Key parties to the conflict and their grievances . ...... primarily because it had become so strongly associated with first the monarchy and then the ...
Mapping Conflict and Peace in Burundi An Analysis of the Burundi Conflict Terrain
Cori Wielenga and Sinmi Akin-Aina March 2016
Table of Contents 1.
2.
Contextual/background analysis...................................................................................... 1 1.1.
Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
1.2.
Historical overview ........................................................................................ 3
1.3.
The current state of affairs ............................................................................. 5
1.4.
What sustains the conflict? ............................................................................. 7
1.5.
Predominant ideas of peace in Burundi ........................................................... 8
1.6.
Key determinants of peace in Burundi ............................................................ 9
Actors, their relationships and the results of their peace efforts .......................... 11 2.1.
Key parties to the conflict and their grievances ............................................. 11
The Burundian government ........................................................................................................... 11 Opposition parties .............................................................................................................................. 12 Rwanda ................................................................................................................................................... 12 Local society ......................................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.
Actors seeking to build and sustain peace ..................................................... 14
African regional initiatives.............................................................................................................. 14 The UN and the EU ............................................................................................................................. 15 Middle level actors ............................................................................................................................. 16 NGOs and civil society....................................................................................................................... 17 The institution of Ubushingantahe............................................................................................... 18 2.3.
The nature of the relationship between peacemakers and local communities. 19
2.4.
Whose vision of peace dominates the process?.............................................. 20
2.5.
Institutions directing peace efforts ............................................................... 22
2.6.
Funders of peace efforts and services............................................................ 23
2.7.
Actors providing key services and support .................................................... 24
2.8.
Actors writing about the conflict and peace efforts ........................................ 25
Academic scholarship ....................................................................................................................... 25 The media .............................................................................................................................................. 25 NGO reports .......................................................................................................................................... 26 2.9.
Visible evidence of reconciliation emerging across society ............................ 26 i
Peaceful coexistence and social cohesion at the national level ........................................ 27 Healing and restoring relationships at the interpersonal level ........................................ 27 3.
Outcomes (3000 words – currently 2200) ......................................................................... 29 3.1.
Tangible and intangible dividends of peace ................................................... 29
3.2.
Evidence that the elements of peace secured can be sustained....................... 30
3.3.
Visible indicators that conflicting parties and the rest of the local society are
pursuing a common destiny ................................................................................... 30 3.4.
Are emerging leaders and new actors altering the terrain in significant ways? 31
3.5.
Overall conclusions on what peace means and how peace is approached by
different
actors
……………………………………………………………………………………… ………32 3.6.
The danger of conflict relapse ....................................................................... 33
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................ 35
ii
Contextual/background analysis 1.1. Introduction Burundi has seen decades of violent conflict, caused by a complex interplay of ethnic and political factors. Hundreds of thousands of Burundians have died, and as many have fled to other countries1. In this context, there has been an intensely high level of international and regional involvement in peacebuilding, including large amounts of funding put aside for the purpose. However, our analysis suggests that this involvement has tended to only minimally contribute to sustainable peace, both at the elite level and at the level of local society. By-and-large, very few peace efforts have been of any benefit to the local society or have reflected peace as understood by local communities. From independence in 1962 until 1993, Burundian politics has been dominated by the ruling Uprona (Union pour le Progrès National) party which became increasingly radically pro-Tutsi. As this party attempted to maintain power over a Hutu majority, repeated incidents of violent conflict occurred, beginning in 1972 with what is sometimes referred to as the Burundian genocide, when a large portion of the educated Hutu population were massacred2. Melchior Ndadaye of Frodebu (Front pour la démocratie au Burundi), the first Hutu president, assumed power for a brief period in 1993, but upon the assassination of both he and his predecessor3, power reverted to Uprona. At this time, the more radical Hutu members of Frodebu broke away to form the CNDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie) and its military wing, the FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie). Violence broke out between the FDD and the government army and the country was plunged into a civil war that lasted 12 years. In 1998, while the war was raging, peace talks in Arusha brought together Uprona, Frodebu and Palipehutu (Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – one of the older Hutu parties that had formed in 1980) as well as smaller political parties. The military wing of Palipehutu, the FNL (Forces nationales pour la libération) was also engaged in the conflict. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000 between president Buyoya of Uprona, which had been in power almost continuously since independence4, Frodebu, and various smaller rebel groups. Significantly, the
