Depleted Uranium Weapon Use in Okinawa, Japan. Yoko Abe ...... the people who live in the region surrounding Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (KASA) on.
MANUFACTURING SECURITY: MASS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DEPLETED URANIUM WEAPON USE IN OKINAWA, JAPAN
Yoko Abe
Thesis submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences at West Virginia University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Applied Social Science
Melissa Latimer, Ph.D., Chair Carson Mencken, Ph.D. Robert Hanham, Ph.D.
School of Applied Social Science West Virginia University Division of Sociology and Anthropology
Morgantown, West Virginia 2001
Keywords: Okinawa, Security, U.S. Military, Neo-Imperialism, Mass Media, Depleted Uranium Weapons, Environment Copyright 2001 Yoko Abe
ABSTRACT
Manufacturing Security: Mass Media Coverage of Depleted Uranium Weapon Use in Okinawa, Japan Yoko Abe Despite the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, thirty-eight U.S. military bases still remain in the prefecture. While the local residents’ entreaties to end their suffering from the consequences of the U.S. military presence remain strong, the U.S. and Japanese governments have adopted measures to maintain the U.S. military foothold. This study examined the viewpoints of six claimsmakers to illustrate an overlooked political process in the perpetuation of the U.S. military presence. The research applied a content analysis of newspaper articles appearing in the Okinawa Times following the disclosure of the U.S. Marine Corps’ use of depleted uranium weapons. The study analyzed the degree to which the Okinawa Times connected the Okinawans’ experiences to those of other people around the world who are also suffering from the presence of U.S. military forces, and to the role of the strengthened bilateral military alliance in manufacturing the security required by corporate Japan.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I want to thank Ms. Abe Mitsuko, Mr. Abe Masaki, Chu-shiro, and Komori for their understanding and unconditional support.
I would also like to thank Professor emeritus Mori
Shigeyasu of Kyushu University, Professor Arasaki Moriteru at the University of Okinawa, film producer Mr. Takaiwa Jin, and Dr. Shawn Banasick at Kent State University for many insightful ideas.
I was also fortunate to exchange valuable conversations with many
admirable local citizens of Okinawa, from whom I learned that “ignorance is sin.”
I am also
thankful to Mr. John McIntosh, Mr. John May and Mr. Jeremy Davis, for their time and help during the editing process.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Melissa
Latimer, Dr. Carson Mencken, and Dr. Robert Hanham for their guidance and encouragement, especially for my committee chair, Dr. Latimer for her enduring support.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................iv LIST OF FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS..............................................................................x I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................2 A. Introduction......................................................................................................2 B. Thesis Outline ..................................................................................................7
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND A. The Depleted Uranium Weapon Incident at Tori Shima and the Current Situation in Okinawa............................................................................................................8 B. A Brief History of Okinawa Since 1609............................................................11
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................15 A. The Role of the U.S. Military in the Present World ..........................................15 1) The activities of the U.S. military in the post-Cold War period .................15 2) The U.S. military-industrial complex and the Gulf War.............................18 3) Global arms sales and military intervention through diplomacy ................19 4) The nuclear deterrent and nuclear waste materials ....................................20 5) Depleted uranium weapons .......................................................................21 6) U.S. “Ptolemaic theory” ..........................................................................27
v
7) Neo-imperialism .......................................................................................29 B. The U.S.-Japan Relationship: Issues Surrounding the Ampo and Okinawa.................30 1) Globalization of the Japanese economy and the strengthened Ampo-taisei (neoAmpo-taisei) .......................................................................................................30 2) The Japanese government’s manipulation of public opinion and remilitarization of the state ............................................................................................................34 3) The development of Okinawan dependency on the Japanese Government.............36 4) Environmental degradation ...................................................................................38 5) Environmental consequences of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa................40 6) Definitions of “affluence”.......................................................................................42 C. The Historical Background of the Mass Media in Japan ............................................43
IV. METHODS, DATA, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS..................................................49 A. Methods and Data ......................................................................................................49 B. Research Questions ...................................................................................................54
V. ANALYSIS.....................................................................................................................59 A. Local People ..............................................................................................................59 1) Who are the “local people”?..................................................................................59 2) Kume Jima .............................................................................................................63 3) Local people’s voices in the Okinawa Times’ articles ............................................66 4) Local people’s claims ...........................................................................................69 a. Criticisms of the U.S. and Japanese governments’ cover up of the Depleted
.69
Uranium weapon incident b. Three types of anxieties ..................................................................................70
vi
i. Possibility of similar, unreported incidents....................................................71 ii. Health and the environment .........................................................................71 iii. Livelihood ..................................................................................................72 c. Accumulated anger against the U.S. military .....................................................73 d. Return of Tori Shima ......................................................................................75 B. Local Governments versus Okinawa Prefectural Government ...................................77 1) Who are the “local governments” and Okinawa prefectural government? ...............78 2) The local governments (and assemblies) (LG) ........................................................78 3) The first reactions to the disclosure of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident ......78 4) Local governments’ claims....................................................................................79 a. Local residents’ anxieties ................................................................................79 b. Complete recovery of the remaining depleted uranium ammunition from Tori ..80 Shima c. Suspension of the U.S. military practices at Tori Shima ....................................83 d. Complete return of Tori Shima .......................................................................84 e. Environmental examinations/finding the effects of depleted uranium .............85 f. Health examination for the entire population of Kume Jima ...........................86 g. Removal of the depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa ................................87 5) The structural discrimination against Okinawa: The local assemblies’ view ..........88 6) Okinawa prefectural government (OPG) ...............................................................90 7) Okinawa prefectural government’s claims ..........................................................92 a. Structural discrimination against Okinawa ......................................................92 b. Removal or reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa ........................93 c. Establishment of a reliable reporting system of U.S. military-related accidents and incidents ............................................................................................................95
vii
d. Disclosure of the 5.15 memo ..........................................................................96 e. Concerns over possible environmental effects of depleted uranium .................98 f. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa.................................... 100 8) Okinawa prefectural government’s other claims .................................................. 101
C. The Japanese Government and the U.S. Government and Military .......................... 103 1) Who are the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military? ........... 105 2) The Japanese government (JG) ............................................................................. 106 3) The Japanese government’s claims ..................................................................... 107 a. Explanations for withholding the Depleted Uranium weapon incident ............. 107 b. Apologies to Okinawa and concerns centering on the effects of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident on its remilitarization plans .................................... 108 c. Responses to the Okinawa prefectural government’s demand to remove or reduce the USMC ....................................................................................................... 110 d. Responses to the Okinawa prefectural government’s demand to reveal the 5.15 memo ...................................................................................................... 111 e. Responses to the demand to examine the environmental effects of depleted uranium ........................................................................................................... 112 f. Responses to depleted uranium shell casings found in Nishihara Town ........... 114 4) The Japanese government’s responses to the Local governments’ most pressing claims ................................................................................................................... 116 a. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from U.S. military bases .................... 116 b. Suspension of U.S. military bombing exercises at Area Tori Shima Range and the return of the range ........................................................................................... 117 c. Recovery of the remaining depleted uranium weapons from Tori Shima .......... 118
viii
5) The missing reasons in the Japanese government’s claims .................................... 119 6) U.S. government and military (USGM) ................................................................ 122 7) U.S. government and military’s claims ............................................................... 123 a. Explanations for the U.S. Marine Corps use of depleted uranium weapons at Tori Shima ...................................................................................................... 123 b. Downplaying the Depleted Uranium weapon incident ..................................... 123 i. Reasons for reporting the Depleted Uranium weapon incident to the Japanese government ................................................................................................... 124 ii. Attempts to trivialize the danger of depleted uranium weapons..................... 125 c. Responses to the question of whether or not depleted uranium weapons are stored in Okinawa ........................................................................................... 128 d. Responses to the demand to recover depleted uranium ammunition and to conduct environmental examinations ............................................................... 129 e. Evading responsibility for selling depleted uranium shell casings to a private scrapyard owner .............................................................................................. 131 8) The Ampo and the local people of Okinawa.......................................................... 133 D. The Okinawa Times.................................................................................................. 137 1) The Okinawa Time’s claims ................................................................................ 138 a. Information on the radiological and chemical toxicities of depleted uranium .... 138 b. Establishment of a reliable reporting system for accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military ............................................................................................... 141 c. Examinations of environmental safety ............................................................. 144 d. Disclosure of the 5.15 memo ........................................................................... 148 e. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa .................................... 152 2) Contribution to the status quo............................................................................... 155
ix
E. International News ................................................................................................... 161 1) Content analysis of international news regard to depleted uranium weapons ....... 162 a. The Gulf War Syndrome .................................................................................. 162 b. The test firing of depleted uranium weapons within the United States ............. 166 c. The U.S.-lead NATO’s use of depleted uranium weapons in Yugoslavia ....... 167 d. The transfer of depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa to South Korea ...... 171 e. The use of depleted uranium weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina ........................ 174 2) Consequences of the dependency on the Kyodo News’ news items ....................... 175
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 180 A. Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 180 B. Research Findings ................................................................................................... 181 C. Thesis Contribution ................................................................................................. 194 D. Future Research ...................................................................................................... 196 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................. 198 APPENDIX .................................................................................................................... 210
x
LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES
Figure 1.
Okinawa and Asia.............................................................................................1
Figure 2.
U.S. Facilities on Main Okinawan Island and Nearby Islands ...........................11
Figure 3.
U.S. military Installations (World) ....................................................................17
Figure 4 (I).
Kume Jima and Main Okinawan Island ......................................................64
Figure 4 (II).
Kume Jima ................................................................................................64
Figure 5.
U.S. Facilities around Okinawa Island ............................................................65
Figure 6.
Frequency of Claimsmakers’ Claims Appeared in the 445 Examined Articles for the Analysis ...............................................................................................67
Figure 7.
Local people’s Most Frequently Presented Claims ............................................70
Figure 8.
The Local Governments/Assemblies’ Most Frequently Presented Claims .........80
Figure 9.
Okinawa Prefectural Government’s Most Frequently Presented Claims ............94
Figure 10.
Japanese Government’s Most Frequently Presented Claims .......................... 109
Figure 11.
The U.S. Government’s Most Frequently Presented Claims .......................... 124
Figure 12.
The Okinawa Times’ Most Frequently Presented Claims ............................... 142
Diagram 1.
Generalized Political Process for Perpetuating the U.S. Military’s Free Use of the Bases in Okinawa.............................................................................. 105
Diagram 2.
The Okinawa Times’ Role............................................................................ 179
1
Okinawa and Asia
Source http://www.virtualginza.com/japan3htm
2
-- CHAPTER ONE --
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into two parts.
The first part discusses the context of the
research and is further subdivided into four sections, including: 1) a brief explanation of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident, 2) a description of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, 3) a personal account of being part of structural discrimination against Okinawa, 4) reasons for studying the Okinawan mass media.
The second part of the chapter outlines the rest of
the thesis.
A. Introduction The focus of this thesis centers on a content analysis of newspaper coverage surrounding the use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons by the U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier jet crews in the area of the Tori Shima artillery range (located off the west coast of main Okinawan Island) on three separate occasions between December 1995 and January 1996 (the DUw incident for short). Because of the weapons’ very high penetrating power, DU tipped projectiles are the Pentagon’s favorite weapons in the age of super high-tech warfare (Fahey, 1997).
The
toxicities of DU are both chemical and radiological, and can cause cellular death, genetic mutations, cancer, as well as genetic abnormalities in future generations (Blum, 2000; Caldicott, 1997; Guenther, 1997).
In 1991, DU weapons were used in combat for the first
time during the Persian Gulf War (Fahey, 1997).
When used as a weapon, DU
“spontaneously burns on impact, creating tiny aerosolized particles less than five microns in diameter, small enough to be inhaled” (Caldicott, 1997, p. 18).
Over 90,000 Gulf War
3
veterans suffer from mysterious illnesses, collectively known as the Gulf War Syndrome, and many scientists believe that these illnesses may be the result of being internally exposed to DU particles (Flounders, 1997).
Nuclear physicist Michio Kaku (1997) points out that once
uranium-238 (DU), which has half-life of 4.5 billion years, enters the lungs, “lung cells which are near the uranium dioxide particulate will be bathed with intense radiation for decades to come” (p. 113).
DU weapons were also used during NATO’s air raids in the Balkans
(British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001).
In January 2001, responding to the deaths of
eighteen NATO soldiers who served in the region for cancer-type illnesses, the European Parliament (EP) voted for a ban on the use of DU (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). Furthermore, critics have charged that DU “often contains other dangerous elements associated with nuclear power plants, such as plutonium, radium and americium” (Environmental News Service, 2001, pp. 2-3).
In the same month that the EP voted against
the use of DU, a Pentagon spokesperson admitted that traces of plutonium could be found in some DU munitions (Environmental News Service, 2001).
Plutonium is known to pose a
serious threat to health when inhaled (Ichikawa et al., 1994).
It can remain in the lungs for a
long period of time where it emits alpha radiation, increasing the chances of causing lung cancer (Ichikawa et al., 1994). So far only 16.3 percent of the 1,520 rounds of DU weapons fired over Tori Shima by the U.S. Marine Corps’ AV-8HB Harrier jet crews have been recovered (as of April 24, 2000, the Okinawa Times, 2000).
The DUw incident is a perfect case to examine the political
process of how the U.S. military presence in Okinawa manages to remain intact despite the local people’s forceful protest and entreaties for an end to their suffering caused by the U.S. military. The Japanese government has been instrumental in keeping the U.S. forces in Okinawa since the end of WWII.
They have given generous financial support to the U.S. forces in
4
Japan (including Okinawa) since 1978. since the mid 1980s.
A process of remilitarization has occurred in Japan
As part of the intensification of the remilitarization process, the
Japanese and U.S. governments have forced Okinawa to accept their plans to enhance the U.S. military presence.
The globalization of the Japanese economy and neo-imperialism also
help to explain the actions of the Japanese and U.S. governments and are discussed in the literature review in chapter three. There are several treaties and agreements, as well as unknown number of secret agreements which the Japanese government has adopted to maintain the U.S. military presence in Okinawa since the 1972 reversion to Japan.
Two of these, the Ampo (Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (1960) upon which the Japan-U.S. political, economic and military alliance is based) and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement1, are the foundation for the U.S. military presence and its irresponsible practices in Okinawa.
In addition to these treaties and agreements, another
factor discussed in the literature review is Okinawa’s economic dependency on the Japanese government.
The Japanese government has constrained Okinawa’s autonomy by keeping
the Okinawan economy dependent, thus forcing Okinawa to accept the burden of the U.S. military presence.
However, the most important concept underlying the perpetuation of the
U.S. military presence is, perhaps, discrimination against Okinawa.
The Ampo-taisei (taisei
= system or structure in English) cannot function without this discrimination. As a Yamatonchu (mainland Japanese), I grew up in Fukuoka prefecture where in my daily life I had little contact with the reality of the Ampo-taisei. 1
In the fall of 1995,
Article VI of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (Ampo) states: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement (the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement), replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended and by such other arrangements as may be
5
Okinawans’ explosion of anger against the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. servicemen pushed the mainland mass media to give extensive coverage to Okinawa’s suffering from the heavy concentration of the U.S. military bases in the prefecture.
This incident became the
catalyst for my research on the Ampo-imposed problems in Okinawa.
However, the more I
learned about the cultural, historical, political, economic and environmental aspects of Okinawa, including several visits to the prefecture, the more difficult it became to comprehend the so called “Okinawa mondai,” (or “Okinawan problems” in English.) But one thing became very clear – one aspect of the discrimination against Okinawa is the general assumption that the problems involving the U.S. military in Okinawa are the problems of Okinawa.
I realized that for a long time, I was unconsciously discriminating against
Okinawa myself by conceptualizing Okinawa as the island of the military bases, without questioning the reasons why the burden of the Ampo is not being shared evenly throughout Japan.
As former Governor of Okinawa, Ota Masahide pointed out, neither the Ampo nor
the SOFA states that the U.S. military bases must be in Okinawa, yet the vast majority of Yamatonchu seem to take Okinawa for granted as if it is Okinawa’s fate to bear the burden of the U.S. military presence.
Consequently, discrimination is a crucial aspect of the
perpetuation of the U.S. military presence. While it is essential to point out the undeniable existence of discrimination, it is also important to analyze aspects of how this discrimination is perpetuated. This study attempts to illustrate the political process which helps to maintain the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.
In particular, one main research objective was to illustrate the
role of several important claimsmakers in the political process of perpetuating the U.S. military presence.
The main claimsmakers included in the analysis were 1) the local people,
2) the local governments and assemblies, 3) the Okinawa prefectural government, 4) the agreed upon” (1960).
6
Japanese government, 5) and the United States government and military and 6) the Okinawan mass media. Another main objective was to critically examine the role of the Okinawan mass media.
By analyzing the newspaper coverage of the DUw incident, I tried to understand the
extent to which the Okinawan mass media made links not only between the experience of Okinawa with the DU weapons and the global casualties of the DU weapons, but also between these two and the Ampo-taisei.
Yamatonchu are accomplices to the structural
discrimination against Okinawa under the Ampo-taisei without a doubt.
At the same time, I
believe that for the struggle against the U.S. military to earn global solidarity, the larger population of Okinawa must gain greater understanding of the consequences of the U.S. military presence and practices around the world, and how they are instrumental for capitalist expansion.
A necessary prerequisite for this is that the people in Okinawa have easy access
to the voices of other people in the world whose struggle is related to their own, and information which explains the reasons for Japan’s remilitarization in the era of an increasingly globalized Japanese economy.
I believe that the mass media in Okinawa has a
responsibility to provide such voices and information for the empowerment of the people. The DUw incident is an appropriate case which allows readers to visualize the connections between the local, national and international situations.
It could be a catalyst for more
readers to broaden their perspective on the effects of U.S. militarism, the casualties of U.S. militarism around the world, and the impact of the strengthened bilateral military alliance on Okinawa and in the Third World where military operations take place.
Without this
awareness, Okinawans in general may fail to understand the importance of global solidarity and mistakenly localize the Okinawa mondai.
7
B. Thesis Outline Because the issues surrounding Okinawa are unfamiliar to many people outside Okinawa, the second chapter presents background information on Okinawa.
The chapter
includes a description of the DUw incident at the area of Tori Shima bombing range, the current situation in Okinawa, and a brief history of Okinawa from 1609 to the present. Chapter three presents the literature review, which is divided into three sections.
The first
section discusses the role of post-Cold War U.S. military strategy in the present world.
This
discussion includes descriptions of the toxicity of depleted uranium (DU) and some effects of DU weapons on people who have been internally exposed to them.
The second section
explains several key aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship, emphasizing the issues surrounding the Ampo and the ways in which Okinawa has been affected by the treaty’s structure.
The third section summarizes the historical development of the mass media in
mainland Japan in order to make comparisons with the mass media in Okinawa. four describes the study method and research questions.
Chapter
Chapter five presents the research
findings, and is divided into five sections: A) local people, B) local governments and Okinawa prefectural government, C) the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military, D) the Okinawa Times, E) and the global DU-related news. conclusion.
Finally, Chapter six is a
8
-- CHAPTER TWO --
This chapter describes the Depleted Uranium weapon incident which took place in Tori Shima between late 1995 and early 1996.
Brief summaries of Okinawa’s current
situation and its history since 1609 follow.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Depleted Uranium Weapon Incident at Tori Shima and the Current Situation in Okinawa The use of DU weapons is banned in Japan. weapons are the cause of the Gulf War Syndrome.
Many scientists believe that DU
Yet on February 10, 1997, the people of
Okinawa learned for the first time that the U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier jet pilots had fired a total of 1,520 rounds of 25mm Depleted Uranium (DU) weapons at the Tori Shima bombing range (the DUw incident), one of the 38 U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
These
firings occurred on three separate occasions: on December 5 and 6, 1995 and on January 24, 1996.
The U.S. military called the USMC’s use of DU weapons, occurring during joint
maneuvers known as “Beach Crest,” a “mistake.”
The United States government did not
inform the Japanese government about the DUw incident until January 15, 1997, and the Japanese government kept the information from Okinawa until the Washington Times reported the incident on February 10, 1997.
Despite the fact that a large number of chemically-toxic
and radioactive weapons were fired in Okinawa, the people of Okinawa were the last ones to find out about what was taking place on a U.S. military base.
Known to the Japanese and
U.S. governments as “Tori Shima Range,” Tori Shima has been a firing and bombing-exercise area for the United States military since 1951.
The surrounding airspace and waters are also
9
part of “Area Tori Shima Range” (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
Years of the
U.S. military’s firing and bombing exercises have changed the shape of Tori Shima and transformed it to a lifeless island.
However, as the name Tori Shima (tori = birds, shima =
island) suggests, it was once covered with a thick forest, and visited by thousands of sea birds (Kamiesu, 1997).
The dramatic way in which Tori Shima has been transformed is just one
of the countless pieces of evidence of the environmental degradation caused by the U.S. military in Okinawa. On September 8, 1996 during Okinawa’s prefectural referendum, 89.09 percent of the voters supported the idea of reductions and realignments (modified from “removal” or “withdrawal”) of the U.S. military bases (Arasaki, 1996).
However, the Japanese and U.S.
governments have been following through with their plans for a drastic improvement of the technical efficiency of the U.S. military bases by returning land area of technically insufficient old bases to Okinawa and planning to construct several new bases in other strategically convenient locations within the prefecture. Approximately seventy-five percent of the total land area used exclusively by U.S. forces in Japan is concentrated in Okinawa, while the prefecture comprises only 0.6 percent of Japan’s total land area (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998). Okinawan Island is 1,257 square kilometers.
The area of main
Of the 38 U.S. military bases in the Okinawa
prefecture (See Figure 2), 32 bases occupy 19.3 percent of the land area of main Okinawan Island (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
Bases in some municipalities occupy more
than 40 percent of the total land area (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
In Kadena
town, for instance, 82.8 percent of the total land area, is appropriated exclusively for the U.S. military (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998). right around the bases (Fukuchi, 1996).
Thus, a large population is forced to live
The total number of U.S. military personal, their
family members and civilian employees is 49,502 [U.S. military personnel: 24,845; family
10
members, 23,196; civilian employees, 1,448 as of March 31, 2000, (Okinawa prefectural government, 2000)].
While the prefecture’s population was 1,294,300 as of February 1,
1998 (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998), the majority resides on Okinawa Island. Contrary to common assumptions, the U.S. military bases’ direct economic contribution to the prefecture is very small.
Since the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan from the U.S.
administration, Okinawa’s economic dependency on bases has declined from 15.6 percent (May 1972) to 4.9 percent (March 1997) (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998). Likewise, the number of Okinawan employees on military bases has decreased during the same period from 19,980 to 8,348 (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
Furthermore,
since 1991, Japan has generously paid for “all of the costs of local national labor employed by U.S. forces, as well as the costs of public utilities on U.S. bases” (DOD, March 1999, p. II-7). The payment for the U.S. forces has been called the “sympathy budget” since 1978, when
11
Figure 2: U.S. Facilities on Main Okinawan Island and Nearby Islands
*U.S. Facilities = U.S. Military Bases
Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government Government (2000)
Japan started making financial contributions to the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
At the
time, the U.S. economy was in a deep recession and Japan’s economy was rapidly growing (Aniya et al, 1996).
B. A Brief History of Okinawa Since 1609 Okinawa has been described by the U.S. officials as the “keystone” of the U.S. global strategies in the Asia-Pacific.
Chibana Shoichi, whose land has been occupied by a U.S.
12
military base (Sobe Communication Site), argues that if Okinawa has 75 percent of the total land area used by U.S. forces in Japan, Okinawa should have 75 percent of the power concerning the Ampo (Kataoka, 1996).
If Okinawa’s anti-U.S. military base movement
becomes strong and uncontrollable, the Ampo-taisei would be at risk, because its structure would be difficult to maintain without the Okinawa prefectural government’s cooperation (Okamoto, 1996).
Several past events have shown that Okinawa’s strong movement against
the U.S. military bases could easily threaten the stability of the Japanese government (Arasaki, 1996; 1999).
On the other hand, Okinawa’s economic dependency on the Japanese
government creates a situation that weakens the movement (Arasaki, 1999). Okinawa, also known as Ryukyu, has been under Japanese control since 1609, when the Satsuma clan (one of the Japanese feudal clans) invaded the then independent Kingdom of Ryukyu (Arasaki, 1997; Hashimoto, 1997).
The U.S., the other dominating force in present
day Okinawa, has had a geopolitical interest in Ryukyu Islands since 1853, when the U.S. Navy’s Commodore Perry called at the port in Ryukyu (Arasaki, 1997).
During the Second
World War, Okinawa was the sole battlefield on Japanese soil, and between one third and one fourth of the population in Okinawa was killed (approximately 150,000) either by Japanese troops, U.S. troops, or by mass suicide (Hashimoto, 1997). Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, between 1941 and 1945, the Japanese forces first requisitioned land in various parts of Okinawa for airfields. 1945, the U.S. forces occupied Okinawa.
When Japan was defeated in
In 1947, the Japanese Showa emperor Hirohito
made an announcement to the U.S. General Headquarters that “the U.S. military’s occupation of Okinawa for the next twenty-five, fifty years or longer is for the interests of both the United States and Japan” (quoted in Arasaki, 1997, p. 45, translated into English).
Between
1945 and 1952, until the enactment of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. forces expropriated land under the provisions of the “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs
13
of War on Land,” Hague Convention No. IV (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
The
infamous expropriations against the will of local residents by “threatening them with bayonets and leveling land with bulldozers” took place during the early 1950s (Arasaki and Nakano, 1976; Arasaki, 1996; 1997; 1998).
Okinawa has had three major struggles against the bases
since the mid 1950s, and during each period the Japanese government undertook various means to maintain the bases (Arasaki, 1996).
In 1951, the original Ampo was concluded
along with the Treaty of Peace with Japan, making it possible for the U.S. military to use Japan as a military base (Arasaki, 1996; 1997).
Okinawa was separated from Japan under
the U.S. administration so that Okinawa could be used as a special base where the U.S. could bring in nuclear weapons and use the land without restriction as a sortie base during wars (Arasaki, 1996; 1997).
The Japanese government understood that the people’s strong
protests against the U.S. military’s active use of mainland Japan would threaten the stability of the government (Arasaki, 1996; 1997). During the Cold War, the U.S. forces relied on bases in Okinawa to carry out military operations in Korea and Vietnam (Arasaki, 1996; 1997; McCormack, 1999).
It is also
important to note that the post World War II Japanese economic development was boosted by the special U.S. procurement boom, which was the direct result of the Korean War (1950-1953) (Arasaki, 1997; 1998).
Since Japan was the only industrialized nation in Asia
at the time, the ability of the U.S. to use it as a supply base greatly increased efficiency and lowered costs (Arasaki, 1997; 1998). U.S. direct administration of Okinawa ended in 1972, and Okinawa once again became one of the Japanese prefectures (Arasaki, 1996; 1997).
However, contrary to the
demands of people in Okinawa, the U.S. military bases remained (Arasaki, 1976; 1996; 1997). On May 15, 1972, the U.S. military’s direct occupation of the bases was replaced by a new system where the Japanese government makes a contract with an individual landowner and
14
offers lands to the U.S. military based on the Ampo and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the Japanese government also
decided to install its Self-Defense Force on crowded Okinawa, despite strong opposition from the Okinawan people (Arasaki, 1996). The ineffectiveness of the U.S. Marine Corps’ presence in Okinawa, especially III Marine Expeditionary Force in U.S. military strategy is arguable (Umebayashi, 1997). However, during the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), the first major conflict in the post-Cold War era (Arasaki, 1997; 1998; McCormack, 1999), and also during the 1996 dispute between China and Taiwan, Okinawa functioned as an important base for the U.S. forces (Gillert, 1997). It is important not to look at U.S. military activities in Okinawa in isolation, since they are part of both a regional and a global security strategy.
The following section discusses
how the United States engages in policing the world through military intervention, arms sales and diplomacy.
During the Gulf War, the U.S. military used DU weapons for the first time
in combat and later used them in Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and Serbia.
The
U.S. military maintained the battle-readiness of DU weapons through live-fire practice at its foreign bases, within the United States and its territories (Catalinotto and Flounders, 2000; Blum, 2000).
The effective demonstration of the weapon is necessary for both the
battlefield and for sales in the global arms market.
The Gulf War set new precedents for
conducting war, and the U.S. succeeded in demonstrating the latest form of imperialism (or neo-imperialism, discussed below) for the post Cold War period.
15
-- CHAPTER THREE --
This chapter presents the literature review for the research. role of the U.S. military in the present world.
First, it examines the
This includes information on the radiological
and chemical toxicities of depleted uranium, and how depleted uranium weapons came into being.
The second part of the chapter explains the Japan-U.S. security relationship in the
era of an increasingly globalized Japanese economy, and the consequences of the highly concentrated U.S. military presence on Okinawa.
The last section of the chapter addresses
the historical background of the mass media in Japan.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. The Role of the U.S. Military in the Present World
1. The activities of the U.S. military in the post-Cold War period The Cold War ended in 1989.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United
States as the world’s only superpower (Asai, 1999; Chomsky, 1997; Watanabe, 1998).
The
post-Cold War U.S. has been downsizing its domestic military installations, yet its foreign installations are still spread out over nineteen countries worldwide, in addition to three (Guam, Puerto Rico and Trust Territory of the Pacific) within its territory (U.S. Department of Defense, 1998, See Figure 3).
The brief moment of international optimism for a world
without armed conflict soon disappeared with the outbreak of regional problems that had been contained during the Cold War (Asai, 1999). To confront “a diverse set of threats to U.S. security” (DOD, March 1999, p. I-1), the post-Cold War U.S. armed forces have been extremely active.
For forty-five years from the
16
end of the World War II to the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. mobilized its military forces only eight times (Asai, 1999).
For the seven years between the Gulf War and 1998, however, the
U.S. military was mobilized forty-eight times (Asai, 1999).
As Chomsky (1997, p. 74)
points out, “with the Soviet deterrent gone, the US is much more free to use violence around the world.” The U.S. Department of Defense (1998) does not show the slightest intention of removing troops from the Asia-Pacific region, despite the demands of the people in Okinawa and South Korea that the U.S. military presence be downsized (Kim, Yi and Yi, 1998; Kim, 1999).
The U.S. currently has approximately 100,000 U.S military personnel in the region,
of which 47,000 are in Japan.
17
Figure 3: U.S. Military Installations (World)
Installation
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marines
Total
1 Australia
0
0
1
0
1
2 Belgium
1
0
0
0
1
Foreign Summary
3 Cuba
0
1
0
0
1
4 Denmark
1
0
0
0
1
5 Diego Garcia
0
1
0
0
1
6 Germany
8
0
2
0
10
7 Greece
0
1
0
0
1
8 Greenland
0
0
1
0
1
9 Iceland
0
1
0
0
1
10 Italy
1
3
1
0
5
11 Japan
2
6
3
2
13
12 Korea
4
0
2
0
6
13 Luxembourg
1
0
0
0
1
14 Netherlands
1
0
0
0
1
15 Panama
4
2
1
0
7
16 Portugal
0
0
1
0
1
17 Spain
0
1
0
0
1
18 Turkey
0
0
2
0
2
19 United Kingdom
1
2
3
0
6
Continued on next page
18
U.S. Territory Summary 20 Guam
0
2
1
0
3
21 Puerto Rico
1
2
1
0
4
22 Trust territory of the Pacific
1
0
0
0
1
139
53
122
187
519
United States Summary 23 United States
U.S. Department of Defense (1998)
2. The U.S. military-industrial complex and the Gulf War The United States leads the world in military spending ($269.76 billion in 1998), the size of active-duty military personnel (1,518,000 in 1998) and foreign assistance ($9,547.120 million in 1997, data for 1998 not available).
The number of U.S. citizens who work in the
military-related sector is also quite large (Foerstel, 1997). works for the arms industry.
“One out of every ten Americans
This includes the Pentagon’s civilian bureaucracy, intelligence
organizations, defense laboratories, research centers, and military industries, as well as the millions of people who make up the armed forces” (Foerstel, 1997, p. 66).
Foerstel (1997)
argues that this contributed in part to the strong support for the Persian Gulf War among the American population. The Gulf War demonstrated that a combination of advanced technology and arms development could dramatically change the character of war (Asai, 1999).
A scale of
firepower that once required a regiment now requires only a platoon (Asai, 1999). progress in the power of destruction characterizes the present warfare (Asai, 1999).
Rapid The
1991 War against Iraq killed an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Iraqis including civilians and soldiers (Clark, 1998), let alone more than 1.7 million deaths (as of August 1999) caused by the economic sanctions which have been imposed by the United Nation since the “end” of the war (Sloan, 1999).
As if economic sanctions were insufficient to punish oil-rich Iraq, “the
U.S. has fired more than 1,100 missiles against 359 targets, triple the targets of the four-day
19
bombing campaign ‘Operation Desert Fox’ between December 16-19, 1998” (Sloan, 1999, p. 2).
While economic sanctions and frequent air raids took many innocent Iraqi citizens’ lives,
the often repeated justification for the mistreatment of Iraqis, the alleged “development of mass destruction”, happens to be a false claim as these weapons no longer exist there (Zubair, 1999). Unlike the television reports during the Vietnam War, the depictions of the Gulf War were reminiscent of super high-tech war games (Catalinotto, 1997).
Such sanitized images
can be attributed to the “Department of Defense Media Pool,” of 1984, which was enforced during the intensive attack (Foerstel, 1997).
The Pentagon established a “pool system,”
consisting of controlled and supervised press access to military action (Foerstel, 1997, p. 62). For instance, the television reports never showed the world viewers some eight hundred Iraqi women and children who fled to a bomb shelter in Baghdad being targeted by “a depleted-uranium projectile fired by a U.S. plane,” which penetrated the shelter’s walls and burned all of them to death (Foerstel, 1997, p. 61).
3. Global arms sales and military intervention through diplomacy The censored news reports served not only to blind the world population to the cruelty of war (Catalinotto, 1997; Foerstel, 1997), but also acted as a demonstration show for the U.S. military industries in the global arms market (Maryknoll World Productions, 1997). U.S. military industries have been flourishing (Amnesty International, 1998). dominates the post-Cold War global market for arms and security equipment.
Indeed,
“The USA
It is estimated
that from 1989 to 1996 the USA sold more than $117 billion of arms, about 45 per cent of the global total” (Amnesty International, 1998, p. 135).
Once sales are made, “official financial
assistance, military training and logistical support programs” often follow (Amnesty International, 1998, p. 135).
Moreover, the United States has a history of installing and/or
20
supporting notorious dictators, such as Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines), General Suharto (Indonesia), and General Pinochet (Chile).
The Iraqi government was once one of them.
Amnesty International (1998) explains that: the US government’s claim to promote human rights and freedom around the globe is undermined by its support for armed forces known to commit human rights abuses.
The
USA has supplied arms, security equipment and training to governments and armed groups that have committed torture, political killings and other human rights abuses in countries around the world.
Oversight by public bodies remains inadequate to the task
of ensuring that US supplies do not contribute to further human rights violation (p. 135).
Historically, the U.S. has used violence not only through direct military interventions, but also indirectly and covertly through diplomacy (Chomsky, 1999).
In addition, the
post-Cold War United States is more interested in pursuing regional stability for mutual geopolitical and economic interests by sharing costs and military operations with its allies. This issue is addressed in greater detail below.
4. The nuclear deterrent and nuclear waste materials “Since 1940, the U.S. government has spent more than nineteen trillion dollars---$19,000,000,000,000---in the pursuit of military objectives” (A 1998 Brookings Institution report cited in Becker, 1998, p. 46)… and “nearly a third of U.S. military spending, $5.8 trillion, has been for nuclear weapons.
Today, seven years after the end of the ‘Cold
War’ was declared, the Pentagon has more than 16,000 nuclear warheads, more than all other countries combined” (Becker, 1998, p. 46). Nuclear deterrent remains as part of the post-Cold War U.S. military strategy (Becker, 1998).
However, the United States also faces the serious challenge of cleaning up
contaminated nuclear facilities spread throughout thirty states where nuclear weapons have been developed, produced and dismantled (Nakajima, 1995).
On April 3, 1995, the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it would cost $230 billion, and perhaps an
21
additional $100 billion over the next seventy-five years, to cleanup eighty-one major locations among 15,000 facilities associated with nuclear arms-level plutonium production (Nakajima, 1995).
By 1997, the DOE realized that the level of contamination is devastatingly high and
that the cost is too overwhelming for cleanup to be completed within a decade, if it ever were possible (Frank cited in the Tennessee Times, 1997). “A by-product from the production of enriched fuel for nuclear reactors and weapons” (Caldicott, 1997, p. 18), depleted uranium (DU) is a very problematic material.
It is not
only radioactively and chemically toxic, but also costly to “store in low-level radioactive waste repositories” (Fahey, 1997, p. 2).
In the Daily Report for Executives (1996), “Public
Input Sought on Depleted Uranium/DOE to Assess Disposition of 505,000 Tons,” the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. reported that “the U.S. has in excess of 1.1 billion pounds of DU waste material” (BNA Inc. quoted in Fahey, 1999, p. 26).
One way for the DOE to avoid
responsibility for the storage and maintenance of the huge amount of the low-level radioactive toxic materials is to find private companies who are interested in using it to manufacturing goods (Baker, 1998).
5. Depleted uranium weapons The other solution which has already been put into practice is to use DU “to manufacture shells, bullets and protective armor of tanks” (Caldicott, 1997, p. 18).
During
1970s and 80s, firing tests were conducted at a few sites in the U.S. to examine the effectiveness of DU when used as an ammunition or armor, but “Operation Desert Storm provided the first opportunity for the Pentagon to test DU munitions in combat” (Fehay, 1997, p. 26).
“As of February, 1994, contractors had produced more than 1.6 million DU
penatrators for tank ammunition and more than 55 million DU penetrators for small caliber (20, 25 and 30 mm) applications” (in Fehay, 1997, p. 26).
Before proceeding further with
22
this discussion, it is useful to understand the nature of depleted uranium.
Fehay (1997)
explains that: “Depleted” uranium is so called because the content of the fissianable U-235 isotope is reduced from 0.7% to 0.2% during the enrichment process.
The isotope U-238 makes
up over 99% of the content of both natural uranium and depleted uranium.
Depleted
uranium is roughly 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium, and has a half life of 4.5 billion years…(p. 2).
The characteristics of DU are very attractive for the field of weapons technology (Caldicott, 1997; Gunther, 1999).
It is extremely heavy and dense, so that DU tipped
projectiles have very high penetrating power (Caldicott, 1997; Gunther, 1999). Furthermore, DU is “available in large quantities and given for free to arms manufacturers” (emphasis added, Fehay, 1997, p. 26).
Moreover, when a DU weapon penetrates an armor
plate, it breaks into dust which burns with frictional heat, incinerating the people and interior apparatus of the tank.
Thus, DU weapons are called “ultimate anti-tank weaponry.”
These are some of the major reasons for using DU rather than tungsten, which had been used for over fifty years before DU became readily available (Noguchi, 1997).
Tungsten is
denser than other metals but is not as dense as DU (The Okinawa Times, 1997).
However,
unlike DU, tungsten has no chemical or radioactive toxicities during production or use (Noguchi, 1997).
Although the initial production costs for DU weapons are lower than
those of tungsten, if disposal costs are included, tungsten is more cost effective (Noguchi, 1997). What the DOE downplays about DU is the fact that DU is hazardous to human health and the environment.
First, in regards to the chemical toxicity of DU as a radioactive heavy
metal, the U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) explains as follows: there is no known way to reduce the chemical toxicity of DU in the body. Technology cannot significantly affect the solubility of uranium oxides formed in an uncontrolled environment such as the battlefield or in a fire.
When munitions are fired or burned and
when armor is pierced during battle, DU released to the environment will react with other
23
nearby elements. chemical toxicities.
These chemical reactions may produce compounds with various While fires and high-energy penetrator impacts occurring in an
uncontrolled environment result in uncontrolled dispersion of DU contamination, the potential toxicity of this contamination can be limited by preventing DU exposure (pp. 113-114)
DU enters the body though the ingestion of contaminated food or water (AEPI, 1995). Another possible way is through inhalation, since “depleted uranium spontaneously burns on impact, creating tiny aerosolized particles less than five microns in diameter, small enough to be inhaled.
At least seventy percent of the uranium in these weapons is released in this
form on impact, and these tiny particles travel long distances when airborne” (Caldicott, 1997, p. 18).
Moreover, the tiny aerosolized DU particles can transform themselves to a highly
insoluble ceramic form, which can stay in the body for “at least eight to nine years and possibly even 20 years” (International Peace Bureau/Campaign Against Depleted Uranium (CADU), 1999, p. 1). The radiological toxicity of DU may be an explanations for the cause of the Gulf War Syndrome.
Some of the symptoms include respiratory, liver and kidney dysfunction,
memory loss, headaches, fever, low blood pressure and birth defects among their children (Clark, 1997).
Caldicott (1997) explains the radiological toxicity: that
uranium 238 emits both alpha and gamma radiation, while the two “daughter” elements…are both beta and gamma emitters.
Gamma radiation is non-particulate
radioactive energy, which can induce genetic mutations the instant it traverses a cell. Alpha and beta radiation are particulate forms which, when they pass through a living cell, are likely also to induce either cellular death or a genetic mutation.
Alpha is very
carcinogenic while beta, because it is a smaller particle, is less so.
Mutation in a
regulatory gene of a normal body cell can induce cancer years later.
Mutation in the
germ cells---ova and sperm---can cause genetic abnormalities in future generations (emphasis added, pp. 18-20).
The U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute’s (AEPI, 1995) explanation parallels Caldicott’s (1997), pointing out the radiological toxicity of DU: “internalized DU delivers radiation wherever it migrates in the body.
Within the body, alpha radiation is the most
24
important contributor to the radiation hazard posed by DU” (p. 113).
In regard to kidney
dysfunction, a study by the AEPI (1995) indicates that “when DU is incorporated in the body, the soluble components migrate throughout the body. kidney and liver.
Uranium concentrates in the bones,
The kidney is the most sensitive organ to DU toxicity” (Kathren et al.,
1989; Stokinger, 1981; Wrenn et al., 1985 cited in AEPI, 1995). The U.S. military has used Depleted Uranium (DU) weapons in Kuwait, Iraq, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Serbia.
During the Gulf War in particular, approximately 940,000
30-millimeter DU bullets and “more than 14,000 large caliber DU rounds were consumed during Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield” (U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute, A-10).
Consequently, “between 300 and 800 tons of DU particles and dust have been
scattered over the ground and the water in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
As a result,
hundreds of thousands of people, both civilians and soldiers, have suffered the effects of exposure to these radioactive weapons” (Clark, 1997, p. 21).
In Southern Iraq where DU
weapons were fired, birth abnormalities have increased seven to ten fold (CADU, 1999). Bertell (in CADU, 1999) describes concerns surrounding the higher risk for women and children.
In fact, Iraqi medical doctors and environmentalists believe that toxic chemicals
and particularly DU weapons are the cause of the dramatic increase in children who suffer from diseases that were never seen before the war (Zubair, 1999). While the AEPI acknowledges that “personnel in or near vehicles when the vehicles are hit by DU munitions are the most likely to receive internal exposures,” many soldiers during the Gulf War were not fully informed about the toxicity of DU (AEPI, 1995, p. 134). The AEPI report describes how “measuring the quantity of DU a soldier internalized, as soon as practical after initial exposure, would improve the Army’s ability to subsequently determine the significance of the exposure” and “when this value is known or estimated, cancer and hereditary risk estimates can be determined” (1995, p. 113).
However, such
25
estimation would be difficult to conduct.
It may take years to develop an illness and people
may not notice it until its later stages.
Among the 697,000 U.S. military personnel who
served in the Gulf War, 90,000 veterans suffer illnesses which are collectively known as “Gulf War Syndrome” (An International Appeal to Ban the Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons).
Reports published in March 1994 on 251 families of Gulf War veterans living in
the state of Mississippi, showed that “sixty-seven percent of the children of these families were born with congenital deformities: their eyes, ears or fingers are missing or they are suffering from severe blood diseases and respiratory problems” (Guenther, 1997).
Many
Gulf War veterans who suffer from the syndrome find a parallel between Pentagon’s “reluctance to divulge health hazards in Vietnam,” (or more specifically, for Agent Orange) and how it has dealt with the issues of DU weapons (Peterson, 1999).
In the former
Yugoslavia, where DU ammunition were fired from U.S. combat aircraft, about 1,000 children (as of November 1996) are suffering from symptoms similar to the Gulf War Syndrome. The AEPI (1995) is aware that “the risks associated with DU in the body are both chemical and radiological” and “if DU (Depleted Uranium) enters the body, it has the potential to generate significant medical consequences” (p. 101).
The AEPI also
acknowledges that “no available technology can change the inherent toxicity of DU or significantly reduce its toxicity” (p. 133).
However, it concludes that “DU’s chemical and
radiological health risks to the patient and the health care provider are sufficiently low so that DU contamination should not be considered an issue until the patient’s immediate medical needs have been addressed” (p. 134). In regard to DU contamination in the environment, the AEPI (1995, p. 152) argues that “sites contaminated with DU may need to be cleaned up to reduce health and environmental risks.”
However, in terms of conducting cleanups, “DU remediation
26
technologies are not well developed.” (AEPI, p. 152).
Thus it suggests that “many mature
technologies from the mining community and processes used for remediation of other heavy metals may be appropriate for DU remediation” (pp. 152-153).
