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Development in Practice, Volume 21, Numbers 4 – 5, June 2011

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Lessons from the 2008 global food crisis: agro-food dynamics in Mali William G. Moseley High food prices in 2008 sparked food riots around the world, with urban West Africa suffering many of these disturbances. Urban Mali appears to have been spared the worst of this crisis as consumers shifted from rice to sorghum, a grain whose production increased steeply as cotton production collapsed in the wake of lower global prices for this commodity. This study comments on the ‘rice bias’ in policy circles, the tension between cotton and food production, and the hidden blessing of geographic isolation. The findings are based on household surveys and analysis of national-level production data. Enseignements tire´s de la crise alimentaire mondiale de 2008 : dynamique agro-alimentaire au Mali Les prix e´leve´s des produits alimentaires en 2008 ont dećlenche´ des e´meutes relatives aux produits alimentaires dans le monde entier, et l’Afrique occidentale urbaine a e´te´ la sce`ne de nombre de ces perturbations. Le Mali urbain semble avoir ećhappe´ aux pires effets de cette crise ; les consommateurs sont passe´s du riz au sorgho, un grain dont la production a connu une augmentation importante, alors meˆme que la production de coton s’effondrait suite a` la baisse des cours mondiaux. Cette e´tude pre´sente un commentaire sur le « biais du riz » dans les cercles de politique geńe´rale, la tension entre la production du coton et de produits alimentaires et la beńe´diction cacheé de l’isolement geógraphique. Les conclusions se basent sur des enqueˆtes meneés parmi les meńages et sur une analyse des donneés nationales sur la production. Liço˜es da crise alimentar global de 2008: dinaˆmicas agroalimentares em Mali Os altos preços dos alimentos em 2008 estimularam conflitos por alimentos em todo o mundo, com a a´rea urbana do oeste da A´frica enfrentando muitos destes conflitos. A a´rea urbana de Mali parece ter sido poupada do pior desta crise pois os consumidores mudaram a produçaõ do arroz para o sorgo, um graõ cuja produçaõ aumentou rapidamente quando a produçaõ de algodaõ entrou em colapso na onda dos preços globais mais baixos para esta commodity. Este estudo comenta sobre o “vie´s do arroz” nos cı´rculos de polı´ticas, a tensaõ entre a produçaõ de algodaõ e alimentos e as vantagens ocultas do isolamento geogra´fico. Os resultados saõ baseados em levantamentos sobre as famı´lias e ana´lises de dados de produçaõ no aˆmbito nacional.

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ISSN 0961-4524 Print/ISSN 1364-9213 Online 4– 50604-9 # 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09614524.2011.561290 Routledge Publishing

Lessons from the 2008 global food crisis: agro-food dynamics in Mali


Aprendizajes de la crisis mundial de alimentos de 2008: las dina´micas agroalimentarias de Malı´ Los altos precios de los alimentos en 2008 provocaron disturbios en distintos lugares del mundo; A´frica Occidental estuvo entre los lugares ma´s afectados. Las ciudades de Malı´ superaron las peores fases de la crisis sustituyendo el consumo de arroz por el de sorgo, cuya produccioń subio´ abruptamente tras el colapso de la produccioń de algodoń por la baja mundial en los precios de este producto. Este ensayo examina el “sesgo por el arroz” en el sector pu´blico, la tensioń entre la produccioń de algodoń y de alimentos, y la ventaja oculta del aislamiento geogra´fico. Los resultados se basan en encuestas realizadas en hogares y en el ana´lisis de los datos de produccioń nacional.

