011). Along the Akaki River, a tributary of River Awash, many factories have been established. Most of them are discharging their effluent directly into this river without any prior 40


treatment. In addition, about 30 percent of the residents of Addis Ababa have no access to toilet facilities and the human excreta from direct defecation on every open space including the river-banks creates an additional burden on the Akaki River (Said 2000). Flush toilet users connect their sewage system either to the centralized system, storm water drainage system or to separate septic tanks (AAWSA 2000). Direct discharge of domestic and municipal sewages is not limited to the Akaki River. The same problem creates water quality problems in the Huluka River, west Showa zone of Oromia. As the result of weak policies and the lack of enforcement of environmental laws, sewage waste is released directly into the river. The direct discharge of the pollutants into the Huluka River not only entails a decline in the quality of the water in the river, it also creates serious harm for aquatic life and downstream users. Even though there are few studies, the ones that have been conducted indicate that both the surface and ground water of the Akaki River basin are severely polluted. For instance, Frezer (2012) states that all of the Akaki ground water wells show a high concentration of phosphates, well above the permissible limit. This high level of phosphates in the groundwater most likely resulted from the Akaki River itself through base flow. Currently, a 136 ha land fill site 50 km north of Addis Ababa at Sedafa Bake is freely made available for use by Addis Ababa. This was done under the guise of providing a benefit for the special zone: the towns surrounding Addis Ababa would be able to use the landfill, an unfeasible proposition. For instance, for the Sabata, Chancho, or Holeta municipalities to benefit they would have to transport their solid waste to the landfill site, which is nearly 100 kms away. In addition, the social cost of the landfill has been overlooked. Information obtained from experts in the Finfinnee Surrounding Special Zone of Oromia reports that the heavy hand of the Federal government has been observed in providing lands for investors, regardless of the environmental impact and existing land use plan. Cases in point include the leather factories in Sululta and Sebeta and a textile factory in Sebeta. These factories are polluting the environment, and often do not comply with the environmental regulations. The health impact on human, animals, and plants are significant. Oromia‘s EPA experts are under mounting pressure, but implicit influence of the authorities and the imprisoned of some— 41


because they took measures in accordance with the existing environmental laws—account for the lax enforcement of existing laws. Direct phone calls from political elites rather than environmental laws are more powerful in getting things done in Oromia. Hence, the Oromo of Finfinnee and its vicinity have not only been uprooted but also polluted and subject to the risk of serious health problems.

Unremitting Socio-Political and Economic dominance of the Tigrian-Amhara Ethnonational groups Ethiopia has been led by the TPLF/EPRDF for the last two decades in a coercive, centralized, and unitary state manner with most power residing at the political center (Keller & Smith 2005; Ezikel 2008). The party is a coalition of four parties, though the other three have been considered as satellite parties. The TPLF has been the architect of major decisions in the country and is believed to continue doing so as a level playing field is not available for opposition politics (Merera 2002; Indian Ocean Time 2008; International Crisis Group 2009). The three parties constituting EPRDF can hardly pursue an equal footing with TPLF. The power grip of TPLF/EPRDF has manifested itself through the current self-declared democratic developmental state ideology, which believed to be in favor of a strong and dominant party ruling the country. The TPLF was originally formed to liberate the Tigrian nation; Manifesto of the TPLF, Vol. I, pg. 24, published Feb. 1976, which declared that the first task of the TPLF would be ―the establishment of an independent democratic republic of Tigray‖ (Paulos 2003; Aragawi 2008). They sought self-determination within Tigray, but with the passage of time and the achievement of victory in the field there was a broadening of these goals to encompass the liberation, administration, and the domination of the country. Getahun (2002) argues that since 1987 when the TPLF took over Tigray, the ideological thinking shifted to governing the whole of Ethiopia. And, whoever controls the capital city controls Ethiopia. The premise behind the argument is that the TPLF understood the deteriorated and impoverished Tigray could not be self-sufficient without dominating the political and economic institutions of Ethiopia. Indeed, the 2007 World Bank report estimated that party42


affiliated business and conglomerates controlled between 50-55% of the national economy. Party members virtually control all state organs and (civic) institutions. Hence, Addis Ababa is found to be the heart-land as it serves the nation as a center of growth, prosperity and modernization. Besides, the geographical location of the city makes it politically and economically strategic and central to the whole nation. Despite the federal government‘s multi-ethnonational composition, TPLF officers occupy the highest levels of decisionmaking while operating behind the scene. The TPLF‘s dominance is particularly evident in the armed forces and the National Intelligence and Security Office (Indian Ocean Times 2008). Democratic centralism, the dominance of the party apparatus behind the façade of regional and local autonomy, an extensive patronage system, and the use of force to silence opposition have severely hampered the genuine democratization process (International Crisis Group 2009). ANDEM, OPDO, and SEPDEM leaders have built their careers on personal links with their TPLF/EPRDF masters or bosses. The federal government directs regional governments (Tigray‘s case is exceptional) through these channels, assuring broadly uniform policy and law. Disloyal regional politicians are unable to remain in power. Regional EPRDF officials are regularly removed or disciplined by federal politicians. For example, following the TPLF split in March 2001, half of the OPDO central committee was expelled or defected to the OLF because of their association with the TPLF faction that Meles and his group ousted (International Crisis Group 2009). The TPLF has punished those who raised Oromo causes by labeling them as narrow-minded and/or terrorist. The act has made people too fearful to make inquiry about constitutional rights including article 49 (5). The victims of the so-called narrow nationalism within the OPDO include central committee members, former FDRE speaker of house of the parliament, ex-FDRE president, the head of Oromia Justice Bureau and many more. A recurrent method to silence critics is to accuse Oromos of being a member of or affiliate with the OLF. Unsurprisingly, Oromia has the country‘s highest level of reported human rights violations. An atmosphere of suspicion, intimidation, and fear prevails in Oromia and other regions (HRW 2013; 2014; International Crisis Group 2009). The TPLF has considered those Oromo rights to be within its domain of interest. From its track record, it is evident that TPLF exercises, without any restraint, every

43


advantage it has in order to control the Oromia government (Abiyu 2003). Moreover, since 2001, the TPLF/EPRDF has de-emphasized its regional and ethno-national identity (International Crisis Group 2009). Birhanu (2008) and Arriola (2011) also argue that the on-going ethno-national federal arrangement in Ethiopia is not genuine but rather serves as an apparatus for dominance. The federal system has been subverted by the ruling party‘s political monopoly. Because the state council of every region is controlled by the EPRDF or an affiliate, state leaders‘ tenure depends on the approval of the executive committee. Career concerns induce party members in ―elected‖ positions at lower levels of government to implement decisions handed down from Addis Ababa, thereby fusing party and government functions from top to bottom. The increasingly intertwined relationship between EPRDF party structures and federal institutions has bolstered the ruling party‘s influence at the local level (International Crisis Group 2009). Hence, the State of Oromia lacks the necessary autonomy to exercise its constitutional rights, and the article 49 (5) case falls under this category. The heavy hand of the central government on regions and the unconstitutionalzed political elites‘ relationships make the rule of law in the country a fiasco, specifically wherever the issue has political implication. The rule of law has been adhered to only when it favors the ruling party‘s opportunity to punish the opposition camp.

Weak Political Leadership and the Surrogate party in Oromia The Oromo people led an egalitarian collectivism way of life (Asmerom 2000, 216; Asafa 2010a, 44) as opposed to the hierarchical and tyrannical one prevailing in the social structure of the northerners (Jeylan 2006, 259). Despite, the fierce self-defending war that the Oromos fought against their northern conquerors, the final outcome, which has dictated the political, socio-economic, and cultural aspects of Ethiopia for so long, was not in favor of them. The war was partly institutional, and the hierarchical institution that was well equipped with European modern firearms won the game. Religion was also instrumental to the north-south war of the late 19th century Ethiopia with the northerners appealing to the Europeans using a Christian discourse (Asafa and Schaffer 2013). In addition, history informs us that since the first advancement of Menelik II‘s 44


force southward, there has been betrayal among Oromos. In northern Oromia, certain individuals among the Oromo betrayed their people and cooperated with Menelik‘s desire to take control of the Oromo land. Moreover, the Oromo institutional capacity to rebound from the disturbance imposed on them by the conquerors remains a point of debate in the sense that certain values and cultural elements appear to have disappeared in the areas where the northerners dominate. To date these values and cultural elements have seldom been openly restored. This signifies how much the Oromo institutions appear to have failed to ensure integrity among the people as it had been during the rule of one Gadaa system. On the other hand, the lack of a strong responsive political leadership in the Oromo nationalism movement has weakened the Oromos‘ quest for self-determination, democracy, and social justice (Asafa 2008). Since the beginning of the organized Oromo nationalism movement (1970s), its splitting into different factions signifies the lack of strong leadership (Vaguhan 1994; Abiyu 2003). Efforts to shape the direction and strategy of the struggle remain a grey area in the political struggle of the Oromo nation. For instance in early 1991, the representation of the Oromo nation in the conference to establish the TGE was fragmented into five oftenfractious forces—the OLF, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), the United Oromo People Liberation Front (UOPLF), the Oromo Abbo Liberation Front (OALF), and the OPDO (Abiyu 2003). Most of these organizations were nominal in character, lacking a sound political structure and clear ideology. These forces were scattered among the 27 council seats allocated to the Oromo nation while the sole representative of the Trigray, the TPLF, secured 32 seats (Vaguhan 1994; Abiyu 2003). Since the formation of the FDRE, Oromo-centered opposition political parties have continued to split, rather than joining hands to bring about the end of the long years of political, economic, and cultural subjugation of their people. A case in point is that of Oromo National Congress (ONC) led by Merea Gudina. In the post 2005 Ethiopia‘s parliamentary election, certain ONC members successfully conspired to ban their leader and some members from engaging in any party related activities. This led to the establishment of OPC by the banned former leader and members of ONC. Oromo-based opposition political parties have demonstrated political naiveté in an era when shrewdness and conspiracy have become the norm. 45


Asafa (2008) noted that the Oromo political weakness emerged as Oromos moved away from one gadaa republic and began to form autonomous gadaa governments in different parts of Oromia. He suggests human society is dynamic and all visions and strategies must be reevaluated and reinvented from time to time in order to enable the Oromo leadership to effectively respond to emerging conditions and opportunities. The growing level of infighting and the consequent lack of trust among the Oromo elites are the major obstacle in their effort to rationally claim the constitutional rights of the nation. Hence, the denied State of Oromia‘s interest on Addis Ababa can in part be attributed to the self-inflicted weakness of the claimant. If you ask any OPDO members why article 49 (5) has not materialized, the answer for sure will be the ‗OPDO always hesitate to claim because of power asymmetry within EPRDF and survival of the elites serving the interest of the dominant party, TPLF, in the coalition. However, the proper role of the federal government is to ensure the implementation of the constitution which holds today‘s Ethiopia together, though with arms, the political culture of the ruling party, the Oromo-phobic mentality of the Abyssinians developed over the centuries, and the weakness of the Oromo political leadership, the constitutional protection of the interests of the state of Oromia in Addis Ababa have not been implemented. Inherent in the failure of the state of Oromia to claim the implementation of the constitutional promise is the nature of the surrogate party, the OPDO. The party emerged as an illegitimate child born of the TPLF in 1990 (Vaguhan 1994; Joireman 1997; Abiyu 2003; International Crisis Group 2009; Arriola 2011). It was meant to strengthen the shifted political agenda of TPLF from liberating Tigray to ruling Ethiopia. For a long time, the OPDO was guided by TPLF assigned personalities like Solomon Tesfaye in any decisions made in Oromia (International Crisis Group 2009). The same source indicates that the Oromos and many others consider the OPDO as a TPLF puppet political party and portray its officials as opportunists. It is not considered to be a legitimate party in Oromia. Those who established the OPDO failed to ensure its legitimacy by providing covertly established benefit packages for those who would join it, while punishing those who refused. Historically, the OPDO was formed of military captives in 1990 (Vaguhan 1994; Joireman 1997; Abiyu 2003; Paulos 2003; International Crisis Group 2009). It never considered leading or taking part in the Oromo nationalist 46


movement against the absolute monarchy and tyrant military dictator. These regimes have been marked by the lingering political, economic, and cultural dominance of the Amhara-Tigrian ethno-national group. Had the former OPDO elites been operating with a fully awareness of the need for safeguarding the interest of Oromo nation, there would have been the possibility for it to join in with Oromo liberation front(s). Moreover, the psychology of captured soldiers of the weak and outgoing regime would be vulnerable because they were either escaping from war imprisonment or engaged in making decisions that would reduce their suffering. Another suggestion that accounts for its failure to work in the best interest of the Oromo people is that the OPDO‘s elites of the early period are thought not to be Oromo but rather descendants of the settlers from northern Ethiopia. This has been an issue in Oromo politics for the last two decades. In this context the likelihood of those party members operating with their own Oromo cause would be minimal. On the other hand, OPDO was busily engaged in gimgema (denunciation and self-denunciation) led by TPLF leaders through the 1990s. This was to refine the OPDO members as some of them had been suspected of being OLF sympathizers (International Crisis Group 2009). In the aftermath of the new millennia, the pervasiveness of the corruption of officials— because of the client patronage modality of members‘ recruitments and promotion in the TPLF/EPRDF politics—has become the central agenda. These two things kept the OPDO from dealing with other issues. The party is unable to be in a position to claim the interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa and the other rights of the people. Had the OPDO elites insisted on the provision of particulars of Article 49 (5), they would have been ostracized because, as Arriola (2011) states, their tenure has been in the hands of the TPLF/EPRDF. The relationship between the OPDO and the TPLF has never been and never will be on an equal footing. However, the International Crisis Group (2009) has asserted that in the post-2005 period, aware of their increased importance within the EPRDF, the OPDO and SEPDF are resisting TPLF interference in their regional states. It can hardly be fair to say that the OPDO was born out of the Oromo nationalist movement or stands in a position to guard the interest of the Oromo people. Rather, the party has been by and large accused of being opportunistic and lacking its own genuine agenda. 47


Its elites survive on the personal relationships they have developed with members of the TPLF. Hence, OPDO‘s concern over article 49 (5) may not different from other parties that make up the EPRDF. Nauseatingly, the party dared to shift the capital of Oromia to Adama in 2003. The state‘s revised constitution, Proclamation 46/2001 confirmed that Adama would be the capital city of Oromia. But, the 1997 Addis Ababa city charter indicated Oromia shall have the right to make Addis Ababa the capital city of the state. The OPDO was unwilling to act on such legal rights but rather collaborated with the TPLF in denial of the symbolic, cultural, political, and economic interests of the state of Oromia in Addis Ababa. During the time the caffee office moved to Adama, the Oromos all over the world were fiercely opposed. But, the result was the expulsion of 350 Addis Ababa University students from their studies for a year, the detaining the Maccaa-Tulamaa Association leaders, and finally banning the association as the previous regimes did. OPDO‘s basis of argument in favor of shifting the capital city of Oromia from Addis Ababa to Adama was that such a move would accelerate the urban development process in Oromia. However, various scholars (Getahun 2010; Asafa 2010) argue that the action is but a recent example of the historical pattern of depriving the Oromo nation of the opportunity to benefit from the fruits of cities. I also support the argument because it is clearly visible that many non-state capital urban centers throughout Ethiopia are developing, except those in Oromia. Despite the OPDO elites reluctance to insist on the enforcement of article 49(5) of the FDRE Constitution, there has been, on different occasions, a growing demand from the party‘s members for implementation of the article. The demand rose to a peak on two occasions: political evaluative training and the election period. The case in point was the hot debate held in the evaluative training of Justice Sector OPDO members in 2013 at Adama. Participants urged the leaders to provide on how article 49(5) was being implemented and said answers to their request were overdue. Their justification was that without enacting laws to implement article 49(5) it would be difficult to protect the interests of Oromia on Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, the OPDO elites leading the training have justified policies that constitute the State of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa. These were the same old stories which include Addis Ababa city Administration‘s provision of housing to OPDO officials (speaker of Caffee, bureau heads, advisors etc) in the city; the 48


provision of land for construction of the Oromo cultural center, offices, and schools (not yet constructed); and housing projects—the city administration took back one of the parcels of land that had been provided. The state of Oromia‘s capital city is Addis Ababa and the city also serves as the seat of Finfinnee and the surrounding Oromia special Zone. These are, however, a disingenuous response for the sake of diluting the hot debates on the issue rather than providing details about the real interests (political, economic, social, cultural and environmental) of Oromia in Addis Ababa.

