Living Dangerously in an Era of Globalization

Living Dangerously in an Era of Globalization: Rethinking Third World Strategies for Development The Possible Role of the Elite in the Process of Structural Change1 Citing the obvious: the world in an era of globalization Borderless. Expanding. Threatening. Encompassing. Even unimaginable – very unlike Benedict Anderson’s concept of imagined communities. These are but a few descriptors that can be used to describe in an era of globalization.

In a way, the present time is confusing for people who make up this globalization. Projections as to the future of the nation-states have been put forward – whether existing ones need to configure their placement and position in the global arena for them to reap the promised rewards of “free trade” on the one hand, or suffer the consequences on the other, that is, perish altogether.

There are also the following debates that both states and researchers are grappling with, namely: the primacy of internal weaknesses inherent in governments vis-à-vis the decisiveness of external factors in the process of development, exemplified by the dependency school and whether states need to intervene in markets in the tradition of Keynesian welfare economics vis-à-vis total embrace of the neoliberalist ideology, that is emphasizing the superiority of market forces and price mechanisms.

For most part, the aforementioned hampers policy and decision-making in developing countries. Moreover, the specter of having to deal with the conditionality of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – deliciously called structural adjustment – on a day-to-day basis has led to what Chossudovsky calls “globalization of poverty.” The IMF-WB had been able to intervene in the political economy of Third World States, including Sub-Saharan Africa, by implementing structural adjustment measures that continue to impact on the capacity of governments to extend education, health and housing services to their respective population. For example, Malawi and Zimbabwe used to gain grain surplus; so did Rwanda which was virtually self-sufficient in food until 1990 when the IMF ordered the dumping of European Union and United States grain surpluses on the domestic market causing the bankruptcy of small farmers. A “free market” in grain imposed by the IMF-WB destroys the peasant economy and undermines “food security” (Chossudovsky 2003). This scenario has been diagnosed by Abrahamson (2003) as suffering from TINA or There Is No Alternative Syndrome. TINA lends to what Gramsci refers to as “pessimism of the intelligence.” Citing programmatic slogan in 1919 – “Pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will – Abrahamson calls to mind Gramsci’s intention to underscore the importance of a Machiavellian realism to achieve social change and the need for active and realistic politicians to combine the pessimism of the intelligence with an “optimism of the will.” Abrahamson thought that TINA is akin to paralysis: it not only makes for a difficult conceptualization of structural change; it also makes the This paper by Mr. Alfredo Antonio is presented to Dr. Christopher Skene, Ph.D. in partial fulfilment of the requirements in the course International Political Economy (DVS754P), Department of Political Science, De La Salle University, Third Term School Year 2005-2006. 1

identification of forces and actions to achieve change become merely rhetoric “conveniently used at international summits.” Something to look forward to: otherwise, everything else looks gloomy

O’Brien (2004) thought that all is not lost in the debate – there is still a chance that something could be done, at least the ability of a state to arrive at a major decision with regard to the external circumstances it is facing:

There are many cases where the choices for Third World countries are not completely determined by outside forces and these choices are neither trivial nor meaningless. The available choices may be sharply circumscribed by the weakness and poverty of the Third World and the options may be heavily conditioned by the attitudes and assumptions of advanced industrial countries, but even within these boundaries the possibility of better or worse decisions for each country has frequently remained open. Moreover, the impact of nationalism, the growth of indigenous capacities, and the impact of international organizations have increased the desire and ability of developing countries’ elites to make their own decisions. Abrahamson argued that generally, the evidence of modern history does not support this pessimism with regard to human action, citing the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and the abolition of apartheid in the 1990s as encouraging examples. Historically, there comes a time when interests of the elite classes and other sectors in the society, particularly the civil society, have to coincide to bring about change, which could either be long-term or myopic, depending on extenuating circumstances. Marx argued that the point of history is not only to understand it but to change it. However, in an era of globalization, this is easier said than done, what with the structures currently prevailing in the globe “engulfing” and “disciplining” countries to conform as in the case of IMF-WB conditionalities for example. It would make sense for the poorer regions of the world to seize all opportunities, whether existing of imminent, so they could get out of the mire they are presently in or at least mitigate the negative effects of structural adjustment. Theorizing critically: a policy project for the future

If researchers, however diverse their backgrounds, are committed enough to find answers to their problems, the process they need to undergo ought to lead to theorizing, taking into account available information and historical data to predict what could take place in the medium-term as well as in the long-term.

