Malbon--Dealing with Coercion - SSRN papers

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A number of chapters in this book criticise bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) between a strong state and a weak state containing TRIPS-plus terms.[1] The ...
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[Chapter 8: in Interpreting and Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Is it fair? J Malbon and C Lawson (eds) (Edward Elgar, UK 2008)]

TRIPS-plus Treaty Terms: Dealing with Coercion Justin Malbon

1.

Introduction

A number of chapters in this book criticise bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) between a strong state and a weak state containing TRIPS-plus terms.[1] The general criticism made is that the TRIPS-plus terms are unfair or exploitative and serve the self-interest of a strong state at the expense of the interests of a weak state. This chapter is interested in how it might be decided within a legal framework whether TRIPS-plus terms are unfair or exploitative. An implication underlying the criticisms is that TRIPS-plus terms are obtained through coercion or undue influence, or unfair exploitation of the strong party’s dominant position. Under present law, a treaty is void if procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Arguably, a treaty is also void if procured by the threat or use of economic duress. It seems highly unlikely that the TRIPS-plus FTAs referred to in this book were attained by the threat of force. It might be possible to claim they were attained by actual or threatened economic duress. Even on a generous interpretation of the law the threatened or actual duress needs to be reasonably blatant. There probably needs to be a threat of the imposition of economic sanctions if the weak nation does not agree to the treaty terms. Again, it seems unlikely that the TRIPS-plus FTAs have been obtained through economic duress defined in this way. Given that the present state of the law probably does not provide the legal basis for satisfying the critics of TRIPS-plus terms, this chapter will consider whether extending the law beyond its current parameters can meet their concerns about abuse of dominant party position. The chapter will leapfrog into an imagined future state of the law in which treaty terms are challengeable on the basis they unjustifiably give a party an excessive advantage. The imagined law will also enable a party to seek to have treaty terms suspended, amended or setaside in circumstances of hardship. Although the imagined law extends beyond existing law, it is not as outlandish as may first appear as it is consistent with the overarching international

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law obligations of good faith. The imagined law also builds upon current rules and principles of contract law, which pay increasing attention to matters of substantive fairness. Domestic law is not uncommonly referred to for reforming the international law. In the case of treaty law it is useful to refer to domestic contract law principles. Treaties have been likened to contracts in the sense that they are entered into upon the basis of party autonomy (in the case of international law this has parallels with notions of state sovereignty) for the purpose of the parties obtaining mutually beneficial outcomes (or maximising their joint welfare). This chapter will propose a plausible set of rules regarding treaties based upon contract law to deal with circumstances in which a party abuses its dominant position by extracting unfair treaty terms. It will also suggest a means for dealing with situations in which the prevailing circumstances unpredictably change causing hardship to a party. The question arises in the present context as to which domestic contract law should be borrowed from to gain inspiration for reforming treaty law. Fortunately, we can side step the somewhat xenophobic undertones of this question by referring to two sets of internationally devised contract laws or principles: the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (GISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. The CISG says very little about oppressive contract terms, whilst the UNIDROIT Principles contain a number of provisions on the topic. Of present interest is Art 3.10, which deals with contracts and contract terms that result in a gross disparity between the obligations of the parties that gives one party an unjustifiable advantage; and Chapter 6, Section 2 of the UNIDROIT Principles, which deals with hardship. This chapter will borrow from Art 3.10 to construct an imagined amendment to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that will deal with treaties and treaty terms which, at the time a treaty was entered into, resulted in gross disparity of the party’s treaty obligations leading one party gaining an unjustifiable advantage. Chapter 6, Section 2 of the UNIDROIT Principles will be borrowed from to suggest ways of dealing with circumstances of hardship arising after the treaty was entered into. It will be assumed for present purposes that parties could challenge treaties with TRIPS related subject matter (including TRIPS-plus terms) before the WTO’s Disputes Settlements Body. This chapter will proceed to speculate as to how such a treaty law would affect the behaviour of parties to TRIPS-plus FTAs, or parties negotiating TRIPS-plus terms. It will be speculated that it is unlikely (although possible) that a nation would challenge the TRIPS-plus terms of an FTA under the imagined reformed position. Even if nations rarely or ever challenge treaty terms under the imagined law, it will be claimed that the reformed position will alter the existing normative regime at the margins thereby placing greater emphasis on issues of substantive fairness than presently exists. This shift would not be insignificant as treaty law has a long antecedence of toleration of bullying and coercive behaviour by strong states. Arguably, the TRIPS Agreement itself resulted from oppressive conduct by strong states. Further tilting the normative regime so that it places greater emphasis on substantive fairness is arguably a good thing, even if it is not a complete answer to the concerns of critics regarding TRIPS-plus terms.

2 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411469

2.