Urban Planning and Heritage Protection as an Instrument The currently prepared ―Integrated Development Plan‖ for Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia special zone, extending 40-100 km radius around Addis Ababa, is scheduled for implementation over the next 25 years (2014-2038). According to the Project Office of Addis Ababa and the Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Plan (2013), the Planning Region, designated for the implementation of integrated development oiver the next 25 years, encompasses 17 rural districts and 36 urban centers including the capital, Addis Ababa. Total area of the Region is estimated to be 1.1 million hectares, of which the share of rural and urban areas amount to 85 percent and 15 percent respectively. However, this ―Integrated Development Plan‖ neither considers nor harmonizes its goals with the already existing and detailed Finfinnee Surrounding Special zone land use plan prepared by State of Oromia in 2009. This demonstrates a waste of resources and an abuse of the right of the State of Oromia. The ―Integrated Development Plan‖ preparation abruptly obtained blessings from the OPDO officials without taking into consideration its implication for the state of Oromia. Despite the growing political fear, Oromia officials, mayors, and experts have exhibited their dissatisfaction with the plan. The discontent has both a national and an international dimension, in the sense that the plan has faced serious criticism from Oromos all over the world, as well as OPDO officials and some urban planning and management scholars in Ethiopia and other countries. Because experts from the Oromia Urban Planning Institute (OUPI) and Finfinnee surrounding Special zone were ignored and/or nominally represented, it is difficult to conclude that the planning process was participatory. The participatory nature of the plan could be best represented by 49


Arnestien‘s (1969) Tokenism or Pretty‘s (1995) manipulative type of participation. The interim plan report, presented in June 2013 at Adama and from the reaction of experts and mayors from Oromia, testifies to the extent to which the process was not participatory. Subsequently, the issue has become more contentious as the project office held workshop and training of trainers at Adama town in March and April 2014 respectively. Among the major issues raised by participants from Oromia are: 1) the plan is centrally-imposed while the issue is intertwined with the identity of the Oromo nation; 2) it breaches the constitution articles 43 (2) and 89 (6) which stipulate that any development policy and plans shall be participatory; and 3) no thought is given to the interest of Oromia in the plan. The responses from the stage led by the OPDO elites labeled the participants who raised these issues as OLF agenda bearers. This is the card that is always played when Oromos challenge the exploitative political and economic system. The rejection of the plan during the Adama workshop and the training of trainers was followed by broad based protests in many parts of Oromia, in Addis Ababa, and in different parts of the world. Ethnic Oromo students in universities including Haromaya, Adama, Dire Dawa, Wollega, Mada Walabu, Jimma, Ambo, Addis Ababa, Bule Hora began their protest against the plan on 26th April 2014. Oromos in Burayu, Ginchi, Mida Kagni, Aambo, Gudar, Toke, Gida Ayana, Bako, Nekemte, Gimbi, Nejo, Mendi, Begi, Dembii Dolo, Aira Guliso, Matu, Jimma, Walisoo, Ijaji, Inango, Kuyu, Ganji, Qebe, Meta-Robi, Adola, and other places have demonstrated their disgruntlement with the ppoposed plan. High school students protests in many parts of Oromia have faced a crack down by government forces. While the protesters were unarmed and peaceful, the Ethiopian government forces fired real bullets and killed protesters indiscriminately, arresting and beating many. Intimidation and fear grows as the allegation of governmental scrutinizing of what it labeled ―anti-peace agents‖ spreads to different parts of Oromia. The number of deaths reported in Ambo town alone reached around fifty. On May 2, 2014 a witness in Ambo told the BBC that 47 were killed by the security forces. Other death reports come from Bale Robe, Haromaya, Nejo, Nekemte, Adama and other parts of Oromia. An explosion in the TV room in Haromaya University killed three students and injured 70. The number of deaths is likely to increase as

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the protests spread sporadically across Oromia, and there are significant numbers of lethally wounded protesters. Nonetheless, the government media have under-reported the number of deaths (11 deaths), and have emphasized the material destruction caused by the protests along with the usual fraudulent tool of blaming ―anti-peace and anti-development agents behind the scene.‖ Of course the EPRDF has a poor track record when it comes to the handling of peaceful protests; the responses, since 1992, have been by and large gunning people down. On the other hand, the master plan and the brutality of the government with regard to peaceful protesters has outraged ethnic Oromo in the diaspora in the US, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and other parts of the world. In addition, different opposition political parties within and and outside of Ethiopia (Unity for Justice and Democracy, Medrek-coalition of different ethnic based political parties, OLF, United Sidama Parties for Freedom and Justice) condemn the atrocity of the EPRDF on the actions of Oromos peacefully demanding to have their constitutional rights respected. Amid the growing Oromo protest against the master plan, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, visited Addis Ababa (on May 1, 2014) and startlingly turned a deaf ear to the cries of Oromos. However, the international community, including the EU, Human Rights Watch, and UN Human Rights Convention representatives of Botswana and Armenia, succinctly emphasize their concern over the situation in Ethiopia in relation to the issues of the freedom of speech and the handling of peaceful protests. Armenia credibly worries about the way the Ethiopian government responded to Oromos who were protesting against the master plan.1 1

For further information see the following sources: A Tragic Consequence of the ―10th Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan.‖ Warning for the Future, by Negaso Gidada on May 8, 2014; Killings in Ethiopia outrage Minnesota‘s Oromo community, by Ibrahim Hirsi, www.minnpost.com/community-sketchbook on May 8, 2014; The Indiscriminate Killings of Oromo University Students and Other Civilians by Ethiopian Security Forces is Deplorable! Press Release by United Sidama Parties for Freedom and Justice 'USPFJ' http://uspfj.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/the-indiscriminate-killingsof.html?m=1 on 7th May 2014; In choosing security over democracy in Ethiopia, U.S. will get neither: Kerry misses chance to press Addis Ababa on political liberalization, by Hassen Hussein, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/5/john-kerry-

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Hence, I argue that behind the scene of the ill conceived Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia Special Zone ―Integrated Development plan 2014-2038‖ there might be the strong hand of the federal government, and the OPDO elites did not bargain with them to have representative experts from Oromia fully engaged in the planning process. Undoubtedly they were not expecting the EPRDFled atrocity against the current peaceful protesters. The pragmatic nature of the TPLF/EPRDF (Vaguhan 1994) in continuously working to realize its own agenda counts more than the inputs of others. As a result, it always preaches a developmentalist ideology whenever state interests are tabled for discussion. At the same time, the party argues that the long-lasting quest of nationalism has been addressed by introducing federalism and thus the input of others is not necessary. This constitutes the ongoing marginalization and denial of power so the Oromos can develop within the structure and make decisions on the fate of the national project of modernization as it affects them (Bender cited in Getahun 2002). In most of the public plat forms and scientific studies it seems that the architects, social anthropologists and city planners have deliberately ignored the importance of restoring the heritage of the indigenous residents of Addis Ababa. For instance, it is usual to hear, watch, and read about the lost architectural and non-tangible heritage of Addis Ababa. But, none of those academic elites, architects, and planners describes the multiple benefit of restoring or having replicas of the lost heritage of the indigenous settlers. Rather, due emphasis has been given to a heritage that reflects only the European and Abyssinian cultures. The case in point is papers presented in the frequently organized events on urban issues and architectural heritage at Göthe Institute (German funded Institute in Addis Ababa). One may encounter strong critics who are labeled as parochial or narrow-minded in case s/he raises questions about ways to restore the lost heritage of indigenous settlers in the ethiopiaaddisababaoromostudentprotestspressfreedom.html May 2, 2014; Protests Grow Over Addis Ababa‘s Expansion http://oromoprotests.com/2014/05/protests-grow-over-addis-ababasexpansion/, May 7, 2014; Oromo Diaspora Mobilizes to Shine Spotlight on Student Protests in Ethiopia, by Amy Bergquistm, The Advocates Post, May 5, 2014; Ethiopia protest: Ambo students killed in Oromia state, BBC focus on Africa, May 2, 2014.

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area. In a multi-cultural society, an effort to restore, maintain, and promote heritages, like that of the Oromo who inhabited the land before the establishment of Addis Ababa, will help to maintain the identity of the people, add a color into the city, and contribute to tourism and development and enhance the income generated by this sector.

Conclusion In the process of building Addis Ababa, the Oromo culture, livelihood, and political institutions were sacrificed. Oromos view the city as the historical heartland of Oromia; they believe that the city was built with Oromo labor and resources. The Oromo, therefore, believe they are entitled to use the city‘s modern resources to develop their economy and culture (Getahun 2002). However, it is worth noting that the settlers, mainly from the north and few from the southern parts of Ethiopia, have also contributed to the course of Addis Ababa‘s development. Hence, it is logical to argue that the one who made the sacrifice needed to develop the city ought also reap the corresponding benefits resulting from the fruits of development in the city rather than by being evicted by social, economic, and political constraints. It has been demonstrated that the improvement that has been achieved in Addis Ababa was designed to benefit the occupiers rather than the original inhabitants (Getahun 2002; Asafa 2010a). The Oromo were excluded from integration into the urban economic, social, and politico-cultural developments in the city. Hence, the undelivered constitutional promise, article 49 (5), reflects the continuing denial of Oromo rights to benef from any development that happens in the capital city. The urban policies and structures still prohibit Oromos from becoming residents in the city. The current master plan of Addis Ababa and the surrounding area is worthy of mention. The integrated Development Plan completely lacks participation by the affected public at all levels; rather it can be best described as prescriptive plan that meets the goals of the EPRDF. The social, political and economic injustice that pervades the country has continued to throw up impediments to the use by the Oromo of their own institutional frameworks to promote change and to adopt aspects of modern science and technology in Addis Ababa. The same story is happening to towns surrounding Addis Ababa like Lega Tafo where one can observe that Oromo residents are becoming a minority in their own 53


town. The Oromos are being evicted in the name of investment, and as they have been so economically disadvantage that they can illafford to bid for the land lease and build villas. Unless immediate measures are taken, the problem does and will adversely affect the political situation of Ethiopia. The current protest against the Addis Ababa and Oromia Surrounding Zone ―Integrated Development Plan 2014-2038‖ reveals the continuous quest for the delivery of constitutional rights. Indeed, the brutal action the government takes against the peaceful protesters exposes the persistence of EPRDF orchestrated atrocity against the Oromos who are seeking democracy and justice. Given the horrible track record of Ethiopia regarding human right violations, the EPRDF has continued to shelve the series of reports released by Human Rights Watch that document the atrocities. I therefore argue that there is an urgent need to reform the multi-faceted exploitative political and economic institutions in Ethiopia. The state of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa cannot be solved without a major reform of the political economy of the country. As the historical portrayal of the Oromos has been stereotypical and they suffer from the continuous denial of rights, the situation has become dangerous when it comes to the coexistence of the Oromo and the occupiers of Finfinnee. There is an urgent need for deconstructing the historically-institutionalized systemic dominance of the Amhara-Tigray ethno-national groups in the city and nation. Hence, in order to consider the FDRE Constitution as the embodied social contract of all people, the government must be committed to ensuring a level playing field for an inclusive institutional establishment and the rule of law. The Oromos and other nations can only benefit from inclusive institutions and a democratic political setting. But, this requires a huge task on the part of the TPLF/EPRDF. It has to, in practice, shift from a polarized/cornered stance and adopt inclusive political thinking and practices. The use of intimidation and terror to frighten and stop people from demanding their constitutional rights like article 49 (5) and indeed article 39 (self-determination to secession) will exacerbate the situation. The brutal measures taken during the protests against the shift in State of Oromia capital and the current Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia Special zone ―Integrated Development Plan‖ will not stop people from demanding the constitutional rights.

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With inclusive political and economic institutions there will be room for looking for the best federal city governance model, one that ensures the state of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa. The interest is broader and constitutes political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors. Every federal country formed along ethnonational lines faces the difficult task in deciding how its capital city should be governed. The federal government wishes to control the capital, the residents wish to govern themselves to the greatest extent possible, and a state within which the capital is located needs its interests to be realized and protected (Rowat 1973; Harris 1995; Campbell 2003). There are three federal capital governance models, namely federal districts or territories within a federal system, capital cities that are city-states, and capital city within a state/province/other sub-national level of government (Wolman et al. 2007; Watts 2008; Slack & Chattopadhyay 2011). The federal district model depicts a capital city exclusively established in the jurisdiction of the federal government and with limited the fiscal autonomy of the city. In such contexts, there has been an overbalance of interest in favor of the federal government. Increasing conflicts on the basis of ideology (whenever there are different political parties dominating the federal government and elected local councils) and over legal boundaries as capital cities are featured by population spill over (e.g. Caracas, Washington DC, Mexico City) (Wolman et al. 2007; Watts 2008; Slack & Chattopadhyay 2011). City-states have combined local and state function and enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. This certainly ensures local self governance by avoiding any form of subservience to the federal government or any other state. The notable drawback of city-state model is similar with Federal district, rigidity of boundaries and population spill over that result in conflicts with adjacent state or settlements. Cities in this category may also face the problem of limited discretionary federal funding owing to constitutional parity with other states/provinces. Capitals of Germany (Berlin), Austria (Vienna), Belgium (Brussels) and Russia (Moscow) fall under citystate governance arrangement (Wolman et al. 2007; Watts 2008; Slack & Chattopadhyay 2011). A city within state represents a capital city under the jurisdiction of the state within which it is located. In most cases such capitals are situated in the largest member state and serve as the capital (Bern, 55


Basseterre and Abu Dhabi) of the state as well. Capital cities within state enjoy high autonomy and also addresses the problems of the two aforementioned models i.e. rigidity of boundaries and resultant conflicts (Watts 2008). Constitutionally, Addis Ababa falls under none of the aforementioned governance arrangements, however practically, as noted by Watts (2008), it resembles to the Federal district model. On the ground, the current governance arrangement cannot address the constitutional interests of the State of Oromia, within which Addis Ababa is situated; neither has it provided a sustainable solution to the frequent boundary conflicts with the surrounding Oromia‘s Special Zone. Hence, I argue that in an ethnonational federal system like Ethiopia where the State of Oromia holds special interests in the capital city and boundary issue results in frequent upheavals (which cost lives of many Oromos), the city within state model is an incredibly appropriate governance arrangement to be adopted. By employing bilingual policy in the city, the fear of cultural dominance of the governing state often mentioned in the Case of Bern and other multiethnic federal capitals will be solved. Besides, the state of Oromia unlike the past and present institutions will not govern to uproot cultures of others but rather to maintain equality and challenge the exploitative institutions. These might be possible if and only if there is level a playing field in Ethiopian politics where all parties have equal standing. In addition, there is a need to have functional check-and-balance of state-government power. In the current political context, it can hardly be possible to deliver the constitutional promise of the state of Oromia‘s interest in Addis Ababa.

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Feyisa Demie (1998). The origin of the Oromo: a reconsideration of the theory of the Cushitic roots. The Journal of Oromo Studies, 5( 1 &2):155-172 Frezer Eshetu Tegegn (2012) Physico-chemical pollution pattern in Akaki River basin, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Garson, J. G. (1896). ―On the Morphological Characters of the Abyssinians.‖ In J. Theodore Bent, The Sacred City of the Ethiopians: Travel and Research in Abyssinia in 1893. London: Longmans, Green and Co. https://archive.org/details/sacredcityethio00garsgoog retrieved on 20/01/2014 Gebru Tareke (1996). Ethiopia: power and protest: peasant revolts in the twentieth century. Red Sea Press. Getahun Benti (2000). ―The Dynamics of Migration to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and the Over urbanization of the City, c. 19411974,‖ Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University. ________(2002). A nation without a city [a blind person without a cane]: The Oromo struggle for Addis Ababa. Northeast African Studies, 9(3), 115-131. Greenfield, R. and Mohammed Hassen (1980). Interpretation of Oromo Nationalism, Horn of Africa 3(3). Hall, P.A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms Discussion Paper 96/6 June Harris, C. (1995). Congress and the Governance of the Nation‘s Capital: The Conflict of Federal and Local Interests, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Helmke, G. and Steven Levitsky (2006), Introduction, in: Gretchen Helmke, and Steven Levitsky (eds.), Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1‐30. Hultin, Jan (1996). ―Perceiving Oromo. ‗Galla‘ in the Great Narrative of Ethiopia‖. In: Being and becoming Oromo, ed. by P.T.V. Baxter, Jan Hultin, Alessandro Triulzi, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Huntingford, G. W. B. (1955). The Gala of Ethiopia: the Kingdoms of Keffa and and Janjero, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, London Indian Ocean Newsletter, 3 September 2008. International Crisis Group (2009) Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents Africa Report N°153 – 4 September 2009 59


Jeylan Wolyie Hussein (2006). A Critical Review of the Political and Stereotypical Portrayals of the Oromo in the Ethiopian Historiography, Nordic Journal of African Studies, 15(3): 256–276 Joireman, S.F. (1997) Opposition Politics and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: We Will All Go down Together. The Journal of Modern African Studies,35 (3): 387-407 http://www.jstor.org/stable/161748 . Accessed: 21/01/2014 Kenate Worku (2008). The Expansion of Addis Ababa and Its Impact on the Surrounding Areas: A Preliminary Study of the Nefas Silk Lafto District, Journal of Oromo Studies, 15 (2): 97131. Merera Gudina (2002). Ethiopia – Competing ethnic nationalisms and the quest for democracy, 1960-2000. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing Mohammed A. (2002). Industrial Pollution and Its Impact on the Little Akaki River, Msc Thesis, Faculty of Engineering, Loughborough University, UK. Mohammed Hassen (1990). The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 15701850, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ___________ (2008) [Review of Book Addis Ababa: Migration and the Making of A Multi-Ethnic Metropolis, 1941-1974, By Getahun Benti, Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2007.] Journal of Oromo Studies 15 (2):249-254 OPHCC (1987). The 1984 ―Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia Analytical Report on Results for Addis Ababa‖. Addis Ababa, Office of the Population and Housing Census Commission. ORAAMP (2002). Addis Ababa in Action: Progress Through Partnership City Development Plan 2001–2010 Executive Summary. Addis Ababa, Office for the Revision of the Addis Ababa Master Plan. Petrie, F. (1939).The Making of Egypt, London: The Sheldon Press. Pretty, J. (1995). Trainer‘s Guide for Participation Learning and Action, IIED participation Methodology series, London Pankhurst, R. (1985). The History of Ethiopian Towns from Midnineteenth Century to 1935, Stauttgart: Steinerverelagwiesbaden. Pawlos Milkias (2003). Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor. Northeast African Studies, 10(2): 1366. 60


Rowat, D. (1973). ―Introduction,‖ in Donald Rowat (ed.) The Government of Foreign Capitals, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Said A (2000). Assessment of little Akaki River water pollution. Final reports of Addis Ababa City Government Environmental Protection Bureau. Slack, E. & Chattopadhyay, R. (2011). Finance and Governance of Capital Cities in Federal system. Forum of Federations. Steinmo, S. (2001) The New Institutionalism in Barry Clark and Joe Foweraker, (eds.) The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, London: Routlege __________(2008). What is Historical Institutionalism? In Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating eds Approaches in the Social Sciences, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press Tamiru A, Dagnachew L and Tenalem A (2005).Hydrology, Water Quality and the Degree of Groundwater Valnerablility to Pollution in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. UNEP/UNESCO/UNHabita/ECA, Addis Ababa. Tahal Consultant Group (2005). Addis Ababa Water Supply Project. Final design report. Executive Summary. Addis Ababa. Tegenge Gebre Egziabher. (2000). Perspectives and Issues of Urban Development in Ethiopia, Working Paper No.10, RLDS. Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa University. Thelen, K. & Sven Steinmo (1992). Historical institutionalism in Comparative Politics in Kathleen Thelen , Sven Steinmo & Frank Tomkins, Henry (1889). Remarks on Mr. Flinders Petrie‘s Collection of Ethnographic types from the Monuments of Egypt, The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 18 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2842420retrieved: 20/01/2014 Trimingham, J. S. (1952). Islam in Ethiopia, London Tsega Etefa (2008). Pan-Oromo Confederations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Journal of Oromo Studies 15 (2): 19-40. UN-Habitat (2008). Addis Ababa Urban Profile. United Nations Human Settlements Programme Van der Beken, C. (n.d). Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia. Van Rooijen & Taddesse (2009).Urban sanitation and wastewater treatment in Addis Ababa in the Awash Basin, Ethiopia.34th 61


WEDC International Conference on Water, sanitation and hygiene: sustainable development and multi-sectoral approaches, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Vaughan, S. (1994). The Addis Ababa transitional conference of July 1991: its origins, history and significance. Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University. Watt, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. 3rd ed. Institute of Intergovernmental Relation. MacGill queens University Press Wolman,H., Jan Chadwick, Ana Karruz, Julia Friedman and Garry Young (2007). Capital cities and their national governments: Washington, D.C. in comparative perspective. Working Paper 30. George Washington Institute of Public Policy. Zeleke G, Trutmann P and Denekew A (2007). Fostering New Development Pathways: Harnessing Rural-urban Linkages (RUL) to Reduce Poverty and improve Environment in the Highlands of Ethiopia. Proceedings of A planning workshop on Thematic Research Area of the Global Mountain Program (GMP), Addis Ababa, Global Mountain Programme. Zerfe Mersha (2011). ―The problem of Pollution in Addis Ababa‖ In Nurturing the Future Generation Proceedings of Environmental Awareness creation Workshop to 20 high schools in Addis Ababa. Panos Ethiopia and Henerich Boll Stiftung, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Zerayakob B and Zeru G. (1999). Industrial Waste Management and the Pollution of Akaki River. A paper presented on Situation Analyses Workshop on Akaki River Pollution, Amharic , ENDA Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Proclamation No. 7/1992 A Proclamation to Provide National/Regional Self-Governments Establishment Proclamation No. 46 / 1994 Oromia Regional State Government Revised Constitution Proclamation No. 87/1997 Addis Ababa City Administration charter Proclamation No. 311/2003 Addis Ababa City Administration Revised charter Proclamation No. 361/2003 Addis Ababa City Administration Revised charter

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Land Dispossession and its Impacts on the Bako Woreda Oromo Community of Western Oromia, Ethiopia Yonas Tesema Amaya*

Abstract Recently, the world experienced an unprecedented skyrocketing of the cost of living in terms of food and energy prices. To cope with these challenges, countries primarily from Asia and the Middle East and developed countries resorted to what is popularly dubbed as “land grabbing.” In other words, both developed and developing countries are striving to enhance their food and energy security through access to land resources elsewhere. The situation has resulted in a dramatic increase of the scale of investment in less developed countries including Ethiopia. Ethiopia, as one of the destinations for international land dealers, is providing huge chunks of land to foreign investors without recognizing local people’s rights to the land. The government’s rationale for the promotion of this investment policy is to end poverty, create job opportunities, and boost food security, though the reality *

Yonas Tesema Amaya holds a BA in History from Dire Dawa University and Masters in Social Anthropology from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. He is currently lecturer at Dire Dawa University. Yonas‘s research interests include globalization vis-à-vis land, environment and investment, and customary land use rights.


goes beyond the assumption. Accordingly, the Ethiopian government delivered 11,704.33 hectares of land from Bako Tibe Woreda1, west Oromia to Karuturi Global2 in 2008. The leasing of land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele3 of Bako Tibe Woreda to Karuturi provoked conflict between the local community and the government. While the government claims that the land leased to the Indian company has not been used, the local community, on the other hand, is arguing that the land has always been theirs and is being used. Indeed handing over lands to investors in Ethiopia without the consultation with and participation of the local community is sparking conflict between the local community, on one hand, and the government and the investors on the other. This article tries to shed some light on these issues.