KEY WORDS : Governance and public policy; Labour and livelihoods

Introduction Global food prices rose steadily between 2000 and 2008, with particularly acute increases in the 2007– 08 period (FAO 2008). Rising more steeply than the price of other grains was rice, which saw its average cost to consumers increase by 100 per cent between February 2007 and March 2008 (FAO 2008). While increasing food prices may present a problem for all segments of the population, this phenomenon is particularly acute for the urban poor, who spend a disproportionately large proportion of their income on food. High food prices created hardships for the urban poor around the world, and it was in the riceconsuming regions that there was arguably the greatest distress. In fact, in response to fears about rising prices, the governments of several major rice producers introduced bans on rice exports during this period. This exacerbated an already bad situation at the global scale, brought on in large part by high energy prices. Urban West Africa was particularly vulnerable to this global food crisis, as its consumption of imported rice had increased over the past several decades. Cheap imported rice from Asia (facilitated by production gains in Asia and World Bank-imposed tariff reductions in West Africa) had become an increasingly inexpensive source of calories for the West African urban poor. In fact, by the early 2000s, the region was importing 40 per cent of the rice that it consumed, even though this was an area which historically produced high quantities of rice in certain zones. As imported-rice prices climbed in 2007– 08, they touched off food riots in cities across the region, such as Douala, Cameroon (February 2007), Nouakchott, Mauritania (November 2007), Conakry, Guinea (January 2008), Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso (February 2008), Dakar, Senegal (March 2008), Abidjan, Coˆte d’Ivoire (April 2008), and Banjul, The Gambia (May 2008). Mali is a landlocked country and roughly 70 per cent of its population are rural and agricultural. Cotton is the dominant cash crop, accounting for over 80 per cent of export revenues (Dembele and Statz 2002). Rain-fed cereals (mainly millet, maize, and sorghum) constitute 85 per cent of cereal calories, with rice providing the remaining 15 per cent. Rice is more important in urban areas, accounting for half of cereals consumed (Dembele and Staatz 2002). Mali produces 80 per cent of its own rice. While Mali imports rice, it is not a net food importer in most years (World Bank 2008). Average food prices in Bamako (Mali’s capital city) never reached the levels reached in other West African urban centres during 2007– 08 (FEWS NET 2008). Nonetheless, the Malian government was sufficiently alarmed by rising food prices in 2008 to suspend tariffs on imported rice and to ban exports of Malian rice to neighbouring countries (the latter measure being less Development in Practice, Volume 21, Numbers 4 –5, June 2011

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effective). The government also launched an upland, rain-fed Nerica rice initiative in April 2008 (the results of which are hotly contested). This study seeks to understand the reasons for Mali’s stronger position compared with neighbouring countries in relation to higher global food prices in 2007– 08. To address this, the article will take a longer-term view and seek to answer three inter-related questions. 1. What accounts for the shifting mix of imported versus local grains consumed by urban dwellers in Mali? 2. What are the implications of the current mix of domestic and imported food supplies for urban food security and rural livelihoods in Mali? 3. Why did Mali become less dependent on imported rice than neighbouring countries, even though it experienced similar policy reforms in the 1980s and 1990s? The rest of this article is divided into sections on research methods, a historical review of food and agricultural policy in Mali, an analysis of Mali’s relative position during the 2007 – 08 global food crisis, and a conclusion.

Research methods The findings in this article are based on field work in 1992, 1999– 2000, 2003, and – most importantly – in 2009 when semi-structured household interviews were conducted concerning the impact of the 2007– 08 global food crisis. Thirty urban and 30 rural households were involved. The latter interviews were conducted in the local language (Bamanan) in July 2009. Urban households were selected at random from four neighbourhoods in Bamako: Badialan III, Bankoni, Niamkoro, and Sabalibougou. Badialan III and Bankoni are older neighbourhoods on the north side of the river and are primarily composed of households that have been in Bamako for a generation or more. Niamakoro and Sabalibougou are newer neighbourhoods on the south side of the river and are largely composed of more recent arrivals. According to key informants, Badialan III is considered more of a middle-class neighbourhood, whereas Bankoni, Niamakoro, and Sabalibougou are considered to be poorer. Rural interviews, also with randomly selected households, were conducted in three villages (Falan, Zambougou, and Nianzana) in the commune of Sanankoroba (southern end of the Kati Cercle in the Koulikoro Region). These villages are located approximately 80 km to the south-east of Bamako. Agriculture in this moist savannah area is dominated by coarse grain production (sorghum and maize), peanuts, and cotton. Rice is grown by women in seasonal wetlands. Interviews were conducted with at least two family members per household and took between 40 and 60 minutes.

