leaving no stone unturned: exploring responses to ...

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L EAVING N O S TONE U NTURNED : E XPLORING RESPONSES TO AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED CRACK-FOR-CAR TRANSACTIONS HEITH COPES, ROD K. BRUNSON, CRAIG J. FORSYTH, HEATHER WHITE A sizeable number of crack cocaine users trade temporary use of their vehicles for small amounts of the drug. While the majority of these crack-for-car contracts are fulfilled without police intervention, many are not. These failed arrangements have the potential to cause a wide range of problems for police and the community. Using semi-structured interviews with police officers and active crack cocaine users, we examine how crack-for-car transactions come to law enforcement officers’ attention and how police respond to and perceive the practice. Findings reveal that police believe that these incidents: artificially increase motor vehicle theft rates, waste police resources, perpetuate the drug market, and contribute to tenuous policecitizen relations. Findings have important implications for understanding policecitizen interactions and for developing effective policies.

INTRODUCTION

Privileging certain perspectives about crime and drug issues may lead to distorted and incomplete understandings about the causes, consequences, and solutions to these problems. Many adherents of the broken windows perspective suggest that unkempt lawns, unattended buildings, and unaddressed graffiti are clear signs that __________ Heith Copes is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Sciences at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. His primary research combines symbolic interactionism and rational choice theory to better understand the criminal decision-making process. His recent publications appear in British Journal of Criminology, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Criminology and Public Policy, Justice Quarterly, and Social Problems. He has received funding from the National Institute of Justice. Rod K. Brunson is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey. His work appears in the British Journal of Criminology, Crime & Delinquency, Criminology, Criminology & Public Policy, Gender & Society, Justice Quarterly, Sociological Quarterly, and Urban Affairs Review. Craig J. Forsyth is Professor and the Head of the Department of Criminal Justice and Professor of Sociology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 1983. He is the author of over 160 journal articles, books, and book chapters. His principal research interests are in the areas of deviance and crime. Heather White recently earned a Master’s degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Alabama at Birmingham.

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residents have given up on their communities. This outsider perspective—typically offered by academics and/or public officials—is widely accepted as “truth;” however, as St. Jean (2007) has shown, inhabitants of these neighborhoods interpret these signs of physical decay as evidence that city leaders have abandoned them. Similarly, the view that a community’s crime problem is affected by the degree of informal social control exercised by its residents has long been a focus of traditional and contemporary criminological theories (e.g., Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942;). For instance, in Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls’ (1997) study of Chicago neighborhoods, weak collective efficacy, defined as “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (p. 919), was a strong predictor of violence. However, ethnographic research on active offenders and interviews with residents in some high crime neighborhoods suggest a high degree of social control, albeit toward protecting activities in the underground economy (e.g., Bourgois, 2003; Venkatesh, 2006). This research suggests that socially and physically disorganized neighborhoods do in fact have a measure of community cohesion, but such cohesion exists as a way to maintain illicit activities such as drug selling, prostitution, and the violence that often accompanies such activities. These varying perspectives have the potential to lead to widely different proposed solutions. Thus, examining criminal events from multiple perspectives (e.g., law enforcement, offenders, and victims) is important for understanding, responding to, and preventing such behaviors. Recently, Copes, Forsyth, and Brunson (2007) explored the practice of renting vehicles for crack cocaine from the perspective of those involved. Placing their study in the context of hustling strategies of chronic drug users, they detailed the social organization of what they referred to as “rock rentals.” Implicit in their description of study participants’ motives was the idea that loaning their vehicles was a means for drug users to obtain goods without having to commit riskier crimes, demeaning acts, or endure exorbitant financial burdens. Copes et al.’s respondents considered these arrangements benign because concerned parties both consented and mutually benefited. Regardless of the intensity with which those who engage in rock rentals claim that their actions are harmless, the veracity of such statements is dubious. Law enforcement administrators are quick to highlight the hidden costs associated with a wide range of other supposed victimless crimes (Cohen, 2005). Instead of relying exclusively on the accounts of those who engage in rock rentals to frame the discussion, investigating an additional perspective will advance our understanding of the phenomenon. The primary goal of this research is to examine police officers’ and crack users’ perceptions of and responses to breached rock rental contracts. Specifically, we interviewed police and crack users to explore 152

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the nature and extent of crack-for-car transactions in the study setting, the way police become involved in and responded to these incidents, and officers’ views of the consequences these arrangements had for them and public safety. Toward this end, we first contextualize crack-for-car transactions by reviewing what is known about the practice. After describing our recruitment and data collection strategies, we present study participants’ detailed accounts. We conclude with theoretical and policy implications of our findings. ROCK RENTALS IN CONTEXT