Agnes Nindorera, “Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi”, Working Paper 102, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, University of Massachusetts, Boston (2003). 2 Gerard Prunier, “Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?” Issue paper. Writenet , (UK, 1994). 3 Cyprien Ntaryamira was in fact killed while travelling in the same plane as the Rwandan president when it was shot down, sparking off the Rwandan genocide. 4 The Hutu party Frodebu was in power for a short period in 1993, until the president, and his successor, were assassinated. 1
1
CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL were not initially part of the Arusha negotiations5 (Reyntjens 2001). The negotiated Agreement includes a Resolution to establish a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry (IJCI) and possibly an international criminal tribunal. If we follow Burundi’s trajectory since the signing of the initial ceasefire agreement in 2000, it could be argued that Burundi has yet to enter its transitional phase and is still in the conflict phase. Although the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in 2000, two of the major actors in the conflict, the CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL, only signed onto the agreement in 2003. Major Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi who had been in power since 1987 (apart from a short ‘break’ between 1993 and 1996 when Cyprien Ntaryamira, and then Sylvestre Ntibantunganya from Frodebu were in power), gave over power to Ndayizeye in 2003. Pierre Nkurunziza was elected by parliament in 2005, and the last so-called ‘rebel group’, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) signed onto the ceasefire agreement in 2006. In September of 2007, there were violent clashes between FNL and the government, which erupted again in April and May of 2008, leaving at least a hundred dead ( placing this under the definition of an ‘active armed conflict’ as classified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program definition). FNL only officially laid down arms and became a recognized political party in 2009. The first presidential elections were boycotted by oppositional leaders leaving Nkurunziza to be elected in an uncontested poll. In 2011, human rights groups reported some 500 deaths, mostly those of members of opposition parties. Additionally, in the years running up to the 2015 elections, there were numerous occurrences of infringements of media freedoms, as well as the imprisonment and intimidation of journalists and opposition leaders. The current conflict in Burundi centres on the decision by President Pierre Nkurunziza to stand for a third term. Technically, proponents of the president argue it is not a third term as he was elected by the two houses of parliament, and not through a presidential election in his first term. When Nkurunziza’s third term was announced in May 2015, opponents took to the streets in protest and conflict erupted between opposition leaders and the government, in the form of clashes between state-sanctioned security forces and the Imborenakure and civilian dissenters. As things stand, the opposition is largely in the diaspora, and it is to their advantage to paint a picture of Burundi on the verge of civil war or ethnic genocide, and in drastic need of external intervention. The main goal of the opposition is to have Nkurunziza ousted. But it remains unclear what they will do next if successful. The government aims to portray an image of a peaceful and stable Burundi in order to prevent external intervention. It can thus be assumed that most of the violence currently occurring is instigated and/or staged by the opposition. 5
Filip Reyntjens, “Again at the Crossroads: Rwanda and Burundi 2000–2001”. Current African Issues, (2001) 24, 1–26.
2
1.2. Historical overview Although the conflict in Burundi has often been described as being ethnic in nature, a closer scrutiny of the context reveals that this is not necessarily the case. Prior to colonialism, Burundi was an old, centrally-organized kingdom dating back to at least the sixteenth century AD6. Although there was a king, the country was ruled through princes, called the ganwa7. This royalty was neither Hutu nor Tutsi, and at the communal level, both Hutus and Tutsis held power. However, according to Lemarchand8, the royalty was at the centre of what became an increasingly exploitative social system, and upon the arrival of the colonialists in the 19th century, the political elite had long since been taking advantage of Hutu labour. A succession dispute between two ganwas formed a rift between their lineages, the Bezi and the Batare, and played an important role in colonial and post-independence politics. The colonialists manipulated the cleavage between both princes and the nascent ethnic tension to their advantage. Thus, by the time of Burundi’s independence in the late 1950s, the situation was rife for conflict. The first political parties formed in Burundi were the Bezi’s Union Pour le Progrès National (Uprona) and the Batare’s Parti Démocratique Chrétien (PDC). Interestingly, both parties were ethnically mixed and the princes leading the parties believed in a unified Burundi. According to Prunier, the Belgians, who wanted to divide Burundi further, implemented a third Hutu-only party, the Parti du Peuple. Uprona won the first election in 1962, but shortly after, the prime minister was assassinated, and the party became radically Tutsi, partly as a result of the Hutu revolution taking place in neighbouring Rwanda. This started a pattern of assassinations and attempted coups, which would lead to killings and reprisal killings throughout the country for the next four decades. During this period, power was monopolized by the Tutsi elite from the Hima clan in Bururi and ethnic tensions were manipulated to mobilise the general population behind one politician or another9. The first of these violent conflicts was the insurrection of 1965, in which Hutu military officers killed 500 Tutsi in Muramvya, and in response, 2000 Hutu military officers were killed. The next significant conflict was in 1972, with a Hutu insurrection near Bujumbura in which 2000-3000 Tutsi lost their lives. Reprisal killings resulted in the elimination of almost the entire educated Hutu population; 200 000 lost their lives and
Prunier, “Burundi: A Manageable Crisis?” René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi , London: Pall Mall Press (1970). 8 René Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” African Affairs, 106/422, ( 2006)1–20. 6 7
9
Nindorera, “Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi”, (2003).
