Looking and Competing: Accountability and Visual ... - APA PsycNET

Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/81/4001-0111500.75

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1981, Vol. 40, No. 1, 111-120

Looking and Competing: Accountability and Visual Access in Integrative Bargaining Peter J. D. Carnevale, Dean G. Pruitt, and Steven D. Seilheimer State University of New York at Buffalo This research was designed to reconcile conflicting findings about the impact of negotiator accountability on bargaining process and outcome. Some studies have found that high accountability produces more pressure (dominance) tactics and lower joint benefit than low accountability. Other studies have found no accountability effects. Results of the present research suggest that negotiators' visual accessibility is a moderator of the effects of accountability. Accountability only produced lower joint benefit when the negotiators were face to face. Cooperative behavior and reports of a cooperative atmosphere were also diminished when negotiators were facing each other rather than talking across a barrier. These results were interpreted on the assumption that negotiation involves a competitive definition of the situation, especially under high accountability. In such a context, staring is likely to be employed to dominate and is likely to be interpreted as domineering behavior. When there is no visual access, staring is not possible; hence, there is less temptation to try to dominate and less reason to view the other party as making a similar effort. The result is more cooperation and greater joint benefit.

This research dealt with the effects of negotiator accountability on joint benefit in bilateral negotiation. Negotiators are "accountable" to the extent that their constituents can reward or punish them on the basis of their performance. "Joint benefit" means the collective gain achieved by the two negotiators in the final agreement. The study was part of a larger series of investigations of the antecedents of high joint benefit. Processes that lead to high joint benefit have sometimes been called "integrative bargaining" (Walton & McKersie, 1965) because the negotiators' separate values must be integrated (i.e., reconciled) to achieve this outcome. An earlier study in this series (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) provides support for what Pruitt and Lewis (1977) call a "flexThe research reported here was supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS76-10963. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Alice M. Isen and Brenda Major. Portions of this article were presented at the 50th annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, April 1979. Requests for reprints should be sent to Peter J. D. Carnevale, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo, 4230 Ridge Lea Road, Buffalo, New York 14226.

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ible-rigidity" hypothesis about integrative bargaining. This hypothesis postulates that agreements involving high joint benefit will result when both negotiators have high, relatively rigid aspirations in conjunction with a flexible, problem-solving orientation. A problem-solving orientation involves the goal of finding an agreement that is mutually acceptable to both parties. It can be contrasted with a win/lose orientation, which involves the goal of profiting at the other party's expense. The rationale for this hypothesis is as follows: High aspirations provide the motivation necessary to seek out the nonobvious options that must so often be found if high joint benefit is to be achieved. The tactics adopted under a problem-solving orientation make it possible to locate such options. Pruitt and his associates (see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1980; Pruitt & Lewis, 1977) have described several classes of negotiation tactics. Two of these are encouraged by a problem-solving orientation: 1. Exchange of information about values and priorities. Receiving this kind of information allows a negotiator to think simultaneously about both parties' welfare, which

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P. CARNEVALE, D. PRUITT, AND S. SEILHEIMER

is necessary for achieving an insightful solution to the common problem. 2. Heuristic trial and error, in which each party makes an orderly series of proposals reflecting his/her own values and priorities in an effort to find one that also appeals to the other party. Four intercorrelated tactics have been identified in this latter class (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Pruitt et al., 1978): (a) frequently making new and different proposals, (b) making concessions on low-priority issues while holding firm on high-priority issues, (c) proposing all the options one can devise at a given level of benefit to oneself before conceding to a lower level of benefit,1 and (d) requesting the other's reaction to each proposal. The first of these tactics is simple trial and error; the second and third are heuristics for generating new proposals that suit one's own needs; the fourth is a manifestation of the problem-solving orientation that gives rise to this class of tactics. A third class of tactics, pressure tactics, is a manifestation of the win/lose orientation. The following four intercorrelated tactics are examples of this class: use of threats, positional commitments, arguments aimed at persuading the other to concede, and efforts to raise one's status in the other party's eyes. All are aimed at dominating the other party. Prior experiments (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Kimmel et al., 1980; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt et al., 1978; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Schulz & Pruitt, 1978) have shown that under certain conditions information exchange and/or heuristic trial and error are antecedents of high joint benefit, whereas pressure tactics are an antecedent of low joint benefit. The negotiation task employed in this research (which will be described later) has integrative potential in that there are a number of possible agreements with differing levels of joint profit. However, not all negotiation situations have this potential. In particular, integrative potential is small or nonexistent in "unidimensional" tasks, where the options are arrayed along a single dimension that has opposing value for the two parties, such as a single price or wage rate.