Introduction Recently, the Ethiopian government has leased huge tracts of land to foreign investors. The government claims that the lands it has leased to the foreign investors are those that are ―unused.‖ The government used this justification when it leased a large tract of land to the Karuturi Agro products PLC, a branch of Karuturi Global, in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele, Bako Tibe Woreda West Shewa Zone of Oromia. The local community residing in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele vehemently contests the government‘s justification. Instead, they argue that they have used the land for a long time. They claim that the land was put to various material and non-material uses before the advent of the Karuturi Global. Basing their argument on such uses, the local residents claim that the land belongs to them. In this rapidly globalizing world, the national borders of many less developed countries have increasingly become permeable to the flow of capital from rich but resource deficient countries. This trend has increased the market value of land through the commoditization it enacts. Many factors has facilitated this state of affairs and resulted in land grabbing in many less developed countries. In Ethiopia, huge tracts of land that formerly were used by local communities, in one way or another, have been transferred to foreign investors under the banner of promoting national development. This has been done primarily through redefining the land and its users. When the land formerly used by a local community is redefined as ―unutilized‖ land, its former users are branded as ―squatters‖ so that they cannot make legal claims to the land that has been leased to the investor. This inevitably brings about a conflict between the interest of the local community on one hand and the state and the foreign investors on 64

LAND DISPOSSESSION AND ITS IMPACTS

the other. The local community usually loses the land and suffers many negative consequences. Despite this unbalanced power relationship between the local community and the state and investors, the local community resists the loss of their land and its resources both through open revolt and through what James Scott (1985) called ‗everyday form of resistance.‘ This is what happened in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele of western Oromia. The data in this article was collected from December 2012 to February in 2013 in the form of fieldwork. Interviews, focused group discussions, informal discussions, case studies and observations were extensively used. Many subjects were involved in the research, including grassroots communities, farmers (men and women), elders, youth, and government officials at different levels of the state structure. Before carrying out fieldwork for this article, I prepared an interview guide on the issues to be covered. I followed the interview guides which oriented the direction of the interview and focused group discussions. Informants were selected from the government officials, mainly at Oromia Regional State and Bako Tibe Woreda investment offices, as well as from the company and from four of the villages which were more adversely affected by the investment project than others since the land under investment is found in an area central to these villages1 Accordingly, I interviewed twenty informants from the community, one from the company and one each from the Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development office, Investment Desk office, and Land and Environmental Conservation Affairs office as well as one from Oromia Investment Commission office. I interviewed the manager of the company and officials after I had interviewed the local community. I had around four key informants who I interviewed more than once. They were selected because they were among the representatives of the community who appealed the case to the relevant government offices. All together, twenty five informants were interviewed through this method. During my initial trip to the field, people were afraid to provide me with relevant information assuming that I would reveal their identity to the authorities. However, after some weeks and many discussions they began to ask me whether my study would resolve the problems or if I would simply get them into trouble. After I assured them that I would not use their names in my report, they 1

These are Tullu Sa‘a, Qiltu Gada, Goromti and Milmil villages.

65


provided me with all the relevant data. Accordingly, I analyzed the information provided and used it in this article. Because of the sensitivity of the issues involved, informants have been kept anonymous as per their request. I used pseudonyms to safeguard the identity of the informants.

Local Uses of the Land prior to Acquisition by Karuturi The local people have historically used the land acquired by Karuturi for a wide variety of purposes. The land was used to provide them with forest and water resources. They used the plant resources to provide them with medicinal plants, firewood, and wood for house building and plough parts. They also used the area for beekeeping as well as farming and grazing. The local residents value the land not only for its material products but also for its non-material or symbolic aspects. They have developed an emotional attachment to the land over time. They see the land currently under investment as the land of their ancestors and they believe that they have the responsibility to pass the land on to the coming generation. According to them, the land of their ancestors serves them both when they are alive and after they have died. In the past, part of the land given to build a residence was used by the local residents as a burial ground. Of particular importance in this regard is a place called Tullu Sa‘a. The ancestors of the people in the village of Tullu Sa‘a were buried over a long period of time. However, after the government gave the land to Karuturi, the company bulldozed the cemetery of the ancestors of the local residents and built a residence for the company‘s foreign staff. The people of the area were highly enraged over this. Moreover, the space over Tullu Sa‘a where the residence for the Karuturi staff is currently located is considered as the abode of ayyaanaa or abdaarii (spirit). Prior to the fencing of the area by the company, the followers of Oromo indigenous religion (Waaqeffannaa) went there and prayed. They prayed for fertility, rain, productivity, peace and prosperity and make rituals. Once a year, they conducted rituals under odaa, a tree found at the top of the Tullu Sa‘a hill.

Competing Valuation of Land Use? The Ethiopian government transferred about 11,704.33 hectares of 66


land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele of Bako Tibe Woreda to the Karuturi Agro Products PLC in May 2008. The justification the government provided for transferring this land to the Indian Company was based on the premise that this land was ―unutilized.‖ However, the local residents of the Kebele had used the land in many different ways until it was given to Karuturi. They bitterly disagree with the government‘s characterization of the leased land as ―unutilized.‖ For them, the land is not only an economic resource which they use to derive livelihood resources but also is a place with cultural, spiritual, and symbolic significance. At this point, it is important to ask some questions: Why did the government redefine the land that had been used by the local people for significant period of time? What does ―unused land‖ mean? When is it that a piece of land is considered unused? Whose perspective matters in defining certain land as unused? These are some of the questions that beg answers when one discusses the issue of lands designated as ―unused,‖ like in the case of the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele. To begin with, why did the government define the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele as unused when in fact the local community had been using the land for various material and non-material uses? Here, one can argue that the difference in the characterization of this land between the local community and the State seems to be the result of different ways of valuing land. In other words, it is a matter of difference in perspective. From the perspective of the local community, the land had already been under use for generations. That is why they claim that the land belonged to their ancestors and feel that they have the responsibility to transfer it to their children. Viewed from this perspective, it means that the local community has ancestral and familial ties to the land. This is one way of valuing the land. Related to this perspective is the idea that this land has served as a cultural, spiritual, and symbolic resource for many generations. This land contains a sacred site where religious rituals were carried out. This land is also full of the revered Odaa (sycamore) trees under whose protective shelter social and cultural events were carried out. In addition, this land was the source of many material resources that supported the livelihood of local community. The local community used to have both communal and private access to the livelihood resources there. It is from all these points of view that the local community sees the land as being actively used and argues that it belongs to them. 67


From the perspective of the government, the land at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele seems to have been labeled as ―unutilized‖ because the land was not being used to produce the maximum potential economic benefits. I discerned this from what the officials working in the agricultural office of the Woreda repeatedly said during my interview with them4. They stated that the aim of the government was to make this land more productive and bring about development. The investor also values the land in the same way. From the investor‘s perspective, his major goal is to alleviate the global and African food crisis by transforming ―wastelands‖ into food plantations.5 Based on the perspectives of the government and the investor, one can equate the term ―unused‖ (i.e. the land in the Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele) with the word ―underutilized.‖ Thus one can argue that the characterization of the land as unused does not indicate the absence of local use of the land in multiple ways but rather reflects a different ways of valuing how land ―should‖ be used. The issues I have raised so far can be recapitulated by Braun and Meinzen-Dick‘s (2009: 2) argument that: … the land leases are justified on the basis that the land being acquired by the foreign investor is ―unproductive‖ or ―underutilized‖.... However, there is some form of land use, often by the poor for purposes such as grazing animals and gathering fuel wood or medicinal plants. These uses tend to be undervalued in official assessments because they are not marketed, but they can provide valuable livelihood sources to the poor. Large-scale land acquisitions may further jeopardize the welfare of the poor by depriving them of the safety-net function that this type of land and water use fulfils.

As the citation above reveals, the government and the Karuturi‘s valuation of the land at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele is done in terms of the effective exploitation of the potential of the land to increase the market value one gets from it. From this perspective, what matters is not the existence of prior use of land, but the extent to which it can be productive in terms of market values. This is what Da Via (2011: 10) calls a ―capital-centric ‗assessment‘ of the productivity rather than [the] existence of resource uses.‖ The idea is that the transfer of such ―unproductive‖ lands from local users to foreign investors facilitates ―transfer of land rights from less to more efficient producers‖ (Ibid). It is clear that lands communally owned by local community usually 68


fall prey to such designations as ―unused‖ land, ―marginal‖ land, ―underutilized‖ land, etc. To whom do the commons belong also usually involves contentious debates. I used the term communal in the sense of Alden Wily‘s (2011: 4) definition: Commons may be defined by the fact of their communal ownership; that they are acknowledged (at least in customary or common law) as being the shared property of a definable group of persons. Shared property in this instance means property held in undivided shares (common property or common hold), whether or not recognized in statutory law.

As discussed above, the local community in the area claims that the land is their common property in view of the non-material and material benefits it provides. I agree with Peters (2009) that the characterization of certain lands simply as communal conceals many facts. This is specially the case in Africa. In lands that are described as communal, one can also see private use of land. In other words, the communal ownership of resources does not automatically extinguish private rights. In the case of the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele, one can see this fact. Even though the land is communally owned, some portion of it was still used by private farmers. For instance, even though the local people communally own the resources on the land, the ownership of beehive trees is private. In short, one can observe multiple use rights even in lands that are communally owned. Another interesting thing about communal land is that local community usually claims rights to communal land in terms of customary uses because they have customarily been using the land, but they do not have land certificates to it. When the government carried out the land registration in 2008 in the area, the land was not registered and certified. Some farmers who cultivated some of the communally owned land made tried to get a certificate for the land they plough, but they were unsuccessful. The state officials told the farmers that black soil (koticha) land of the area was not subject to registration and the land cultivated by the local farmers does not belong to them. The local officials further asserted that the farmers were unlawfully ploughing the land that is not theirs. The farmers on their part argue that the government officials refused to measure the land and give them certificates, not because the land is black soil, but because the officials were preparing the land for investment. They further argue that in the adjacent Woredas, farmers were given 69


certificates on black soil land while the Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele farmers were refused the registration of the land by the state. To ascertain the claims of the peasants, I went to the Office of Agriculture and Rural Development of Bako Tibe Woreda and they told me the same thing. According to them, the Oromia Regional Government Agricultural Bureau told them that they should not register and certify koticha land. When I asked them why, they advised me to refer to Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation No. 130/2007. However, the stated proclamation says nothing about the registration of koticha soil. In fact, the officials did not deny the fact that the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele was prepared for investment before the registration of land in the area. By the time of land registration in the area, the officials already notified the size and location of the land currently under investment to the West Shewa Zone and Oromia Investment Commission Bureau hierarchically. It means that the land had already added to the land portfolio of the investment land bank. By the time the officials were measuring the land to notify the zonal and regional authorities, they told the locals that the communally owned land should not be registered and certified in individual names. If that happens, the locals were told, they would pay a huge land tax. Desiring not to pay more tax but to have access to its use, the people did not insist for on measurement at first. I contacted one of the five farmer‘s representatives who was trained by the Woreda and participated in the land measurement process. He told me that they did what the officials told them to do. Now the locals of the Kebele regret that they did not insist on the measurement and registration of the land. From the very outset had they known that they were being cheated by the state agents into believing that the land should not be registered in their names because the tax amount they would be paying was huge, they would have acted differently. At the time, the local community was told that the land would be reserved for communal use as before. For the officials, it is easy to describe a certain land as unused land when it is not registered in the name of individuals in spite of the local people‘s historic and continued use of it. When later the people refused the transfer of the land to the Indian Company, an official told them that: ―This land does not belong to you. You have no certificates on it. If it is yours, show us your certificates. It is state land, and the government delivered the land to the developmental 70


investor.6‖ The official whom I talked to also confirmed this stand: The local people encroached on to the land and ploughed it knowing well that the land does not belong to them. The land was an open pasture where everybody was using but did not belong to anybody. Because of the population pressure and infertility of the adjacent lands (borqaa’uu lafaa), the farmers stretched their holdings to the land. Using the land and its resources does not mean that the land is theirs7.

This means that using the land does not guarantee that one owns the land. One has to have legal certificate/title to it. On the basis of this, the status of the land and its users were redefined at once. The land was described as public land and soon given a status as ―unused‖ and the former use of the land by the community became illegal. The former users were at once transformed into ―squatters‖ despite their occupancy of the land from time immemorial. In line with this, Deininger et al (2012: 106) disclose the existence of gap in land property valuation in the country: Gaps and problems in property valuation are widespread. A contributing factor is the absence of a uniform system of land valuation in line with Ethiopia‘s land tenure system. This uniformity can best be achieved by creating a specialized institution to set guidelines for land and property valuation in urban and rural areas.

The measures that the government took seem to contradict the government‘s own claims. State official8 claims that forest land, village grazing area, and existing farms are to be excluded when delivering land to investors. It is vacant, not owned and unused land that has to be given instead. The government also uses this same rhetoric to attract foreign investors to the country. In Ethiopia, ―all land allocations recorded at the national investment promotion agency are classified as involving ―wastelands‖ with no pre-existing users‖ (Da Via 2011: 9). So, one can see that branding land as ―unused‖ is important in attracting foreign investors because that designation as ―unused‖ serves to create the impression that this country has reserve lands worth investing on them. Such strategy of branding of lands to attract foreign investors has now spread to many African countries (Ibid). The characterization of investment lands in 71


Ethiopia as ―terra nullius,‖ a sort of no man‘s land, is part of that. Now a days, ―States use cosmographies of power and terra nullius narratives to remake places identified as empty, underutilized or unproductive‖ (Makki and Geisler 2011: 1).

Land Deal Actors There was little or no participation of the local community in the process of the land deal that finally resulted in the transfer of the land to the Karuturi. Almost all of the deal was made between the Karuturi and the State officials. The land deal was conducted at federal government level because it is the mandate of the federal government to process and deliver land whose size is more than 5,000 hectares. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution gives the mandate of administration and allocation of rural lands to Regional States. Accordingly, article 52(2) (d) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution gives Regional States the powers and functions to administer land and other natural resources in accordance with Federal laws. However, Ministry of Agriculture has recently established an Agricultural Investment Support Directorate to administer the allocation of rural lands measuring 5000 and above hectares. This sharply contradicts the constitution, and utmost unconstitutional. Article 50 (9) provides that Federal government can delegate the mandate given to it under the constitution to Regional States but there is no provision in the constitution that permits for upward delegation of the mandates of the Regional States to Federal government. The Regional Government‘s role was to provide the ‗unused‘ land to the federal government land bank. Accordingly, the Karuturi and Federal Government processed the deal and informed the Oromia Investment Commission Office to take down the deal to the Woreda level. Oromia Investment Commission and the Karuturi signed the contractual agreement without prior consent of the local people. It was later that the Woreda officials were told to execute the deal. This might be indicative of what Anseeuw et al (2011: 49) stated as ―decision-making and negotiations for land deals usually happen behind closed doors. Only rarely do local landholders have say in such negotiations‖. The procedure of land identification and allocation for investment goes like this: The Woreda surveys and identifies land for investment and informs the Zone about the appropriateness of the 72


land with its size and location from the town of the Woreda. The Zone reports to the Oromia Investment Commission and then Oromia Investment Commission hands it to the federal land bank hierarchically. Accordingly, it was a Woreda ―expert‖ who surveyed the land and identified as investment land. According to Bako Tibe Investment Office, the Woreda officials knew nothing after the survey of the land by the Woreda expert and submission of the land to the federal land bank on behalf of Oromia Investment Commission9. They claim that they were ordinary agents of Regional and Federal governments‘ orders. Federal and Regional concerned officials went to the Woreda to order the investment desk to facilitate and implement the land allocation to the investor. It was after these processes and agreements were signed between the investor and government that the Woreda officials, as well as, local community were informed. One can see that the processes that resulted in the transfer of the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele to Karuturi followed a top-down approach. The Bako Tibe Woreda and Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele officials assigned few individuals as ―representatives‖ of the local people and gave them the mandate to convince the people that the land has been given to the investor to promote investment and development and that would benefit the community. That was part of the effort to persuade the community to accept the investment. However, the community refused the persuasion attempts of the ―representatives‖. The community claimed that the people who claimed to represent them were not their genuine representatives. They simply accepted what officials told them and failed to voice community‘s questions and concerns. If the local community‘s claim is true, the people who were selected to represent the community had no farmland in the area given to the Karuturi and, thus, could not envision the future impact of the project and were easily deceived by the officials. The officials told the ―representatives‖ that the investment would bring enormous benefits to the nation as a whole and that it would create job opportunity for the community‘s children. But the ―representatives‖ were not successful to accomplish their mission smoothly. The larger part of the community from villages of Goromti, Milmil, Tullu Sa‘a and Qiltu Gada opposed the implementation of the project. What one of my focus group discussants said seemed to confirm the absence of popular participation in the deal: 73


We lost our lands and our resources. We were not included in policy discussions and land deals. We lacked consultation on matters attaching our own livelihoods. We became aliens in our own land and to ourselves because the people who participated in the deal did not represent the whole community10.