3
150 000 Hutu fled the country. Those that fled launched occasional raids from refugee camps and from this, in 1980, the political party, Palipehutu, was started10. In the late 1980s, due to failed political reforms and increasing tensions, especially in the north of the country, violence broke out again, in which hundreds of Tutsi were killed. Reprisal killing resulted in 20 000 Hutu losing their lives, and another 60 000 fleeing the country. Following this violence, in the early 1990s reforms were implemented which would allow the Hutu more political power. A charter of national unity was drafted and a multi-party system was introduced11 . The first presidential election under this new constitution was won by Melchoir Ndadaye in June, 1993. From the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (Frodebu), he was the first Hutu president of Burundi, bringing an end to the four decades of Tutsi rule. He was assassinated, but Frodebu managed to maintain power under another Hutu president, Cyprien Ntaryamira. During this time, there was a bourgeoning period of hope in Burundi, however, Ntaryamira was then killed in the airplane carrying the Rwandan president in an incident that sparked off the genocide in Rwanda. Political power again fell into the hands of Uprona, and the more radical Hutu members of Frodebu broke away to form the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD), with its military wing, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD). Violence broke out between the FDD and the government army and the country entered into a civil war that would last twelve years. While the civil war was raging, peace talks began in Arusha in 1998, however the conflict continued until 2008. The negotiations that were being brokered in Arusha were largely between Uprona, Frodebu and Palipehutu. While the negotiations were occurring, violence continued between the government army, the FDD and the military wing of Palipehutu, the Forces nationales pour la libération (FNL). These military wings split from their political counterparts and the FDD and FNL were excluded from the peace talks. The Arusha agreement was signed in August, 2000. The FNL and FDD denounced the agreement and increased their commitment to the civil war. After further negotiations, the CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire, but FNL continued fighting. In 2005, general elections were held and Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD became president, with an easy majority. The peace negotiations only came to an end in 2009, when the FNL finally gave up arms to become an official political party. This was in the hope that they might stand a chance to win in the upcoming 2010 elections. But when the CNDD-FDD won the local elections by a large margin, the FNL, together with many of the other opposition 10Institute
for Security Studies, “Burundi: Political System and History”, (2005), Accessed 16 August 2011, http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/burundi/politics.html.. 11 Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing. Burundi: a Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?” , African Affairs, 105 no 418, (2006),117-35.
4
parties, including UPRONA, rejected the results and boycotted the presidential and legislative elections. At the last minute, Uprona joined the election process again, securing 17 seats in the National Assembly12 (Vandeginste 2011). The CNDD-FDD won the presidential election and, due to the actions of the opposition parties, have ruled Burundi more or less as a single-party state. 1.3. The current state of affairs Although the history of Burundi reveals that the conflict was not so much ethnic as political, during the civil war, between 1993 and 2005, the conflict had become one of Hutu against Tutsi. Many of the reconciliation efforts by NGOs in Burundi have focused on demystifying the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi. However, there has been a shift occurring in the conflict in Burundi over the past few years, from ethnic to political. One of the significant reasons for this shift is the ethnic quota system that Burundi has implemented as a result of the negotiated agreement. This was one of the issues that caused conflict and tension during the Arusha negotiations. The agreement made was that the president should have one Hutu and one Tutsi vice-president, the government and national assembly will be 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, the senate and security forces will have an equal number of each, and at the communal level, no more than 67% of the mayors are to belong to either group. Women should fill 30% of the national assembly. If the polls fail to produce the required quotas, the constitution allows for co-opting the necessary people. The issue, during the negotiations, was whether the Tutsi quota would be chosen from identified Tutsi parties or from all the parties, in which case Hutu parties could select Tutsi sympathetic to their cause. Eventually, it was agreed that Tutsi from any party could be selected13. According to Vandeginste, “It is generally recognized that this process of engineering of ethnicity has, so far, been highly successful and has strongly reduced ethnopolitical tension. Today’s main political divide is no longer ethnic” 14. The conflict today is between competing political parties, particularly the CNDD-FDD and a collection of opposition parties, most of which can be described as being ‘Hutu’ parties. Apart from the role the quota system has played, another reason for the shift can be attributed to the fact that conditions for Hutu in Burundi have not significantly improved since a Hutu party has been in power. Both ethnic groups in Burundi had expected that with a Hutu political party in power, Hutu would be privileged over Tutsi. Stef Vandeginste, “Power-sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The costs and benefits of Burundi’s 2010 elections”. Journal of Modern African Studies 49 no 2, (2011), 315-335. 12
Lemarchand, “Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, (2006). 14Stef Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to shed light on the past while standing in the dark shadow of politics”, International Journal of Transitional Justice 6 no 3, (2012) 1–11. 13
5
But with the quota system in place, the power play between Hutu and Tutsi seems to have been laid to rest. Although this important shift has happened, political tensions are rising. In a report released shortly after the 2010 elections, Human Rights Watch describes how Burundi’s political space in the few years preceding the elections was seen as vibrant and open. However, in the months leading up to the 2010 election and since then the CNDD-FDD has been dominating the political arena with a ‘heavy hand’ 15. In 2011, there was an increase in politically and criminally motivated violence. Some opposition leaders fled the country, others were arrested and media and civil society groups were harassed 16. The government ascribed this violence to criminal activities, but tension between the government and opposition parties, particularly the FNL, was mounting. Twelve of the opposition parties that boycotted the 2010 elections created the Alliance of Democrats for Change in Burundi (ADC-Ikibiri) in order to advocate for dialogue with the current government about issues of corruption, transitional justice, laws and the constitution, but the government was not interested in negotiating with them unless they participated as recognised political parties. The position of the ADC-Ikibiri remained ambiguous as, on the one hand, they seemed interested in dialogue but on the other they seemed to support the possibility of violent alternatives. It is the ADC-Ikibiri that led the protest against the president after he announced standing for a third term in May 2015. Since then, leaders of the opposition parties that make up ADC-Ikibiri have been systematically killed or have fled into exile. Since July, 2015, the ADC-Ikibiri seems to have been taken over by the National Council for the Restoration of the Arusha Accord and the Rule of Law in Burundi (CNARED), which is working to unseat Nkurunziza. This conflict seems to be centred at the level of the political elite. At the community level, the greatest concern seems to be land disputes. The conflict in Burundi resulted in people fleeing to neighbouring countries, and in particular, Tanzania. In 1972, somewhere between 200 000 and 300 000 people fled, and in 1993, approximately 400 000 people fled17. Apart from this, there were some 80 000 internally displaced people. Since the signing of the Arusha Agreement, both spontaneous and UNHCR facilitated repatriation has taken place. The UNHCR reported repatriating over half a million Burundians18. With Burundi being a densely populated