Crack was first developed during the cocaine boom of the 1970s and its use became popular in the United States during the mid-1980s (Reinerman & Levine, 1997). Crack was inexpensive, relatively easy to manufacture, and highly profitable for low-level dealers. Its convenience and potency made it attractive to users as well. A surge in crack sales democratized street level drug selling as more people could gather the necessary resources to become entrepreneurs (Jacobs, 1999). As a consequence: The ranks of street-level crack dealers [were] swelled by [those] who are most likely to be lured by the attractions of the street (e.g., stylish clothes and nice vehicles) and the ones who are least likely to have the means to legally come by these goods. (Copes et al., 2007, p. 897) These factors played a large role in the development and maintenance of an underground economy. Crack addiction can exact a heavy toll on users’ personal finances. Indeed, physiological effects of the drug can make maintaining lawful, steady employment difficult. Crack dealers began trading drugs for goods and services when it became apparent that many of their customers were impoverished and desperate for the drug (Maher, Dunlap, Johnson, & Hamid, 1996; Mieczkowski, 1990; Ratner, 1993). The most commonly cited exchanges involve stolen property or sexual favors (Ratner, 1993). Engaging in such behaviors creates a precarious situation for users as it can lead to them being labeled as “crackheads,” bringing about considerable shame and increased victimization risk (Copes, Hochstetler, & Williams, 2008). To avoid such stigma, it is not uncommon for drug users of all types to offer non-sex related goods and services as a less demeaning way to procure drugs.1 Cash-strapped drug users have been found to barter temporary housing (Maher et al. 1996), drug paraphernalia (e.g., needles) (Preble & Casey, 1969; Sterk, 1999; Williams, 1992), and firearms (Morselli, 2002) to secure their desired intoxicants. The array of non-traditional goods and services provided in many disadvantaged neighborhoods has fostered a significant economy that is, “off the books” (Venkatesh, 2006).2 One service provided WINTER 2011

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by some drug users is to periodically trade the temporary use of their vehicles for crack (Copes et al., 2007). Although most reports about the practice of trading drugs for vehicles come from states in the southern and western parts of the country, it is likely not confined to any particular area within the United States. The practice of rock renting has been described in both newspaper accounts and academic reports across the United States. In August of 2008, a Florida newspaper published an article about an addict lending his $10,000 car to a man he had never met before in exchange for twenty dollars worth of cocaine (Winslow, 2008). Further, a Georgia journalist reported that approximately a tenth of the stolen vehicle reports from Athens-Clarke County could be attributed to rock rentals (Johnson, 2009). Finally, Treen (2009) reported on police responses to the practice in Jacksonville, Florida. In addition to journalists’ writings, rock rentals have been mentioned in a few academic reports (Arizona Criminal Justice Commission [ACJC], 2004; Copes et al., 2007; Lavin & Rich, 2003). During a comprehensive review of motor vehicle theft and the underlying conditions associated with it, “crack street rentals” were listed as a major problem in Detroit and a contributing factor to increased fraudulent auto theft reports in Miami (ACJC, 2004). Rock rentals were also evident in Reno, Nevada, according to a 2003 Information Systems Technology case study, which listed rock rentals among the six major types of auto theft in the jurisdiction (Lavin & Rich, 2003). While the practice of renting cars for drugs is not a new phenomenon, the first extensive academic examination of the practice was conducted by Copes et al. (2007). Using interviews with drug dealers who rented vehicles for crack and active crack cocaine users who loaned their vehicles, they investigated the social organization of rock rentals, including the structure of crack-for-car transactions and the motives behind them. Copes and his colleagues discovered that transactions were more often initiated by crack users rather than by dealers. Further, they reported that the customary arrangement was two to four small pieces of crack cocaine in exchange for three to four hours use of the vehicle, though this exchange rate varied depending on the circumstances. For example, more drugs were needed for nicer vehicles and extended rental times. Most important for the current study, Copes et al. (2007) suggested that parties in the rock rental transaction often abide by the informal contract. That is, borrowers typically return the vehicles on time and loaners do not try to get their automobiles back too soon. There are good reasons why this is the case. Dealers want to be able to continue using the vehicles and users want to continue getting drugs with what is deemed a modest investment of wear and tear on the vehicle. Violations do occur, however. Indeed, some car thieves deliberately prey on those willing to 154



loan their vehicles for drugs (Copes & Cherbonneau, 2006; Lavin & Rich, 2003). Other dealers borrow automobiles to drive them recklessly or to commit additional crimes. In some cases, users get anxious about the arrangement and report their cars stolen, even when the borrowers intend to return the automobiles (even if a little later than agreed upon and/or worse for wear). Some drug users loan vehicles that do not belong to them without the consent of the legitimate owners. It is these situations that may present problems for law enforcement and the larger community and are the focus of the current research. Extending the work of Copes et al. (2007), we examine how police become involved in failed rock rental transactions and their perceptions of the deleterious consequences of these illicit transactions. METHODS