The process through which land deal had taken place between officials and the investor clearly contradicts article 43 (2) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia‘s constitution, which states the right of nationals to participate in national development process and the right to be consulted about projects that affect them. The procedure fell short of fulfilling this constitutional provision, and conflict resulted. I will elaborate this point.

From Persuasion to Conflict In the beginning, the state officials told the people that the parcel of land to be given to Karuturi was not the one that was found near their villages. They were told that it was the one found at a distance situated towards the Gibe River. They attempted to convince the people that the aim of the investment project was to transfer knowledge by facilitating learning from each other, to share experience by farming side by side, and to teach the people how to work hard with the result of producing more crops through exposure to a modern farming system. The community was told to continue farming as they previously had done and that the investor would not take them off their lands. The government informed the people that the company had to start from Gibe River onwards i.e., from Gibe River towards the community‘s farms. The investor, however, began clearing the field and farming the area from the opposite direction. The company‘s bulldozers and excavators started clearing the land during the time when the harvested and piled xaafii and niger seed were on the land. The local community resisted the company because it started to plough the land in the wrong direction, from the community‘s land towards the Gibe River instead of the opposite. When the people resisted the clearing of the land, the project manager of the company phoned the Woreda officials, informing them that the local people were inhibiting ―the nation‘s development by hampering the company from working well.‖ The Woreda police office immediately sent police officers who arrested many people 74


whom they called ―conflict provokers.‖ All my focus group discussants agreed that the company started from wrong place and that they attempted to resist it accordingly. What one of the discussants expressed represents the views of all: The company encroached upon our land. We protested so as to move the investor‘s dozers away from our land. We requested the investor to start farming from the side of Gibe River as we were told by the state officials. The investor didn‘t even listen to us and they undermined us. The company thinks that the community does not understand the advantage of the project and that we were only motivated by some people they say were conflict provokers. We tried to resist but we failed because of the Woreda police. They detained some people and intimidated us. Regardless of our attempt, we lost and the company won. We will see what will happen in the future.11

After bringing the local community protest under control and arresting some people, my respondents said the Woreda officials sought to intimidate the community saying: ―Your case will not be seen by domestic people. It is seen by people coming from the investor‘s country. You are illiterate and cannot meet with them. If you continue resisting you will be harmed.‖ This indicates the extent to which the officials undermine and look down on the local people and force them to not ask for their rights. The company faced one of continuous resistance, both overt and covert, when it cleared Tullu Sa‘a. It is a sacred place that is revered by members of the local community who come there to pray. As its name indicates, Tullu Sa‘a is a high ground amid the low lying field. After two weeks consecutive resistance by the people, the company took control of Tullu Sa‘a one day when the community around went to mourn the death of a well-known elder in the Kebele. Only children were at home. On that day, the police were sent from the Woreda to accompany the company‘s bulldozers on the way to Tullu Sa‘a. There, they built a residence for the company‘s expatriate officials. When the people returned from mourning, they found that Tullu Sa‘a hill had already been bulldozed and its plant cover removed. Some sobbing people tried to express their opposition but police arrested them and erected a fence around the cleared land. The experiences of people in other African countries show that the disgracing of sacred sites of a community can sometimes result in 75


unintended consequences. For instance, in Madagascar in 2008, when the government leased lands, on which culturally significant tombs of kings existed, to the Daewoo company of South Korea, the peoples‘ opposition broke out and contributed to the ousting of the country‘s leader (Abbink 2011: 524). Therefore, non-economic aspects of land should not be ignored when leasing land to investors. In addition to other uses, the local people‘s opposition to the clearing of Tullu Sa‘a is symbolic. Tullu Sa‘a is a high ground and it was on this high ground that the expatriate staffs of the company dwell. When the local people express their grievance about this state of affair they usually say ―they sat on our head and look us down,‖12 which means the company‘s officials‘ residence on that high ground connotes their higher position vis-à-vis the local community. Having seen the local people who are disappointed and infuriated at the loss of their land and its material and non-material uses, an official from the Agriculture and Rural Development office of the Woreda is said to have commented ―Re’een utuma iyyituu qalamti‖13 (A goat will be slaughtered despite it laments). This clearly reveals that whether the people got infuriated and disappointed or not, the land would be given to the company. I have asked some officials if they knew about the sacred place at Tullu Sa‘a and they said no. Despite intimidation by the authorities, the local people continued to resist the implementation of the project. Consequently, some of them faced three months imprisonment because the government agents politicized the issue. Here is one case that illustrates my point: I have no other land from which to feed my children than the land given to the investor. I have six children. I have been feeding them all by the produce I got from the land. Rather than family consumption, I also used to sell the rest of the crop to buy household equipment and pay government tax and my children‘s school stationery. I have no other income than the crop left from household consumption. Losing my land is, therefore, losing food and income. Missing my land is missing my life. Upon their coming, the investor and the state officials told us that we can plough the land as before and share experience with the investor. But when they started to farm my land, I requested that they not do it but they refused and then I expelled them with my fellow farmers for the time. They described me as a ‗conflict provoker‘ and ‗peasant motivator‘ towards the project as well as the ‗inhibitor‘ of national development. Consequently, I was arrested and imprisoned for three months in Ambo. Today, I am in trouble

76


and face a miserable situation in trying to feed my children. The government claims that the project changes our life and the nation at large in terms of food security and income generation. My life has been transformed from food-self-reliant to food-insecure because of the loss of the land. I don‘t see the project changing our life for the better. Rather, it is deteriorating our lives14.

In addition to physically resisting the loss of their land, the locals also tried to appeal to the officials. The community‘s representatives from Tullu Sa‘a, Qiltu Gada, and Goromti and Milmil villages regularly appealed to the relevant offices to complain about the situation after the land was given to Karuturi. The Woreda officials told them that the order to transfer the land had come from higher authorities and that the local administration did not have the power to change the decision. They were only able to implement what they are ordered to do. Consequently, seven elders from the villages went to the Oromia Investment Commission Bureau in Finfinne15 to explain their grievances. The elders also presented the community‘s petition.16 However, their appeals fell on deaf ears. The Oromia Regional State directed the elders back to the Agriculture and Rural Development office of West Shewa Zone by warning them to follow the hierarchical path of the federal structure and not to complain again against nation‘s development. Zone officials themselves also warned the community‘s representatives. The West Shewa Zone officials told the elders that the officials managed to attract the investor who would have otherwise invested in Gojjam.17 They forced the elders to go back to their villages. When we hear that the land deal was made between the Federal government and the investor, and the involvement of Regional government was minimal, we can say that the officials were simply deceiving the elders. A team of ‗experts‘ from the Agriculture and Rural Development Office of the Zone went to the area along with Woreda officials and the investor to investigate the status of the land under claim and they did nothing to address the concerns of the local community.

The Impact of Land Acquisition a)

Farming Land

As a result of the transfer of the land in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele to Karuturi, the local community‘s access to farming and grazing 77


resources on that parcel has been banned. All the trees on the land have been cleared and the people have lost all the material benefits they used to derive from the area. In the community under study there was no physical eviction and relocation of the people from the site. However, the investment restricted their access to the livelihood resources provided by the communal land. The loss of farming land was described by the informants as the biggest challenge they ever faced. Local farmers used to plant xaafii and niger seed for household consumption and sale in the local market, respectively. As a result of the loss of the land, their livelihood is affected. As a way to survive, they resorted to sharecropping, renting land, and cultivating land elsewhere. Almost all farmers who were ploughing the land currently under investment are participating in the land rent and sharecropping system in order to feed their children and lead their life. In the context of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia‘s constitution, land is not subject to sale and mortgage. Because of this, farmers who have enough land but lack the resources needed to plough the land are facing a difficulty. They have enough amount of land to feed their families if it is properly ploughed and used but they are lacking draft oxen to do so. As a result, they are forced to give their land to the relatively richer, more able person through a land rent contract and sharecropping arrangement. Land rent and sharecropping are quite different arrangements. The former requires a cash payment to the land owner for who then transfers his use-rights to the one who rents the land while the latter provides a share of the crop to the land owner after the harvest. Landless farmers who have the necessary cash to pay the farmer who has available land, leases the land for three years on contractual basis as per the rule of the Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation No.130/2007 article 10(2). The amount of money paid per hectare is based on the agreement of the lessee and the lessor. The farmers who lost their farm land and have the money needed to cash rent the lands are using land rent mechanism. The sharecropping agreement is held between the landowner and sharecropper supported by the parties‘ signatures and containing terms of agreement on the future share of the crop based on the provided inputs for agricultural purposes by the parties. The sharecropping agreement is, therefore, written and signed from the outset and given to the landowner and sharecropper. Mostly, the 78


written agreement is used if the parties are not relatives. Therefore, the landowners with no draft oxen, physically disable person with no labor and animal power, and women-headed household with no labor and draft oxen are sharecropping with the farmers who have labor and draft oxen but have lost their access to land as a result of Karuturi project. Although the sharecroppers worry about the loss of their ability to use their land, they extol God for the existence of land rent and sharecropping. That is why one of my informants says ―Had it not been for sharecropping and land rent, we would have died two deaths.”18 The idea is that they have died symbolic death first at the loss of the land leased to Karuturi and the second death would have been the loss of any means of survival. Local farmers who were deprived of their previous farmland became sharecroppers. The scarcity of farmland and the competition among the sharecroppers to get land for sharecropping have changed the trends of sharecropping in the area. Previously, the production was shared between the landholder and sharecropper after the harvest. Today, this trend has changed to what is locally called jalakennii (payment in advance).19 The sharecropper gives a certain amount of cereal to the land owner before farming the land so as to win in the competition for sharecropping. Landless peasants are competing to get sharecropping land by means of jalakennii. This is done some months before sowing season. As a result the poorer people who cannot afford to pay in advance are getting out of the game of land rent and sharecropping.

b)

Grazing Land

The people of the study area traditionally kept livestock like cattle, goats and sheep. As a result of the Karuturi project they have been denied access to their traditional grazing lands. Their access to the watering point is also severely restricted. The plot of land left for grazing is not sufficient for the number of livestock grazing on it and as a result it has now become overgrazed. The company does not even allow the community cattle to graze on its crop residues. The leasing of the land also closed the cattle route between the grazing and watering areas. Moreover, the company had dug a deep ditch so that the people and livestock cannot cross its leased land on their way between their grazing fields and the watering points on the Gibe River. There is a narrow cattle route around the ditch which is the only route to pass to the grazing and watering points that can be 79


used. This has resulted in losses and increased fear among community members as it has already cost the lives of people and their livestock. For instance, local people reported that a livestock keeper who was keeping his family‘s cattle died after falling into the deep ditch which he was attempting to cross.20 The size of the available grazing land has been reduced as a result of the agreement and this state of affairs has not only provoked disagreements and enmity between the local community on one hand and the state and Karuturi on the other but also among the local members of the community. In this regard, my informant said: After Karuturi took our land, we have no access to our age-old inherited land. We and our cattle are facing difficulty to survive as a result of lack of pasture and water. People are confined to their holdings to feed their cattle, which are not enough. Competition for such limited grazing land and watering point is also sparking conflict among individuals21.

Most of the informants I interviewed and the focus group discussants I met with reported that local officials are joking about the suffering of local inhabitants. When the community members complained about the shortage of grazing land to the Woreda officials, they said to have responded like this: ―the land belongs to government. You can rope your cattle to your feet.‖ As a result of their dwindling access to grazing land and watering points, people have sold their cattle. Consequently, the former owners of many cattle have lost social and economic status in the community. In rural areas of Oromia, the social status is associated with the number of cattle and the size of the land held by a particular household. In this case, as Borras and Franco (2010: 3) correctly stated, land is not the only the source of economic livelihood for the rural poor but also serves as source of social status and prestige. FAO et al (2010: 3) also states that land is not only productive asset but also serves as water resources, safety net, old age insurance and a determinant of social status. Cattle hold a special value among the Oromo people. They love and praise their cattle. They have an emotional bond with their cattle. However, due to the reduction of the size of pasture land and access to watering points, the people are being forced to selling their livestock. Besides occupying the grazing areas, blocking of the routes to water points and access to strategic pastures the Karuturi lease has 80


resulted in a serious loss to the livestock economy as well as the emotional attachment the people have to their cattle. As my informants said, those who had numerous cattle were forced to reduce the size of their herd through selling experienced a painful loss.22

c)

Environmental Impact

Trees that have precious cultural and environmental values were destroyed by the company‘s bulldozers. In this regard, the local residents in the study area are poking fun at the incongruity between the government‘s official policy of natural resources protection in the area and what the company is doing in the area. On the one hand, people are required to dig terraces on the land and plant trees to protect the natural resources and the environment while Karuturi Global is clearing forests including the majestic Odaa trees. The local residents say ―our government is making us plant trees on highland areas while at the same time it is allowing the investor to destroy trees in the lowlands‖. In fact, my interview with the Woreda officials shows that the company destroyed trees without consulting the state and the people. This destruction of trees sharply contradicts the policy of the government that usually sings the mantra of a green resilient economic strategy. According to the agreement signed between the company and the state, the company has to plant trees on 2% of the land given to it. However, it has done nothing so far. The company has also drained part of the wetland there, which is a source of biodiversity. The local people are disappointed with the loss of biodiversity and forest. Therefore, they are speaking about the consequence of this act as follows: Muka aadaa qabu a tree which has cultural value Muka qorichummaa qabu a tree which has medicinal value Muka qabbana fidu a tree which bring cool and fresh air Muka bokkaa fidu a tree which brings us rain Muka namniifi loon jala boqotan a tree under which both human and cattle take rest Muka bineensotni bakkee dawoo godhatan a tree wild animal used to defend themselves Muka kanniisa horsiisuuf nu fayyadu a tree we used for beekeeping Muka jalatti wal araarsinu a tree under which we resolve conflict 81


Muka ijaarsa manaaf nu fayyadu Muka mi’a qonnaaf nu fayyadu Citaa mana ajjeeruuf nu fayyadu Kana hundumaa ciranii balleessan Aduuf nu saaxilan Hongee nutti harkisan Qilleensa jiidhaa nutti hir’isan Jireenya keenya balaaf saaxilan

a tree we used for house building a tree we used for plough equipment a grass we used for house roof thatching they destroyed all these they exposed us to sun they dragged drought towards us we lost cool and fresh air as a result they exposed our life to disaster

The enforcement of environmental regulations and laws seems non-existent in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele. As a result, trees of special value for the community were dispassionately smashed and eradicated. Many wild animals (e.g. reedbuck, wild boar, bush back, and duiker) in the surrounding area migrated as a result of the clearing of the field by the bulldozers. Therefore, the project has adversely affected both the community and the environment. Even though all the above damages were made to the community under study there has no compensation has been paid to the community either in kind or in cash. The people who had farmland on the area under investment were ignored by the state and not compensated because they did not hold a certificate to that land. Putting aside the lack of compensation for the loss of the land that was not certified, the people whose assets (eucalyptus, mango and orange trees) were destroyed in the process of constructing road to the investment site were denied any compensation despite the fact that they have certificates to the land. The state officials argued that the road is part and parcel of rural road development and should not be compensated. The local people on the other hand claim that the road is only for the sake of the project and the investor has to pay compensation. The state refused the payment and the local community members have continued their resistance. The people bitterly speak of the lost resource without compensation and its adverse effect on their livelihoods. The assumption, at the time, was that the community would benefit from the transfer of the land, because their members would be paid for working for Karuturi as laborers, rather than having to continue with subsistence farming. Deroy (2012: 15) states ―local land users with customary tenure who lose their land, even if they are compensated 82


monetarily or with jobs lose the benefit of any future increases in the value of that land.‖

Toward “Everyday form of Resistance”? An everyday form of resistance is a political action, which constitutes actions of relatively powerless groups. Everyday form of resistance usually takes place when open defiance is impossible or entails danger. Most forms of everyday resistance are characterized by little or no coordination or planning and often represent a form of individual self-help and avoid any direct confrontation with the authorities. The everyday form of resistance is conducted in the form of gossip, slander, demeaning others, feigned ignorance, and dissimulation (Scott 1985). As I discussed above, the local inhabitants resisted the takeover of their land as much as possible. They selected elders and sent to higher officials with a petition. But none of this worked. Regarding peasant reactions to the state, De Sardan (2005: 142) reveales that peasants might react with the state either to preserve or gain access to land and increase patrimonial land. He also suggested that the inability to understand state policies has also spurred reactions between peasants and the state. The open or overt resistance of the local community in the study area might be connected with what Kerkvliet (2009: 232) calls ‗advocacy politics.‘ This type of politics involves the direct and concerted efforts of the peasants either to support or oppose government policies and programs. When they failed to stop the project because of police force intervention, they began to express their dissatisfaction in covert and unorganized ways. This conforms to what James Scott (1985) identified as ‗weapons of the weak‘ or ‗everyday forms of peasant resistance.‘ According to Kerkvliet (2009: 233), peasant resistance is the way people express feelings such as disgust, anger or opposition to what they regard unjust, unfair, and illegal claims on them by a more powerful class or institution. Local people express their negative feelings about the company saying: ―other than God one cannot expel these people from here.‖ They usually wish Karuturi would experience an economic loss, expecting that this would cause its removal from their land. According to Kerkvliet (2009: 233), the nasty and derogatory things peasants say or the jokes they crack about their employers, landlords, and government officials are the forms of everyday resistance. It is through time that people‘s overt resistance changes 83


into covert forms of everyday resistance. For instance, people developed detestation and abhorrence towards Karuturi and began gossiping about investment after the takeover of the land.