Human Rights Watch, “Closing Doors : The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi”, (2010). International Crisis Group, “Burundi: From electoral boycott to political impasse. Africa”, Report No. 169, (2011). 16 Vandeginste, “Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to shed light on the past while standing in the dark shadow of politics”, (2012). 17 UNHCR/WFP (2007) ‘Report of the Joint Assessment Mission of Burundian Returnees, 7–11 May 2007’, Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ- 743CJL?OpenDocument. 18 see UNHCR country operation Burundi http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c056.html 15
6
country with a high dependency on agriculture and livestock, the greatest challenge facing returnees was the issue of land19. Not only are there land disputes related to returnees, Banderembako (2006) describes how degradation or arable land has meant that “scarce and poorly distributed resources lead to a tiny elite appropriating public resources and cash crops, and the rural population struggling for subsistence land”20. The land disputes seem to be the central concern of local society although they have not been on the agenda of the external actors and political elite nearly as much as power sharing, security sector reform or transitional justice. Burundi is largely dependent on agriculture and land for the majority of its economic activity. However, as mentioned previously as a result of: overpopulation, soil erosion, poverty and climactic, this has produced very low economic yield. Agriculture accounts for over 30% of Burundi’s GDP and more than 90% of the population is employed within the agricultural sector. Burundi as a whole however is economically underdeveloped: it is heavily dependent on foreign aid as this represents 42% of the country’s national income, with a high unemployment rate and 99.8% of the population living on less than two dollars a day.21 1.4. What sustains the conflict? Since the signing of the Arusha Agreement, several issues have contributed to a continued instability in Burundi. As described by the former Minister of Defence, Germain Niyoyankana at a seminar at the Clingendael Institute in 2010, these include: ‘nervousness of politicians and mutual accusations’ the deplorable economic situation in Burundi, the return of a large number of refugees, the unstable regional environment, and a lack of resources for reforming the various sectors. Other issues include high levels of corruption, and the high prevalence of weapons in the country22. Part of the reason for the most recent reoccurrence of conflict is the failed 2010 elections and the lack of a resolution around this, especially between Nkurunziza and opposition parties – there was never any dialogue between them after the failed elections23. Another part of the reason for the most recent reoccurrence of conflict is
Jenny Theron, “Resolving Land Disputes in Burundi”, Conflict Trends, no 1, ACCORD, (2008). Deo Banderembako, “The Link between Land, Environment, Employment, and Conflict in Burundi”, USAID Working Paper (2006). 21 Human Development Report 2015 22 Maria Derks, Niki Frencken, and Sylvie More, “Keeping Post-Conflict Peacebuilding on Track: The role of security sector development in the case of Burundi”. Seminar report: Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands, (2010). 23 Vandeginste, “Power-sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The costs and benefits of Burundi’s 2010 elections”, (2011). 19 20
7
political parties/leaders wanting access to power and beginning to question the way the power sharing agreement was negotiated. In the most recent conflict, this is sustained through support from outside actors, such as Rwanda, opposition parties or people in the diaspora supporting armed resistance to Nkurunziza. The lack of flexibility on the part of Nkurunziza, his acts of force and political repression, as well as his unwillingness to dialogue with the opposition also contribute to sustaining the conflict. Regional and international bodies, such as the AU and the UN have also failed to meaningfully intervene in Burundi and seem to be exacerbating rather than resolving the conflict. A source in Burundi suggests that although the AU has been taking an active role in trying to get negotiations underway, the Burundian government suspects the EU is behind the AU’s actions (as their primary funder) and is exerting pressure on the AU to act. It has been suggested that the UN should take the lead in negotiations, bringing in first the EAC and then only later the AU. 1.5. Predominant ideas of peace in Burundi This varies from the high level actors through to the local society. External high level actors seemed to have focused on three areas of peace, namely, power sharing, security sector reform and transitional justice. Their approach has leaned towards a liberal peacebuilding model, an emphasis on electoral democracy and criminal prosecutions. Amidst this fairly ‘typical’ engagement by the so-called international community, within Burundi there is an awareness of the problems with this approach and various external actors have shown higher levels of sensitivity to their approach to peace. This is evident, for example, in the Dutch governments’ approach to security sector reform, where they have attempted to emphasise Burundian ownership over the process, although South African analysts have expressed doubt as to whether the Dutch government has achieved this as successfully as Dutch researchers report. South African involvement between 1996 and 2009 emphasised a very high level of local ownership and ensured the involvement of regional bodies as well. However, this came to an end in 2009, when the UN, EU and other European actors took over. The Burundian government’s official idea of peace has been formally expressed in ‘Burundi Vision 2025’, which emphasises the ‘regional blending of ethnic groups’. This has been actualised through a policy of ethnic quotas in the government and military. Vision 2025 stresses the importance of social cohesion and national unity as a foundation for growth development. A ‘spirit of equity’, social justice and an end to 8
lawlessness are all mentioned as guiding principles and a commitment to the support of the work by civil society and religious organizations is stated. Further, support for traditional mechanisms for the resolution of conflict and societal management are included. Interestingly, Vision 2025 makes particular reference to the importance of promoting cultural identity as a means of bringing about social cohesion, and this includes drawing from ‘fundamental values of Burundian society’ such as Ubuntu, tolerance, respect for the other, sharing’, Burundian dance, folktales, literature, poetry and drama. However, how much of this is realised in government action, particularly in the last five years, during which time the political space has been increasingly restricted, is difficult to assess. 1.6. Key determinants of peace in Burundi There are several key areas around which peace in Burundi hinges, some of which were central to the negotiation process. These include:
Power sharing: As is the case in many African contexts, politics has become a zero sum game, and it has all been about who gets what from the power pie. Unlikely alliances between former antagonists (e.g.: between the leaders of the FNL and Uprona in the recent conflict) points to the fact that acquiring power is the driving agenda of many political elites.