Yet Dr. Stephen Shelton, a
civil engineer at the University of New Mexico who worked for three years as research director for the AEPI’s study (1995), explained at a public hearing in Denver on August 4, 1996 that contrary to what the Army claimed, the environmental hazards of DU cannot be controlled after DU “goes out the muzzle of a weapon” (Shelton quoted in Ensign, 1997, p. 72). The fact that “no international law, treaty, regulation, or custom requires the United States to remediate Persian Gulf War battlefields” (AEPI, 1995, p. 4) helps the U.S. military (and other potential users around the globe) to use DU weapons freely in the battlefield. Guenther (1997, p. 167) who brought back one of the remains of the projectiles from Iraq (which he saw Iraqi children playing with) to Germany for the purpose of examination got in “serious trouble” because “the material was highly toxic and radioactive that it was confiscated by a large police detachment, carried away under enormous safety precautions and stored in a specially shielded deposit.”
In short, instead of being stored at a radioactive
waste depository site, vast amounts of the depleted uranium accumulated since the Manhattan Project have been or are waiting to be transformed into DU munitions and dispersed in foreign battlefields where the U.S. has no responsibility for cleanup. The Iraqi civilians and soldiers, as well as U.S. and other veterans who suffer from Gulf War Syndrome, may have been exposed not only to DU weapons, but also to various types of poisonous chemicals, experimental drugs, and insecticides (Noguchi, 1997).
The
interaction effects of DU weapons with these other materials and impact on Gulf War Syndrome are unknown (Noguchi, 1997).
However, there is ample scientific evidence that
DU weapons’ radiological and chemical toxicities do affect human health and the
27
environment, as the U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (1995) describes in great detail. Yet the Department of Defense has kept using DU weapons in battlefields while denying any connection between DU weapons and the syndrome, based on the report by the RAND Corporation, which was funded by the DOD itself (CADU, 1999).
Moreover, because DU
weapons are sold without restriction as conventional weapons in the global arms market, the AEPI states that “the number of DU patients on future battlefields probably will be significantly higher because other countries will use systems containing DU” (1995, p. 120). Currently, at least seventeen countries besides the U.S. carry DU weapons (Peterson, 1999). The entropy of the Cold War continues to expand through DU weapons.
6. U.S. “Ptolemaic theory” At the end of the Cold War, countries around the world had an opportunity to reexamine their post-World War II global strategies that were based on confrontation between the two blocs (Asai, 1999).
The United States is no exception.
However, the Clinton
administration maintained the traditional U.S.-style “Ptolemaic theory,” in which the United States sets the world order based upon American capitalism (Asai, 1999).
The Clinton
administration employed the fall of the eastern bloc as momentum to establish a world structure where the United States increasingly dominates politics and the global economy (Asai, 1999).
The highly U.S. influenced WTO/IMF/World Bank represent the current
world system in which the basic rule “to respect sovereign nations’ equality regardless of the size and wealth” is completely ignored, and Japan, along with western countries that follow the U.S. lead, control politics and economics in “underdeveloped” countries (Asai, 1999). Yet the post-Cold War U.S. economy could not continue to support the mobilization of military forces without its allies’ financial cooperation and military participation (Asai, 1996; 1999; Chomsky, 1997; Watanabe, 1998).
Even though the U.S. in the 1990s still had
28
the largest economy in the world, its power had declined over the past several decades, partially due to the prolonged, high spending on military (Asai, 1996; 1999; Chomsky, 1997; Watanabe, 1998).
In his address before Congress on the Gulf Crisis on September 11, 1990,
titled, Toward a New World Order then President Bush explained the budgetary difficulties in maintaining the world leadership status, its reason to attack Iraq, and the possibility for multinational military activities to develop a new world order. For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital… To revitalize our leadership, our leadership capacity, we must address our budget deficit… Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs would only make our fiscal deficit problem worse. That deficit was already greater than it should have been --- a projected $232 billion for the coming year… The gulf situation helps us realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should be. Americans must never again enter any crisis---economic or military---with an excessive dependence on foreign oil and an excessive burden of federal debt…At this very moment, (Americans) serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order… (emphasis added, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Sept. 17, 1990 pp. 91-94)
For the U.S. to maintain leadership in the battlefield and to impose “order and stability” on the Third World, the U.S. needs to share the cost of war operations (or in the Department of Defense’s term, “responsibilities”) with Japan, Korea, NATO allies, and others such as Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Asai, 1996; Chomsky, 1997; Watanabe, 1998; Arasaki, 1999; Department of Defense, 1999). The model case upon which the U.S. post-Cold War military strategy was built was the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis (Asai, 1996).
First, using a United Nations Security Council’s
resolution, the United States succeeded in masking its military intervention as a “UN operation” (Asai, 1996).
Approximately $600 million dollars was spent for Operation
Desert Storm (arms excluded), of which only $120 million was from the United States and the rest was contributed from Japan, South Korea, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other nations (Asai, 1996).
Out of the $130 million contribution from Japan, $20 million was
29
directed to help earn support from the Arab nations (Asai, 1996).
If the Arab nations
recognized the war as the “western” attack on Iraq, they would have supported Iraq instead (Asai, 1996).
Therefore, Asai (1996) argues that the Japanese contribution helped the U.S.-
dominated UN forces to carry out military intervention smoothly which may not have been possible without it.
For the DOD, it was “a major financial contribution to the peace
process” (DOD, April 12, 1996) that Japan would “cooperate under the Mutual Security Treaty (Ampo)” for “a broad range of regional and global issues from North Korea to Bosnia where the Japanese will be making a major financial contribution…” (DOD, 1996). The Gulf War became a model for the future war operations (Asai, 1996).
While
leadership remained in the hands of the U.S., its allies supplemented financial resources, military personnel and war potential (Asai, 1996).
7. Neo-imperialism Multilateral military alliances are not a new phenomenon.
However, “international
corporations are now determining western foreign policy and have set into motion military action against countries which are considered a threat to corporate interests” (Foerstel, 1997, p. 65). Under classic imperialism, each colonial power depended largely on its own military to provide security for economic activities in its colonies (politically enclosed market), to exclusively control the areas’ natural resources, and to expand its sphere of influence (Watanabe, 1999). that sense.
Obviously, none of the presently dominant countries are imperialist in
The present imperialism, or neo-imperialism, under multinational corporations,
does depend upon the national military power and demands stronger militarism (Watanabe, 1998).
While it does not ask for military action to protect the nation’s exclusive market, the
corporations do demand the protection and expansion of the world’s free markets (Watanabe,
30
1999).
For example, in the Asia-Pacific region, the DOD states that “in contrast to Cold
War-era alliance, they (U.S. alliances in the region) are not directed at any third power but serve the interests of all who benefit from regional stability and security” (1998, p. 19).
In
brief, the neo-imperialists see multinational military activities as essential to protect their interests (Watanabe, 1999; Inoue, 1999; Takaiwa, 2000).
B. The U.S.-Japan Relationship: Issues Surrounding the Ampo and Okinawa
1. Globalization of the Japanese economy and the strengthened Ampo-taisei (neo-Ampotaisei) An intensification of the globalization of Japanese economy was instituted in response to the 1985 G5 “agreement” to strengthen the Japanese currency, as well as an escalation of economic conflict between Japan and the U.S. which resulted in stricter regulations for Japanese exports (Watanabe, 1998, 1999).
The number of cars for export or such products
were restricted and Japanese corporations faced a major crisis and lose market share if no drastic measures were taken (Watanabe, 1998).
Thus, 1985 was the major turning point for
the Japanese economy, afterwards Japanese corporations started investing heavily abroad (Watanabe, 1999). As described by the catch phrase popular in the late 1970s, “Japan as Number One,” Japanese corporations successfully sustained its competitiveness during the global economic decline of the period (Watanabe, 1999).
However, they were capable of maintaining
competitiveness by gaining extreme control of their laborers and paying workers lower wages (compared with the U.S.), extending work hours, breaking confrontational labor unions, discriminating against women, and utilizing multiple layers of subcontractors (Watanabe, 1999).
Since the onset of intense globalization, their relative competitiveness began to
decline because they were incapable of applying their oppressive corporate practices in the
31
United States and European countries where they would be accused of violating laborers’ rights (Watanabe, 1999).
Japanese corporations hesitantly advanced into these regions only
because of the strong yen and to protect of market access and share (Watanabe, 1998, 1999). The regions to which they turned to make profits were in Asia and Japan.
The
Japanese multinationals in these regions have several major characteristic differences from other multinational corporations (Watanabe, 1999).
The first difference is that Japanese
multinational productions are heavily concentrated in Asia (Watanabe, 1999).
Japan-based
multinational corporations have taken advantage of the many benefits of moving production to Asia.
In addition to low wages, lax environmental regulations, and fewer problems in
regards to labor-management relations, Asia NIES and ASEAN countries actively sought out foreign capital and instituted a number of favorable policies and tax system for foreign based corporations (Watanabe, 1998). The second characteristic is that in many cases Japanese corporations multinationalize while maintaining the system of head office in Japan and domestic production system (Watanabe, 1998). Japan.
The hollowing out of domestic industry has become a major problem in
The manufacturing sector and especially small subcontractors are experiencing high
rates of bankruptcy (Banasick, 2001).
At the same time, big corporations have been
restructuring production so that they can still export products despite the extremely strong yen. These restructuring measures include the further discrimination of female employees, elimination of many managerial positions, and division of workers into long term elite employees and term-restrictive employees (Watanabe, 1998).
Watanabe (1998) argues that
the reason why Japanese society suffers from both a hollowing of industry and a restructuring of the corporate system is because corporations’ multinationalization is occurring while they are still export-oriented. Briefly, Japan-based multinational corporations have had low profitability in their
32
productions in the U.S. and Europe.
However, they have been making such a tremendous
amount of profit in Asia and Japan that they are not only able to cover deficit but to accumulate a vast amount of capital, which has enable them to advance their global activities (Watanabe, 1998).
By 1991, their accumulated profit from foreign direct investments was
the second largest in the world, after the United States and surpassing the United Kingdom (Watanabe, 1998).
After 1991, the amount of direct investments dropped slightly, but
around 1994, it started to increase again (Watanabe, 1998). As the globalization of the Japanese economy intensifies, Japan-based multinational corporations seek order and stability in countries where they have made investments (Watanabe, 1998).
For them, the protection and expansion of profitable relations between
labor and management, public order, politics, taxation system, and environmental regulations are crucial (Watanabe, 1998).
In most cases, these “developing” countries are under
despotic governments and a profitable system and privileges for the multinational corporations are made possible only by suppressing these countries’ democratic movements (Watanabe, 1998).
One way to maintain the profitable system is to provide political and
economic assistance for these governments (Watanabe, 1998).
Watanabe (1998) argues that
the Official Development Assistance (ODA), which the Japanese government explains as funding to help development of these countries, but for the multinational cooperations the real purpose of ODA is to support these countries’ governments.
In 1997, Japan was one of four
nations “with the largest foreign assistance contributions (in absolute terms)…” (DOD, 1999, p. III-37).
However, ODA is not going to protect their corporate activities and privileges
from potential threats.
Consequently, they need military pressure to restore the stability of
the government and to protect their advantageous policies and special privileges (Watanabe, 1998). When production was concentrated in Japan, it was unnecessary to send the Japanese
33
Self-Defense Forces abroad for military interventions (Watanabe, 1999).
On the other hand,
the buildup of Self-Defense Forces was convenient for satisfying the demands of the U.S. arms industry (Watanabe, 1999).
The Japanese military budget was often used as means to
resolve trade conflicts between Japan and the U.S., for example, by giving up development of domestic arms production in exchange for importing arms from the U.S. (Watanabe, 1998). Central to Japan’s security planning, the bilateral military force under the strengthened Ampo-taisei, or neo-Ampo-taisei must protect the smooth economic activities in the region from unexpected events such as political unrest, civil uprisings or changes in government policies which would be detrimental to corporate interests (Watanabe, 1998).
Responding to
the multinational corporations’ strong demands, the Japanese conservative parties have been trying to enact laws which would enable the Japanese government to send Japanese forces along with the U.S. (and possibly with others) to participate in combat (as of 1998, among all U.S. allies, Japanese defense spending is the second largest ($30.05 billion), next to France ($39.22)).
Yet for Japan, this is unconstitutional and the effort already has been facing
severe criticism from concerned people in Japan as well as from neighboring countries which suffered severely from the cruelty of the Japanese military and zaibatsu’s, (financial groups’) exploitation during the Second World War (Watanabe, 1998). For the United States, its bilateral alliance with Japan is the key to the U.S. “security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and is crucial to the forward deployment of U.S. forces there” (DOD, p. II-7, 1999).
The U.S. “sees no substitute for this historic relationship as the
region prepares to address old and new challenges into a new century” and “its host nation support is the most generous of any U.S. ally” (DOD, 1998, p. 61; 1999, p. II-7).
The
DOD’s estimates of “Japan’s cost sharing in support of U.S. forces for 1997 ranged from $3.7 to $4.3 billion ($4.9 billion according to State Department sources), covering 75 percent of U.S. basing costs” (emphasis added, DOD, 1999, p. II-7).
In summary, the Japanese
34
government’s generosity is one of the key factors making it possible for U.S. forces to remain in Japan (Aniya et al., 1996). While both the Japanese and U.S. governments pursue an expansion of market economy power and depend on their military alliance to protect their interests, the U.S. has another reason to maintain its military forces in Japan - to increase the American business presence there (Armitage, 1996).
Japan, the world’s second largest market, has been
pressured by the U.S. to relax regulations, institute tax reform, and increase savings and investment in the U.S. (Suda, 1996).
2. The Japanese government’s manipulation of public opinion and remilitarization of the state The Bottom-up Review, the first official document indicating a dramatic increase in Japan’s cooperation with the U.S. military operations, revealed that there had been an extensive dialogue between the Japanese and U.S. governments on the development of Japan’s remilitarization since at least 1993 (Asai, 1996). The incident which helped to stall the strengthening of Okinawa’s role as a crucial bilateral military foothold in the new era of global capitalist expansion was the rape of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. military servicemen (one of numerous violent incidents committed by US servicemen)2.
Several major political and judicial anti-base events
followed, which literally threatened the continuation of the Ampo-taisei (Furugen, 1995; Okamoto, 1996).
Since then the governments have manipulated public opinion with
agreements in the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (discussion on the
2
Since May 1972, there have been approximately 5,000 cases of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel. Of these crimes, 527 are heinous crimes, including murder cases (as of December 2000. Okinawa prefectural government, 2000). The Red Card Movement (2001) in Okinawa explains that since 1972, “well over 100 women and girls have been raped by GIs. (This is only the number of reported rapes; in Okinawa as in the U.S., most women who are raped never report it). And the number steadily continues to increase.”
35
SACO agreements appears below) and redefined the Ampo, affirming the bilateral relationship and expanding the role of Japan in providing regional security in the post-Cold War era (Arasaki, 1998). The Japanese government has also revised the Special Land Lease Law in order to maintain its total control over the use of the lands including those of hansen-jinushis (anti-war landowners) and a few thousand hitotsubo-hansen jinushis (who joined hansen jinushis’ struggle by acquiring very small parcels of land) for the U.S. military bases.
Previously the
processes required municipal and prefectural authorities’ compliance for the land use. Several bilateral declarations and agreements, such as the U.S.-Japanese Joint Declaration on Security (1996), and the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (1997) have been concluded, which explain Japan’s further commitment to remilitarization.
Regarding the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration, the Chinese newspaper (The
People’s Daily Newspaper) expressed concern about the alliance’s qualitative change from defense to a form of offense (Amano and Arasaki, 1999).
Once a legal framework for the
Guidelines’ implementation is put in place, Japanese support for U.S. forces responding to a regional contingency will not only be financial but also may include providing access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with U.S. forces to conduct such missions and functions as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce UN sanctions (DOD, 1998, p. 20).
In addition to the military alliance with the U.S., the use of multinational military forces for UN action has provided a convenient excuse for the Japanese government to persuade the public to support sending Japanese troops for UN Peace Keeping Operations (the use of force is still unconstitutional and unapproved), supposedly to restore “world peace” (Watanabe, 1998). In the spring of 1999, the Japanese coalition government railroaded through the Diet
36
(the Japanese Legislature) a series of the new Guidelines-related bills which partially help implement Japan’s military cooperation with U.S.-lead forces for corporate security. Needless to say, Japan’s drastic remilitarization enhances the maintenance of U.S. bases in Okinawa.
The following section explains how consecutive Japanese governments
have managed to keep U.S. military bases in Okinawa for over half a century.
3. The development of Okinawan dependency on the Japanese government Arasaki (1996; 1999), Tokuyama (June 1999), and Ui (April 1995) argue that, since the administration of Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972, the Japanese government has spent approximately five trillion yen (more than $40 billion) for “economic development” packages in Okinawa as compensation for the continuing presence of the U.S. military bases.
The
Japanese government has been very clear that Okinawa can receive generous funding for shinkousaku (“economic development package” in English) as long as the prefecture loyally accepts the bases. Although “Okinawa ranks as sixth in the world in terms of per capita income” (McCormack, 1999, p. 7), the prefecture has the highest unemployment rate in Japan. Japan’s economic recession further reduces career opportunities for Okinawans in mainland Japan, which were abundant during the “bubble economy” of the 1980’s.
The fact that
Okinawa has been trapped in a cycle of financial dependency on the Japanese government has been the major obstacle for the anti-U.S. military base movement (Arasaki, 1999).
Tourism
has become the number one industry in Okinawa and direct economic dependency on the U.S. military bases have declined over the years (The Okinawa Times, 1997).
However,
Okinawa in many ways is still indirectly dependent on the bases to the extent that they help maintain the flow of public funds from the Japanese government (Arasaki, 1999).
The
average income of Okinawans has remained at 70 percent that of the average Japanese
37
(Tokuyama, 1999).
The Japanese government has successfully practiced the system of
“ikasazu korosazu” or “don’t let them live, but don’t let them die” in order to deter Okinawa’s economic and political autonomy, which would eventually threaten the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei, (Arasaki, 1997; 1999; Furugen, 1995; Tokuyama, 1999).
At the same time, for
the major political powers in Okinawa, business circles and the large landowners, the angry voices against the U.S. military presence have become convenient excuses to extract money from the Japanese government (Arasaki, 1999). Also, there is a rhetoric which has been used to maintain and to increase the flow of the government aid to Okinawa: the rejection of the bases equals the termination of the funding from the Japanese government.
The rhetoric does work.
The financial circles in
Okinawa which have strong ties with mainland Japanese corporations, as well as the Japanese government, use it frequently to deter Okinawa’s anti-U.S. military base movement (Arasaki, 1999).
The following case illustrates the powerful role the rhetoric plays in controlling
public opinion. In the fall of 1998, several months before his defeat in the last gubernatorial election, Ota decided to oppose the plan to relocate the old Futenma Air Station (FAS), which currently occupies a massive area right in the middle of densely populated Ginowan City.
The plan,
which has been met with strong opposition from local people, is to move the FAS to an area offshore of Camp Schwab in Nago City.
His decision was based on the result of a Nago
City referendum which was held in December 1997, when a majority (52.85 percent vs. 45.3 percent) of the local population voted against the plan, despite heavy interference by interest groups (Ota in the Okinawa Times, 1998, parenthesis added).
Since Governor Ota
announced his opposition to the relocation plan, the Japanese government stopped having contact with Okinawa prefectural government and froze financial assistance.
During the
election campaign, Inamine, the pro-business opposition candidate, blamed Govenor Ota for
38
Okinawa’s high unemployment and stagnant relationship with the Japanese government. With the help of expensive advertising agencies, Inamine successfully instilled in the minds of many voters the idea that “anti-U.S. military bases does not bring bread on the table” (Inamine: 374,833 vs. Ota: 337,369). On October 21, 1995, over eighty-five thousand people gathered at a rally to protest the rape incident and the continuing dominant presence of the U.S. military bases (Furugen, 1995).
In response to the people’s demand for the reductions and realignments (or removal)
of U.S. bases in Okinawa, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)3 concluded that the relocation of some U.S. bases within Okinawa would be part of the solution to reduce Okinawa’s burden.
However, the reduction in size actually meant an increase in
technological efficiency and the construction of more than half a dozen new bases.
Thus,
the movement against the U.S. military bases has turned out to be very convenient for both the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military.
The fact that during
relocation and construction “the vast majority of the cost will be borne by Japan” (DOD, 1999, p. 8) shows that these steps are “not only in American national interests but their (Japanese) interest” (DOD, 1999, p. 8).
It is the Japanese government’s desire also to maintain and
improve facilities for the U.S. forces in Okinawa.
4. Environmental degradation Since 1972, the amount of financial assistance to Okinawa from Tokyo for “development” has been tremendous (Arasaki, 1999; Tokuyama, 1999; Ui, 1995).
Yet
contrary to expectations, the main portion of this capital has fallen into the hands of the large
3
In November 1995, the Japanese and U.S. governments co-established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to discuss the efficient reductions and realignments of U.S. military bases in Okinawa (Military Base Affairs Office, Okinawa prefectural government, p. 12).
39
mainland corporations and there has been little growth of sustainable industry in Okinawa (Tokuyama, 1999).
The main outcome of dependency has been the overgrowth of
construction companies and their sub-contractors throughout Okinawa (McCormack, 1999). In the northern mountain region, Yanbaru, there are about 500 animal and insect species endemic to the region (Fukuchi, 1996).
On Okinawa’s seventy some islands,
collectively called the “Galapagos of the Orient,” there are approximately 2000 plant species (Fukuchi, 1996).
These areas contain four to five times the diversity of mainland Japan
(Fukuchi, 1996).
However, the budgets of endless development projects planned by the
bureaucracy in Tokyo do not include costs associated with damage to Okinawa’s unique ecosystem (Ui, 1999).
Thus, Okinawa’s precious and fragile environment continues to be
destroyed and is losing its biological diversity (McCormack, 1999).
The proliferation of the
Japanese-style convenient way of life, urbanization, rapacious development by mainland tourist industries, increasing numbers of tourists, degenerative agriculture, and military activities (Okinawa also has bases for the Japanese Self Defense Force) contribute to environmental destruction in Okinawa as well.
The Japanese government recognizes the
biological significance of the region, but has shown little or no interest in protecting the wildlife habitat in Okinawa.
Worse yet, despite the deep-seated protest against the plan
among local citizens, the Japanese and U.S. governments are still forcing the plan to relocate Futenma Air Station by constructing a “hybrid base” for the U.S Marine Corps, which will destroy a relatively preserved sea and mountain area, where people have a quiet life and many endangered species exist.
The Japanese government is now “dangling before the Nago
people a huge $1 billion (110 billion yen) payout over 10 years of ‘Northern Region’ development” (McCormack and Yonetani, 2000).
Former President Clinton also
blackmailed the OPG by stating that the G8 Summit in the year 2000 would not take place in
40
Okinawa unless the prefecture come up with a solution for the relocation.4 To what extent would the natural environment in Okinawa be damaged by development projects if there were no bases?
Based on their writings, Murai (1995) or
McCormack (1999) would answer that the environment in Okinawa would still suffer from public construction and other development projects even if there were no U.S. military bases, since Japan is known as doken kokka, a term which translates as the “public works (construction) political economy” (McCormack, 1999, parenthesis added).
Large mainland
construction corporations make tremendous profits in the Third World, in the form of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) funded by the Japanese government, and they do the same within Japan with large allocations from the national budget (Murai, 1995).
Since
1972, the cause of environmental degradation in Okinawa has largely been due to the “improvement” of farmland, the “development” of dams, roads, ports, harbors, resort areas, and other projects funded mainly by the Japanese government (McCormack, 1999). of these projects are unnecessary.
Many
Destructive construction projects, with little concern for
the ecosystem, have been seen throughout the Japanese archipelago.
5. Environmental consequences of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa The fact that Okinawa is peripheral as a prefecture and yet is defined as the “keystone” for the U.S. and Japanese world strategies sets Okinawa apart from most of the prefectures in mainland Japan.
For instance, although postwar harbor laws prohibit the
Japanese government from controlling ports, construction of U.S. military ports can be fully funded by the Japanese defense budget (Tokuyama, 1999).
This type of exceptional
treatment is a significant factor keeping U.S. military-related projects in Okinawa lucrative
4
Despite the Okinawa prefectural government’s failure to produce particular solutions, the G8 Summit took place in July 2000.
41
for Japanese mainland construction companies, business circles in Okinawa, as well as U.S. construction companies which also seek to gain a share of the projects (Tokuyama, 1999). Okinawa was the only battlefield in Japan during the Second World War, and the dreadful U.S. bombings, metaphorically described as “iron-storms,” destroyed many parts of the islands and killed thousands of people (Arasaki, 1997; Fukuchi, 1996; Hashimoto, 1997; Ikehara, 1997; Kuba, 1997).
In postwar Okinawa, environmental degradation was
accelerated by the U.S. military occupation (Irei, 1999).
Since 1950, at the time of the
Korean War, the U.S. expanded the area of bases by 40 percent (Fukuchi, 1996). early 1970s the land was expropriated by force.
Until the
Since then, the U.S. military has intensified
its exercises, severely affecting Okinawa’s fragile environment (Fukuchi, 1996).
Some
examples of the effects of military exercises in Okinawa which have contributed to the prefecture’s environmental degradation are: forest fires and soil erosion from heavy live shell exercises (leading to the pollution of the nearby bodies of water and decreases in marine life), unlawful dumping of toxic chemicals, discharging of sewage into the sea, frequent aircraft crashes, extreme noise pollution (affecting nerve-systems, hearing ability, concentration among school children (Fukuchi, 1992), port calls by nuclear submarines releasing radioactive cobalt 60, and anti-guerrilla exercises in Yanbaru (Fukuchi, 1996; Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
PCB, cadmium, mercury, lead and other toxic metals, which
are known to cause various health problems and destroy ecosystems, have been found in the soil of U.S. military bases (Fukuchi, 1996; Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
Land
at the Onna Communication Site has been returned to Okinawa, but the prefecture is unable to use the land because the soil is heavily polluted with the toxic metals (Okinawa prefectural government, 1998).
The U.S. government has no obligation to clean the soil according to
the Article IV in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement and the Japanese government so far has not shown any intention of reviewing the agreement.
42
Contemporary Japan’s structural discrimination against Okinawa under the Ampo-taisei (Arasaki, 1996) underlies the issues discussed above.
The Ampo-taisei in the
post-Cold War era has been strengthening its hegemonic character while tightening its military grip on Okinawa in order to control economic resources and labor in the Third World (Arasaki, 1996; Watanabe, 1998; 1999).
Thus, to be effective, the struggle against the U.S.
and Japanese treatment of Okinawa as the “keystone” of Asia-Pacific security policy must employ a clear understanding of the Ampo-taisei’s effects on the Third World.
To be
complete, any such analysis should take into account effects on the Third world’s natural environment, as well as its people.
6. Definitions of “affluence” Okinawa’s economic dependency on Tokyo has taken a major role in perpetuating the U.S. military presence, and has an inevitable connection with the suppression of Third World countries.
In other words, while the ruling class of Okinawa and their political
representatives seek “economic affluence” through this dependency, the measurement of such affluence through monetary value has a strong relationship with multilateral state terrorism. One of the grassroot groups against the planned construction of a new military base offshore of eastern Nago City defines “affluence” as “a society where respect for life has precedence over all other things” (Nago Heripo-toni Hantaisuru Kai, 1999).
The
measurement of affluence can vary according to a society’s values and monetary income should never be treated as the only indicator (Amano and Arasaki, 1999).
However,
because the use of income level as a measure of affluence leads to profits, capitalist countries such as the U.S. and Japan force the rest of the world to accept their perspective and punish those countries which do otherwise (Amano and Arasaki, 1999). Accepting dependency which suppresses Okinawa equals accepting the system of
43
violence.
This concept already has been widely discussed among the people who reject
dependency for that very reason.
They have been struggling to establish sustainable
industry and an appreciation of alternative life styles that are culturally-different from the Tokyo-based mainland Japanese convenient, urban-style, consumption culture (Koshiishi, 1997).
Their struggle differs significantly from those of the business circles and large
landowners who emphasize the burden of Okinawa and expect large sums of money from the Japanese government in return.
Their effort to develop solidarity with concerned citizens
outside Okinawa also helps them to overcome isolation from the rest of the world. A better understanding of the domestic and global situation by a greater number of people may become a foundation for the solidarity with people outside Okinawa who suffer from the same causes.
Such an understanding may also lead to the development of an
autonomous and uniquely affluent Okinawa.
Yet first, easy access to information on the
domestic and global situation is necessary not only for already committed activists but also for the larger public.
C. The Historical Background of the Mass Media in Japan The mass media plays an important role in shaping public opinion in the present society (Sudou, 1995).
It is also the primary source of information leading to awareness on
various issues for the vast majority of people (Yoshimura, 1999).
For example, the DUw
incident on Tori Shima may not have become public without a newspaper report.
According
to Asai (1995) and Monna (1995), there are two major ideal functions of the mass media: first, it is able to criticize power freely and thereby prevent corruption; second, it is able to lead and shape people’s ideas and opinions about policies that are made by the powerful, thereby preventing the powerful from doing whatever they want.
The mass media then reports
various people’s ideas and opinions to the public (Monna, 1995).
However, mass media can
44
also be a spokesperson for the powerful, as has been the case in Japan since WWII (Asai, 1995; Monna, 1995; Murai, 1995).
What follows is a discussion of several aspects of
Japan’s mass media, including its history.
This information will serve for purposes of
comparison with Okinawa’s mass media in the analysis to follow. The conditions under which modern Japanese newspapers developed (Meiji era, 1868 – 1911 to Taisho, era, 1912 – 1925) were completely undemocratic (Katsura, 1992).
The
activities of journalists under such conditions forced an association with the formation and maintenance of the state power including scrambles for power within the political ruling class (Katsura, 1992).
Sudou (1995) argues that the constraints on journalists’ activities in the
early development stage formed the basis for modern journalistic thinking.
The mentality of
modern journalism in Japan was shaped in close association with the ideology of the emperor system.
This system defines Japanese state power and sets the tone for the patriarchal
controlling relationships among people (Sudou, 1995).
The pre-war policies of press
censorship were so extreme that there was no opportunity for Japanese journalists to earn freedom and autonomy (Sudou, 1995). In pre-war Japan, in addition to the regulation of information and state suppression of the press, the developing mass media produced an “imagined community” where political symbols such as “responsibility for the world security” justified imperialist expansion (Anderson cited in Monna, 1995).
The “imagined community” gave birth to nationalism
and eventually allowed journalists to praise military power and nationalism itself (Monna, 1995).
Monna (1995) also explains that journalism at the time was already opportunistic,
meaning that journalism allowed itself to be manipulated by the mass media’s commercialism. By 1932, an underground newspaper, Gendai Shimbun Hihan, (Newspaper Critique Today in English) argued that the press and public opinion were unable to develop freely because of the conservative establishment journalism (Monna, 1995).
Gendai Shimbun Hihan often
45
criticized the mass media’s lack of sagacious subjectivity and objective understanding of the domestic and global issues resulting from the disintegration of logical arguments because of national wartime sentiment and instigation (Monna, 1995).
As a result, Japanese
newspapers led readers to a complete misunderstanding of the domestic and world situation (Monna, 1995). Tsukamoto (1995) argues that a turning point for the Japanese media occurred between August 1945 to 1946 when it reflected on its absolute support for the war and debated extensively how to transform itself to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. However, Monna (1995) and Murai (1995) think differently. mass media has hardly changed since the wartime era.
They believe that the
The emperor system as a ruling
structure no longer exists in postwar society, yet criticism of the emperor system remains taboo within the mainstream media (Sudou, 1995).
Furthermore, the media as corporate
organizations, in combination with patriarchal structure, retain various types of discrimination which diminish the opportunity for mutual criticism (Sudou, 1995). On the subject of broadcasting, multi-media digitalization has increased the number of TV channels (Kawashima, 1999).
Ideally, this would increase choices for viewers.
However, what has happened so far is that rather than the qualitative improvement, there has been an increase in channels dedicated to the “mass production of inferior goods,” such as pornography, while many channels have stopped broadcasting because they are unprofitable (Kawashima, 1999).
Also, digitalization has increased the disparity between the
“information rich and information poor,” as people must increasingly pay to watch television (Kawashima, 1999). Pluralistic speech plays an important role in shaping public opinion (Sudou, 1995). However, the mass media has failed to present this by consciously ignoring or excluding the particular policies of political parties or activities (Sudou, 1995).
46
The national priority has long since shifted from military to economic power and the mass media’s false and instigative reports during the war have been replaced by the absence of reports on the consequences of Japanese economic activities abroad (Monna, 1995; Murai, 1995a; 1995b).
Critical reports on devastating environmental effects and dislocations of
people in Third World countries, caused by the infamous Japanese government’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), have been largely absent from the mass media (Murai, 1995). Of course, this phenomenon is not uniquely Japanese, but global.
“From time to time, the
mass media do report on some major problems of globalization, but the reporting rarely conveys the connections between the specific crises they describe and the root causes in globalization itself” (Mander, 1996, p.6).
As long as the mass media is the Japanese
people’s primary source of domestic and world news, the majority will stay ignorant (Monna, 1995a; 1995b). Throughout its history in Japan, the mass media has lacked empathy for the people who suffered from Japanese militarism, corporate activities and pro-business government policies (Monna, 1995).
This lack of empathy can be also found in depictions of countries
such as North Korea, a “rogue nation” according to the U.S., which must be terrified by the collective military power of South Korea, Japan and the U.S., encircling the country (Mori, 1998). What has been tied to the lack of empathy is the Japanese ethnocentric attitude towards the rest of Asia in the past and present, which can be found not only in the government but also in the mass media and the whole of Japanese society (Asai, 1995). Ethnocentrism characterizes Japan’s insensitivity towards the impact of the development of Japan’s increasing military commitment on the minds of millions of Asian people whose memories of Japanese imperialism are still alive (Asai, 1995).
Tuan (1990) argues that
human beings “differentiate between ‘we’ and ‘they,’ where ‘we’ are at the center” and
47
“human beings lose human attributes in proportion as they are removed from the center” (pp. 30-31).
The geographical distance between Okinawa and Tokyo is perhaps part of the
reason which perpetuates structural discrimination against Okinawa under the Ampo-taisei. Moreover, Okinawa’s exclusion from the distribution range of major newspapers in mainland Japan might contribute to a localization of the problems in Okinawa, while the Ampo-induced problems in Okinawa are national as well as international issues. The implications of localization are as follow.
First, while the Okinawan local
newspapers can avoid competition from the major mainland newspapers, the major mainland newspapers do not have to focus on the base problems in Okinawa.
Second, localization
prevents the voices of people in Okinawa from being presented in the readers’ opinions. Third, mainland readers are not reminded every day that Okinawa is affected by the presence of U.S. military bases. cover the issue.
They are only reminded when the mainland mass media decides to
Finally, these implications conveniently contribute to the Tokyo-centered
Japanese ethnocentrism which supports the continuation of structural discrimination against Okinawa. The “imagined community” again came into play during the Gulf Crisis (Monna, 1995).
The mass media helped the Japanese government shape public opinion to support
the “contribution to the UN forces for the international security” as the pretext to send Japanese troops abroad and to join the United Nations Security Council (Asai, 1995; Monna, 1995).
In the meantime, the mass media allowed little dissent against militarism, but rather
encouraged the public to believe that it was time for Japan to join military activities as a member of the international community (Monna, 1995).
The mass media also disregarded
Okinawa’s strategic location, which again came into play during the Gulf Crisis, as it had during the Vietnam War and during other contingencies and joint maneuvers (Monna, 1995). Although Japan only participated financially during the Gulf War, during the years
48
following the war Japan has been steadily transforming itself into a state with an overt emphasis on militarism (Inoue, 1999: Takaiwa, 2000; Watanabe, 1998).
The Japanese
mainstream media has taken part in the trend towards the extreme right by passively reporting the government’s undemocratic decisions. underway.
An Okinawaization of mainland Japan is also
First, live shell exercises have been transferred from Okinawa to several rural
communities in mainland Japan.
In addition, the national legislature passed some new
Guidelines-related bills which require the cooperation of local governments and private institutions in Japan in the event of regional conflict.
During the 1980’s development period
of Japanese economic hegemony and the rise of nationalism under the guise of internationalism, journalism praised economic prosperity (without substance) and slighted arguments to “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” (Article 9, the Constitution of Japan, p. 18) (Monna, 1995). During the fifty year period after the end of Second World War, the mass media has taken on management policies similar to those of corporate businesses (Sudou, 1995). News and entertainment have become products to be sold to consumers for the profit of corporations (Sudou, 1995), as in much of the world, where the sense of a public sphere has been rapidly diminishing in favor of the profit motive (Katsura, 1995; Amano and Arasaki, 1999).
The post war Japanese mass media bears a great responsibility for the ignorance of
the majority of people in Japan about the true intentions of the state’s “security” policies or the neo-Ampo-taisei and its effects on mainland Japanese, the people of Okinawa, and on Third World countries (Takaiwa, 2000).
49
-- CHAPTER FOUR --
This chapter addresses the methods and data for the research as well as the research questions. METHODS, DATA, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. Methods and Data While people in Okinawa have easy access to several mainland commercial and national broadcasting outlets, Okinawa is excluded from the distribution ranges for the major mainland newspaper companies.
It is obvious that newspaper articles are not the only
medium which provides information to people or helps to form public opinion; however, I examined to what extent newspapers in Okinawa followed the patterns of mainstream newspapers in Japan.
Newspaper articles in Okinawa might differ from the mainland
newspapers in the sense that newspapers in the prefecture must deal with the Ampo-induced problems as local issues, even though they are also national and international issues.
I also
examined how newspapers in Okinawa address the status quo, which is characterized by the suppression of Okinawan freedom and the perpetuation of dependency on the Japanese government. For purposes of my study of mass media, I chose to focus on the DUw incident at Tori Shima.
My reasons for choosing the incident among the hundreds of other problems in
Okinawa have been discussed above (see introduction).
This study examined 445
newspaper articles (including columns and editorials) in the Okinawa Times which contained the term, “rekka urandan” (“depleted uranium weapons” in English). The Okinawa Times, established in 1948, is one of two major newspaper publishing companies in Okinawa.
As of January 1999 the paper had a circulation of 202,476, which
50
was slightly larger than the circulation of the other major newspaper: the Ryukyu Shimpo. One reason for studying newspaper articles only from the Okinawa Times was because there were over 1,000 articles which contained the term, “rekka urandan” in both of these major newspapers.
Therefore, I restricted my analysis to articles only in the Okinawa Times.
I
studied articles published from February 11, 1997, the first day the DUw incident appeared in the Okinawa Times, to June 29, 2000, the day it reported on the Okinawa International Women’s Summit.
At the summit women from the Philippines, South Korea, Puerto Rico,
and the United States gathered to discuss security issues with Okinawan women from the perspective of women and children.
Except for readers’ opinions and special columns, most
of the articles did not mention any reporters’ names.
Another reason for choosing the
Okinawa Times was because the articles were available through the internet at no cost.
It
was difficult to gain access to the articles in the Ryukyu Shimpo, which currently requires membership and a monthly charge. The keyword I used to search for the articles on the incident was “rekka urandan.” The articles from the days following the disclosure of the DUw incident focused mainly on the incident and on DU weapons in different contexts.
However, as time went by the DUw
incident became one of the examples in the articles of the detrimental consequences of the U.S. military presence when the Okinawa Times reported other U.S. military-related problems or presented its claims on variety of issues regarding the Ampo-taisei. I chose content analysis for this study for several reasons. physical distance to the location of the subjects of this study.
First, there was a great
Second, because of limited
financial resources, free access to the large volume of newspaper articles was very convenient (in this study, newspaper articles, columns and editorials are collectively referred to as articles).
And most importantly, because the newspaper articles reported the subsequent
account of each subject’s claims-making processes in reaction to the disclosure of the DUw
51
incident, it helped to identify the often overlooked role of each claimsmaker in the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei.
I analyzed the following six claimsmakers represented in
the articles: 1) the local people of Nakazato Village and Gushikawa Village in Kume Jima; 2) the local governments of Kume Jima; 3) the Okinawa prefectural government; 4) the Japanese government; 5) the U.S. government and military; 6) and the Okinawa Times. Using the newspaper articles was convenient and reliable for the analysis of their claims in sequence, from the day the DUw incident surfaced, as well as the consequences that followed the disclosure of the incident.
Acquiring each claimsmaker’s claims would have
been very difficult by other means because of the inaccessibility of the subjects, especially the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military. However, there are limitations to using newspaper articles.
The newspaper company
is prone to print only what it wants to report, thus posing a limitation on the study. Therefore, studying the voices of the local people through the newspaper articles was not a perfect method.
The articles are selectively presented to fit in the available space of the
newspaper for the convenience of the newspaper company.
The best method would have
been to hold interview sessions after a researcher develops a trusting relationship with the local people in which they felt free to speak their minds. consuming as well as costly method. another important element to this study.
Unfortunately, this is a time
Also, the critique of the Okinawan mass media was The content analysis of the Okinawa Times articles
enabled an examination of how the newspaper company projected its opinions on the issues involving Ampo-taisei. However the unit of analysis for this study was themes, identified as “claims”.
In
Conducting Political Research (1971), Jones maintained that “themes refers to any proposition contained in the communication” (p. 78).
Jones (1971) also argued that “since
themes can be found in clauses, sentences, paragraphs, illustrations, and entire stories, it is
52
also necessary to specify which of these places…will be searched when using theme as the unit of analysis” (p. 78).
For this study, each article was examined for themes.
Although Jones (1971) suggested that at least two people are necessary to eliminate the problem of coder-reliability, it was not possible for this study to find another person to examine the meaning of each theme because of the language barrier (the Okinawa Times is written in Japanese). problem.
Therefore, the following two measures were taken as solutions to this
First, nearly all six claimsmakers’ claims that were necessary to answer the
research questions were translated into English for a third party to review. examined each newspaper article as many times as possible.
Second, I
However, there could still be
room for further corrections if another person examined them. Jones (1971) discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using words as the unit of analysis.
The former is their “definitional simplicity” and the latter is “the amount of effort
required to collect data” (Jones, 1971, p. 78).
For this study which uses themes as the unit
of analysis, while the latter was true, the former was not applicable.
As the research
questions show, each thesis question could not be examined by simply counting specific themes uniformly for all six claimsmakers.
Even when the same words appeared in each
claimsmakers’ themes, the hierarchy of power made each claimsmaker’s claims different. Thus, I modified Jones’ (1971) version of simply counting themes in a uniform manner in order to examine one research question, to counting each claimsmaker’s themes in a uniform manner in order to examine five research questions. The following steps were taken to analyze the data (articles). 1) Each article was numbered (397 to –75)5
5
Each article was numbered, starting with 397 and decreasing to -75. After I had already numbered the original set of articles which I was going to analyze, I decided to examine more articles. As a result, there are negative numbers. There are articles which appeared with exactly the same contents as they came out in a second and/or third edition. They are counted as one article, unless they contained additional information.
53
2) After reading each article, I summarized the contents of the article. 3) The contents were classified into twelve claimsmakers, of which six of them were important to examine my research questions6. 4) Each claimsmaker’s claims/actions were classified according to their themes. 5) Each claimsmaker’s classified claims were counted to find the proportion of each claim relative to other claims.
(The percentage is not cumulative because one newspaper article
could contain more than one claims or claimsmaker.) 6) Nearly everything that I believed as necessary to answer my thesis questions was translated into English. 7) The translated data was distributed to the committee members to review. 8) Further examination of the articles in the original language (Japanese) slightly changed the English version of the classified contents of each claimsmaker’s themes. 9) The most frequently presented claims of each claimsmakers were examined according to the thesis questions. 10) Diagrams and figures were made based on the findings. In regard to the fifth thesis question, I analyzed the most frequently presented issues. Therefore, this piece differed from the other parts of the analysis because it was not an examination of one claimsmaker’s claims, but focused instead on articles in the Okinawa Times involving DU related global news. There were two major reasons for focusing on the most frequently presented claims. Although the Okinawa Times decided the contents of the articles and the frequency of the presentation of each claimsmaker’s claims, it was plausible that the frequency of claims indicated the level of each claimsmaker’s focus on the claims. 6
Thus, each claimsmaker’s
As I started to examine the newspaper articles, I realized that there were twelve claimsmakers. However, I decided to analyze the original six claimsmakers upon which my literature review and thesis questions focused.
54
perspective could be understood by studying the most frequently presented claims. was also a technical reason.
There
Because of the large volume of newspaper articles, the
outcome of studying each claim of each claimsmaker could be too lengthy.
Nonetheless,
during the process of compiling the data, all of the claims were classified and recorded. However, the most frequently presented claims were sufficient to examine the thesis questions.
B. Research Questions I posed five research questions for the analysis. Question 1: To what degree have local people’s voices been presented relative to other claimsmakers?
I believe that the people’s voices of protest provide the most accurate
expression of what has been sacrificed for the Ampo-taisei (Amano and Arasaki, 1999). Okinawa’s struggle against the U.S. military bases is comprised of many local people in various parts of Okinawa.
As a Yamatonchu who witnessed the local people’s deep-seated
opposition against the planned construction of a new Marine base offshore of eastern Nago City, I was moved by their strong determination to protect their peaceful lives and the beautiful yet fragile environment.
At the same time, I was ashamed of the indifference of
the vast majority of Yamatonchu for making the people of Nago to fight alone against the Japanese government’s aggression to enhance the U.S. military presence in Okinawa as part of its remilitarization process.
While the people of Nago City are struggling against the
construction of a new base, there are many local struggles throughout the prefecture against already existing bases where locals physically experience the impacts of the Ampo-taisei in their daily lives.
Kume Jima is one of these localities bearing a heavy burden of the taisei as
the island is surrounded by three U.S. military bombing ranges including Tori Shima. Jima’s situation is largely unknown to most people outside the island.
Kume
Although an
55
assessment of local voices of protest is necessary to understand the situation in Kume Jima, I also had a question as to whether or not there were enough articles containing them.