State-led development in the colonial era and first two decades of independence Mali’s Inland Niger Delta is one of the oldest rice-production areas in the world, and the zone where African rice (Oryza glaberrima) was probably domesticated (Carney 2001). In addition to this area, rice traditionally is grown in southern Mali’s seasonal wetlands (or bas fonds). Much of this rice is for home consumption. Policies giving priority to rice in national development strategies date back to the French colonial period. The Office du Niger (ON) was established in the 1920s by the French with an initial focus on cotton which was later switched to rice (Figure 1). At the heart of this scheme was a dam constructed on the Niger River near Se˙gou (at Markala) to divert water northwards into a series of canals and irrigated perimeters. The success of this scheme is contested. Proponents point out that the ON has historically pro606




Figure 1: Major rice, cotton, and sorghum growing areas of Mali Source: Cartography by Birgit Muehlenhaus, Department of Geography, Macalester College.

duced half of Mali’s rice and, more critically, most of the domestic rice for urban markets (Aw and Diemer 2005). Critics note that this scheme diverted water from the traditional, downstream rice-growing areas of the Inland Niger Delta, suffers from salinisation, and was implemented at a massive human cost (involving the importation of labour from Burkina Faso which remains in the area until present) (Valenza, Grillot and Dazy 2000; Filipovish 2001). The other crop given priority in the French colonial period was cotton, which also had traditionally been grown in the area. After failed attempts to develop export-oriented cotton along the Niger River in the ON irrigated schemes (Van Beusekom 2002), the French finally settled on rain-fed cotton in the southern part of the country in the 1950s as the best way to valorise this colony (Roberts 1996). Many of these same policies emphasising rice and cotton were continued during the first two decades after independence. Consistent with the modernisation approach of the time, the state sought to capture surpluses from agriculture (including coarsegrain trade) via marketing boards in order to invest in industry (Dembele and Staatz 2002).

1980s and 1990s: market reforms and export orientation Mali, like neighbouring countries, went through a period of liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s in the form of structural adjustment. In the agricultural sector, the most concerted efforts were made to liberalise cereals marketing. Tariff barriers on imported grains were Development in Practice, Volume 21, Numbers 4 –5, June 2011

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reduced. The grain-marketing board (Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali – OPAM), which had controlled consumer and producer prices, was also forced to relinquish its monopoly control. While this change was significant, it should also be understood that OPAM handled only between 20 per cent and 40 per cent of grain traded in the country, and an even smaller percentage of total production (as 85 per cent of grain production was used for subsistence and not traded) (Dembele and Staatz 2002). The loss of monopoly control by OPAM created a much larger official space for private grain traders. Nonetheless, OPAM continued to market much of the rice produced by the ON (as the state retained management of this scheme). Rice from the ON remained competitive because of donor investments in the scheme and because of Malians’ preference for the taste of local rice. The cotton sector retained a high level of vertical integration with the semi-privatised state cotton company, the Compagnie Malienne pour le De´veloppement des Textiles (CMDT), maintaining monopsony control. Unlike OPAM, which was losing money and draining state resources, the cotton sector was not fully privatised, because the cotton company was highly profitable, accounting for the majority of export revenues and a sizeable proportion of government receipts. Interviews with civil servants in 2000 revealed an acute awareness of the importance of the CMDT. For example, a common refrain was ‘Graˆce a` la CMDT, nos functionnaires sont payeés’ [‘because of the CMDT, our civil servants are paid’]. When the CFA franc (the common currency in francophone West Africa) was devalued in 1994 by 50 per cent, the price for this crop in local currency immediately rose. The government captured much of this surplus, passing on only some of it to farmers. However, the rise in cotton producer prices was enough to spur production. Cotton production rose steadily in the 1990s, surpassing 500,000 metric tonnes per annum in several years between 1998 and 2004 (during which time Mali was often the leading cotton producer in sub-Saharan Africa). Despite national production statistics for cotton and sorghum which often demonstrate an inverse relationship (see Figure 2), the CMDT frequently maintained that cotton and grain production were complementary. Field work in four rural communities in 2000 revealed a different