Data for the current study are drawn from in-depth interviews with 13 police officers and 27 active crack cocaine users who loaned their vehicles for drugs. The interview participants (both crack users and police) were recruited from a mid-sized city in Louisiana. At the time of the interviews, nearly two-thirds of the city’s population is White, one-third is Black, and roughly five percent is comprised of other races. Approximately one-fifth of the population lived below the poverty line. The violent crime rate of the metropolitan area was slightly higher than the average rate for comparable areas; however, the city’s property crime rate overall, and motor vehicle theft rate specifically, were considerably lower than comparable areas nationwide. The officers we interviewed were employed by the city’s police department. In 2009, the police department employed 253 sworn officers and 55 civilian employees (FBI, 2009). This department houses a single detective division that investigates all felonies, including motor vehicle thefts. When we approached police officials with questions about rock rentals, they appeared well aware of the problem and eager to understand it better. The police participants were recruited by an officer from the department under study. Seven of the respondents were assigned to patrol and six were detectives (one was a Sergeant); four were female and nine were male. During the course of the interviews, officers were asked to describe the characteristics of those who engage in rock rentals (both as borrowers and lenders) and of the transactions (e.g., the length of time vehicles were loaned and amounts of drugs involved). We also asked police respondents about their perceptions of the nature and extent of this activity in their jurisdiction. For example, they were asked to estimate when the practice first began and the frequency with which it currently occurs. During the interviews we probed for information regarding problems, if any, that they thought rock rentals created for individual officers, departmental resources, and public safety. The police participants were also asked to explain how, if at all, they saw rock rentals as being different from traditional auto thefts and how they responded to each. The concluding questions WINTER 2011

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asked what officers thought the department policy about rock rentals should be and how that differed from current directives. We also wanted to gain the perspective of those who had traded their automobiles for crack. During a previous research project on local drug markets, one of the authors established rapport with three active crack cocaine users who loaned their vehicles for drugs (Evans, Forsyth, & Gauthier, 2002). These individuals served as initial interview participants and later as recruiters. Using snowball sampling techniques, we located an additional 24 individuals. Our interviews with drug using respondents were designed to learn about their participation in renting vehicles for drugs, including whether they involved police in contract violations, whether they encountered problems with police for doing so, and whether they knew of others who had problems with police. For this sample, all were African American and ranged in age from 21 to 54; the average age was 36. Twenty-two were male and five were female. The number of years they reported using crack spanned from two to 16, with the average being seven years. While most claimed not to involve police when things went awry, a handful of them admitted to occasionally reporting their vehicles as stolen, either as retribution against dealers or to facilitate the recovery of lost property. Both interview guides contained open-ended, semi-structured questions that allowed for considerable probing. The interviews were put into text-form for analysis. During this process all identifying marks were removed. The names that appear in the text, for both officers and drug users, are aliases assigned by us. For coding transcripts, we independently read them to identify common themes regarding police involvement and perceptions of rock rentals (i.e., open coding) (Strauss, 1987). We then conferred to compare coding and come to agreement on axial coding, which became the sections included in the results (Charmaz, 2006). Once we agreed upon the overarching themes, the first two authors then recoded all transcripts. On the few cases where we initially differed on coding, we discussed the discrepancy and reached agreement. In addition, this data was complemented by official police reports about motor vehicle thefts and failure to return, which include rock rentals. Specifically, we were given access to all motor vehicle theft (Code 68) and failure to return (Code 10) reports for 2007. For a typical auto theft in the study setting, an officer is called to the scene to create a report and the incident is designated a Code 68. The vehicle information is subsequently entered into the National Crime Information Center database (NCIC). In cases where a person willingly loans their vehicle, a stolen vehicle report will not be taken. Instead, the incident will be classified as a Code 10, request to locate, and will not be entered into the NCIC. Police in the jurisdiction do not consider the vehicle stolen because both parties voluntarily entered into an 156



agreement concerning the automobile’s use. According to the NCIC entry guidelines, a rented vehicle does not meet the criteria needed in order to be listed in the national database. These reports allowed us to gain a better understanding of the extent of rock rentals reported as motor vehicle thefts in the study site. This information was used to estimate the prevalence of rock rentals in relation to auto thefts. POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN ROCK RENTALS

Previous research shows that most rock rentals go as planned, and even when they do not, police are not usually informed (Copes et al., 2007). This is due to a general distrust of police and reluctance to request their services among those we interviewed, an opinion shared by many drug addicted persons living in the United States and abroad (Bennett, Brookman, Hochstetler, & Copes, 2011; Jacobs, 1999). The officers interviewed had differing opinions about the percentage of rock rentals that are conducted without police intervention. Their estimates on the number of rock rentals that did not result in official reports ranged from 60 to 75 percent. These assessments were based on non-rock rental related investigations with those who participate in such affairs. For example, Officer Stackhouse stated, “when suspects are being interviewed about another crime, they admit to participating in rock rentals on a regular basis.” The general tendency to avoid police was likely due to the common edict among those living criminal lifestyles to deal with problems on their own (Anderson, 1999; Jacobs & Wright, 2006). Many of the crack users with whom we spoke shared this view. When asked how he handled borrowers not returning his car on time or doing damage to it, Donovan replied, “if they just damage it then I just accept crack for the repairs and I don’t repair it.” Similarly, Damone said, “I just get my insurance to fix it and my cousins pay me with a lot of crack if they mess something up.” Other respondents were more fatalistic in answering this question. Marcus claimed that, “I really don’t care, as long as I get my issue [of drugs].” Implicit in their statements was that they avoided involving police in their “business.” This reluctance to involve police led some to suffer adverse legal consequences. For instance, when asked if he ever had problems with police for renting his vehicle, Damone replied, “One time the guys [I rented to] had got caught and I had to go get my vehicle in Texas and [the police] questioned me a lot and even threaten[ed] to put me in jail if I didn’t cooperate.” Similarly, Jeanenne said: One time when I let my brother use my car, he went [to] score some dope in Texas and got pulled over for no seat belt. [Police] stripped the car and found two [kilos of cocaine] in the bumper. I had to go get my car and they came at me hard this time because that was the second time my car was stopped; so they threatened to put me in jail . . . That’s the last time I let anyone use my car. WINTER 2011