In such constant-sum situations, a gain for one party is a loss for the other. Accountability has been studied extensively in experiments involving unidimensional negotiation tasks. The majority (eight) of these studies show that accountability makes bargainers reluctant to concede (Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975; Benton, 1972; Benton & Druckman, 1973, 1974; Druckman, Solomon, & Zechmeister, 1972; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974; Kogan, Lamm, & Trommsdorff, 1972).2 A minority (three) of these studies found no accountability effects (Frey & Adams, 1972; Cruder, 1971; Cruder & Rosen, 1971).3 The majority finding is ambiguous with respect to integrative bargaining. If the reluctance to concede results from the maintenance of high aspirations, accountability should encourage agreements that involve high joint 1 This third, "systematic-concession" tactic was originally described by Kelley and Schenitzki (1972), who showed that it produced high joint benefit in negotiation sessions involving note passing. 2 In four of these studies (Bartunek et al., 1975; Benton & Druckman, 1973, 1974; Druckman et al., 1972), accountability was confounded with the presence or absence of a constituent. But the results were identical to the three in which pure accountability was manipulated (Benton, 1972; Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 1974), suggesting that accountability was the important variable in the first four studies. The experiment by Kogan et al. (1972) is not strictly a study of accountability in that the constituents' capacity to reward or punish the negotiator was not manipulated. But a close cousin of accountability was manipulated—the constituent's power to make decisions about how to conduct the negotiation; the results were similar to those achieved with accountability. It should also be noted in these studies that the accountability effect was stronger under some conditions than others. It was weak or nonexistent when (a) the bargainers believed that their constituents wanted them to behave cooperatively toward the other negotiator (Benton & Druckman, 1974), (b) the bargainers did not find membership in their groups attractive (Klimoski, 1972), (c) a mediator suggested a solution or encouraged role-reversal behavior (Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975), and (d) the bargainers were school girls (Druckman et al., 1972). However it should be noted that a full accountability effect was obtained when the subjects were college women (Benton & Druckman, 1973, 1974). 3 One other study (Druckman, 1967) that failed to achieve an accountability effect is not included in this list because unlike the other 11 studies, there were no constituents in the laboratory with the subject. Instead, a weak, role-playing manipulation was employed.