Forward-base regulatory model

As mentioned, this chapter will leapfrog from the present to an imagined future state of the international law. That leap requires explanation. In order to skip the usual debates about whether there should be reform of international relations and the attendant law that ought to deal with this apparent abuse of party position, this chapter will postulate a set of reforms to offer the analyst a different (imaginary) future place in time for assessing initially conceived proposals for reform. The objective of proposing an idealised set of reforms – or a ‘forwardbase regulatory model’ as it will be described in this chapter – is to shift focus from a present day perspective, which is locked into an ‘ought to’ debate, to a future in which the idealised reform scheme exists. Although the aim is to skip the ‘ought to’ debate, the strictures of this methodology will be relaxed somewhat in order to justify the policy considerations upon which the model is based. Although this is not strictly necessary (and risks sliding into an ‘ought to’ debate) it is done to explain the plausibility of the reformed position and offer insights into the problematics of the unreformed position. The forward-base regulatory model proposed here is positioned at a ‘forward-base’ in the sense that the posited law does not exist at present, but theoretically could exist at some future point in time. It is regulatory, in the sense that the model is about the regulation of behaviour using recognisably legal mechanisms. Finally, it is an idealised model built upon specified and plausible assumptions. Building the model has the advantages of: • clarifying what reform advocates are actually seeking when they criticise the present state of the law; • offering a different perspective from which to consider alternate reform measures, or consider whether reform is necessary in the first place; • exposing assumptions and limitations about the existing system; and • allowing assessments to be made as to how various players might respond to a particular reformed set of laws. The purpose of offering an idealised set of international regulations, therefore, is to allow an additional way of reflecting upon alternative regulatory reform proposals and theories than generally exists. It also opens another space, and another position, for applying methodologies that attempt to either predict or gain additional insights into the way people and organisations respond to regulatory change (see, for example, Lempert et al 2003). The methodologies can, for example, include game theory and adaptive agent modelling (see, for examples, Banks and Duggan 2006; Mahoney and Sanchirico 2003). These methodologies will not be attempted in this chapter. They do, however, offer ways of analysing reform proposals and offering some (albeit limited) capacity for predicting likely party responses to reform measures. Proponents claim that game theory and dynamic game theory offer a means for assessing how parties might interact with each other to advance their perceived self-interest. They also claim the theories have the capacity to predict party behaviour, and in other contexts, predict market behaviour. Critics claim, however, that these methodologies tend only to work well in analysing two or three agents, and they are concerned with equilibrium outcomes rather than any process (Moss 2002, p. 7267). These methodologies and concomitant theories are, therefore, unlikely to cope with the complexity of international relations overlayed with

3 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411469

assessments of how judges and tribunals will respond to a hypothesised set of legal regulations. An interesting development involves the use of multiagent models for building theories about complex organizational behaviour and strategies. These have been used to analyse decisions, and policies influencing the performance, effectiveness, flexibility, and survivability of complex social systems (Carley 2002, p. 7257). According to Carley: Multiagent models used in a ‘what-if’ fashion are improving our understanding of how different technologies, decisions, and policies influence the performance, effectiveness, flexibility, and survivability of complex social systems (Carley 2002, p. 7257).

She adds that the key point is that ‘these models enable the analyst to look at complex systems and reason about such scenarios in a more systematic fashion than many other forms of theorizing’ (Carley 2002, p. 7262). There are a number of computer programs available to assist analysis for the multiagent models. Given the enormous complexity of human organisational behaviour, and the bounded rationality and emotional responses of the actors the multiagent models seek to analyse, the capacity for the analyst to predict organisational behaviour remains somewhat limited. Their greater value, like other theories and methodologies, often lies in their capacity to lay bare hidden assumptions and potential limitations in existing ways of doing things (Carley 2002, p. 7267). Similarly, the forwardbase regulatory model proposed here is unlikely to predict accurately how states and tribunals might respond to the hypothetical regulations, but it does offer new perspectives for making additional hypothesises about likely party behaviour, as well as exposing assumptions and limitations about the existing system. Claims about likely party responses to the modelled rules will therefore be tentative and generalised. Generalised predictions can often be more accurate, but potentially less useful (although possibly sufficiently useful), than more precise predictions. By way of analogy, I can make the very general but reliable prediction that next year in Cape Town the average temperatures during summer will be higher than the average temperatures during winter. This is likely to be a highly accurate although not altogether useful prediction, as it is so widely known. However if I make the more precise prediction that the maximum temperature in Cape Town on 1 September next year will be 20 degrees Celsius, chances are it will be wrong. The complexities of weather systems are so great and susceptible to so many variable influences that precise prediction of maximum temperatures and prevailing weather conditions beyond a few days into the future is impossible. Much the same can be said of human behaviour in complex institutional settings. Predicting to any level of detail how states might perform under a particular (hypothesised) regulatory regime is extremely fraught. The way key-diplomats and negotiators perceive their self-interest, read the prevailing political climate, develop relationships and alliances with other diplomats and negotiators and so on, all add an increasing array of variables that can dramatically change the outcomes of any modelling that attempts to predict future behaviour. Generalised claims about future responses to a hypothetical reform scenario are therefore likely to be more reliable than specific claims. The model applied here is itself deliberately generalised and simplified to attain greater utility. The model seeks to gain insights into the behaviour of ‘strong states’ and ‘weak

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states’ in negotiating TRIPS-plus terms. The term ‘weak state’ is highly generalised, and contestable. China, for example, might be thought of as a weak state as it is classified as a developing country because of its low household incomes and its consumption is quite low in rural and inland areas. On the other hand it might be thought of as a strong state because it is the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of gross domestic product at 2006 exchange rates, and the second largest when adjustments are made for the differences in the domestic purchasing power of national currencies.[2] It might therefore be considered to be negotiating as a strong state even where the other party is the US. In some contexts a developed country might be considered to be a relatively weak state. Australia, for example, is a developed country with a diverse economy. It is also a small economy on world rankings and remains heavily dependent upon its primary industries. The US economy, on the other hand, dwarfs the Australian economy. Although highly generalised and contestable, the terms strong state and weak state are useful for making broad theoretical claims and for gaining generalised insights into party behaviour. The forward-base regulatory model theorises that: • strong states (particularly the United States) are using their dominant market position to extract contentious TRIPS-plus terms from weak parties; • the weak states would not have agreed to the contentious terms if they were dealing with a state with equal bargaining power; and • the present law is insufficiently robust to deal with a party abusing its dominant position to extract ‘unfair’ treaty terms. Given these theoretical assumptions, this chapter proposes a reformed position based upon commercial contract law principles, which are at the same time consistent with the overarching obligation under international law that parties deal with each other on the basis of good faith. This analysis will not be run as an ‘ought to’ debate (although such a debate lies in the shadows of this analysis), but rather as an ‘as if’ analysis of how parties might respond to the reformed position. The first two propositions mentioned above are dealt with at some length in other chapters in this book and will therefore not be discussed at any great length in this chapter.[3] Taking the third proposition first (that the law is insufficiently robust), it is necessary to examine the state of the existing law.