The
Okinawa Times may have been more interested in participating in the political maneuvering between the Okinawa prefectural government and the Japanese government than making the voices of locals heard.
Thus, I examined the Okinawa Times’ approach to presenting the
local voices of Kume Jima. Question 2: To what extent have the claims of the two local governments of Kume Jima and the Okinawa prefectural government echoed the locals’ demands?
I compared the
claims of the two local governments of Kume Jima and those of Okinawa prefectural government (OPG).
Historically, the prefectural government of Okinawa has been
relatively weak in administrative ability because it lacks the experience of the local governments, which have struggled to protect the local people from the U.S. forces’ brutal land expropriations, military exercises, and human rights abuses (Ui, 1996).
I tried to find
out how the OPG, under former Governor Ota (who was working to develop the Cosmopolitan City Formation Plan7 and Base Return Action Program8 with the Japanese government’s financial support.
The program aimed to transform the prefecture into a free
trade zone), addressed the incident with the Japanese government.
In other words, I was
interested in examining how Okinawa’s dependency on the Japanese government affected the OPG’s claims regarding the DUw incident, in comparison with the claims of the local
7
The Okinawa prefectural government describes the Cosmopolitan City Formation Plan as follows. Based on the regional characteristics and the historical background of Okinawa, along with “Peace Exchange,” “International Technical Cooperation,” and “Economic Exchange” as three key factors, the Cosmopolitan City Formation Plan aims to establish Okinawa as a center contributing to the peace and sustainable development of the Asia-Pacific region (Military Base Affairs Office, Okinawa prefectural government, 1998, p. 14). 8 The Okinawa prefectural government describes the Base Return Action Program as follows: “The existence of vast U.S. military bases poses to be a great obstacle for orderly urban development. Thus, the OPG submitted to the Japanese government the Base Return Action Program, which seeks the return of the bases in tangible steps while planning to use the sites returned as centers for international cooperation” (Military Base Affairs Office, Okinawa prefectural government, 1998, pp. 14 – 15).
56
governments, which tend to represent people’s rights and interests more directly. Concerning the dialogue between Tokyo and the OPG, around the time when the DUw incident surfaced, the OPG was taking the position that in order to solve the problems involving U.S. military bases, a reduction of the U.S. Marine force was necessary. Governor Ota had to come up with a measure to satisfy the Okinawan people who were disappointed with him for signing an agreement that reversed his previous decision.
In
September 1996, Ota signed an agreement to allow the Japanese government’s continued forcible use of private lands within several bases for U.S. forces, in place of the landowners and municipal heads who had refused to sign.
In the meantime, the Japanese government
was pushing the plan to avoid the coming expiration on May 14, 1997 of compulsory use of the land appropriated for the twelve U.S. military bases.
Tokyo accomplished this by
revising the Special Land Lease Law (was in effect since April 23, 1997), which temporarily secured the legal ground for the Japanese government to maintain the U.S. military bases. Also, the Japanese government was, and still is, attempting to relocate an old air base within Okinawa by constructing a new Marine base.
Therefore, it was essential for Tokyo to
secure cooperation with the OPG in order to advance its agenda.
The Japanese government
thought that if it supported the OPG’s Cosmopolitan City Formation Plan (CCFP), Okinawa would, in exchange, accept the maintenance and improvement of the U.S. bases in the prefecture.
However, the fundamental difference between Ota and the current pro-base
governor Inamine is that Ota attempted to transform Okinawa from islands of U.S. bases into a financially independent prefecture by asking for financial assistance from the Japanese government.
He may have used the DUw incident as a reason to receive more funds from
the Japanese government for the CCFP.
Inamine uses Okinawa’s sacrifice of allowing bases
to remain as a rational for asking Tokyo for more money.
Ironically, Ota’s idea of
transforming Okinawa into a free trade zone was far from the ideal of establishing an
57
independent economy for Okinawa, but rather a perpetuation of heavy financial dependence upon the Japanese government (Arasaki, 1997). Question 3: How did the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military respond to Okinawa as the DUw incident became public, and justify the incident so as to maintain the Ampo-taisei?
According to Noguchi (1997), the DUw incident at Tori Shima
parallels the case in which a U.S. A4 Sky-hawk attack plane carrying a one-megaton hydrogen bomb failed to take off from an aircraft carrier and submerged in Okinawan waters in December 1965.
The U.S. government did not report the accident to the Japanese
government for almost sixteen years, and the Japanese government informed Okinawa only eight years later, shortly after U.S. Newsweek reported the accident (Noguchi, 1997). Neither 83.75 percent of the DU ammunition at Tori Shima nor the hydrogen bomb have been recovered, and the U.S. and Japanese governments have denied their harmful effects to human beings and the environment (Noguchi, 1997).
When the DUw incident surfaced, the
Japanese government was in the midst of preparation for a revision of the Special Land Lease Law as a part of the process to acquire a total control over the lands already appropriated for the bases in Okinawa.
In addition, the Review of the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, which set the framework for the strengthened military alliance for corporate security, was underway.
It was an extremely crucial period for the Japanese government to
avoid a confrontation with the Okinawa prefectural government.
I believe that the timing of
the disclosure of the DUw incident allowed me to see clearly the process of the enhancement of the taisei by the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military. Question 4: To what extent was the Okinawa Times critical of the incident?
First,
information on the radiological and chemical toxicities of DU should have been provided by the newspaper.
Obviously, the DUw incident at Tori Shima, as well as other military-related
accidents and incidents, have continued to occur because of the Ampo-taisei.
At the same
58
time, Okinawa’s economic dependency on the Japanese government has maintained the status quo.
The continuation of Okinawa’s dependency on the Japanese government is also
indirectly connected to the use of violence against people in the Third World countries.
I
examined how the Okinawa Times addressed these conflicting positions as a claimsmaker. Question 5: To what extent did the articles on the DUw incident in the Okinawa Times make links between the experience of Okinawa with the DU weapons, the global casualties of the DU weapons, and the Ampo-taisei?
I believe that making connections between these
three points is necessary for readers to understand both the domestic and global situations and to find a basis for the development of solidarity among people who suffer from the same causes. Finally, while there have been a variety of studies done on the Japanese mainstream media in recent years, few works have examined Okinawa’s distinctive mass media: its newspapers (Ota, 1996; Monna, 1983; Yokota et al., 1994).
The rape of a twelve year old
schoolgirl by three U.S. military personnel in the fall of 1995 became a catalyst for Okinawans to reexamine the effects of the Ampo on their daily lives.
The years following
the incident were a period when Okinawa discussed security issues and discrimination under the Ampo-taisei more than at any other time in recent history.
I believe that my study will
add a new dimension to the emerging critique of the Okinawan mass media.
59
-- CHAPTER FIVE --
This chapter presents the results of the analysis.
ANALYSIS
A. Local People This section discusses local people’s claims in order to substantiate the effects of the Ampo-taisei on local people, which are often mere abstractions to the vast majority of people in mainland Japan, as well as in the United States.
The local people’s voices of protest are
the most accurate expression of what has been sacrificed for the Ampo-taisei (Amano and Arasaki, 1999). First, this section defines who the “local people” are for the purposes of this study. This definition is particularly necessary as the people who were directly and indirectly affected by the DUw incident were not just the people in Kume Jima, the closest inhabited island from Tori Shima.
Because Kume Jima may not be familiar to the readers of this
paper, there is a brief description of the island.
As a critique of Okinawan mass media, this
section also explains the extent to which local people’s voices were presented relative to those of other claimsmakers.
The rest of the section discusses the local people’s most frequently
presented claims.
1. Who are the “local people”? After studying newspaper articles from February 11, 1997 to June 29, 2000, which contained the word “rekka urandan,” or “DU armor piercing projectiles” (DU weapons or DU ammunition for short) in English, it became clear that the DUw incident directly and
60
indirectly affected not only the people of Kume Jima, but also a wider range of people in Okinawa, Yamaguch in mainland Japan, as well as in South Korea.
“Being affected” by the
DUw incident does not necessarily mean that they are physically affected by the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC) use of DU weapons at Tori Shima. The DUw incident involves more than the use of DU weapons at Tori Shima.
First,
the people who live in the region surrounding Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (KASA) on main Okinawan Island (363, 347, 337), as well as near Iwakuni Air Base (IAB) in Yamaguchi Prefecture in mainland Japan (273), are concerned about the storage of DU weapons at these facilities for compelling reasons.
The Science and Technology Agency indicated that,
despite the low level of radiation in DU, it could be detrimental to health if the exposure was at a close distance for a long period of time (350, 253, 199).
The mayor of Chatan Town
believed that the storage of the DU weapons itself was a problem, because the use and storage of the DU weapons are prohibited in Japan (363, 179).
Moreover, exposure to DU weapons
is suspected to be the cause of Gulf War Syndrome (363). Second, in August 1997, about six months after the DUw incident became public, the U.S. military released several inconsistent explanations about the removal of DU weapons from Okinawa.
Kenneth Bacon, the Press Secretary of the Department of Defense (DOD),
first explained to the Japanese press that the DU weapons which had been stored in Okinawa were removed and transferred to South Korea to prepare for the conflict on the Korean Peninsula (68).
However, after he made the statement, the headquarters of South Korea-U.S.
Allied Forces in South Korea announced that not a single DU weapon had been transferred to South Korea from the U.S. military bases in Japan (62 & 61).
The Okinawa Times (OT)
simply presented the news articles from the Kyodo News, which did not mention the South Korean reaction to the transfer of DU weapons from Japan.
However, Mayonaka Shinya, an
Okinawan peace activist who visited South Korea to develop solidarity with the Korean
61
activists, contributed a report on his visit to South Korea to the OT on September 10, 1997 (50).
In his report, Mayonaka wrote, “I visited South Korea right in the midst of widely
expressed anger and anxieties about the news that the DU weapons were transferred from Japan to South Korea” (ibid. translated into English).
In May 2000, due to the South
Korean people’s persistent demand, the South Korean and U.S. governments finally admitted that the DU weapons were transferred from Okinawa in February 1997 and that they were “inadvertently expended” (Catalinotto and Flounders, 2000).
However, the quantity of
weapons and the specific location(s) where they were fired still remain undisclosed (ibid.). The U.S. military’s final explanation in August 1997 about the removal of the DU weapons was that the DU weapons, which belonged to the USMC stationed in Japan, were completely removed and shipped back to the United States (59). was not an honest explanation.
As mentioned above, this
If the USMC’s DU weapons were transferred to South
Korea, there would be no more DU weapons at IAB because the base is used by the USMC. However, because the requests from Iwakuni City and Yuu Town to investigate IAB’s ammunition storage area were turned down, no confirmation of the removal of the DU weapons from the base has been made (90 & 91).
The OT reported that on April 27, 1997,
about two thousand labor union members in five Chugoku region prefectures held a rally and marched down to Iwakuni Air Base to demand an immediate removal of the DU weapons (93). The people of Yamaguchi prefecture also expressed their concern that the U.S. military could be disposing DU munitions at Iwakuni Air Base’s Himeko Jima Ammunition Disposal Site (HJADS) (98).
The Yamaguchi prefectural government requested the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to conduct a radiation survey at the site (ibid.). the MFA rejected the request for the following reasons.
However,
First, the MFA claimed that the U.S.
military used special facilities in the United States for the disposal of the weapons (ibid.).
62
Second, the USMC at IAB explained that no DU weapons were disposed at HJADS (ibid.). Because of the Japanese government’s cooperation with IAB, the prefectural government was unable to dispel local people’s concerns. So far, KASA is the only facility where the storage of DU weapons is officially confirmed (380, -32).
In spite of the local municipalities’ strong demands for their removal,
the Japanese government (JG) supports the U.S. military’s position that “the U.S. military may need to use DU weapons in case of emergency to protect Japan’s peace and security” (275). On May 31, 2000, about 470 DU shell casings were found in a private metal scrapyard in Nishihara Town on main Okinawan Island (Weekly Times, 2000).
The owner of the
scrapyard had no idea about the toxicity of the shell casings and purchased them from the U.S. military’s Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) on Camp Kinser in Urasoe City at a sealed bid action six to seven years ago (as of May 2000).
Since then, the DU shell
casings were stored in the open-air at his scrapyard and he intended to sell them as scrap metal (-43). Local municipalities and the Okinawa prefectural government (OPG) repeatedly demanded that Camp Kinser explain the process by which the hazardous material became available to a civilian, as well as when and where the DU weapons were used (-47, -56, -59, -68).
Although the U.S. military claimed that U.S. forces had never used DU weapons in
Okinawa other than at Tori Shima, the owner of the scrapyard insisted that he purchased the shell casings several years prior to the DUw incident at Tori Shima (-59).
According to the
DRMO, records prior to the past two years had already been destroyed (ibid.).
Therefore, it
is unlikely that the U.S. military will ever disclose the truth (ibid.). The mayor of Nishihara Town explained the fears of the town’s residents.
He also
discussed the possibility of requesting the JG to conduct health examinations for the residents,
63
depending on the result of the radiation survey at the site (-48).
Nishihara Town (-61) and
Urazoe City (-72) both unanimously adopted the protest resolutions to demand a strengthened control system to deal with hazardous materials.
They also demanded the revision of the
Status of Forces Agreement, which entitles the U.S. military to refuse the municipalities’ requests to investigate inside the bases, as well as to open information (ibid.). Furthermore, fishers who use the waters surrounding Tori Shima (except for the three nautical miles surrounding Tori Shima, which are restricted areas) were also affected by the DUw incident (395, 384).
Consumers were equally affected by the potential contamination
of “imaiyu,” a dialect for “fresh fish” (219, 209). Broadly speaking, the people of Okinawa, Yamaguchi and of South Korea could be considered “local people.” the “local people.”
However, this study focuses on the residents of Kume Jima as
This restriction is because I would like to study the voices of the people
who live in the closest inhabited island to Tori Shima, where the USMC knowingly fired DU weapons (361).
The residents of Kume Jima are still unable to dispel their anxieties
completely more than three years after the disclosure of the DUw incident (-30, -34).
The
half-life of DU is 4.5 billion years and the remnants of over twelve hundred DU ammunition are still left unrecovered from Tori Shima.
2. Kume Jima Kume Jima is located approximately 100 kilometers west of main Okinawan Island in the East China Sea (See Figure 4.I, and 4.II).
The island has a circumference of
approximately 50 kilometers and consists of two villages: Nakazato and Gushikawa.
The
combined population is about 10,000 (5,138 for Nakazato and 4,549 for Gushikawa) (Nakazato Village and Gushikawa Village).
64
Figure 4. I: Kume Jima and Main Okinawa Island
Kerama Islands
Kume Jima
Main Okinawan Okinawa Island
Kume Jima is surrounded by well-preserved coral reefs where a wide variety of tropical fish shelter.
The reefs attract large numbers of scuba divers from all over Japan.
Consequently, the service industry, including small to medium size scuba diving tour companies, is Kume Jima’s third largest source of income after the government service and construction sectors (Okinawa Prefectural Government Statistics Section, 1996). An otherwise peaceful island, Kume Jima is also surrounded by three U.S. military artillery ranges: from nearest to farthest away, they are as follows (See Figure 5): 1) Kume Jima Range (located in the 2,000 square-meter island on the eastern shore of Kume Jima.
The range includes Area Kume Jima Range for airspace and waters),
2) Idesuna Jima Range (located approximately 4 kilometers west of Tonaki Jima, a separate inhabited island from Kume Jima. airspace and waters), and
The range includes Area Idesuna Jima Range for
65
Figure 5:
*U.S. Facilities = U.S. Military Bases
Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government Government (2000)
3) Tori Shima Range (approximately 41,000 square-meter island.
The range includes Area
Tori Shima Range for airspace and waters). According to Blum (2000) “DU particles thrown into the air by the round’s impact, or by resultant fires and explosion, can be carried downwind for 25 miles or more” (p. 96). Kume Jima is located approximately 28 kilometers (15 miles) south of Tori Shima and is the closest inhabited island from the range.
In fact, Tori Shima can be seen clearly from Kume
Jima (209). Kume Jima is right in the danger zone during low altitude military flights in these three ranges, and bombing practices at Tori Shima routinely endanger fishers (397, 372).
The U.S.
military related accidents occurred during and after bombing training at Tori Shima several
66
times in the past9.
Moreover, even though the U.S. military is supposed to dispose of spent
shells on Tori Shima, unexploded and spent shells cover the entire island (150). Anger against the presence of the U.S. military base culminated in the disclosure of the DUw incident (296), which lead Kume Jima to hold an island wide protest rally for the first time in the island’s history (241).
3. Local people’s voices in the Okinawa Times’ articles Amongst the six claimsmakers who were examined in this study, the voices of the local people of Kume Jima were the least presented in the newspaper articles (See Figure 6). Out of 445 articles, only 14 (3.15%) either presented or discussed local people’s voices. Soon after the disclosure of the DUw incident, although for a brief period of time, the incident was used for the political maneuvering between the OPG and the JG, with each side pursuing its own agenda.
The OT was more interested in reporting and indirectly participating in the
political negotiations between Okinawa and Tokyo and paid relatively little attention to the voices of local people.
9
1987: a Malaysian cargo boat, the Pomex Saga, was bombed by the U.S. military. 1995: a U.S. military Harrier jet crashed. 1996: a U.S. Marine Corps’ combat plane, on the way back from Tori Shima Range dropped a 450 kg bomb (1,000-pound) offshore near Naha Airport.
67
Figure 6: Frequency of Claimsmakers' Claims Appeared in the 445 Examined Articles for the Analysis (percentage not cumulative)
OT
83 (18.7%)
USGM
113 (25.4%)
JG
182 (40.9%)
OPG
140 (31.5%)
LG
25 (5.6%)
Locals
14 (3.2%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
When the OT did present the local people’s voices, it did so based on the assumption that the individuals most affected by the DUw incident were local fishers.
Claims of Uehara
Koichi, chair of Kume Jima’s fishers’ union, appeared in seven newspaper articles, in addition to one article each for the chair of Tonaki Village’s fishers’ union, and two local fish retailers. The OT emphasized claims of people who worked in the local fishing industry for several reasons.
First, the U.S. military’s bombing practices at Tori Shima have always been
pointed out as threats to their safety (397, 384).
Second, Kume Jima’s fishers are more
economically dependent on the waters surrounding Tori Shima than most of the island’s other occupation groups.
The DUw incident also caused a drop in prices which harmed local
sea-products retailers. However, the DUw incident affected more than just the local fishing industry.
Imaiyu
is an essential part of the local population’s diet and the likelihood of contamination caused great anxiety throughout the local population (219).
68
When Kume Jima’s residents held a protest rally against the DUw incident on February 24, 1997, approximately six hundred people gathered, far exceeding the expected number of participants as well as the seating capacity of the hall.
The OT wrote:
At the island’s people’s rally in the evening of the 24th, Kume Jima residents including the assemblies of both villages exclaimed “NO” to the U.S. military base one after another to protest against the DUw incident. want the U.S. military base.
They expressed that for their own future, they did not
Even though it is the busiest harvest season for sugar canes and
vegetables, the hall was packed with six hundred people of younger and older generations and was filled with their enthusiasms.
Everyone held up their fist manifesting their desire for
the return of Tori Shima Range (219, translated into English).
It was clear that the incident affected the entire population of Kume Jima, regardless of occupation.
People who work in the service sector, including the tourist industry, comprise
the second largest group (Prefectural Statistics, 1996).
The tourist association in Kume Jima
was “concerned about the detrimental effects of the DUw incident to the image of tourism in Kume Jima,” the OT reported (217). The voices of local people were disproportionately under-represented in the extreme, appearing in only 14 out of 445 (about 3 percent) articles.
The number suggests that the
OT’s focus was not on sharing with the readers the local people’s voices of concern and protest.
Okinawa prefecture consists of more than thirty inhabited islands.
The level of
people’s protest against the U.S. military presence varies widely, and often depends upon the relative impact of military bases.
Therefore, when local people, such as the residents of
Kume Jima, need a supporting movement in other parts of Okinawa, the mass media plays a significant role in deciding its quality.
Of course, there are other determining factors, such
as the dominance of centrally-controlled labor unions and political parties headquartered in mainland Japan.
These groups have created passivity among the people in Okinawa, which
is counterproductive to the movement (Arasaki, 1996).
Moreover, the extent to which U.S.
military related problems receive nationwide attention is partly determined by the Okinawan
69
mass media’s success at making local voices heard throughout Okinawa.
Strong voices of
protest within Okinawa could not be ignored by the mainland Japanese mass media and vice versa.
If the mainland media took up the Okinawan people’s struggle against the problems
created by the U.S. military, the struggle in Okinawa would strengthen as well.
This
phenomenon was evident in the rape case of a young schoolchild in the fall of 1995. As mentioned above, however, the difficulty posed to Okinawan mass media, such as the OT, is that the high frequency of the problems involving the U.S. military could not always allow it to help building an effective movement, until an attention grabbing accident or incident occurs.
The OT did treat the DUw incident as a serious case. However, its focus
was rarely on the local people of Kume Jima. In addition, considering the fact that the OT is conscious of its readers in the central government in Tokyo, and intends to send them the voices of Okinawa (Arasaki, 1999), a small number of articles present local people’s claims suggests that their voices barely reached Tokyo.
The total control of Okinawa is one of the top priorities for the JG.
Thus,
government officials are undoubtedly interested in reading Okinawa’s major newspapers to study trends in the Okinawa prefectural government or the people’s voices in order to find effective strategies to control them.
Sections D and E below further criticize the OT’s
articles.
4. Local people’s claims
a. Criticisms of the U.S. and Japanese governments’ cover up of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident (2/14 = 14.29%) When news of the DUw incident first broke in the afternoon of February 10, 1997, the OT reported that it was a tremendous shock for Kume Jima as well as for the prefectural marine-product industry (397).
The fact that not only the U.S. military, but also the Japanese
70
and U.S. governments withheld the incident, further infuriated the residents of Kume Jima (ibid.).
The OT reported that the counselor of the local fishers’ union, the vice-chair of
Kume Jima’s tourist association and a childcare practitioner denounced the JG and the USGM’s withholding of the incident at the protest rally on February 24, 1997 (291).
(See
Figure 7). Figure 7: Local People's Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
2 (14.3%)
5 (35.71%)
6 (42.9%)
7 (50%)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
criticisms of the U.S. and Japanese governments' cover up of the DUw incident return of Tori Shima accumulated anger against the U.S. military anxieties over health/ environment/ livelihood and possibility of similar, unreported incidents
b. Three types of anxieties (7/14 = 50%) The local people faced a double edged sword when they tried to learn the true effect of DU on the environment and human health.
For instance, a negative environmental
examination result would certainly be detrimental to the local economy, which is largely dependent on the surrounding sea (217).
The local people’s anxieties, given this
predicament, can be sorted into the following three categories:
71
i. Possibility of similar, unreported incidents The chair of the Tonaki fishers’ union expressed his concern about the possibility that there could have been similar incidents at the Idesuna Jima range as well (384).
More than
three years later, his concern turned out to be justified, as several hundreds of DU shell casings, used prior to the DUw incident of 1997, were found in a scrapyard in Nishihara Town on main Okinawan Island.
The OT suggested that those DU shell casings could be some of
the recovered shells from the Gulf War (-58).
However, because “no international law,
treaty, regulation, or custom requires the United States to remediate Persian Gulf War battlefields” (AEPI, 1995, p. 154), it is likely that the U.S. military is hiding another case of firing DU weapons in Okinawa.
ii. Health and the environment While the JG and the USGM downplayed the potential danger of DU to the human body and the surrounding environment (391, 394, 350, etc.), local people feared the radiation, which could have been contaminating the environment and posing a threat to their health (221).
At the protest rally, a childcare practitioner expressed her anxiety to an OT reporter
that “we have fish for dinner almost everyday.
I don’t mind about us but I do worry for the
children…also my husband grows chrysanthemums in wind and rain. (219, translated into English).
I’m really worried”
The JG and the USGM’s withholding of the DUw incident
had already intensified the local residents’ distrust of them and a lack of honest dialogue between local residents and the JG or the USGM about the potential effects of DU might have further increased their fears. After the rally, there were only a few presentations of the local people’s voices in the OT’s articles.
When one of the Science and Technology Agency (STA, a Japanese
72
government’s agency) announced that “a high density of uranium was detected on the soil of Tori Shima” (99), the OT simply reported the intensified anger and anxieties in Kume Jima. Because a high level of uranium was detected right around the area where unrecovered DU amunitions was found, the JG’s and the USGM’s lack of sincere effort to recover large amount of remaining DU ammunition made the local residents’ anxieties permanent (92). On April 30, 1998, a year after the disclosure of the DUw incident the STA started its third sampling examination of the area surrounding Tori Shima (26).
Because neither the
JG nor the USGM informed Okinawa about the status of remaining DU munitions, Uehara Koichi ordered complete examinations of Tori Shima to dispel the local residents’ anxieties. However, as of May 20, 2000, only 247 out of 1,520 DU munitions were recovered (-30). Furthermore, the JG declined to respond to the local governments’ and OPG’s requests to conduct health examinations of the entire population of Kume Jima (6, -30).
iii. Livelihood The OT presented the local people’s anxiety about the DUw incident’s impact on the local economy more than the other specific fears.
Imaiyu is an essential source of nutrition
for the local people and the local fishers as well as fish retailers depend largely on local customers.
One fish retailer (name unidentified) said, “it seems that the sales has been
slightly declined.
But I am more concerned about the future.
If the environmental
examination shows that there are indeed effects of radiation, it would be a matter of life or death to us” (222, translated into English).
About two months after the DUw incident
surfaced, Uehara Koichi explained that there were times when consumption of fish declined and the price of fish went down one third below normal levels due to fears that the fish was contaminated.
This negative impact on local fishery caused him to become extremely
sensitive toward the media’s reports involving the DUw incident (105).
73
Because Kume Jima is a popular destination for Japanese scuba divers, the local tourist industry expressed their concern over the possibility that tourism from mainland Japan would decline because of damage to the image of the island by the DUw incident (217).
A few
weeks after the incident, the Kume Jima Tourist Association was receiving calls from scuba divers concerning the safety of the ocean surrounding Kume Jima (ibid.).
By April 1997,
diving shops around Kume Jima had many cancelled reservations (105).
The chair of the
Kume Jima Tourist Association told the OT that “there is no life in Kume Jima if we lose the ocean.
From the standpoint of the local residents, we are extremely annoyed by this
incident” (217, translated into English).
c. Accumulated anger against the U.S. military (6/14 = 42.86%) The DUw incident outraged the people of Kume Jima perhaps more than any other previous incidents involving the U.S. military.
However, the local opinions presented in the
articles show that it was not just because of the DUw incident and the government cover up that caused their anger to explode.
Four out of nine local people featured in the articles
expressed that the U.S. military had already caused enough problems in the past. Higa Hiroyoshi, chair of the Tonaki fishers’ union (384), and Kamizato Minoru, a member of the regional labor union criticized the style of U.S. military training, which ignored the local residents (ibid.).
Every time the U.S. military has maneuvers at the three
ranges surrounding Kume Jima, military aircraft fly at a low altitude with Kume Jima right in the danger zone (372).
Moreover, the U.S. military is not even required to inform local
municipalities about their schedule of bombing practice at Tori Shima (390). military is only required to report cancellations of bombing practice (ibid.).
The U.S. Kume Jima
received such notice only twice in the past three years (as of 1997): once on Christmas in 1995 and once on the New Year’s day in 1996 (218).
74
Because the waters surrounding Tori Shima are excellent for fishing, the fishing industry had already been calling for a reexamination of U.S. military training practices before the DUw incident even surfaced (117). The chair of Kume Jima’s fishers’ union, Uehara Koichi, explained that the conditions on Kume Jima with the presence of the U.S. military’s three artillery ranges were not very different from having the U.S. military bases on the ground (on main Okinawan Island) (311).
Therefore, when Uehara made a protest visit
to Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau as a local representative, he requested that the U.S. military reduce the frequency of maneuvers at the three artillery ranges (372). Uehara explained the U.S. military’s regular restrictions on their economic activities: Three nautical miles (approximately 5.5 kilometers) surrounding Tori Shima are restricted waters and we cannot operate fishing there all year round. So we take caution and try not to enter more than five nautical miles. We are afraid of stray bullets and bombings at wrong targets (384, translated into English).
Uehara’s following statement also helps explain the fishers’ accumulated anger against the presence of the military base on Tori Shima. It’s not just about the (Marines’ use of) DU weapons.
Ever since the end of the war (WWII),
we haven’t been able to use the precious fishing ground.
…We always have borne various
types of problems because of the presence of (the U.S. military) base.
Before the war
(WWII), the waters surrounding Tori Shima was a single hook fishing ground for expensive fish such as sea breams and the island was covered by the seabirds.
Since the island became
the bombing range, there was a period when we would catch floated fish after bombings. But in recent years, the number of fish themselves has decreased dramatically.
They are
very sensitive to sound and vibration…” (105, parenthesis added, translated into English).
Uehara said that he regularly spoke with about 370 members of the union and asked them to fish around Tori Shima as little as possible (ibid.), but he could not force them to listen (ibid.). “It means that even our lives are threatened because of the presence of the U.S. bombing range.
I couldn’t stand our daily lives being suppressed any longer” (ibid.). Matsumoto Toru, vice chair of the Kume Jima Tourist Association, also discussed the
history of Kume Jima since the arrival of the U.S. military.
He told the people at the protest
75
rally that, “we’ve protested again and again.
Yet the U.S. military kept making accidents
one after another…” (219). Knowledge of the local history of suffering due to the U.S. military’s low-altitude flights, bombing practices, recurring accidents and restrictions on the people’s livelihood is essential to an understanding of the people’s demand for the ultimate solution to the problems involving the U.S. military: the return of Tori Shima.
d. Return of Tori Shima (5/14 = 35.71%) Voices of local people featured in the articles, as well as those of protesters at the rally on February 24, 1997, showed that the residents of Kume Jima believed the return of Tori Shima was the only solution that would completely eradicate the U.S. military-related problems. Immediately after the DUw incident surfaced, Uehara Koichi demanded the return of Tori Shima (384).
Because there are unrecovered blind shells on the range, he said, “we
want (the U.S. military) to restore Tori Shima as the way it was originally and return it” (384, translated into English). Also, to a fish retailer, whose business was threatened by the DUw incident, the removal of the U.S. military’s artillery range from Tori Shima was a reasonable demand (217). “As long as the range remained,” he said, “I could not be so sure if a similar incident would never happen again” (ibid. translated into English). At the protest rally on February 24, 1997, it became apparent that this demand was shared widely by local residents (219).
As the chair of the local women’s association,
Tokeshi Haruko called for the people’s cooperation in gaining the return of Tori Shima, she received tremendous applause from the crowd (ibid.).
Tokeshi said, “…in order to remove
the U.S. military base from the peaceful island, this is the time to unite everyone’s power”
76
(ibid.). The people who participated in the protest rally unanimously adopted the following mission statement as well as a list of seven demands, which were collectively composed by the local governments, assemblies, fishers’ union, as well as organizations for economy, education, senior citizens, women and youth (241).
1) The complete return of Tori Shima Range. 2) The suspension of the live bombing training at Area Tori Shima Range.10 3) The immediate removal of the U.S. military’s DU weapons from the prefecture.
The seven demands were not all listed together in one article, but six out of the seven were gathered from several articles (296, 241, 221, 208).
1) Environmental examinations of Tori Shima and surrounding areas. 2) Disclosure of the results of environmental examinations. 3) A strengthened control system to prevent recurrence of accidents/incidents. 4) Complete disclosure of past U.S. military-related accidents/incidents. 5) Complete investigation of the DUw incident. 6) Immediate recovery of remaining DU ammunition.
The removal of the U.S. military range from Tori Shima was categorized as one of the mission statements.
In addition, as mentioned above, it was the local residents’ most
pressing demand.
10
The articles did not clearly indicate whether or not they demanded the suspension of bombing practices at the two other ranges as well.
77
In short, although the number of articles which presented their claims was small, the local people’s expression of anxieties and protest showed, at least partially, how the Ampo affected their lives.
If there were no U.S. military artillery ranges surrounding the
population of Kume Jima, a situation enjoyed by the vast majority of Japanese, they might not be aware of how the bilateral treaty functions by sacrificing the safety, health and livelihood of the people even during peacetime.
Most of the local people presented in the articles did
not use the term, “Ampo” in relation to the problems of the U.S. military artillery ranges. Use of the term was unnecessary.
Their history of living with U.S. bombing ranges explain
what the Ampo-taisei means to them.
Despite the locals’ accumulated anger against the
presence of the U.S. military base and their determination to end the Ampo-imposed suffering, the people’s demands will not be met and the process will be likely to repeat itself next time there is an accident or incident.
B. Local Governments versus Okinawa Prefectural Government
This section discusses the comparison between the local governments of Kume Jima (LG) and the Okinawa prefectural government (OPG).
The two claimsmakers were
analyzed from the perspective that the prefectural government of Okinawa has been relatively weak in administrative ability because it lacks the experience of the local governments, which have struggled to protect the local people from the U.S. forces’ brutal land expropriations, exercises, and human rights abuses (Ui, 1996).
Because the two claimsmakers’ claims
showed differences in priorities regarding respective resolutions of problems involving the U.S. military which resurfaced with the DUw incident, I examined their claims separately. The first part of this section discusses the LG’s claims and OPG’s follow in the second part. Prior to the discussion of the two claimsmakers’ claims, the terms, the LG and the OPG, are
78
explained in order to identify them more clearly.
Also the LG’s first reaction immediately
after the disclosure of the DUw incident is described because it explains how being in the lowest tier of the political structure hinders from receiving information about the incident, even though Kume Jima had to face the most serious distress directly from the incident.
1. Who are the “local governments” and Okinawa prefectural government? In Kume Jima, there are two villages, Nakazato and Gushikawa, each with its own administration and assembly. separate institutions.
The two local governments and the local assemblies are
However, as they jointly made claims and took actions against the
incident, I combined them as one claimsmaker, the LG.
Okinawa prefectural assembly
(OPA), on the contrary, cannot be studied as part of the OPG.
OPA unanimously adopted a
protest resolution against the DUw incident on February 14, 1997 (326 & 325) and made a protest visit to the JG in Tokyo on February 17, 1997 (301).
However, the OPA is comprised
of members of different political parties and those who categorize themselves as non-affiliated did not take any particular organized action to deal with the incident with the OPG.
2. The local governments/(assemblies) (LG) As expected, the Okinawa Times (OT) presented more claims from the OPG than the LG.
While 140 articles presented the OPG’s claims amongst the total of 445 articles, 25
articles presented the LG’s claims, which made the LG the second least presented claimsmaker (See Figure 6).
3. The first reactions to the disclosure of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident Taira Sousei, the mayor of Nakazato Village, first learned of the DUw incident as he watched the evening news on television, on February 10, 1997 (397).
The mayor of
79
Gushikawa Village, Uchima Seiroku, heard the breaking news from Mayor Taira the same evening (ibid.).
None of the articles indicated that either municipality formally received
information on the incident from the OPG, the JG, or from the USGM. Taira and Uchima first responded to the incident with shock, anger, and anxiety (ibid.). The incident was withheld for over a year and there was (is) a large number of unrecovered DU ammunition at Tori Shima (ibid.).
They feared the effects of radioactive substances on
the environment as well as on the local fishery (ibid.). Only about a month before, the two mayors made a protest visit to Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau as the U.S. military jet dropped a 1,000-pound bomb offshore of Naha City on the way from its bombing training at Tori Shima (ibid.).
The
frequent accidents and incidents made Mayor Taira concerned about the possibility of other incidents which were not yet disclosed (ibid.). The mayors’ initial claim to the incident continued to appear in other articles, as well as additional claims which Nakazato and Gushikawa Villages both shared.
4. Local governments/assemblies’ claims a. Local residents’ anxieties (11/25 = 44 %) Although the LG is examined separately from the local people of Kume Jima, the LG consists of the local residents and it directly represented their voices.
Among the 25 articles,
11 presented the LG’s claim that the people of Kume Jima were having serious anxieties about the presence of the unexploded DU ammunition on Tori Shima, contamination of the environment with radioactive substances, and its effects on their health and on the community’s economic activities such as fishery and tourist industries. In May 2000, more than three years after the disclosure of the DUw incident, reelected Mayor Uchima of Gushikawa Village explained the situation in Kume Jima where the local
80
people of Kume Jima were still unable to dispel their anxieties (-31).
(See Figure 8).
Figure 8: The Local Governments/ Assemblies' Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
5 (20%) 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 8 (32%) 8 (32%) 11 (44%) 14 (56%)
0
2
4
6
complete recovery of remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima suspension of the U.S. military practices at Tori Shima environmental examinations/ finding the effects of DU removal of DU weapons from Okinawa
8
10
12
14
16
locals' anxieties return of Tori Shima health examinations for the entire population of Kume Jima
b. Complete recovery of the remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima (14/25 = 56%) Among the LG’s claims, the complete recovery of the DU weapons from Tori Shima was most frequently presented.
A nuclear physicist, Noguchi (1997) and the USGM argued
(375) that because Tori Shima is an inhabitant island and distant from Kume Jima (approximately 15-mile), the use of DU weapons may not have directly posed serious dangers to the health of the residents in Kume Jima.
However, as it is discussed in the section on the
JG and the USGM below, their persistently irresponsible attitudes did not help Kume Jima to trust their explanations.
Moreover, however the JG and the USGM downplayed the danger
of DU, the locals were already convinced of the dangers associated with it.
The LG
explained that the residents of Kume Jima would never feel safe as long as the remnants of DU ammunition were left unrecovered (66, 48, 26).
81
When the representatives from Kume Jima made their protest visit to the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (NDFAB) on February 12, 1997, they claimed the suspension of the bombing practices until the safety and the recovery of the remnants of DU ammunition were completed (397). In addition to the protest visit to NDFAB, the LG took other measures to claim the complete recovery of the DU ammunition from Tori Shima along with other claims.
First,
on February 18, 1997, Nakazato and Gushikawa assemblies unanimously adopted the protest resolution against the DUw incident which included the claim for the recovery of the DU ammunition (296).
The protest resolution was also sent to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan
and to the Chief Commander of the U.S. military in Japan.
The protest letter was sent to the
Prime Minister and the Japanese government’s ministry and agencies in Tokyo (ibid.). The LG’s next step was to present the claim as part of another protest resolution, which was adopted during the protest rally in Kume Jima on February 24, 1997 (241, 221). The following day, the LG went to Tokyo to directly express their claims at the Prime Minister’s official residence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and at the Defense Agency (208). On March 27, 1997, the Science and Technology Agency (STA) announced that its examination team found ten times higher density of uranium than the atmospheric radiation on the northern hillside of Tori Shima (111).
In response to the local people’s intensified
anger and anxieties, the two mayors of Kume Jima composed a joint letter of protest and presented it at the U.S. Consulate and the U.S. military administration office in Naha on May 1, 1997 (92).
The request letter stated that
the residents of Kume Jima are extremely shocked that a high density of uranium was detected on the northern hillside of Tori Shima near where unrecovered DU ammunition was found.
The surrounding waters of Tori Shima are very important fishing ground for Kume
82
Jima and the residents are concerned about the effects on the environment in the future (ibid. translated into English).
The letter also explained the DUw incident’s detrimental impact on the tourism in Kume Jima (ibid.). On October 2, 1997, the two mayors made their last visit to the JG to present their claims directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Secretary of the Defense Agency (48).
They explained that the fishers as well as the local residents were extremely
concerned because there was almost no progress in the recovery of the remaining DU ammunition (ibid.).
Thus, the LG demanded that the JG take measures to deal with the
problem immediately (ibid.). More than three years after the disclosure of the DUw incident on May 24, 2000, Okinawa learned that the U.S. military still stored DU weapons in Okinawa (-32).
Mayor
Uchima of Gushikawa Village reiterated the local people’s concerns and mentioned the extreme danger of the DU weapons which he learned from the field’s experts since the DUw incident surfaced (-31). For months following the disclosure of the DUw incident, both Nakazato and Gushikawa Villages made claims directly to the JG or the USGM.
However, having nearly
no progress for the next few years, the latest report in the OT showed that the new mayor Takazato of Nakazato Village and Mayor Uchima’s claim for the Okinawa Prefectural Governor’s Public Office to transmit their request for the recovery of the DU ammunition and health examinations to the Japanese government (-31).
So far, it has made no difference.
While the JG and the USGM made no visit to Kume Jima to offer apologies or to discuss problems involving the DUw incident, members of the Investigation Commission of Okinawa from the International Lawyers’ Association Japan came to visit the island and discussed the situation with the mayors (78).
During their talk, the lawyers explained that
the United Nation’s subcommittee made a resolution in June 1996 that the DU weapons
83
should be banned along with the nuclear and biological weapons (ibid.).
After their visit to
Kume Jima, the members held a press conference and demanded minute investigations, disclosure of information, and complete recovery of the DU ammunition from Tori Shima (ibid.).
The contrasting responses between the JG, the USGM and the International
Lawyers’ Association highlighted how the U.S. military training was given priority by the JG and the USGM over the environment, health, safety, and the livelihood of the people of Kume Jima.
c. Suspension of U.S. military practices at Area Tori Shima Range (8/25 = 32%) Although the day after the disclosure of the DUw incident, February 11, was a national holiday, the U.S. military reported to Nakazato Village that it was going to practice bombing (397).
This insensitive decision further infuriated Mayor Taira (ibid.).
Initially,
the suspension of the bombing practices was demanded as a moratorium until Kume Jima clearly understood the details as regards the incident and assured the safety of the area (397, 372, 296).
However, as Kume Jima’s anger culminated, the discontinuation of the bombing
practices became a preliminary claim for the return of Tori Shima. Like the claim for the recovery of the DU weapons, the local representatives directly demanded the discontinuation of the bombing practices to the JG and the USGM (372, 296, 208, 48).
Mayor Taira of Nakazato Village explained that even though they were calling for
the return of Tori Shima, he was demanding the suspension of the bombing practices as it should be possible immediately (179).
He believed that if Tori Shima became free of the
U.S. military’s bombing training, the local people would be able to restore a sense of safety (ibid.).
This idea was directly connected to the concern that the continuation of the bombing
practices might lead to the recurrence of similar incidents (ibid.). Mayor Taira explained the benefit of ending the U.S. bombing practices for an
84
economic reason as well (ibid.).
He claimed that “with the discontinuation of the military
practices, the civil aviation which currently avoids the airspace which serves exclusively for the U.S. military practices could fly faster and passenger fare would become cheaper” (ibid.). As tourism is one of the major industries for Kume Jima, the decrease in airfare would contribute positively to the local finance. After the LG directly demanded the immediate discontinuation of the U.S. military’s bombing training to the Japanese government officials in Tokyo in October 1997, the claim stopped appearing in the articles (48).
As it is discussed in section C below, in spite of the
LG’s serious efforts, the JG brushed aside this claim as well by using the bilateral security treaty, the Ampo, as the reason.
d. Complete return of Tori Shima (8/25 = 32%) Kume Jima’s residents, municipal administrations, and the assemblies as a whole came to the conclusion that the return of Tori Shima was an ultimate resolution for problems involving the U.S. military (241, 221).
The chief executive of the action committee for the
protest rally, Mayor Taira opened the rally on February 24, 1997 and declared that “the DUw incident caused serious shock and anxieties to the people of the island. happened precisely because of the presence of the base.
The incident
I will put all of my energy to
demand the complete return of Tori Shima” (211, translated into English). The day after the protest rally in Kume Jima, there was another protest rally in Yogi Park in Naha City (209).
The article showed that the prefectural people of Okinawa who
came to the rally considered the DU weapons as equally detrimental as nuclear weapons (ibid.). The same day the rally was held in Naha, the representatives of Kume Jima visited the government officials in Tokyo and called for the return of Tori Shima, among other claims
85
(208). During the discussion with the members of the Investigation Commission of Okinawa from the International Lawyers’ Association Japan, the two mayors told the members that the DUw incident significantly damaged the local tourist industry and their hopes for the return of Tori Shima after the restoration of the artillery range (78). Despite the fact that the DUw incident convinced the locals of Kume Jima and the LG that the only resolution to end suffering from the U.S. military was the return of Tori Shima, the Okinawa prefectural government (OPG) never shared the claim and it also stopped appearing in the articles.
e. Environmental examinations: finding the effects of depleted uranium (8/25 = 32%) The LG claimed an immediate environmental examination to the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (372, 296) as it could not trust the U.S. military’s explanation that there were no effects on the human body from the incident (372). The OT did not report the reactions of the LG to the result of each examination. However, the following two points were clear.
First, the LG expected the examinations to
be not only comprehensive environmental examinations of the area (221) but also included the complete recovery of DU ammunition (48, 26). the JG’s environmental examinations (F, 26).
Second, the LG was never satisfied with
The JG’s sampling examinations did not meet
the LG’s expectations nor were they frequent enough (only once a year) to update the safety condition of the area (48, 26). On May 23, 1999, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Takamura Masahiko, visited Okinawa and met with the mayors of the twenty-five cities, towns, and villages in which U.S. military bases are located and each mayor was asked to voice their requests to the MFA (-16). Takamura also set a condition for their requests that the MFA “would start dealing with the
86
ones of which the Ministry is capable” (ibid.).
The mayors of Nakazato and Gushikawa
Villages both requested the recovery of the remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima and environmental examinations (ibid.).
In the year 2000, the USGM conducted only one brief
sampling examination at Tori Shima while the JG conducted none at all.
f. Health examination for the entire population of Kume Jima (6/25 = 24%) About four months after the disclosure of the incident, the STA’s committee examined the data of the JG’s first semi-independent environmental examination on the area surrounding Tori Shima and announced that the effects of DU in the area surrounding Tori Shima could be ignored (G).