State Policies vis-à-vis Local Practices The complexities of the tenure system, the arbitrary eviction of farmers and the tenancy system of the Imperial time have aggravated the questions surrounding land issues. It has been argued that the major factor in the downfall of the Emperor was the land question. The socialist Derg enacted Land Reform in March 1975 to end previous land-related problems and distributed land to the landless through Peasant Associations. Even with that reform the land questions were not properly addressed, rather the state used the reform for political purpose. The reform did nothing beyond the abolition of feudalism. In this regard, Clapham writes that the Derg ―land reform thus involved not the distribution of land among the peasantry which could thus gain control over its own means of production, but rather the ‗capture‘ of the peasantry in a way that subjected them increasingly to the state control‖ (Clapham 2002: 15 in Mamo 2006: 56). Under the current government too, the land question has not been resolved. The Ethiopian People‘s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government reaffirmed the land reforms and proclamations of its predecessor. According to the 1995 current government constitution and Federal Land Use and Administration proclamation No.456/2005, every individual aged 18 and above can acquire land free of charge for an unlimited time, if used properly. In light of this proclamation, the Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation gave the right to use land to the rural people. Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation No.130/2007, article 5(4), gave rural communities the right to use the land for grazing, watering points, social and spiritual purposes for free. However, it does not explain the method of recourse the people have if these rights are disrespected because of state policy, like the delivering of land to an investor like Karuturi. The people of the study area had been using the land for social, economic, and spiritual purposes. The proclamation in principle respects these rights though it failed to protect them when they lost their land to investment. The Federal and Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamations article 8(5) and 9(1), respectively, state that any 84


landholder shall have the right to transfer his rural land use rights through inheritance to members of his family. In light of these articles, the local people of Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele claim that they gained the land from their forefathers through inheritance and gift. Paradoxically, the state has taken the land from the people for investment purpose without any land and/or monetary compensation. They have been ploughing the land for generations and had long-standing customary rights to the land. The Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele people claiming that the land now given for Karuturi Company has been entirely theirs. However, the Oromia Land Use and Administration proclamation No.130/2007, article 10(6) states that any agreement made on land renting shall bear the consent of all individuals who have rights on that land. And Federal Land Use and Administration proclamation No. 456/2005 article 8(2) also supports the idea that the consent of the people has to be considered. In the area under study, the enforcement of the principles of both federal and regional proclamations remains ineffective and unpracticed. The people continue to explain their grievances. When I made the request to interview the people, they bitterly expressed their feelings. For instance, they said, ―does our case have a solution or you are simply troubling us?‖ Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation No.130/2007 article 6(16) describes that the rural land will be taken from the user if he/she does not properly conserve the land and if the user is unable to use the land for two consecutive years. According to Federal Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation article 7(3) of No.456/2005 and Federal constitution article 44(2), if a rural landholder is evicted from his land for public use, he/she shall be given compensation proportional to the development he/she has made on the land and has the right to commensurate monetary or alternative means of compensation. In addition, as per article 4(5) of Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation, a rural community has the right to use the land for spiritual purposes. In area under study, the land given for the investor‘s residence was used for traditional spiritual and ritual purpose. The spiritual land is a sacred place for the people and it has no replacement. Therefore, what is the compensation value either in kind or in cash for such sacred and holy place? Shouldn‘t it be left intact? This practice utterly violates Article 27 (1) of the Constitution, 85


which reads: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to hold or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

Karuturi has also destroyed local wetlands in the area. But wetlands are critical to local livelihoods. They serve as a buffer against floods, are areas of high biodiversity, help to regulate river flows, and recharge groundwater supplies. Yet little attention is given to protecting wetlands in the region. Key wetland areas are being partially drained for agricultural use by Karuturi. Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration proclamation No.130/2007 under article 20 explains that rural wetlands have to be conserved and protected. The farmland given for the Karuturi is partially wetland used for grazing and other natural resources. Nonetheless, all arable farmland and wetland given to the investor in that Kebele contradicts the proclamation. The article states that the rural land users should not do any activity that causes damage to wetland and springs, and makes suggestions for its proper management. It also proclaims the way to use wetland for agricultural purposes if it is based on the consent of the community and other technical support officials. My informants described that the wetlands have been conserved by the local community for as long as anyone can remember. They didn‘t attempt to drain the land to convert it for agricultural use. They only ploughed the part of the land which is naturally suitable for agriculture. Paradoxically, the state that is calling for its protection is damaging the wetland through unwarrantedly transferring it to the investors.

Conclusion This article argues that the local community in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele has been using the land for various material and non-material purposes. In other words, the value that the local community attaches to the land is related to both material and non-material. Materially speaking, the local community used the land for subsistence purposes. They obtained the material necessities of life from that land. On the other hand, the use of the land for the local 86


community went well beyond its material value. The land has both symbolic and spiritual value. Even ignoring the symbolic and spiritual values of the land, the leasing process did not consider the subsistence need of the local community. Contrary to the local community‘s perception and use of the land, the state redefined the land and leased it out to the company on the premise that the land is ―unused.‖ Why has the government defined the land that the local community has been using as unused land? It seems that such a difference has resulted from different methods of valuating the land. The local community values the land for the subsistence and other non-material needs it satisfies. On the other hand, the state and the company value the land for the economic profits it can produce. From this perspective, the designation of the land as unused does not seem to indicate the absence of any use on the land in the proper sense of the term. Rather it indicates the underutilization of the land compared to its productive potential. This is the point at which the capital-centric perceptions of the state and the company towards the land collide with the subsistence/spiritual-centric perceptions of the local community. One can also argue that the redefinition of the land as unused served to legitimate the intervention of the government.

References Abbink, Jon. 2011. ‗Land to foreigners: Economic, Legal, and Sociocultural aspects of New Land Acquisition schemes in Ethiopia‘. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29 (4): 513535. Alden Wily, Liz. 2011. ‗The Tragedy of Public Lands: The Fate of the Commons under Global Commercial Pressure‘. ILC, Rome. Anseeuw, Ward, Liz Alden Wily, Lorenzo Cotula, and Michael Taylor. 2012. ‗Land Rights and the Rush for Land: Findings of the Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project.‘ ILC, Rome. Borras Jr., Saturnino and Jennifer Franco. 2010. ‗Contemporary Discourses and Contestations around Pro-poor Land Policies and Land Governance. Journal of Agrarian Change 10 (1): 1- 32. Braun, Joachim and Ruth Meinzen-Dick. 2009. “Land Grabbing” by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington D.C. 87


Da Via, Elisa. 2011. ‗The Politics of ―Win –Win‖ Narratives: Land Grabs as Development Opportunity?‘ Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing from April 6-8, University of Sussex. De Sardan, Jean-Pierre. 2005. Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change (translated by Antoinette Alou). London and New York: Zed Books. Deininger, Klaus, Harris Selod, and Anthony Burns. 2012. The Land Governance Assessment Framework: Identifying and monitoring good practice in the land sector. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Deroy, Craig. 2012. ‗Large Scale Land Acquisitions: Mapping Global Action‘. Paper presented at Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty from April 23- 26, Washington D.C. FAO, IFAD, UNICTAD and WB. 2010. ‗Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources‘. A discussion note for ongoing global dialogue. Available http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTARD/2145741111138388661/22453321 /Principles_Extended.pdf (Accessed, 05 Nov 2012). Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution. 1995. Addis Ababa. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation No.456/2005 Kerkvliet, Benedict. 2009. ‗Everyday Politics in Peasant Societies (and ours)‘. The Journal of Peasant Studies 36 (1): 227- 243. Makki, Fouad and Charles Geisler. 2011. ‗Development by Dispossession: Land Grabbing as New Enclosures in Contemporary Ethiopia‘. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing from April 6-8, University of Sussex. Mamo Hebo. 2006. Land, Local Custom and State Policies: Land Tenure, Land Disputes and Disputes Settlement among the Arsii Oromo of Southern Ethiopia. Kyoto: Shoukadoh. Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration Proclamation No.130/2007 Scott, James. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Endnotes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

Woreda is loosely to say district. Karuturi Global is an Indian company based in Bangalore which is given numerous hectares of land in Ethiopia. Kebele is the lowest administrative division in Ethiopia‘s federal government structure. Interview with one official at Bako town on March 01, 2013 Interview with an Indian assistant manager of Karuturi farm at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 08, 2013 Interview with Dabala Chala at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on January 10, 2013 Interview with an official from Agriculture and Rural Development office of the Bako Tibe Woreda on February 27, 2013 Interview with an official from Oromia Investment Commission, on March 17, 2013, Finfinne Interview with an official from Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Office at Bako Town on February 17, 2013 Statement of one of the participant of focus group discussion held in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele at Tullu Sa‘a village on January 24, 2013 The statement of focus group discussant held in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele at the village of Qiltu Gada on January 19, 203 Interview with Dirriba Dabale at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 09, 2013 Interview with Hirpha Mul‘ata at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 14, 2013 Interview with Badhasa Tufa in Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 14, 2013 Finfinne is also known as Addis Ababa, the capital city of the country. It is known among the Oromo people as Finfinne. It has been believed that the Oromo called today‘s Addis Ababa as Finfinne before the expansion of Abyssinian kingdoms to the area. A letter written for Oromia Investment Commission by community‘s representatives Gojjam is inhabited by Amhara people and found in north western part of the country Interview with Gemechu Nagasa held at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on January 27, 2013 The type of crop given for the landowner is mostly not same with which the sharecropper will produce. If payment in advance is maize and the produced crop type is teff, their value is recognized as equal because the time when maize was given is considered. The sharecropper who paid jalakennii would get it back from the landowner after the harvest.

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20 A livestock keeper knew nothing about the depth of the ditch and he simply attempted to cross. Unfortunately he sunk in the ditch and his life passed away. With the help of swimmers, his body came out of the ditch. Local elders gathered and complained the case to the Woreda officials for the compensation of the lost life. The company didn‘t pay compensation as far as this study conducted. 21 Interview with Galata Gudina at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 16, 2013 22 Interview with Dhufera Bulcha and Dirriba Dabale at Bachera Oda Gibe Kebele on February 03, 2013

90

Acknowledging Genocide against the Oromo Habtamu Dugo, Joanne Eisen & Dr. Paul Gallant1

Abstract It is widely accepted that the Oromo people have suffered several periods of violence which they believe rise to the level of genocide. However, the scholars at the vanguard of genocide studies do not apply the term “genocide” to the violence that has taken place against the Oromo. We suggest that Oromo scholars need to participate in the ongoing dialogue in order to change the current perception and position of these genocide scholars. We show why this can easily be done, and we explain how this can be accomplished. We further suggest that Oromo scholars create a body of literature to support the claim that acts of genocide have occurred on multiple occasions. We also suggest that Oromo scholars must examine other 1

Habtamu Dugo graduated from George Mason University with an M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Habtamu Dugo is an Adjunct professor of Communication and Media Arts at The State University of New York‘s Westchester Community College. Dr. Joanne Eisen graduated from the New York University College of Dentistry and is a Senior Fellow for Criminal Justice at the Independence Institute. Dr. Paul Gallant is a Senior Fellow for Criminal Justice at the Independence Institute. He received an M.S. in Chemistry from Brooklyn College, City University of New York. Dr. Paul Gallant received a doctor of Optometry degree (O.D.) from The State University of New York, College of Optometry.


little-discussed genocides in the Horn in order to facilitate their becoming an active force in genocide studies. We all know that the Holocaust occurred: a genocide committed by Nazis who murdered 6 million Jews. With the Nazis defeated, and given the academic strength of the Jews, survivors were able to fully document the atrocities. There are museums, archives, and days of remembrance devoted to the Holocaust. Yet there remain few who recall the 7 million non-combatant gypsies, Poles, Catholics and others who died at the hands of the Nazis. At this point in time, the study of genocide is in a period of great flux. Attention is given to the questions of prediction and prevention. And the definition of genocide itself remains fluid and open to a wide range of interpretations and questions. For example, exactly which groups fall within the definition? What percentage of the population of the group must be killed to meet the definition of genocide? Must they actually die, or is sterilization, removal from ancestral territory, or cultural deprivation (such as destruction of a library) sufficient to meet the definition? And what about inadequate government funding for AIDS treatment and research, decried as genocide by some human rights advocates?1 Daniel Feierstein states: ―Disagreements over definitions led scholars to develop a rich variety of concepts based on alternate definitions of genocide...there is no consensus...The disagreements have been reflected in the wide disparity between scholars in regards to which cases of mass killing merit the label of genocide.‖2 Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide, was in favor of an inclusive interpretation of the new concept, although many current-day scholars are not. Early discussions and drafts relating to the definition of genocide, as well as more recent discussions within the genocide scholars‘ community, illustrate the wide divide. The Genocide Convention, adopted in January 1951 by the UN, does not include cultural genocide, yet the early first draft does.3 It does not include politicide although some scholars now question the correctness of that decision. The original concept was ambiguous, but political concerns have been the driving force behind this division—in part, because of the perceived need for an actor(s) to take on responsibility for the prevention of genocide, and because of the difficult task of exacting retribution from the perpetrators in a court of law. 92

ACKNOWLEDGING GENOCIDE AGAINST THE OROMO

Serious discussion revolves around the definition of ―intent.‖ Intent could be difficult to prove, especially if the perpetrators control the documentation. Although Article 2 of the Convention refers to ―acts committed with intent to destroy,‖ paragraphs 38-39 of the UN's Whitaker Report4 suggest that documented proof of intent is not necessary for the atrocities under examination to rise to the level of genocide. Whitaker advised that ―a court should be able to infer necessary intent from sufficient evidence...the defendant must reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of its conduct.‖ However, the reality is that proof of intent can help determine a court‘s decision. In 2005, Professor Mekuria Bulcha authored a comprehensive article, ―Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia,‖5 which should have put the Oromo question to rest, since Bulcha's arguments and documentation were impeccable. Regardless, Dr. Trevor Trueman advised us in an E-mail: ―I've taken up the question of genocide against Oromo with members of the International Association of Genocide Scholars and the experts do not feel it fits the criteria. Greg Stanton‘s Genocide Watch did however regard the mass killings of Anuak in Gabella in late 2000 as genocide. War crimes and crimes against humanity are claimed by Human Rights Watch in the Ogaden.‖ 6 One must therefore raise questions such as ―Why do the sufferings of the Oromo people, and other peoples of the south, not rise to the definition of genocide?‖ And, ―Why, with a documented history of past and present atrocities, and the mass murder of civilians that surely must be defined as genocide, is the community of genocide scholars loath to bestow that valuable definition on the Oromo?‖ Damien Short acknowledges: ―When they [indigenous peoples] invoke the term genocide to describe their present day experiences, it is often derided.‖7 Perhaps the explanation can be partially explained by Dominik Schaller‘s statement: ―Although genocide research is conducted worldwide, the field is still dominated by Eurocentric attitudes and approaches.‖8 Yet, acknowledgement of genocide results in a comfortable vindication, according to Schaller who said: ―They [indigenous victims] see international recognition as a form of symbolic reparation.‖9 He explains that there is competition from victim lobbies to earn the label of genocide. Schaller warned that the

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degree of recognition depends on a group‘s ―ability to mobilize public opinion and raise international pressure.‖ Surely, for the Oromo nation—still in the throes of oppression—acceptance as a victim of genocide by the international community would be beneficial, and would tend to help change the balance of power between the central Ethiopian regime and the oppressed majority. According to Helen Fein: ―If the perpetrators of genocidal massacres within the state could anticipate costs in the international system, such murders might be deterred.‖10 And at this time, in word—if not in deed—no voice dares to rise above the cries of victims and proclaim that oppression, atrocity, brutality, or murder are acceptable and welcome behaviors. The Oromo people need to break into the consciousness of Eurocentric global genocide scholars. The key to recognition is massive, indisputable, and well-organized documentation. Those who have such documentation, those who can make the argument and who can enter the open discussions of the community of genocide scholars, will be the ones to mold global opinion. If the Oromo wait for the scholars to make the case for their people, they may wait in vain. Taking lessons from the Jews and Armenians, the Oromo must create their own destiny. Professor Asafa Jalata discussed the balance of power between the Oromo and the oppressing central government. He said: ―the world is harsh and cruel, and it belongs to those who can seriously take care of their own business.‖11 Jalata continued: ―We fail to understand that we only get support from others if we first help ourselves and convince others that they can benefit by helping us.‖12 He also suggested the need for ―developing critical global awareness.‖13 The time is ripe for the Oromo to enter the global dialogue on genocide. The Oromo need to become the voice of the voiceless oppressed, and become known as people who care about others. The Oromo people should not remain as part of the forlorn group of helpless oppressed victims. They should seize the dialogue, elaborate on it, and add to it in a manner closer to the truth than what has previously been told. Once the label of genocide is accepted, genocide denial follows. For example, Guenter Lewy, Professor Emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, dismisses the Turkish genocide of Armenians as ―a badly mismanaged war-time security measure....‖14 We know that the government of Ethiopia will become very strident 94


and deny its role in perpetrating genocide, since they have already distanced themselves from the instigation of violence .However, the Ethiopian government will find these denials to be counterproductive: deniers of genocide are not often held in high esteem. That the Oromo have been the victims of genocide on more than one occasion is undeniable. There is a wealth of information available indicating that an Oromo genocide began as early as the 1840s. William Cornwallis Harris describes harrowing violence against the Oromo in Serite, Ekka, Finfinne and other villages on the Plain of Germama.15 He further describes massacres by the Amhara against unarmed civilians,16 and states that a series of 84 similarly destructive forays occurred. He writes: ―children of three and four years of age, who had been placed in the trees with the hope that they might escape observation, were included in the inexorable massacres, and pitilessly shot among the branches.‖ The population, he continued, ―had in a few hours been swept from off the face of the earth by the devastating iruption of the barbarian Amhara hordes.‖ If one must include intent in the genocide debate, Harris explains that the victims were treated as outsiders, not as part of the group. This situation describes ―otherness,‖ a term used by genocide scholars to partially describe cause and intent. Harris stated: ―Cruelties emanating from the hereditary detestation of the heathen...is handed down as an heir-loom from generation to generation.‖ 17 Other scholars discuss this factor of emotional division in cultural or political terms. The Abyssinian pejorative term, ―Galla‖ (heathen), could be used to show continuing intent, and the desire of the ruling government to create ―otherness.‖ The book Travels, Researches And Missionary Labours During An Eighteen Years’ Residence In Eastern Africa, published in 1860 by Johann Ludwig Krapf18, ends with a literature review of 174 references. This could likely comprise a source of additional corroborative evidence of genocidal action—not only against the Oromo, but against other ethnicities. In his seminal article, ―Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia‖, Mekuria Bulcha suggests that statebuilding in the second half of the 19th century was linked to a great deal of genocidal activity, and provides a wealth of research, detail and insight. By itself, the article should have generated a body of 95