3.

Present state of the law

Treaty law and contract law have long been built upon the foundational assumption of party autonomy, or sovereignty. It follows from this that parties are free to enter into mutually beneficial bargains or compacts. The law of both contracts and treaties provides remedies for behaviour that militates against the contract or treaty being the result of a free and consensual agreement of the parties. Militating behaviour includes fraud, threats of violence and other behaviour by one party that oppresses the will of the other. Consistent with giving effect to party autonomy and the concomitant freedom of the parties to negotiate mutually agreed terms, both contract law and treaty law (in theory at least) treat the legal rights of the parties to the agreement as being equal. That is, the law applies equally to both parties; it does not provide more legal rights to one party at the expense of the other. A limited exception applies

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to rebalance party rights where one party exploits its dominant position by extracting unfair terms from the other under the contract. This exception is discussed below. As mentioned, the ideal, regarding the status of international states, is that they enter into treaties as equals, and each has equal rights at law. The reality is somewhat more contentious. Marshall CJ of the United States Supreme Court expressed the ideal of state equality some time ago in his usual lofty way: No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another (The Antelope 1825, p. 122).

His sentiments are now echoed in Art 2, Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that Members shall act in accordance with a number of principles, including that the ‘[o]rganization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’. The principle of state equality is also voiced in the preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that the Convention has in mind ‘the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’. Consistent with the principle of state equality, the Preamble also observes that ‘the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognized’. All this speaks to the idea (and the ideal) that nation-states deal with each other on the basis of mutual respect rather than on the basis of strong-arm tactics and bullying. The reality, at least prior to the Charter of the United Nation, was somewhat different. Kaufmann claimed in 1911 that: The right to equality, in the sense of inherent equality of power and rights, is nonsense, and in the sense of formal equality of capacity for rights is nothing else but a tautological expression for the conception of International Personality (Kaufmann 1911, p. 195).

After citing a number of examples of ‘political inequalities’ in international society, McNair concluded in 1927 that: The truth is that in two important and relevant respects international law lags behind the private law of most civilized States and international treaties differ from private contracts. The first is that international law does not recognize the fact that one party to a treaty was induced by duress or coercion or undue influence to make it, as a ground for treating it as invalid. The second is that only in the most rudimentary degree does international law recognize that a treaty which conflicts with morality or with policy is void and need not be performed (McNair 1927, p. 139).

In any event, he concluded, ‘[n]o one can regard the position of duress in international law as satisfactory or as consistent with a civilized society’ (McNair 1927, p. 140). McNair cited a number of examples of treaties obtained by duress, including the system of capitulations resulting in China and Turkey agreeing to surrender the right to try certain classes of

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foreigners for crimes committed in their territories; the Peace Treaties of 1919 which required Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria to forfeit the privileges and immunities of sovereignty; and the impairing of Panama’s freedom of action (McNair 1927, p. 140). He was not to know it at the time, but the inherent unfairness of these treaties was to contribute to international instability in the lead up to World War II, in some cases to a spectacular degree (McNair 1927, p. 139). The United Nations International Law Commission, which drafted the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, noted that prior to the advent of the Covenant of the League of Nations a treaty’s validity was unaffected by the fact it had been brought about by the threat of the use of force. The Commission stated that this doctrine: … was simply a reflection of the general attitude of international law during that era towards the legality of the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris there began to develop a strong body of opinion which held that such treaties should no longer be recognized as legally valid (United Nations International Law Commission 1966, p. 246).

In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, which stated in part that: No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.

At around this time the United Nations International Law Commission concluded its work on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which included a number of provisions dealing with treaties obtained by fraud and coercion. The Convention codifies the grounds on which a treaty may be impeached.[4] Art 51 provides that the expression of a State’s consent to be bound to a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats shall be without any legal effect. Of interest for present purposes is Art 52, which provides: Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

There was a deal of controversy amongst the members of the United Nations International Law Commission engaged in drafting the Convention about this provision. Delegates from developing nations wanted it to expressly mention economic duress as a basis for voiding a treaty, whilst developed nations sought to narrow the grounds for voidance (see, for examples, Bowett 1972; Briggs 1967; Nahlik 1971). According to the Commission’s Commentary on the provision: Some members of the Commission expressed the view that any other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the economy of a country, ought to be stated in the article as falling within the concept of coercion. The Commission, however, decided to define coercion in terms of a ‘threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter’, and considered that the precise scope of the acts covered by this definition

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should be left to be determined in practice by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter (United Nations International Law Commission 1966, p. 246).[5]

In the end a compromise was reached in which economic coercion was not expressly mentioned, but the following declaration was annexed to the Final Act of the Conference on the Law of Treaties: Declaration on the prohibition of military, political or economic coercion in the conclusion of treaties Having adopted the Declaration on the prohibition of military, political or economic coercion in the conclusion of treaties as part of the Final Act of the Conference: 1. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to bring the Declaration to the attention of all Member States and other States participating in the Conference, and of the principal organs of the United Nations; 2. Requests Member States to give the Declaration the widest possible publicity and dissemination (UN Doc A/CONF 39/26).