The ethnic quota system: This has arguably shifted the central site of conflict in Burundi from an ethnic to a political one. The ethnic quota system has been applied to government and the security sector. Many argue that ethnicity is no longer a divisive cleavage in Burundi.
Security sector reform: This included the reintegration of the army, the disarmament of a highly armed citizenry, demobilisation of combatants and so on. Until the recent conflict, progress in this sector was seen to be slow but positive.
Transitional justice: Significantly, although the UN and international human rights organisations have argued for ‘an end to impunity’ through criminal prosecutions, the government has consistently preferred the option of a truth commission with conditional amnesty, following the South African model, and the local society has not expressed support for either criminal prosecutions or a truth commission but have expressed a preference for more local rituals and practices to be adopted to resolve disputes at the local level.
9
Land disputes: This is the central most pressing issue for those living outside of the capital, but is not nearly as high on the agenda of external actors as transitional justice is. Far too little time and resources are being channelled towards what is a crisis of daily survival for many Burundians.
Poverty reduction: As one of the poorest nations in the world, unemployment, and deplorable levels of poverty remain one of the most urgent issues in Burundi.
Reconciliation, healing, dialogue
To date, much of the peace work in Burundi has focused on the elite level, and has taken place in Bujumbura, with a focus on resolving conflicts between elite political actors, security sector reform and transitional justice. While all of these are important, very little attention has been given to Burundi outside of the capital, which is largely rural and underdeveloped. Even civil society is active mostly in the capital, and the voice of local society is rarely heard.
10
2. Actors, their relationships and the results of their peace efforts 2.1. Key parties to the conflict and their grievances The key parties to the current conflict are the Burundian government and the opposition parties. Other actors from the region also seem to be involved, such as the Rwandan government, who has, to date, an unidentified agenda. Although some reports in the media have described this as a return to ethnic conflict, there is no evidence that this is about ethnicity. It is also not a ‘popular’ conflict, in that local society seems to have little interest in becoming involved and have been described as being ‘war weary’. Instead, this seems to be a conflict between political actors, both within Burundi and regionally. The Burundian government The Burundian government is a difficult actor to define at this time, as members of the government have been turning against the president, Pierre Nkurunziza. High profile exiles, including the former second vice president, Gervais Rufyikiri, are behind the establishment of a national transitional council, the National Council for the Restoration of the Arusha Accord and the Rule of Law in Burundi (CNARED), working to unseat Nkurunziza24. Until he announced standing for a third term, Nkurunziza was perceived to be a president ‘of the people’, who understood the needs of local society. His intention was to focus on issues such as providing free medical care and education. However, little development has taken place under the Nkurunziza government, and Nkurunziza’s insistence on standing for a third term has reduced his legitimacy in the eyes of the Burundian elite. At the same time, he does still maintain popular support in large parts of rural Burundi. The imbonerakure, the Kirundi word for “the Watchmen” or literally, “Those who see far”, is the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, numbering around 2 million25. This group described as the youth militia of the CNDD-FDD, is said to be equipped with weapons provided by security forces, and has been accused of intimidation and enacting violence against Nkuruniziza’s opponents. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recounts:
See the East African: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Burundi-exiles--opposition-in-talks-to-formtransitional-council/-/2558/2790232/-/2ihivo/-/index.html. 25 http://www.dw.com/en/burundi-pro-government-youth-linked-to-violence/a-18514644 24
11
We have been receiving consistent testimonies indicating that Imbonerakure members operate under instructions from the ruling party and with the support of the national police and intelligence services who provide them with weapons.26 Some of the acts of violence the imbonerakure have been accused of include: daubing the houses of opposition members in red paint as a threat, the beating and torture of opposition members, and together with members of the police force, security forces, and the army, the gang-rape of women believed to be members of the opposition or their relatives27. Opposition parties There are two significant coalitions standing in opposition to the government. One is the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC-Ikibiri) which was formed in 2010, and the other, which seems to now have replaced the ADC, is the National Council for the Respect of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi and the Restoration of the State of Law (CNARED), which was formed in July, 2015. Importantly, most of CNARED leaders are in exile, most in Belgium or in Rwanda. There are ongoing dissensions inside the CNARED with regard to leadership and the strategy to use in order to topple Nkurunziza. Some support peaceful means, while others are ready to use violence. The link between this contention coalition and Rwanda (and Belgium) is difficult to unravel. Rwanda Mysteriously, in the past few months the Rwandan government has been accused of playing a central role in the conflict in Burundi. This first emerged when Jeff Drumtra wrote a story in the Washington Post28 in which he alleged that the Rwandan government was recruiting Burundian refugees who had fled to Rwanda at the onset of the recent violence in Burundi, to fight in Burundi. This was confirmed by a report by the NGO Refugees International, which describes in detail the recruitment practices of the Rwandan government. This report describes that over 50 Burundians in the Rwandan refugee camp of Mahama have raised concerns about recruitment between May and November, 2015. The Burundian government has formally accused Rwanda of helping to plan an attack against Burundi, which the Rwandan government has denied. Additionally, the United States has leveraged accusations against Rwanda for being
26
Ibid
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/un-reports-gang-rapes-mass-graves-inburundi/article28210851/ 28 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/burundis-dangerous-neighbor/2015/11/18/298b1e88-8bbe-11e5934c-a369c80822c2_story.html. 27
12