Figure 2: Sorghum and seed-cotton production in Mali (1961–2007) Source: Based on data from UN Food and Agriculture Organization (2009) FAOSTAT Database.

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story from that promoted to farmers by the CMDT (Moseley 2005). Out of a sample of 65 households arrayed across different wealth groups, cotton production did rise significantly between 1982 and 1984 and from 1997 to 1999. However, grain production during this period rose only for the top 10 per cent of households classified as wealthy. Poor and intermediate households saw their surplus food production decline during this period (by – 76 per cent and – 79 per cent) as their cotton production grew (see Table 1). According to the CMDT, cotton production increases sorghum production when the two crops are rotated from year to year on the same plot. Cotton provides the revenue to purchase inputs. Sorghum then benefits from the residual fertiliser in off years. This appears to be what is happening for the wealthiest of households. Wealthier households are also larger, averaging 20.1 persons of working age, compared with 10.6 and 6.9 for intermediate and poor households respectively. This means that wealthier households also have sufficient labour to maintain foodcrop and cotton fields. Poorer and intermediate-wealth households often compromise labour inputs to food-crop fields as they expand cotton production. Poorer and intermediate-wealth households also are less able to invest in fertiliser, which means that the sorghum crop has less residual fertiliser from which to benefit in off years. Finally, while the currency devaluation did increase the producer price for cotton, it also led to substantial price increases in inputs – further encouraging the under-use of fertilisers. The Malian cotton crop peaked at 564,971 metric tonnes in 2004/05. By 2007/08, the cotton crop was 240,237 metric tonnes, a decline of over 50 per cent. The chief reason for declining cotton production is a sagging global price, which was 14 per cent below the five-year average in 2007/08 (FEWS NET 2008). As Figure 2 shows, sorghum production rose dramatically as cotton production declined.

Mali during the 2007 – 08 global food crisis Mali’s urban population has consumed increasing quantities of imported rice in recent years, although less than in neighbouring countries such as Coˆte d’Ivoire, Senegal, or The Gambia. This increasing use of imported rice is related to at least three factors. First, there were increasing quantities of cheap Asian rice on the market, whose importation was facilitated by relatively modest tariff barriers. Second, drought conditions and food shortages in the early 1970s and mid-1980s conditioned Mali to food imports as a way to resolve food problems. Third, while Mali is still a predominantly rural country, its urban population has been growing at a steep rate in recent years and currently represents about 30 per cent of the population (Koenig 2005). The increasingly urban nature of Mali’s population partially explains a shift from coarse grains to rice. Other studies (Pearson 1981; Koenig 2005; Seck 2008), as well as qualitative interviews with urban households in Bamako in 2009, suggest that rice is favoured by urbanites because of (a) the ease and speed with which it may be prepared; (b) a perception Table 1:

Surplus food production (months of household food needs) in Djitoumou, Mali

Wealth group

Sample size

1982 –84 (in months)

1997–99 (in months)

Change (%)