However, Mayor Taira could not trust the result and claimed
that the local residents would not be able to dispel their anxieties completely unless health examinations were conducted and showed no change in their conditions (F).
For the LG,
association between the use of the DU weapons during the Gulf War and illnesses was another strong reason to request health examinations for the locals of Kume Jima (66).
Mayor
Uchima also explained that because the environmental examination was conducted after such a long time from the actual use of DU weapons, the concern (of the accuracy of the examination) still remained (ibid., parenthesis added).
Therefore, on June 19, 1997, the two
mayors visited NDFAB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ office in Naha and demanded that the JG conduct health examinations for the entire population of Kume Jima (ibid.).
The LG
also planned to call for health examinations from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (ibid.). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Science and Technology Agency (STA) justified its decision to not conduct health examinations for the following reason. Akino Yoshinari, the head of the Nuclear Energy Safety Bureau of the Environmental Disaster Control Office, stated that “as our data evaluation committee which includes a professional from Okinawa judged that there are no effects (of DU on the environment) based on the
87
scientific point of view, we understand that there is no need for the health examinations” (6, translated into English, parenthesis added).
For the LG, the environmental examination
result was dubious and it was the main reason to claim health examinations for the entire population of Kume Jima.
However, the LG’s claim fell flat on the STA and the MFA.
Although the OPG did request that the STA and the MFA conduct health examinations for the LG (56, 21, 13), it was not the OPG’s top priority, or at least it was not one of the most frequently presented claims.
There is still the possibility that the OT did not choose to
present the claim as much as others.
In either case, the articles showed the LG’s lack of a
reliable political or media channels to actualize its claim to help the locals (further discussion of the media (i.e. the Okinawa Times) is in section D below). An absence of the LG’s ability to realize its claim seemed structural.
The LG
pressed the claim which certainly would have helped the locals to understand the impact of the USMC’s use of DU on their health.
However, being in the lower tier of political
hierarchy, the LG neither had power to influence the Japanese government’s (JG) decisions, nor did it have help from an upper level political institution (i.e. the OPG), which could have pushed forward the LG’s claim.
The LG’s lack of success in pushing forward this claim was
also a shared pattern with its other claims, except for the JG’s independent environmental examination which the JG conducted to prove that the U.S. military did nothing particularly wrong.
The LG’s sincere efforts to represent the voices of the local people and to realize its
claims notwithstanding, its structural powerlessness maintained the local status quo.
g. Removal of the depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa (5/25 = 20%) Although the two local assemblies and Kume Jima’s protest rally included the removal of the DU weapons from Okinawa as part of the resolutions, there was little discussion of the claim in the articles.
A member of the Nakazato Village assembly, Hirata Tsutomu, spoke at
88
the protest rally in Naha (209).
He explained that for locals such as fishers, (the
contamination of the environment) could mean a matter of life and death (ibid.).
However
Hirata expressed the fear (of the recurrence of similar incidents) as long as the DU weapons were stored in Okinawa, he claimed the return of Tori Shima as the resolution to end the U.S. military-caused problems (for Kume Jima) (ibid. parenthesis added). When the transfer of the DU weapons which belonged to the USMC stationed in Okinawa to South Korea became public, both mayors of Kume Jima welcomed the removal (66).
At the same time, they claimed that the recovery of remaining DU ammunition from
Tori Shima and the conducting of health examinations for the locals as their main concerns (ibid.).
The LG’s focus on the problems involving the U.S. military’s activities in the area
surrounding Kume Jima could perhaps explain that the LG’s protest against the U.S. military was restricted on the local level.
The vast majority of the people in mainland Japan live
without directly facing the problems with the U.S. military bases.
Likewise, if Kume Jima
were not surrounded by the three U.S. military artillery ranges, the LG might not be so concerned about the U.S. military-related problems on main Okinawan Island, or the mayors’ concerns were restricted to the people inside Okinawa.
As it is discussed in the previous
section, the U.S. military did expend DU weapons in South Korea once they were transferred from Okinawa and the local people of South Korea had exactly the same experience as the people of Kume Jima.
However, the LG’s localization of the U.S. military-related problems
could be part of the consequences of the absence of empathetic reports in the mass media such as the Okinawa Times on the neighboring countries’ problems with the U.S. military bases. This issue is discussed further in section E below.
5. The structural discrimination against Okinawa: the local assemblies’ view During the period when Kume Jima was dealing with serious consequences of the
89
DUw incident, the Japanese government (JG) was preparing for the revision of the Special Land Lease Law (SLLL) (122 & 121).
The Nakazato Village assembly claimed that the
JG’s move was intolerable because the legislation discriminatorily applied only to Okinawa (ibid.).
The Nakazato Village assembly was the first municipal assembly in the entire
Okinawa Prefecture (53 cities, towns and villages) to adopt a resolution against the revision of the SLLL (ibid.).
Having Tori Shima within the administrative district, Nakazato Village
was one of the most severely affected municipalities in Okinawa by the Ampo at the time. Gushikawa Village assembly also adopted a similar resolution (106). Kume Jima’s successful multi-partisan denouncement of the revision of the SLLL seemed to have a few contributing factors other than the recurring accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military.
There was only one landowner leasing land to the JG for the
U.S. military base and the artillery range created no employment opportunity for the locals. Wealthy landowners who lease their lands to the JG for the U.S. military bases in other parts of Okinawa often have the powerful influence to avoid any legal actions which may threaten the presence of the U.S. military bases (Arasaki, 1996). However, there was a more important reason for Nakazato Village assembly members to unanimously adopt the resolution against the revision of the SLLL.
They predicted that
once the law was revised and the JG acquired total control of the lands issued for the use by the U.S. military, the prefecture and municipal authorities would become permanently incapable of protecting the people from the detrimental effects of the Ampo (122 & 121). For the members of Nakazato Village assembly, who just witnessed the detrimental consequences of “the effective function of the Ampo” to the community, no more evidence was necessary to confront the JG with the revision of the SLLL.
The resolution against the
revision stated as follows. The Japanese government decided to adopt a law to quicken the process of appropriating
90
lands for the U.S. military bases by revising the Special Land Lease Law in this Diet session. There is extreme shock and protest among the people of Okinawa against the government’s decision.
After fifty years since the end of the Second World War, seventy-five percent of
the U.S. military bases concentrate in Okinawa and the prefecture bears the extremely heavy burden of the bases.
…The revision of the SLLL is nothing but to settle the bases within
Okinawa and it is completely against the prefectural people’s demand.
The revision of the
SLLL is virtually a discriminatory legislation which only applies to Okinawa.
From the
position to protect the prefectural people’s properties and rights, we strongly oppose the revision of the SLLL (ibid. translated into English).
However, on the prefectural scale, only 15 out of the 53 municipalities adopted either the protest resolution or the statement against the revision of the SLLL (ibid.).
Most of those
fifteen municipalities were generally known as politically progressive, except for Nago City and the two villages in Kume Jima, which at the time were most significantly affected by the U.S. military (ibid.). While 43 Towns and Villages Associations (250), cities throughout Okinawa, and the prefectural assembly unanimously adopted the protest resolution against the DUw incident, there were distinctive differences of views on the resolution against the revision of the SLLL, which directly challenged the Japanese government’s policy to improve the function of the Ampo (106).
At the prefectural assembly, the Liberal Democratic Party opposed the
resolution against the revision of the SLLL and many municipal assemblies rejected, shelved or carried over the resolution to the next session (ibid.).
Okinawa prefecture under
Governor Ota, however, was taking the stance against the revision of the SLLL.
The second
half of the section discusses Okinawa prefectural government’s claims.
6. Okinawa prefectural government (OPG) During the time when the DUw incident surfaced in mid February 1997, the OPG was under the pressure of both the Japanese government (JG) and the prefectural people of Okinawa.
On the one hand, the OPG was facing increasing pressure from the JG, which
91
wanted the OPG to cooperate with the maintenance of the legal compulsory use of the private lands for the U.S. military bases after the expiration on May 14, 1997, as well as with the planned construction of a new Marine base offshore of eastern Nago City.
The majority of
the prefectural people, on the other hand, wanted the OPG to pursue the actual reductions and realignments of the U.S. military bases.
They opposed the continuation of the JG’s forcible
use of the lands for the U.S. military bases and the construction of a new U.S. military base within the prefecture. Fifteen articles (15/140 = 10.71%) mentioned the OPG’s strong denunciation of the DUw incident (388, 381, 378, etc) and there were eleven articles in which the Okinawa Times explained that because of the DUw incident, the OPG’s cooperation with the JG became grim (393, 378, 357, etc).
With the disclosure of the DUw incident, the disproportionately
overwhelming power of the JG over the OPG weakened suddenly, even if for only a very brief period of time. While the LG’s claims were based on their efforts to restore a sense of safety and protect the livelihood of the local community, the OPG’s frequently presented claims showed that they intended to regain overall control of the prefecture, instead of focusing on the situation in Kume Jima.
Problems involving the U.S. military which spread over
twenty-five municipalities throughout the prefecture literally ruined the normal administrative function of the OPG. Regarding the role of the DUw incident in the OPG’s attempt to receive large scale funding from the JG for the Cosmopolitan City Formation Plan (CCFP), the OPG did not use the incident to advance the CCFP.
However, the OPG did use the DUw incident as strong
evidence to go forward with the Base Return Action Program, which needed to progress simultaneously with the CCFP.
92
7. Okinawa prefectural government’s claims
a. Structural discrimination against Okinawa (15/140 = 10.71%) Immediately after the DUw incident became public, Ota stated that perhaps the U.S. still considered Okinawa under its occupation (378, 356).
Ota pointed out the U.S.
military’s unrestricted use of DU weapons in Okinawa as an example of a situation in which the prefectural people were discriminatorily treated, and demanded the JG to end such treatment (297, 287).
Since the fall of 1995, the OPG became increasingly opposed to the
discrimination against Okinawa.
Consequently, one of the underlined themes of the OPG’s
claims in the examined articles was its opposition against the JG to maintain the discrimination, although it faded as Inamine replaced Ota (297, 293).
Among the 140
articles which presented the OPG’s claims, 15 of them contained its opposition against the discrimination. One article reported that the Japanese business circles criticized Vice Governor Tomon at a round table conference as she presented the detrimental consequences of the concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa (348).
They first asked if she, as a
member of the prefectural people of Okinawa, recognized the importance of the Ampo-taisei’s contribution to the security in Asia and Japan (348).
Then they criticized her presentation,
which focused on Okinawa’s suffering from the bases, as a mere emotional theory (ibid.). Tomon explained that her group presented the actual condition from the standpoint of the people who live in Okinawa and argued that the human rights of the people of Okinawa were ignored under the pretext of national security (ibid.).
Finally, she refuted their criticisms by
stating that Okinawa contributed to security for fifty-two years (as of February 1997) (ibid., parenthesis added). The discrimination was also apparent in the JG’s plan for the revision of the Special
93
Land Lease Law.
The OPG opposed the revision of the SLLL because the law applied only
to Okinawa (300 & 299, 287, 162).
The revision was de facto the JG’s preliminary move to
seize on the permanent rights for the compulsory use of the lands in Okinawa for the U.S. military bases, which highlighted the Ampo’s structural discrimination against Okinawa.
As
Ota pointed out, neither of the grounds for the U.S. armed forces’ being stationed in Japan, the Ampo and the Status of Forces Agreement11, specified that the U.S. military must be stationed in Okinawa (88).
Ota argued that if the maintenance of the Ampo was the JG’s policy, the
burden of the treaty should be divided equally throughout the whole country and that it was beyond the capacity of the head of an administration to bear it (262).
Nonetheless, the OPG
was not interested in challenging the national policy to maintain the Ampo and argued that the best resolution for the base problems was the reduction of U.S. forces (ibid.).
(See Figure
9).
b. Removal or reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa (19/140 = 13.57%) Like many other accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military, it was again the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) which caused the DUw incident.
Since the incident surfaced, it
became a strong case for the OPG to illustrate the situation in Okinawa with the USMC. After Governor Ota received the information on the DUw incident on February 10, 1997, he held a press conference and denounced the USMC’s presence in Okinawa (388).
Ota said,
“because the U.S. Marine Corps threatens the lives of the people of the prefecture in peacetime, the only resolution is to ask them to go back to the United States” (ibid. translated into English).
11
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan (the Ampo), Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (concluded on January 19, 1960).
94
Figure 9: Okinawa Prefectural Government's Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
14 (10%) 14 (10%) 15 (10.7%) 15 (10.7%) 17 (12.1%) 19 (13.6%) 19 (13.6%)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
removal of DU weapons from Okinawa disclosure of the 5.15 memo criticisms of the structural discrimination against Okinawa denunciation of the DUw incident concerns over possible environmental effects of DU establishment of a reliable reporting system of U.S. military- related accidents and incidents removal/ reduction of the USMC from Okinawa
The reduction of the USMC stationed in Okinawa was the OPG’s top priority even before the DUw incident was disclosed.
The OPG believed that the reduction of Okinawa’s
burden of having heavily concentrated U.S. military bases should be resolved through the removal of the USMC from Okinawa, rather than forcing other prefectures in mainland Japan to share the burden (357).
The removal of the USMC would also help its plans for future
development (i.e. CCFP) (58).
In addition, the OPG explained that the reduction of the
USMC stationed in Okinawa would be the only way to resolve the U.S. military-related problems in Okinawa without disrupting the Ampo-taisei (262).
The prefectural people
strongly supported the OPG’s idea of downsizing the U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, particularly the USMC (120, 114).
According to the OT, they strongly opposed the idea that
the size of the USMC should remain the same while the SLLL was revised, because it meant the permanence of the U.S. military bases’ settlement in Okinawa (293).
95
It is not clear if the OPG kept pressing the claim after Ota declared the opposition against the construction of a new Marine base offshore of eastern Nago City.
On February 6,
1998, Ota officially declared opposition against the planned construction of a Marine base and reiterated the claim for the reduction of U.S. military forces (37). relationship between the OPG and the JG worsened.
Since then the
Consequently, the JG affirmed Ota as a
major obstacle to the transformation of Okinawa to a high-tech base for the neo-Ampo-taisei where it is planned to serve as a sortie base for military interventions in Asian countries and beyond where the Japanese and U.S. corporate interests would be threatened.
Thus, the
relationship between the OPG and the JG became dysfunctional and the little progress in solving problems involving the U.S. military became even more dormant.
c. Establishment of a reliable and prompt reporting system of U.S. military-relatd accidents and incidents (19/140 = 13.57%) Among the 140 articles, the establishment of a reliable and prompt reporting system for U.S. military-related accidents and incidents was one of the most frequently presented claims.
However, this claim did not surface simply because of the DUw incident.
The
Ota administration constantly demanded that the JG and the USGM report U.S. military-related accidents and incidents immediately to the OPG because the JG and the USGM routinely failed to report them (388, 378). According to the Military Base Affairs Office (MBAO) of the OPG, the chair of the Office of the Ampo in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) called the MBAO at 3:30pm on February 10, 1997 and faxed the summery of the DUw incident (ibid.).
However, the OPG
had already received a copied article about the DUw incident that had been reported in the Washington Times an hour earlier, which made it certain that the JG decided to report the incident only because it had already been uncovered by the media (390, 353). Coincidentally, the same day the Washington Times reported the DUw incident, Vice
96
Governor Tomon was in Washington DC as the chair of the women’s delegation members to the United States and claimed the establishment of the prompt and reliable reporting system to Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of Defense, Campbell (376).
But in the days
following the disclosure of the DUw incident, the OPG negotiated mainly with the JG, as issues involving the U.S. military are directly under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (366 & 369, 352, 301, etc.). Less than two months after the disclosure of the DUw incident, a Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon an improved reporting policy of accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military (107, 75).
Yet in spite of the establishment of the new system that aimed to
speed up reporting accidents and incidents which might threaten public safety and contaminate the environment, the U.S. military already started breaking the agreement within two months after the conclusion of the improved reporting system (81, 79, 75, 12).
To make
the situation even worse, once Inamine became the governor, the prompt reporting system was no longer one of the OPG’s top priorities (-3, -17).
This issue is discussed further in
section D below.
d. Disclosure of the 5.15 memo (14/140 = 10%) After the disclosure of the DUw incident, the OPG was determined to make the JG completely disclose a secret memorandum.
The use of the DU weapons was prohibited in
Japan, yet they were expended without restrictions in Okinawa (287).
The OPG suspected
the reason that serious accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military, such as the DUw incident, kept occurring in Okinawa was because the conditions for the U.S. military to use the bases in Okinawa were much less strict than for those in mainland Japan (139).
Thus,
the OPG felt the necessity to examine the contents of a secret memorandum, which was known to contain specified conditions for the U.S. military forces regarding their use of each
97
base in Okinawa (287, 235, 112). A secret memorandum, which is known as the “5.15 memo” was exchanged between the U.S. and Japanese governments as Okinawa was reverted to Japan in 1972 (Weekly Times, 1997).
The purpose of the memo was to ensure the U.S. military a free use of facilities and
training areas (bases), even after the Japanese government took over the administrative rights of Okinawa from the U.S. (ibid.).
Although a small section was disclosed in 1978, the rest
of the memo was kept secret despite the OPG’s call for the complete disclosure in 1982 (156) and in 1995 (319).
Governor Ota officially demanded the complete disclosure of the 5.15
memo at a meeting with Prime Minister Hashimoto on February 17, 1997 (289). While the negotiation continued, the JG explained that it eventually wanted to reveal the memo completely to dissolve Okinawa’s concern about the presence of secrets (189). At the same time, the JG explained the difficulty to open the entire memo as the U.S. military was concerned about the military secrets (182) and gave other excuses such as the memo’s length (250 pages) and the language (English) (189).
Therefore, the OT reported that the
JG was going to open only the summary of the memo (ibid.).
However, on March 7, 1997,
the complete 5.15 memo became public after a quarter century of secrecy (156). The OT reported that the contents of the memo showed that the style of the U.S. military’s use of the bases in Okinawa during the period under the U.S. occupation remained today and clearly brought out the concentrated burden of the Ampo on Okinawa (ibid.). However, it was also apparent that no specific military secrets were written in the memo unlike the OPG had suspected since the reversion to Japan (152).
The memo stated a
flexible and free use of each of the eighty-eight bases (the number of the areas and facilities used exclusively by the U.S. military as of May 1972) (ibid.).
Yet critics believed that the
U.S. military bases in Okinawa were (are) used based on the multiple layers of secret agreements (ibid.).
For instance, the secret agreements involving nuclear weapons, the use
98
of Okinawa in case of emergency, and other matters were exchanged between the high-ranking officers of the two governments outside the 5.15 memo (ibid.).
OPG officials
also questioned that even if the memo, which specified Japan’s provision for the bases, was disclosed, “the whole picture of the U.S. military’s use of the bases may not be elucidated” (ibid., translated into English).
Ota also asked Hashimoto if there were other documents,
because the memo did not specify the Ampo’s connection with the agreements in the memo (120, 114). The Okinawa Times (OT) suggested that the JG used the disclosure of the 5.15 memo to appease the OPG before the JG revised the Special Land Lease Law (SLLL) (112). However, the OPG never officially challenged the JG’s motivation behind the disclosure of the memo.
Soon after the disclosure of the 5.15 memo, the OPG’s discussion on the memo
stopped appearing in the articles.
The OPG explained that it would make comparisons
between the specified conditions for the use of the bases in the memo and the actual use and demand that the JG revise certain conditions if necessary (115).
However, no follow up
claim on the issue was found in the examined articles. Disclosure of the memo was significant in terms of dismantling a portion of the JG’s and the USGM’s secrecy, even if the JG may have wanted to keep the memo secret for the sake of secrecy.
Thus, on the surface level, this was a successful outcome of the political
maneuvering between the two claimsmakers after the disclosure of the DUw incident. Nonetheless, it resolved virtually no U.S. military-related problems.
Moreover, the
disclosure of the memo was instrumental for the JG to revise the SLLL.
e. Concerns over the environmental effects of depleted uranium (17/140 = 12.14%) While Governor Ota and Vice Governor Yoshimoto claimed the necessity for the Japanese and U.S. governments to take measures such as an application of the U.S.
99
environmental laws to the U.S. military forces’ practices in Okinawa (388, 288, 188), a majority of 17 articles presented the OPG’s claim for the JG’s independent environmental examinations. The OPG once stated that the most important issue involving the DUw incident was to conduct examinations to find the effects of DU on the environment (114).
However, based
on the 17 articles, contrary to the local governments of Kume Jima (LG), the overall tone of the OPG’s claim on this subject did not show a very strong commitment to find the actual impact of the use of DU weapons on the environment.
For instance, when high density of
uranium was found in the soil of Tori Shima and the local residents’ anxieties intensified, the OPG only stated that it wanted to wait for the final report on the environmental examination, which was conducted in March 1997 (96).
The OT did not report any further claim on this
issue by the OPG. Immediately after the DUw incident surfaced, like the LG, OPG made a protest visit to the offices of the JG and the USGM in Naha, and discussed the “prefectural people’s anxiety” and the OPG’s concerns for the effects of DU on the ecology and the inhabited islands surrounding Tori Shima (366 & 369).
However, the terms “local people of Kume Jima” or
the “local residents” were absent in OPG’s discussions in the 17 articles.
Instead, they were
categorized as the “prefectural people” (388, 366 & 369) or the “general public” (73). OPG did not completely disregard the local people of Kume Jima.
The
Rather, it appeared that
because accumulation of prefecture-wide U.S. military-related problems was so overwhelming, it was incapable of paying closer attention to the voices of the local people. For instance, within the two weeks after the disclosure of the DUw incident, the two environmental problems involving the U.S. military surfaced.
First, one of the U.S. military
bases on main Okinawan Island, Camp Zukeran, discharged untreated oil which contained a high level of PCB (34.2 ppm) (230).
Second, the U.S. military’s faulty shore protection
100
works caused washout and polluted the surrounding ocean (199).
After all, the OPG had the
main administrative works other than the U.S. military related problems. Yet as the result of the OPG’s focus on the claims, which rarely echoed the LG’s, the local people of Kume Jima were more or less ignored in the OPG-JG negotiation processes. Clearly, the DUw incident affirmed the OPG’s limitation to protect the “local people.”
f. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa (14/140 = 10%) This claim can be separated into two time periods. months following the disclosure of the DUw incident.
The first time period was several
The second time period was in May
2000 when one of the U.S. Air Force commanders stationed in Okinawa admitted that the U.S. military still stored DU weapons in Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (-32).
Nine articles
presented the first period and three articles presented the second period. Although this claim was one of the most frequently presented ones, the OPG did not originally take the initiative to make removal of DU weapons from Okinawa as its claim.
It
was the municipalities’ association, the chair of Kadena Town municipal assembly, and political parties’ representatives who requested the OPG to demand the removal of DU weapons from Okinawa, to the JG and the USGM (336, 323, 236, 198).
In fact, among the
nine articles which presented the claim in the first period, the first four articles presented OPG’s responses to their requests that the OPG was going to make the claim to the JG and the USGM. After August 1997, the claim stopped appearing in the articles until the issue resurfaced as the U.S. military admitted the storage of DU weapons in Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (KASA) on May 25, 2000 (-32).
The OPG, under the Inamine administration,
claimed that it was going to request the removal of DU weapons from Okinawa as soon as it officially assured the storage of DU weapons at KASA (-32, -35, -41).
However, this time
101
too, the claim soon stopped appearing in the articles because within only a week, a large number of DU shell casings were found in Nishihara Town and the OPG had to move on to deal with the issue.
Similar to the first period, however, municipalities’ associations,
political party representative and Kadena Town’s municipal administration were the most outspoken groups to demand the removal of DU weapons from Okinawa (-35, -36, -38). The OPG’s lack of persistence to demand the removal of the DU weapons could be part of the reasons for the U.S. military to store them at KASA even today (as of May 2000).
8. Okinawa prefectural government’s other claims The OPG made the following demands as well: a. Recovery of DU weapons from Tori Shima (10/140 = 7.14%), b. Establishment of a reliable control system of weapons (7/140 = 5%), c. Health examinations for the entire population of Kume Jima (7/140 = 5%), d. Thorough investigation of the cause of the DUw incident (6/140 = 4.29%) e. Suspension of U.S. military practices at Area Tori Shima Range (5/140 = 3.57%). Ui (1996) argued that the OPG is very weak in administrative ability because it lacks the equivalent experiences of the local governments, which came to existence and have struggled to protect the local people from the U.S. forces’ brutal land expropriations, exercises, and human rights abuses.
As far as the limited number of articles showed, the
OPG was indeed unsuccessful in representing the voices of the local people of Kume Jima to the JG.
Although the OPG and the LG may have held talks occasionally or frequently, the
articles hardly indicated interactions between the two claimsmakers.
As it is discussed
above, the LG made enthusiastic efforts to end suffering from the U.S. military by presenting specific claims to attain the goal directly to the JG and the USGM. the USGM simply ignored the LG.
However, the JG and
The study indicated that it was partly the result of the
102
OPG’s claimsmaking processes in response to the disclosure of the DUw incident.
The LG,
which lacked power for being in the lower tier of political hierarchy, rarely had direct support from the OPG.
The OPG did make claims occasionally for the LG to the JG.
However, as
the percentages for these claims show, they were less pressing than other claims such as the reduction of the USMC presence or an improvement of the reporting system. The OPG made more comprehensive claims to gain better control over the problems as well as accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military, which recurred one after another across twenty-five municipalities where part of their lands were occupied by the U.S. military bases.
However, there is a downside to the approach.
For instance, the claim for
the reduction of the USMC may benefit not only main Okinawan Island where accidents and incidents (as well as crimes) committed by the Marines are concentrated, but also Kume Jima, as the USMC might reduce the frequency of flying and bombing practices at the three water and air spaces surrounding the island.
Yet it would also take years before the JG actually
considers requesting the reduction of the U.S. military forces stationed in Okinawa to the U.S. government.
The reality is that the JG supports the U.S. military’s position to maintain the
size of U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region.
In the meantime, locals are forced to live
with the situation with the same conditions before the incident took place.
But again, the
number of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel stationed in Okinawa since the reversion to Japan alone may explain the reasons why the OPG could not devote to resolving the U.S. military-related problems in the specific locality (i.e. Kume Jima) which surfaced with the disclosure of the DUw incident. Finally, even though the OPG failed to directly represent the voices of the local people and the LG, it was not simply the matter of its weak administrative ability but also because of numerous unresolved problems as well as recurring accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military.
As Ota stated that he reached the limit of his strength as the head of an
103
administration to deal with U.S. military-related problems (262), the study showed that focusing on Kume Jima’s claims was beyond the OPG’s administrative ability (See Diagram I).
C. The Japanese Government and the U.S. Government and Military
This section discusses how the Japanese government (JG) and the U.S. government and military (USGM) handled the DUw incident once it became public.
The ways in which the
two claimsmakers responded to the disclosure of the DUw incident showed a strong resemblance to how they had handled incidents involving toxic materials and dangerous weapons in the past (Noguchi, 1997).
Using the DUw incident at Tori Shima as an example,
this section analyses the routine and systematic process the JG and the USGM use to keep the Ampo-taisei intact, despite Okinawa’s strong protests. several important points.
This analysis of the process makes
First, while the processes have been repeated since Okinawa’s
reversion to Japan in 1972, they have been overlooked as if the Ampo entitles the JG and the USGM to continue their irresponsible practices.
Secondly, people who are unfamiliar with
the situation in Okinawa should be able to understand how the Ampo-taisei is maintained or even strengthened at times after serious accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military occur.
And most importantly, this section illustrates how this process is inherently
discriminatory against the people of Okinawa. The first half of the section discusses the JG’s claims and the second half, the USGM’s. It is important to note that even though the JG’s and the USGM’s comments and explanations are categorized as claims in this study, they could be more accurately categorized as “responses” because the JG and USGM did not voluntarily make the claims in most cases.
104
Preventing Negative Perspective on the U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa
Diagram I The USGM covers up the incident.
Generalized Political Process for Perpetuating the U.S. Military’s Free Use of the Bases in Okinawa
The Japanese mass media questions the DOD about the incident.
The USGM reports the incident to the JG.
The JG covers up the incident.
A U.S. military-related accident / incident occurs. A U.S. newspaper discloses the incident.
The U.S. military forces give no priority to pursuits other than their military objectives and continue to practice with little or no change.
The JG immediately reports the incident to the OPG.
After the disclosure of the incident The JG and the USGM come up with temporary solutions to U.S. military-related problems which surfaced after the disclosure of the incident. The JG apologizes to the OPG for delaying the report and helps the USGM downplay the incident. The JG’s negotiation with OPG creates a favorable situation for the JG to maintain Okinawa as a foothold for the strengthened bilateral military alliance.
The OPG predicament allows the JG to ignore the LG. It negotiates with the OPG but responds only to the claims which would have little impact on the U.S. military’s free use of the bases.
The OPG’ presses reform-oriented claims to the JG to gain overall control of the prefecture.
The OPG cannot focus on U.S. military-related problems imposed upon one locality as accumulated problems spread in several dozen municipalities and surrounding communities throughout the prefecture.
The incident becomes a catalyst for the locals to express accumulated anger against the U.S. military presence and to make demands to end suffering.
The LG represents the locals’ demands directly to the JG and the USGM in order to protect the locals’ health, safety and livelihood.
Dead-end for the locals to generate political power to push forward their demands.
While the U.S. military remains irresponsible and gives unaccountable responses to the repercussions of the incident, it identifies problems which derive from its presence and practices as matters of discussion between the Japanese and the U.S. governments.
See Diagram II for the Okinawa Times’ role in this process.
105
Their claims were made in response to the confrontations with OPG, some of the political parties’ representatives in the Diet, and others.
Instead of taking any initiative to solve the
problems which surfaced or resurfaced after the disclosure of the DUw incident, the JG selected few of OPG’s claims and responded to them tactically.
In regard to the USGM,
while it remained a defensive claimsmaker throughout the examined articles, the JG often functioned as its spokesperson.
1. Who are the Japanese government and the U.S. government and military? Several government ministries and agencies were represented by the term, “the JG”. The ministries and agencies appeared in the examined articles were as follows. 1) Prime Minister 2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3) Science and Technology Agency 4) Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau 5) Defense Facilities Administration Agency 6) Defense Agency Also, several government institutions and military divisions were represented by the term, “the USGM”.
The following were examined for purposes of this study.
1) The U.S. Consulate General in Okinawa 2) The U.S. Consulate General in Tokyo 3) The U.S. Embassy in Japan 4) The U.S. Department of Defense 5) The Headquarters of the U.S. Military Forces Stationed in Japan 6) The U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute 7) The U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa
106
8) The U.S. Air Force stationed in Okinawa
2. The Japanese government (JG) Among the 445 examined articles, 182 of them contained the JG’s claims, making the JG the most frequently presented claimsmaker (See Figure 6).
The large number of articles
featuring claims of the JG allowed the study to examine more closely how the JG condoned the U.S. military’s dangerous and irresponsible practices for “peace and security” reasons. Furthermore, the articles showed that the JG used the DUw incident as an opportunity rather than a disadvantage, for the maintenance of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
The study
of those articles also demonstrated that for the JG, the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei was incomparably more important than the health, safety and livelihood of the local people. Japan’s hierarchical political structure, which has given little power to local municipal governments, conveniently allowed it to entirely ignore Kume Jima’s voices of anxiety and protest.
As discussed in the sections above, more than three years after the disclosure of the
DUw incident, the local people of Kume Jima were still suffering from anxieties about the possible contamination of the environment and health risks associated with DU.
Although
the USGM was mainly to blame for the incident, the JG’s handling of the incident made it worse.
The local representatives from Kume Jima made several protest visits to the JG’s
agencies and ministry in Naha and Tokyo, but the JG took advantage of the hierarchical nature of the domestic political structure and negotiated only with the OPG. not particularly represent the voices of the people of Kume Jima, either.
The OPG did
Instead of taking
measures which would dispel local people’s anxieties and resolve problems which derived from the U.S. military’s flying and bombing exercises at Tori Shima, the JG was only concerned about how to negotiate with the OPG to draw favorable outcomes for its planned implementation of the neo-Ampo-taisei.
In the new taisei, the globalized Japanese economy
107
is supposed to benefit from keeping the U.S. military in Okinawa with improved efficiency of the bases while the Japanese armed forces and private sectors join the U.S. military interventions in Asia and beyond. Among many claims which OPG presented, the JG decided to work on the two (239). First, it was to conduct independent environmental examinations in the area surrounding Tori Shima and second, to reveal the 5.15 memo (ibid.).
These claims were least likely to pose a
threat to the system under the Ampo, compared to other possible claims, especially ones like those of the local governments’. Although I examined the most frequently presented claims as the method of analysis, the following discussions are not arranged according to the proportion of the claims, but chronologically and according to the flow of argument.
I also included the JG’s minor
claims, which explained the body’s undemocratic policy of maintaining the U.S. military in Okinawa.
3. The Japanese government’s claims a. Explanations for withholding the Depleted Uranium weapon incident (14/182 = 7.69%) As the Okinawa Times (OT) pointed out, the JG may not have informed Okinawa about the incident if media did not disclose it (386, 381).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
received information about the incident from the U.S. government on January 16, 1997 (392). However, the JG withheld the information for nearly a month until the Washington Times reported the incident on February 10, 1997 (356). Once the incident surfaced, the MFA explained that it was going to report the incident to the OPG after it examined the U.S. military’s data on environmental effects (392).
The
MFA also explained that the OPG would have been more confused if the report lacked
108
detailed information (356).
Moreover, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ikeda, assumed a
defiant attitude and commented that “even if we did not report the incident immediately to Okinawa, the situation at Tori Shima would not have gotten worse…” (352, translated into English).
An official from the Science and Technology Agency (STA) also stated that
because “the domestic law does not directly apply to the U.S. military,” the USMC’s use of DU weapons for its bombing exercises posed no legal problem (205). Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama’s response seemed to be more sensitive toward Okinawa.
Kajiyama expressed his understanding of Okinawa’s anger at the withholding of
the incident and explained that the MFA should have followed his advice to report the incident to the OPG immediately (367).
Kajiyama also criticized the U.S. Department of Defense,
which commented that the disclosure of the incident was unnecessary (ibid).
However, his
rationale was that upsetting the OPG would create more difficulties in advancing the JG and the USGM’s plans in Okinawa and further damage the relationship between Japan and the U.S. (ibid.).
While the MFA wanted to avoid any disruption between the fragile
Okinawa-Tokyo relationship by withholding the incident as long as it could, Kajiyama wanted to share the information about the incident immediately so that Okinawa would avoid further distrust of the JG and the USGM.
In either case, considerations of the effects of the DUw
incident on the local community of Kume Jima were completely absent.
(See Figure 10).
b. Apologies to Okinawa (33/182 = 18.13%), and concerns centering on the effects of the Depleted Uranium weapon incident on its remilitarization plans (21/182 = 11.54%) As the DUw incident surfaced, the most serious concern for the JG was that Okinawa’s anger and distrust which would threaten the JG’s two specific goals: 1) the revision of the
109
Figure 10: Japanese Government's Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
13 (7.1%) 14 (7.7%) 14 (7.7%) 17 (9.3%) 21 (11.5%) 33 (18.1%) 67 (36.8%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
responses to the OPG's demand to remove/ reduce the USMC responses to DU shell casings found in Nishi Hara Town explanations for withholding the DUw incident from the OPG reponses to the OPG's demand to disclose the 5.15 memo concerns for the effects of the DUw incident on its remilitarization plans apologies to Okinawa responses to examine the effects of DU on the environmet
Special Land Lease Law (SLLL) to continue forcible appropriation of the lands for the U.S. military bases without being obstructed by an expiration date and 2) the relocation of the Futenma Air Station (FAS) to an area offshore of eastern Nago City. The JG’s concern about the potential detrimental effects of Okinawa’s anger and distrust of the JG on these planned goals was presented in 11.54 percent of the articles.
The JG desperately needed OPG’s
cooperation with these goals, although in retrospect, it is clear that the JG’s manipulation of the OPG after the disclosure of the DUw incident did not directly affect the latter. Once the Washington Times disclosed the DUw incident, the JG repeatedly made apologies to the OPG for withholding information regarding the incident. to Okinawa was mentioned in 18.13 percent of articles.
The JG’s apology
The JG apologized to the following
groups: the OPG, members of several political parties, and representatives of Kume Jima who visited the government offices in Naha and Tokyo to protest.
Because upsetting Okinawa
110
was the least desirable situation for the JG, some of the government’s top officials made special visits to Okinawa to calm anger and to mend renewed distrust of the JG and the USGM (337, 306, 237).
The JG’s concern was serious enough that, for the first time in
twenty-one years (as of February 1997), the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Okinawa. The visit was in part to make an official apology to the OPG, but mainly to convince the OPG to cooperate with the transfer of the Futenma Air Station to Nago City (237).
c. Responses to the Okinawa prefectural government’s demand to remove or reduce the U.S. Marine Corps (13/182 = 7.143%) Although the JG had no intention of asking the U.S. for a reduction of the USMC presence in Okinawa, the JG’s position under this subject was one of the most frequently presented claims because it was pressured to respond to the OPG’s persistent demand.
The
OPG was already demanding the reduction of the USMC presence in Okinawa as an essential element of the Base Return Action Program prior to the disclosure of the DUw incident. However, even though the JG was desperate to appease Okinawa’s anger and distrust, the reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps was out of the question.
During the Diet session on
February 18, 1997, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ikeda explained as follows: The U.S. government makes it clear that the U.S. military presence in Okinawa is indispensable for the security of the region including Japan. The quick mobility to respond in case of emergency is the significant characteristic of the U.S. Marine Corps and that is precisely the point of their presence. Okinawa has a reasonable distance from each region in the Far East and the presence of the US. military is indispensable (275 translated into English).
The increasingly globalized Japanese economy certainly benefits from the presence of the USMC.
However, Ikeda restricted his explanation only to the security issue.
The JG
reiterated the idea that the discussion of a reduction of the USMC from Okinawa could be held between the Japanese and U.S. governments in the future, if the security situation in the region ever improved dramatically (339, 289, 270, etc).
In the meantime, the JG explained,
111
it would make diplomatic efforts to improve the regional security environment (ibid.). While the JG used the security instability in Korean Peninsula as the primary reason for not asking the U.S. government for a reduction of the USMC (287, 118), it withheld the real purpose of maintaining the size of the USMC contingent.
It is not only part of the U.S.
strategy but it is also a reliable strike force for the JG to crush situations which would threaten Japanese and U.S. economic activities in Asian countries (Takaiwa, 2000).
Further
discussion on this topic appears below.
d. Responses to the Okinawa prefectural government’s demand to reveal the 5.15 memo (17/182 = 9.34%) The 5.15 memo contains no specific military secrets.
Instead, it states that, depending
on the base, the U.S. military has discretion to change any regulation on the use of the base as it sees fit (156).
The U.S. military also ignores the regulations in the memo.
At the Tori
Shima artillery range, for instance, aside from the “misuse” of DU weapons, countless numbers of unexploded and used shells are scattered all over the range, even though disposal of used shells is part of the regulations (150).
The flexibility of regulations leads to the free
use of the bases without restriction: the same situation existed when Okinawa was under the direct administration of the United States (156). As discussed above, among the OPG’s many claims, the disclosure of the 5.15 memo was one of the two to which the JG decided to respond.
In the preceding section, there is a
discussion of how the JG turned the disclosure of the memo into a major breakthrough in the development of a trusting relationship between the OPG and the JG.
In reality, however,
there was no real trust and the relationship consisted of the JG manipulating the OPG with carrots and sticks. When the DUw incident surfaced, the JG was temporarily put on the defensive. Before this, however, Governor Ota was put in the difficult position of having the JG
112
aggressively try to persuade him to accept the revision of the Special Land Lease Law (SLLL) and the construction of a Marine base (289). As the incident became public, the JG was unable to press forward with the plan. Ironically, however, the OPG’s persistent demand to reveal the 5.15 memo saved the JG from falling into a predicament.
During the course of discussions with the OPG, the JG
successfully kept the OPG’s focus on the disclosure of the 5.15 memo.
While the expiration
date of the JG’s compulsory appropriation of the lands for U.S. military bases in the twelve sites was closing in on the JG, it played up the memo’s disclosure to be a great favor to the OPG (287, 260, 189, etc). Although the OPG had no intention of accepting the disclosure of the memo in exchange for allowing the JG to revise the SLLL, the disclosure was an instrumental, de facto move to create a favorable situation for the JG to do so.
The ways in which the JG
responded to the OPG’s request demonstrate how it manipulated Okinawa’s demand to improve the situation and tactically strengthened its control over the prefecture.
This action
was critical for a bilateral strategy, as the neo-Ampo-taisei’s framework, the review of the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation was underway (completed on September 23, 1997).
e. Responses to the demand to examine the environmental effects of depleted uranium (67/182 = 36.81%) The JG decided to conduct independent environmental examinations in response to Okinawa’s strong demand.
The local assemblies in Kume Jima, along with the rest of the
prefecture’s municipal assemblies, were adopting protest resolutions against the DUw incident one after another.
The JG had another motive as well for trying to calm Okinawa’s
anger, and this was the same motive that led to the disclosure of the 5.15 memo (239). According to the articles, the JG and the USGM conducted a total of nine sampling
113
examinations since March 1996, of which the three were conducted by the JG independently from the U.S.
Studying sixty-seven articles which described how the STA conducted the
examinations and handled the results suggested that the STA might have planned how to explain the results of the examinations before it had even conducted them. After each environmental examination, the STA announced that the data evaluation committee found samples to be within the “normal range” for uranium levels and concluded that the effects of DU on the surrounding environment of Tori Shima could be ignored (204, 111, 100 & 101, etc). Even though the examination team found a density of uranium ten times higher than the background atmospheric radioactivity in an area where unrecovered DU ammunition was found on March 26, 1997, the head of the Nuclear Energy Safety Office, Omori of the STA, told OPG that “nothing particularly abnormal was found” (111). Almost a month later, despite the presence of high densities of uranium, the STA claimed the area was safe for the following reasons.
First, other sampled areas showed no
sign of abnormal uranium levels (100 & 101).
In addition, because the range was
surrounded by off-limits waters, the uranium which was detected in the soil of Tori Shima would not affect the environment immediately (ibid.).
These were the exact same
explanations the U.S. military used when the incident was first disclosed (375).
Furthermore,
the STA explained that, even if a person stood for a year on the spot where uranium was detected, the level of radiation to which s/he would be exposed should be no more than one fifth of the maximum level of radiation which a human being could tolerate per year, based on the prescribed legal standard (99).
In addition, even though the U.S. military failed to locate
a DU weapon which was found in the slope on the northern side of Tori Shima during the previous year’s examination the JG remained indifferent (21).
The device was initially left
at the site because the core of the projectile remained in the trial bomb (ibid.). Yagasaki Katsuma, a physics professor at Ryukyu University, pointed out that DU could
114
not be sufficiently detected by a brief examination (396).
Yagasaki explained that the long
term effects of unrecovered DU weapons should be taken into consideration because it is possible that the uranium could corrode, leak into the soil, and affect the plants and surrounding waters (ibid.). Even though the STA’s Nuclear Energy Safety Bureau emphasized that the effects of DU could be ignored, it would continue to conduct environmental examinations the following year (1998) to relieve anxiety among the prefectural people (3). of the STA pointed out the danger of DU.
In contrast, another branch
The STA’s Office of Nuclear Fuel Control
explained that internal exposure to DU could cause liver and kidney disorders and despite the low radiation levels, long term storage of DU weapons could have harmful effects (350, 199). Thus, it is possible that the need to acknowledge the potential danger to health is part of the reason the JG avoided responding directly and denied the necessity of the LG’s and OPG’s requests to conduct health examinations for the entire population of Kume Jima (13, 6, -28, etc). In August 27, 1999, the STA presented its demand for budgetary appropriations for the fiscal year 2000.
Among Okinawa-related costs, the STA demanded ¥135,000,000
(approximately $1,227,273) for radiation surveys, including the cost of environmental examinations in the area surrounding Tori Shima (-22).
However, there was no report of an
environmental examination being conducted in the area by the STA as of December 2000.
f. Responses to depleted uranium shell casings found in Nishihara Town (14/182 = 7.7%) On May 31, 2000, less than two months before the opening of the G8 Summit in Okinawa (July 21 – 23, 2000) about 470 DU shell casings were found in a private scrapyard in Nishihara Town.
The initial shock and anxiety about possible contamination spread
rapidly among the townspeople because the DU shell casings had been stored in open-air (-48,
115
-49). The JG’s choice of Okinawa as the site of the G8 Summit was integral to the Japanese and U.S. governments’ plan to reiterate to the world the importance of continuing the Okinawa’s role in the bilateral alliance into the twenty-first century (Medoruma, 2000). Accordingly, the JG was taking extra precautions to avoid the rise of anti-U.S. military sentiment in Okinawa at the time.
The JG responded to the case of Nishihara Town in an
unprecedented manner, sending staff from the MFA, the STA, the DFAA and a radiation survey team from Tokyo to the scrapyard the next day (June 1) to examine uranium levels of the shell casings and the soil surrounding the shell-containing drum (-52).
The MFA
explained that “as shell casings have been stored outside, the best solution to dispel anxieties among the local residents is to actually conduct an examination” (-49, translated into English). This response was in stark contrast to the JG’s first semi-independent environmental examination of the area surrounding Tori Shima, which took place more than a month after it was informed by the U.S. about the DUw incident. The examination team declared that the radiation levels of samples were 0.02 to 0.03 micro gray, about the same as atmospheric radioactivity (-56).
The analysis of soil which
came out several days later indicated that the soil showed no effects from DU (-68).
Based
on the results of the survey, the STA stated that the site posed no danger to health (ibid). However, Tashiro Akira, a mainland journalist who specializes on the issue of DU weapons said, “although the level of the density of DU is lower than that of atmospheric, DU238 has strong toxicities.