involved in ‘destabilizing activities’ in Burundi, based on evidence from confidential UN reports29. Rwanda however, has had a history of intervention within the region, as evidenced by its involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Numerous possibilities have been put forward to explain Rwanda’s involvement in Burundi. One has been the contention of the fear of ethnic violence spreading from Hutu majority Burundi to Rwanda, as well as unsubstantiated claims that the FDLR ( Force for the Liberation of Rwanda) the Hutuled militia founded by the initial perpetrators and instigators of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, are supporters of Nkurunziza.30
What these reports do not explain is the reason behind Rwanda’s involvement. Suggestions have been made that Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, wants to ‘protect Tutsi’ in Burundi, but this is unlikely to be the case. Analysis of Kagame’s decisionmaking during and after the Rwandan genocide suggests that his interest has been in achieving and maintaining power at whatever cost (including the sacrifice of many Rwandan Tutsi who were inside Rwanda during the war there), and that although he may favour Ugandan-Rwandans he has not been seen to favour Rwandan Tutsi, or hold a high opinion of Burundians altogether. Additionally, in light of these accusations, Rwanda is now taking steps to expel the Burundian refugees within its borders and relocate them. The Rwandan government has stated that it will not close its borders to refugees in flight, but maintains that this is a necessary step to ensure national security and maintain stability in the region.31 There is thus another reason behind Rwanda’s involvement which remains unclear, possibly related to the fact that a destabilised region benefits Rwanda, or that minerals have been discovered in Burundi, which was sufficient reason for Rwanda to enter eastern DRC. Local society Within Burundian local society disputes centre around land conflict. Contesting parties at this level are returnees and Burundians who, for a variety of reasons, are living on the land that previously belonged to these returnees. There are also contestations between local communities and elites who are taking ownership of more and more arable land. Further, land is a contentious issue in communities in general, where conflicts easily arise over who has access to what land.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201602121212.html http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-will-talk-to-Burundi-over-FDLR-after-current-crisis//2558/2966068/-/m64gxt/-/index.html 31 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35558082 29 30
13
2.2. Actors seeking to build and sustain peace High level political actors involved in building and sustaining peace in Burundi include the United Nations, the United States (as the foremost donor country), the European Union, Belgium (as former colonial ruler and donor country with the most political influence), the African Union, the International Conference for the Great Lakes, and for a limited period of time, South Africa. At the middle level, the Burundian government has put in place several institutions, such as the National Commission on Land and other Properties (CNTB) and the Independent National Commission on Human Rights as well as the National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNID). However, the CNTB has been shut down during the most recent conflict. The National University of Burundi has also been active in the area of peace. Some international and local NGO’s have also been working on a national level towards building and sustaining peace. At the community level there are numerous quite large grassroots NGOs that are very actively working for peace. In many communities, the Bashingantahe (community mediators) are also active, in some cases playing a positive role, and in others a negative role. African regional initiatives The Arusha peace process that started in 1996 and culminated in an agreement in 2000, is seen as an African initiative that succeeded thanks to the joint efforts of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region, the African Union and the political and financial support of the international community32. It was prompted by the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with the support of the UN. Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian president was chosen as the first mediator of this process not by these organizations but by the regional heads of state acting under the auspices of the ‘Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi’33. In 1996 the then South African president Nelson Mandela took over the negotiations which resulted in a peace agreement being signed in 2000. This did not end the war, though, primarily because the CNDD-FDD and the FNL had not signed the Agreement. In 2002 Jacob Zuma, then South African deputy-president, Kristina Bentley & Roger Southall, “An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi”, HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) Press, Cape Town, (2005). 33 Ayebare, A, 2010. Peacemaking in Burundi: A case study of regional diplomacy backed by regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Paper presented at 39th International Peace Institute Seminar, UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process and Practice, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Published as International Peace Institute Favorita Paper (1), 81–6. 32
14
succeeded Mandela, to broker a cease-fire agreement between the Burundi transitional government and the two remaining armed groups, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, with the aim of ending the war and obtaining a Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. Charles Nqakula took over mediation in 2005. Apart from their central role in the mediation process the South African Defence Force deployed troops in Burundi in 2001, and two years later the AU established the AU Mission in Burundi. After a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2004, the UN took over. By 2009, all of South Africa’s troops had been recalled, and as Hendricks and Lucey (2013) discuss, South African involvement in Burundi decreased significantly. The reasons for the decrease of interest on the part of the AU and South African government remain unclear. More recently, the African Union has also been tentatively involved in a resolution of the current crisis in Burundi. The African Union voted to send in peacekeeping troops to Burundi, however upon hearing of Nkurunziza’s statement that he would consider such action an act of war, the vote was later rescinded34. The East African Community and East African Legislative Assembly The East African Community and East African Legislative Assembly has also being involved in finding a regional solution to the current crisis in Burundi. As a result of a petition of the citizens of the East African Community, The