Oromo genocide literature sufficient to change the minds of even those genocide scholars who accept only a fairly restrictive definition. It is time to bring Bulcha's definitive article out of the closet, to read it as often as necessary for ideas to start flowing, and for articles to fly out of computers and into journals. Bulcha not only examines genocide in Oromia from 1850 to more recent years, but he also generously mentions the genocide of the San, the Herrero and the Nama peoples. And, in doing so, he provides an excellent list of references. Right now, despite massive ongoing targeted atrocities, mainstream genocide scholars fail to recognize the Oromo case as rising to the classic definition of genocide. Therefore, when the Oromo turn to current political conditions, they need to be cognizant of the wider definition of genocide which includes the issue of culture. Asafa Jalata discusses the present situation as ―hidden genocide.‖19 In order to make that hidden genocide more visible, what appears to be political or cultural oppression should be documented, and discussed in the language of genocide scholars. For example, those scholars are now using terms such as ―genocide in slow motion‖ or ―genocide by attrition.‖ The more one reads the genocide literature, the more one will find parallels to the Oromo situation and be able to use those parallels to good advantage. The diaspora is an example of a social phenomenon that could be a reflection of hidden genocide. For example, according to Bill Frelick: ―In many cases, refugees are the measure of genocide in the making, a barometer of repression that provides a warning that something so dangerous is happening as to impel people to flee their homes and country.‖20 But the meager documentation in existence which confirms this situation is generally provided by NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and is insufficient to the task. One cannot trust the occasional awareness of peace groups—as wellmeaning as they might be—but whose primary concern is not specifically the welfare of the Oromo. The Oromo leadership needs to help gather and catalogue the individual stories of depredations against them that define genocidal conditions, as was done after the Holocaust. Jalata21 suggested in 2007 that government-sponsored rape of women should be included as a mechanism of genocide. Indeed, Jalata was ahead of his time, as we are just now seeing such changes in the definition of genocide. Daniela de Vito stated: ―When rape is 96


subsumed within genocide, which is conceived, placed and treated as a crime against enumerated groups, its dynamic changes.‖22 One can easily see that the study of genocide is ripe to become more inclusive, to the extent that many of the policies used by the Ethiopian regime—and many other tyrannical regimes—would constitute a genocidal attack on the population even if existing documentation failed to change the attitudes of some genocide scholars. This documentation should not be limited to rape, but to all atrocities that tend to destroy the group and its culture. Many genocide scholars are not only turning to the study of rape as a component of genocide, but also to the study of survivors and the aftermath of the genocide‘s violence.23 Taking a lesson from those who have documented the Holocaust, one should include the lingering post-violence effects on succeeding generations. We believe that these issues are becoming part of the next phase of genocide research, and however painful and difficult it might be to revisit these incidents, sensitive but necessary documentation needs to be gathered and recorded. Using the term ―ethnic cleansing‖ instead of genocide is an easy way out for those who prefer to define genocide in a narrow manner. Regarding displaced victims, Linda Pertusati stated: ―...land is part of their cultural, social, and religious fabric - it is what constitutes their identity ...‖ 24 Others recognize this connection to ancestral land, and yet it is usually discussed as a political or cultural problem. But ethnic cleansing should be recognized as genocide, and could be recognized as genocide if the argument was made convincingly. The Oromo Studies Association (OSA) has the capacity of taking the lead—not only in proving whether or not genocide has been committed upon the Oromo, but also upon other forgotten, voiceless peoples. We suggest that OSA is in the ideal position to pursue the suggestions of Jalata and Bulcha, and to enter and mold global genocide discussions. We believe that the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) must, at the very least, join the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) (which accepts individual and group membership) in order to begin a dialogue with scholars. IAGS has an active online discussion group where one can lurk, learn and participate. OSA must create a body of literature uncovering the forgotten genocides in the Horn as the means of changing the attitude of global genocide scholars. 97


The field of genocide studies is so new that, regardless of one‘s original educational discipline, one can add to the ongoing dialogue in a meaningful, constructive manner. We should remember the words of Jalata, who created a plan of action that would place the Oromo on the global map, bypassing government repression, and making tanks and attack aircraft irrelevant: ―...Victory belongs to those who dream it, plan for it, and take strategic and concrete collective national actions.‖25

Endnotes 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century, (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2004), 10. Daniel Feierstein, ―Leaving the Parental Home: An Overview of the Current State of Genocide Studies‖, Genocide Studies and Prevention 6 no. 3 (December, 2011): 258. UN, ―Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide-the Secretariat and Ad Hoc Committee Drafts,‖ (New York: the UN Secretariat, 1947). UN, Whitaker Report, (1985), available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/whitaker/ Mekuria Bulcha, ―Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia.‖ African Sociological Review 9, no. 2 (2005):1-54 Trevor Trueman, E-mail message to Joanne Eisen and Habtamu Dugo, February 10, 2012. Dr. Trueman is the founder and Chair of the U.K.based Oromia Support Group, ―a non-political organization which attempts to raise awareness of human rights abuses in Ethiopia.‖ Damien Short, ―Cultural Genocide and Indigenous Peoples: A Sociological Approach,‖ International Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 6 (November, 2012): 833. Dominik J. Schaller. ―From Lemkin to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies,‖ in Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (December, 2011): 253. Ibid., pp. 249. Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociologic Perspective ( London: Sage Publications, 1993) : 91. Asafa Jalata, Oromummaa, (Atlanta: Oromia Publishing Company, 2007), 37. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 58. David Holthouse, ―State of Denial : Turkey Spends Millions to Cover Up Armenian Genocide,‖ Intelligence Report , no. 130 (Summer 2008).


15 William Cornwallis, The Highlands of Ethiopia: 1846:177, (New York: New World Press, 1844). 16 Ibid., p. 177-188. 17 Ibid., p. 182. 18 Johann Ludwig Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labors During an Eighteen Years’ Residence in Eastern Africa (London: Paternoster Row, 1860), 555. 19 Asafa Jalata, Oromummaa, (Atlanta: Oromia Publishing Company, 2007). 20 Bill Frelick, ―Refugees: Contemporary Witnesses to Genocide,‖ Genocide Watch, Helen Fein, ed., Ch 4, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) : 53. 21 Supra endnote 10, pp. 172. 22 Daniela de Vito, Aisha Gill & Damien Short, ―Rape Characterised as Genocide,‖ International Journal of Human Rights 6, no. 10 ( June 2009): 28 23 See Robert Melson, ―Critique of Current Genocide Studies,‖ in Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (December, 2011) : 279 (―the testimonies of victims and survivors must be taken into account in order to better understand the motives of the perpetrators and bystanders and give victims and survivors a voice in the narrative of destruction.‖). 24 Linda Pertusati, In Defense of Mohawk Land (Albany: the SUNY Press, 1997), IX. 25 Supra note 10, p. 37.

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Transnationalism, Networks and Remittances among Eritrean Refugee Communities in the Town of Kassala, Eastern Sudan Saida Hassanen*

Abstract Remittances have been widely studied from the point of view of transnational practices and the encouragement of relations with the sending country. The importance of remittances is sometimes disregarded when analysing refugeesreception policies. Remittances might not only become a matter of economic help but also a source of survival and settlement among refugees in a certain area. This study deconstructs the intricate trajectory of remittances and the chain effects that remittances have over their receptors at a material and psychological level. Based on the experience of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, this article shows how remittance sending enables informal refugees to disregard the country’s policy of discouraging the integration of Eritreans into Sudanese society. The aim is to analyse refugees’ search and struggle for resettlement beyond identity politics, paying special attention to the significance of remittances as a survival and resistance strategy. The results illustrate the undeniable significance of remittances in the life of their recipients and, additionally, the unintended effect of generating new ideas about how the recipients live their lives by nourishing hopes about resettlement in a third country.

Introduction This article seeks to highlight the importance of remittances associated to transnational networks of migrants (some voluntary, some forced). Remittance sending has the unintended and contradictory consequence of evading or at least circumventing the policy in some refugee-receiving countries of isolating refugees in *

Saida Hassanen, PhD works in the Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University. Her research interests include Horn of Africa peoples and their diasporas as well as international migration movements.


camps away from the native population. Remittance sending enables informal refugees to disregard the country‘s policy of discouraging the integration of, in this case, Eritreans into Sudanese society. Remittance sending rests on the existence of functioning transnational networks. At the receiving end two concurrent processes widen the horizon for individuals in difficult situations (Levitt 2001, 2004). The issues raised in this paper symbolise the challenge inherent in the internationally framed solution and nationally conceived frameworks for refugee/migrant reception. The office of the UNHCR, whose task is to find permanent solutions to refugee problems, identifies three strategies known as local integration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement to a third country (Koser and Black 1999; Bakewell 1999; Crisp 2003; Hsassanen 2007, 2013). Two of these imply local solutions, that is integration in the host country and repatriation to the country of origin. The third solution, namely resettlement to a third country, involves countries further afield to take on refugees. Resettlement to a third country takes place under one or more of the following conditions: when (I) conditions in the first countries of asylum are unfavourable, (ii) refugees do not feel safe in first countries of asylum, (iii) their human rights are violated, (iv) host governments‘ policies are inimical to local integration, and (v) refugees do not want to return to their countries of origin (Riak, 2004, 2005; Hassanen, 2007). To this must be added the desire of refugees to be resettled in one of the countries in the Western World, or the wealthy North where they may have their relatives, friends or neighbours who either finance their illegal journeys or help them to emigrate under family reunification programmes or the UNHCR resettlement programme. Which of the three options are Eritreans in Sudan most inclined towards? It appears that receiving remittances entices one to pursue the third option. To establish whether this hypothesis holds true in the case of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, I carried out 22 interviews in Kassala about how people envisage their resettlement opportunities. What role do their transnational connections play in their resettlement plans? Are these understandings determined by the situation in the country of asylum or by the availability of resettlement programmes? To what extent are the transnational links related to these dynamics?

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The main contribution of this paper is to deconstruct the intricate trajectory of remittances and the chain effects—materially and psychologically—remittances have on the recipient. The analysis is centred on the refugee search and struggle for resettlement beyond identity politics, paying special attention to the significance of remittances as a survival and resistance strategy. The effect of migration on decision-making processes among Eritrean refugees has been a recurring theme in research, which I have carried out. The case of Eritrean migrants in Kassala in Eastern Sudan has captured my interest. My personal experience of living in that condition has become a lifelong engagement. However, in recent years I have also become deeply interested in survival strategies among refugees in Sweden, where I have evaluated the controversial return migration project that encourages Iraqi refugees to return to Iraq. Working with refugees both in Sweden in Europe and Sudan in Africa has given me a unique insight into the importance of financial remittances and the significance of the international community in the emergence of the remittance sending phenomenon.

Background Between January 2001 and November 2003, I carried out a project among Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. The main fieldwork was done in the town of Kassala. The study was based on in-depth interviews with women and men in three districts of Kassala. Besides interviews, my fieldwork included participating in many informal events and discussions with refugees in residential areas, market places and cafés. Refugee agency officers were also interviewed. The key informants were men and women of different ages, occupations and times of migration as well as of different ethnicities and religious faiths. The interest behind this study was to investigate and analyse migration in general. This project also had the aim of identifying factors that influence decision-making processes among the refugees about the three options available to them: extending their stay in exile, re-migrating to Eritrea, or migrating to a third country. The central questions in my study were: How do refugees look at the political changes that have taken place in their country of origin? Do these changes allow them to return in safety as indicated by the UNHCR convention related to refugee status? How do the personal experiences and the socioeconomic changes they have undergone in the host country (Sudan) affect their decisions about whether to stay 103


in Sudan, re-migrate to their country of origin, or migrate to a third country?

Refugee situation in Africa In Sudan, as elsewhere in Africa, refugees are struggling in situations of protracted and unresolved exile (Hassanen, 2007). Although many Eritreans as well as the Oromo and other refugees from the Ethiopian Empire stay in Sudan, their status as refugees is not recognised. Refugees in UN camps receive some very basic support from international aid organisations but those who live outside refugee camps have no support of any kind. Thus, they are obliged to find alternative ways of surviving on their own. The support that formally recognised refugees obtain in camps is well known (Jacobsen, 2005). For officially declared Eritrean refugees and nonofficial stateless urban refugees in Sudan alike, receiving remittances from Eritrean exiles who are resettled in a third country through the UNHCR resettlement programme is an essential contribution for their survival. Strange as it may seem, little is known about the role that remittances play for urban refugees in Sudan. In this study, the reception of remittances among the official as well as the unofficial Eritrean residents is analysed from two points of view. Firstly, it addresses the empirical experiences of receiving remittances and the material impact these have on the lives of recipients. Secondly, the study deals with the theoretical connection between the transnationalist forum and remittance receiving and the refugees‘ utilisation of their social networks. A hypothesis drawn in the analysis is that remittance sending transcends the purely material dimension and becomes a nexus of connecting the two fora together through information exchange and the recipient‘s fantasies about the sender‘s condition.

Refugee as forced migrants Most of the time, refugees are victims of human rights violations in their countries of origin and thus leave in order to seek protection elsewhere. According to the international instruments relating to refugee status, a refugee is one who flees due to well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group (Moussa, 1993; Westin 1999; Jacobsen, 104


2002). The institution of asylum was first developed in Europe, necessitated by the need to provide protection to those who were displaced because of occupation and shifted borders after World Wars I and II. In developing countries, the refugee problem was mainly the result of the conflict and disorder that accompanied the process of decolonization and state building (Westin 1996, 1999). Refugees flee their areas of origin in order to seek protection elsewhere. However, not only are the countries where they seek protection in many cases violators of human rights, they are also very poor, even to the extent of not being able to provide for the basic needs of their own citizens. Being a refugee in a country where there is a lack of human rights means that one may continue to be subjected to maltreatment and abuse. In many African states, refugees suffer restrictions to their freedom of movement and residence, employment, and access to social and physical services (Kibreab 1996c; Fellesson 2003; Horst 2003). These restrictions are deliberately imposed to prevent rather than to facilitate integration of refugees (Crisp, 2002). Most host governments are opposed to selfsettlement of refugees and decide therefore to place them in government-designated locations (Kibreab 1987, 1990). Persons who are caught residing outside of such camps and settlements are punished by law (Karadawi 1999). Most of the restrictions imposed on refugees‘ rights in host countries are contrary to the principles embodied in international refugee law and international human rights law. However, violation of refugee rights not only occurs in Africa, but is becoming increasingly common in the Middle East and even in several European countries (Westin 1999; Crisp 2002). Although most refugee situations are the result of human rights violations and conflict, it is important to realize that people flee, not just for a single reason but for multiple and inextricably linked political, economic, social, and environmental reasons (Kibreab, 1996). In countries ruled by dictatorial regimes, people often feel insecure and may flee in search of freedom and safety. It is important to observe, however, that although the initial reason for displacement is insecurity, once refugees reach safety, they become part of the transnational global community. Transnationality and social networks are important concepts that shed light on the embeddedness of refugee and remittance conditions. The transnational perspective enables us to see the ―homeland‖ and ―host country‖ as interlinked systems. The refugees‘ 105


networks represent a continuum between the homeland, the host country, and other transnational places of settlement. These networks form a common system in the everyday life of these migrant communities (Castles and Miller 1993; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Watson 1997). Faist (2000) points out that a boundary transcending transaction creates alternative options for action. In many cases, but not in all, one‘s network provides an alternative frame of action and possibilities for economic, political, cultural and social life. Networks determine important decisions for the individual to follow and provide support when it is needed (Castles 2003). This, however, does not mean that the nation-state has no relevance as a source of identification. Instead, what we see is that the traditional position of nation-state is being challenged and is changing as a consequence of the transnational practices of individuals embedded in different networks that transcend the nation-state borders. With this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that transnational networks have the potential to widen the individual frame of action and to widen identifications well beyond the boundaries of a country. Transnationalism is a process by which refugees (migrants) form social fields that cross nation state boundaries (Schiller et al. 1992). According to Levitt and Schiller (2004), social fields are a set of multiple and combined networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are irregularly exchanged, organized, and transformed. The boundaries of social fields do not necessarily overlap with those of nations. National social fields are those that stay within national boundaries while transnational social fields connect actors, through direct and indirect relations, across borders. Conceptualizing the migration experience as taking place within social fields moves the analysis beyond those who actually migrate to those who do not necessarily move but are connected to migrants through the networks of social relations they sustain across borders.

The importance of remittances If migrants who reside in developed countries are unable to help their relatives in their countries of origin or asylum, they often send remittances to enable these relatives to survive in their current abode. A remittance is a transfer of funds from migrants settled in economically developed countries to relatives or friends in developing countries, either countries of first asylum or their 106


countries of origin. A remittance is individually sent money to relatives intended to meet their immediate needs for health care, education, housing and food. An aspect of remittance sending that has not drawn much attention is that of its effects on the minds of the recipients. For though the money fuels the recipients‘ capacity to survive, and it also generates their hope to join kin in developed countries. Today much attention is directed to money remittances worldwide as a phenomenon of economic assistance to societies in the developing countries, the so-called South (Van Hear 2005; Sorensen 2005; Hassanen 2007). This is how many Eritrean refugee families in Kassala town survive. Without remittances from relatives in various transnational Eritrean communities, many of the families who lack access to secure means of livelihood would slip into economic destitution. At the economic level, remittances sent to Sudan fall in to the same pattern as elsewhere. The research emphasis has been on remittance patterns between some of involuntary migrants as well as voluntary migrants in developed countries and recipients in developing countries. Another research focus has been on the impact of financial transactions on local and national development in countries to which remittances are sent. Today, research into remittance sending also involves forced migrants at both ends, as senders as well as receivers. Not surprisingly, the increase in asylum seeking due to conflict, oppression and human rights violations, and UNHCR‘s ‗durable solution‘ strategy of resettlement to third countries, has led to increasing activity in the field of remittances. Thousands of Eritrean refugees and migrants in Europe, North America and Australia regularly send money back to relatives in Kassala town and elsewhere in Sudan. Although remittances make up a significant part of international financial flows to developing countries, the individual recipient uses only a small proportion the remittance in direct business investments or production schemes. Remittances in the form of cash have been seen as one of the major benefits of emigration for developing countries (Sorensen 2005). Since remittances are largely directed towards migrants‘ families or communities of origin, they can increase inequalities among the refugee communities, as individual families are the primary beneficiaries.

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Migration does not occur randomly with people drawn evenly from a given country. Migrants tend to follow paths established by family members, friends, or neighbours. As a result, some communities may receive remittances from numerous relatives overseas, while others receive none. It is also important to note that migration, being an expensive undertaking, requires significant investment and thus, is only available to those who have sufficient resources to draw on. The poorest of the poor are less likely to migrate or receive remittances. The majority of transfers are made in small amounts to help subsidise household budgets and to fund children‘s education, healthcare and housing. In conflict-affected areas, the financial support from family members living in the diaspora may be essential for a household‘s survival and for a general post-war recovery. Where families incur debts to fund migrants‘ journeys by paying extortionate fees to human smugglers, remittances are directed towards the repayment of such debts. Remittances are an indispensable source of support for many African households and an important source of foreign exchange for many African nations. At the national level, remittances have a substantial effect on the balance of payments and on foreign exchange revenues. Yet remittance flows to Africa are heavily underreported (Raki 2005; Horst 2004). Migrant remittances have become an increasingly important feature of modern economic life and due to the growth of migration, their effects on the economy will probably continue. Remittances have become the second largest capital flow in the global economy and have more than doubled in value during the past decade. This monetary transfer has made a substantial contribution to national balance of payments and to the welfare of recipient households in developing countries. Moreover, remittances have also proved to be the most stable source of financial flow compared to development aid from developed countries (Pelling, Hedberg, & Malmberg, 2011). This trend now constitutes the predominant type of economy and has profound implications for those who receive it. The intensity of this support led to its recognition by the World Bank and by governments of countries of origin (Raki 2004; Carling 2005). Today money remittance is one of the principal instruments for poverty reduction due to its flexibility and advantage to those who are settled in less developed countries of the South (Raki 2004; Carling 2005). Thus, remittances are recognised as an important source of global 108


development finance within domestic and official spheres in developing countries (Van Hear 2005; Horst 2003, 2004; Sorensen 2005; Raki 2005).