So even if only tiny amount is detected, it proves launching of DU weapon
and it should be separately considered from the atmospheric uranium” (-59, translated into English).
In addition, as in the case of Tori Shima, both the JG and the USGM completely
ignored the time lapse between the day the incident occurred and the day the incident became public.
The two governments dismissed the fact that the owner of the scrapyard might have
116
risked dangerous long-term exposure to DU since he purchased the shell casings six to seven years previous as the result of the U.S. military’s irresponsible management of the toxic materials. The JG did not cooperate with them to pressure the USGM to answer concerning the local municipalities’ question about how such potentially dangerous materials found their way into the hands of a private scrapyard owner. There was also a suspicion that DU weapons could have been fired elsewhere besides Tori Shima.
Immediately after the DUw incident surfaced, the JG claimed, based on the U.S.
explanation, that the U.S. military had not “misused” DU weapons other than at Tori Shima, (349).
Yet when the same question came up with more convincing evidence, the JG and the
USGM faced little complaint from the OPG under Inamine administration.
4. The Japanese government’s responses to the local governments’ most pressing claims The JG’s responses to the LG’s claims, designed to end the suffering from the U.S. military, were as follows.
a. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from U.S. military bases (8/182 = 4.4%) As the JG repeatedly rejected the OPG’s demand for a reduction/removal of the USMC presence, it also refused the demand for a removal of DU weapons.
The MFA explained that
the U.S. military might need to use DU weapons in case of emergency to protect Japan’s “peace and security” (275).
Ikeda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, rejected the removal, stating,
“the U.S. military used DU weapons in Tori Shima by mistake and nobody suffered from it” (248).
He considered the DUw incident to be in this way characteristically different from
other U.S. military-related accidents and incidents in the past (ibid.). Harashima, the MFA’s Ambassador to Okinawa, was aware that the people of the
117
prefecture strongly favored the removal of DU weapons (53).
Therefore, he threatened the
OPG that if Okinawa did not accept the construction of a new Marine base offshore of eastern Nago City, he would not request that the U.S. remove its DU weapons (ibid.).
However,
whether or not he actually intended to request the removal of DU weapons, the JG’s decision on this matter was not to do so (268, 275). In sum, while Okinawa demanded the removal of the DU weapons, to prevent the recurrence of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons in Okinawa and to protect the people’s health, safety, livelihood and environment, the JG reiterated that DU weapons must be kept at U.S. military base(s) to ensure regional security (ibid.).
b. Suspension of U.S. military exercises at Tori Shima and the return of the range (4/182 = 2.2%) As discussed in the section above, the suspension of the U.S. bombing exercises at Tori Shima and the return of the range to Okinawa were Kume Jima’s most frequently-presented claims.
However, as the small percentage (2.2 percent) of the JG’s response on the subject
suggests, the JG simply brushed off the claims in order to protect the Ampo-taisei.
First,
Ikeda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not see any problem with the USMC’s use of DU weapons at Tori Shima (248).
He explained that the Harrier jet pilots who fired DU weapons
at Tori Shima followed official protocol and that because the U.S. military claimed to be taking measures to prevent additional “misuse” of DU weapons, the JG did not intend to ask the U.S. military to suspend the training exercises (ibid.).
The statement of Tanaka Nobuaki,
the MFA’s deliberation secretary, also reflected this complete absence of consideration for the local people. The prescribed practices at the bombing ranges such as Tori Shima are indispensable to maintain and improve pilots’ skills.
Moreover, the practices at these ranges are related to the
effective function of the Ampo. Therefore, we have no plan to ask the U.S. to suspend their practices and return of the range (3).
118
Briefly, the JG rejected any demand that would create obstacles to U.S. military training. However, as was often the case, the JG did not explain the reasons behind the “necessity” of giving U.S. military training priority over the welfare of the local people.
The JG’s defiant
responses implied discrimination against the people of Kume Jima.
c. Recovery of the remaining DU weapons from Tori Shima (8/182 = 4.4%) The JG’s responses to the LG’s and OPG’s demands to recover the remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima were inconsistent.
Immediately after the DUw incident
surfaced, the MFA commented that most of the remaining DU weapons would have been “exploded and should not be in the original shape” (389, translated into English). Considering the soft surface of the island of Tori Shima, including the rocks, as well as characteristics of the DU weapons which are known as “ultimate anti-tank weapons,” this claim cannot be taken seriously.
At the same time, the MFA explained, as the spokesperson
for the U.S. military, that they would inspect the remaining DU weapons periodically, but added “there are no detrimental effects on the environment and the human body” (368 & 365). Contrary to the MFA’s original explanation, the STA argued that “because the core of DU projectiles are inserted in the trial bombs, it is technically difficult to recover them” (F). But the previous time the MFA responded to OPG, it explained that it would continue to ask the U.S. military to recover them (6). There should be specific reasons for the JG and the USGM not to recover remnants of DU weapons from Tori Shima.
However, the JG never put forth any rational explanations
for not using the U.S. military’s “state of the art” equipment to recover them.
Thus, the U.S.
military could be taking precautions to avoid serious accidents while recovering DU weapons, which are very likely to be buried deep under the surface. In the meantime, the JG kept
119
giving vague and inconsistent responses to deflect the local people’s anger until they gave up pressing for their claim.
In summary, the OT articles revealed one of the JG’s tactics in
dealing with the difficult situation: employ minimal effort in resolving the problem and wait until the LG and the OPG’s claims fade away over time.
5. The missing reasons in the Japanese government’s claims In essence, the JG kept repeating the same lines when it publicly described Japan’s role in its alliance with the U.S.
The JG reiterated that Japan’s responsibility under the Ampo
was to continue supplying bases to the U.S. military because the Ampo was indispensable for the “security” of the Asia-Pacific region.
Under this system, the U.S. military is given the
right to use military bases in Okinawa in any way they choose. The JG’s extraordinarily lenient attitude towards the U.S. military is likely to worsen, as it has been making drastic efforts to repossess “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”12
The OT argued that once
the JG establishes laws which help implement the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the prefectural people’s safety, and other important rights will be jeopardized even further as military bases are disproportionately concentrated in Okinawa (73). However, the OT’s argument was limited to the military aspect of the reactionary situation. At least in the 445 examined articles for the analysis, the issues surrounding the relationship between the dramatic increase in direct Japanese corporate investment in Asia since 1985 and the corporations’ strong demand to remilitarize Japan (Takaiwa, 2000) were completely absent. While the value of the yen almost doubled due to the Plaza Accord13 in 1985, domestic
12 13
The Constitution of Japan: Article 9, Renunciation of War. A restructuring of currency exchange rates in order to help ameliorate the U.S. trade deficit.
120
production became significantly less profitable.
In response, Japanese manufacturers
dramatically expanded direct investment abroad, especially in Asia (Inoue, 1999; Takaiwa, 2000; Watanabe, 1999).
Taking advantage of the conditions in developing countries where
despotic governments suppress human rights and maintain lax environmental regulations, the Japanese corporations’ pernicious economic activities abroad have proliferated and have been characterized by the people of these countries as “the second Japanese invasion” (Takaiwa, 2000). One significant unfavorable characteristic of these Asian countries for Japanese corporations (or their U.S. counterparts), however, is the people’s struggle to end economic oppression, environmental destruction and the state dictatorship (Takaiwa, 2000). resistance is illustrated by the mass uprising in Indonesia in 1998 (ibid.).
This
Japanese
corporations are dependent on undemocratic conditions in Asia to maintain profits since their investments in North America and Europe continue to be in the red (Takaiwa, 2000, Watanabe, 1998).
In the same year that the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation (1997) was completed, Ushio Jiro, the chief secretary of the Japanese Economic Federation (also the chairperson of Ushio Denki (Ushio Electronics in English), expressed an urgent demand (Inoue, 1999), which was shared by the vast majority of the Japanese investors (Takaiwa, 2000).
The demand was to prevent the democratization of these countries by
military force with the direct involvement of Japan (Takaiwa, 2000).
Ushio argued that “in
terms of the international order, if corporations abroad are dragged into some regional conflict, the U.S., for instance, could simply send an aircraft carrier and problems could be solved just like that.
But in the case of Japan, individual corporations must ask Heaven for help”
(quoted in Inoue, 1999, pp. 1-2, translated into English).
To put it simply, Ushio urged the
JG to remilitarize the Japanese state for purposes of protecting its economic power (ibid.). By the year 2000, the law providing for the use of Japanese Defense Forces’ aircraft to
121
“rescue Japanese residing abroad” was revised to allow Japan to send battleships independently without restrictions for actions such as UN resolutions (Takaiwa, 2000). Takaiwa (2000) points out that since the Meiji era (1868 – 1912) Japanese invasions of Asia always began by using “rescue the Japanese residing abroad” as an excuse.
The Japanese
military fabricated incidents, such as killing of a Japanese national, and started invasions to “rescue the Japanese” (Takaiwa, 2000). This revision of the law was long awaited by Japanese investors, especially since 1985 when direct Japanese corporate investment in Asia began to increase (Takaiwa, 2000, Watanabe, 1998).
However, the remilitarization of Japan would not be complete without the
U.S., its super-powerful ally.
The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
(1997) is a blueprint for future contingencies where the U.S. military will crush the democratization of Asian countries (or elsewhere) with the strong backing of the JG, the Self-Defense Forces, and private sector (Takaiwa, 2000).
Since the completion of the new
Guidelines, the JG has been making steady progress to establish Japan’s combat readiness. Within this context of bilateral security, the JG is only interested in making the U.S. military bases in Okinawa permanent and technically more efficient.
While the revision of the
Special Land Lease Law (SLLL) of 1997 was essential for the continuation of the compulsory appropriation of lands for the U.S. military, it was only a preliminary step toward permanent Japanese control over the lands eventually, accomplished by the 1999 re-revision of the SLLL. Although the discussion above is merely an abbreviated recent history of Japan’s remilitarization, it points out the reasons for the JG’s (as a representation of Japanese corporate interests) obsessive emphasis on the importance of its responsibilities under the Ampo.
The situation is extremely similar to the conditions when the entire nation was
involved in the “first” invasion in Asia, which started in the late nineteenth century.
At that
122
time, as is the case today, the vast majority of the Japanese population were ignorant of the zaibatsu’s (“financial combine’s” in English) economic expansion (Takaiwa, 2000). Economic proliferation of zaibatsu during World War II could not have been accomplished without the systematic execution of barbarous acts by the Japanese Emperor’s Army against millions of Asian people (Takaiwa, 2000).
Today’s ignorance of the Japanese population
concerning corporate demands to remilitarize Japan and strengthening the military alliance with the U.S. is enabled by the JG with the tacit support of the mass media which censors discussion of these issues (Takaiwa, 2000). criticism.
Unfortunately, the OT cannot escape from this
Further discussion on this topic continues in the next section D.
6. U.S. government and military (USGM) One hundred and thirteen newspaper articles presented the USGM’s claims.
This
number makes the USGM the third most frequently-presented claimsmaker (See Figure 6). The USGM’s claims illustrated that the U.S. military defended its irresponsible practices with haphazard and inconsistent explanations.
The following statement of Aroyciaus M O’Neill,
U.S. Consul General in Okinawa, sums up the attitude of the USGM. “I apologize to the people of Japan and Okinawa prefecture. a big issue.
We did not realize that the DUw incident was such
After we publicly announced the incident, we understood the repercussions for
the first time.
It should never happen again” (358, translated into English).
Accidents and
incidents involving the U.S. military continued to occur in Okinawa after he made the statement.
If the U.S. military responded to the DUw incident in an extremely unreliable
manner, as discussed below in detail, it is likely to respond similarly to other disasters it creates in Okinawa.
The USGM’s most frequently presented claims are as follows.
123
7. U.S. government and military’s claims
a. Explanations for the U.S. Marine Corps use of depleted uranium weapons at Tori Shima (7/113 = 6.19%) The USGM had several different reasons why the U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier jet crews fired a total of 1,520 DU weapons during three separate training exercised at Tori Shima between December 1995 and January 1996.
One explanation, which was repeated
several times by a few U.S. officials, was that DU weapons had inappropriate labels (389, 392, 361).
Another explanation was that the catalog for the DU weapons contained a mistake
which was later corrected to avoid future “misuse” (380). However, Sear, the head of the Security Treaty office in the U.S. Embassy in Japan, changed the explanations (361).
According to Sear, the Harrier jet crews knew the type of
weapons which they fired during the bombing practices (ibid.).
He explained that the
manual for personnel in charge of arming the jets did not stipulate that DU weapons were not to be used in Japan (ibid.).
(See Figure 11).
b. Downplaying the Depleted Uranium weapon incident (15/113 = 13.27%) The local people of Kume Jima were angry about the two governments’ withholding of the DUw incident.
However, the most serious problem for the locals was the fact that DU
weapons were fired near their homes, thus threatening their health, environment and local economy.
On the contrary, for O’Neill, the U.S. Consul General, the most serious problem
was the reporting system (358).
His statement was typical of those offered by other U.S.
officials, who attempted to divert public criticism from the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons as well as from the storage of the DU weapons in Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.
The
following two subsections illustrate the ways in which the USGM downplayed the DUw incident.
124
Figure 11: The U.S. Government and Military's Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
7 (6.2%)
12 (10.6%)
15 (13.3%)
22 (19.5%)
24 (21.2%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
explanations for the USMC use of DU weapons at Tori Shima evading responsibility for selling DU shell casings to a private scrapyard owner downplaying the DUw incident responses to the question of whether or not DU weapons are stored in Okinawa responses to the demand to recovr DU ammunition and conduct environmental examinations
i. Reasons for reporting the Depleted Uranium weapon incident to the Japanese government The USGM’s explanations for withholding the incident for a year but deciding to report the incident to the JG were as follows.
The USMC fired DU weapons at Tori Shima as a
“simple mistake” and because the range was an uninhabited island, they did not find it necessary to report it to Japan (371, 290).
However, the Press Department of the U.S.
military stationed in Japan explained things differently.
The U.S. military reported the
incident to the JG “along with other accidents to the JG in order to improve trust between the U.S. and Japan during the revision of the reporting system for accidents and incidents upon which Japan and U.S. recently agreed” (380, translated into English). When Kenneth Bacon, the Press Secretary of the DOD, was questioned at a routine press conference about the reason for reporting the incident to Japan, he replied that “as a
125
result, we caused trouble for Japan.
As long as our presence in Japan is to maintain security
in the Asia-Pacific region for our mutual interests, the U.S. military always needs to take responsible action” (290, translated into English).
However, he also added another
explanation. “Quite honestly speaking, after we were interviewed by a Japanese broadcasting company in January (1997), we reported the incident to the Japanese government” (371). This comment indicated that the DOD wanted to avoid a situation in which the incident was disclosed by the media.
Accordingly, when the U.S. finally reported the incident to the JG
out of “goodwill” to “improve trust between the U.S. and Japan” (380), the DUw incident was camouflaged as one of the several “accidents.”
ii. Attempts to trivialize the danger of depleted uranium weapons One of the USGM’s tactics in downplaying the danger of DU weapons was to define them as “conventional weapons” (389, 380, 375, etc). While DU is actually sixty percent as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium (Fahay, 1997), the Press Department of the U.S. military stationed in Japan explained that “the DU weapons contain no radioactive substances,” (380, translated into English). The USGM reacted defensively to the claim that “the use of DU weapons is prohibited in Japan but the U.S. military used them at Tori Shima” (ibid., translated into English).
The
Press Department of U.S. military in Japan explained that it was not that the use of DU weapons was prohibited in Japan, but the U.S. military had bylaws which restricted the use of the weapons in cases other than emergency (ibid.). USGM officials employed several other explanations in an attempt to trivialize the radioactive component of DU weapons.
Kenneth Bacon explained that “the level of
radiation in depleted uranium is extremely low, even lower than the radiation from a 1950’s television set” (371, D, 307, translated into English).
Klijark, chair of the Press Department
126
of the U.S. military in Japan also tried to downplay the radiation level of DU.
He explained
that the total weight of DU in 1,520 DU shells was “less than the total weight of DU which is loaded in a civilian’s jumbo jet” and that the level of DU which was fired at Tori Shima was one tenth of the permissible level by U.S. standards, while Japan did not have any such standards (380).
Thus, he concluded that the effects of DU on the human body and the
environment should be close to nothing (ibid). However, the U.S. military compiled a detailed report on the DUw incident, which indicated that it took the “misuse” of the DU weapons very seriously (179).
Samples of soil
and water were collected for comparative examinations from over one hundred points at Tori Shima and the surrounding waters and from twenty-three points on main Okinawan Island (ibid.).
There is also evidence that the level of DU at Tori Shima was examined only after
the U.S. military removed the contaminated sand and soil from the range (188).
Iha Yoichi
of Yuinokai, a member of the Okinawa prefectural assembly, studied the U.S. military’s report on its first environmental examination at Tori Shima in March 1996, a month following the Marines’ third bombing practice using DU weapons (ibid.).
Iha pointed out that the disposal
operations were conducted as they were following nuclear accidents (ibid.).
Before the
initial sampling of the environment, the U.S. military sent its nuclear disposal specialists to Tori Shima and removed the contaminated sand and soil to bring the island’s surface to the level of atmospheric radioactivity (ibid.).
The report did not indicate the level of radiation
before the removal of sand and soil, but it mentioned that the materials were transferred to Kadena Air Base and stored in accordance with the radioactive materials permit (ibid.). According to the report, by the time the U.S. military conducted the first environmental examination, the level of radiation was one tenth of the minimum level at which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires remediation (389). completely reliable.
However, this report could not be
One year after the disposal operations, a high level of uranium was
127
detected right around the area where a remaining DU weapon was found.
Most of the DU
weapons still remain unrecovered. Throughout the period when the people’s shock and anger against the DUw incident and the storage of DU weapons were at their peak, U.S. officials in Japan maintained a defiant attitude towards the protesters.
U.S. Consul O’Neill told the representatives from an
Okinawan women’s association, “there is no danger from DU as long as it does not enter the human body.
The people of Okinawa seem to be a bit too nervous about the word uranium”
(250, translated into English, emphasis added).
The U.S. military also lied.
The Japanese
headquarters of the U.S. military denied the Japanese mass media’s report that the USMC fired a type of weapon which was restricted from use in Japan (307).
The headquarters
explained that “because they are expensive weapons, we usually don’t use them,” as if no one in Okinawa knew that U.S. arms manufacturers could receive the radioactive waste materials (DU) for free and the cost of DU weapon production was less than the cost of disposal (307, translated into English, emphasis added). Similarly, when 470 DU shell casings were found in the private scrapyard in Nishihara Town in May 2000, the USMC Press Department emphasized that “all the shell casings are harmless” (-47) and simply let the JG conduct the radiation survey to calm the anxieties of the Nishihara Town residents (-52).
Further discussion of this topic appears below.
In brief, the USGM does recognize the potential danger of DU.
The U.S. military’s
manual for the use of DU weapons states that “even though the level of radiation is low, there is a possibility of causing cancer or contaminating the environment” (307, translated into English).
However, once the U.S. military came under attack after the disclosure of the
DUw incident, the USGM denied and/or trivialized the danger of DU and the consequences of DU weapons being fired at Tori Shima.
128
c. Responses to the question of whether or not depleted uranium weapons are stored in Okinawa (22/113 = 19.5%) After the DUw incident surfaced, the people of Okinawa demanded that the U.S. military disclose the specific locations where DU weapons were stored and also demanded their removal from the storage sites. this issue as well.
The U.S. military was inconsistent in its responses to
The U.S. military Press Department in Japan first admitted the storage of
DU weapons in the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (KASA), as it was “not a matter of military secret,” (375) but at other times it refused to specify the storage location because it was “a matter of military secret” (392, 187, 179). About six months after the disclosure of the DUw incident, Mainichi Shimbun, one of the major mainland Japanese newspapers, reported that Kenneth Bacon, the DOD’s Press Secretary, told a reporter that the DU weapons which had been stored in Okinawa, were completely removed and transferred in case of emergency to South Korea, an area “close to the potential battlefield” (68 & 67). While the headquarters of the Korea-U.S. Allied Forces denied the transfer of DU weapons from Okinawa (62), the headquarters of the U.S. military in Japan announced that the U.S. military removed DU weapons from all of the U.S. Marine Corps’ bases in Japan (64).
The headquarters of the Korea-U.S. Allied Forces then stated that “all of DU weapons
which the U.S. Marine Corps had stored in Japan (including Okinawa) were transferred to the United States” (59).
This information also turned out to be false, as explained above.
During the next three years, there was no follow-up investigation to determine whether or not the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan actually removed DU weapons from Okinawa. However, on May 24, 2000, James Smith, the commander of the U.S. Air Force 18th Flying Corps, reluctantly admitted to a group of journalists that DU weapons were still stored in the KASA (-32).
After Smith admitted that DU weapons were stored in the KASA, he
explained that “the DU weapons are not as dangerous as you might think and the effects of
129
DU weapons to the body can be ignored” (ibid. translated into English).
Smith also stated
that the DU weapons in Okinawa were 30mm projectiles for A-10 Warthog, anti-tank attack planes deployed in South Korea in readiness for contingencies in the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East (ibid.).
He added that there was no plan to remove them (ibid.).
Therefore,
despite the renewed demand to remove DU weapons, the U.S. military continues to store the weapons in Okinawa.
d. Responses to the demand to recover depleted uranium weapons and to conduct environmental examinations (24/113 = 21.24%) Because the U.S. military recovered some DU weapons from Tori Shima (with minimal effort) while it conducted sampling examinations, I counted both the recoveries of DU weapons and environmental examinations in the same category. The vast majority of DU weapons still remain unrecovered today.
However, the
USGM’s original explanation after the disclosure of the DUw incident was that they would be recovered by the end of March, 1997 (349). examinations after March 1996.
The U.S. military conducted a total of six
After the DUw incident became public, the MFA and the
STA became spokespersons for the U.S. military (391, 389, -30, etc).
For instance, when the
MFA and the STA conducted its first semi-independent sampling examination of the area surrounding Tori Shima, the U.S. military revoked permission for the media’s entry into the restricted waters and air for “safety reasons” (233).
The MFA, which is in charge of the
Ampo-relations, simply told the press about the U.S. military’s decision to ban media from the area without further explanation, even though the sampling examination excluded Tori Shima itself. The U.S. military’s report on its first environmental examination at Tori Shima and surrounding areas in March 1996 stated that DU weapons which were embedded into rocks and soil below twenty-five centimeters (9.8 inches) deep were left unrecovered (188).
The
130
same report also concluded that “most of the DU weapons rebounded off quays and submerged in the East China Sea” (271).
However, because DU weapons can pierce through
armored vehicles, it is difficult to believe that they would rebound off rocks, which must be considerably softer than armor (Noguchi, 1997). Regarding the slow progress of DU weapon recovery since April 1997, the U.S. military insisted that it recovered everything that it could (66).
However, it is written in the
U.S. military’s own report that the DU weapons which went deep into soil might resurface because of soil erosion (70).
The potential consequences of unrecovered DU weapons deep
under the soil of Tori Shima are discussed in the first part of this section. Like the JG, the U.S. military did not explain the reason why it would not recover DU ammunition that went deeper than twenty-five centimeters below the surface.
Given that
most of the DU weapons are still unrecovered, it is questionable that the U.S. military conducted even one comprehensive examination of Tori Shima and the surrounding areas. For instance, during the latest examination, conducted on May 9, 2000, staff from the STA observed that the U.S. military’s examination team consisted of merely seven personnel and the length of the examination was approximately an hour (-30).
During the examination, the
team, using radiation-measuring instrument(s), searched for DU weapons in just fifty percent of the area where a large amount of DU ammunition was previously found (ibid.). According to the STA, the team was unable to find any DU weapons (ibid.).
Tori Shima is
41,000 square meters in area (circumference of approximately 1.8 kilometers) and if the U.S. military were serious about examining the safety of the environment, it could have employed more personnel and time, at least more often than once a year. a single environmental examination for the year 2000.
However, this was counted as
131
e. Evading responsibility for selling DU shell casings to a private scrapyard owner (12/113 = 10.62%) After DU shell casings were found in a private scrapyard, the local municipalities and OPG expressed the people’s concerns about the following questions. 1) How did potentially hazardous materials become available to Karimata (a private scrapyard owner)? 2) Do they pose any danger to the surrounding environment and health of the people in the area? 3) Were they the DU shell casings which had been recovered from Tori Shima? 4) If they were not the recovered shell casings from Tori Shima, did the U.S. military fire DU weapons on an undisclosed occasion? As demonstrated previously, the main characteristics of the U.S. military response to the DUw incident were irresponsibility and unaccountability. also apparent with the shell casings’ case.
These characteristics were
Despite the local municipalities’ concerns, the
U.S. military’s Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) at Camp Kinser in Urazoe City responded that it “examines and disposes all waste metals using the same procedure in order to sell them” and there was no problem with that procedure (-47, translated into English).
According to the DRMO, after safety checks, dangerous materials were sent
back to the United States (-56).
In addition, contrary to the scrapyard owner’s claim that he
purchased the shell casings with other scrap metals at the DRMO’s auction, the DRMO argued that “materials are sorted based on their types and scrap metals and shell casings cannot be sold together” (-57, translated into English). The DRMO claimed that, because the office kept only records of the auction bids from the previous two years, the only way to find out how they became available to Karimata would be by searching through the serial numbers on the shell casings (-66).
The DRMO
kept repeating that the matter was under investigation and the U.S. military in Japan would
132
disclose the details (-47, -56, -59), but no article in the OT indicated that the DRMO reported the results of the investigation.
The identification of the launching material of the shell
casings (-47) followed the same pattern.
It is questionable whether the U.S. military actually
investigated the matters in the first place. The U.S. military’s handling of its own blunder was not only unreliable, but also extremely disrespectful to the local people of Nishihara Town. Without examining the shell casings, the Press Department of the USMC announced that “all DU shell casings are harmless” (ibid., translated into English) and left it to the JG to take care of the radiation survey of the shell casings and the surrounding soil (-52).
Because no one from the U.S.
military was at the site when the survey was conducted, Mayor Onaga Seitei of Nishihara Town expressed his anger and said, “this is such a serious problem and the U.S. military couldn’t even show up” (ibid. translated into English).
After the radiation survey, the shell
casings were returned to the DRMO in Camp Kinser (ibid.). The shell casings at Karimata’s scrapyard were 25mm (-57).
Because the USMC’s
Harrier jets fired the same type of DU weapons at Tori Shima (ibid.), they were considered at first to be the recovered casings from Tori Shima (-43).
However, Karimata insisted that he
purchased the shell casings in either 1993 or 1994 and the Press Department of the USMC also claimed that they had not sold E1M (scrap metals including shell casings) since 1994 (-52).
Because the DUw incident took place in 1995 and 1996, Okinawa prefectural
government suspected that there was another instance when the U.S. military fired DU weapons in Okinawa (-57).
When the OT and reporters from other media questioned the
USMC Press Department, it repeated that it did not know when and where those DU shells were used and stated that the DRMO was investigating on the subject (-47, -57). December 2000, there has been no report on the result of the investigation.
As of
133
8. The Ampo and the local people of Okinawa The U.S. military was more open about discussing the bilateral military alliance’s role in economic activities abroad than the JG, even though discussions remained superficial.
A
few weeks before the G8 Summit in Okinawa in July 2000, Thomas Yarboro, the U.S. Air Force Eighteenth Flying Corps’ sub-commander, discussed his plan to introduce the role of the Ampo to the press from around the world once they gathered in Okinawa (-74).
Yarboro
explained that the Ampo was the backbone of Japan’s stable economy: the cooperation between the U.S. military in Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (ibid.). Although the JG often avoids stating the specific regions which are covered by the Ampo, Yarboro explained that the Ampo was the reason that the U.S. Air Force or other military forces for that matter were stationed in Okinawa and that their duties extended all the way to the Middle East (ibid., parenthesis added).
He explained that “specialists for military
strategy analyze concerns over the regional conflicts and we are prepared to launch operations in response to their analysis” (translated into English) and emphasized that the U.S. Air Force in Okinawa keeps a close eye on military power in East Asia and the Taiwan Strait (ibid.). It is questionable that these military strategy specialists make an effort to analyze how to protect the local people of Okinawa considering that the U.S. military routinely threatens them, as if they live in a perpetual battlefield. The U.S. armed forces in Okinawa give no priority to pursuits other than their military missions (ibid.).
The USGM may be apologetic
about accidents and incidents, as it was when the DUw incident became public, and it occasionally makes cosmetic changes to the regulations of military practices or of base management.
However, as Ota pointed out, this is merely lip service (390).
Within a few weeks after the DUw incident became public, Madeline Albright said to Prime Minister Hashimoto, “regarding Okinawa, we know that various incidents have occurred there.
We will respond to them sensitively” (220, translated into English).
134
However, this study showed that the USGM handled the DUw incident with no sign of sensitivity to the people of Okinawa. As illustrated above, the USGM completely ignored the local people of Okinawa. First, the USMC’s Harrier jet crews knowingly fired DU weapons at Tori Shima in disregard of the consequences to the local community. A few months after the last rounds of DU weapons were fired at Tori Shima, the U.S. military supposedly removed the contaminated soil, yet left most of the DU ammunition unrecovered. causes anxiety among the people of Kume Jima.
The remaining ammunition still
Second, the U.S. military withheld the
incident until a Japanese reporter questioned the DOD about the use of DU weapons at Tori Shima.
Once the DUw incident surfaced, U.S. officials made a statements that “our trusting
relationship with the people of Okinawa is very important” (376, translated into English) and “the U.S. will make effort to prevent incidents…” (220, translated into English).
If a
“trusting relationship” were so important, the U.S. military would not have fired DU weapons in the first place.
Furthermore, the study showed that the USGM responded directly to none
of the claims made by the local people, local governments/assemblies or OPG.
The U.S.
military-related matters were handled only by the Japanese and U.S. governments.
This
system, which excluded locals, was convenient for both the JG and the USGM in the maintenance of the taisei. In fact, the U.S. military tried to avoid direct confrontation with the local municipalities and OPG as much as possible.
As the DUw incident surfaced, the Ota administration once
again urged Sansha-Renraku-Kyogikai (“Sansha-Kyo” for short, or, in English, “Liaison Committee of OPG, Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, and the U.S. military”) to convene a meeting (288, 198, 173, etc).
The purpose of Sansha-kyo, established in 1979, is
to discuss U.S. military base-related problems on the local level between OPG, NDFAB and the U.S. military.
The body is supposed to convene quarterly (175).
However, during the
135
eight-year Ota administration, the meetings were held only twice because the U.S. military was reluctant to face difficult issues, such as the downsizing of bases (ibid.).
For a few
months following the disclosure of the DUw incident, the OPG insisted on resuming the Sansha-kyo meetings.
This never happened.
Revealing its dislike of Ota, the U.S. military agreed to resume the Sansha-kyo meetings once pro-base Inamine became the governor of Okinawa (-1).
However, the U.S.
military refused to discuss any issues which might interfere with their military objectives, insisting that the discussion topics be limited to ones that could be resolved on a local level (ibid.).
The local municipalities (twenty-five cities, towns and villages where the U.S.
military occupies the lands) asked the previous OPG administration to discuss issues such as the following at the Sansha-kyo deliberations (ibid.). -
The U.S. military jets observance the Anti-Noise agreement.
-
Confirmation of the storage of DU weapons and their removal from Okinawa.
-
Fire prevention during the disposal of unexploded shells at the artillery ranges.
-
Local municipal officials’ entry into the U.S. military’s construction sites in accordance with the Prevention of Red Soil Erosion Act.
-
Local municipal officials’ on site investigation of PCB-contaminated soil in areas within the bases.
The rationale for the U.S. military’s refusal to discuss these issues at the Sansha-kyo meetings was that they should be dealt with between the Japanese and U.S. governments (ibid.). However, as the DUw incident illustrated, under the pretext of regional security, neither government was interested in changing the style of U.S. military practices at all, even if they posed threats to the lives of the local people.
Consequently, none of Okinawa’s claims
received actual responses from the JG or the USGM, except the claims which would not obstruct the U.S. military’s free use of the bases.
In the case of the DUw incident, those
136
claims were: conducting environmental examinations, disclosing the 5.15 memo and establishing a more reliable reporting system (which turned out to be just as ineffective as the previous system.) Thus, the cycle continues where the U.S. military’s irresponsible practices cause accidents and incidents without any recourse for the Okinawan people despite their strong protests.
Unfortunately, with the re-revision of the Special Land Lease Law, the
prospect of ending this cycle is dim. In summary, the routine and systematic processes of how the JG and the USGM maintain the Ampo-taisei, despite Okinawa’s strong protest, was clearly demonstrated in their claimsmaking (or responses) which followed the disclosure of the DUw incident. incident became public, the JG apologized repeatedly for delaying the report.
Once the
At the same
time, both the USGM and the JG downplayed the seriousness of the incident, and even attempted to divert attention from the USMC’s use of DU weapons by claiming that the most serious problem was the delay of the report about the incident to Okinawa.
(Hashimoto later
changed his claim by explaining that the most serious problem was that the weapons, whose use was prohibited in Japan, were fired by mistake (275).) While Okinawa (the local people of Kume Jima, the local governments/assemblies and OPG in this study) confronted the USGM and the JG about the incident and made claims to resolve problems involving the U.S. military which accompanied the incident, the USGM remained completely unaccountable. This evasion of responsibility and accountability was perhaps the most convenient strategy for the U.S. military in dealing with confrontations from local people, municipalities and the prefecture, and was seen as necessary for the continuation of its military training/objectives. The JG, on the contrary, did respond to some of OPG’s claims.
However, those responses
were merely temporary solutions to deflect Okinawa’s protests and had no bearing on the U.S. military’s free use of the bases.
In addition, one of the OPG’s demands, the disclosure of the
5.15 memo, was instrumental to the JG’s creation of a favorable climate for the revision of the
137
SLLL.
This revision, in turn, ensured the JG’s continuation of the compulsory use of lands
for U.S. military bases past the expiration date.
Thus, the JG not only protected the U.S.
military from Okinawa’s protests, but also strengthened the foundation of the Ampo-taisei, which was in the transformation process towards the neo-Ampo-taisei.
The complete
absence of consideration for the people of Kume Jima made it possible for the JG and the USGM to ignore the people’s determination to end the suffering caused by the U.S. military through the removal of the artillery range from Tori Shima.
Because none of Okinawa’s
proposed solutions which would have resolved problems involving the U.S. military were realized, when the next accident or incident occurs, the problems will repeat.
Okinawa has
accumulated such problems for decades (See Diagram I). To use Arasaki’s (1996) term to describe the processes of maintaining the Ampo-taisei, it is “structural discrimination against Okinawa”.
According to Arasaki, structural
discrimination cannot be understood merely within the realm of binomial antagonism between Yamato (mainland Japan) and Okinawa (1996).
It is integral to the U.S. global strategy and
the Ampo-taisei, which is evolving into joint hegemony (the neo-Ampo-taisei), using places like Okinawa as military footholds for the oppression of Third World countries, especially those in Asia (Arasaki, 1996).
Thus, an increase in the power of the U.S. military stationed
in Okinawa in this era of neo-imperialism not only contributes to structural discrimination against Okinawa, but also discourages the democratization of despotic governments in Asia.
D. The Okinawa Times
Based on the analysis of the Okinawa Times’ (OT) claims, this section describes the OT’s role in the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei.
The first part of the section discusses the
OT’s most frequently presented claims, and the second part explains the three major
138
components of the OT’s claims which contributed to maintain the status quo.
Because this
study excluded articles which did not contain the term, “rekka urandan” (“DU weapons” in English), the analysis may not represent the whole spectrum of the OT’s perspective. Nevertheless, within the 83 articles used to examine the OT’s claims, a wide range of topics were discussed other than the DUw incident and it can be safely argued that there were a sufficient number of articles to conduct a media critique.
1. The Okinawa Time’s claims Among 445 articles, 83 presented the OT’s claims (18.65%), making the OT the fourth most frequently presented claimsmaker (See Figure 6).
When the incident was initially
disclosed, the OT made several dozen claims. The following are the OT’s most frequently presented claims.
a. Information on the radiological and chemical toxicities of depleted uranium (16/83 = 19.28%) There was substantial information presented on the toxicities of DU, especially its danger when used as a weapon.
This information was perhaps the foundation for making
other claims, such as the removal of DU weapons from Okinawa. The OT admitted its lack of knowledge on the DU weapons when the incident first surfaced (346 & 344).
However, the OT provided an adequate amount of information on the
radiological and chemical toxicities of DU.
Among the 83 articles which presented the OT’s
claims, 16 contained explanations on the radiological and chemical toxicities of DU.
The
OT gathered information on DU from several experts in the field and from the internet. More than 11,000 titles on DU related issues appeared on the internet, surprising the OT’s staff who was in charge of searching for the information (ibid.).
As discussed in the
previous section, the JG and the USGM downplayed the danger of DU and trivialized the
139
USMC’s use of the DU weapons at Tori Shima.
The OT did not accept their explanations
and made information about the toxicities of DU available to the readers.
The information
which appeared in the articles were as follows: - Unlike enriched uranium, which is used for nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs,
depleted uranium (DU) has a half-life of 4.5 billion years (396, 362, 327, 97). - DU radiation does not penetrate well, yet it still radiates for a long period of time (396,
327, 97). - DU can not be detected by just a single environmental survey (396). - DU can corrode and dissolve into soil and affect plants and nearby water (396). - Even though the level of radiation is low, DU contains small amounts of fissionable
substances and it is a radioactive material (396, 362, 327, 97, -34). - DU is used in the core of armor piercing projectiles because it has an excellent penetrating
power as well as an incendiary effect as soon as it hits a steel plate (385). - DU is also a toxic heavy metal (373, 362, 305). - The report which the U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute submitted in June 1994 to
the federal government indicated that “the risk associated with DU in the body are both chemical and radiological” (350). - According to the Science and Technology Agency’s Nuclear Fuel Control Office, while
the level of radiation is low, storing DU weapons for a long period of time may have harmful effects (350, 199). - DU does not contain gamma radiation, which could damage the body when it is exposed
externally.
However, DU does contain Uranium 238.
Once Uranium 238 enters the
body, the internal organs are exposed to radiation and results in the dysfunction of liver and kidney (350, 199). - Once DU weapons hit targets with a hard surface, they burn on impact and incinerate both
140
vehicles and soldiers inside the vehicle (350, 346 & 344, 307, 97). - “When a kinetic energy round penetrates a vehicle, it contaminates the vehicle interior
with dust and fragments. …As much as 70 percent of a DU penetrator can be aerosolized when it strikes a tank. downwind.
Aerosols containing DU oxides may contaminate the area
DU fragments may also contaminate the soil around the struck vehicle” –
the OT quoting the U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute (350, 346 & 344). - Uranium enrichment process can abstract only a small amount of enriched uranium for
nuclear fuel (0.2 to 0.7 percent) and the byproduct of the process is generally called depleted uranium.
Before the military use of DU started it had been stored in large
stockpiles (307). - The military use of DU costs less than the cost of disposal and the U.S. exports DU
abroad (307, 97). - DU is the densest and the hardest of all heavy metals (307, 97). - The U.S. military’s manual for the firing training of DU indicates that “however the level
of radiation is low, it could cause cancer and contaminate the environment” (307, 97). - Because DU has caused various diseases among the U.S. soldiers and Iraqi citizens who
inhaled DU, there is only a very fine line between DU weapons and nuclear weapons (307, 97). - The human body can be exposed to DU by 1) inhaling aerosols containing DU oxides and
2) through the food chain (253). - DU easily reacts chemically and once DU corrodes and becomes fine particles, they
become more dangerous (95). - Despite the U.S. categorization of DU weapons as conventional weapons, they can cause
the same radiation disorders as nuclear bombs (-19). - Because of concerns surrounding radiation hazards, there are strong criticisms of DU
141
weapons within the U.S. and the U.S. Navy has already stopped the use of the DU weapons (-34). - Uranium 238 is extremely toxic and should be recognized separately from atmospheric
uranium (-59). The OT uncovered the health risks associated with DU as well as the fact that the USGM and the JG, who emphasized the safety of the DU weapons, were fully aware of the chemical and radiological toxicities of DU.
The OT also pointed out that the use of the DU
weapons in Japan was prohibited by the nuclear fuel regulations, highlighting the USGM’s lack of respect for domestic Japanese law.
The OT reiterated that the DU weapons were
considered as nuclear toxic waste materials and the test firings were permitted only in special airtight facilities in the United States.
In reality, however, there are sites in several states in
the U.S. where DU weapons are tested open-air (Blum, 2000). OT’s misinformation on this matter appears in section E below.
Further discussion on the (See Figure 12).
b. Establishment of a reliable reporting system for accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military (19/83 = 22.89%) The establishment of a reliable reporting system for U.S. military-related accidents and incidents was the OT’s most frequently presented claim.
The DUw incident was another
case where the U.S. military neglected reporting a serious incident to the JG for a long period of time until it was uncovered by the media.
To make the situation worse, even after the U.S.
reported the incident to the JG, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also kept the incident from Okinawa for nearly a month until the Washington Times disclosed it.
The OT was infuriated
by the repeated pattern and called for the establishment of a prompt and reliable reporting system.
Such a system is undoubtedly important.
However, the OT’s rational for the
establishment of such system posed a question about the extent to which the OT was serious about eradicating actual problems involving the U.S. military.
142
Figure 12: The Okinawa Times' Most Frequently Presented Claims (percentage not cumulative)
12 (14.5%)
14 (16.9%)
16 (19.3%)
17 (29.5%)
19 (22.9%)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
removal of DU weapons from Okinawa disclosure of the 5.15 memo radiological and chemical toxicities of DU examinations of environmental safety establishment of a reliable reporting system of U.S. military- related accidents and incidents
The Press Department of the U.S. military stationed in Japan explained that it did not find it particularly necessary to report the use of DU weapons at Tori Shima because it was not a secret matter and it happened simply as the result of a mistake in the users’ catalogue. The OT commented that it was such a selfish excuse and questioned in sarcastic tone, “is it saying that it would have reported if (the incident) was a dangerous and secret matter?” (362, translated into English, parenthesis added)
The OT called for the establishment of a prompt
and reliable reporting system for U.S. military related accidents and incidents because the USGM and the JG had once again repeated the ingrained pattern where they covered up the incident until the media got wind of it (362, 290). The OT argued that there were circumstances which could explain the reasons why the USGM kept the DUw incident secret (381).
First, when DU weapons were fired at Tori
Shima in January 1996, the then prime minister Murayama’s legal action against Governor Ota for his rejection to sign an agreement on the JG’s compulsory appropriation of the private
143
lands for U.S. military bases was pending in court (ibid.).
Second, during the period when
the U.S. removed contaminated soil from Tori Shima and conducted an environmental examination on Tori Shima as well as surrounding waters, one section of Sobe Communication Site’s lease had expired and was being illegally occupied by the JG (ibid.). The OT believed that the USGM withheld the DUw incident to avoid adverse effects on the maintenance of the bases (ibid.). Regarding the JG’s habitual use of secretive methods to cover over difficult situations, the OT questioned the authenticity of the people’s right to know (381, 182).
In addition, the
OT was very critical of another repeated pattern where the information about the U.S. military bases did not come from the JG, which provides the bases for the U.S. military, but from the U.S. via the Freedom of Information Act or the media (386, 381, 14, etc).
The OT argued
that these patterns indicated that the maintenance of the bases was given priority over informing the people (14). The OT also explained the possible basis for the USMC to fire the DU weapons in Okinawa, to keep it secret for over a year and for the JG to withhold the information for nearly a month (346 & 344).
First, Okinawa was one of the few places where the U.S.
military could store and use the DU weapons (ibid.).
Second, the U.S. military had total
control over the information, and whether or not to disclose it (ibid.). Third, the JG knew that the matter was extremely serious (ibid.).
The OT described the situation as being
“inconsistent” where the JG and the USGM were capable of controlling the information while it was kept from the prefectural people (ibid.).
For the OT, as long as this “inconsistency”
was maintained, the same pattern would be practiced continuously and there would be no “trust” between the people, the JG and the USGM (ibid.). A prompt and reliable reporting system is important for the prefectural and municipal authorities to act quickly to protect the people, their properties and environment.
However,
144
it is questionable if the OT’s use of the term “trust” was appropriate to describe the outcome of the JG’s and the USGM’s willingness to open information promptly (even though it is not the case), while the people would be still forced to tolerate recurring military accidents and incidents.
It is even more doubtful if the vast majority of people of Okinawa could ever
develop “trust” with the JG and the USGM to begin with, after years of being forced to sacrifice their quality of life.
The OT’s opinion raises questions about its stance, as well as
the OT’s depth of criticism against the JG and the USGM. When Inamine came to hold office, the Okinawa prefectural government acted as if it became part of the power which was indifferent to the consequences of the dysfunctional reporting system.
The OT pointed out a case of the U.S. military’s helicopter crash on April
19, 1999, which was reported to the OPG three and half hours after the accident took place (-3).
The OPG commented that it did not accept the argument that the report was too late
(ibid.).
As the result of the accident, the local municipalities which were located near the
accident site decided to reexamine the question of whether or not they should accept the planned construction of the U.S. military’s helicopter landing pads (ibid.).
In other words,
these municipal authorities were already taking precautions against a potential helicopter crash on the assumption that the heli-pads would be constructed (ibid.). On the contrary, the OPG was not concerned about the possibility that the accident could have had local casualties and the delay of the report from the U.S. military could have been fatal (ibid.).
The OT
warned the OPG that it could also lose the prefectural people’s trust if it turned its back to the prefectural government’s previous efforts to establish a reliable reporting system (-17).
c. Examinations of environmental safety (17/83 = 20.48%) After the disclosure of the DUw incident, Okinawans feared possible environmental and human contamination.
