International Conference
N Nu ucclleeaarr E En neerrg gyy ffo orr N Neew wE Eu urro op pee 2 20 00 09 9 Bled / Slovenia / September 14-17
Transits of Nuclear Materials and Certain High-activity Sources through Slovenia in the Last Decade Polona Tavčar, Janez Češarek, Igor Osojnik, Maksimilijan Pečnik Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration Železna cesta 16, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
[email protected],
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[email protected] ABSTRACT Fresh nuclear fuel is shipped regularly to Slovenia for operation of the nuclear power plant. Other shipments of (fissile) nuclear materials are fewer and take place at random intervals. An important event was the return of Slovenian spent fuel from TRIGA research reactor in 1999 and transits of highly enriched spent nuclear fuel from research reactors on their way to Russia or USA. In order to contribute to the nuclear non-proliferation, Slovenia, like many other countries, does not impede transits of such nuclear material. In the last decade, all together six transits through Slovenia occurred. Countries of origin of irradiated fuel were Italy and Romania in 1999, Austria in 2006, Romania and Hungary in 2008. There was also a transit of non-irradiated fuel from Italy in 2008. All shipments left Slovenia through the Port of Koper and continued their journey by ship either to USA or to Russia. All transits were performed by road. The only exception was the shipment of spent fuel from Hungary to Russia in autumn 2008. It was performed by train from Hungarian research reactor to Port of Koper. Involvement of experienced Slovenian carriers facilitated administrative, technical procedures and logistic. The physical protection was approved by Ministry of the Interior and assured through the police. A team of Slovenian radiation protection experts accompanied each shipment. Several shipments of high-activity sources were also in transit through Slovenia in past years. Last significant shipment was a transit of several PBq sources from Hungary through Slovenia to Egypt. 1
INTRODUCTION
International activities in the non-proliferation are closely related to the research reactor spent fuel take back programmes, the United States of America Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) acceptance programme and the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) programme [1]. Highly enriched uranium (HEU), used in numerous research reactors around the world could be diverted to production of nuclear weapons. For this reason all HEU in fresh and spent fuel is to be returned to the countries of origin, to Russia or USA respectively. After return, the material stays at reprocessing plants in highly secured areas compared to research reactor facilities worldwide. Slovenia has returned 219 fuel elements to the USA in 1999 and has opportunity to return the rest of it research reactor fuel till mid 2019. 1307.1
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Due to its geographic position and positive attitude to nuclear non-proliferation Slovenia has become a transit country for several such shipments. Shipments of nuclear material transited Slovenia mostly from Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Romania. The transport from Romania via Hungary and Slovenia to the USA or to Russia is obviously not the shortest way to the sea port. The reasons for transits through Slovenia are mostly good rail, road and Port of Koper infrastructures and well established administrative, safety and security infrastructure. The countries of origin and recipient countries tried to find alternative shorter routes. However due to lack of cooperation of certain continental countries the shipments are not feasible within acceptable time limits. Transport to the coast of Black Sea and further through the Bosporus Strait and to high seas seams to be difficult because of administrative hurdles. Air transport is applicable only in case of relatively small amounts of irradiated spent fuel. Therefore it seems that the transit through Slovenia to the Port of Koper is the only feasible option at present. Due to this Slovenian organisations involved in administrative arrangement, assurance of physical protection and radiation safety and those involved in logistic of transport had developed high level of skills in this particular area of activities.
Figure 1: Loading of the vessel with the spent fuel from Hungary in Port of Koper [2]. 2
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
The Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) is beside the Ministry of the Interior the principal competent authority for licensing of transits of nuclear material and high-activity sources. For the transit of nuclear material and so called “sources with important activity” (i.e. those exceeding IAEA levels for Category II) it is necessary (according to the Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act [3]) to obtain the license for the transit. In case of transit of spent nuclear fuel, the SNSA issues consent according to the EU Shipment directive [4]. In case of transit of nuclear material the carrier should obtain also the license for carrying out radiation practice - transportation of nuclear material. The carrier should additionally comply with Modal regulations requirements (ADR/RID/IMO/ICAO) [5]. Based on opinion of the SNSA, the cask certificate that is subject to multilateral approval is revalidated by the Minister of the Environment and Spatial Planning. Based on the carrier’s notification the Ministry of the Interior in co-operation with other state organisations prepares the “design basis threat” for every shipment of (fissile) nuclear material. The Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe, Bled, Slovenia, Sept. 14-17, 2009
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physical protection plan is prepared by the carrier and later approved by the Ministry of the Interior. 3
DATA ON THE PAST TRANSITS AND INVENTORY
In the last decade, all together six transits of nuclear material through Slovenia occurred. In 1999, together with the Slovenian high enriched spent fuel from TRIGA research reactor, two other shipments of spent fuel passed through Slovenia. There was a shipment of spent fuel from Romania and from Italy. All three shipments were loaded on a vessel in the Port of Koper. The spent fuel from Danish and German research reactors were already on board. The material from Slovenian, Italian and Romanian research reactors were loaded and joined shipment travelled further via Portugal to the USA [6]. In December 2005, the transit of spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor SiemensArgonout, Graz, Austria via Slovenia to the Port of Koper was carried out. The cargo was loaded on a ship and transported to the USA [7]. At the end of July 2008, a road transport of irradiated fuel from Romania took place from Dolga vas to the Port of Koper. The shipment consisted of two packages with app. 600 irradiated elements, containing HEU. The consignor was the Institute for Nuclear Research (Pitesti), Romania. The total activity amounted to 4778 TBq. On the same vessel, bound for the USA, another shipment was loaded, namely non-irradiated enriched uranium. This road shipment derived from Italy (Ispra). The total activity of this shipment was 66 GBq. In the middle of September 2008, a rail transport of irradiated fuel from a Hungarian research reactor was carried out. There were 798 irradiated fuel elements either highly or low enriched. The total activity amounted to 6657 TBq. This shipment was carried out by a special train (Figure 2). The fuel was loaded into 8 containers, each containing two casks. The rail transport between the Hungarian research reactor and the Port of Koper was followed by loading the containers onto the vessel that travelled across the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean to the port of Murmansk (north of the Russian Federation) [8].