The experience of Eritrean refugees in Kassala The reason why Eritrean refugees in Kassala hope for resettlement to a third country instead of other options is because the respondents think of the resettlement countries as countries that provide economic protection and security as well as respect for human rights. Compared to the life the refugees have in Kassala where welfaresystems are non-existent, their first option is to seek a condition where they will be considered as locals and their rights protected. Thus, resettlement in a third country is viewed as a better option than returning to Eritrea or staying in Sudan. Through their transnational networks and access to telecommunication channels, the Kassala refugees are well informed about what conditions prevail in countries of the North or the Western world. The development of modern technology makes information available to all people and the refugees try to benefit from it by imagining a better life for themselves elsewhere. Although people live in different parts of the world, the advances in technology has shrunk the speed of sharing information and has increased the depth of knowledge that can be shared. The media produce and disseminate information and images about the world, which has led to fundamental changes in the nature of imaginations over the past decades (Levitt 1998; Horst 2003; Hassanen 2000; Riak 2004; Horst 2005; Pelling et al 2011). Besides accessible public information through media and Internet, relatives who are already resettled in Europe, North America or Australia provide various kinds of personal accounts that inform recipients about living conditions. All this information affects people‘s imagination and spurs their longing to join their relatives through resettlement in a third country. Combined with the hardships they face in Sudan due to the economic and political problems of the country, the hope of third country re-settlement is understandable. The hardships facing refugees is visible in the dramatic expansion of Kassala over the decades of Eritrean immigration. The Eritrean migrants‘ investment of time and money is visible in the commercial development of suks? (markets) in the town centre and in the northern Gazera area, where the native inhabitants 109


seem have come to terms with the fact that Eritreans now are their neighbours. Refugees in Kassala have made financial investments in the town. Remittances from family members abroad have been crucial to enable these investments. Thus the UNHCR resettlement programme has enabled (unofficial) refugees in Sudan to invest in their own livelihood, independently of both the Sudanese state and of the return policies intended for them by the UNHCR. However, as the cases below show, those who live on remittances are demographically mixed. In the next section, I will mention only the first initial of the first name of refugees I interviewed in Kassala. The reason for this is that none of the refugees interviewed in 2001 want their name to be mentioned, thus I have to respect their wishes and thus use S only the initial of their first name. Four cases are given below. S is 48 years old and the mother of ten children. She depends on the remittances sent to her from Australia by her sisters. She left Eritrea at the beginning of 1977 with her parents and siblings. She lived in a refugee camp called Wedsherfy until 2000. After her sisters had settled in Australia, they persuaded her to move out of the camp and into an urban area with the promise of monthly remittances. S‘s husband is younger than she is but he is in poor health, and therefore he cannot work to support his family. S receives USA $300 dollars every month. Six of her eight surviving children go to a Sudanese school and two have started their university study. S‘s plan is one day to join her sisters in Australia. She believes it will happen and her sisters are working on her case. J is a man who lives with his family in Kassala. He moved with his family from southern Eritrea at the age of 10 years in 1972. This means that he had lived as a refugee for 42 years. He grew up in a refugee camp called Omsagada with his parents. At the age of 27, he married and started to work at an irrigation project. At the time of the interview, J was fifty-two years old and a family man with five children. J moved to Kassala in 2003 when the camp he lived in was closed and relocated to another site. Before he decided to move to Kassala, he called his cousin who lives in a country of the North to inform him about the changing situation. His cousin encouraged him to move and sent him some money offering to assist him in starting a business in Kassala. After the move, J started a profitable business and with assistance from his cousin he was able to purchase a car and 110


expand his business into the transport sector. At the time of the interview, J was very happy and appreciated what his cousin did for him (Family man, taxi driver who manages his life with the help of remittances). F was born in Eritrea in 1983 but was raised in a refugee camp in Sudan. His family left the town of Agordat in Eritrea because of the war. After Eritrea‘s war of independence ended in 1991, F and his family returned to Eritrea, where he finished high school and then worked as a teacher until 1998. When the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out in 1998 he migrated to Sudan again, leaving his father, mother, and siblings in Eritrea. Shortly after his emigration to Sudan his father died in Eritrea. At the time of the interview, F was staying with relatives in Kassala. F was supported financially by another relative residing in Germany. F never met this relative. The only thing he knows about this person is through his mother. F‘s mother had asked this relative to support F, so the relative started to send money to F. However, the remittances he receives are not sufficient to support him, so he also works as a street vendor in the town market. F is a very social and humble person. Thanks to his extensive network and the remittances he receives, he was able to buy a wagon from which he sells teas and soft drinks in the Kassala market. F hopes to resettle in one of the countries of North through the UNHCR resettlement programme. These three examples illustrate the importance of remittances for the socio-economic situation of families who lack other regular means of obtaining income. Some refugees such as S are well-off living on remittances. Others such as F have to supplement the remittances with other income earning through informal employment. The differences in their socio-economic status notwithstanding, nearly all the refugees living in urban environments are integrated into the local society and economy. Among the families who live by remittances, female-headed households are over-represented. The phenomenon of an absent ‗father‘ is common among these families. The reasons for this differ from family to family. Some ‗fathers‘ never left Eritrea. Others died in the war of independence. Others again emigrated to the GulfStates, Western Europe, Australia, and North America. Households depending on remittances receive cash and gifts from members of their extended family. Those respondents who have close relatives, such as parents, spouses, or siblings, who live either in North 111


America, or Europe or Australia receive regular remittances that support them in their refugee camps in Sudan. This means the livelihood of Eritrean refugees in the Sudan depends on the remittance that they receive from their close relatives in rich countries. However, Eritrean refugees in Sudan who have more distant relatives, such as cousins or nieces, do not receive remittance monthly. They receive financial support mostly when they ask for it and when they face serious challenges. G is a 32 years old single female who lives with her family in Kassala. She said: ―Since we arrived in Kassala, my brother has supported us. My family and I came to Sudan in 1975 from a town called Agordat in Eritrea. Since then, we have been dependent on my brother, who is living and working in Saudi Arabia. I also have two sisters who live in Europe who originally went through resettlement programme and we occasionally get some money from them too. It is my brother who sends remittances on a monthly basis.‖1

According to the data from the in-depth interviews with 13 women and 11 men in three districts of Kassala town, remittances are about commitment to kin but in Eritrean society commitments differ both in accordance with closeness of blood relationship and with gender. Traditionally the responsibility of supporting aging parents and other family members lies with male members of the family, especially the eldest son. Displacement has broken this tradition and economic support has increasingly become a function of capability and opportunity more than anything else. In most cases today, it is women rather than men who bear the main responsibility of sending remittances to members of their families at home or in first countries of asylum. Changes are due to the fact that more women are increasingly becoming either joint or sole breadwinners. Among Eritreans it is also commonly believed that women are more empathetic to the plight of their family members than men, which might explain why women tend to remit more cash to their relatives than their male counterparts. As noted earlier, the Eritrean refugees in Kassala have close relatives in many parts of the world. Being globally connected 1

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Personal communication, Kassala 2002. The respondent is from the Blin group.


through relatives entails many consequences. One is the dream of resettlement to one of the prosperous countries in the North. This powerful desire for resettlement is to a large extent precipitated by the ‗misleading‘ signals sent by those refugees who are resettled in third countries. This remittance sending is not only about sending cash it is also about sending signals about favourable conditions in those countries where the remittance sender lives. Sending money creates an image of the sender as enjoying a better and a happier life. The recipients assume that unless the sender concerned has excess cash, she or he would not send so much money. Commonly recipients have no clue about how the cash they receive from their relatives is obtained. Most Eritreans in the Diaspora work hard in low-paying and menial jobs to earn their living. It is from those meagre earnings that they send remittances to their relatives at home or to those who are ‗stranded‘ in first countries of asylum. The fact that they send a lot of money does not mean that they have much extra cash. Most of them forgo their medium and long-term family interests to help their relatives in need. The social obligation of helping relatives in need is so burdensome that many marriages break up because of the pressures. Those who live off remittances from relatives abroad are not aware of the conditions in which the cash they receive is earned and the tension it causes to families by those at the sending end. The dream of resettlement is far more intense among the youth than among the middle-aged. Many young persons take drastic actions even risking their lives in order to settle in a third country. Remittances generate dependency. Some families in Kassala are completely dependent on the remittances from relatives abroad, while others are semi-dependent. Those who have been dependent on remittances for many years without themselves contributing to their subsistence spend their time dreaming about being resettled which they may never realise in their lifetime. This fantasy was common among those who had members of their families in a developed country. In a group discussion I asked young boys whether they would consider staying in Kassala if they found suitable jobs after their graduation. They all said, ‗no.‘ When asked to state the reasons why they would not stay, they all answered that the jobs available in Kassala do not require skills, they are low-paying and monotonous jobs.

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Their dream was to be resettled in one of the rich countries in the North. Uninformed or misinformed as they seem to be, they believed that they could obtain skilled jobs in the North. They were not aware of the fact that those relatives who send remittances to sustain them are doing the most monotonous and unskilled jobs, wherever they may be. They would probably be put off if they learned that the money they are living on was earned from washing toilets and dishes and cleaning. Thus it appears that lack of accurate information is to some extent due to those who send remittances. They are reluctant to inform their relatives about the kind of works they are actually doing to earn a living. None of those who live by remittances in Kassala want to learn about the difficulties that their kin face in Europe and elsewhere. For instance, migrants in Sweden are overrepresented in jobs that require no skills such as cleaning homes for the elderly or dishwashing in restaurants. The respondents in Kassala were not ready to hear what I told them about the conditions in which their relatives earned the cash they sent to them. The receptors of remittances in Kassala believe that their family members living in developed countries are working as qualified professionals. Remittance senders withhold information from their family members abroad because they feel some sense of embarrassment or so as not to dishearten their relatives. If a migrant had worked as a medical doctor prior to his or her departure from Eritrea and is now working as a cleaner at the University Hospital in Stockholm, it is rather likely that such a person would be hesitant about sharing such disheartening information with relatives back home. This is not unique to Eritrean communities. Horst (2003) found in her study of Somalis living in Holland that if they told their relatives about the difficulties they faced in Holland, they would be accused of telling lies in order to avoid the responsibility of sending remittances to relatives in need. There were, however, a few respondents who seemed to be aware of the difficulties their relatives in the rich countries face as the result of helping those back home. This is implied in the following quotation. My siblings live in one of the Scandinavian countries. Financially we are dependent on them; they send us money from time to time. My husband has casual jobs, and his salary is not enough, therefore I am mostly dependent on my sisters‘ help. I know my sisters have

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their own problems; they are married and have children. Despite that, they call me every two or three weeks to know how I am doing. I never ask them to help me but they know my situation from before and as soon as they get the chance, they send me some money.2

The responsibility of helping relatives is not limited to immediate family members. In most parts of Eritrea, the extended family is a norm and this tends to increase the burden of remittance senders who are expected to help cousins or even more distant relatives. The following example demonstrates this. I am the only daughter. Thus, my parents got me married at an early age in order to be close to them here in Kassala. My father works as a watchman, and my mother is a homemaker. My husband is a truck driver. He supports the whole family but his salary is not enough. I have relatives (cousins who migrated through the UNHCR) in Australia. They send us money every now and then. Sometimes they also send us clothes and perfumes.3

The pressure on remittance senders is not limited to supporting close relatives financially, but they are also expected to facilitate the resettlement of their relatives either legally or illegally. Not only is the cost of helping relatives migrate illegally to the rich countries in the North very heavy but also the risk of failure after payment is very high. Those at the receiving end either discount the pressure on their relatives abroad or they are not aware of it. They are single-mindedly have focused on being resettled no matter what the cost. In this context, the idea of returning to Eritrea does not figure in the options the Kassala refugees consider viable. However, when you ask anyone why they are not returning to Eritrea, they would never say, ―we don‘t want to return, because our dream is to be resettled in one of the rich countries.‖ Instead they would say, ―There are still human rights violations in Eritrea, there is no freedom, no democracy, the government oppresses Muslims, etc.‖ Some of the accusations may

3

Personal communication, Kassala 2002. A mother of five children – three daughters two sons. She lives in the same compound with her parents. She is from the Tigre ethnic group. She is 30 years old and is a Muslim.

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not necessarily be wrong, but they have little or nothing to do with the reasons why those who are desperate to be resettled have not returned to Eritrea. Refugees are not allowed to own property in Sudan (Kibreab 1987, 1996). The reason for this is that the Sudanese government consistently regards refugees as persons staying on a temporary basis and who must return as soon as the conditions that forced them to flee come to an end. Ownership of property indicates some degree of permanency. That is why the government‘s policy clearly states that refugees should live in temporary accommodation until the conditions that prompted their displacement are eliminated. In spite of this prohibition many Eritrean refugees who live by remittances and those who belong to the first category (Muslims) own property. It is interesting to note that although Eritrean émigrés own property and have been settled in Kassala for more than three decades, they still present themselves as refugees and they express their desire to resettle to a third country. However, they do not say that they are going to return to Eritrea. Instead they say they will return if there is a change of the regime in Eritrea. Whatever plans these refugees may express, looking at their settlement, economy and sources of information, it seems fairly obvious that they are part of the global and transnational networks supporting movements across borders, maintaining links with their kin. Their ideas of representing themselves refugees or Eritreans should rather be understood as a way of expressing identity.

Discussion This article has analysed the varied effects of remittances on the Eritrean urban refugees in Kassala. The analysis illustrates the undeniable significance of remittances on the life of the recipient. Additionally the remittances have had the unintended effect of generating new ideas about how the recipients should live their lives and nourishing hopes about resettlement in a third country. Eritrean exiles in the Diaspora are the main senders of remittances, but they are also the source of information about conditions in third countries of resettlement. Refugees who want to be resettled to other countries utilise their transnational networks, drawing on previous familial or other relationships as social capital to achieve this end. Why would they rather migrate to a third country than return to Eritrea? Once 116


again, as important as the immediate economic benefits of resettlement are, it alone does not to explain their motives. An additional factor, which accounts for the desire for resettlement is family. The refugees make this choice, first of all because they do not feel that their first asylum country can provide them with what is important in life. For instance, as the excerpts from my informants suggest, they imagine that resettlement will offer them better livelihood, opportunity to express their feelings, opportunity to work and to live in dignity. Intrinsic to this imagining is the desire to live in a democratic country as well as to have sufficient income. In other words, by resettlement they hope to live close to their relatives who they believe live in conditions with a much higher standard of living than in Sudan. Refugees are well informed about the world around them which is made accessible to them through modern technology as well as modern information systems such as Internet, satellite TV, etc. Their knowledge of the favourable conditions in developed countries of the North and Australia contributes to their wish for a third country migration. However, the wish of the refugees to leave first Eritrea and later Sudan is above all because of the abusive regimes in these countries. Being globally connected through relatives entails many direct and indirect consequences. One of the consequences is the obsession or the powerful dream of resettlement to one of the prosperous countries in the North. This powerful desire of resettlement is to a large extent precipitated by the ‗misleading‘ signals sent by those refugees who are resettled in third countries. Remittance sending is not only about sending of cash, it is also about sending signals about favourable conditions in those countries where the remittance sender lives. The money sending is connected to the sender having a better and a happier life. The recipients assume that unless the sender concerned has excess cash, she or he would not send so much money. Recipients have no clue about how the cash they receive from their relatives is earned. Most Eritreans in the Diaspora do low-paying and menial jobs to earn their living. It is from those meagre earnings they send remittances to their relatives at home or to those who are ‗stranded‘ in first countries of asylum. The fact that they send a lot of money does not mean that they have extra cash. Most of them forgo their medium and long-term family interests to help their relatives in need. 117


The social obligation of helping relatives in need is so burdensome that there are many families that breakdown because of such pressure. The obsession to migrate to the Western countries is far more powerful among the youth. Many of the latter take drastic actions such as risking their lives in order to settle in a third country. Finally, I believe there is a serious need for further studies among the Oromo, Ethiopian and other refugees in Sudan to establish the link between remittances and dependency among refugees in Sudan. If this short article kindles enthusiasm for more research among the Oromo, Ethiopian and other refugees in Sudan, its purpose will have been fulfilled enriching and expanding our understanding about the impact remittances has on refugees in Sudan.

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Hassanen, S. (2000), The effect of migration among the Blin people in Melbourne from a gender perspective. Unpublished paper. Umeå: Department of Geography, Umeå University. Hassanen, S. (2007), Repatriation, Integration or Resettlement, the dilemmas of Migration among Eritrean refugees in Eastern Sudan. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press, Inc, Horst, C. (2003) Vital links in social security, Somali refugees in the Dadaab camp in Kenya. www.UNHCR.c Horst, C. (2003), Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya. Doctorate Dissertation: Amsterdam University. Horst, C. (2006a) Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya. Oxford: Berghahn. Horst, C. (2006b) ‗Introduction: Refugee Livelihoods: Continuity and Transformation‘, Refugee Survey Quarterly. Horst, C. 2004 ‗Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora‘. Working Paper No. 9, Global Migration Perspectives. Geneva: GCIM. Horst, C. 2006a ‗Buufi s amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The transnational and historical logics behind resettlement dreams‘. Journal of Refugee Studies 19(2) Horst, C. 2006b Transnational Nomads. How Somalis cope with refugee life in the Dadaab camps of Kenya. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books. Horst, C. 2004 ‗Money and Mobility: Transnational Livelihood Strategies of the Somali Diaspora‘. Working Paper No. 9, Global Migration Perspectives. Geneva: GCIM. De Haas, H. (2007) Remittances, Migration and Social Development: A conceptual review of the literature. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Social Policy and Development Programme Paper no 34. Jacobsen, K. 2002 ‗Livelihoods in confl ict. The pursuit of livelihoods by refugees and the impact on the human security of host communities‘. International Migration 40(5): 95-123. Jacobsen, K. 2005 The Economic Life of Refugees. Bloomfi eld CT: Kumarian Press. Jacobsen, C. & Landau, L (2003), Researching refugees some methodological and ethnical consideration in social science and forced migration. www.UNHCR.ch.