Consequently, the local governments, the OPG, as well as the OT
145
demanded that the JG conduct independent environmental examinations. seemed to be concerned about the effects of DU on the environment.
At first the OT
However, the OT’s
claim on this topic showed its Naha-centric (Naha is the capital city of Okinawa prefecture) tendency where the voices of Kume Jima were overshadowed by the OT’s own claim, which was presented as that of “prefectural people’s.” Having been convinced of the danger of DU, the OT demanded the necessity to examine the effects of unrecovered DU ammunition at Tori Shima (381, 244 & 243, 97). The OT expressed that additional environmental contamination was intolerable, when bases and their surrounding soil and ground water were already contaminated by toxic materials (381), such as arsenic, asbestos, cadmium, lead, and mercury among others and the people of Okinawa had no way of knowing what type of dangerous materials were stored in the facilities (15). The USGM emphasized that there were no effects of the use of DU weapons.
In the
meanwhile, the U.S. military conducted the environmental examination immediately after the incident, recovered some of the fired DU weapons and explained that it would continue to work on the recovery (373, 327).
The OT was unable to trust the U.S. military’s
explanations and pointed out that if the DU weapons had no threats to health, the recovery of the DU ammunitions, environmental examinations and restrictions for the use of the DU weapons were unnecessary (ibid.).
For the OT, the USGM was simply repeating the same
excuse that “there are no danger to human body and the environment” every time a secretly conducted military exercise becomes public (362, 327). While the OT demanded environmental examinations, it also expressed an opinion which completely disregarded the concerns of the local people of Kume Jima.
On February
13, 1997, the editorial wrote, “we, the prefectural people are not concerned about whether or not there were effects (of DU) on the human body or the environment.
What we are
146
concerned is the fact that the (DU) weapons have been stored, even if they are conventional weapons…” (362, translated into English; emphasis and parenthesis added).
On the
previous day, however, the OT reported that Mayor Taira of Nakazato Village had expressed a distrust of the USGM’s denial of the effects of DU on the human body and environment, and demanded an early environmental examination (372). seeing the DUw incident from her/his perspective.
Perhaps the editorial writer was
As mentioned in section A above, the
issue of the DUw incident included not only the USMC’s use of the DU weapons at Tori Shima, but also other problems, such as DU weapons being stored at the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (KASA).
Storage of the weapons containing radioactive substances at the
KASA, which is located in the central region of main Okinawan Island near the head offices of the OT in Naha City (the capital city of Okinawa) could have been a more serious problem for her/him than the actual use of the weapons which took place at a distant island, ninety-four kilometers offshore, west of Naha.
However, the OT’s idea of the removal of
ammunition storage site to end the recurrence of a similar incident was merely a superficial suggestion, as well as a sign of excluding direct voices of the people of Kume Jima during the early stage of the OT’s claimsmaking process, following the disclosure of the DUw incident. Once the JG announced that it was going to conduct an independent environmental examination of the area surrounding Tori Shima, the OT praised the public opinions which, according to the OT, successfully forced the JG to do so (268).
The OT wrote that the JG
showed signs of regret for delaying the report and the environmental contamination problem of the DUw incident (ibid.).
However, once the JG’s first semi-independent sampling
examination was conducted, the OT criticized the style of the examination (199).
The
examination took place only briefly and excluded Tori Shima, where approximately 1,300 rounds of DU ammunition were still unrecovered (ibid.).
The OT claimed that only one or
two examinations could not dispel the “prefectural people’s” anxieties (ibid.).
During the
147
follow up examination at Tori Shima on March 26, 1997, a high level of uranium was detected (111).
The editorial explained that this was expected and that an intensification of
the “prefectural people’s” anger as they learned more about the danger of DU was inevitable (97). The OT’s use of the term, the “prefectural people” to describe the locals of Kume Jima paralleled with that of the OPG.
Being conscious of the readers in Tokyo, it may have
pressed its own claim as if they were the prefectural people’s.
The term could also help
present the problems in Kume Jima as those of the entire prefecture.
At the same time,
however, categorizing them as the prefectural people’s overshadowed the locals’ actual voices of protest. Soon after the DUw incident surfaced, the discharge of high levels of PCB contaminated oil from Camp Zukeran became public (179).
Although the contamination of
the U.S. military bases with hazardous materials was already a serious concern, these incidents were catalysts for deepening the OPG’s concern over widespread contamination of the U.S. military bases, which could be more detrimental than they had previously thought (179, 9).
Thus, the OT was very supportive of the plan when the OPG announced that it was
going to establish a team which would function beyond the framework of the administration to deal with the environmental problems involving U.S. military bases (15, 9).
The editorial
on June 17, 1997 wrote: according to the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. military is not only able to use the bases almost freely, but is also “not obliged” to restore the facilities and areas to the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces. It is also ambiguous whether or not the Japanese government will be taking full responsibility. While today’s society takes environmental problems very seriously, the JG is being quite irresponsible. The issue of base cleanup cannot be separated from demanding the return of the bases, the use of the returned lands, and employment measures. Even if the return of the bases is realized, the lands cannot be used if they were contaminated by toxic materials.
This is a problem which should be dealt with first as part of the JG’s
148
responsibility (15, translated into English).
The OT explained that every time an environmental contamination was created by the U.S. military, such as the DUw incident, the U.S. military faced protests but the voices of the Okinawans were always suppressed by the JG and the USGM (7).
However, while the OT
pointed out the cycle of protests against environmental contamination and the irresponsible responses of the JG and the USGM as a problem, the OT failed to utilize its power as a mass media institution which could have empowered the voices of Kume Jima by making supportive claims.
Regarding Kume Jima’s strong demand for the complete recovery of DU
ammunition from Tori Shima, it was merely one of the OT’s minor claims (4/83 = 4.8%).
To
put it simply, the OT’s claim on the environmental safety did not reflect the voices of the locals of Kume Jima and the OT presented its own claim as if it was speaking for the entire people of the prefecture.
This pattern was apparent in its other claims as well.
d. Disclosure of the 5.15 memo (14/83 = 16.87%) One of the consequences of the disclosure of the DUw incident was the intensification of the OPG’s suspicions regarding the contents of the 5.15 memo, a secret memorandum exchanged between the Japanese and U.S. governments shortly before Okinawa’s reversion to Japan on May 15, 1972.
The OPG suspected that the memo might explain the basis for
recurring serious accidents and incidents, such as the DUw incident, which would be unlikely to happen in U.S. military bases in mainland Japan. The OT strongly supported the OPG’s claim to reveal the memo. this claim shows that it was presented less frequently than those above.
The percentage of However, this is
partially because the OT made this claim over a time span of less than two months, while the other claims were made over a period of more than three years.
In fact, it was the OT’s
central claim between February 14 and March 27, 1997, at the height of political negotiation
149
between the OPG and the JG before the revision of the Special Land Lease Law.
When the
memo was finally disclosed, it became apparent that the disclosure of the memo contributed little to improve U.S. military-related problems.
However, the OT did not reflect on its
indirect yet active involvement as one of the main institutions of the local mass media to pressure the JG to reveal the memo.
This inaction left Kume Jima alone to struggle for the
return of Tori Shima. When the DUw incident surfaced, Vice Governor Yoshimoto expressed his suspicion that the reason why the accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military occurred in Okinawa so frequently could be found in the contents of the 5.15 memo (112).
The OPG’s
arguments and petition for the disclosure of the 5.15 memo reflected in the OT’s claim. According to the OT, although Okinawa had reverted to Japan a quarter century ago (as of February 1997), the prefectural people always had suspicion that the U.S. military was allowed to use bases in Okinawa without any regards to Japanese domestic laws (277).
In
the case of the DUw incident, the U.S. military not only stored and fired the DU weapons in Okinawa (use of the DU weapons are prohibited in Japan), but also it commented that the U.S. had no obligation to report the incident to Okinawa (ibid.).
The OT argued that DUw
incident renewed people’s suspicion and it would not be dispelled unless the memo was entirely disclosed (ibid.). As the complete disclosure of the 5.15 memo became one of the OPG’s temporary focuses, the OT also intensified its tone of demand to reveal the memo (290).
It was partly
because the JG’s initial response was positive, even though its strategy was to selectively deal with the OPG’s claims.
The OT claimed that as long as the situation did not change and the
memo was veiled in secrecy, the accidents and incidents involving the U.S. military would continue to occur frequently, and the U.S. refused to apologize to the prefectural people, (Okinawa’s) distrust and discontent would remain (ibid. parenthesis added).
To sum the
150
situation, the OT quoted Ota that “Okinawa is discriminatorily treated” (ibid.). In the midst of the negotiations to reveal the memo between the OPG and the JG, the JG announced that it was facing difficulties because of the U.S. military’s concern about the military secrets discussed in the memo (182).
Extremely dissatisfied with the JG’s
announcement, the OT argued that the concept of the people’s “right to know” was originally established in the United States (ibid.).
The then managing director of Associated Press,
Kent Cooper, took part in the establishment of the concept of the people’s “right to know” (ibid.).
Cooper felt the necessity to establish a new concept of people’s rights as a
contraposition to confront the state power (ibid.).
His idea was based on the reflection on
the intensified antagonism and hate in countries during World War II, which resulted from the people’s deprivation of knowing the truth due to the governments’ propaganda and control of news (ibid.).
Having explained the historical background, the OT wondered if the JG was so
spineless that it could only accept the U.S. military’s explanation for not willing to reveal the memo (ibid.).
The OT also pointed out that the JG’s intention to a partial release of the
contents of the memo was just a stepping stone for the revision of the SLLL (ibid.). The OT claimed that because the Japanese and U.S. governments did not reveal the memo which contained the conditions of the use of the bases at the time when Okinawa reverted to Japan, the U.S. military continued to use the bases in a selfish and irresponsible manner (ibid.).
However, as it was discussed in the previous sections, when the memo was
finally disclosed on March 7, 1997, the OT found that the memo did not contain any particular military secrets (152).
The OT claimed that a U.S. diplomat commented in regards to the
contents of the memo that “there is nothing particularly important” (ibid. translated into English). As the OT further examined the memo, it became clear that the JG had set almost no restrictions on the U.S. military’s use of the bases in Okinawa (116). The OT wrote, “the
151
contents of the memo show that the JG assured ‘the form and conditions of the use of bases by the U.S. military and for the U.S. military’” (150, translated into English).
The OT
explained that Okinawa had to suffer successive U.S. military-caused disasters precisely because the JG took a basic stance in which it would not criticize U.S. military training as long as Japan offered the bases in accordance with the treaty (Ampo) (ibid. parenthesis added). Therefore, the OT suggested two resolutions which could reduce the base related suffering: first, reducing troops and the frequency of military exercises and second, setting restrictions on every military exercise (ibid.).
The OT argued that these were particularly necessary
because the environment surrounding the bases in Okinawa changed significantly since the conclusion of the memo a quarter century ago (ibid.).
Those changes included the end of
Cold War, the urbanization of the areas surrounding the bases, and changes in the people’s level of tolerance of the U.S. military bases (ibid.).
In addition, the OT suggested that
updating the 5.15 memo should reduce base-related suffering (112). The OT’s argument explained that it was only interested in reducing the U.S. military-related problems. Consequently, it never claimed the return of Tori Shima, which the Kume Jima locals demanded as the rational solution to end their suffering from the U.S. military presence. In the last article which contained both the OT’s view on the disclosure of the 5.15 memo and the term “rekka urandan,” the OT argued that the JG used the disclosure of the memo as a means to forcefully maintain U.S. military bases in Okinawa (112).
However, the
OT did not discuss its indirect involvement in the political maneuvering between the OPG and the JG as one of the major mass media institutions in Okinawa which was strongly advocating the disclosure of the memo.
The OT chose to align with the OPG, rather than Kume Jima.
From September 1995 to 1996, Governor Ota challenged state power by refusing to allow the forcible land appropriation. Ampo-taisei (Arasaki, 1996).
This action threatened the continuation of the
After the disclosure of the memo, the JG managed the revision
152
of the SLLL, 14 an indispensable element for the neo-Ampo-taisei.
Considering the
disproportionately overwhelming power of the JG, even if the OPG and the OT focused on claims other than the 5.15 memo, it probably would have ended up with same outcome. However, it is still important to argue that having the power to influence public opinion, the outcome might have been more empowering for the “prefectural people,” such as the locals of Kume Jima, if the OT had made claims in alliance with those of Kume Jima, instead of the OPG.
e. Removal of depleted uranium weapons from Okinawa (12/83 = 14.46%) The OT’s first demand immediately after the DUw incident surfaced was the removal of the ammunition storage (i.e. Kadena Ammunition Storage Area) in addition to the reduction/removal of the USMC from Okinawa.
Part of the reasons why DU weapons are
still stored in Okinawa, despite the strong protest of the residents surrounding the area of the KASA, could be the OT’s (or other local mass media institutions’) lack of effort to investigate the storage of the weapons, even if the information was classified as a “military secret” by the Status of Forces Agreement.
When the OT first claimed the removal of DU weapons from
Okinawa, it argued that: it is impermissible to misuse the weapons which harm and kill human beings.
The
insensitivity which treats the misuse (of the DU weapons) as a simple mistake will be the cause of another serious mistake. The only solution to prevent this type of incident from happening again is the removal of the ammunition storage area (362, translated into English).
However, after this editorial opinion on February 13, 1997, no other article presented a demand for the removal of the ammunition storage area by the OT.
The focus of the claim
shifted to the criticisms of the USGM’s refusal to remove DU weapons and of the JG, which defended the USGM (307, 179). 14
Japan only permits the use of DU for research and
The JG re-revised the SLLL in 1999 and the JG no longer had to face similar confrontation from the
153
industrial purposes within a power plant or enrichment plant based on the nuclear fuel restriction laws (307).
The OT quoted Maeda Tetsuo, professor at Tokyo International
University, “the Ampo is given priority over domestic laws” (ibid. translated into English). Yet the OT’s criticism was directed to the JG, which was concerned solely about the protection of the U.S. military’s storage of DU weapons (268), and completely ignored the prefectural people’s strong demand for the removal of DU weapons (264, 97, 88).
The OT
challenged the JG by arguing that if it considered the protection of the Japanese people’s health as its priority, it must force the USGM to remove the DU weapons from KASA (199). The OT used “kokumin” (translated as “national citizens” in English) instead of “kenmin” (“the prefectural people” in English) to highlight the fact that Okinawans were Japanese yet receiving un-“kokumin”-like treatment. Harashima, Ambassador to Okinawa from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that DU weapons were stored in KASA to protect Japan and to contribute to peace in the region (53).
The OT criticized his comment as violent language against Okinawa, which
was reminiscent of the national defense theory of the pre-WWII era in which the role of Okinawa was to protect Japan in case of a crisis (ibid.). When a high level of uranium was detected at Tori Shima on March 26, 1997, the OT pointed out the prefectural people’s anger had intensified against the storage of the DU weapons as they learned more about their danger, and urged the JG to take the matter seriously (97).
The JG response to this claim was discussed in the section above.
For the next three years, the OT’s claim for the removal of the DU weapons from Okinawa disappeared.
Shortly after the Kyodo News (KN) reported that DU weapons which
belonged to the USMC stationed in Japan had been transferred to the United States (59), the OT dropped the claim despite the fact that it was false information and the KN’s report OPG.
154
indicated that other U.S. forces in Japan were still likely to be storing the weapons.
Yet the
OT did not even attempt to investigate the storage of DU weapons which belonged to the forces other than the USMC.
The OT was taken by surprise when a U.S. Airforce officer
admitted to the storage of DU weapons at KASA on May 24, 2000 (-32).
The following day,
the OT’s editorial criticized the U.S. military for storing the weapons and demanded their removal (-34).
Likewise, when DU shell casings were found in Nishihara Town a week later,
the OT demanded the removal of shell casings as well as DU weapons (-46). In these editorials, the OT discussed that the health examinations for the residents of Kume Jima were conducted by the JG for the fear of possible detrimental effects of DU (-34, -46).
However, it is difficult to believe that the JG actually conducted examinations for the
locals of Kume Jima. For the past three years (as of May 2000), the local governments of Kume Jima had been demanding the JG to conduct health examinations for locals and the JG kept denying the necessity of examinations.
In fact, only one month before the DU shell
casings were found, the Science and Technology Agency turned down the OPG’s request for conducting examinations, representing Kume Jima’s demand (-28). conducting health examinations since then.
There was no report on
Yet there was no article which corrected the
OT’s false statement, either. In sum, when the DUw incident surfaced, the OT expressed strong concern about DU weapons being stored in Okinawa.
However, there was no persistence to its demand.
As
the storage of DU weapons resurfaced as news coverage again, the editorial simply repeated the same demand without any criticism about its failure to provide accurate information for the readers in the past several years. by accident.
The U.S. military admitted the storage of DU weapons
In addition, the Status of Forces Agreement is a major obstacle to conducting
investigations on U.S. military bases.
However, the OT’s dependency on the Kyodo News
did not help the OT become a dependable source of information for the local people.
Further
155
discussion on the problems of the OT’s dependency on the KN for news items appears in section E below.
2. Contribution to the status quo The analysis of the OT’s claims suggested that the reason why the OT appeared to challenge the Ampo-taisei was largely because it constantly criticized problems which derived from the system.
However, there were three main characteristics which needed critical
attention. First, as the most frequently presented claims show, the OT’s claims did not reflect the voices of Kume Jima locals, who apparently suffered the most from the DUw incident.
The
OT put no effort towards empowering Kume Jima’s determination to end its suffering caused by the U.S. military.
In a sense, the OT further marginalized the people of Kume Jima.
The OT’s underlying tone was a Naha-centered mentality, which paid attention to base problems in the prefecture’s remote island.
Yet its focus was not necessarily on bringing the
opinions of the locals to light and aligning with their struggle, but to press its own claim which by and large aimed for the reform of the U.S. military’s unrestrained practices. Second, there was little discussion of Okinawa’s financial dependency on the JG. Among the 83 articles which presented the OT’s claims, only three mentioned the economic aspect of the relationship between the JG and Okinawa (293, 53, 39).
Of these, one article
explained the problems of an economic development plan, which had come to divide the prefectural people (53). According to the OT, the economic development plan should have been the subject of concern after the prefectural people realized the reductions and realignments of the bases and restored peaceful life (ibid.).
As the result of the people’s strong demand for a development
of a peaceful way of life, live fire artillery training over Prefectural Route 104 were abolished
156
and transferred to the five rural areas of mainland Japan, and air-to-air refueling planes which stationed in Futenma were also going to be transferred (ibid.).
The OT argued that those
only comprised a partial elimination of the problems and that they were qualitatively different from reductions and realignments of the bases (ibid.). “Unfortunately,” wrote the OT, “before any reductions and realignments were accomplished, the Okinawa prefectural government introduced an economic development plan” (ibid., translated into English).
As part of the development of the plan, which centered
around an establishment of a free trade zone started forming, the OPG had to pay close attention to the relationship with the JG (ibid.). Consequently, the people of Nago City were forced to make a choice between accepting the transfer of Futenma Air Station in exchange for financial support from Tokyo for the economic development plan, or refusing the transfer and receive nothing (ibid.).
The OT believed that the JG’s intention was to maintain the
Ampo by shifting Okinawa’s focus from base problems to economic development issues, while advancing its plan for a dramatic increase in Japan’s direct cooperation with the U.S. military (ibid.). The editorial reminded Okinawans that “if we do not contemplate on the root causes of the dividing issues (i.e. the development of free trade zone and construction of a Marine base), both of which derived from having bases, we are creating detrimental legacies” (53, translated into English and parenthesis added).
Nevertheless, the OT never explained Okinawa’s
chronic dependency on the U.S. military bases which has kept the generous flow of money from the JG since the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan (although little of this capital remains in Okinawa.) Following the rape incident in the fall of 1995, Okinawa’s demand for reductions and realignments of the bases became extremely strong in a manner unprecedented in recent history.
However, it did not mean that Okinawans as a whole were simultaneously
constructing ideas about how to decrease dependency on the JG.
In addition, the OPG’s
157
economic development plan was formed without consensus from the prefectural people and was dependent largely on the JG’s financial assistance.
In other words, the JG still had a
grip on Okinawa even when the anti-U.S. military base movement was shaking the foundations of the Ampo-taisei.
The JG regained further control when the OPG proposed
the economic development plan and used a familiar strategy to dangle a promise of a large sum of money in front of Okinawa.
As long as the prefecture depends heavily on the JG,
reductions, realignments, or removal of bases, as well as the development of an autonomous Okinawa would remain only a dream.
In the articles examined in this study, the OT did not
articulate this pessimistic reality, nor did it create a forum for the readers to engage in active discussions by putting forth original ideas for the development of autonomous prefecture. Third, it is commonly assumed that the newspapers in Okinawa, such as the OT, are incomparably more critical of the development of the neo-Ampo-taisei than any of those in mainland Japan (Takaiwa, 2000).
However, after examining the 445 articles which reported
and discussed a variety of military related topics other than the DUw incident, it appeared that the OT, like the mainland Japanese mass media, had a self-imposed censorship on its own opinions and news reports regarding corporate activities in the Third World and the role of corporations in Japan’s remilitarization. The OT opposed every move of strengthening military capability, such as the revision of the Special Land Lease Law, which was a stepping stone for the JG to assure a permanent settlement of the U.S. military, and the development of a stronger military alliance with the U.S.
The OT argued that “because of the presence of U.S. military bases, fifty years after
the Constitution took effect and a quarter century after Okinawa was reverted to Japan, nothing has changed in terms of continued fundamental human rights violations and environment destruction” (88, translated into English).
To illustrate the situation, the OT
discussed the daily disturbances in the areas surrounding the Kadena Air Base and Futenma
158
Air Station, where U.S. military aircraft have caused unbearable noise pollution (ibid.).
A
study showed that there was a high rate of hearing disability and underweight newborn babies among the residents of surrounding areas (ibid.).
Military aircraft noise routinely interrupts
school classes, and infants show signs of physical and psychological abnormalities which require professional healthcare (ibid.).
In order to acquire Okinawans’ equal rights as
Japanese nationals, the OT demanded that Okinawa’s living conditions be brought to the level of an average prefecture in mainland Japan by reducing the problems related to the presence of the U.S. military. Focusing its criticisms on existing U.S. military base-problems and the strengthened military alliance between Japan and the U.S. was an understandable consequence for the OT, which had to deal with military-related problems on daily basis.
Nonetheless, solely
criticizing the military aspect of the situation is likely to prevent the readers from understanding the real forces behind the JG’s move to repossess the right of belligerency and warfare.
Corporations also benefit from being excluded from the OT’s criticisms.
It
reduces their chances of facing public confrontations about suppression of democracy and environmental destruction in the Third World countries where they have heavily invested, thus enabling them to continue their activities.
In addition, without having information
available to the readers about the detrimental consequences of corporate activities abroad and reasons for their strong demands to increase the military power of the state, the readers could be easily instigated by the governments’ false claims, such as supposed security threats from China and North Korea.
At least the OT was very critical of military buildup and skeptical
about the threats from hypothetical enemies (345 & 343).
However, its failure to address the
connection between the globalization of the Japanese economy and the JG’s railroading of the legislation to legalize aiding the U.S. armed forces “in case of a crisis” would not help to understand their concurrence to those who may be trapped in the “imagined community”.
In
159
this hypothetical paradigm, they were persuaded by the JG via the mainland mass media that the only means to protect “national security” is to strengthen military alliance with the U.S. and to allow the Self-Defense Forces involvement in military interventions. Information on corporate activities in the Third World countries, particularly in Asia, and corporations’ strong demand to strengthen military power to crush democratization in these countries may influence the type of “affluence” the readers may want to pursue.
Since
the special procurement boom during Korean War (1950 – 1953), Okinawa has been sacrificed for Japanese economic development.
As mentioned above, the JG’s current effort
to legalize the right of belligerency coincides with the increasing globalization of the Japanese economy.
While the Ampo states, “desiring to further encourage closer economic
cooperation between them (Japan and the United States) and to promote conditions of economic stability…” (1960, parenthesis added), the neo-Ampo-taisei will increase the direct involvement of Japan in military interventions to secure economic stability for investors. The Japanese neo-imperialist expansion of economic affluence is inseparable from the dramatic increase in their demands to make the use of bilateral/multilateral state-terrorism available to protect their activities.
However, none of the articles examined for this study
explained this relationship in the context of Okinawa’s situation, such as the revision of the SLLL or the planned construction of a hybrid base for the USMC. The readers should have been informed of the whole picture of Japan’s remilitarization. The continuation of dependency on Tokyo as integral part of the Ampo-taisei under which the structural discrimination against Okinawa has been perpetuated and the suppression of democratization in the Third World countries to maximize corporate profits are inseparable. A clear understanding of the connection between these two may have resulted in a qualitative change in some of the readers’ perspectives on the ingrained pattern of keeping U.S. military bases in exchange for receiving a marginal increase in economic affluence.
This, however,
160
was outside the framework of the OT’s claims. In summary, as far as the examined articles showed the OT was not interested in eradicating the U.S. military-related problems, but rather in improving the situation by setting regulations on U.S. military practices or other temporary and partial measures.
In the case of
the DUw incident, the OT demonstrated a Naha-centric approach in which it offered no support to Kume Jima’s struggle to demand the return of Tori Shima and end the suffering caused by the U.S. military presence.
What the OT did was to press its own demands as if it
represented all the people of Okinawa, which in effect marginalized Kume Jima and perpetuated the island’s problems under the Ampo-taisei. The OT seemed to repeat modest demands whenever a problem involving the U.S. military occured, perhaps because the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei is the primary concern for the JG and the USGM, and they would simply ignore any demands which would disrupt free base operations and military exercises.
The most drastic reform-oriented measure
suggested was the reduction/removal of the U.S. Marine Corps, which appeared in six articles (7.23%).
This demand was aligned with the OPG’s, similar to the demand related to the
disclosure of the 5.15 memo.
However, this demand disappeared shortly thereafter, as the
JG was completely disinterested in keeping it on the negotiation table.
(The demand is
likely to resurface when the OPG calls for the removal/reduction of the USMC, responding to serious crimes or accidents involving the USMC).
In addition, base-related problems
occurred one after another and it must have been impossible for the OT to pursue one particular demand until the JG and/or the USGM actually responded.
This approach
parallels the efforts of the Okinawa prefectural government, which has had to deal with prefecture-wide problems caused by the U.S. military presence. Nevertheless, as the result of the OT’s reformist approach none of the underlying subjects, such as economic dependency or corporate-backed remilitarization of the state, were
161
addressed, resulting in what appeared to be a self-imposed censorship. The vast majority of people only have easy access to commercial mass media, and this limitation could be one of the major drawbacks for the people’s struggle against the JG’s forceful perpetuation of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.
Apparently, the people who
live close to the bases already know that there are numerous problems inside and surrounding the areas exclusively used by the U.S. forces, and they will continue to suffer from them for years to come.
However, without the help of the mass media most people will not accurately
understand the reason why the JG to put so much effort to legalize the right of belligerency and to maintain the U.S. military forces in Okinawa.
Often expressed reasons are: 1) the
pressure from the U.S., and 2) a belief that Japan should be able to use military power from the potential security threats.
Both of them conveniently disguise the neo-imperialists’
intentions. Before Japan becomes capable of sending its armed forces to Third World countries as a U.S. ally or a part of UN forces, it is time for people throughout Japan to understand the real purpose behind the remilitarization of the state and to reexamine their lifestyles which cannot be experienced without exploitation of environment and people of these countries.
The
articles examined for this study showed that the OT neglected its responsibility to provide accurate information to the readers.
By doing so, it was not only supporting the status quo,
but also its business position as part of corporate Japan.
E. International News This section discusses the extent to which the overall articles (which contained the term “rekka urandan,” or “DU weapons” in English) in the Okinawa Times were capable of making links between the experience of Okinawa with the DU weapons, the global casualties
162
of the DU weapons, and the Ampo-taisei.
Because the methods which were applied for this
particular research question differs from the other questions, this section first explains the methods of analysis.
1. Content analysis of international news regard to depleted uranium weapons In order to analyze the links between the experience of Okinawa with DU weapons, the global casualties of the DU weapons, and the Ampo-taisei, I first classified articles which discussed and/or reported the news involving DU weapons outside Japan.
The articles were
then sorted, based on the particular topic. Unfortunately, this analysis had only limited findings.
While international issues
and/or news were taken mainly from the Kyodo News (KN) and some from the internet and professionals, the OT rarely presented its own opinions on them. the links was not always possible.
As a result, the analysis of
Nonetheless, the OT presented international news on DU
and DU weapons more than I had expected. Among the 445 articles which discussed or mentioned DU weapons, 65 presented the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons, or DU related issues in other parts of the world.
The number of articles in this category was greater than
that of the local governments and assemblies (LG = 25) and of the local people (LP = 14). Consequently, international news on DU weapons was more available to the readers than the voices of Kume Jima.
a. The Gulf War Syndrome (32/65 = 49.23 %) The largest number of articles (49.23 %) discussed the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons during the Gulf War and the illnesses that are collectively known as the Gulf War Syndrome.
Among the 65 articles, 32 discussed or mentioned the use of DU weapons
during the Gulf War and its consequences on veterans, their offspring, and the people of Iraq.
163
Each article presented one or a few of the following points: 1. The reasons for the U.S. to use DU weapons since the Gulf War: large accumulation of DU as radioactive waste material, low production cost, and superior destructive power (345 & 343, 307, -20). 2. DU is radioactive toxic waste material and requires careful handling.
However, the U.S.
started to export the DU weapons because the use of DU for military purposes costs less than their disposal (307). 3. The U.S. military used the DU weapons in actual combat for the first time during the Gulf War (363, 342, 313, 280, 179, 97, -4, -32). 4. According to British Broadcasting Corporation, the U.S. military expected the risk associated with the use of the DU weapons before they used them during the Gulf War. However, the U.S. military did not even warn its own soldiers (25). 5. More than 1,000,000 DU weapons were fired during the Gulf War, 67,000 of which were fired by the U.S. Marine Corps’ Harrier jets (the same type of fighter planes which fired DU weapons at Tori Shima) (-59). 6. Among the demobilized soldiers from the Gulf War, many of them are experiencing physical and/or psychological conditions that are similar to radiation-caused illnesses (the Gulf War Syndrome).
DU weapons are cited as the potential cause of the Gulf War
Syndrome (381, 363, 350, 346 & 344, 342, 327, 313, 307, 300 & 299, 97, 44, 32, 25). 7. The prevailing view of the cause of the Gulf War Syndrome is that soldiers inhaled or ingested aerosolized DU particles and were internally exposed to radiation (307, 97). 8. There are cases of the Gulf War veterans’ offspring having birth defects (350, 346 & 344, 327, 44). 9. There was a dramatic increase in birth defects, malfunction of internal organs, leukemia and other forms of cancer among Iraqi children since the end of the Gulf War (350, 327,
164
307, 97, 32). 10. DU weapons charred Iraqi tanks and the soldiers inside, becoming “ultimate anti-tank weapons,” (350, 346 & 344, 307, 97). 11. Iraq became the U.S. arms industry’s inventory clearance zone for outdated weapons as well as an experiment/exhibit hall for new-model weapons (32). 12. The U.S. government denied the link between the use of DU weapons and the Gulf War Syndrome (381, 34, A, D, 1). 13. Private research institutions and citizens in the U.S. requested a ban on weapons which contain DU (350, 307, 280, -31). 14. The Gulf War Veteran Resource Center and other U.S. veterans’ groups publicized their report on the DU weapons-related research and indicated that at least 400,000 U.S. and allied soldiers were at risk of being exposed to aerosolized DU particles (34, -18). 15. The citizens’ groups in Okinawa held photography exhibitions on post-Gulf War Iraq and Iraqi children suffering from the economic sanctions and illnesses that are possibly caused by DU weapons (-13, -21, -69). The five articles presented the U.S. government’s view, which denied the links between the use of DU weapons and the Gulf War Syndrome or an increase in birth defects and the rate of cancer among Iraqi children.
However, 87.5 percent of the 32 articles presented the
potential links between the U.S. military’s (the OT did not mention the British forces’) use of DU weapons during the Gulf War and outbreak of illnesses among the veterans and Iraqi citizens.
Accordingly, the OT successfully highlighted the danger of DU weapons as well as
the United States’ irresponsibility to the aftermath of the use of the weapons. The OT is certainly not the only source of information on the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons during the Gulf War and its alleged controversial consequences.
However, as the
OT presented the information and discussion on the potential links between the DU weapons
165
and illnesses, the readers also expressed their opinions against the DUw incident and the storage of DU weapons in Okinawa, as well as the fear of DU weapons as the cause of the Gulf War Syndrome and other illnesses (342, 313, 300, etc.). As the OT learned more about the danger of DU, it intensified the expression of anger and suggested the removal of the U.S. military bases as the only resolution to prevent such incidents from occurring in Okinawa (345 & 343).
Sun-pyo Sun-byo, a small column in the
evening editions which expresses the columnist’s opinions with humor and poetic style, wrote the following (ibid.). Even the “devil’s weapons” are matters of everyday life in Okinawa?
No threats to the
environment? Give us a break! How could they be so selfish? The more I learn about the DU weapons, cold shivers run up my spine. The fear of the Gulf War Syndrome is felt so close. Yet our uproar wouldn’t reach the U.S. embassy. They say they are keeping the DU weapons here. The Japanese government must have thought the prefectural people’s anger as the state of emergency. We are sick of listening to their apology after apology! There is no more resolution left but removing the bases, Mr. Hashimoto! But they still don’t know our pain. Unstable conditions in North Korea. This time a high rank official sought asylum in South Korea.
So you need the bases, the U.S. explains (ibid. translated into English).
It is important to reiterate that the OT is conscious of its readers in Tokyo and intends to send Okinawa’s voices via articles, (columns, and especially editorials) (Arasaki, 1999). did not mention the term, “Ampo-taisei” in this column.
The OT
However, by taking advantage of
the nature of the column, which is taken comparatively less seriously as the OT’s opinions than the editorial, the OT criticized the taisei which condones any U.S. military’s accidents and incidents for security reasons such as “the threats from North Korea.”
The writer of
Sun-pyo Sun-byo suggested that then Prime Minister Hashimoto to get Okinawa out of the taisei by removing the bases (ibid.). The OT informed the readers of the consequences of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons in Iraq to highlight the grave threat not only to the Gulf War veterans and Iraqi citizens but also to Okinawa, where DU weapons were expended and (are) stored.
The OT’s
166
criticisms on the Ampo-taisei vary, depending on the matter of discussion.
In this topic, the
OT criticized the taisei as the basis for Okinawa to be threatened by the U.S. military actions during peacetime, which was illustrated by the detailed information on the outbreak of illnesses among those internally exposed to DU during the Gulf War.
However, among the
32 articles, none mentioned the economic reasons behind the U.S. (and its multinational allies’) “relentless bombing for more than 40 days and nights against one of the most advanced nations in the Middle East, devastating its ancient and modern capital city; 177 million pounds of bombs falling on the people of Iraq…” (Blum, 2000, p. 159).
Monna
(1995) pointed out the mainland Japanese newspapers’ complete absence of discussions on oil companies’ demand to devastate Iraq in order to seize control over the region’s oil field and these discussions were also absent from the Okinawa Times. While the readers were informed about the devastating effects of the use of DU weapons, they were left on their own to find out the reasons why the U.S. military has inflicted violence against Iraq.
b. The test firing of DU weapons within the United States (14/65 = 21.54%) The second most frequently presented topic was that the DU weapons were used only in the special airtight facilities in the United States in order to protect the citizens’ health from the radioactive toxic waste materials.
The OT used this issue to present a sharp contrast with
the USMC’s open-air bombing in Okinawa. Although the claim might have helped to highlight the U.S. military’s irresponsible practices at Tori Shima, the fact is that the U.S. military does open-air testing of DU weapons within the United States (Blum, 2000).
Testing takes place on the island of San Clemente off
the California coast and at other sites in several states (ibid.).
For instance, open-air testing
of DU has been conducted in some parts of New Mexico since 1950 (ibid.). In Socorro (Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque), the residents did not know until
167
1986 that DU testing had been taking place since 1972 less than two miles from the town square, downwind from the proving grounds.
Over the years, there have been a few
scattered surveys and anecdotal evidence of a high incidence of the congenital birth defect hydrocephalus, but the year 1999 saw an increasing movement of Socoro citizens demanding broad epidemiological and contamination surveys of the area (Blum, 2000, p. 99).
The U.S. military publicly announced its internal rules, which specified the firing practices to be conducted in special facilities (391).
Therefore, the OT was partially correct.
However, even though the OT suggested that the U.S. military used DU weapons at Tori Shima without considerations for the residents in Kume Jima, also at risk are the health and safety of the citizens and the environment in the United States.
The articles might have
given the readers a wrong idea that the U.S. military’s bombing training at Tori Shima was incomparably worse than those in the United States.
The misinformation deprived them
from understanding a common problem faced by the people in the U.S. who are potentially more directly affected by the open-air testing of the DU weapons.
c. The U.S.-lead NATO’s use of DU weapons in Yugoslavia (10/65 = 15.38%) Among the 65 articles which presented the international news or issues on DU or DU weapons, 15.38 percent discussed the U.S.-lead NATO attack on Kosovo and the use of DU weapons there.
Among the ten articles, one was the OT’s editorial, seven were taken from
the Kyodo News (KN), and two were written by Kamata Takashi, a professor at Okinawa International University who did his research in former Yugoslavia-Croatia. Perhaps the OT chose Kamata Takashi to write a more humanistic report on the effects of NATO’s bombing on the people of Yugoslavia because the Kyodo News’ (KN) news items were limited to officially-released facts and events. Kamata strongly criticized the U.S.-lead NATO bombing campaigns against the innocent civilians and public infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, manufacturing plants, power plants, churches, and television transmitting stations (-6).
Within the first four weeks
168
of “the bombing to protect refugees,” NATO made 6,000 attacks and the increase in number of refugees accelerated (-7).
Kamata argued that the bombing campaign, which violated
both international and U.S. domestic laws served for the interests of the arms industry (ibid.). Kamata argued that the final cost of the bombing operation for the U.S. was four billion dollars and it provided a great opportunity for the U.S. and NATO countries’ arms industries to collect data and to improve problems with parts on high tech weapons during actual combat (ibid.).
The war also expended weapons in stock, including DU weapons and created room
for a further development of the new technology (ibid.).
Kamata’s argument could draw a
parallel with the Gulf War, where Iraq became the U.S. arms industry’s inventory clearance zone for outdated weapons as well as experiment/exhibit hall for new-model weapons. The OT presented the KN’s news items which discussed NATO’s use of DU weapons in Kosovo.
Although each news item had contradictory ideas and figures from one another, the
OT simply carried them without indicating the contradictions.
First, an article from May 14,
1999 reported that NATO denied the effects of DU weapons on the human body as they were “just using them for bullets of the machine guns that are loaded in the A-10 anti-ground fighter planes” (-14, translated into English).
However, another article presented a potential
impact of NATO’s use of DU weapons during the air raids, based on a report submitted by a researcher at Yugoslavia’s Nuclear Research Institute.
According to a Yugoslavian
researcher, “while the allied forces expended 300 tons of DU in Iraq, a several times greater amount was used in Kosovo” during the course of two and a half months of bombing, and “the consequences will be incomparably more devastating than those of the Gulf War” (-18, translated into English).
His prediction was that the symptoms that were similar to those of
the Gulf War Syndrome would eventually surface among soldiers of the U.S. military and of the International Security Unit who served in Kosovo where thousands of DU weapons were fired (ibid.).
He also argued that unlike the dry climate of Iraq, in topographically hilly
169
Kosovo with four distinct seasons, DU might be filtered into the soil and the contamination could spread a greater distance (ibid.). Contrary to the researcher’s estimate of the amount of DU expended during NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, another news item which was taken from the KN indicated that NATO explained the total amount of DU fired as ten tons (-26).
During the
78-day NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, approximately 31,000 rounds of DU ammunition were fired from the A-10 Warthog anti-tank planes (IAC, 2000).
Because the
A-10 Warthogs use 30mm rounds, each of which contains 300-grams of DU core, NATO’s official estimate must be closer to the actual amount of DU scattered in Kosovo. Despite NATO’s denial of the effects of DU weapons on the human body, NATO countries are currently experiencing serious concerns as illnesses including leukemia, collectively known as the “Balkan Syndrome,” surfaced (The Okinawa Times, 2001).
While
many cases of health complaints among soldiers employed in the Balkans were filed, “seven Italians, five Belgians, two Dutch nationals, two Spaniards, a Portuguese and a Czech national have died after serving in the Balkans” (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). During the conflict, the OT’s editorial discussed the U.S. Department of Defense’ (DOD) plan to deploy its Air Force stationed in Japan (including Okinawa) to Yugoslavia as NATO’s air raids were not as effective as they had expected (-5).
The OT strongly opposed
the U.S. military’s use of Japan (Okinawa) as its sortie base and attack on the innocent people of Yugoslavia regardless of the U.S. and NATO’s reasons and justifications (ibid.).
The OT
pointed out that Okinawa had been sortie base for the U.S. military during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Gulf War, each time expanding its sphere of activities from Asia, the Middle East, and perhaps to Europe (ibid.). As NATO’s bombing continued, the number of civilian casualties mounted (500 dead and 4,000 wounded as of April 24, 1999) and many survivors lost their means of living (the
170
unemployment rate exceeded twenty percent in the same period) (ibid.).
The OT claimed
that “DU weapons, which were fired at Tori Shima, are used in Yugoslavia and…contrary to their purposes, high tech weapons such as laser guided missiles are bombing at ‘wrong targets’ (ibid.). The OT argued that the conflict in Kosovo should not be considered as some type of event, which was taking place on the other side of the globe (ibid.). “If a similar conflict would break out in the Asia-Pacific region,” the OT wrote, “the laws associated with the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation could be put into effect and Japan might be cooperating with the U.S. (ibid.).”
In May 1999, the national legislature passed the three
new Guidelines-related bills, assuring further the establishment of the neo-Ampo-taisei.
Through the combination of the news items from the KN, Kamata’s articles, and the editorial, the OT made links between the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons in Okinawa, the U.S.-lead NATO’s use of DU weapons against public infrastructure in Yugoslavia and the Ampo-taisei.
On this topic, the OT opposed NATO countries’ armed attack against
Yugoslavia by emphasizing on the devastating effects on the lives of the citizens and warned the readers that the conflict in Kosovo could be a potential blueprint of Japan’s future military action with the U.S.
But again, just like the case of its presentation of the U.S. military’s use
of DU weapons during the Gulf War, none of the ten articles presented the NATO’s real purpose of devastating Yugoslavia for “humanity.”
Two years after the bombing of
Yugoslavia, the country is under the control of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (Chosudovsky, 2001).
The bankers and creditors mainly from the countries which
bombed Yugoslavia are playing “donors” to rebuild Yugoslavia (Chosudovsky, 2001).
While Yugoslavia’s external debt is in excess of $14 billion of which $5 billion are owed to the
171
Paris Club (i.e. largely to the governments of NATO countries) and $3 billion to the London Club. The latter is a syndicate of private banks, which in the case of Yugoslavia includes some 400 creditor institutions. The largest part of Yugoslavia’s commercial debt, however, is held by some 16 (mainly) American and European banks which are members of an “International Coordinating Committee” (JCC) headed by America’s Citigroup and Germany’s giant WestDeutsche Landesbank. Other big players in the ICC include J.P.Morgan-Chase and Merrill Lynch (Chussudovsky, 2001, p. 3).
Chussudovsky (2001) points out that their “intent is to not only to collect money from Yugoslavia, but also to gain full control and ownership of the Yugoslav economy. Meanwhile, national laws have been revised to facilitate sweeping privatization.
Serbia’s
large industrial complexes and public utilities are to be restructured and auctioned off to foreign capital” (ibid.).
Chussudovsky’s observation illustrates the impact of the
neo-imperialism demonstrated by NATO countries.
During the bombing campaign, it may
not have been clear what NATO countries’ true intentions were for devastating the country. However, since the war in Bosnia (1994) it has become clear that NATO countries were trying to seize the opportunity to expand their market after the fall of Soviet Union, responding to investors’ demands.
The OT did point out the devastating effects of NATO’s air raid on
Yugoslavia as a blueprint of what Japan may do with the U.S. forces as the result of the neo-Ampo-taisei (although the OT did not use this term).
However, none of the articles
explained the Japanese neo-imperialists’ attempts to inflict violence against the democratization of despotic countries in Asia.
d. The transfer of DU weapons from Okinawa to South Korea (9/65 = 13.85%) Amongst the nine articles which reported the transfer of DU weapons from Okinawa to South Korea, only two of which (one was written by Arasaki Moriteru, who was the guest columnist for Shicho, a monthly column for the OT and the other was a contribution by musician/peace activist Mayonaka Shinya) discussed the South Koreans’ tremendous shock
172
and anxieties about the transfer.
On the contrary, the rest of the articles that were taken
either from the KN or written by the OT completely disregarded the South Korean people’s concerns. The OT mainly focused on the following points.
First, it was concerned whether or
not the Kadena Ammunition Storage Area still stored the DU weapons, as the JG announced that the ones which belonged to the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan were removed not only from Okinawa but also from mainland Japan (63). reporting system.
Second, the OT focused on the U.S. military’s
The OT argued that the disclosure of the DUw incident in February 1997
culminated Okinawa’s strong call for the establishment of a reliable and prompt reporting system.
However, Okinawa was once again not informed about the transfer of DU weapons
to South Korea until a mainland Japanese newspaper disclosed it (65).