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profit. But if it is due to a win/lose orien- orientation" means a goal of enhancing one's tation, accountability should discourage the own benefit without reference to the other's gains.) All negotiators played the role of development of such agreements. To resolve this ambiguity, Pruitt et al. accountable representatives, though constit(1978) manipulated accountability in a sit- uents were not actually present. Significant uation with integrative potential. Under high interactions were found for both pressure accountability, there were more pressure tactics and joint benefit, with the largest tactics and lower joint profit than under low amount of pressure tactics and the least joint accountability, suggesting that accountabil- profit in the condition where the negotiators ity encourages a win/lose orientation. Fur- had an individualistic orientation and talked thermore, accountability was found to have face to face. An analogy can be made beno effect on several measures of level of as- tween the individualistic orientation in the piration. In an unpublished follow-up study, Lewis and Fry study and high accountability however, the present authors were unable to in our studies, in that both seem likely to replicate these findings. There were only impart a competitive definition of the situtrends in the direction of higher account- ation. Hence, this finding suggests that a ability producing more pressure tactics and combination of high accountability and visual access produces especially strong preslower joint benefit. A comparison of the procedures used in sure tactics and especially low joint benefit. Lewis and Fry (1977) provide a possible these two studies and a review of the literature suggested the hypothesis tested in the theoretical rationale for this hypothesis, present experiment. In the Pruitt et al. based on the assumption that face-to-face (1978) study, negotiations were conducted interaction permits bargainers to gaze at face to face, whereas in the follow-up study each other. Under a competitive definition negotiations were conducted over an inter- of the situation, the other party's gaze may com. Furthermore, a review of the prior, be interpreted as an effort to dominate, unidimensional-task literature revealed that which must be defended against by pressure in the eight studies that achieved account- tactics. These pressure tactics in turn disability effects, negotiations were conducted courage the development of high joint benface to face, whereas in the three that did efit. In support of this interpretation, these not obtain such effects, negotiation was by authors found that in the face-to-face conmeans of note passing. Hence, we hypothe- dition, dyads whose members stared more sized that accountability enhances pressure at each other also employed more pressure tactics and diminishes joint benefit when tactics and achieved lower joint benefit. A negotiators can see and hear each other, but related possible interpretation is that verbal and nonverbal dominance behaviors are tied not when they can only hear each other. This hypothesis is superficially inconsis- together psychologically, so that the former tent with prior research by Milgram (1974) will be attenuated if the latter cannot be and Gahagan (1970), who found that phys- enacted. If so, under a competitive definition ical proximity makes it harder for people to of the situation, bargainers will make presimpose costs on one another, and by Morley sure statements only if they can accompany and Stephenson (1977), who found that ne- them with efforts to stare the other down. gotiators are more concerned with achieving If staring is ruled out by a barrier, joint equal outcomes when face to face than when profit will be larger because it will not be so talking over the telephone. However, the easy for the bargainers to try to dominate hypothesized interaction very much resem- each other verbally. Assuming that high accountability creates bles one found by Lewis and Fry (1977) in a task with integrative potential. These au- a competitive definition of the situation, simthors manipulated orientation (problem- ilar arguments can be employed in support solving vs. individualistic) and visual access of the hypothesis tested in the present re(face to face vs. conversation across a bar- search. In summary, we hypothesized an interrier) in a 2 X 2 design. ("Individualistic

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action between negotiator accountability and visual access so that accountability will enhance the use of pressure tactics and will diminish joint benefit when negotiators can see and hear each other, but not when they can only hear each other. To test this hypothesis, we employed a 3 X 2 factorial design. The three levels of the first variable were high, low, and no accountability, with the latter involving no constituent. On the basis of findings by Benton (1972), we expected the low- and no-accountability conditions to have similar effects. The two levels of the second variable consisted of visual access, where the negotiators talked face to face, and no visual access, where they talked across a barrier. Method Subjects The negotiators were 132 males recruited by advertisement on the campus of the State University of New York at Buffalo. They were promised $3 for their participation plus any benefits they might accrue. Their ages ranged from 18 to 40 years. Twenty-two other participants (11 negotiator pairs) were discarded from the design because of prior knowledge of the task (5), inability to understand the task (3), or prior acquaintance with the other participants (3). The subjects discarded were evenly distributed across the design. Two subjects were scheduled at a time and appeared with two undergraduate confederates who served as constituents. Eleven pairs of subjects were randomly assigned to each of the six cells in the design.

Negotiation Task The task was very similar to that employed in our previous research on integrative bargaining (Kimmel et al., 1980; Pruitt et al., 1978; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). It required pairs of participants, taking the roles of buyer and seller in a wholesale market, to agree on prices for three appliances: television sets, vacuum cleaners, and typewriters. The buyer was said to represent a large department store, and the seller a manufacturer of small appliances. Each negotiator had a profit schedule that could not be shown to the other. In the buyer's schedule, TVs had the highest and typewriters the lowest potential for profit. These priorities were reversed for the seller. Hence, the task had integrative (logrolling) potential in the sense that high joint profits could be achieved if the negotiators exchanged concessions on their low-profit items.