Poor

40

2.52

.6

276

Intermediate

18

5.16

1.08

279

7

1.56

2.16

+38

65

3

.96

268

Rich Average

Source: Fieldwork and surveys, 2000

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that rice is a more desirable food stuff for middle-class households; and (c) the ability of rice to greatly expand when it is cooked, suggesting that its cost per volume may be lower when rice prices are low. The rising price of food, particularly rice, was clearly a problem for Mali in 2007 – 08. Mali’s political establishment was sufficiently alarmed and responded by banning rice exports and removing import tariffs. Most interesting was a Nerica rice initiative spearheaded by the Malian Prime Minister in the spring of 2008 in the southern part of the country. ‘Nerica’ stands for ‘New Rice for Africa’, the name for a cross between Asian and African rice varieties developed by the Africa Rice Center. Southern Mali, often noted for its potential to be the bread basket of West Africa, historically has produced significant volumes of sorghum, maize, and millet. While sorghum and millet can be produced with few inputs, the rain-fed variety of Nerica rice being promoted requires purchased seeds and fertilisers, as well as relatively good rainfall. Furthermore, while women traditionally grow rice in southern Mali’s seasonal wetlands, it is men who are being encouraged to grow rice in upland areas. Not only do men have little experience with this crop, but (according to semi-structured interviews) it strikes them as odd to be planting rice in fields where they historically grew cotton and sorghum. Furthermore, there is no organised credit system in place to support the purchase of the seed and fertiliser required for rain-fed Nerica rice production. The novelty of upland, rain-fed rice production for men, the poorly timed delivery of inputs, and the lack of a credit system to support rice largely explain why southern Mali’s Nerica rice initiative performed below expectations in 2008 (FEWS NET 2008). I argue that rather than the political initiatives of 2008 (such as the aforementioned Nerica programme, or a reduction in import tariffs, or export bans), it was Mali’s higher level of food self-sufficiency that saved the country from the worst of this crisis. This higher level of national food self-sufficiency is related to several factors. First, Mali’s landlocked status and related expensive transport options to coastal ports have made imported rice relatively more expensive, a factor which favours domestic rice producers. While being landlocked is often presented as a development handicap (for example, Sachs 2005), in this instance it created enough financial space for the sustenance and growth of a national food economy. Second, Mali’s internal road network has improved in recent years (spurred by high levels of donor support), which reduced the cost of getting local rice to market (Njoh 2008). Third, local rice producers are aided by urban consumers who prefer local to imported rice (with gambiaka being the most preferred local variety), even when (to a point) local rice is more costly. While poorer urban Malians are more likely to consume cheaper imported rice, they are also more likely to switch to coarse grains when rice prices rise. This willingness to switch to coarse grains is in part related to urban Mali’s relatively high number of recent immigrants from rural areas, many of whom are accustomed to a diet primarily composed of coarse grains. The collapse of cotton, and a switch of many cotton producers over to sorghum, meant that this grain was abundant at the time when rice prices rose.

Conclusions Structural adjustment, which led to a series of policy changes across West Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, favoured Asian exporters over West African producers. The removal of production subsidies (often in the form of support for inputs) and declining tariff barriers led to a flood of Asian rice on local markets. The importation of relatively cheap Asian rice from the 1980s met the needs of urban consumers for more than two decades, because it supplied the unmet demand for rice and also exerted downward pressure on local rice prices. While it was asserted that freer markets would benefit rural households when producer prices were no longer controlled (World 610