The declaration notably describes Art 52 as a declaration on the prohibition of military, political or economic coercion in the conclusion of treaties. In any event, Art 52 refers to ‘the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’, which in turn references Art 2(4) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits the use of force. The term ‘force’ in this context has its ambiguities (Schachter 1991, p. 111), and sometimes is used in a wide sense to ‘embrace all types of coercion: economic, political and psychological as well as physical’ (Schachter 1991, p. 111). Opposition to economic coercion against states also appears in the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.[6] Arguably, the impugned behaviour includes intentionally interfering with the trading patterns of a state (Barrie 1988, p. 314).[7] A number of commentators state that economic coercion can only be employed in support of self-defence or to redress an international wrong (Barrie 1988, p. 314; Thomas and Thomas 1972, pp. 90-91; Farer 1985, p. 411). A broader and perhaps more fundamental question is what precisely do we mean by coercion? Farer observes that most people instinctively divide threats into two categories: threats not to give a benefit or to withdraw a previously given benefit (Farer 1985, p. 405). In the international community these include threats to refuse to provide or to withdraw economic aid and to deny most favoured nation status. Indeed, he says, threats, ‘more or less subtle, have always been an important feature of the intercourse of states, even among allies’ (Farer 1985, p. 406). Farrer goes so far as to say that: The nub of the matter is that the word ‘coercion’ has no normative significance; there is nothing illegal about coercion. Coercion is normal in all human relationships, including those between lovers. It’s part of life. So is cooperation. Indeed, every human relationship is some mixture of coercion and cooperation. So to say that a particular relationship is coercive is to say nothing at all about its legitimacy (Farer 1985, p. 406).

His claim that coercion has no normative significance goes too far as it empties the term of any real meaning. His point is significant, however, to the extent that to have a meaning in a legal context the term ‘coercion’ must be given clear definition.

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Despite the threat or use of force being a ground for voiding a treaty, various forms of duress continue to exist in more or less subtle forms today. This leads to a present situation where, in Harris’ assessment: Much of the unfairness in international law results from severe power inequalities among the various nations and the power-based regime that undergirds global governance. The remedy for treaties negotiated unfairly is quite often more treaties or, alternatively, hollow talk of promoting national sovereignty. Neither of these solutions directly attacks the problem. Indeed, there is lack of political will among nations to address the structural defects and power asymmetries in the international system (Harris 2006, p. 684).

Given it was not so long ago that overt threats of force and other forms of duress were tolerated, it is easy to imagine that old mind-sets die hard. Dominant states no doubt find irresistible the urge to place pressure on states to extract favourable treaty terms. It is, after all, the way international relations have been conducted for centuries. It is unsurprising then that coercive conduct, although more subtlety conducted nowadays, remains the norm. As we have seen then, over the course of the 20th century international law shifted from a position where bullying and coercive tactics were generally tolerated (and even considered acceptable) to one where this is no longer the case, at least as far as overt threats or use of force are concerned. It is possible that economic coercion is unacceptable under present international law, although it is probable that the coercion must amount to a real threat or use of economic sanctions or some other form of substantial economic harm to constitute a breach. Over the course of the 20th century, domestic contract law has grown increasingly intolerant of oppressive conduct, and paid increasing attention to issues of substantive fairness regarding the conduct of contractual relations.[8] At the same time international law has also become increasingly concerned with matters of substantive fairness, including with regard to the conduct of treaty relations, although it lags well behind domestic law by failing to match these concerns with sufficiently developed legal principles and sufficiently robust means for their enforcement (see DiMatteo 1997, p. 149 referring to Nassar 1995, p. 234). Under domestic law, the norm of fairness provides an umbrella for a number of doctrines including the civil law’s notion of just contract and the common law doctrine of unconscionability. Any apparent divergence between the civil and common law on this issue ultimately is a difference of semantics (DiMatteo 1997, p. 149). These domestic law developments in contract law can usefully inform developments in treaty law, although analogising contract law with treaty law is an exercise that should be undertaken with due caution.

4.

Borrowing from the domestic law of contract

Analogising treaties with contracts has its limits. Caution needs to be exercised to ensure the analogising is not taken too far, and the purpose for the analogising needs always to be borne in mind.

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There are clear differences between the nature and role of treaties and contracts. They differ to the extent that treaties perform functions that in national systems would be carried out by statutes, whereas contacts are legal transactions that create rights and duties only for the contracting parties, who are usually few in number (Malanczuk 1997, p. 37). Treaties can appear to have effects analogous to legislation because they are a source of rules that apply to a very large number of people, although it must be said that there are also problems with analogising treaties with national legislation (Malanczuk 1997, p. 37).[9] McNair, who drew heavily upon contract law as a resource for treaty law, noted a number of distinctions between the two. States use treaties ‘not only to agree on the rules which will govern a particular private relationship, but also to convey, to create an organization or association, and to legislate’ (Hutchinson 1989, p. 375). In addition, ‘the way in which States conduct their relations and enforce their rights has no obvious parallel in municipal law’, for example when engaging in war and concluding a war with peace treaties. Allott cautions against conceiving the relationship of the sources of customary international law and treaty law ‘either in terms of a lazy analogy with contract law or by a one-to-one correspondence with their relationship in a national legal system’ (Allott 1999, para 37(3)). Rather, he conceives the treaty and the law as creating a unique ‘micro-legal system within the general legal system from which they derive their legal effect, and within the society from which they derive their social effect’ (Allott 1999, para 35). The distinction between national and international legal systems can nevertheless be overdrawn. Kelsen says there is no absolute borderline between communities constituted by national and by international law. He notes that national law can rise from international law, as is the case when a State is established by an international treaty (Kelsen 1944, p. 211). Contract law offers a rich experience of dealing with inter-party disputes which can inform the development of treaty law. When reviewing the republication in 1986 of Lord McNair’s classic work The Law of Treaties Hutchinson noted that McNair’s view was that: … the devices and notions of municipal law represent a resource on which to draw for the purpose of analysing international legal practice and expounding the rules which it exemplifies. Developed after a long and detailed study by municipal legislators, judges and jurists, and tested through extensive application, they probably represent the most justified and workable solutions to international legal problems, just as they have provided satisfactory solutions to legal problems arising at the national level (Hutchinson 1989, p. 375).[10]

McNair employed municipal law analogies believing the law of contract is ‘potentially the most fruitful source of ideas for explaining and analysing treaty law’ (Hutchinson 1989, p. 375). The value of analogising contract law with treaty law was recognised by the WTO Appellant Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, when it said that: The WTO Agreement is a treaty – the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement (WT/DS8/AB/R).[11].