Procedure In the high and low accountability conditions, two confederates posing as subjects were in the room with the subjects. Two teams were formed, each consisting of a subject and a confederate. The task was described as involving "negotiation between two simulated companies." Team members were seated beside each other and introduced. One was then randomly designated as the "company owner" and the other as the "company negotiator." This was a bogus randomization procedure in that confederates always played the role of company owner. Care was taken to ensure that neither teammates nor opposing negotiators were previously acquainted or had interacted while waiting for the experiment to begin. The teams were seated across a table from one another, separated by a large barrier that prevented them from seeing one another. They were given printed copies of the instructions, which were presented by tape recorder as they followed the text. The experimenter was present and periodically stopped the tape recorder to answer questions. Each team was given its own profit schedule, and the schedules were explained in such a way that neither team could tell what numbers appeared in the other's schedule. The participants were told that the negotiators would be able to talk freely to each other about anything they wished, including the profits in their schedules, but could not show their schedules to one another. The negotiators were told that the profits made in the negotiation would be "converted into real money and divided between you and the owner." They were shown a printed form, the Settlement Report, that was to be used to report to the company owner how much money had been made in the negotiation. A brief quiz was administered to be sure each participant understood his profit schedule and how to compute the cash proceeds (the negotiator and owner answered the quiz separately). The accountability instructions were then presented. The owners were next sent to a separate room, to write a message that would be sent to their negotiator to indicate how they wanted the negotiator to act and that would also reiterate part of the instructions. It was said that the owners would be busy filling out questionnaires during the negotiation. Thus, they would not be able to see the actual negotiation but would receive a report about how much money their respective negotiator had made. Their role was minimal after this point. The negotiators were then given a mimeographed checklist reminding them of the most important parts of the procedure. This list was read to them as they followed the text, and it was retained by them during the negotiation. Just after this, a handwritten note was delivered to the negotiators by their respective company owners. This note was designed to reinforce the accountability manipulation. The negotiation then began. A time limit of 30 min. was imposed, during which the negotiators were to reach agreement. If agreement was not reached after 25 min., the experimenter administered a 5-min. warning with the statement, "It is important that you reach agreement, since otherwise you will both make nothing from

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LOOKING AND COMPETING the negotiation." In all conditions the experimenter sat in a room behind a one-way mirror during the negotiation, and the participants knew he was there. After the negotiation, questionnaires were filled out and the participants were interviewed, debriefed, and finally paid the amount they had earned. In the no-accountability condition, the procedure was identical except that there were no company owners and the subject was told he would keep whatever money he earned.

Manipulation of Accountability In the high accountability condition, the negotiators were told that the money each made would be sent to his company owner who would "decide how to divide it between himself and youself and would also "write a brief evaluation of how well you have done in the negotiation, so that you can see the basis for his decision about dividing up the money." In the low accountability condition, the negotiators were told that they would receive the money and could "decide how to divide it between yourself and the company owner." In this condition, nothing was said about an evaluation by the company owner. Under no accountability, at no time was any mention made of a company owner. The manipulation was reinforced by material included in the checklist and by the Settlement Report. Under high accountability, the checklist said, "Your company owner will be responsible for dividing any real money earned in the negotiation. (Your company owner will also write a report on your performance.)" The Settlement Report had a space for the negotiator to fill in his net profit, spaces for the company owner to indicate how this profit should be divided, and a space for the owner to write an "evaluation of negotiator performance." On completion of the negotiation, this report was to go from the negotiator to the owner and then back to the negotiator. Under low accountability, the checklist said, "You, the negotiator, will be responsible for dividing any real money earned in the negotiation." The Settlement Report had spaces for the negotiator to fill in his net profit and to divide this profit between the owner and himself. No mention was made of an evaluation, and this report was to go only from the negotiator to the owner. Also in the checklist, negotiators under high accountability were told they would meet with their company owner and not with the other negotiator after the negotiation. Negotiators under low accountability were told they would not meet with their company owner but would meet with the other negotiator after the negotiation. The high and low accountability conditions also differed in the message each negotiator received from his respective company owner. The message reiterated part of the instructions and told each negotiator to "make as much as you can for our company." In the high accountability condition, the message said, "I understand that I'll be given any money you make and that I'll divide it between us any way I want. I'll also write an evaluation of how well I think you did." In the low accountability condition, it said, "I understand that you will be given any money you make and that you will

divide it between us any way you want." No mention was made of an evaluation in the low accountability condition.

Manipulation of Visual Access Under visual access, the barrier that had separated the teams during the instructions was removed just before the start of the negotiation, allowing the negotiators to see one another. Under no visual access, the barrier remained in place for the negotiation. Thus, visual interaction was eliminated, but verbal communication was not hindered.