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Those who rent their vehicles seemingly have little recourse when things do not go their way. While violence and retaliation are promoted as the primary ways to settle disputes among those embedded in street-life, those who have succumb to the effects of chronic crack use are seldom able to strike fear in others (Copes et al., 2008; Furst, Johnson, Dunlap, & Curtis, 1999). Thus, the proposed benefit of warding off future victimization that violent retaliation brings is seldom available to them. Their only options, then, may be to call police, request that the borrower give them more crack, or simply accept their fates. While the latter two are seemingly the most common responses, official data confirmed that those involved in rock rentals occasionally do solicit police for assistance. Involving police was usually the result of drug users getting anxious when borrowers were delayed in returning vehicles, rather than a planned event to get their vehicles back prematurely. That said, drug users often threatened borrowers with going to police to ensure that vehicles were eventually returned. For example, Travis, one of the crack users interviewed, said, “I’d tell [borrowers] to be careful because if they get in trouble, I am going to say they stole it.” Likewise, Justin stated, “They must bring it back by the time I say or I call the cops.” Some lenders did more than threaten to call police. For instance, Eddie recounted the following incident, “I got arrested for a hit and run that my car was involved in and I told [the police the person’s name] who was driving it and they got arrested.” And while relaying a rock rental incident that happened to a friend, Cody said: The cops reported that someone driving a white Neon was speeding and driving crazy . . . When police caught up with the car later, it was abandon[ed]. The cops went to the person’s house whose name the car was registered in and arrested him. So he had to tell who was driving the car or take the lick (charge)—of course he told. Similarly, Brison offered the following account: I heard that another crackhead had taken his wife’s car in the middle of the night without her permission and when she woke up to go to work in the early hours of the morning, her car wasn’t there and she reported it stolen. The cops found the car with the guys in it who had rented it from her husband and arrested them. And her husband said they stole it, too, so she would not find out about his bad [crack] habit. Some crack users who rented their vehicles were tipped off that the borrowers might engage in illegal acts while in possession of their cars. This knowledge prompted their decision to involve police. For instance, Damone stated: One time my cousins had robbed a truck stop casino nearby and the cops was chasing them and they ditched the vehicle and ran 158



away. The cops traced the vehicle back to me but I had reported it stolen because they were taking too long to bring my vehicle back and plus I had found out what they had planned to do. Thus, it is clear that renters interpreted some situations worthy of soliciting police for help, regardless of subcultural expectations (Topalli, 2005). Evidence of drug users contacting police was also found in the narratives of police reports filed for motor vehicle thefts and requests to locate. One report read, “Complainant contacted the police and stated that his vehicle was stolen. During the investigation, it was learned that the vehicle was rented for crack cocaine.” While most of the lenders tried to disguise that they rented their vehicles, some were more forthright. These reports included statements such as, “Complainant contacted police and advised that he rented out his vehicle for illegal narcotics. He stated that his vehicle has not been returned” and “Complainant contacted the police and reported that his brother rented out his vehicle in exchange for crack cocaine.” In addition to complaints directly from those renting their vehicles, police also became involved in rock rental investigations when the user loaned the vehicle of a friend or family member without obtaining the owner’s permission, which was not uncommon (recall Brison’s previous quote). In some instances, when family members became aware that their vehicles had been rented, they reported the incidents to police. The officers claimed that in these cases they recorded the events as motor vehicle thefts if they thought that the real owners were not aware of the rental transaction. As Officer Thornton explained: The only situation where I would consider [a rock rental] a real theft is when . . . or example, if I loan my vehicle to my brother, who came to visit me from Texas, and he loaned the vehicle out, then I should not be penalized. Another example of this situation was highlighted in a police report: [The complainant] allowed her father to drive her vehicle to the store. He returned without the car stating that it was stolen while he was [inside]. She admitted that her father has a drug problem and he probably rented the car out for drugs. In this case, the officer coded the incident as a motor vehicle theft even though it was most likely a rock rental. Finally, police became involved in rock rentals when they witnessed or received reports about vehicles being driven recklessly. Evidence of this type of careless driving was demonstrated in Copes et al.’s study (2007). They found that several of those interviewed obtained rented cars solely for this purpose. Two of their study participants stated:

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[I] drove [rock rentals] hard—jumping [railroad] tracks and stuff” and “[I used rock rentals] just to tear them up. Sometimes I might get a rock rental and [drive to a place where] they have a big ole field or open park and I’d get out there and spin the tires all in the park . . . I was just having fun in the cars tearing them up or just squealing the tires” (p. 893). Those who rented their vehicles to dealers shared similar stories. According to Jerry, “the guys had rented a car and were driving drunk and the driver fell to sleep and they hit another car head on.” Whitney said those renting his car were caught because “they had got pulled over for speeding.” Damone recalled an incident that happened to his cousin, in his words, “[he] had rented out his car to someone who was driving drunk and he hit a teenage girl and smashed her into a tree and killed her.” POLICE PERCEPTIONS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ROCK RENTALS

Regardless of how police become aware of the transactions, police officers’ ongoing battle with rock rentals made them keenly aware of the many problems this practice has for the community and local police. In their accounts of the practice, it became clear that they did not see rock rentals as a victimless crime. Some of the problems they attributed to the practice included strained police-citizen relations, increased motor vehicle theft rates, wasted police resources, and perpetuation of drug and criminal activities. STRAINED POLICE-CITIZEN RELATIONS

For the most part, those who contacted police tried to conceal that they had rented their vehicles for drugs. Police study participants reported that in the past they treated rock rentals as auto thefts, even when the complainants were honest about the situation. Eventually, police stopped this practice and began treating crack-for-car transactions as “requests to locate.” Police acknowledged that they expended minimal energy looking for these vehicles. Officer Morrow claimed that he spent no time looking for them unless, “I recognize one or stumble across one then I’ll deal with it.” Officer Patin acknowledged that he occasionally looked for crack rented vehicles, but only when, “looking for drug dealers, because that is who is driving them.” As a result of police assigning rock rentals low priority, drug users reported that their vehicles were located faster if they were reported stolen rather than simply missing. Drug users seemingly adapted to the change in police procedure by trying to deceive officers. Thus, it became increasingly difficult for police to determine if the alleged victim rented his or her automobile for drugs. This evolution of policy was best explained by Officer Northman:

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[Previously] these transactions would be listed as stolen vehicles, but in the past few years, the police have begun asking proper questions and filing the report appropriately so as not to list stolen vehicles that were not legitimately stolen. The addicts have become wise to this and now will describe a vehicle theft, even when it is not, so that the police will list it as stolen and make a genuine effort to recover it. It is a game of cat and mouse between the police and the addicts. Drug users acknowledged that police did not take their calls seriously unless they claimed the incident was a theft. According to Officer Merlotte, “Quite often, an addict reports the car stolen but will report that they left the car unlocked and the keys in it at a motel or other location. They usually won’t say it’s a [rock] rental unless the officer questions them.” An example of this was found in an October 2007 police report stating that a complainant contacted the police and reported that her car was stolen while she was inside a store. She stated that she left the keys in the car and the doors unlocked. The officer indicated in the report that she had reported her car stolen on four previous occasions. She had also been arrested once before for filing a false report of a stolen car. The responding officer did not classify the incident as a motor vehicle theft but as a request to locate. To avoid devoting resources to locate rock rentals, officers said that they tried to determine if the complaint was “legitimate.” Officer Northman explained the cues that he looked for when trying to determine if a stolen auto report was actually a rock rental: You have to ask the complainant the proper questions. If it is an actual theft, the vehicle will most likely have evidence of a forced entry and the suspect will still have the keys. If it is a rock rental, the complainant will most likely know who the suspect is or where the vehicle is likely to be found. As Officer Northman explained, he and his colleagues began to compile a list of characteristics that were seemingly unique to rock rentals. For example, they claimed that with “actual” auto thefts, the complainants typically still had possession of their keys and there was evidence of forced entry, such as damaged locks, broken windows or cracked steering columns (Cherbonneau & Copes, 2006); however, those who willingly loaned their vehicle also relinquished their keys to borrowers. Another factor officers considered was whether the complainant could tell them who the likely suspect was or where police might find the vehicle. Officers noticed that if a vehicle was actually stolen, the victim should have no idea about how it was taken, who would have taken it or where it might be located. As officers became more experienced with false reports, they claimed to have developed the ability to WINTER 2011

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recognize inconsistencies in complainants’ stories. The officers interviewed reported having consistently encountered reports of auto thefts that turned out to be defaulted rock rentals and as a result had reportedly honed their ability to detect fraud. Many of the officers thought that the “cat and mouse game” of dealing with rock rentals had a negative impact on police-citizen relations. After devoting numerous man hours to investigating fraudulent auto theft calls, officers noted that they became skeptical of most auto theft claims. As Officer Boshart stated, “Officers tend to look at every car theft complainant as a possible drug user and officers might receive civilian complaints because they try to dispute their story of how the vehicle was taken.” This cynical mentality led some officers to become more aggressive in their questioning of alleged auto theft victims. Officer Landry acknowledged that, “I would try to discredit the complainant’s story and if I could not, I would file the 68 report (motor vehicle theft).” This officer took a position that it was necessary to try to falsify the complainant’s claim and only if he could not would he treat the incident as a motor vehicle theft. Another officer claimed that she would, “question the complainant thoroughly . . . looking for clues.” As a result of these antagonistic lines of questioning, officers claimed that the department received more citizen complaints. However, officers saw this as a necessary risk. As Officer Reynolds explained, “If the officer tries to get [a complainant] to admit it is a rental, they may file [an allegation] against the officer but if the officer pursues and a life is lost, the officer is held responsible for not investigating.” It appears that the tactics officers took to cull false reports from real ones varied from stealth strategies that relied more on subtle questions to more aggressive tactics that were accusatory and confrontational. It is the latter form of questioning that is most deleterious for police-citizen relations. INCREASED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT RATES