Drawing from contract law, then, it is possible to envisage ways in which the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could be expanded so as to deal with oppressive conduct

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in the negotiation of treaties. The question becomes, which is the most appropriate domestic contract law from which to draw? Fortunately, there are two internationally devised contract law instruments that can be referred to: the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) devised by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles).[12]

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International contract law

The CISG says very little about coercive or oppressive conduct. The UNIDROIT Principles, on the other hand, offer ground that is more fertile for present purposes. The UNIDROIT Principles are non-binding and therefore rely on their persuasive value for adoption. They have been used as the basis for reforming the domestic law of contract in a number of countries (Bonell 2004, p. 7). In addition, they can be, and are, chosen as the law governing contract by parties to contracts for the international sale of goods or services. Also arbitrators to international commercial disputes will often apply the UNIDROIT Principles to a contract that states that the law applying to the contract are the ‘general principles of law’, ‘principles of international law’, ‘lex mercatoria’ or the like, or where the contract makes no choice of law at all (Bonell 2004, p. 13). That is to say, the Principles are taken to represent ‘a particularly authoritative expression of similar supra-national or transnational principles and rules of law’ (Bonell 2004, p. 13). This is probably unsurprising given that the 2004 Principles, which built on an earlier version of the Principles, was drafted by a Working Party comprised of seventeen members who offered a wide representation of the major legal systems and regions of the world, and who hold the highest professional qualifications (Bonell 2004, p. 5; see also Bonell 2005). A number of the UNIDROIT Principles’ provisions deal with oppression by one party of the will of the other. Art 3.9, states that a party may avoid the contract ‘when it has been led to conclude the contract by the other party’s unjustified threat which, having regard to the circumstances, is so imminent and serious as to leave the first party no reasonable alternative’. Art 3.9 adds that in particular, ‘a threat is unjustified if the act or omission with which a party has been threatened is wrongful in itself, or it is wrongful to use it as a means to obtain the conclusion of the contract’. Art 3.10 deals with gross disparity. Specifically it states that: (1) A party may avoid the contract or an individual term of it if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the contract or term unjustifiably gave the other party an excessive advantage. Regard is to be had, among other factors, to: (a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the first party’s dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining skill; and (b) the nature and purpose of the contract. (2) Upon the request of the party entitled to avoidance, a court may adapt the contract or term in order to make it accord with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. (3) A court may also adapt the contract or term upon the request of the party receiving notice of avoidance, provided that that party informs the other party of its request promptly after receiving such

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notice and before the other party has reasonably acted in reliance on it. The provisions of Art 3.13(2) apply accordingly.

Bonell says that this was one of the most difficult provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles to draft (Bonell 2004, p. 165). Delegates to the UNDROIT Study Group sessions for the drafting of the Principles were divided over whether the proposed principles for dealing with gross disparity went far enough and whether it should appear in the Principles at all. Opponents argued that the proposal ventured beyond dealing with incidences of defects of consent and into the content of the contract itself (Bonell 2004, p. 167). Some argued that it was doubtful in the context of international trade that such a provision was appropriate as it would be extremely rare, between merchants, for them to agree to grossly unfair terms (Bonell 2004, p. 167). In the end a compromise was reached in which a party can only resort to Art 3.10 if it can establish that (a) there is gross disparity between the obligations of the parties, giving one party an excessive advantage; and (b) the excessive advantage must be unjustifiable. That is, it must have been obtained by exploiting a bargaining handicap of the other party or otherwise be lacking justification (Bonell 2004, p. 168). Consequently: From this perspective the provision is in line with the tendency, which is more and more prevalent within domestic laws, to consider procedural and substantive unfairness as two distinct but in most cases interrelated matters (Bonell 2004, p. 168).

According to the official UNIDROIT Commentary to its Principles the excessive advantage gained by a party must have existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract (UNIDROIT Commentary to its Principles).If an excessive advantage occurs after the conclusion of the contract, then the hardship provisions may assist the prejudiced party. The term ‘excessive advantage’ under Art 3.10(1) requires more than even a ‘considerable disparity in the value and the price or some other element which upsets the equilibrium of performance and counter-performance’ of the contract. What is required, according to the UNIDROIT Commentary is ‘that the disequilibrium is in the circumstances so great as to shock the conscience of a reasonable person’. Thus, not only must the advantage be excessive, it must be unjustifiable. The Commentary gives as an example of unjustifiable advantage a party selling an outdated automobile assembly line for a price that corresponds to the price of a modern assembly line. The contract may be avoided even if the seller made no representations about the efficiency of the assembly line. Other factors may need to be taken into account when deciding whether a party has gained an unjustifiable advantage, according to the Commentary, include the ethics prevailing in the business or trade. This factor can be taken into account in determining whether there has been a breach of good faith. With minimal redrafting of Art 3.10 of the UNIDROIT Principles to place it within the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties it is possible to envisage the provision reading as follows: (1) A party to a treaty may avoid the treaty or an individual term of it if, at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, the treaty or term unjustifiably gave the other party an excessive advantage. Regard is to be had, among other factors, to:

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(a) the fact that the other party has taken unfair advantage of the first party’s dependence, economic distress or urgent needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining skill; and (b) the nature and purpose of the treaty. (2) Upon the request of the party entitled to avoidance, a duly appointed tribunal may adapt the treaty or term in order to make it accord with international law standards of fair dealing. (3) A duly appointed tribunal may also adapt the treaty or term upon the request of the party receiving notice of avoidance, provided that that party informs the other party of its request promptly after receiving such notice and before the other party has reasonably acted in reliance on it. The provisions of Art 3.13(2) apply accordingly.[13]

Translating the requirements for establishing gross disparity under Art 3.10 to an imagined equivalent set of requirements under the Vienna Convention would require a weak state to establish that the strong state had taken unfair advantage of the weak state’s dependence, economic distress or urgent needs. To establish this, evidence of dependence could be adduced regarding the extent to which the weak state is dependent on the strong state for foreign aid, for favourable economic and security treatment, and so forth. All nations, of course, are to a greater or lesser extent mutually dependent upon each other for trade and investment. Dependence in this context must mean more than the usual degree of international economic, diplomatic and defence relations. It would therefore need to amount to an overwhelming dependence, such that the nation would suffer severe economic and social consequences if the strong party withdrew any privileges and favoured status to the weak party. Another factor that could be taken into account is whether the weak party is suffering economic distress. This might require evidence that the strong party gained an unjustified advantage under the treaty by exploiting a bargaining handicap by taking advantage of the weak state’s poor economic status. The advantage gained would need to be such that the disequilibrium is in the circumstances so great as to ‘shock the conscience’ of the international community, or to constitute a breach of ‘the principles of free consent and of good faith’, as per the preamble of the United Nations Charter. Chapter 6, Section 2 UNIDROIT Principles provides for remedial action if there are circumstances of hardship. The mere fact that the performance of the contract has become more onerous for one of the parties is itself insufficient grounds for establishing hardship (Art 6.2.1). Hardship arises if ‘the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished’, and: (a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the conclusion of the contract; (b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract; (c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and (d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party (Art 6.2.2).

Hardship entitles the disadvantaged party to request renegotiation of the contract (Art 6.2.3). If this fails, either party may request a court to terminate the contract on a date and terms to be fixed, or that the court adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.

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UNIDROIT appears to have intended that the hardship provisions reflect the domestic contract law concept of frustration of purpose (UNIDROIT Commentary to its Principles, p. 183). The change in circumstances must result in a fundamental alteration of the equilibrium of the contract. Whether there is a fundamental alteration will depend on the circumstances of each case (UNIDROIT Commentary to its Principles, p. 184). An illustration of an unforeseeable fundamental alteration of circumstances offered by the UNIDROIT Commentary is where one month after the conclusion of a contract a political crises occurs leading to a massive devaluation of 80% of a party’s currency (UNIDROIT Commentary to its Principles, p. 186). The UNIDROIT hardship provisions have some parallels with the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus under customary international law, which permits a party to terminate, withdraw from or suspend its obligations under a treaty if there is fundamental change of circumstances from those that existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty that was not foreseen by the parties. As an example, the United States terminated an international agreement on shipping load restrictions because of the outbreak of World War II (see Nelson 2006, p. 19). Art 62 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties limits the grounds for termination or withdrawal to those changed circumstances (a) that constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and (b) where the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed by the parties. According to Jenkins and Watts, rebus sic stantibus ‘when kept within proper limits, embodies a general principle of law as expressed in the doctrines of frustration, or supervening impossibility of performance, or the like, and known to the law of many countries’ (Jennings and Watts 1996, p. 1306). The UNIDROIT test is whether ‘the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract’, whilst Art 62 Vienna Convention refers to circumstances in which ‘the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty’. There is probably little practical difference between these two tests, although UNIDROIT’s test places emphasis on attaining party balance whilst Art 62 merely speaks of a transformation of the obligations of the parties. UNIDROIT is also clearer about the options available if hardship occurs, and requires the parties to attempt renegotiation of the terms as a first step. Modifying the Vienna Convention to take on board these aspects of the UNIDROIT Principles has a number of attractions, particularly the way in which it focuses attention on the substantive fairness issue of party balance.

6.

Good faith under treaty law

The law proposed by the forward-base regulatory model in this chapter might not involve so great an imaginative leap as might first be thought if it accepted that the UNIDROIT Principles provision dealing with gross disparity is simply an elaboration of the overarching obligation upon the parties to deal with each other on the basis good faith. Good faith is an obligation known under both domestic contract law and international treaty law.