EAC held public hearings on the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in Burundi from the 12th24th of January 2016, at its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The EAC then convened three Extraordinary Summits on Burundi, and President Yoweri Museveni was appointed mediator in the crisis. The mediation was stalled a number of times due to a lack of participation from Burundian government representatives. Present at the hearing were: members of the Burundian civil society, media, women’s movement and political opposition as well as representatives of the government35. The UN and the EU The United National Operations in Burundi (ONUB) was established by United Nations Security Council in May 2004 to ensure the continuation of the Arusha Agreement. Initially, ONUB consisted of 5,650 military personnel, 120 civilian police, and support personnel in the form of 200 military observers and 125 military staff officers. The mission ended 1 January 2007 when many of its functions were transferred to the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/african-union-decides-peacekeepers-burundi-160131102052278.html accessed February 17th, 2016 35 EAC transcripts 34
15
The reasons for establishing a second mission in Burundi, following directly on the ONUB missions, was the ceasefire agreement reached between the new CNDD-FDD government and the last remaining rebel group Palipehutu-FNL. This ceasefire agreement was signed on 7 September 2006 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, after mediation by South Africa in talks that began in May. Among the key points in the agreement were a complete cessation of hostilities, temporary immunity for FNL fighters and the demobilization of these troops and their subsequent integration into the armed forces of Burundi, in line with earlier peace agreements in this conflict that all stipulated power-sharing arrangements in the security sector. BINUB was replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) on 1 January 2011 as a scaled-down operation, and was authorised to support the development of national institutions, promote dialogue, combat impunity, promote human rights, ensure economic and financial policies meet the needs of vulnerable people and advocate resource mobilisation for Burundi and support with regional integration issues. The BNUB completed its mandate 31 December 2014, and its responsibilities were transferred to the UN Development Assistance Framework, specifically to the Country Team for Burundi. The UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) officially began work on 1 January 2015 and its operations came to an end on 31 December 2015. It is unclear what exactly the UN’s involvement in Burundi is in 2016. During this period of UN involvement, Belgium has been one of the more active and vocal international political actors and has acted as the de facto advisor to and representative of the EU. The Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, is the most prominent academic centre globally dedicated to the study of Rwanda, Burundi and eastern DRC. The Dutch government has been very involved in security sector reform, equipping, resourcing and training the police and the army, since 2009. The European Commission, through the Woodrow Wilson Centre, together with the US and UK government have been involved in training high level leaders from a cross section of society. Middle level actors At the middle level, the Burundian government has put in place several institutions, such as the National Commission on Land and other Properties (CNTB) to resolve land disputes. The Independent National Commission on Human Rights, established in 2011, has been making strides in the area of addressing human rights issues. International and some local NGO’s have also been working on a national level towards building and sustaining peace.
16
The National University of Burundi holds the UNESCO chair for Peace and Conflict Resolution. This was established in 1999 to promote an integrated system of research, training, information and documentation activities in service of education for peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts as well as human rights, democracy and tolerance and to facilitate regional and sub-regional collaboration between high-level researchers and professors with the staff of the University. NGOs and civil society Burundi’s contemporary civil society began to emerge in the early 1990s and as such is a relatively new phenomenon there. According Uvin, in 1991 Burundi had only one organization that could be described as being part of civil society. By 1993 at least 5 organizations had emerged, and throughout the civil war, the number of organizations exploded, led by several human rights-based organizations36. The literature describes how Burundi has an active civil society, but at the same time, it is sometimes seen as elitist (and particularly associated with the Tutsi elite) and limited in its reach to the capital city. This is slowly changing but it remains difficult for small and often under resourced NGO’s to have an impact ‘up country’, in the more rural parts of Burundi. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) has the longest history of an international organization working in peace and reconciliation in Burundi. The local NGO, Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS) is one of the oldest local organizations that has been working in the field of reconciliation in Burundi. Other prominent Burundian organisations working in the area of peace and reconciliation include the Burundian League for Human Rights, Burundian Women for Peace and Development, Association Burundaise pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (APRODH - the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons) 37, Association of Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT), Maison Shalom and Harvest for Christ which has worked primarily on the campus of the University of Burundi, and has trained university students in peacebuilding and reconciliation for the past ten years. One of the widest reaching local efforts is the Organization for Reconciliation and Forgiveness with over 80 000 members across the country. This kind of organisation may be the most effective in reaching the largest number of people in the far corners of 36Peter
Uvin, “Structural Causes, Development Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda: a country case study”, available at: http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP889/participants/participants.aspx (2007). 37
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33767768
17
the country without expending large amounts of resources. A similar grassroots organisation is Association Dushirahamwe, one of Burundi’s leading grassroots networks of women’s peacebuilders operating in 10 provinces. It comprises provincial and communal committees, 158 trainers, 390 women leaders and mediators and over 9,000 members across the country.