Results Manipulation Checks In comparison to low accountability negotiators, high accountability negotiators reported feeling more accountable to their company owner, F(l, 40) = 5.70, p < .05; more concerned with satisfying their company owner, F(\, 40) = 7.40, p < .01; and less powerful than their company owner, F( \, 40) = 13.32, p < .001. These differences suggest that the accountability manipulation was successful. Outcome of the Negotiation All pairs of negotiators reached agreement, as might be expected, since this was the only way to make money in the negotiation task. Table 1 presents means for the outcomes of negotiation. Two measures of joint benefit were employed, both drawn from Sen (1970): total profit made by the dyad as a whole and the profit made by the less successful negotiator. The latter measure is sensitive to both the overall dyadic outcome and the equality of the outcomes achieved by the two negotiators. Two other outcome measures are also presented. As can be seen in rows 1 and 2 of Table 1, high accountability led to diminished utility of agreement only when negotiators had visual access to one another. Significant interactions were obtained for both joint profit, F(2, 60) = 3.82, p < .05, and the profit for the less successful negotiator, F(2, 60) = 3.81, p < .05. Thus, the part of our hypothesis about joint profit was supported. No significant main effects were obtained for these two variables. No signif-

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Table 1 Outcome Measures as a Function of Visual Access and Accountability Visual access

No visual access

Outcome measure

HiA

LoA

NoA

HiA

LoA

NoA

1. Total dyad profit 2. Profit of less successful negotiator 3. Profit of more successful negotiator 4. Row 3 minus row 2

8,845

9,936

9,964

9,909

9,800

9,827

4,027

4,782

4,791

4,673

4,555

4,655

4,818 791

5,154 372

5,173 382

5,236 563

5,245 690

5,172 517

Note. HiA = high accountability; LoA = low accountability; NoA = no accountability.

icant main effects or interactions were obtained for the profit of the more successful negotiator or the differences between the more successful and less successful negotiators. Negotiation Process A number of process measures were derived from transcripts of the negotiation sessions. Some involved counting the number of times various themes were mentioned in the negotiation and dividing by the total number of statements made. These measures had interrater reliability correlation coefficients of .79 or above. Others involved recording or counting various features of the sequence of offers made by the negotiators. Still another measure involved counting the number of first-person singular and plural pronouns employed in the negotiation. In our experience, the latter two types of codes can be extracted with practically no error; hence, reliability coefficients were not calculated for them. Table 2 presents five indices derived from these measures and two indices based on items from the postquestionnaire. All tests of significance on the means in this table were done with dyad scores. Means from the index of pressure tactics are shown in row 1 of Table 2. This index consisted of the sum of equally weighted measures of the use of threats, positional commitments, status slurs, and arguments that the other should concede for reasons that relate to the commercial setting hypothetically surrounding the negotiation. Our

prediction that accountability would have a larger impact on pressure tactics in faceto-face negotiations than in negotiations without visual interaction was borne out by a significant interaction for this index, F(2, 60) = 3.23, p < .05. As hypothesized, the most pressure tactics by far were exhibited in the high accountability-visual access cell. Rows 2 and 3 of Table 2 provide means from indices of information exchange and heuristic trial and error. Our index of information exchange involved the proportion of statements in which truthful information was given about the numbers in the speaker's profit schedule. A significant main effect for visual access was found on this variable, with negotiators providing one another more information when not able to see one another than when able to see one another, F(l, 60) = 4.34, p < .05. No other significant effects were found for this variable. Our index of heuristic trial and error involved the mean of the standard scores of four measures: the number of different offers made, the extent of concessions on low-priority appliances, the number of offers made before a substantial concession, and the proportion of statements in which the listener was asked to react to the speaker's most recent offer. No significant effects were obtained for this variable. A measure of negotiator aspirations was obtained by averaging standard scores of three intercorrelated variables: value of the first offer, value of the second offer, and number of offers made after one negotiator had mentioned an offer that was equal to or

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Table 2 Process Measures as a Function of Visual Access and Accountability No visual access

Visual access Process measure

1. Pressure tactics 2. Information exchange 3. Heuristic trial and error 4. Aspiration level 5. Understands other's priorities 6. We/I ratio 7. Cooperative atmosphere