The OT criticized the
USGM that it should have informed the JG and OPG as to when and how the U.S. military was going to transfer DU weapons, and made sure that the safety of the prefectural people was guaranteed during the removal and transfer processes (ibid.).
Thus, the OT agreed with
Mayor Miyagi of Kadena Town that because there were no ways of investigating the weapons storage area, which is treated as a “sanctuary,” even the transfer of DU weapons was questionable (ibid.).
As discussed above, DU weapons were indeed transferred to South
Korea from Okinawa and were expended in one of the U.S. military bases (Catalinotto and Flounders, 2000).
However, this was never reported in the OT.
Among the mayors of several municipalities who were interviewed by the OT, the mayors of Kume Jima welcomed the removal without showing any consideration for the people of South Korea (66).
Contrary to the mayors of Kume Jima, several peace activists
who were involved in the movement against nuclear weapons believed that the transfer of DU weapons to South Korea did not solve the root cause of the problems and they should be also removed from South Korea (ibid.).
Higa Sachiko, a survivor of atomic bombing, demanded
173
the abolition of all nuclear weapons including the DU wepaons by all means (ibid.). Yoshizawa Hiroaki, the chair of Okinawa Prefectural Association against Nuclear Weapons, discussed the necessity for the victims of the Gulf War and the war in Bosnia to be compensated (ibid.). Although the OT presented the interviewees’ comments and opinions, it hardly discussed its own.
The OT did not explain the consequences of the transfer of weapons to
South Korea in any of the articles on this issue.
Instead of reporting the impact of the
transfer on South Koreans, the OT let third persons such as Arasaki and Mayonaka discuss them.
Even though Arasaki and Mayonaka explained South Koreans’ reactions to the
transfer, they were not specifically asked by the OT to write about them.
Apparently, the OT
did not take this as an opportunity to share South Koreans’ struggle against the U.S. military bases with the readers. Arasaki discussed the importance of building solidarity between the people of Okinawa and South Korea (55).
Arasaki wrote,
While South Koreans take notice of Okinawa’s anti-war movement (anti-U.S. military base movement) and are interested in learning from Okinawa’s struggle against the U.S. military bases, they also have serious anxieties about the future of South Korea. In A Guide to the South Korea-U.S. Administrative Agreement it says, “after the U.S. announced the agreement that it was going to return the land of the twenty percent of the U.S. military bases to Okinawa, the Secretary of State Perry stated that the U.S. was considering the transfer of the removed U.S. military bases from Okinawa to South Korea. We have even more serious concerns when we think about the future that we may have to provide more lands to the U.S. military forces in addition to the ones that are already occupied by them” (ibid. translated into English).
He concluded his argument by quoting from the preface of A Guide to South Korea-U.S. Administrative Agreement. “We have to understand clearly the structure in which the people of the two countries are the victims of the U.S. world strategy, yet its accomplices are the governments of the two countries” (ibid.).
174
There was a sharp contrast between Arasaki’s discussion and the OT’s lack of discussion on the consequences of the transfer of DU weapons from Okinawa to South Korea. In sum, Arasaki expressed the necessity to include concerns for the impact on the people of South Korea when Okinawa made demands against the U.S. military (ibid.).
He also pointed
out the root cause of the problems under which both South Korea and Okinawa suffered. The OT, on the contrary, maintained its criticism against the U.S. military on the surface level, such as the storage of DU weapons and an insufficient reporting system.
After more than
half a century of U.S. military presence in Okinawa, one of the only two major newspaper companies in Okinawa did not make Arasaki’s level of argument.
e. The use of DU weapons in Bosnia Herzegovina (5/65 = 7.69%) Among the 65 articles examined for this section, 7.69 percent discussed NATO’s use of DU weapons in Bosnia Herzegovina. While 10,000 rounds of DU ammunition were expended in Bosnia in1994 and 1995, NATO forces dropped most extensively on the town of Hadzici near Sarajevo, where the Bosnian Serb army had a weapons depot (British Broadcasting Corporation, January 25, 2001).
Among the 5,000 civilians who evacuated Hadzici, approximately 400 people have
died mainly of cancer (The Okinawa Times, January 10, 2001).
Doctors believe the internal
exposure to DU is the cause of the high rate of cancer-type illnesses and deaths among the former Hadzici residents (ibid.) Yoshizawa Hiroaki, the chair of Okinawa Prefectural Association against Nucelar Weapons was the first person in the OT to discuss that the victims of DU weapons in Bosnia should be guaranteed of receiving compensations (66).
When Yoshizawa made this
comment in August 1997, NATO-led Stabilization Force’s use of DU weapons in Bosnia was only starting to receive international attention.
175
While three articles (-4, -5, -7) simply mentioned NATO’s use of DU weapons in the Balkans in 1994, one article, which was taken from the KN (-18) briefly discussed the effects of DU on the people in Bosnia.
The KN presented a report by a researcher at the Nuclear
Research Institute in Yugoslavia that in Bosnia Herzegovina, where NATO dropped DU weapons, the number of birth defects and cancer patients sharply increased and numerous cases of contaminated agricultural products were reported (ibid.). The OT reported that NATO expended DU weapons in Bosnia Herzegovina.
However,
when the several hundreds of DU shell casings were found in Nishihara Town in June 2000, the OT claimed that prior to the U.S. Marine Corps’ use of DU weapons in Tori Shima in 1995 and 1996, the only time the U.S. military used DU weapons was during the Gulf War (-59). Perhaps the OT had no single journalist who was assigned to focus on DU related issues.
An
assigned individual could have corrected simple factual mistakes such as this one and others that are mentioned above.
However, another possibility was that there were simply too
many U.S. military related problems that the OT had no luxury to focus on one incident, even if they wanted to.
Nonetheless, the OT should recognize the importance of accuracy to
prevent jeopardizing their dependability as a news source for the prefectural people and to avoid misinforming its readers who may construct their opinions based on the information which is provided by the OT.
2. Consequences of the dependency on the Kyodo News’ news items While the OT covers the local (prefectural) news, it largely depends on the Kyodo News (KN) for other news items.
Carrying the KN’s news items directly in the newspaper is
convenient for the OT (or any other local newspapers throughout Japan which depend on the KN as a news source). It does not have to present the news items to the readers based on its own investigation or from its own perspective or by making links between the news items
176
and the similar local issues.
For example, the U.S. military related global news which are
provided by the KN in uniform manner throughout Japan may not always be sufficient for Okinawa, as the U.S. military stationed in Okinawa is often directly or indirectly connected to the operation of the U.S. military elsewhere. In addition, while the OT is able to cover important segments of the newspaper by carrying the KN’s news items, it is also taking risks of not informing issues or events which could be important for the readers to understand the consequences of the U.S. military’s activities on the global scale.
For instance, the U.S. Navy’s use of DU weapons at Vieques,
Puerto Rico (the DUw incident at Vieques) on February 19, 1999 became public on May 10 of that year. at Tori Shima.
However, the OT failed to report the incident despite the similarity of the case Perhaps it was not included in the KN’s news items.
An “accident” during the F-18 fighter jet’s bombing exercise in Vieques, which killed a local resident, on April 19, 1999 became the catalyst for a widespread protest against the Navy’s occupation of 75 percent of the land area and bombardments in Vieques (Vieques Libre, 2000).
It was the eighth accident involving death since the Navy started live
exercises in Vieques (The Okinawa Times, 2000).
Yet the article on Vieques’ movement to
close down the artillery range appeared on the OT for the first time on October 20, 1999 (The Okinawa Times, 1999).
The article, which was taken from the KN reported that the U.S.
government’s advisory committee recommended the Department of Defense (DOD) to close the artillery range within five years (ibid.).
The article also indicated that the DOD was
having a difficult time dealing with the recommendation as it was concerned about the effects such a closure could have on other U.S. military problems abroad, such as Okinawa (ibid.). However, despite the fact that the KN’s news item pointed out the potential impact of the anti-U.S. military base movement in Vieques on Okinawa, the OT did not seem to realize the importance of conducting its own research on the movement.
More than a month after
177
the first article on Vieques appeared, the OT discussed its opinion of the movement on December 5, 1999 (The Okinawa Times, 1999).
The editorial discussed the grave
differences between the governor of Puerto Rico, who insisted (at the time) on the immediate return of Vieques and the JG, which never asked the removal of the military bases from Okinawa to the United States, in spite of the change in the international situation (ibid.). The OT criticized the JG’s efforts to maintain the U.S. military bases in Okinawa while transforming Japan into a state which was capable of being involved in military interventions with the U.S. by breaking Constitutional law (ibid.).
However, the OT concluded that the
JG did not have to transform Japan for the United States, and called to making Vieques’ anti-U.S. military base movement a lesson to review the structure which was built upon the Ampo.
This was another case where the OT completely ignored the direct link between the
globalization of the Japanese economy and the remilitarization of the state. When the OT finally mentioned the Navy’s use of DU weapons at Vieques and the high cancer rate among the residents of the island on July 29, 2000, the news item did not come from the KN (-75).
It was from the report on the Okinawa International Women’s Summit
where women of Okinawa, Philippines, South Korea, Puerto Rico, and the United States gathered to discuss security issues from the perspective of women and children (ibid.). Although they were not part of the examined articles for this study, the OT did have more detailed articles on the situations in Vieques.
Nakachi Kiyoshi, a professor at Meio
University in Okinawa, contributed the special series, Puerto Rico, the (U.S. military) Base and Autonomy.
The OT also reported the voices of the people of Vieques as local news, as
some of them came to visit Okinawa to develop solidarity with the Okinawan activists (The Okinawa Times, 2000). Of the four articles which mentioned the Navy’s use of DU weapons at Vieques and its consequences, none were taken from the KN.
However, the OT never presented the DUw
178
incident at Vieques as a case that was similar to the DUw incident at Tori Shima.
Although
the KN may be partly responsible for not including the DUw incident at Vieques in its news items, the OT appeared to have little interest in examining the two similar cases together. Finally, there were mixed results as to whether or not the OT was capable of forging links between Okinawa’s experiences with DU weapons, the global casualties of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons, and the Ampo-taisei.
The OT did make these links in topics
such as the Gulf War and the attack on Yugoslavia.
At the same time, the OT failed to
inform readers about similar incidents in Panama, South Korea and in Vieques.
The DUw
incident in Vieques only appeared in the articles when the people from Vieques came to visit Okinawa to discuss their U.S. military- related problems.
The Gulf War and NATO air raids
against Yugoslavia were examples of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons during actual military interventions.
However, the OT could have also reported the U.S. military’s use of
DU weapons in Panama, South Korea and Vieques in detail.
They could have highlighted
the same problems faced by the people in other parts of the world where the U.S. military secretly fired DU weapons without any considerations for the locals’ health, safety, livelihood, and environment during peacetime, just like the people of Kume Jima experienced because of the Ampo.
In addition, although it was not the OT’s fault entirely, it misinformed the readers
about the U.S. military’s open-air testing of DU weapons in the United States.
Sharing the
information about the U.S. military base-related problems in other parts of the world is essential for building the global network against the U.S. military’s irresponsible practices and ultimately for the removal of U.S. military bases from their lands.
As far as this study
showed, the OT did not successfully function as a medium of information for the development of solidarity beyond borders.
Perhaps it was partly the result of the OT’s dependency on the
news items provided by the KN, as well as its lack of enough effort to investigate cases on its own.
179
Diagram II
The Okinawa Times’ Role
The OT’s claims
Go back to Diagram I
The OT’s dependency on the Kyodo News Agency for news items makes the OT a weak source of information for readers to understand similar situations with U.S. military presence and practices in other parts of the world.
The OT is extremely critical of the incident but reports a minimum amount of the voices of locals who are most affected by the disclosure of the incident.
The OT supports the OPG’s reformoriented claims which are meant to improve the overall situation of the prefecture with the U.S. military presence, instead of the LG’s.
The OT’s focus on the military aspect of the economic-military alliance with the U.S. fails to provide information for readers to understand actual forces and motivations behind military actions and advances.
The OT’s reporting style on U.S. military-related issues
The OT’s reform-oriented and Nahacentric claims marginalize the most affected locality’s claims. U.S. military-related problems keep surfacing one after another, and the OT cannot focus on one incident.
180
-- CHAPTER SIX –
CONCLUSION
This chapter restates the research objectives and summarizes the result of the analysis. Also included are a discussion of the thesis’ contribution and future research avenues. A. Research Objectives When the U.S. Marine Corps’ use of depleted uranium weapons at the Area Tori Shima Range in December 1995 and January 1996 (the DUw incident) was uncovered by the Washington Times in February 1997, the Japanese and U.S. governments were in the process of transforming the Ampo-taisei into the neo-Ampo-taisei.
The transformation was
characterized by a drastic increase in Japan’s role in its military alliance with the U.S., responding to the globalization of the Japanese economy.
The Review of the Guidelines for
the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which would set the framework for the revitalized military alliance for corporate security, was soon to be completed in September 1997. The DUw incident most directly affected the residents of Kume Jima, the closest inhabited island from Tori Shima.
This thesis examined the extent to which the Okinawa
Times (OT) presented the voices of the Kume Jima locals relative to other claimsmakers, based on the idea that the local people’s voices of protest against the U.S. military presence can most accurately explain what has been sacrificed for the Ampo-taisei. The analysis was conducted for the following six claimsmakers in the 445 examined articles: 1) the local people of Kume Jima 2) the local assemblies and governments of Kume Jima (LG)
181
3) the Okinawa prefectural government (OPG) 4) the Japanese government (JG) 5) the U.S. government and military (USGM) 6) and the Okinawa Times (OT) In addition, the thesis sought to understand each claimsmaker’s most focused claims in reaction to the disclosure of the DUw incident.
By using the DUw incident as an example,
the purpose was to clarify each claimsmaker’s perspective on the U.S. military presence and ideas of possible solutions to its detrimental consequences. The research also attempted to illustrate the political process which helped to perpetuate the U.S. military presence in Okinawa by analyzing the media reports following the disclosure of the DUw incident.
The U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (1960) has
been the primary focus of criticism for problems associated with the U.S. military presence and practices.
However, the roles of the claimsmakers in the political process of maintaining
or strengthening the Ampo-taisei have been overlooked, even though the often-repeated process demands critical attention.
This objective was achieved by analyzing how each tier
of the political hierarchy responded to the Kume Jima locals’ voices of protest. An additional objective was to conduct a critique of the Okinawan mass media. Because the entire research was based on the content analysis of the newspaper articles, critiques appear throughout the summary.
Therefore, the final section focuses on the
consequences of the Okinawa Times’ dependency on the Kyodo News for U.S. military-related international news.
B. Research Findings Disproportionately underrepresented voices of the Kume Jima locals The frequency of the presentation of the claimsmakers’ claims followed the
182
hierarchical order of political power, with the exception being the OT itself.
While the
USGM had the most power among the six claimsmakers, the OT presented the JG’s claims most frequently (40.9 percent).
The lower frequency of the USGM’s claims was precisely
because the JG represented the USGM.
On the basis of the Ampo agreement, the JG
assumed full responsibility for appropriating lands for the U.S. military bases and protected the U.S. military from facing a number of difficult situations. Among the claimsmakers in Okinawa, the most frequently presented was the Okinawa prefectural government (OPG), followed by the OT, the local assemblies and governments of Kume Jima (LG) and finally, the local people of Kume Jima.
The proportion of the LG’s
claims presented in the articles (5.62 percent) was only one sixth of the OPG’s (31.46 percent). While the environment, health, safety and livelihood of the local community of Kume Jima were most directly threatened by the DUw incident, the study identified the Kume Jima locals as the least presented claimsmaker.
A mere 3.15 percent of the articles contained their
voices of protest. The articles examined for the analysis indicated that the disclosure of the DUw incident affected the locals regardless of their occupations.
However, the OT focused on the
local fishing industry, based on an assumption that it was experiencing the most serious impact of the incident.
Within the already small presentation of the locals’ voices, there was
even less coverage of other occupation groups. Kume Jima has three U.S. military bombing and flight exercise areas surrounding the island and their impacts on locals are relatively unknown to people outside the island.
The
disproportionately underrepresented local’s claims suggested that the OT was not particularly interested in using the disclosure of the DUw incident as an opportunity to empower the Kume Jima residents’ struggle against the U.S. military presence.
The government officials
in Tokyo read Okinawan newspapers to study the trend of public opinion for their strategy to
183
maintain steady control over the prefecture.
Because the OT presented its own claims as
“Okinawa’s”, a small proportion for the locals’ voices meant that they were among “Okinawa’s” minor claims. Considering the JG’s sole priority, which was to protect the U.S. military’s free use of the bases, the degree to which the JG responded to Kume Jima’s claims would have made a trivial difference even if the OT covered the voices of the locals more frequently.
However,
it is still important to point out that the disproportionately small coverage of the locals’ voices made a minuscule contribution toward a better understanding of what Kume Jima has sacrificed for the Ampo-taisei.
Claimsmakers’ most frequently presented claims The limited number of articles presenting the Kume Jima locals’ claims made it difficult to substantiate the effects of the Ampo-taisei on them.
However, the articles
examined for the analysis clearly showed that after decades of suffering from the U.S. military’s irresponsible practices, the DUw incident became the catalyst for them to demand the return of Tori Shima.
Their claims showed that the surrounding ocean played an
important role for the local economy, especially the tourist industry which depends on visits from mainland Japanese, as well as for an essential part of the traditional diet, fresh fish. The locals’ consensus on a solution to end the U.S. military-related problems imposed upon their daily lives was to remove the U.S. military presence from the Area Tori Shima Range. However, it was not clearly identified in the OT whether or not the locals demanded the return of the two other nearby ranges, surrounding air and water spaces exclusively used by the U.S. military as well. The study found that the LG’s claims were designed to restore a sense of safety and to protect the livelihood of the community.
The most urgent demand was the recovery of the
184
remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima, which was releasing high levels of radiation and causing serious anxiety among the locals.
There were several major factors which appeared
to explain why the people of Kume Jima and the LG were united in opposition to the U.S. military presence.
The LG shared the locals’ demand for the return of Tori Shima and
believed that the local economy would significantly benefit from removing the U.S. military presence, or at least by terminating the flight exercises.
Because Tori Shima is covered with
duds and spent shells, the mayors of the two villages in Kume Jima demanded the environmental restoration and return of the artillery range as soon as possible.
While there
were substantial detrimental effects from the use of the surrounding air, water, and land space as flight and bombing exercise areas for the U.S. military, the Area Tori Shima Range created no job opportunities for the locals, nor did any group of landowners benefit from the lease of the areas to the JG for the U.S. military base. At the same time, the LG’s protest against the U.S. military-related problems was localized.
The analysis showed that the mayors of the two villages in Kume Jima welcomed
the transfer of DU weapons from Okinawa to South Korea and emphasized that the most urgent matter was the removal of the remaining DU ammunition from Tori Shima.
This
finding indicated that there was lack of empathic reports in the mass media to learn about the U.S. military’s presence in South Korea.
Easy access to such information could have helped
to build a sense of solidarity with people facing a similar situation. The two Kume Jima legislative assemblies became the frontline opposition to the revision of the Special Land Lease Law.
Having experienced direct threats from the U.S.
military practices, Kume Jima’s assemblies foresaw that the people of Okinawa were being sacrificed under the revised SLLL, while the prefecture and municipal authorities would continue to be deprived of having any means to protect the people from the detrimental effects of the system.
The OPG also opposed the revision.
However, many municipal assemblies
185
and the prefectural assembly were divided on this issue because of their conflict of interests. The analysis showed that the OPG was infuriated by the DUw incident, and by the fact that the USGM and the JG both kept the incident from Okinawa until the media uncovered it. The OPG reiterated that the discrimination against Okinawa was the basis for the USMC’s use of DU weapons at Tori Shima.
However, contrary to claims of the LG, the OPG’s claims
focused on gaining better control over the prefecture instead of solving the U.S. military-related problems imposed upon a particular locality.
The high concentration of U.S.
military bases affected the day-to-day administrative ability of the OPG and further limited its ability to protect the people of the prefecture, such as the Kume Jima locals, from the U.S. military’s irresponsible practices. Acknowledging the maintenance of the Ampo-taisei as a national policy, the OPG made claims which it believed could be realized without disturbing the system.
The
reduction/removal of the U.S. Marine Corps was one of these reform-oriented claims.
The
DUw incident was again a case involving the USMC.
The OPG used the DUw incident to
justify its claim that the reduction/removal of the USMC could reduce Okinawa’s burden of having the U.S. military bases occupying prefectural air, land, and water space.
The OPG
argued that it could contribute to the future development of the prefecture without affecting national policy. memo.
The OPG’s other reform-oriented claim was the disclosure of the 5.15
When Kume Jima was struggling with the serious consequences of the disclosure of
the DUw incident, the OPG was devoting its energy to the disclosure of the memo.
The
OPG expected to find agreements in the memo which described the U.S. military’s discriminatory use of the bases in Okinawa. Following the disclosure of the DUw incident, the JG repeatedly apologized to Okinawa, including visits by top officials to the prefecture.
However, the analysis identified
that this was only because the JG desperately needed the OPG’s cooperation with the revision
186
of the SLLL and the planned construction of a new Marine base offshore of eastern Nago City, replacing no longer technically efficient Futenma Air Base. components of the strengthened bilateral military alliance.
These steps were necessary Also important in the
remilitarization process was the replacement of Governor Ota Masahide by Inamine Keiichi. As Inamine took over the administration after defeating Ota in the gubernatorial election in the fall of 1998, the tone of the OPG’s approach to the U.S. military-related problems shifted from a reform orientation to making decisions in concert with the JG for monetary reward by accepting the construction of additional U.S. military bases. The DUw incident highlighted the discriminatory conditions imposed on Okinawa under the Ampo-taisei.
In order to contain Okinawa’s mounting distrust and anger, the JG
decided to respond to the two claims which were least likely to affect the system as well as very likely to benefit the JG to attain its goals.
These claims were: 1) to conduct
independent environmental examinations, 2) and to reveal the 5.15 memo.
In regard to the
first claim, the JG appeared to believe that the brief sampling examinations of air quality, water quality, and sea products surrounding Kume Jima and the Area Tori Shima Range could prove that the U.S. military did nothing to harm the environment or the Kume Jima locals. After each examination the JG simply repeated that there were no immediate effects of DU on the environment.
It seemed that the examinations were conducted ceremonially to calm
protest rather than to find the actual effects of DU, completely disregarding the long term effects of unrecovered DU ammunition.
The examined articles also showed that the
examinations (conducted once a year) ended two years after the disclosure of the DUw incident.
This inaction suggested that the JG applied one of its routine tactics when facing
difficult situation: apply temporary measures and wait until local demands fade away over time.
Second, the disclosure of the 5.15 memo was instrumental for the JG to regain control
over Okinawa as the balance of power shifted slightly over to the OPG after the disclosure of
187
the DUw incident.
Furthermore, showing Okinawans that the memo contained no secret
agreements for the U.S. military’s discriminatory use of bases in Okinawa hindered the OPG’s opportunity to strengthen its position against the revision of the SLLL. The analysis of the JG’s claims identified that it was strategically driven by its eagerness to maintain control over Okinawa as the main foothold for the neo-Ampo-taisei. However, the JG never explained the actual reasons for remilitarization.
The U.S.
government and military (USGM), on the contrary, was more direct in terms of explaining the role of the military alliance with Japan as part of a global strategy, although the explanations remained superficial. The USGM’s claims following the disclosure of the DUw incident showed that it was engaged in trivializing the incident in order to minimize the impact on its free use of the bases. No sign of consideration for the Kume Jima locals was shown in any of its claims, revealing the effect of the U.S. military forces’ practices on the environment, local residents’ health, safety, and livelihood can be ignored under the pretext of military missions.
Like most of
the JG’s claims, the USGM’s “claims” were more accurately termed “responses”, as those “claims” were made in response to the protests from Okinawan citizens’ groups, the media, the OPG and others.
The USGM was on the defensive on every subject; the USMC’s use of
DU weapons, delaying the report about the DUw incident to Japan, the danger of DU weapons, the effects of DU on the human body and the environment, the storage of DU weapons, and the sale of DU shell casings to a private scrapyard owner.
In addition, the
responses were often inconsistent and some officials’ responses were corrected by their own colleagues. The Okinawa Times’ claims were parallel to four out of the five most frequently presented claims by the OPG.
Thus, the OT’s claims were also reform-oriented and
designed to help improve the condition of Okinawa rather than solving the particular
188
problems imposed upon Kume Jima.
They only claim which was distinctive to the OT was
the substantial information on the radiological and chemical toxicities of DU.
This
information helped to counter the JG and the USGM’s downplaying of the DUw incident. The claim to environmental safety from the JG’s independent examination was one of the LG’s claims as well as the OT’s.
However, the analysis revealed that the OT’s claim had
a Naha-centric tendency, which ignored the Kume Jima locals’ serious concerns over the possible contamination of the environment.
Furthermore, the recovery of the remaining DU
ammunition from Tori Shima was only one of the OT’s minor claims and the return of Tori Shima gained no support from the OT. The claimsmakers’ claims examined for the analysis clearly showed that the only claimsmakers determined to end the U.S. military-related problems imposed upon Kume Jima were its local people and the local governments.
The political process and the perpetuation of the U.S. military presence Despite the small coverage of the locals’ voices, it was clear that the Kume Jima locals participated in events to make their voices heard, both at the island’s first rally against the U.S. military presence and at a prefecture-wide rally against the DUw incident in Naha.
At the
same time, the analysis showed that they were deprived of generating sufficient political power to change the routine threats from the U.S. military’s flights and bombing exercises as well as occasional accidents and incidents.
Although the OPG generally represents the
demands made by municipal governments to the JG, the LG directly represented the locals’ voices and made appeals to the JG and the USGM.
However, neither the JG nor the USGM
responded positively to any of the LG’s claims, and the OPG had its own pressing agenda in which the locals’ voices were remote. rather than Kume Jima’s.
Moreover, the OT aligned with the OPG’s claims
These elements undercut the Kume Jima locals’ efforts to
189
generate political power for pushing forward their claims.
Nearly 85 percent of the DU
weapons fired at Tori Shima still remain unrecovered, and the U.S. military continues to use the Area Tori Shima Range as it had before the disclosure of the DUw incident. After months of having no positive response from the JG or the USGM, the LG requested that the OPG represent their demands.
The OPG did follow the LG’s requests.
However, they were marginalized by the OPG’s political maneuvering with the JG. Under-representation of the LG’s claims was the OPG’s major fallacy, as well as the limited ability to deal with the U.S. military-related problems which spread to dozens of municipalities throughout the prefecture.
The problems faced by these municipalities and
surrounding communities vary according to the military unit’s operations and training objectives at each base.
Thus, the OPG’s comprehensive approach to solve the U.S.
military-related problems for better control over the prefecture, and advancement of its future development plans inevitably failed to reflect Kume Jima’s distinctive situation.
Yet, it was
simply impossible for the OPG to focus only on Kume Jima because problems involving the U.S. military kept surfacing one after another, further adding to other already unresolved problems. The OPG’s predicament benefited the JG’s efforts to maintain the system. Following the hierarchy of political power, the JG dealt only with the OPG.
It allowed the
JG to simply dismiss the LG’s claims, based on the Ampo, that the U.S. military’s training at Tori Shima was indispensable for the regions’ “peace and security”, even though it was detrimental for the Kume Jima locals.
The JG responses of opening the 5.15 memo and
conducting independent environmental examinations made no positive difference to Kume Jima’s situation under the Ampo-taisei.
Moreover, the SLLL was revised, which was a
crucial step towards a permanent depletion of Okinawa’s ability to reject the JG’s forcible appropriation of the private lands for the U.S. military bases.
Kume Jima will continue to
190
be forced to endure the U.S. military’s flight and bombing exercises under the neo-Ampo-taisei. The analysis also revealed that the JG responded swiftly to Okinawa’s demands only when the JG’s immediate interests were at stake.
When nearly 500 DU shell casings were
found in a private scrapyard in Nishihara Town on May 31, 2000, the JG was exceptionally cooperative with the municipal government.
However, it was only because the JG wanted
to contain Okinawa’s anti-U.S. military sentiment as quickly as possible before the opening of the G8 Summit in July 2000 in Nago, Okinawa.
At the Summit, the JG and the USGM had
a plan to reiterate to the world that Okinawa would continue to play an important role in the bilateral alliance into the twenty-fist century.
During the outbreak of tremendous shock
among the local people of Nishihara Town following the finding of DU shell casings, the USGM remained completely unaccountable and let the JG take care of the locals’ fear of possible contamination. Aside from the use of DU weapons at Tori Shima, the USGM’s responses following the disclosure of the DUw incident can be summarized with two words: irresponsibility and unaccountability.
These attitudes were clearly part of the USGM’s strategy for dealing with
the local protest.
The U.S. military defined the U.S. military-related problems imposed
upon the locals as matters of discussion between the Japanese and U.S. governments.
This
stance allowed the U.S. military to completely disregard the demands made by the OPG, the LG, and the Kume Jima locals.
Because the JG supported the USGM’s downplaying of the
DUw incident and never expressed interest in disrupting the U.S. military practices for the smooth function of the Ampo, the U.S. military faced no obstruction to its practices in the Area Tori Shima Range.
Eventually, the Kume Jima representatives’ demand to end the
situation where the U.S. military posed major threats to their health, safety and livelihood disappeared from the newspaper coverage.
Similar demands are likely to surface when the
191
next U.S. military-related accident or incident occurs in the future because Kume Jima did not actualize a removal of the artillery range from the area, or even any improvement in the negative effects of the U.S. military presence. Support from a mass media institution would have substantially augmented the power of the Kume Jima locals, but the analysis showed that they received little help from the OT. Taking a reform-oriented approach with a Naha-centric perspective, the OT clearly distanced itself from Kume Jima’s radical position against the U.S. military presence.
Instead, the OT
aligned with the OPG’s claims and indirectly participated in the political negotiation between the OPG and the JG. Like the OPG, the OT apparently faced a dilemma of not being able to focus on one particular U.S. military-related incident.
This impasse appeared to be the reason for the OT
to take a reform-oriented approach to improve the overall situation in Okinawa.
However,
this approach was prone to manipulation by the JG, and, as mentioned above, it overshadowed the problems facing a particular locality.
Similarly, when the OPG and the OT made their
claims, they often used terms such as “us” or “the prefectural people.”
The use of these
terms not only marginalized the actual voices of the locals, but also misrepresented them. Unfortunately, the analysis showed that the OPG and the OT did not reflect upon their style of claims-making, which partially contributed to the perpetuation of the U.S. military-related problems posed upon Kume Jima. Furthermore, the OT appeared to avoid making claims or providing information which might have put its business position at risk. which derived from the system.
The OT’s criticisms were directed to problems
The OT did oppose the revision of the SLLL, the planned
construction of a new Marine base, as well as bills to implement the new Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
However, the root causes which contributed to the
perpetuation of the U.S. military presence and the transformation of Okinawa as the bilateral
192
sortie base for the neo-Ampo-taisei were completely absent in the OT’s reporting.
Among
the 445 examined articles, which also included a variety of topics other than the DUw incident, none of them explained Okinawa’s chronic economic dependency on Tokyo, or the link between increasingly the globalized Japanese economy and the development of the neo-Ampo-taisei.
What distinguished the OT from the mainland Japanese mass media
institutions was that at least the OT did not use “threats from North Korea” or participate in creating an “imagined community” where Japan’s remilitarization to take part in multinational military operations was rationalized as a necessary contribution for the world community.
A
defense theory based on security instability in East Asia and the “imagined community” helped to camouflage the neo-imperialists’ strong demands to make available the Japanese troops’ involvement in armed operations along with the U.S.-lead multinational forces to protect their investments abroad.
In either case, the neo-imperialists benefited from the
absence of criticism against their environmentally destructive and anti-democratic activities and direct connection with state remilitarization.
Accordingly, The OT not only blinded the
readers from understanding corporate backing of a strengthened Ampo-taisei, but also failed to point out the inseparable link between Okinawa’s dependency on Tokyo as an integral part of the system and the suppression of democratization in countries of despotic governments in Asia.
Perhaps creating a forum for the readers to re-examine the perpetuation of the U.S.
military presence in exchange for a marginal development of economic affluence was fatal to the OT’s business position as part of corporate Japan.
The Okinawa Times’ dependency on the Kyodo News The analysis of the OT’s claims and its role in maintaining the status quo were already summarized above.
Therefore, this section assesses the degree to which the OT was capable
of being an effective medium to create/support solidarity between the people of Okinawa who
193
struggled against the U.S. military presence, and those around the world who suffered from similar situations. The major barrier to achieving this objective was that the OT carried most of the international news/information provided by the Kyodo News (KN), the main news source for the local newspapers throughout Japan.
Additional information and analysis of the U.S.
military activities abroad were written by field professionals.
Consequently, the OT’s own
investigation and opinions on international news/information were largely unavailable for the analysis. One exception was the information on detrimental consequences of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons during the Gulf War.
The DU weapons’ potential association with Gulf
War Syndrome appeared most frequently, which helped to highlight Okinawa’s situation. The OT also strongly opposed the transformation of Okinawa into a major sortie base under the neo-Ampo-taisei.
It argued that the U.S.-led NATO attack against Yugoslavia, in which
DU weapons were used, could be a blueprint of Japan’s future involvement in military interventions with the United States. In these two cases, the OT was successful in forging links between Okinawa’s situation under the Ampo-taisei/neo-Ampo-taisei and the global casualties of U.S. military actions. In both cases, however, the OT made no explanations about the inseparable association between multinational military operations and neo-imperialists’ desires to seize market, industry, and natural resources.
Thus, as long as the readers’ source of political
information was limited to the OT, their understanding also would be limited to the military aspects of the interventions. The small number of the OT’s own perspectives and investigations on the international news weakened the viability of the analysis of the OT’s ability to make links between the DUw incident, a detrimental impact of the Ampo-taisei and the global casualties of the U.S.
194
military’s use of DU weapons.
Thus, the research focused on the consequences of the OT’s
dependency on the KN for U.S. military-related international news. Apparently, the KN’s purpose for covering the U.S. military-related news for the readers throughout Japan was not to comprehend U.S. military activities at the global scale, nor to understand the people’s struggle against the U.S. military presence/operations around the world.
The analysis showed that the OT never attempted to make links between Kume
Jima’s experience and that of Panama, South Korea, Vieques, and mainland United States where locals were affected by the U.S. military use of DU weapons during peacetime.
The
OT did not seem to see the importance of demonstrating to the readers that Okinawa was not an isolated case in suffering from U.S. military practices, by comparing the DUw incident and similar cases in other parts of the globe.
The OT even reiterated the false information that
the U.S. military test-fired DU weapons in special airtight facilities in the United States, as if to portray Okinawa as incomparably the worst victim. The analysis indicated that both the dependency on the KN, and Okinawa’s enormous burden of the U.S. military presence and its detrimental consequences simultaneously limited the OT’s potential to be a medium for the advancement of global networks in the struggle against the U.S. military presence.
The implication of this limitation is that the quality of
the struggle within Okinawa could be also affected.
An “information rich” population, who
has abundant access to global news via the internet or specialized publications, becomes a minority among a majority “information poor” population whose access to information is limited to the OT or other mass media institutions.
C. Thesis Contribution During the past several years the Japanese government has been waging a major campaign to change Okinawans’ perception of the U.S. military presence.
This campaign is
195
part of the process of establishing the neo-Ampo-taisei and includes the prefecture’s conservative academics.
They have worked to propagate the idea that Okinawa is the major
contributor to the regional security and that it is time to stop questioning whether or not the U.S. military bases should remain in Okinawa.
According to these academics, Okinawans
should be aware of their responsibility for regional security as part of New Japan, instead of perceiving themselves as victims of their historical problems with mainland Japan and the U.S. military presence (Takara et al., 2000).
This perspective, which received warm welcome
from advocates of the strengthened bilateral military alliance, is called the Okinawa Initiative. The aim of the Okinawa Initiative in essence is to silence the local people of Okinawa who have persistently refused the transformation of Okinawa into a high-tech sortie base for the neo-Ampo-taisei.
The pressure on Okinawan communities to accept the heavier burden of
the Japan-U.S. military alliance for corporate security has intensified.
In the midst of this
ultra-reactionary trend, this thesis joins the anti-neo-Ampo-taisei camp by highlighting the importance of identifying each locality’s distinctive problems with the U.S. military presence and how the locals want to solve those problems. As a mass media critique, the research demonstrated that the Okinawa Times, which is generally assumed to be critical of the status quo, was de facto maintaining the system by making the local people’s voices a separate entity from its own claims.
The research also
revealed that the OT was by and large dysfunctional as a medium to connect struggles against the U.S. military presence around the world and to inform the readers about the actual forces behind the multinational military operations or state remilitarization. The thesis also adds to the sociological literature on the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons abroad.
The thesis offers an account of how the U.S.-produced nuclear waste
materials, which should be securely stored in the United States, are transformed into DU weapons and are contaminating foreign lands.
There is abundant information on the
196
possible detrimental consequences of the U.S. military’s use of DU weapons in actual combat. However, its use of DU weapons at foreign bases during peacetime is relatively undocumented.
D. Future Research This research examined a political process which served to perpetuate the U.S. military presence and strengthen the Ampo-taisei by examining six claimsmakers’ claims presented in the newspaper articles following the disclosure of the DUw incident.
However,
because it examined only a limited number of claimsmakers, some perspectives might have been neglected.
For instance, the roles of the Japanese and American military-industrial
complex in controlling Okinawa as one of their footholds for generating profits could not be examined through the content analysis of the newspaper articles.
Additionally, in recent
years, there have been rising concerns among local residents throughout Okinawa that the political parties, labor unions, and peace movement organizations whose headquarters are in mainland Japan have been caught up in power struggles and have been incapable of forming citizen-centered political activities. Future research could attempt to understand additional factors which have prevented the local residents from generating sufficient political power to reduce the dangers of the U.S. military presence to their daily lives in cases not related to the use of DU weapons. However, as I mentioned in the text, Okinawa’s continued suffering under the development of the neo-Ampo-taisei has an inseparable link with suppression of economic, human and environmental justice in countries of despotic governments in Asia and beyond.
Therefore,
it is extremely important to also examine the voices of the local people in these countries whose demands for economic democracy and protection of the environment are (or will be) targeted by the strengthened U.S.-Japan military alliance on behalf of corporate investors.
197
Such research could be part of ongoing efforts to increase awareness among people throughout Japan of the indirect impacts of pro-corporate mainstream consumerism.
While
they may strongly oppose militarism, they tend to neglect these impacts, which are often directly responsible for suffering of people and environment of low-income countries.
This
awareness could be indispensable for increasing the voices of protest against the U.S.-Japan joint hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region in which Okinawa functions as one of their main footholds.
198
Bibliography
Amano, K. & Arasaki, M. (1999). Hontouni sensouga shitaino? [Really want to get involved in war?] (1st ed.). Tokyo: Gaifusha. Aniya, M., Arakaki, T., Oshiro, Y., Sashida, T., & Miyagi, Y. (1996). Okinawaha naze kichiwo kyohi suruka [Reasons why Okinawa rejects (U.S. military) bases]. Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha. Arasaki, M. & Nakano, Y. (1976). Okinawa sengoshi [History of post-war Okinawa] (1st ed.). Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. Arasaki, M. (1995). Okinawa- hansen jinushi [Okinawa-anti-war landowners] (2nd ed.). Tokyo: Koubunken Arasaki, M. (1996). Okinawa gendaishi [Contemporary history of Okinawa] (1st ed.). Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. Arasaki, M. (1997). Okinawawo shiru nihonwo shiru [Understanding Okinawa for understanding Japan] (1st ed.). Osaka: Kaihou Shuppansha. Arasaki, M. (1998). Okinawano kichiha naze arunoka [Reasons why there are U.S. military bases in Okinawa]. In H. Takaiwa (Ed.) Oshierarenakatta sensouOkinawahen: Ahagon Shoko-Iejimano tatakai [The war we were never taught]. Kanagawa: Eizou Bunka Kyokai Arasaki, M. (1999). Atarashii hankichi undouwo mezashite [Seeking a new anti-base movement]. Ke-shi Kaji, 23, 20-25. Armitage, R. (1996). Nichibei Ampo kankeino kindaika: atarashii jidaino tameno atarashii partnership [Modernization of the U.S.-Japan security relationship: New partnership for a new era]. Gaikou Forum, 40-55. Asai, M. (1995). Masukomino seijiteki donkanto miraisekininno houki [mass media’s political insensitivity and irresponsibility to the future]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), Masukomino rekishi sekininto mirai sekinin [Mass communication’s
199
responsibility to history and the future]. (pp. 41-71). Tokyo: Koubunken. Asai, M. (1997). Nichibei Ampo kankeino shintenkaito Nihonno shinro [Development of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty relationship and Japan’s direction for the future]. In M. Asai & H. Fujii (Eds.). Saishin Ampo jouhou [Most updated information on the Ampo] (pp. 14-38). Tokyo: Shakai Hihyousha. Asai, M. (1999). Nichibei shingaidorainno kokusaiteki haikei. [The Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation and trend of the international community]. In T, Yamauchi (Ed.), Nichibei Shingaidorain to Shuhen Jitaihou (pp. 3-18). [The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and laws for a situation in areas surrounding Japan]. Tokyo: Houritsu Bunkasha. Barukan kikanhei, gan tahatsuno osore: rekka urandanga genin? [Balkan veterans have higher risk of developing cancer: Can DU weapons be the cause?]. (2001, January 4). The Okinawa Times, p. 1. Baker, S. M. (1998). Some thoughts on the potential for discovering new products made with depleted uranium beneficial reuse: ’98, August 5, 1998. Department of Energy: industry partnership for uranium product development. http://www.ead.an.gov/~web/duf6_mgmt/presentations/abstract.html. Banasick, S. (2001). Beyond the workplace: The uneven development of the Japanese space-economy and the role of labor, 1965-1994. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. West Virginia University, West Virginia. Becker, R. (1998). The perpetual sanctions machine. In R. Clark (Ed.), Challenge to genocide: Let Iraq live (pp. 45-48). New York: International Action Center. Blum, W. (2000). Rogue State. Maine: Common Courage Press. Brown, B. (2001, January 10). Italy demands answers on DU. BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1109000/1109877.stm Caldicott, H. (1997). A new kind of nuclear war. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates
200
soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 18-20). New York: International Action Center. Campaign Against Depleted Uranium (1999). Written report-depleted uranium. London: International Peace Bureau. Catalinotto, J. (1997). A tale of two syndromes: Vietnam and Gulf War. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 55-60). New York: International Action Center. Catalinotto, J. & Flounders, S. (2000). Is the Israeli military using depleted-uranium weapons against the Palestinians? http://www.iacenter.org. Clark, R. (1997). An international appeal to ban DU weapons. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 21-22). New York: International Action Center. Clark, R. (1998). The devastation of Iraq by war and sanctions. In R. Clark (Ed.), Challenge to genocide: Let Iraq live (pp. 3-32). New York: International Action Center. Chomsky, N. (1997). What uncle Sam really wants (10th ed.). Tucson: Odonian Press. Chomsky, N. (1999). East Timor questions and answers with Stephen R. Shalom and Michael Albert. http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvs/Timor/qanda.htm. Chussudovsky, M. (2001). Economic Terrorism. http://iacenter.org. Constitution of Japan The. (1946). Department of Defense. (1998). The United States security strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. Department of Defense. (1998, July 17). List of Military Installations: Foreign. http://defenselink.mil/pubs/installations/foreignsummary.htm
201
Department of Defense. (1998, July 17). Military Installations Properties United States Summary. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/installations/. Department of Defense. (1998, July 17). Military Installations Properties: United States Territories. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/installations/territorysummary.htm Department of Defense. (1999, March). Report on allied contributions to the common defense: A report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. Ensign, T. (1997). Burying the past, protecting DU weapons for Future Wars. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 67 - 76). New York: International Action Center. Europe votes for DU ban. (2001, January 17). BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1121000/1121384.stm Fahey, D. (1997). Collateral damage: How U.S. troops were exposed. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 25-42). New York: International Action Center. 5/15 memo made public (1997, March 10). Weekly Times, p. 5. Flounders, S. (1997). The struggle for an independent inquiry. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 3-12). New York: International Action Center. Foerstel, L. (1997). Military and media collaborate in coverup of DU. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 61-66). New York: International Action Center. Fukuchi, H. (1992). Kichito kodomo [Children and (U.S. military) bases]. Ginowan:
202
Southern Press. Fukuchi, H. (1996). Kichito kankyo hakai: Okinawani okeru fukugou osen [(U.S. Military) bases and environmental destruction: Okinawa’s multiple pollution] (1sted.). Tokyo: Doujidaisha. Frank, L. (1997, February 10). Cleanup as challenging as building bomb. Tennesee Times, http://tennessean.com/special/oakridge/part1/frame.shtml. Furugen, S. (1995, October). Remove U.S. forces! End the tragedies! People call for return of a peaceful Okinawa. Rape case rocks Japan-U.S. ties. Dateline Tokyo, pp. 1-4. Gillert, D.J. (1997, April). Straight talk on Okinawa. American Forces Information Service News Articles. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1997/n04241997-9704243.html. Gunther, S.H. (1997). How DU shell residues poison Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 164-166). New York: International Action Center. Gushikawa Village. Toukeini miru sonmin seikatsu [Statistics of villagers’ lives]. http://www.vill.gushikawa.okinawa.jp/. Hashimoto, S. (1997). Okinawasen to Ainu heishi [The Battle of Okinawa and Ainu soldiers] (1st ed.). Tokyo: Kusanono Shuppankai. Ichikawa, F., Kakuta, M., Nakajima, T., & Noguchi, K. (Eds.). (1994). Q & A purutonium [Q & A: plutonium]. Tokyo: Riberuta Shuppan. Ikehara, S. (1997). Okinawano Kankyouni tsuite [On Okinawan environment]. In Japan Environment Association Conference in Okinawa (Ed.), Okinawano kankyouto heiwa [Okinawa’s environment and peace], (pp. 46-49). Naha: Nihon Kankyo Kaigi Okinawa Taikai Jikkou Iinkai. Inoue, S. (1999). “Futsuuni sensouga dekiru kokka” wo mezasu kokka kaizouni tsuite [On state
203
re-organization in attempt to restore “rights to fight wars]. http://www.jca.apc.org/HHK/Tokusoho/990709Inoue.html. Irei, T. (1999). Umito Okinawa- Shindofuji no shiten kara [Sea and Okinawa-from the perspective of inseparable co-existence of human and natural environment]. Iyumachi, 26, 12-17. Joint Declaration of U.S.-Japan The. (1996, April 12). Jones, T. E., (1971). Conducting political research. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. Kaku, M. (1997). Depleted Uranium: huge question of dangerous waste. In Depleted Uranium Education Project (Ed.), Metal of dishonor: Depleted Uranium – how Pentagon radiates soldiers and civilians with DU weapons (pp. 111-115). New York: International Action Center. Kamiesu, S. (1997). Rekka urandan jikenno kyuumeiwo [Call for a close examination of the DUw incident]. Ke-shi Kaji, 15, 5. Kataoka, K. (1997). “Zouno ori kuuhakuno rokkagetu kan. Chibana Shoichi sanni kiku [Interview with Mr. Chibana Shoichi-the Japanese government’s six-month-long illegal occupation of the Sobe Communication Site]. In M. Asai & H. Fujii (Eds.). Saishin Ampo jouhou [The updated information on the Ampo] (pp. 5-13). Tokyo: Shakai Hihyousha. Katsura, K. (1992). Meiji, Taishouno Journalism [Journalism in Meiji and Taishou era]. Tokyo: Iwanami Booklet. Katsura, K. (1995). Journalismno shutaiteki saiseiheno michi [The road to journalism’s subjective reform]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), Masukomino rekishi sekininto mirai sekinin [Mass communication’s responsibility to history and future]. (pp. 41-71). Tokyo: Koubunken. Kawashima, T. (1999, November 5). Dejitaru channerukaha hituyouka [Is digitalization necessary?]. Shuukan Kinyoubi, p. 34.