The false reporting of these incidents as auto thefts was also thought to have contributed to inflated motor vehicle theft rates within the jurisdiction. This trend has been recognized by numerous other police agencies as well (Matteucci, 2005). In fact, estimates from some jurisdictions are that more than half of all cars reported stolen or missing have actually been loaned out to drug dealers who fail to return them (Brown, 2007). One newspaper article revealed that, “nearly 400 of the 792 reports of stolen vehicles taken between May and November [2006] were crack rentals” (Jackson, 2007). According to police in the study site, these problems increased over the past few years. The statistics for the study setting show that approximately 16% of reported auto thefts in 2007 were potentially rock rentals. And of the 853 reports of auto thefts (Code 68s) received in 2007, 135 of them were incorrectly reported. The officers attributed the bulk of these recodes to rock 162



rentals. Artificially inflated motor vehicle theft rates were the most commonly stated problem with rock rentals among police. All officers interviewed made statements consistent with Officer Thornton’s claim that due to rock rentals, “the crime rate appears worse than it is.” One adverse consequence of artificially inflated auto theft rates is the negative image it portrays to potential residents and business owners. According to Officer Thornton, “It lowers the attractiveness of the city and may discourage people from moving into or around the city.” He further added that these false reports, “make it appear that the department can’t control incidents of auto theft.” Additionally, the increase in rock rentals, at least the perception that it increased, may lead to views that drug use, specifically crack cocaine use, has increased in the area. Although we do not have official data indicating that the prevalence of crack use rose in the area, the assumption among officers was that it did. WASTED RESOURCES

All of the officers interviewed said that rock rentals should not be considered equal to motor vehicle thefts and should not have priority over their other duties. Officer Northman expressed this position stating, “If the theft is legitimate, there is a real victim who deserves police assistance, but the addict created the situation and should not consume police resources to recover property he traded for illegal drugs.” If officers determined that the call was a rock rental, the general consensus among them was to document the incident as a Code 10 (i.e., a request to locate) and pass the information on to their fellow officers. If they happen to find the vehicle at a later time, then the owner would be notified as to its whereabouts. As Officer Stackhouse explained: When a vehicle is stolen, the person stealing the vehicle has the intent to permanently deprive the victim of the vehicle. When a rock trade is conducted, there is a trade agreement between two parties which, at that point, makes it a civil matter. This attitude is likely what led many crack users to disguise the nature of the missing vehicle. Even though none of the officers considered rock rentals comparable to auto thefts, they did agree that it was their duty to do something about the reported incidents. The consensus was that they should take the claimants information, look for the vehicle while patrolling, and if the vehicle is located then inform the owner; if it is not, then they should pass on a “be-on-the-lookout” for the vehicle to the next shift. Officers insisted, however, that nothing further should be done about failed crack-for-car transactions. They suggested that they should give requests to locate unreturned rock rentals, “as much [time] as other calls for service allowed during a tour of duty” (Officer Vincent). This common sentiment among officers WINTER 2011

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was circumvented, however, by the addict who withheld information about why his or her automobile was missing. Not only did misrepresenting unreturned vehicles as stolen contribute to artificially high motor vehicle theft rates, they also amounted to significant drains on police resources and increased officers’ workloads. Since department policy mandated that officers respond to all auto theft calls, Officer Young thought misreports, “created needless paperwork and took the officer out of service for a good while.” Officer Stackhouse stated: [rock rentals] add to the expense of running the police department. Manpower is now being utilized to take a report that is false and then to disseminate the information and then officers search for the alleged stolen vehicle. In agreement, Officer Thornton said: It also affects the police department because it is a waste of time when officers could be handling other calls or being proactive. When [rock rentals] are reported as being stolen they often end up in pursuits, which cause a hazard to the officers as well as the citizens. The previous quote from Officer Thornton pointed to another concern of attributing too high of a priority to broken crack-for-car transactions. Specifically, the implication is that legal and physical harm could come to them for pursuing rock rentals. A handful of officers suggested that they may be subject to, “liability when [they] use force to recover a vehicle that is improperly reported stolen when it is not” (Officer Northman). While the legal harm that could emerge from pursuits was a concern for just a few officers, the physical harm that could result from these situations appeared to weigh heavily on the minds of nearly all officers interviewed. Pursuits, especially high speed ones, have the potential to put numerous lives in jeopardy, including fleeing suspects, pursuing officers, and innocent bystanders (Alpert & Anderson, 1986). It was not surprising, then, that the general consensus among police was that they should never engage in pursuits of rock rented vehicles because, “it is too dangerous for everyone involved” (Officer Young); however, sometimes pursuits occurred when suspects fled and police did not know the circumstances. It was the unwitting pursuit of rock rentals that most concerned Officer Young: The biggest concern, to me, is the potential danger that exists as the result of a vehicle pursuit or felony traffic stop on a “stolen” vehicle when it is actually a rental. Officers, bystanders, and other persons involved can be injured if there is a vehicle crash, if officers have to fight with the “suspect” and if K-9 is on scene anyone, including an officer, can be bitten. 164