HiA .24 .03 -.19 -.03

NoA

LoA

.03 .08

.06 .07

.83

.11 1.61

-.57

7.00

10.55

11.91

.31

.40

.29

2.96

4.09

4.46

HiA .08 .11

LoA .04 .17

NoA .05 .12

-.01 -.34

-.83 -.43

12.55

12.73

10.64

.62

.43

.48

4.36

4.82

4.77

-.25

.03

Note. HiA = high accountability; LoA = low accountability; NoA = no accountability.

better for both of them than $4,000.4 The results are shown in row 4. No significant effects were obtained for this measure. In order for negotiators to gain insight into which solutions are most mutually beneficial, they must develop an understanding of one another's values and priorities. A measure of such understanding was constructed from postquestionnaire items regarding which commodities offered the other negotiator the most and least profits. The means for this index are shown in row 5 of Table 2. These results were similar in form to those for our measures of joint benefit. The negotiators had less understanding of one another's priorities in the high-accountabilityvisual access condition than in any of the other conditions. Again the interaction was statistically significant, F(2, 60) = 3.62, p < .05. Two measures of interpersonal atmosphere in the negotiation were also employed. One was a "we/I ratio," consisting of the number of first-person-plural pronouns (we, us, our, ours) referring to the two negotiators divided by the number of firstperson-singular pronouns (I, me, my, mine). We view this ratio as a measure of the extent to which the negotiators have a sense of common identity or unit relationship with one another. The other was a 7-point postquestionnaire rating scale concerning how cooperative the atmosphere had been in the negotiation. The means for these measures

are given in rows 6 and 7 of Table 2. The same result emerged from both measures: There was a more positive atmosphere when the negotiators were not able to see one another than when they were able to see one another. The we/1 ratio was greater under no visual access than under visual access, F( 1, 60) = 4.70, p < .05, and the atmosphere was rated as more cooperative under no visual access than under visual access, F(l, 60) = 7.19, p < .01. There was also a significant main effect for accountability on the measure of perceived cooperativeness, F(2, 64) = 3.74, p < .05. A less cooperative atmosphere was perceived under high accountability than under low or no accountability. Again there were no significant differences between the low and no-accountability conditions on any of these measures. Correlational Findings Within-cell correlations were computed among the variables shown in Tables 1 and 2 in an effort to shed further light on how high joint benefit is achieved. These correlations had 59 degrees of freedom: one for 4

$4,000 represents the amount that can be achieved in this negotiation task by adopting an obvious compromise that involves no exchange of concessions. This is the lowest score ordinarily made by a negotiator. For both parties to improve on this score, it is necessary to exchange concessions on low-priority issues and thus exploit the integrative potential in the situation.

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each of the 66 dyad scores, minus one for each of the six cell means, minus one for the line of regression. The following are among the highlights of these results. There were positive correlations among the three measures that were higher under no visual access than under visual access, as follows: information exchange—we/I ratio, r = .35, p < .01; information exchange—cooperative atmosphere, r = .47, p < .01; we/ I ratio—cooperative atmosphere, r — .47, p < .01. This suggests that these measures dealt with much the same thing, perhaps what Deutsch (1973) calls a "cooperative process." The best predictor of total dyad profit was the understanding negotiators had about one another's priority structure (r = .54, p < .01). None of the three traditional predictors of joint benefit—pressure tactics, information exchange, or heuristic trial and error— was significantly related to total profit (nor were these measures related to one another). However, the perception of a cooperative atmosphere was so related (r = .33, p < .01), suggesting that some as yet unidentified problem-solving process was at work in generating high joint profit. In line with the flexible-rigidity hypothesis, our measure of negotiator aspirations was positively correlated with total profit (r = .33, p < .05). This index was also positively related to heuristic trial and error (r = .40, p < .01) and inversely related to pressure tactics (r = —.33, p < .05). The pressure tactics index was inversely related to insight (r = -.30, p < .05). Information exchange was predictive of the profit of the less (though not the more) successful bargainer (r = .34, p < .01). Our interpretation of this finding is that information exchange produces a mutual understanding of the two parties' priority structures, making it possible to identify an alternative that provides equally high outcomes to the two parties. This interpretation is supported by the finding of a significant inverse correlation (r = —.35, p < .01) between information exchange and the absolute difference between the two parties' outcomes. Though unrelated to total profit across the entire set of conditions, the three traditional