Figure 2: Transport of irradiated fuel from Budapest to the Port of Koper (location: railway station Hodoš) A few shipments of high-activity sources also transited Slovenia in last years. The last shipment of such sources was a transit from Hungary through Slovenia to Egypt in November 2008. There were 51 sources of 60Co with their total activity of 12,913 TBq, intended to be used for industrial irradiation purposes. The consignor was the Institute of Isotopes Co. from Hungary while the consignee was the Atomic Energy Authority from Egypt. This was a road
Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe, Bled, Slovenia, Sept. 14-17, 2009
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transport from Hungary via Dolga vas (border) to the Port of Koper, where the shipment was loaded onto a vessel that delivered the consignment to Alexandria (Egypt). Figure 3 shows the activities of the material in transit through Slovenia in last decade. The data on Austrian shipment in 2005 and Italian shipment in 2008 are not shown because the total activities of the shipments were to low to be presented transparently on the graph. Activity [TBq] 14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000
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Figure 3: Total activities of material in transit through Slovenia.
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SECURITY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
The safety of the shipments is primary assured by the cask design and indirectly by the administrative procedures. Additionally, the shipments of nuclear material have to be physically protected to prevent theft, sabotage or other unwanted (malicious) actions. For that reason the transports of nuclear material through Slovenia were accompanied by guards as well as police. Due to radiation safety and emergency preparedness, the shipments were followed by the Slovene expert organization which carried out radiation measurements and would act in a case of an accident. The exact time and routes of shipments were kept confidential until they reached final destination; in order to assure security and safety, in accordance with international agreements (Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material). [9] There were no radiological impact on the Slovenian residents and the environment. 5
CONCLUSIONS
In last ten years, six transits of nuclear material through Slovenian territory occurred. In a framework of United States and Russian research reactor spent fuel take back programmes, these transits were mostly shipments of spent nuclear fuel from research reactors which Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe, Bled, Slovenia, Sept. 14-17, 2009
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contain highly enriched uranium. To contribute to nuclear non-proliferation Slovenia returned spent fuel from TRIGA research reactor in 1999 and also does not impede transits of such material through Slovenian territory. In addition several shipments of high-activity sources were also in transit through Slovenia in last decade. All Slovenian legal requirements for realization of the transits were fulfilled. Shipments were performed through Slovenian territory by the Slovenian carriers and accompanied by the physical protection staff and radiation protection experts. All Slovenian stakeholders have gained valuable experiences and lessons learned which will undoubtedly improve accomplishment of such projects in the future. REFERENCES [1] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-1593, Return of Research Reactor Spent Fuel to the Country of Origin: Requirements of Technical and Administrative Preparations and National Experiences, Proceedings of a technical meeting held in Vienna, August 28-31, 2006, pp1-3. [2] National Nuclear Security Administration, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Programme, Technical Meeting in Ljubljana, June 22, 2009. [3] Ionising Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act, Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, No. 102/04-official consolidated text, Articles 100-103. [4] Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel, Official Journal of the European Union L 337, 5. 12. 2006. [5] Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, Nos. 33/06- official consolidated text and 41/09. [6] Annual Report 1999 on the Radiation and Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, September 2000, pp 61-64, in Slovene language. [7] Annual Report 2005 on the Radiation and Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, June 2006, pp 47. [8] Annual Report 2008 on the Radiation and Nuclear Safety of the Republic of Slovenia, Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, June 2009, pp 42-43. [9] Act ratifying the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Official Gazette of Republic of Slovenia, No. 14/09.
Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe, Bled, Slovenia, Sept. 14-17, 2009