Police reported that rock rentals often escalated into pursuits because the dealers have no attachment or financial investment in the automobiles (see Copes et al., 2007). Further, because many renters claimed they were not concerned about retaliation from crack users, they felt no obligation or pressure to take care of vehicles once pursued. PERPETUATED DRUG MARKET AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

Another problem police associated with rock rentals was that the practice was thought to be a means to support the drug market and/or other criminal activities. As Officer Stackhouse explained: The fact that addicts have a need for illegal drugs gives the drug dealers a market. The market unfortunately is in someone’s neighborhood, which leads to a higher crime rate. Dealers usually carry weapons, are territorial, and have altercations [with others involved in the drug trade] . . . In turn, this demands a greater police presence to deal with the drug problem, and other crimes by addicts, such as thefts. The implication was that rock rentals helped sustain the drug market, as the practice allowed those short on cash to continue using the drug and simultaneously provided resources for drug sellers. Whitney acknowledged, “I am hooked on this drug and by renting [my car] out to the dealers I don’t have to use my money.” Similarly, Cody noted, “I am unemployed and my unemployment check is not enough to pay my bills and to support my habit so I rent out my car.” By renting out their vehicles they could also hide their drug use from others. Gerald explained, “I rent [my vehicle] out at night so my friends and family don’t know what’s going on and [the dealers] bring it back before daylight.” In agreement, Sidney described how she was able to discretely support her drug habit. She said, “I rent it out late at night so nobody will be in my business and they bring it back [before] daylight.” Additionally, the use of other people’s vehicles allowed drug sellers to engage in a wide range of illicit activities with some degree of anonymity. Copes and his colleagues (2007) discussed the use of rented vehicles to “do dirt.” They quote several offenders to support this claim. For instance, one of the offenders they interview said, “[I] rob in them. But [the owners] never knew that. I just bring it back to them [and say,] ‘I appreciate it brother.’ Whenever we didn’t feel like stealing a car we just say, go get a rock rental.” (p. 893). Such claims by users support the contention by police that rock rentals sustain the drug market. While the perpetuation of drug markets caused officers’ considerable concern, what was most troubling to them was that they may be unwittingly aiding this chain of criminal activity by actively searching for automobiles that were falsely reported as stolen. As Officer Reynolds described: WINTER 2011

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Law enforcement officers are [unwittingly being] used to aid drug abuse. The police are used to get [drug users’] vehicles back. When it is recovered, the “victim” has their car back and the rock has been smoked, resulting in a revolving effect. This potential for facilitating drug markets was especially troubling to many officers. In fact, it seemingly caused them to change the way they interacted with citizens, especially those from disadvantaged areas who attempted to report their vehicles stolen. CONCLUSION

One of the goals of the current research was to provide varying perspectives on the practice of renting vehicles for crack. By illustrating how police and drug users view crack-for-car transactions, we are able to provide a more complete picture of how and why police became involved in the events and the potential consequences of such practices. We found that there is much overlap between the perspectives of police and drug users, at least when discussing the social organization of rock rentals and ways that police become involved in them. The interviews with study participants reveal that crack-for-car transactions are usually conducted without police intervention. Not surprisingly, however, these contracts are not always carried out as planned. Sometimes, the borrowers do not return automobiles promptly, if ever. Few borrowers have reservations about damaging and/or abandoning rented vehicles. Other times, addicts loan vehicles belonging to family members or friends. It is typically under these circumstances that law enforcement officers become involved. We did find divergence in the perceived outcomes of broken rock rental contracts. Those who loan or borrow vehicles for crack see their actions as victimless (Copes et al., 2007). They claim that if there is a victim, it is the person who loaned their vehicle and these people knew the situation for which they were getting involved. Police, on the other hand, were more leery of these transactions and pointed to numerous problems that emerged from them, including strained police-citizen relations, increased motor vehicle theft rates, potential harm from unnecessary pursuits, and perpetuation of drug cultures. They argued that drug addicts often file false motor vehicle theft reports, which has the potential to distort official crime statistics and needlessly consume police resources that could be used more efficiently elsewhere. If a police officer encounters a drug dealer in possession of a rented vehicle, the situation can escalate, which can potentially put themselves and the general public in immediate danger. As a consequence of frequently encountering rock rentals, officers have become skeptical of auto theft reports. According to those we interviewed, this cynicism has contributed to problems with citizens who attempted to report legitimate auto thefts and has led to complaints being filed against 166