predictors of joint benefit were significantly correlated with total profit under high accountability. For pressure tactics, r(20) = -.49, p < .05; for information exchange, r(20) = .47, p < .05; for heuristic trial and error, r(20) = .37 p < .10. Pressure tactics were again inversely related to understanding the other's priorities, r(20) = -.45, p < .05, and understanding was again predictive of total profit, r(20) = .72, p < .01, in this subset of cells. Discussion The results of this study show that the impact of accountability on the conduct and outcome of negotiation is moderated by visual access. As hypothesized, in face-to-face negotiation, high accountability produced more pressure tactics and lower joint outcome than low or no accountability. But accountability had no effect when negotiators talked across a barrier. A similar conclusion can be reached by comparing earlier studies of the effect of accountability in unidimensional negotiation settings. In studies involving face-to-face interaction, accountability produced diminished concession rate, whereas in studies involving note passing, no accountability effects were found. Assuming that slow concession making in unidimensional tasks is a form of pressure tactics akin to positional commitment, this would appear to be the same effect as that found in the present study. Another way of describing the same results is that under high accountability, bargainers who were face to face exhibited more pressure tactics and achieved lower joint benefit than those who talked across a barrier. A broader generalization of this finding is possible in the light of Lewis and Fry's (1977) discovery of similar results in their individualistic-orientation condition. One can argue that when there is a competitive definition of the situation, visual access produces pressure tactics and low joint benefit. Visual access was found to diminish the cooperativeness of the interaction between the bargainers under all levels of the accountability variable. When face to face, the bargainers exchanged less information about values, employed more I's and fewer we's,


and indicated that the atmosphere of the session had been less cooperative than when talking across a barrier. The results described so far seem counterintuitive if one considers that face-toface contact is more intimate than contact across a barrier. Why then should there be more efforts to dominate and more competition in the face-to-face condition? To answer this question, we must recall that bargaining tends to evoke a competitive definition of the situation, especially under high accountability. In such a context, we postulate that various elements of nonverbal behavior, such as staring, are employed in an effort to dominate and are interpreted as domineering behavior. When there is no visual access, such nonverbal tactics are not available. Hence, there is less temptation to try to dominate and less reason to view the other party as trying to dominate. The result is fewer pressure tactics and more cooperation. One alternative interpretation would hold that the visual image of the adversary in a competitive context acts as a releasing cue for domineering and hostile behavior toward that adversary. Other alternative explanations are plausible. For example, negotiators within the visual presence of one another may meet with heightened objective selfawareness that leads them to act in a manner more appropriate for the given situation. The appropriate behavior, for example, employing pressure tactics, may be more clearly defined in the high accountability conditions. The significant main effects and the correlations under high accountability suggest the following four-element causal explanation for the accountability effect in the faceto-face condition: Accountability produces dominance behavior that precludes negotiator understanding of the other party's priorities, resulting in the development of agreements involving low mutual gain. The results also provide further support for the flexible-rigidity hypothesis, which holds that high joint benefit results from a combination of high, rigid aspirations and the adoption of problem-solving tactics. As implied by this hypothesis, aspiration level was correlated with total profit. Furthermore, under high accountability the two

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types of problem-solving tactic, information exchange and heuristic trial and error, were also correlated with total profit. However, failure to find similar orientation effects for the data set as a whole is puzzling. References Bartunek, J. M., Benton, A. A., & Keys, C. B. Third party intervention and the bargaining behavior of group representatives. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, 532-557. Benton, A. A. Accountability and negotiations between group representatives. Proceedings of the 80th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1972, 7, 227-228. Benton, A. A., & Druckman, D. Salient solutions and the bargaining behavior of representatives and nonrepresentatives. International Journal of Group Tensions, 1973, 3, 28-39. Benton, A. A., & Druckman, D. Constituent's bargaining orientation and intergroup negotiations. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1974,4, 141-150. Carnevale, P. J. D., Pruitt, D. G., & Britton, S. D. Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1979,5, 118-121. Deutsch, M. The resolution of conflict. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Druckman, D. Dogmatism, prenegotiation experience, and simulated group representation as determinants of dyadic behavior in a bargaining situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 6, 279290. Druckman, D., Solomon, D., & Zechmeister, K. Effects of representational role obligations on the process of children's distribution of resources. Sociometry, 1972, 35, 387-410. Frey, R. L., Jr., & Adams, J. S. The negotiator's dilemma: Simultaneous in-group and out-group conflict. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972,5, 331-346. Gahagan, J. P. Effects of promise credibility, outside options and social contact on interpersonal conflict. Dissertation Abstracts International, 1970, 30, 3546-A. Cruder, C. L. Relationships with opponent and partner in mixed-motive bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1971, IS, 403-416. Cruder, C. L., & Rosen, N. A. Effects of intragroup relations or intergroup bargaining. International Journal of Group Tensions, 1971, /, 301-317. Kelley, H. H., & Schenitzki, D. P. Bargaining. In C. G. McClintock (Ed.), Experimental social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972. Kimmel, M., Pruitt, D. G., Magenau, J., Konar-Goldband, E., & Carnevale, P. J. D. Effects of trust, aspiration, and gender on negotiation tactics. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1980, 38, 922. Klimoski, R. J. The effects of intragroup forces on in\ergroup conflict resolution. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1972, 8, 363-383.