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The International Court of Justice proclaimed in the Nuclear Tests case that ‘[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith’ (Australia v France 1974, p. 268). In terms of treaties, Art 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’.[14] In addition, Art 31 Vienna Convention provides that, ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Moreover, according to the WTO Appellant Body in US – Gasoline the ‘general rule of interpretation’ contained in Art 31 of the Vienna Convention had attained the status of customary or general international law (WT/DS2/AB/R, p 17). An overarching obligation of good faith plays an important role for contracts in civil law countries. Section 242 of the German Code Burgerliches Gesefzbuch (BGB) provides, for instance, that a debtor is bound to perform according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration (Ebke and Steinhauer 1997, p. 171). Although the section refers to the debtor, interpreters place attention on the debtor’s obligation to perform and the creditor’s right of performance. This is achieved by utilising section 157 of the Code which states contracts must be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith (Ebke and Steinhauer 1997, p. 171; see also Teubner 1998, pp. 25-27). The usual remedy applied in Germany for breach of contract is specific performance rather than damages. Damages are usually only payable if performance is impossible. In addition, the German Law on General Business Conditions, or AGB-Gesetz (AGBG) provides that a contract provision is void if it ‘work[s] to the disadvantage of [a party] in a way irreconcilable with good faith’ (see von Teichman 1983, p. 217; DiMatteo 1997, p. 147). A German court can interpret a clause that was not freely negotiated in a literal and restrictive way and can consider surrounding oral evidence that leads to a more equitable reading of a harsh contract term. In providing a remedy that may result in an equitable reformation or rescission of the contract a court will first attempt to adapt the contract to the new circumstances by re-writing it according to the parties’ intentions and interests, and if this fails, declare the contract void (von Teichman 1983, p. 218). Common law countries have generally shied away from imposing an overarching obligation of good faith. Despite that, most of the good faith obligations as understood in civil law countries exist in some form or another in common law countries, even if not under the good faith banner. The common law, for instance, can set aside a contract if there is inequality or inadequacy of consideration. In Wolford v Powers the court held that if the consideration ‘is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, courts will interfere’ (Wolford v Powers 1882, p. 301; see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 1965; DiMatteo, 1997, p. 150), and in Girard Trust Bank v. Castle Apartments Inc (1977) the court stated that if the ‘value is more than twice the sale price, there is such gross inadequacy as will shock the conscience of the Court and justify setting the sale aside’ (p. 1145 quoting Central National Bank v. Industrial Trust Co 1947). Perhaps not coincidently, the UNIDROIT commentary on Art 3.10 states, as we have seen, that an ‘excessive advantage’ exists if the equilibrium of the performance and counter-performance of the contract is so great as to shock the conscience of a reasonable person.

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Under international law, good faith can be said to be both a generalised expression of one of the main conditions for the functioning of any legal order (see Virally 1983, pp. 131-133), and a term containing a number of more specific obligations that apply to parties to treaties. Aspects of the overarching obligation at international law find expression in more particular obligations such as pacta sunt servanda (pacts must be respected). According to Virally, a function of good faith is that ‘that it furnishes a measure – or pattern – for determining the extent of the legal obligations assumed by states or other subjects of international law’ (Virally 1983, p 132). This is why, in his view, good faith is not only the basis, but also an integral part of pacta sunt servanda. Under treaty law, good faith requires, amongst other things, that parties refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the object of the treaty (see Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia 1926, p. 30; see also United Nations International Law Commission 1966, p. 211). It prohibits the abusive exercise of a party’s rights, which means that if a party’s assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by a treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, which is to say, reasonably (WT/DS58/AB/R, para 158). Nor can a party benefit from its own inconsistencies (The Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain 1960, pp. 213 and 214; The Temple of Preah Vihear 1962, pp. 23-32; see also United Nations International Law Commission 1966, p. 239). It is possible, then, that the requirement that a strong party not use its position to unjustifiably gain an excessive advantage under treaty terms from a weak party is a particularisation of the overarching good faith obligation. Such a particularisation places emphasis on matters of substantive justice, which is of increasing interest to both domestic and international legal systems. The claim that international law stretches as far as this, however, is far from uncontroversial. Jennings and Watts state categorically in Oppenheim’s International Law that the ‘invalidity of ‘unequal treaties’ has found no general acceptance’.[15] Recall however that under Art 3.10 UNIDROIT mere inequality of bargaining positions or contract terms is not enough, the terms must also be unjust. Jennings and Watts’ statement is consistent with Art 3.10 on the first proposition, and may possibly be silent on the second.

7.

The view from here

It can be plausibly argued, then, that under customary international law states are subject to an overarching obligation of good faith in their dealings with each other. This general obligation finds particularised form in various ways, including the obligation not to extract treaty terms by means of coercion. The precise meaning of coercion under Art 52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is not definite, but can conceivably include economic coercion. It might also plausibly be argued that the good faith obligation extends to the requirement that a party not use its position of dominance to extract unfair treaty terms. If this obligation does indeed exist, we may seek guidance from domestic contract law to gain a sense of when a treaty term would be judged to be unfair. In all likelihood it would be a term that so far departed from normative conduct that it would shock the mind of a reasonable observer. In addition, the overarching obligation of good faith can plausibly be argued to include the capacity to alter terms in circumstances of undue hardship. Even if this is not the present state of the international law, this chapter leap-frogs over the question whether the above described possible state of the law is in fact the law or not, or

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even whether it ‘ought to’ be the law. Under the forward-based regulatory position an imagined future state of the law is posited in which the above described law is in fact the law. The question arises as to what impact the modelled law would likely have on party behaviour? Taking the TRIPS-plus provisions in the United States FTAs with Morocco, Chile, Peru, the parties to the Central American FTA, or even the United States with Singapore and Australia for that matter; would a challenge to these provisions be likely to be successful? (see Table 1). On a superficial examination, at least, it appears unlikely. The TRIPS-plus provisions, even if they are taken to be as one-sided as the critics claim, do not appear to reach a point where they amount to terms causing so great a disequilibrium as to shock the conscience of the international community. Although the matter is of course arguable. Interestingly, some of the preambles to the intellectual property chapters in the FTAs go to some lengths to suggest the intellectual property terms will advance the interests of both parties. In the Preamble to the chapter dealing with intellectual property in the United States – Chile FTA, for example, hints at technology transfer gains for Chile: Emphasizing that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is a fundamental principle of this Chapter that helps promote technological innovation as well as the transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of technology producers and users, and that encourages the development of social and economic well-being.