Bank 1981), this policy undermined local rice producers and, by extension, rural livelihoods. The vulnerabilities of this new West African urban food regime were not apparent until the price for imported rice reached unprecedented levels in 2007– 08. This article argues that, while short-term policy measures undertaken by the Malian government during 2008 may have exerted some downward pressure on rice prices, a combination of other short- and long-term factors more effectively explains Mali’s better position during the 2007– 08 global food crisis. These factors include relatively more robust rice and coarsegrain sectors, a record grain harvest for the 2008 season spurred by good rainfall (although with considerable variation across the country), burgeoning sorghum production linked to the collapse of cotton for export, and adaptable poorer households who were willing to switch to coarse grains when rice prices climbed. Further, many of these factors are linked to Mali’s relatively good internal transportation network, landlocked nature, and past policy decisions. The findings of this study have implications for an ongoing discussion about the need for a New Green Revolution in Africa. Green Revolution efforts focused on rice in West Africa continue a long-standing urban bias in food and agricultural policy in this region. The African development literature often discusses the urban bias of state-led development efforts during the two decades following independence, in terms of price controls to benefit urban consumers and the taxation of agriculture in support of industry (World Bank 1981; Dembele and Staatz 2002). This study argues that this bias – in the form of policies to provide cheap rice for urban consumers – continued during the era of free-market reform, and is also resurgent in the current period. The focus on rice has been driven by a desire to address the demands of urban consumers for affordable rice, rather than representing a goal to improve the livelihoods of rural producers. The way forward will require that policy makers consider the needs of urban consumers and rural producers, the latter of which have almost always been a secondary concern. If new seed technologies are to be developed, then these should be designed with the needs of the poorest farmers in mind, including women. The almost one-dimensional obsession with rice might also be tempered, creating space for other crops which are well adapted to drier West African environments, such as millet and sorghum. If food production is to be increased, just as important as improved seed packages (or more important) will be the credit systems, road networks, and the milling/processing capacity needed to get crops to market.

References Aw, D. and G. Diemer (2005) Making a Large Irrigation Scheme Work: A Case Study from Mali, Washington, DC: World Bank. Carney, J. (2001) Black Rice: The African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dembele, N. N. and J. Staatz (2002) ‘The impact of market reform on agricultural transformation in Mali’, in Thomas Jayne, Isaac Minde, and Gem Argwings-Kodhek (eds.) Perspectives in Agricultural Transformation: A View from Africa, Hauppauge, NY: Nova. FEWS NET (2008) ‘Mali Trip reports 2008–2009’, Washington DC: US Agency for International Development, www.fews.net/Pages/Results.aspx?k=Mali. Filipovish, J. (2001) ‘Destined to fail: forced settlement at the Office du Niger, 1926–45’, The Journal of African History, 42 (2): 239–60. Food and Agriculture Organization (2008) ‘Soaring Food Prices: Facts, Perspectives, Impacts and Actions Required’ (HLC/08/INF1), High Level Conference on World Food Security. The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy. Rome, 3 –5 June. Koenig, D. (2005) ‘Food for the Malian middle class: an invisible cuisine’, in Richard Wilk (ed.) Fast Food/Slow Food: The Cultural Economy of the Global Food System, Lanham, MD: Rowman/Altamira.

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William G. Moseley Moseley, W. G. (2005) ‘Global cotton and local environmental management: the political ecology of rich and poor small-hold farmers in southern Mali’, Geographical Journal, 171 (1): 36–55. Njoh, A. (2008) ‘Implications of Africa’s transportation systems for development in the era of globalization’, Review of Black Political Economy, 35: 147–62. Pearson, S. R. (ed.) (1981) Rice in West Africa: Policy and Economics, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Roberts, R. L. (1996) Two Worlds of Cotton: Colonialism and the Regional Economy in the French Soudan, 1800–1946, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Sachs, J. (2005) The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, New York: Penguin Press. Seck, P. A. (2008) ‘Can Rice Crisis be Turned into Opportunity for Africa?’, West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), Cotonou, Coˆte d’Ivoire, 15 May. Valenza, A., J.C. Grillot, and J. Dazy (2000) ‘Influence of groundwater on the degradation of irrigated soils in a semi-arid region, the inner delta of the Niger River, Mali’, Hydrogeology Journal, 8 (4): 417–29. Van Beusekom, M. (2002) Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts at the Office du Niger, 1920– 1960, Westport, CT: Heinemann. World Bank (1981) Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank (2008) Africa Development Indicators 2007, Washington, DC: World Bank.

The author William G. Moseley is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, Macalester College, Saint Paul, USA. ,[email protected].

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