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Jacobsen, K (2001), The forgotten solution, social integration for refugees in developing countries. www.UNHCR.ch Jacobsen, K. 2002 ‗Livelihoods in confl ict. The pursuit of livelihoods by refugees and the impact on the human security of host communities‘. International Migration 40(5): 95-123. Jacobsen, K. 2005 The Economic Life of Refugees. Bloomfi eld CT: Kumarian Press. Karadawi (1999), Refugee policy in Sudan, 1967-1984. New York: Berghahn Books. Kibreab, G (1996b), Ready and willing but still waiting, Eritrean refugees in Sudan and the dilemmas of return. Uppsala: Life and peace institute. Kibreab, G (1996c) ‗Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in Khartoum. What the eye refugees to see‘, African review, 39, 31-178. Koser, K &Van Hear, N (2002) ‗Asylum migration: implications for countries of origin‘. Paper presented to the wider conference on Poverty, international migration and asylum. Helsinki, 2728 September. Levitt, P (2001a), The Transnational Villagers, Migration from the Dominican Republic, New England Council on Latin American Studies. University of California Press. Levitt, P. (2001b), Transnational migration: taking stock and future directions, Global Networks, 1,3 Levitt, P. (2004),Transnational Migrants: When Home Means More Than One Country.‖Migration Fundamentals. Migration Policy Group, Sept. Levitt, P & Glick Schiller, N (2004), Transnational Perspectives on Migration: Conceptualizing Simultaneity,‘ International Migration Review, vol.38, no.3, pp. 1002-1039 Moussa, H (1993), Storm and Sanctuary. The Journey of Ethiopian and Eritrean Women Refugees. Dundas Ontario: Artemis Enterprises.) Pelling, Hedberg, C. & Malmberg, B. (2011), Remittances from Sweden, an exploration of swedish survey data, Institute for future studies Sorensen, N., Van Hear, N. and Pedersen, P (2002), The migration development nexus evidence and policy options. Working paper Centre of development research. Riak, A (2005), Remittances as unforeseen burden, considering displacement, family inaddition, resettlement context in 121


refugee livelihood and well-being, is there anything states.Or organisation can do. www.gcim.org Riak A (2004) Remittances as Unforeseen Burdens: Considering Displacement, Family and Resettlement Contexts in Refugee Livelihood and Wellbeing. Geneva: UNHCR. Sorensen, (2005), Migrant remittances, development and gender. Copenhagen: Dansk institute for international studier. www.diis.dk Van Hear, N (2005), From durable solutions to transnational relations: home and exile among refugee diasporas, www.UNHCR.ch Westin, C. (1996), ‗Migration patterns‘, in Haour-Knipe, M. and Rector, R. (Eds.) Crossing Borders. Migration, Ethnicity and Aids. p. 15-30. London: Taylor and Francis. Westin, C. (1999), ‗Regional analysis of refugees movement. Origin and response‘. In Ager, A (Ed.) Refugees. Perspectives on the Experiences of Forced Migration. p. 24-45. London: Cassell.

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Book Review My life, My vision for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia, by Bulcha Demeksa (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2013), 281 pages, price, $ 34.50 During the twentieth century, especially after 1941, it was assumed that highly educated, Christianized, Amharic language-speaking, culturally Amharized Oromo individuals were not subjected to Amhara elites‘ cultural chauvinism. However, the book under review demonstrates the exact opposite. Even the most highly-qualified, Amharized individuals of Oromo origin who were married to Amhara women, and served in the Ethiopian bureaucracy at the level of cabinet minister never escaped crude and cruel Amhara elites‘ cultural chauvinism. They were ridiculed for their ―heavy‖ Oromo accent even when they did not have any accent and their fluency in Amharic language was at the level of educated Amhara nationals. Several examples are given in a number of places in this book. However, the following two examples should suffice to make the point. The first is Yilma Deressa, the famous technocrat who was responsible for the establishment of Ethiopian Ministry of Finance after 1941. The second Is the author of the book under review, who ―… always found the insensitivity of the Amhara ruling class incredible‖ (p. 85). Yilma Deressa was an economist and lawyer by training. As the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia during the early 1940s, it was Yilma Deressa who negotiated several treaties with the United States and secured financial, technical, and military support for Emperor Haile Selassie‘s government. Yilma Deressa had an excellent command of the Amharic language and wrote a book in that language. And yet, Amhara officials made fun of and joked about ―…Yilma‘s imagined Oromo accent. Yilma actually did not have a heavy accent as the joke-tellers imagined‖ (82). By all accounts, Yilma Deressa was the


most competent Ethiopian government official, who loyally served Haile Selassie from 1941-1974. In 1965 when the Emperor wanted to appoint Yilma Deressa as the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, top Amhara officials adamantly opposed to his appointment. They made their opposition known to the Emperor through his favorite daughter, Princesses Tenagne-Worq, and the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Thus, instead of Yilma, the Emperor was compelled to appoint an Amhara, Akililu Habte Wolde, as the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 1965. Those who opposed Yilma‘s appointment as Prime Minister had a more sinister move than just a personal dislike for him. This was told to me by a prominent Amhara who…said: ‗We do not want the [Oromo] to be too ambitious by making Yilma Prime Minister‘. In Amharic, he said: ‗Gallochin mattgeb ayasfelligim‖.(It is not good to make the Oromo ambitious). The policy in those days was not to recognize the Oromo as an identifiable group, like for example the Tigre people. The hope and effort was that the Oromo would just naturally disappear through assimilation by losing their language…. Appointing Yilma as Prime Minister, according to the reasoning of the time, would just keep [alive] the Oromo dream for their identity and recognition (p. 84).

The second example of the insensitivity of Amhara officials of the 1960s was witnessed by Bulcha Demkesa himself. At this point it is important to provide a brief background information about Bulcha Demkesa. The author of this interesting book was born in 1930 in the district of Boji Birmaji, Western Wallaga region of Oromia. After the death of his father in an Italian prison in 1940 he was brought up by his loving uncle. The young Bulcha Demeksa had to walk two hours daily to and from the school. He was educated at the Ethiopian Seventh Day Adventist Mission School and became an elementary school teacher in 1948. He was blessed with his first son in the same year. He was also trained at Kuyera Seventh Day Adventist Teachers Training School and taught for a few years as a high school teacher. With an insatiable hunger for higher education, Bulcha Demeksa, a father of four children and a husband joined The University College of Addis Ababa in 1956. When he was first year student, there were around 350 students out of which only eight were officially known as Oromo.

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…Oromo students modified their names to make it sound like Amharic names, because of the very heavy social pressure to ‗Amharize‘. E.g. Guddina (Oromo) would change it to Wuddineh (Amharic): Ayano (Oromo) would change it to Ayenew (Amharic); Talila (Oromo) would change it to Tellele, thus passing for an Amhara. In those days, finding a job and getting a promotion was much easier if one had an Amharic name (p. 43).

The book under review clearly demonstrates that it was an Ethiopian government policy to force educated Oromo to deny their identity and to "…be ashamed of their names, accent, the gadaa system (p. 84) and the Oromo way of life and their cultural heritage. The policy of the time was to force educated Oromo to commit cultural suicide and wear an Amahara mask. At University College of Addis Ababa, Bulcha Demkesa studied economics and upon his graduation in 1959, he entered Syracuse University and graduated with a Masters‘ degree in economics and Public Administration. When he returned to Ethiopia in December 1960, he was employed in the Ministry of Finance and ably served under Yilma Deressa. Instead of his Oromo name of Bulcha, some Amhara officials ―… had the temerity to advise me to choose a nice Amhara name and sound normal.‖ The author adds that an important ―… Amhara official once lost his temper and said: ‗After all, you are serving at our will‘‖ (p. 59). Bulcha Demkesa gives another example of the incredible insensitivity of an Amhara official. ―An Amhara Minister of Education…once said to an Oromo student who became first in his class. ‗I cannot present you to the Emperor with this name‘. He gave him the name of ‗Wolde Mekael‘ and presented him to the Emperor‖ (p. 70). The unfortunate man lived with that name until his death. The real tragedy of the policy of Amharization was that Emperor Haile Selassie, who was the main author of this policy himself, had Oromo blood in his vein. It was unthinkable for the ruling class headed by Emperor Haile Selassie to consider Ethiopia as a multiethnic, multi-cultural, multi-language and multi-religious state. What the Ethiopian ruling class since 1941 wanted was to create a single Ethiopian nation based on Amhara identity, their language and cultural heritage. It was through the policy of Amharization that the Emperor wanted to make educated Oromo an integral part of the Amhara nation. Amharization involved abandoning the Oromo names, language, culture, way of life, and world-view and their 125


replacement by Christian names, Amharic language, Amhara culture, religion, way of life, and their world-view. Through the educational system and bureaucracy, the Emperor aimed at breaking educated Oromos in body, soul, and spirit so as to dehumanize and reduce them to the condition of helplessness and dejection, thus facilitating his Amharization policy. This means Haile Selassie's government sought not only to destroy educated Oromos‘ pride in their cultural heritage, but also needed to keep them chained with no faith in themselves, their history to the extent that their university education did not help those Oromo individuals to overcome their inferiority complex. My life, My vision for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia captures the insensitivity and cultural chauvinism of the Amhara and Tigrayan ruling elites towards the Oromo, their determination for marginalizing the Oromo politically and controlling Oromo resources. Bulcha Demkesa‘s efforts at making a difference so eloquently expresses the importance of establishing genuine federalism for achieving full autonomy for the Oromo within Ethiopia. The book depicts the author's fascinating journey through various stages of his life. It is a remarkable journey filled with obstacles, and an indomitable human spirit that enabled the author to achieve what was beyond imagination. One does not expect a son of an Oromo farmer to become a famous personality on the Ethiopian political landscape as well as on the international stage. While working at the Ministry of Finance, Bulcha Demeksa also obtained LLB from Haile Selassie University Law School in 1967. In the same year he married his second wife, Helen, who gave birth to his youngest daughter who was given a beautiful Oromo name of Nacisse, in memory of the author‘s mother. As a competent and hardworking technocrat, Bulcha Demeksa became the youngest Deputy–Minister of Finance. ―… My promotion caused a lot of talk in government circles‖ (59). Although there were more than tenfold Amhara officials in that ministry, those who imagined Bulcha Demeksa's promotion to be Yilma Deressa‘s favoritism spread wild rumor that depicted the Ministry of Finance as ―Galla Ministry‖ the highest expression of cultural chauvinism— Galla was the derogatory name by which Oromo were officially known in those days. Bulcha Demeksa‘s spectacular professional success was dream come true only for the sons of the aristocracy in those days. It was a tribute to his hard work and technical 126

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competence for the man, who was asked to change his "strange sounding" Oromo name to a nice Amhara one, to rise to such position of power so rapidly. His success attracted the envy and jealously of some officials, who through bureaucratic infighting and intrigues forced Bulcha Demeksa to seek an opportunity at the World Bank in 1969. In the process, by the law of unintended consequences, arrogant Amhara officials moved Bulcha Demeksa onto the world stage, opening up opportunities for him to serve at the World Bank. Bulcha Demeksa returned to Ethiopia in March 1974 when Prime Minister Endalkatchew Mekonnen appointed him as a Minister of Agriculture. However, his friends, especially his life-long friend, the Late Bekele Nadhi advised him not to accept the appointment. He quickly returned to Washington DC, which probably saved him from facing the fate of other Ethiopian officials, including the Prime Minister who appointed Bulcha, all of whom were butchered by the brutal Military regime. After working both at the World Bank and as a diplomat at the United Nations for seventeen years Bulcha Demeksa returned to Ethiopia in 1991. It is well known that the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the organizations it manufactured, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Forces (EPDRF) overthrew the brutal Military regime with the full backing of the US administration. What is new in My life, My vision for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia is that it was under the pressure of the United States Government that the World Bank constructed the highway from Bure in Gojjam to Naqamtee in Wallage, which enabled the TPLF to quickly overthrow of the Military regime in May 1991 (p. 152). While Bulcha Demeksa was in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa in August 1991, the US Ambassador to Ethiopia asked him to join the TPLF controlled Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO). The Ambassador suggested to the author that he would be appointed either as the Minister of Finance or as the Governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia (p. 166). However, as a proud self-respecting Oromo national, Bulcha Demkesa refused to join the OPDO, the organization in whose name the TPLF destroyed all independent Oromo organizations, and in whose name still in 2014 the TPLF plots the removal of millions of Oromo farmers from their ancestral lands, while killing peaceful demonstrators and detaining tens of thousands of innocent Oromo. 127


Once again, the author of My life, My vision for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia retuned to Ethiopia and sought an election to the Constituent Assembly and won with a landslide in 1994. However, the Ruling EPRDF/TPLF stole his electoral victory. Undeterred, the author became one of the founding members of Awash International Bank, which he serviced as president and first CEO. He was one of the founding members of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM), which he led for six years and served as a member of Ethiopian parliament from 2005-2010, where he distinguished himself for championing Oromo language to be the second official language of Ethiopia. Amazingly, Tigrayan elites are as adamantly opposed to making Afan Oromo the second working language of Ethiopia as the Amhara elites are. According to Bulcha Demeksa, the TPLF leaders "...were determined to keep down the Oromo and their culture, so that they would not politically ambitious and exercise their democratic rights by providing political leadership to the nation" (p.268). As a leader of his party, Bulcha Demeksa was allowed to speak for only two minutes. If he wanted to speak, he had to submit his question in writing two weeks earlier. Once he submitted the following question to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. ―The Oromo constitute about 40% of the Ethiopian population, but they are only 5% of the federal civil service. Do you intend to correct this obviously unfair situation?" (269). The Prime Minister never responded to the author's question. The Oromo not only lack fair representation in the federal civil service, but their regional state is under the full control of the TPLF. The author of the book under review clearly shows that the late Ethiopian Prime Minister was a vulgar leader, who lacked respect both for members of his rubber stamp parliament as well as the Ethiopian population who watched on Sunday the Prime Minister's responses to questions. The Prime Minister regularly mocked and insulted members of the parliament, including Dr. Nagaso Gidada, the previous nominal President of Ethiopia (270). One of the rarest spontaneous questions that I was allowed to ask the Prime Minister was, if the Treasury got money from the U.S. for sending our army to Somalia in view of the fact that the United States was interested in weeding out Al-Qaeda from Somalia.... The Prime Minister, visibly irritated, answered and said that the country

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‗got not even .05 cents from US government‘. He added: ‗We did get condoms, but that is neither food supply, nor guns‘ (269).

Bulcha Demeksa officially retired from the leadership of his party, OFDM, in November 2010. He was replaced by Bekele Garba as the President of OFDM. However, sadly since 2011 Bekele Garba has been languishing in prison, because the TPLF leaders feared his leadership potential the most (p. 275). Although the author did not intend it to be, My life, My vision of the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia, is also a sad chapter of Oromo history. This is because when the author was born in 1930, most of the Oromo people were landless gabars (serfs), who were exploited economically, dominated politically, and dehumanized culturally by the settlers in Oromo land. When Bulcha Demeksa stepped aside from OFDM at the age of 80 in 2010, tens of thousands of the Oromo were being removed from their lands becoming wretched beggars on the sacred lands of their birth. When Bulcha Demeksa was a young man, the central government went to the rural areas only for collecting taxes. Today the so-called Federal government tightly controls the rural areas of Oromia and other parts of Ethiopia while terrorizing, imprisoning, and even killing those who dare to support opposition parties such as that of OFDM. Today the Oromo are as politically powerless as the generation of the 1930s. This is shown by the fact that Bekele Garba, who was made Deputy President of OFDM party in 2009 was thrown into prison in 2011 and recently sentenced to a long prison term simply because the ruling TPLF/EPRDF fears his potential for inspiring and mobilizing the Oromo people for their freedom. Even worse, today Bulcha Demeksa cannot go to the village of his birth in Western Oromia (Preface xi), which shows the extent to which the TPLF and its agents tightly control Oromia. One important lesson that can be drawn from this beautifully written book is that since 1930 Ethiopia has not produced a single government that did not suppress Oromo identity, that did not humiliate the Oromo in all ways big and small, a single government that did not control Oromo resources, a single government that did not abuse the Oromo and other Ethiopians‘ human and democratic rights. There are several typos and unnecessary errors in the book, which otherwise is a great joy to read. What irritated this reviewer the most is the fact that the Red Sea Press asked him to review the original manuscript before they considered it for publication. He 129


spent more than three days carefully reading, suggesting changes and typos to be eliminated and errors to be corrected. About six months before the publication of the book, the Red Sea Press once again asked the reviewer to look at the manuscript before its publication. The typos and the errors he suggested to be removed were never removed. The reviewer again made the second correction and sent back the manuscript to the Red Sea Press. The reviewer was horrified to find the same typos and errors in the published version of the book. To mention just two examples. First, on page 78 the author claims that Mohammed Hassen published his book on Oromo history in England in 1973. However, in 1973 Mohammed Hassen was an undergraduate student at Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa. His book was published in 1990. Second, on page 79 the author claims that "...P.T.W. Baxter quotes from the magazine ‗African Affairs". However , Paul Baxter did not quote from African Affairs. Rather in 1978 Paul Baxter published an article entitled "Ethiopia's Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo" in African Affairs The Journal of The Royal African Society. Despite such easily correctable errors and typos here and there, the book under review is a fascinating work, which is enjoyable to read from the beginning to the end. The book is as much history of the never ending Byzantine Ethiopian political intrigues and cruel and crude human rights violations as it is the story of the life of its famous author. Bulcha Demeksa appears to have always been very a active and creative individual, who always rose to the challenge of the day. He is committed to the Oromo cause. This reviewer heard from a reliable source in early 2001 that if Bulcha Demeksa desired to be President of Ethiopia, the TPLF leaders would have gladly appointed him to that position. However, as an active and proud individual Bulcha Demeksa was not willing to settle for the nominal title of the President of Ethiopia. The book also includes several, lovely photographs that capture the professional progress the author made from the age of 18 to 80. Finally, My life, My vision of the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia is a well written book that shows its author‘s interest in Oromo unity and the unity of the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia under a democratic federal system. The book is also a catalogue of the hope raised by the overthrow of the brutal military regime in 1991 and quickly dashed by the TPLF's total control of the Ethiopian state, with massive US and other Western governments‘ financial support 130

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for a single party rule in Ethiopia. Anyone, who is interested in knowing the depth of contempt the old and the new Ethiopian ruling elites have for the Oromo will find rich food for thought in this book. The book is enjoyable to read and it is a welcome and timely addition to the growing literature on the never-ending political corruption and human misery in Ethiopia, the country that largely depends on foreign aid for feeding its own people but sadly lacking both a rudimentary rule of law and a basic respect for human dignity. Mohammed Hassen Georgia State University, Atlanta

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