204
Kim, Y. Yi, J. & Yi, J. (1998). Kankokuno beigunkichi mondai [the U.S. military base problems in South Korea]. Ke-shi Kaji, 21, 19-30. Kim, K. (1999). Beigunkiti to kankokuno genjitsu [U.S. military bases and actual situations in South Korea]. Ke-shi Kaji, 22, 16-17. Koshiishi, M. (1997). Herikichi isetsuto “gyakukakusaron” [Helicopter base transfer and “reverse disparity theory”]. Ke-shi Kaji, 15, 40-41. Kroeger, A. (2001, January 25). Depleted uranium: Bosnia tests start. BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1135000/1135846.stm Kuba, M. (1997). Okinawano beigunkichito kankyou mondai [U.S. military bases in Okinawa and environmental problems]. In Japan Environment Association Conference in Okinawa (Ed.), Okinawano kankyouto heiwa [Okinawa’s environment and peace], (pp. 46-49). Naha: Nihon Kankyo Kaigi Okinawa Taikai Jikkou Iinkai. Kume Jima Kanko Kyoukai. The location of Kume Jima. http://www.kumejima.com/top/html. Mander, J. (1996). Facing the rising tide. In J. Mander & E. Goldsmith (Eds.), The case against the global economy. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. (pp. 3-19). Maryknoll World Productions. Arms for the poor [Video]. Farmington, PA: Plough Publishing. Matsurigotono atode/2000nen natsu/Okinawa Samitto (Chuu) [After the festival/ Summer 2000/Summit in Okinawa (II). (2000, July 26). The Okinawa Times, p. 27. McCormack, G. (1999, March). From the sea that divides to the sea that links: contradictions of ecological and economic development in Okinawa. Capitalism Nature Socialism. 10, 3-39. McCormack, G. & Yonetani, J. (2000). The Okinawa G-8 Summit, from below. Japan Policy Research Institute, 71, http://www.jpri.org.
205
Medoruma, S. (2000, August 2). Okinawa samittono mondaiten [The problematic points on Summit in Okinawa]. The Okinawa Times, p. 19. Military Base Affairs Office Okinawa Prefectural Government Japan. (1998). U.S. military bases on Okinawa: Current situation and issues. Naha: Okinawa Prefectural Government. Monna, N. (1983). Mishuu ja-narizumuno rekishi [History of people’s journalism]. Tokyo: Sanichi Shobou. Monna, N. (1995). Kindai Nihon hyakunenni miru masukomino rekishi sekinin [The mass media’s historical responsibility in hundred years of contemporary Japan]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), Masukomino rekishi sekininto mirai sekinin [Mass communication’s responsibility to history and future]. (pp. 11-37). Tokyo: Koubunken. Mori, S. (1998). Chousen misairumondaito Ajiano anzenhoshou [The issue on North Korean missiles and Asia’s security]. Nagasaki: Nagasaki Peace Institute. Murai, Y. (1995). Sengo Nihonha Ajiade naniwo shitekitaka [What Japan has done in Asia after the war]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), Yameru masukomito Nihon [Diseased mass communication and Japan]. Tokyo: Koubunken. Murai, Y. (1995). Kaihatu toka koukyou jigyou toka kaihatu yuushi wo utagattemiru [Examining development, public constructions, or development financing]. In Y. Kitamura and Y. Murai. (Eds.). Kaononai kokusai kikan: IMF-World Bank [International organizations without faces: IMF-World Bank] (pp. 25-46). Tokyo: Gakuyoushoin. Nago Heripo-toni Hantaisuru Kai [Association against the construction of new Marine base]. Kishimoto Nago shichouateno youseibun [Appeal letter to Kishimoto, Mayor of Nago City]. Nakachi, K. (2000, February 20). Puerutoriko/Kichito jichi (Chuu)/Shabakujou hantai tonaeru [Puerto Rico/(U.S. military) bases and autonomy (II)/Urging anti-bombing range]. The Okinawa Times, p. 6.
206
Nakajima, T. (1995). Chikyu kakuosen [Global nuclear contamination]. Tokyo: Riberuta Shuppan. Nakazato Village. Toukeini miru sonmin seikatsu [Statistics of villagers’ lives]. http://www.vill.nakazato.okinawa.jp/hp/tokei.htm. NATO says no link between depleted uranium, cancer. (January 25, 2001). Environment News Service, http://www.ens.lycos.com/ens/jan2001/2001L-01-25-15.html. Noguchi, K. (1997). Rekka urandan hassha jikenni tsuite [Analysis on the incident involving use of DU weapons]. Nihon Kagakusha Kaigi, 15-21. Okamoto, Y. (1996). Okinawa mondaiha kaiketu dekirunoka [Can we solve Okinawan problems?]. Gaikou Forum, 56-67. Okinawa Free Journalist Kaigi. (Eds.). (1994). Okinawano shinbunga tsubureruhi [The day Okinawan newspapers will be ruined]. Naha: Gekkan Okinawasha. Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2000). Outline of the U.S. facilities and areas. http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp. Okinawa Prefectural Government. (2000). U.S. facilities around Okinawa Island. http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp. Okinawa Prefectural Government Statistics Section (1996). Okinawaken shichousonmin shotoku. 4. Sangyoubetsu jun seisan [Okinawa prefecture people’s income by cities, towns, villages. 4: Production by economic sector]. Okinawa Times The. (1997). Hhyaku niju nanaman ninno jikken [The one million twohundred seventy people’s experiment] (1st ed.). Naha: The Okinawa Times Ota chiji kaiken (zenbun) [Interview with Governor Ota (entire script)]. (1998, February 7). The Okinawa Times, p. 7. Peterson, S. (1999, April 29). A special report: Part 2-The trail of a bullet. DU’s global spread spurs debate over effect on humans. Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/29/p12s3.html.
207
Peterson, S. (1999, April 30). A special report: Part 2-The trail of a bullet. Pentagon stance on DU a moving target. Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/04/30/p8sl.htm. Puerutorikono shabakujou heisa kankoku: Bei, Okinawaheno eikyou kenen [Closing of bombing range in Puerto Rico recommended: the U.S. concerns potential effects on Okinawa]. (1999, October 20). The Okinawa Times (Evening Edition), p. 1. Red Card Movement. http://www.ne.jp/~redcardm/. Rekka urandande 400nin shibouka [Could DU weapons be cause of 400 people’s deaths?]. (2001, January 10). The Okinawa Times (Evening edition), p. 1. Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation The. (1997, September). Shasetsu/Bei enshuujouno heisa/Nichibei Ampowo minaosu kyoukunni [Editorial: U.S. will close (bombing) range/Making it a lesson for review of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty]. (1999, December 5). The Okinawa Times, p. 5. Shasetsu/Kunousuru tojoukoku/ “Kyoukan” no nettowa-kuwo [Editorial: Developing countries in agony/Development of “empathetic” network]. (2000, April 24). The Okinawa Times, p. 5. Sloan, S. (1999) Sanctions, covert action, destabilization, and bombings: the U.S. plan to overthrow the government of Iraq. International Action Center. http://www.iacenter.org/usplan.htm. Suda, H. (1996). Ampoha dou kawaruka [How the Ampo is going to change]. (1st ed.). Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppansha. Sudou, H. (1995). Mass media “koukoku baitaika” no kouzou [The structure of mass media’s “medium-ization for advertizement”]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), Masukomino rekishi sekininto mirai sekinin [Mass communication’s responsibility to history and the future]. (pp. 271-277 ). Tokyo: Koubunken. Takaiwa, H. (2000). Oshierarenakatta sensou: Eiga seisaku genba, Ajia karano houkoku
208
[The war which nobody taught us: reports from Asia, location of film productions]. Kanagawa: Eizou Bunka Kyoukai. Takara, K., Oshiro, T., & Maeshiro, M. (2000). Okinawa initiative. The Okinawa Times, http://db.okina…/NEWS&format=long&year=all&month=all&nextskip=&nexttop=&subid=2
Toward a New World Order: Address before a joint session of congress. (1990, September 17). U.S. Department of State Dispatch, pp. 91-94. Tokuyama, C. (1999). Kokusai habukou no ve-ruwo hagu [The truth about the international harbor port]. Ke-shi Kaji, 23, 32-35. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America The. (1960). Tsukamoto, M. (1995). Journalismno oubeki “sekinin” no omosa [The weight of journalism’s “responsibility”]. In the Journalists Council of Japan (Ed.), masukomino rekishi sekininto mirai sekinin [Mass communication’s responsibility to history and the future]. (pp. 77-87). Tokyo: Koubunken. Tuan, Y. (1974). Topophilia. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Tsujimura, A., & Ota, M. (1966). Okinawano genron: shinbunto housou [Speech of Okinawa: newspapers and broadcasting]. Tokyo: Shiseidou. Uehara, S. (1997). Kankokuwo tazunete [My visit to South Korea]. Ke-shi Kaji, 17, 1617. Ui, J. (1996). “Akatsuchi Jourei” ha rekishini gyakkou: Kankyou gyouseino mazushisato ken yakuninno rikiryou (Jou) [“Red soil erosion regulation” runs counter to history: the poverty of environmental administration and prefectural government officials’ ability (Part I)]. Iyu Machi, 9, 44-51. Ui, J. (1999). Okinawa kankyou network dayori [Okinawan network for the environment newsletter]. Ke-shi Kaji, 23, 58-59.
209
Umebayashi, H. (1997, November). Okinawa kaiheitaino kenkyuu [Research on the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa]. Sekai, pp. 257-279. United States Forces Japan: Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. (1960). United States of America-Rights for All. (1998). New York: Amnesty International Publications. U.S. Army Environmental Policy Institute. (1995). Health and environmental consequences of depleted uranium use in the U.S. Army technical report. Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology. Uranium scare in Nishihara. (2000, June 3). The Weekly Times, p. 3. Vieques Libre (2000). Legacy of the U.S. Navy. http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/history/legacy.htm. Watanabe, O. (1998). Nihontoha douiu kunika, dokohe mukatte yukunoka [Trend of today’s Japan and its direction for the future]. Tokyo: Kyouiku Shiryou Shuppankai. Watanabe, O. (1999). Kigyou shakai – Nihonha dokohe yukunoka [Corporate Society – Japan’s direction for the future]. Tokyo: Kyouiku Shiryou Shuppankai. Yoshimura, K. (1999). Shizen kagakuto chikyu kibono kankyo mondai [Natural science and global environmental problems]. In Nihon Butsuri Gakkai Kyushu-shibu (Ed.), 1999 nendo kaki symposium – “buturi kyouikuto sono shuuhen” (V) – chikyu kankyouwo miru, shiru [1999 Summer Symposium – “Physics education and its surroundings” (Part V) – Visualizing and understanding earth’s environment]. 9-18. Zubair, M. (1999, October). Iraqu ha ima: Imadani tuzuku kubakuto keizaiseisai [Iraq today: continuing bombing and economic sanctions]. Shu-kan Kninyobi, pp. 42-45.
210
Appendix Morning edition (M) Evening edition (E) (397) Gyojou osenni tsunoru fuan/Rekka urandan gosha [Mounting fear over contamination of fishing ground/Misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 19. (396) Rekka urandan gosha/Gyojou osenni tsunoru fuan naze hayaku tsuuhousenu [Misuse of DU weapons/Mounting fear over contamination of fishing ground. Why no immediate report?]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 18. (395) Rekka urandan gosha/ “Houshanouni kawarihanai” [Misuse of DU weapons/ “Still containing radiation”]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 18. (394) De-ta machide okure/Rekka urandan gosha [Delayed report as (Japanese government) waited for data/Misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (393) Kaisetsu/ “Kyousei shiyou” ni hakyuka/Beigun, seifuheno fuan zoufuku [Commentary/ Could (disclosure of the DUw incident) affect (Japanese government’s) plan for the “forcible use” of lands for U.S. military bases?/Mounting distrust towards U.S. military and Japanese government]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (392) Shiyou kinshidan naze kokunaini [How can there be banned weapons in this country?]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (391) Rekka urandan gosha keiito seifu kaiken [Details of misuse of DU weapons and interview with Japanese government]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (390) Kaizenha kotoba bakari [Improvement is just lipservice]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (389) Beigunkiga rekka urandan gosha [U.S. military jets fire DU weapons by mistake].
211
(1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p.1. (388) Okinawa chiji/ “Tsugitugito ijou jitaida” [Governor Ota says “problems after problems”]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (386) Daigen Shougen [Column, Daigen Shougen]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (385) Rekka uran [Depleted uranium]. (1997, February 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (384) Beigunha katte houdaida [The U.S. military acts as it pleases]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 19. (381) Shasetsu/Rekka urandan hasshani odoroku [Editorial: Surprised by the use of DU weapons]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (380) “Kataroguno ayamari datta” [“There were some mistakes in the catalog”]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (378) Kishano Memo/Beigunha Okinawaga mada senryoukani…[Reporter’s Memo: The U.S. military may still believe that Okinawa is under its occupation]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (376) Kokuboushou koukanga shazai/Rekkaurandan gosha [Department of Defense higher official apologizes/Misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (375) Zainichi beigun houdoubu/Kadena danyakukoni chozou [Press Department of U.S. military in Japan/(DU weapons) stored in Kadena Ammunition Storage Site]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (373) Daigen Shougen [Column: Daigen Shougen]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (372) “Beigunha hanseino iroganai”/Rekka urandan gosha [“The U.S. military shows no sign of repentance”/Misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa
212
Times, (E), p. 5. (371) Tousho, tsuuhouno hituyou nashito handan [(The U.S. military) decided no need for reporting (the DUw incident), at first]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 5. (369, 366) Rekka urandan gosha/ “Renraku taiseino kakuritsuwo” [Misuse of DU weapons/ “Establish a reporting system”]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (368, 365) Tuuhou okurede shushou chinsha [Prime Minister apologizes for delaying report]. (1997, February 12). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (363) Rekka urandan chozou [DU weapons being stored]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 21. (362) Shasetsu/Danyakuko tekkyoshika nainoda [Editorial: There is no other measure than removing ammunition storage site]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (361) Rekka urandanto shitte shiyou [(U.S. military) knowingly fired DU weapons]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (358) Oni-ru souryoujiga shazai [O’Neill, U.S. Consul General in Okinawa apologizes]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (357) Kawatteinai kotonakare shugi [Unchanged (Ministry of Foreign Affair’s) attitude of avoiding difficult situations]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (356) [Rekka urandan gosha](1)/Beikaiheitai kunrenno shougeki [Misuse of DU weapons (1)/U.S. Marine Corps’ shocking exercises]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (353) Zettaini younin dekinu “boukyo” kengikai guntokui [Absolutely unacceptable “violence”]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (352) Yoshimoto fukuchijiga kougi [Vice Governor Yoshimoto protests]. (1997,
213
February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (350) Rekka urandan/Bei wangansensoude hatsu shiyou [Depleted uranium/U.S. used them for first time during Gulf War]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (349) Seifu, gosha mondaide kankyou chousa jisshihe [Japanese government soon conducts environmental examinations following misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (348) Josei houbei youseidan [The women’s delegation members (make appeals) in the United States]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (347) Rekka urandanno tekkyowo [Remove DU weapons]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (346, 344) Konbanno Wadai/Rekka urandan [Column: Konbanno Wadai/DU weapons]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (345, 343) Sunpyo Sunbyo [Column: Sunpyo Sunbyo]. (1997, February 13). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (342) Rekka urandan goshade kougi aitsugu [Spreading protest against use of DU weapons]. (1997, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 29. (337) Shichousonno koe tsutaeru [Delivering the voices of cities, towns and villages]. (1997, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (336) Rekka urandande kougi yousei/Yanaguchikento Iwakunishiga gaimushou [Yamaguchi prefecture and Iwakuni city make a protest visit to Ministry of Foreign Affairs against (use of) DU weapons]. (1997, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (327) Konbanno Wadai/Gomakashino kakuremino [Column: Konbanno Wadai/Coverups and lies]. (1997, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 8. (326, 325) Kengikai kaimaku/Rekka urandande kougi ketsugi [Prefectural assembly
214
opens/Adopts protest resolution against DU weapons]. (1997, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (323) “Danno kaishu, tekkyowo” [“Recover and remove (DU) weapons”]. (1997, February 15). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 31. (319) Goshamondai tadasu [Okinawa prefecture questions the problems surrounding the DUw incident]. (1997, February 15). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (313) Urandan goshade/Ikarino gaitou kougi [The DUw incident/Angry street protest]. (1997, February 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 21. (311) Ampo to Okinawa/Rekka urandan gosha (3) [The Ampo and Okinawa/Misuse of DU weapons (3)]. (1997, February 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (307) Rekka urandan gosha (4) [Misuse of DU weapons (4)]. (1997, February 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (306) Morotomi choukan kouginonaka Schwab wo shisatu [Chief Cabinet Secretary, Morotomi visits Schwab in midst of strong protest]. (1997, February 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (305) Kaisetu/kakeashi raikenno koukaha [Commentary/Any effects of (Morotomi’s) brief visit to Okinawa?]. (1997, February 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (301) Kento kengikai/rekka urandanno tekkyowo [Prefectural Government and Assembly/ “Remove DU weapons”]. (1997, February 17). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (300, 299) Gosha mondaiha ikan [Ota regrets the misuse of DU weapons]. (1997, February 17). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (297) Nagata chouni Okinawano ikari [Sending Okinawa’s anger to Nagata-chou]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 19. (296) Urandan tekkyo seyo/Kume Jima nisonga kougiketsugi [Remove DU weapons/Two Kume Jima Villages adopt protest resolutions]. (1997, February 18).
215
The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 19. (293) Hyousou shinsou/Houkaiseihe kankyou dukurimo [Column: Hyousou shinsou/(Japanese government) prepares for revision of (Special Land Lease) Law]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (290) Rekka urandan gosha/Beikaiheitai kunrenno shageki (5) [Misuse of DU weapons/U.S. military’s bombing practices]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (289) Hashimoto-Ota kaidan shinario kuruu/ “Rekka uran” ga mizusasu [Unpredicted change/ “DU” interferes with the expected scenario of Hashimoto-Ota talk]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (288) “Shisetsu-kuikinai” mo tuuhoutaishouhe [(Accidents and incidents) “within areas and facilities” also become subjects of reporting]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (287) “5.15 memo” kouhyouwo kentou [(The Japanese government) considers opening the “5.15 memo”]. (1997, February 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (280) “Pasokonde haisai” (74) [Special series on benefits of using personal computers] (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 29. (277) Shasetu/Kinpakukano Hashimoto-Ota kaidan [Editorial: Hashimoto-Ota talk held under strained circumstances]. (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (275) Kokkai ronsen/Okinawa kichi mondai [National assembly dispute/(U.S. military) base problems in Okinawa]. (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (273) Urandan tekkyowo ketsugi [Adopting a resolution for removal of DU weapons]. (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (271) Jintai kankyouni ijounashi [No effects on human body and environment]. (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
216
(268) Daigen Shougen [Column: Daigen Shougen]. (1997, February 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (264) Shasetsu/Kenminno shuchouwo houmuru ugokida [Editorial: The move against the demands of the Okinawan people]. (1997, February 20). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (262) Ota chiji/ “Heiryoku sakugenshika nai” [Governor Ota, “There is no alternative choice but a reduction of the (U.S.) forces”]. (1997, February 20). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (253) Rekka urandan hassha/Kume Jima hibakuno kanouseimo [Use of DU weapons/ Kume Jima possibility of being exposed to radiation]. (1997, February 20). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 9. (250) Fudankyou kougini beisouryouji [Association of women’s groups makes protest visit to U.S. consulate general]. (1997, February 21). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 29. (248) Sochihou kaisei “ketsuron dete inai” [Revision of Special Land Lease Law/ “not reaching a conclusion”]. (1997, February 21). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (244, 243) Sunpyou Sunbyou [Column: Sunpyou Sunbyou]. (1997, February 21). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (241) Kume Jima/nijyuu yokkani toumin soukekki taikai [Kume Jima/Rally will be held on the 24th]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 31. (239) “Mou inoru dakeda”/Hashimoto shushou chijitono saikaidanni kitai [“All I can do is pray”/Prime Minister Hashimoto hopes for reopening of talks with Governor Ota]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (237) Gaishouga Okinawa iri [Minister of Foreign Affairs visits Okinawa]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (236) “Urandan” kakuninni doryoku [(Okinawa prefectural government) makes effort to confirm whereabouts of “DU weapons”]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa
217
Times, (M), p. 2. (235) Seifu/ “5.15 memo” kouhyouhe [Japanese government/Opening the “5.15 memo”]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (233) Seigenikinaino shuzaiwo kyohi [(U.S. military) denies permission for media to enter restricted area]. (1997, February 22). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 5. (230) Shasetsu/Itsumade zusan kichikanri [Editorial: (U.S. military’s) irresponsible base-management continues]. (1997, February 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (222) Rekka urandan mondai [The problems surrounding DU weapons]. (1997, February 24). The Okinawa Times, (E), p.9. (221) Touminno aidani osen fuan [Islanders’ mounting fear of contamination]. (1997, February 24). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 9. (220) Okinawano futan keigenni saidai doryoku [(U.S. government) announces effort for reduction of Okinawans’ burden for U.S. military bases]. (1997, February 24). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (219) Gushiken, M. (1997, February 25). Sakebu Kume Jima “inochi mamore”/Rekka urandan kougi [Kume Jima shouts “protect lives”/protesting (use of ) DU weapons]. The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (218) Nanimo nai/Arunoha musuuno fuhatsudan/Tori Shima chousa [There is nothing but numerous unexploded shells/Examination at Tori Shima]. (1997, February 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (217) Fuan “zoushoku”/Imaiyu “uren” [“Escalating” fear/People are “not buying” imaiyu (fresh fish)]. (1997, February 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (211) Kume Jimade Juumin taikai/Shabaku gekijouno henkanwo [A rally in Kume Jima/Demanding return of bombing range]. (1997, February 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (209) “Rekka urandan hassha” de soukekki takai [Protest rally against “use of DU
218
weapons” held]. (1997, February 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (208) Sabetsuha izentuduku [Continuing discrimination]. (1997, February 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 22. (205) Rekka urandan kankyou eikyou chousa [Environmental examination to find the effects of DU weapons]. (1997, February 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (204) “Tori Shima” kankyou chousa [Environmental examination at “Tori Shima”]. (1997, February 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (199) Shasetsu/ “Ijounashi” de sumasarenu [Editorial: (Japanese government) cannot get away with simply stating, “there are no effects”]. (1997, February 27). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (198) Kengikai rekka urandande chiji [Prefectural assembly/Governor speaks on the DU weapons]. (1997, February 27). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (189) “5.15 memo”/Bei zenmen koukaini nanshoku [The “5.15 memo”/The U.S. showing difficulty with complete disclosure of the memo]. (1997, February 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (188) Beigun chousa maeni osen dojou tekkyo [U.S. military removed contaminated soil prior to examination]. (1997, February 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (187) Rekka urandan/Enshuuno sokuji chuushiwo [DU weapons/Demanding an immediate halt to bombing practices]. (1997, February 28). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (182) Shasetsu/Koukaino daizenteiha “zenmen” da [Editorial: The major premise for opening the memo is a “complete” opening]. (1997, March 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (179) Hirogaru giwaku fuan rekka urandan hasshani PCB osen [Use of DU weapons and PCB contamination spread suspicion and fear]. (1997, March 2). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 9.
219
(175) Zu-mu appu/ “Urandan” kikkakeni/Kyougi kikanwo, kenga youbou/ “Sanshakyou” fukkatsuno ugoki [Column: Zu-mu appu/Prefectural government hopes to resume local talks between Okinawa prefectural government, Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau and U.S. military in Okinawa as the result of the “DU weapons” (incident)]. (1997, March 3). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (173) 5.15 memo [The 5.15 memo]. (1997, March 4). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (162) Ken, tokusouhouni hantai kyouchou [Prefectural government emphasizes its opposition against (revision of) Special Land Lease Law]. (1997, March 7). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (156) Henkangomo kichi jiyuu shiyou [Even after (Okinawa’s) reversion to Japan, (U.S. military) has been using the bases as freely as it had been]. (1997, March 8). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (152) 5.15 memo (Jou)/Kichi koteikano keiyaku [The 5.15 memo (I)/The contract for the permanent settlement of (U.S. military) bases]. (1997, March 9). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (150) 5.15 memo (Ge)/Kichi kotekano keiyaku [The 5.15 memo (II)/The contract for the permanent settlement of (U.S. military) bases]. (1997, March 11). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (139) Seiji Q & A/Beigun kichi 5.15 memo [Politics Q & A/The U.S. military bases and the 5.15 memo]. (1997, March 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (122, 121) Tokusouhou kaiseini hantai/Nakazato songikaiga ketsugi saitaku [Opposing revision of Special Land Lease Law/Nakazato village assembly adopts a protest resolution]. (1997, March 25). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (120) Hashimoto-Ota kaidanno youshi [Summary of Hashimoto-Ota talk]. (1997, March 25). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 6. (117) Tori Shima shabakugekijou/Bakudan shori [The Tori Shima artillery range/disposal of bombs]. (1997, March 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 4.
220
(116) Mondaitenwo miru/Chakudanchiha minkato meto hanano saki [Examining the problem /Impacted area of bomb was just a stone’s throw from a private home]. (1997, March 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 4. (115) Q & A/Seifuha naze kakushitagaru [Q & A/Why Japanese government wanted to keep (the 5.15 memo) secret]. (1997, March 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 4. (114) Ota chiji kishakaiken youshi [Summary of interview with Governor Ota]. (1997, March 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (112) Shasetsu/Be-ru hagitorushika nai [Editorial: Veil of secrecy should be torn away]. (1997, March 27). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (111) Rekka urandan niyoru Tori Shimano kankyou chousa [Environmental effects of DU weapons on Tori Shima examined]. (1997, March 27). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (107) Tuuhou taiseino kaizensakude goui [Agreement reached on the reformed reporting system]. (1997, April 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (106) Kennai shichouson/gikaiha “hantai” ni ninoashi [Prefectures’ cities, towns and villages/assemblies hesitant to “oppose” against (the revision of the Special Land Lease Law)]. (1997, April 4). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 30. (105) Ima iitai (5)/Kichi-Tokusouhou kaisei/Beigun enshuuni ikidouru Kume Jima Gyokyou chouno Uehara Kouichi san [Special series: Expressing Voices (5)/The revision of the Special Land Lease Law/The chair of Kume Jima’s fishers’ union, Uehara Kouichi expresses his anger against the U.S. military exercises]. (1997, April 8). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (100, 101) Tori Shima-Beigun rekkadan/Dojoukara kounoudo uran [U.S. military’s use of DU weapons at Tori Shima/High level of uranium detected from soil]. (1997, April 22). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (99) Tori Shima uran kenshutsu [High level of uranium detected at Tori Shima]. (1997, April 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23.
221
(98) Kankyou chousaha konnanto Gaimushou/Iwakuni kichino rekka urandan [Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains it is difficult to conduct environmental examination/DU weapons at U.S. military base in Iwakuni]. (1997, April 23). The OkinawaTimes, (M), p. 23. (97) Shasetsu/Yaharideta kounoudo uran [Editorial: Expected high level of uranium detected]. (1997, April 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (96) Ken, gendankaideha komento dekinu/Rekka urandan jiken [Prefecture cannot comment on (high level of uranium detected at Tori Shima)/The DU weapons incident. (1997, April 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (95) Beigun rekkadan/Kounoudo uranwo kenshutu [The U.S. military/DU weapons/High level of uranium detected]. (1997, April 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (93) Rekka urandan tekkyo motome shuukai [A rally for removal of DU weapons]. (1997, April 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 19. (92) Zanzon urandan/ “Souki tekkyo seyo”/Kume Jima daihyoudan beigawahe yousei [Remaining DU weapons/ “Remove immediately”/Kume Jima representatives make an appeal to the U.S.]. (1997, May 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (91, 90) Tachiiri kyokasezu/Urandande Beigun Iwakuni kichi [U.S. military at Iwakuni base denies (local municipalities) entry to base for investigation on DU weapons]. (1997, May 1). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (88) Beigunniyoru kihonteki jinkenno shingai/Naniyue Okinawa dakega [Fundamental human rights violation by the U.S. military/Why only Okinawa (is victimised)…]. (1997, May 3). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (81) Beigun heri buhin rakka/shino kikento tonari awase [The U.S. military’s helicopter part falls/living side by side with a death threat]. (1997, May 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 31. (79) Kaba-paneru otosu/Futenma shozoku CH53 heri/Mata tsuuhou okure [A cover panel falls/A CH53 helicopter belonging to Futenma (Air Station)/delaying report
222
once again]. (1997, May 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (78) Kankyou asesuno hitsuyousei kyouchou [(Lawyers association) emphasizes the necessity of environmental assessment]. (1997, May 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (76) Kichi tachiiri/ “SACO goui” mushi [Entering (U.S. military) bases/ “SACO agreement” being ignored]. (1997, May 21). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (75) Nyu-su danmen/Nichibeino goui, kinousezu [Column: Nyu-su danmen/ dysfunctional agreement between U.S. and Japan]. (1997, May 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p.2. (G) Rekka urandanno eikyouha nai/Kagichou kentoukai houkoku [No effects of DU weapons/The Science and Technology’s evaluation committee reports]. (1997, June 19). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (F) Rekka urandan hassha mondai/Zen jumin kenshinno jisshi yousei/Nakazato, Gushikawano ryou sonchou [The DU weapons incident/Health examination for all residents/Mayors of Nakazato and Gushikawa villages request]. (1997, June 20). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (D) Rekka uran saichousamo/Shoukougun kanrende Beigikai kouchoukai [Reexamination of DU weapons/U.S. Congress holds public hearing on (DU weapons) in relation to Gulf War Syndrome]. (1997, June 25). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (A) Beikain
kouchoukai/Rekka
urandanno
eikyoude
tairitsu
[U.S.
House
of
Representatives/Conflicting views on the effects of DU weapons]. (1997, June 27). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1 (73) Kengikai daihyou shitsumon [Representatives questioned prefectural government at assembly]. (1997, July 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (70) Chihyou roshutsuno kanousei shiteki/Beigun kenkyuusho [Possibility of soil erosion pointed out/The U.S. military research institute]. (1997, July 14). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
223
(68, 67) Rekka urandanwo zenmen tekkyo/ “Kadena” kara Kankokuhe [DU weapons completely removed/Transferred from “Kadena” to South Korea]. (1997, August 15). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 2. (66) “Mada anshin dekinu”/ “Tori Shimade kaishuu isoge” [“We still cannot feel safe”/ “Hurry up on (DU weapons) recovery at Tori Shima”]. (1997, August 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 21. (65) Shasetsu/Dounatteiru tsuuhou taisei [Editorial/Effectiveness of reporting system questioned]. (1997, August 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (64) Tekkyoha kaiheitai kichinomi/Kadena Danyakukoni nao giwaku/Rekka urandan [The removal of (DU weapons) were only from U.S. Marine Corps’ bases/Presence of DU weapons at Kadena Ammunition Storage Site still unclear/DU weapons]. (1997, August 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (63) Naze renraku shinai [Why do they fail to report?]. (1997, August 16). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (62, 61) Rekka urandanno Kankoku isouwo hitei/Beikan rengougun shireibu [(Information on) transfer of (DU weapons) from (Okinawa) to South Korea denied/ U.S.-South Korea Allied Forces Headquarters]. (1997, August 16). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (59) Rekka urandanha Bei hondoni [DU weapons transferred to the U.S. mainland]. (1997, August 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (58) Kichimondaini zenmen kyouryoku/Hagi choukan Ota chijito kaidan [Hagi promises dedicated support on U.S. military-related problems/Governor Ota talks with Defense Facilities Administration Bureau’s chief secretary, Hagi-Governor Ota]. (1997, August 20). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (56) Tori Shimano zanzondan tekkyo moushiire/Rekka urande ken [Prefecture requests removal of remaining DU weapons from Tori Shima]. (1997, August 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
224
(55) Shichou 97: Arasaki Moriteru/Futatsuno Kankoku/Kichini fuanno minshuu shiyani/Hanbeigunundou zenkokuni kakudai [Column: Shichou 97 (Arasaki Moriteru)/Two South Koreas/We must include Korean people’s anxiety with (U.S military) bases/Spreading anti-U.S. military movement across the country]. (1997, August 27). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 16. (53) Shasetsu/Kenminno mokuhyouwo toikaesou [Editorial: Remember the objectives of the people of the prefecture]. (1997, August 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (50) Rondan/Mayonaka Shinaya/Hankichi undou/Okinawa-Kankoku kouryuuno tabi [Column: Platform (Mayonaka Shinaya)/Anti-base movement/visit for OkinawaSouth Korea exchange]. (1997, September 10). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 10. (48) Rekka urandan jiken/Seifuno soukyuuna taiouwo/Kume Jimano ryou sonchouga yousei [The DUw incident/The Japanese government should take a swift measure/Kume Jima’s two mayors make an appeal]. (1997, October 2). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (44) Rondan/Hontouno heiwato anzenwo/Shin gaido rainha sensouheno michi [Column: Platform/Asking for true peace and safety/The new Guidelines: a road to war]. (1997, November 15). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (39) “Kyu-jyu nana nen kennai kaiko” (Jou) [“Recollection of events in the prefecture” (I)]. (1997, December 29). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (34) Shinpomo kaisai/Rekka uran/Hibaku 40mannin/Wangansensou shoukougunwo houkoku/Bei dantai [Symposium will be held/Depleted uranium/400,000 people exposed to radiation/Report on Gulf War Syndrome/A U.S. organization]. (1998, March 3). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 5. (32) [Shichou 98]/Arasaki Moriteru/Shigatu jyuushichinichiwo kiokusuru imi/Kichi saihende gunji kyouryoku kyouka/Tekkyokoso hibouryoku shakaiheno ippo [Column: Shichou 98 (Arasaki Moriteru)/Meaning of remembering April 17th/Restructuring (U.S. military) bases for escalation of military cooperation/Removal (of U.S. military bases) is first step towards a non-violent society]. (1998, March 30). The Okinawa Times. (M), p. 7.
225
(26) Asukara kankyou chousa/Tori Shimano rekka urandan gosha [Environmental examination starts tomorrow/Misuse of DU weapons at Tori Shima]. (1998, April 29). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 23. (25) [Shichou 98]/Arasaki Moriteru/Seigi, kousei, heiwatoha nanika/Rekka urandan, jintai jikkendeha?/Jinken fuminijiru Beito Nihon [Column: Shichou 98 (Arasaki Moriteru)/What are justice and peace?/Was the DU weapons (incident) a human experiment?/The U.S. and Japan violate human rights]. (1998, April 30). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 18. (21) Kyukashode futatabi kaishuu/Tori Shima Shabakugekijouno rekka urandan [(DU weapons) recovered at the nine sites again/DU weapons at the Tori Shima bombing range]. (1998, May 3). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (15) Shasetsu/Kichino kankyou osen taisaku isoge [Editorial: Take swift measures to tackle environmental contamination in (U.S. military) bases]. (1998, June 17). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (14) Shasetsu/Sarinno chozou [Editorial: Sarin stored]. (1998, July 5). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (13) Howaito bi-chi/Suityuu houshasenryouritu jitsuha sanbai datta [White Beach/Level of radiation was three times higher]. (1998, July 18). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (12) Beigun heri tsuiraku jiko [U.S. military helicopter crashes]. (1998, July 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 27. (9) Shasetsu/Kichi kankyou mondai/Boushi, joukasakuno seidokawo [Editorial: (U.S. military) bases’ environmental problems/Establish protection and cleanup policy]. (1998, August 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (7) Shasetsu/Kichino kankyou mondai [Editorial: (U.S. military) bases’ environmental problems]. (1998, September 10). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (6) Rekka uran chousa kekka [Result of the environmental examinations on (effects of) DU]. (1998, September 10). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
226
(3) Enshuuno chuushi motomenai/ “Rekka urandan” de gaimushou [Not requesting to halt (U.S. military) exercises/The Ministry of Foreign Affairs answers on the “DU weapons” incident]. (1998, September 30). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (1) Rekka uransetsu hitei/Ganha doku gasuga geninto Beikoku [Theory of DU connection denied/U.S. says cause of cancer is poison gas]. (1998, December 4). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 6. (-1) Kaisetsu/Jikkouseino kakuhoga jyuuyou [Commentary: It is important to assure practicability]. (1999, February 14). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-3) Daigen Shougen [Column: Daigen Shougen]. (1999, April 21). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (-4) Kosobo funsou/NATO gun Yu-gosurabia kuubaku [Conflict in Kosovo/NATO’s air raid against Yugoslavia]. (1999, April 22). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-5) Shasetsu/Yu-go kuubaku/Okinawawo shutsugeki kichini suruna [Editorial/Air raid against Yugoslavia/Don’t make Okinawa a sortie base]. (1999, April 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (-6) Kosobo funsou doronumakano haikei (1) [Background of dragging conflict in Kosovo (1)]. (1999, April 24). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 7. (-7) Kosobo funsou doronumakano haikei (4) [Background of dragging conflict in Kosovo (4)]. (1999, April 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 4. (-13) Iraquno genjou shoukai [Iraqi situation introduced]. (1999, May 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 16. (-14) Kosobo funsou/NATO Yu-gosurabia kuubaku [Conflict in Kosovo/NATO’s air raid against Yugoslavia]. (1999, May 15). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-16) Takamura gaishouto kichishozai shuchou kondan [Minister of Foreign Affairs Takamura talks with heads of municipalities occupied by (U.S. military) bases]. (1999, May 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
227
(-17) Kaisetsu/Kuichigai miseru kento kuni/Heri tsuiraku genin fukouhyou [Commentary: Prefectural and Japanese governments show discrepancy/Failed to publicize cause of helicopter crash]. (1999, June 15). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-18) Kosobo funsou/Wangan shoukougun Kosobodemo [Kosovo conflict/Gulf War Syndrome in Kosovo]. (1999, June 23). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 4. (-19) Rekka urandan haizetsuwo [Abolish DU weapons]. (1999, July 19). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (-20) Rekka urandanno eikyou chousahe [Examination on effects of DU weapons will be held]. (1999, August 13). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 6. (-21) Sensouno sanjou, shashinde/Okinawashi shokurou “Iraquno kodomotachi” ten [Learn horror of war through photographs/Okinawa city staff union holds exhibition “Iraqi children”]. (1999, August 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 16. (-22) Kaiyou shinsousui shisetsuni ichioku sanzen gohyaku manen [One hundred thirty million yen appropriated for deep ocean water facility]. (1999, August 28). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 3. (-26) Yu-go kuubakuni rekkaurandan/NATO ga shiyou kakunin [DU weapons used in Air raid against Yugoslavia/NATO confirmed use]. (2000, March 22). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-28) Tori Shimano gosha urandan [Misused DU weapons at Tori Shima]. (2000, April 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-30) Rekka urandan mitsukarazu/Beigunga Tori Shima chousa [DU weapons not found/U.S. military examines Tori Shima]. (2000, May 20). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-31) Giwakuno heiki “soukyuu tekkyowo”/Rekka urandan hokan [Weapons in suspicion/“remove immediately”/DU weapons stored]. (2000, May 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 25. (-32) Kadenani rekka urandan/Beigun, danyakuko hokan mitomeru [DU weapons
228
(stored) at Kadena/U.S. military confirms storage of (DU weapons) at ammunition storage site]. (2000, May 25). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (-34) Shasetsu/Rekka urandan/Ichinichimo hayai tekkyowo motomeru [Editorial: DU weapons/We demand removal as soon as possible]. (2000, May 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (-35) Rekka uran tekkyowo [Remove DU weapons]. (2000, May 26). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-36) Minkanchideno Beigun/Shageki kunrenni kougi/Kyousantou keni [U.S. military carries out live-fire exercises on private land]. (2000, May 26). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (-38) Sanrenkyou/Tekkyo moushiirehe [Sanrenkyou made an appeal for removal of DU weapons]. (2000, May 26). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-41) Konshuu jyuuni rekkauran chousa/Inamine chiji, Bei kuugun hokande [Investigation on DU (weapons) this week/Governor Inamine comments on U.S. Air Forces’ storing DU weapons]. (2000, May 29). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-43) Urandan yakkyou/Minkan gyoushani ryuushutu/Beigun kanri taiseini gimonno koe [Private scrapyard owner gets to purchase DU shell casings/Concerned voices expressed on U.S. military’s management (of hazardous spent shells)]. (2000, May 31). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-46) Shasetsu/Urandan yakkyou/Fuan zoufuku saseru kanri taisei [Editorial: DU shell casings/(U.S. military’s) management system raises anxiety]. (2000, June 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (-47) Urandan ryuushutsu/Ken noudo kensawo youkyuu [DU ammunition found/ Prefectural government demands (the level of uranium) examined]. (2000, June 1). The Okinawa Times, (M), p.1 (-48) Juuminni fuan hirogaru/Rekka urandan yakkyou ryuushutsu [Spreading fear among residents/DU shell casings found on private land]. (2000, June 1). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 5.
229
(-49) Kensade ijou nashi/Rekka urandan yakkyou ryuushutsu [The examination showed no effects of (DU)/DU shell casings found on private land]. (2000, June 1). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-52) Rekka urandan yakkyouni “ijounashi”/Zusanna kanrini ikari [“No effects” of DU shell casings/Anger against irresponsible management]. (2000, June 2). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 27. (-56) Rekka urandan yakkyou ryuushutsu/ “Gyoushano nyuusatsu kiroku nai” [DU shell casings found on private land/ “No record on (scrapyard) owner’s bid]. (2000, June 3). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-57) Rekka urandan ryuushutsu yakkyou/Tori Shima gosha igaino kanousei [DU shell casings found on private land/Possibility of use of (DU weapons) other than the incident at Tori Shima]. (2000, June 3). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 1. (-58) Sunpyou sunbyou [Column: Sunpyou sunbyou]. (2000, June 3). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-59) Nyu-su kinen kei/Rekka urandan yakkyou ryuushutu mondai/Okinawade shiyou? izen nokoru ginen [Column: Nyu-su kinen kei/DU shell casings found on private land/Were they expended in Okinawa? Suspicion still remains]. (2000, June 4). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 24. (-61) Rekka urandan ryuushutsu yakkyou/Nishihara chougikaiga kougiketsugi [DU shell casings found on private land/Nishihara town assembly adopts a protest resolution]. (2000, June 5). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 1. (-66) Ryuushutsu keiroha izen fumei/Rekka urandan/Ken, Beigunni tadasu [DU shell casings’ route to private scrapyard owner still remains unclear/DU weapons/Prefectural government questions U.S. military]. (2000, June 8). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 5. (-68) Rekka urandan yakkyou/ “Dojoumo anzen” to kuni houkoku [DU shell casings/ “Soil is also safe,” government reports]. (2000, June 9). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2.
230
(-69) Watashino shutyou anatano iken/Heiwano jitsugenhe senkyoni kanshinwo [Letters to the editor: If you want to bring peace, get interested in the election]. (2000, June 10). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 5. (-72) Urazoe shigikaiga kougi ketsugi/Rekka urandan yakkyou ryuushutu [Urazoe city assembly adopts protest resolution/DU shell casings found on private land]. (2000, June 12). The Okinawa Times, (E), p. 7. (-74) Senryaku handanha jiki shousou [Too early for deciding military strategy]. (2000, June 22). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 2. (-75) G8 Okinawa Samitto (8)/NGO koudousuru chikyuushimin [G8 Okinawa Summit (8)/NGO’s active global citizens]. (2000, June 29). The Okinawa Times, (M), p. 16.