It would be interesting to know whether Chile does in fact receive any substantial technological transfer gains as hinted at by the FTA. Would there be any point then in, say, amending the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to introduce provisions dealing with gross disparity and hardship? Such provisions would not constitute a radical realignment of the law, as they are consistent with the duty of good faith and place additional emphasis on matters of substantive fairness. As a practical matter, however, it would appear unlikely that the provisions would ever be invoked, except in the most extreme of circumstances. The emphasis upon issues of substantive fairness under the modelled provisions could serve to tilt the normative environment sufficiently to encourage states to pay greater heed to issues of fairness, and to discourage the sometimes subtle and sometimes unsubtle exercise by strong states of coercive conduct to achieve unduly favourable intellectual property terms in treaties. Recall that international relations have traditionally been transacted in an environment of legal tolerance of treaties obtained by coercion. The normative legal settings require therefore further realignment to counterbalance the long history of toleration of coercion so as to better meet the aspirations of the declarations found in the Charter of the United Nations, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

8.

Conclusion

From our forward-based vantage point we can see that the reformed position posited in this chapter does respond to the issue of treaties gained by the oppression of the will of states by

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promoting improvements to the international normative environment, at least at the margins. As we can also see from this vantage point, the reformed position offers some response (albeit at the margins) to an issue that the law tends to frame as one addressing issues of fairness and substantive justice. There are a number of insights that can be drawn from this analysis. First, legal responses to claimed unfairness of TRIPS-plus terms, even in an idealised form which incorporated the domestic contract law’s increasing concern with issues of substantive fairness, are unlikely to address anything but the most extreme cases of abuse of dominant state position. Second, delving into the way in which treaty law presently deals with coercion it becomes apparent that it inadequately deals with substantive justice, and lags behind domestic contract law in this regard. Third, international law and international relations remains unduly tolerant of coercive conduct, broadly understood. In short, it remains unduly complacent about the abuse of dominant party position, which most likely harms the long term stability of the existing international relations regime. Given this, it can be said the TRIPS-plus critics raise legitimate concerns about substantive fairness. Table 1: Free Trade Agreements concluded by the United States Country

Year of United States signing 2004 2006 1994 2003

Australia Bahrain Canada (NAFTA) Chile Columbia Costa Rica (Central American FTA) 2005 Dominican Republic (Central American FTA) 2005 El Salvador (Central American FTA) 2005 Guatemala (Central American FTA) 2005 Honduras (Central American FTA) 2005 Israel 1985; 1996; 2004 Jordan 2000 Korea 2006 Malaysia 2006 Mexico (NAFTA) 1994 Morocco 2005 Nicaragua 2005 Oman 2006 Peru Not yet signed Singapore 2003

Notes 1. Chapter XXX (Biadgleng); chapter XXX (Lawson and Sanderson); chapter XXX (Dutfield); chapter XXX (Kuanpoth). 2. Remarks by Chairman US Federal Reserve Board, BS Bernanke, “The Chinese Economy: Progress and challenges” speech delivered at the Chinese Academy

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of Social Sciences, Beijing, China on 15 December 2006 www.federalreserve.gov/ BoardDocs/Speeches/2006/20061215/default.htm. 3. Chapter XXX (Biadgleng), p. XXX; chapter XXX (Lawson and Sanderson), p. XXX; chapter XXX (Dutfield), p. XXX; chapter XXX (Kuanpoth), p. XXX. See also, Helfer 2004; Panagariya 2002. 4. Art 42.1 states that the ‘validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention’. Art 42.2 states that a treaty may only be terminated, denounced or suspended, and a party may only withdraw from a treaty, if permitted by the provisions of the treaty or of the Convention. 5. The commentary relating to Art 52 appears as commentary relating to its draft form, (which then existed as Art 49. The only difference between the draft form as Art 49 and the final version as Art 52 is the addition after the words ‘of the principles’ of the words ‘of international law embodied in’. 6. GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50. Art 1 provides that: ‘[e]very State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever’. 7. Contra, Farer is of the view that Art 2(4) is ‘concerned with violence, with military force, not with economic coercion’: Farer 1985, p. 410; and he defines economic coercion as efforts ‘to project influence across frontiers by denying or conditioning access to a country’s resources, raw materials, semi- or finished products, capital, technology, services or consumers’ (p. 408). 8. In terms of the common law, see Atiyah 1985, p. 3 where he said the ‘modern growth of statutory interventions in contract law… [is] designed to ensure substantive fairness in the exchange’. 9. See also Marshall CJ in Foster v Neilson 27 US (2Pet) 253, 314 where he said ‘[a] treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act’. 10. Hutchinson 1989 added that: ‘[t]he explanatory power of this methodology ultimately stems from the fact that States and their legal advisers often do recruit principles from national legal systems in order to develop rules of international law, especially in those fields where State practice is either sparse or ambiguous’ (at p 375). 11. See also Caruso who makes the claim that ‘for better or worse, traditional private-law discourse facilitates the emergence of new forms of institutional sovereignty in the age of globalization’: Caruso 2006, p. 6. 12. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organisation established in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations. After the collapse of the League it was re-established by a multilateral agreement. It is based in Rome and has 61 member nations. See http://www.unidroit.org. 13. This provision would be read subject to Art 75 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that the provisions of the Convention are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may arise from an aggressor state in consequence of measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that state’s aggression. 14. This strongly implies the element of reasonableness. See Jennings and Watts 1996, p. 1272 (note 7). 15. Although see contra Jennings and Watts 1996, p. 1292.

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16. I am only aware of one matter in which Art 3.10 UNIDROIT Principles was invoked, but unsuccessfully; International Chamber of Commerce Arbitral Award No 9029, 3 March, 1998: in International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Bulletin 10/2.

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