An effective theory from a social science perspective should be able to explain the plausibility of relationships between phenomena and account for the roots as well as processes that gave way to such phenomena. Cox (1981) maintained that theory is always for someone and for some purpose. A theory deals with a perspective, that is, a view from a position in time and space. For example, the world could be gauged through concepts of nation, class, division of labor, etc. The more complex a theory is, the more complex the perspective, which has an ability to transcend its own perspective.

Cox thought that there is a need to distinguish between problem-solving theory and critical theory. Problem-solving theory is thinking within the box, so to speak, because it takes the problem at hand as it is and using what is available to solve it and if it is self-explanatory, tries to improve on it; it is largely ahistorical because it is primarily concerned with continuing the present. Critical theory on the other hand forces the thinker to move out of the box and view the problematic as a change

problem – that is, it could be viewed from an entirely different perspective, the main goal of which is to pinpoint the root of the problem and change the vey framework with which it (the problematic) is presently embedded; in that case, Cox avers that critical theory is a theory of history because it is not only concerned with the past but also with a process of continuing process of historical change.

Cox, writing about the social philosophy of Susan Strange, said that the latter despised the tendency of social scientists to view phenomena in a compartmentalized way2. It would not take long for academic disciplines such as political science and economics to incorporate the field of International Political Economy as another sub-field of both disciplines. Strange did not give in to the pressure of being assimilated by any given institutionalized field; she has remained an iconoclast. This prompted Cox to believe that in the field of theorizing, there is a tendency for people who do not share other experts’ or academicians’ line of thinking to be regarded as loners3. Since these types occur in practice quite regularly, Cox believes it is in itself an area for discussion since “the loner does not fit into predefined category, does not fit into conventional classifications, and is not assimilated into any school or sect.” Contrast this to what he calls groupies – the more common or conventional type. Groupies are your typical professionals with a graduate degree who have imbibed a particular thinking about a particular subject matter because they have been “socialized to the discourse by professional training and career ladders that inspire a desire for affiliation and acceptance, and which unconsciously are conducive to conformity.” Loners like Strange are difficult to read. Coming from different backgrounds – which may probably come outside of the academia – “they tend to define their own issues and their own conceptual frameworks.” These aforementioned requirements to view and understand what transpires in the world on two levels, namely, what is happening in the country of origin, and the world at large as it is being continually configured by virtue of what is happening outside of the individual states and government – force researchers to rethink otherwise unthinkable and seemingly improbable phenomena to be taking place as possible areas for critical research and opportunities for future action.

The concept of elite as having a role in structural transformation may be offensive to purists. Others may think otherwise. But the thought will remain largely unpopular since historically, this was not the case – for the elite to be spearheading actions toward social change. However, their role in the management and leadership of corporations has been studied extensively as well as their views on politics and governance and economics as in the case of the United States, for example. Defining the term elite from particular perspectives: an overview

Elite from French “the elect” is a relatively small dominant group within a larger society which enjoys a privileged status which is upheld by individuals of lower status within the structure of a group

Susan Strange in an article published in 1970 entitled “International Economics and International Relations: A case of mutual neglect” criticized the seemingly exclusivity of academic disciplines in dealing with phenomena. Dubbed as a manifesto of sorts, the said article was instrumental in raising discourse as to the inarguable relationships between economic power relations and world politics. This field was later named International Political Economy. 3 Strange shared her field for example with business-school economists more than “pure” economists: public officials whether of national governments or international organizations; historians; sociologists and other people from backgrounds that fundamentally differ from political science and economics. This, she considers as likely sources of new and innovative thinking. 2

(Wikipedia 2006). Therefore, from a functionalist perspective in sociology, elites have their special place in society. The role of elites in history was seen as addressing particular gaps in the development of societies wrought by four primary factors: 1) 2) 3) 4)

The growth of population The growth of occupational specialization (division of labor) The growth of formal organization or bureaucracy; and The growth of moral diversity.

In the process of diversification, even as social classes as the caste system in India have remained, there arose what Keller (1991) calls strategic elites – specialists in excellence. Strategic elites are born out of the need to rise above the rest in a spirit of excellence; otherwise, they would have been kicked out of their post, not unlike what happened in the past to kings, warriors and priests who were unable to bring about peace, harvest, health or prosperity. Along with the development of societies came about complex problems of moral decadence, inequality and dissension. This meant that no single elite could outrank all others “because no one elite knows enough about the specialized work of the others.” If this typology is correct, it follows that strategic elites could be trained and recruited to join the bureaucracy to perform specialized functions. It also implies that strategic elites are not indispensable if they could no longer serve their (functionalist) purpose.