them and the department. Clearly, police see many problems associated with the practice of renting vehicles for crack. While we have focused on the specific practice of rock rentals and police perceptions of the consequences of this behavior, we think that our findings have broader implications. One of the most troubling consequences reported by police was the potential for weakened relations between police and citizens. It appears that police have responded to rock rentals by being skeptical and antagonistic toward victims. This suggests that police should develop better policies for responding to motor vehicle theft calls. The larger issue addressed herein is developing guidelines for problems that do not fit existing policy. In these situations, patrol officers have nowhere to turn and thus are left to come up with their own solutions. As anyone who works in formal agencies involving the public knows, inconsistency breeds distrust. When citizens perceive differential treatment from police they are more apt to file formal complaints, have less trust in police, and are less likely to call them when needed (Brunson, 2007; Brunson & Weitzer, 2009; Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007; Duran, 2009; Gau & Brunson, 2010; Weitzer & Brunson, 2009). All can contribute to citizens being uncooperative with law enforcement officials and encourage self-policing (Anderson, 1999). To thwart these potential problems, line officers should be aware of emerging problems or of incidents that do not fit existing policy and be willing to bring these issues to the attention of police executives. Additionally, administrators should provide officers with opportunities to discuss new problems and be prepared to take action to address them. By doing so, new guidelines can be constructed sooner. And in the meantime, police executives can come to an agreement on standard ways of dealing with the issue, whatever it may be. While there is no way to eliminate the lag between emerging problems caused by drug addiction and formal policy altogether, with diligence and a concerted effort from patrol officers and administrators, it is possible to narrow this gap. Our findings also have implications for our understanding of police officers’ interactions with drug users. Due to economic marginalization, blocked access to legitimate institutions and cultural imperatives, many members of the urban underclass have developed a do-it-yourself attitude toward justice (Anderson, 1999). Whereas most citizens may be comfortable seeking help from police to resolve disputes, those Anderson defines as “street” are more likely to avoid police altogether and settle clashes through personal retaliation (Jacobs & Wright, 2006). This is especially true for individuals engaged in illicit activities, as notifying police may expose their own wrongdoing. Our findings both confirm and challenge these claims about self-policing. It is true that many drug users with whom we spoke claimed to be hesitant to solicit police for help; however, many did just that. Perhaps due WINTER 2011

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to their low status on the streets or their inability to retaliate effectively, they chose to let police handle their disputes. Few crack users with whom we spoke carried themselves as street heavies or presented identities as violent, “hardasses.” The inability to instill the kind of fear necessary to ward off victimization may have left them with few desirable options when seeking return of their vehicles. One reason those involved in illicit activities are thought to avoid police is because they presume that police will be unreceptive to their requests for help. After all, their victimization emerged during the course of their own illegal behavior. Our results show that this assumption is not always accurate. When those who loaned their vehicles for crack sought police assistance, they often received the outcome they desired—the return of their vehicles. Even when police suspected (or in some cases knew) the situation was not completely legitimate (i.e., that the complainant loaned his or her car for drugs) they filed reports and passed on “look outs” for the missing vehicles. Many of the drug users said that police were slow to respond when they knew fully the circumstances of the incident; however, no study participants mentioned police not locating rented vehicles (regardless if they were forthright or if they withheld the truth about the nature of the incident). In addition, only six of the 27 renters said that they experienced trouble with police because of loaning their vehicles and in each of these cases police found drugs when investigating the incident. This finding suggests that drug users do have access to police, albeit limited. While it may seem counterintuitive that police would or should offer aid to those engaged in illegal activities, doing so may reduce street violence. As previously stated, people labeled “crackheads” likely have a diminished capability to retaliate when wronged, which may explain why they contact police. Their reduced status on the streets may put them in harm’s way when confronting other members of the streetlevel drug world. Instead of willingly returning users’ vehicles when confronted, borrowers may be just as likely to respond with violence.3 Thus, when police step in to resolve failed crack-for-car contracts, they may be preventing violence and its spread in communities where these transactions are most common. Due to the relatively large amount of imperfect retaliation that exists (Jacobs & Wright, 2006), responding to such calls for service may even prevent innocent third-parties from being harmed. By providing insights into crack-for-car transactions from varying perspectives, we have been able to offer a more detailed, nuanced perspective of the practice, offer general policy implications, and add to knowledge about various aspects of street-life. While we have focused solely on the practice of bartering crack for vehicles, we think that our research also has implications for future criminal justice research. Specifically, by soliciting the insights from police and “offenders” about other practices that have criminal justice implications (e.g., fleeing from police, 168



participation in black market sales of legal items or fencing stolen goods), scholars can both enhance theoretical insights into criminal and deviant behavior and provide police with a better understanding of offenders’ perspectives and lived experiences. Doing so may be critical for the prevention of problem activities. NOTES 1.

2.

3.

While we focus on behaviors of crack users, those who indulge in other drugs also seek to avoid stigmatizing labels such as “meth heads” and “dope fiends.” Much of the underground economy is not instigated by drug dependency, but by structural barriers that block access to legitimate outlets for these goods and services (Venkatesh, 2006). During the course of our study, a female respondent was killed during a rock rental related dispute.

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