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Klimoski, R. J., & Ash, R. A. Accountability and negotiator behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1974, / / , 409-425. Kogan, N., Lamm, H., & Trommsdorff, G. Negotiation constraints in the risk-taking domain: Effects of being observed by partners of higher or lower status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 23, 143-156. Lewis, S. A., & Fry, W. R. Effects of visual access and orientation on the discovery of integrative bargaining alternatives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1977, 20, 75-92. Milgram, S. Obediance to authority. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. Morley, I., & Stephenson, G. The social psychology of bargaining. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977. Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. D. The development of integrative agreements in social conflict. In V. J. Derlega & J. Grzelak (Eds.), Living with other people: Theories and research on cooperation and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1980. Pruitt, D. G., Kimmel, M. J., Britton, S., Carnevale,

P. J. D., Magenau, J. M., Peragallo, J., and Engram, P. The effect of accountability and surveillance on integrative bargaining. In H. Sauermann (Ed.), Contributions to experimental economics. Tubingen, Germany: Mohr, 1978. Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 621-633. Pruitt, D. G., & Lewis, S. A. The psychology of integrative bargaining. In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations: A social-psychological perspective. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage-Halsted, 1977. Schulz, J. W., & Pruitt, D. G. The effects of mutual concern on joint welfare. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1978, 14, 480-491. Sen, A. K. Collective choice and individual values. New York: Holden-Day, 1970. Walton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. A behavior theory of labor negotiation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Received March 17, 1980

Manuscripts Accepted for Publication in the Section Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes Property Rights, Deservingness, Reciprocity, and Friendship: The Transactional Character of Children's Sharing Behavior. Ervin Staub (Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003) and Henry Noerenberg. Is Empathic Emotion a Source of Altruistic Motivation? C. Daniel Batson (Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045), Bruce D. Duncan, Paula Ackerman, Terese Buckley, and Kimberly Birch. x ldentifiability as a Deterrent to Social Loafing: Two Cheering Experiments. Kipling Williams, Stephen Harkins, and Bibb Latane (Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, 404B West 17th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210). Verbal, Vocal, and Visible Factors in Judgments of Another's Affect. Robert M. Krauss (Department of Psychology, Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027), William Apple, Nancy Morency, Charlotte Wenzel, and Ward Winton. Heiderian Balance as a Group Phenomenon. Theodore M. Newcomb (1045 Cedar Bend Drive, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105). The Effects of Prior Experience on Coalition Bargaining. S. S. Komorita (Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820) and David A. Kravitz. Sex Differences in Reward Allocation: Subjects, Partners, and Tasks. Harry T. Reis (Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627) and Linda A. Jackson. Audience-Induced Inhibition of Overt Practice During Learning. Seymour M. Berger (Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003), Katherine L. Hampton, Linda L. Carli, Paul S. Grandmaison, Janice S. Sadow, Clifford H. Donath, and Laura R. Herschlag. Low-Ball Compliance Technique: Task or Person Commitment? Jerry M. Burger and Richard E. Petty (Department of Psychology, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri 65211). Effects of Communication Timing on Duopoly Bargaining Outcomes. Frank Stech and Charles G. McClintock (Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106).