There may be no room at the inn, so to speak, if it would be classical Marxism that would critique the elite in society – referred to by Marx and Engels as the bourgeoisie. Theirs is a position that could not be dissociated from their vantage point in society because it forms the main basis for oppression of the working classes in an industrialized society and the peasantry in a feudal society. The ruling class as Marx viewed it is “the class which has the means of production at its disposal and the class that controls the state which in fact enables it to rule.” Keller thought that based on their correspondences, Marx and Engels grappled with the complexity of the subject matter that they were dealing with. It seemed to Keller that they regarded the bourgeoisie as a single class that dominated the economic and political spheres of the society; in locating the source of domination and exploitation in this one class, social relations could be cut off by abolishing this class itself. To Keller, Marx and Engels confounded their apprehension of the ruling class by not being able to systematically distinguish between the elite of entrepreneurs and the elite stratum of capitalists because “such an elite was only emerging.” She maintained that had the two lived to see the future, they might have seen that they were recording the rise of a highly specialized, not a comprehensive, elite. Keller argued that over time, this kind of elite would cease to create and accumulate wealth for its own sake and would be compelled to assume larger responsibilities “thereby transforming its social role, its public image and its public style” (Keller 1991). Reconfiguring the concept of “elite” within the framework of structural change

In attempting to identify forces of change, Abrahamson (2003) posited an analytical model for change of action wherein the elite could play a role albeit a temporary and a not-so exclusive one. This model for action is intended to negate TINA’s “depressing” impact. In the process, it can be seen as a move that could work to the advantage of Third World countries that are suffering from poverty and marginalization. He cautioned though that the “optimism of the will” should not lead to a mere utopianism. History had shown that by itself alone, it had not led to a resolution of conflicts; rather, conflict resolution must be constituted by different interacting phases. Elites could play an important role in this struggle to “seize the opportunity” with the view that they are actually studying the socioeconomic conditions existing in the home country and the world, and in the process try to make sense of it.

Cox thought the following three core concepts could be further elaborated and developed into an analytical model designed in a way to study processes behind structural change:

1) Contradictory circumstances – The outcome may be negative or positive but there are particular contradictions that are embedded in the current world order that may reach a nonmanageable level, one that could no longer be tackled within the framework of prevailing structures. 2) Coinciding interests – Interests of various political and economic elites momentarily coincide within the context of a situation that has become fundamentally dysfunctional such that it would be to the best of interest of parties concerned to do something about it; such that a congruence of interests creates a “ripe moment” for change since contradictions referred to previously imply a stalemate that needs to be resolved. 3) Vertical links – Elites are seldom mentioned in literature as the source of social change; rather, structural change requires pressure from below and interaction with other socially conscious segments of the society called civil society.

This paper would not delve on the features of contradictory circumstances as expounded by Abrahamson taking off from a discussion of Cox. What is clear about the discussion is that contradictory circumstances may not necessarily be felt right away by those who form part of such contradictions. In the process of interacting with structures and phenomena wrought by globalization for example there are what Abrahamson calls non-intentional outcomes which could reinforce original contradictions, for example, if a consensus was not arrived at when coming to a decision or an agreement but the agreement would be implemented just the same, and thus lead to a contradictory circumstance. However, as I understood it, it would take a general consensus among those affected by the contradiction to assume full responsibility for their actions, again, given the state of affairs prevailing in the world right now. And this would be easier said than done given the divergent states these states are finding themselves in right now. As I understood it, contradictory circumstances offer a window of opportunity for the elites to view the world singularly, at least on a momentary basis. To counteract hegemony as put forward by Gramsci, there is a need for the elites – whether political or economic or national and transnational – to lead hegemonic and counter-hegemonic formations and also to be an organizer of society in general. The Gramscian concept of hegemony takes on the concept of legitimacy and according to Abrahamson, it is necessary that the “legitimate social base of the elites must be sufficiently large for them to be able to influence the prevailing structures.” In this regard, elites from various groups must recognize the necessity for social change, over and above comprehending the long-term challenges and the political motives to come face to face with contradictory circumstances (Abrahamson 2003). The question is: Will this be feasible? Abrahamson offers the belief that coinciding interests between different “enlightened” groups is important in the sense that it forms part of the bases for interdependence. Presently, it is required of transnational elites to cooperate with legitimate elites on the national and local levels so as to mitigate the negative impact of globalization. He proposed that in fact, this “enlightenment” of the elite does not spring from an altruistic, ethical or empathetic source, but is still largely interest-based; thereby, giving it a realistic assumption about human nature. Again, the concept of coinciding interests must be differentiated from the concept of harmonizing interests simply because interests of various elite groups temporarily converge on the basis of identified common goals and objectives.

I am pressed to think of contradictory circumstances existing now in the world which might have implications for coinciding interests. Unfortunately, I could only think of support of governments to other governments during times of calamity and disaster as was the case just this year when a landslide buried an entire village in Guinsaugon, Leyte, Philippines. For a while, rescuers from all over the world converged in that part of the country to render their assistance to the victims of the tragedy. From what I saw on television, representatives from various countries tried to do their best, using the technology that they brought with them, in spite of the obvious difficulty in trudging along the sinking mud. I thought when something like this happens, boundaries between countries – because they have no choice but to pool resources together – are temporarily erased, and the prospects of a genuine and lasting become more realistic. However, as the same case had shown, people quickly move on with their lives, so to speak, as soon as “stability” is maintained; thereby forgetting the situation altogether.

I also think that the growing tension between states to push through with the General Agreement in Trades in Services (GATS) also constitutes a point of convergence of opinions as to the would-be future of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is not only developing countries that have signified their opposition to the further opening up of their markets to free trade but also the advanced Western countries. The growing discontent among the youth and labor unions in Europe for example might pose a quandary on the part of the states to rethink their position as regards neoliberalism.

On the core concept of vertical links, Abrahamson qualified his position that his take on the issue of strong vertical links between the elite and civil society is at best blurred. He did not categorically explain his position about civil society, stating that his research is not aimed at tackling the issue. However, he thought it is necessary for both sectors to apply what he calls a two-way top-down – bottom-up process – which is not only a question of how the elite could channel pressure for change articulated by civil society in a bottom-up process but how they could also take such initiatives and mobilize such pressures to merge with their own strivings. It would be to the advantage of the elite to involve civil society in decision-making and in gaining their support. This would be problematic if the State and ruling elite continue to control and appropriate the intellectual base of civil society, along with its material base in an attempt to perpetuate their hegemony over the latter which in Western capitalist societies are attempted to be established through private mechanisms of media, education and culture (Tandon 1994). In the process of the enlightened elite’s quest to address contradictory circumstances, it might be of consequence to them to assist in the strengthening of civil society’s material, institutional and ideological basis, but probably not in the guise of co-opting them. Civil society must be allowed to explore its links with the other sectors of the society even as it critically reflects on its would-be vertical link with the elite. However, if structural change would be forthcoming, it becomes imperative for the two to exert pressure on issues of global proportion. Some parting notes

Globalization has restructured the world in unthinkable ways. Structures that are not inherent in states have had tremendous impact on how local and internal resources and labor are allocated and accounted for. Debates as to the consistency and relevance of states in influencing and controlling markets would continue in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, elsewhere in the world, globalization of poverty is continuing. For most part, actions against the negative impact of globalization should be global in scale and would necessitate the support of aggrieved parties. In this case, the role of the elite is being studied and tested to assist in this quest for structural change. I do not see the elite to be decisive in this endeavor. And Abrahamson does not point to the permanency

of their role in addressing contradictory circumstances either. But for sure, in the interim, their resources and networks – probably with civil society – could be counted on to at least, to get discussions about the weaknesses of states in addressing fiscal and monetary deficits rolling, including corruption at the local level, and the long-term effects of globalization of poverty. I would like to write about this subject matter again. For one, it would be instructive for me to explore the role of the elite, especially in Southeast Asia, in establishing developmental states in an era of globalization. I would like to believe that further analysis of the “democratic” states of Southeast Asia would yield best practices of an enlightened elite, establishing a vertical link with civil society. This, an attempt to rethink Third World strategies for development. REFERENCES

Abrahamson, H. (2003). Understanding World Order and Structural Change: Poverty, Conflict and the Global Arena. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Anderson, B. (2003). Imagined Communities (Philippine Edition). Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc. Chossudovsky, M. (2003). The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order 2nd ed. Manila: IBON Books Cox, R. and Sinclair, T. (1999). Approaches to World Order. New York: Cambridge University Press Keller, S. (1991). Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers Martinussen, J. (1997). Society and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development. Nova Scotia: Fernwood Books, Ltd. O’brien, R. and Williamson, M. (2004). Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Serrano, I. (1994). Civil Society in the Pacific Region. Philippines: Civicus (World Alliance for Citizen Participation) Woods, N., editor (2000). The Political Economy of Globalization. London: Macmillan Press