The institution of Ubushingantahe The traditional bashingantahe councils historically consisted of wise elders who would play a central role in maintaining the values of a community and facilitating communitylevel dispute resolution. Before the colonial era, the bashingantahe was seen as a key institution whose main function was to settle disputes, mediate and advise for members of a given community they lived in. Over time, the bashingantahe acquired prominent political functions. They were interlocutors between the local and the national political authorities38. There has been an attempt to revive or restore this institution although this has been controversial. The idea of restoring the bashingantahe institution was evoked during the Arusha Peace Process for Burundi. Later, it was included in the final agreement where the Bashingantahe are supposed to play an important role in the reconciliation process. However, as of 2010, they have been formally excluded from Burundian legislation by the government39. The initial revival of the council was encouraged by external actors 40 but the current government has consistently resisted this traditional institution, primarily because it had become so strongly associated with first the monarchy and then the post-independence, Tutsi-dominated, one-party state 41. Several scholars have written about the ways in which the bashingantahe have become corrupt42. Hajayandi describes how the selection of these community mediators became less about the moral integrity of the individual and more about giving positions for political expediency. In a study undertaken in two distinctly different regions of Burundi, Hajayandi (forthcoming) has found the bashingantahe has developed in very different ways. In Hajayandi, Patrick (forthcoming). “The case of Burundi” in Wielenga, C. and Nshimbi, C. Transitional justice, regionalism and policy in Africa. CODESRIA. 39 Ingelaere, Bert, and Dominik Kohlhagen. "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bushingantahe in Burundi." International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 40-59. 40 Nindorera, “Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi”, (2003). 41 Ingelaere, Bert, and Dominik Kohlhagen. "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bushingantahe in Burundi." International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 44. 42 Ibid. Hajayandi, Patrick (forthcoming). “The case of Burundi” in Wielenga, C. and Nshimbi, C. Transitional justice, regionalism and policy in Africa. CODESRIA. 38
18
Nyanza-Lac, in the south east of Burundi, Hajayandi found that the bashingantahe had lost credibility amidst allegations of corruption and their problematic role in resolving land related disputes. But in Rugombo, in the west of the country, the bashingantahe were experienced very positively, and the institution had been integrated with the broader judicial system, and was working closely with local and international NGOs. In this district, the bashingantahe had incorporated women and youth, and play a central role in peacebuilding at the level of the local community43. 2.3. The nature of the relationship between peacemakers and local communities Already from the time of the Arusha Agreement, peace processes focused on and benefited elite actors more than those at the level of the local community. McClinktock and Nahimana44 describe that there is a neighbourhood in Bujumbura called ‘Quartier Arusha’ where a number of participants who became wealthy through the per diem received in the Arusha negotiation process now live. They describe the negotiation process as ‘exclusionary’, seen to cater for the needs of the elite and not the local society. Burundian civil society was also largely excluded from the negotiation process. Although as was mentioned earlier, few international or local NGOs that work at the national level have a wide reach ‘upcountry’. Grassroots organisations at the local community level are doing the most in terms of active peacebuilding. McClintock and Nahimana explore one example within the Burundian context where an attempt was made to involve local society in the peace process while the Arusha negotiations were underway. Two members of government at the time undertook a series of dialogue missions; Eugene Nindorera, Minister for Human Rights, Institutional Reform and Parliamentary Relations, and Terence Nahimana, a Deputy in the National Assembly, toured the country from 1997–2000 with the objective of building a constituency for peace through dialogue1. Another attempt at including local society in dialogue was in 2009, around the issue of transitional justice. In 2005 the UN Secretary General conducted a round of negotiations with the Burundi Government in order to analyze the implementation of the transitional justice mechanism under the UNSC Resolution 1606 (UNSC Resolution, 2005). The fact that the Burundi Government found it necessary to negotiate with the UN around this particular issue underlines the fact that there has been a lack of appropriation of the
43
Ibid.
44Elizabeth
Mcclintock, and Térence Nahimana. "Managing the Tension between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi." International Negotiation 13, no. 1 (2008): 73-91.
19
transitional justice mechanisms by the Burundian leadership. The negotiations between Burundi government and the UN did not have any positive results. They did lead to conducting a National Consultation with local society in order to fully understand its perceptions with relation to the transitional justice mechanisms. The work was conducted under the supervision of the Tripartite Steering Committee led by Hon. Festus Ntanyungu, a former member of Burundi’s Parliament. The National Consultations ran from July to December 2009 and covered all the provinces of Burundi. Some members of the diaspora in East Africa and Europe were also part of the process. The results of this National Consultation, and the extent to which their findings were taken seriously by the UN, donor countries and the Burundian government is difficult to unravel45. The bashingantahe have a potentially important role to play here, as mediators between the political elite and the local community. As mentioned in the previous section, in some cases the bashingantahe are in a good position to do this but in others, they have become so corrupt that their role is more destructive than productive. However contentious their position is, most Burundians still do turn to the bashingantahe to resolve their conflicts (a forthcoming study by Hajayandi undertaken in two regions of Burundi suggests that as many as 98% of rural Burundians turn to the bashingantahe before any other formal or informal dispute resolution mechanism). 2.4. Whose vision of peace dominates the process? This depends at which level one is looking. At a high level, the UN and EU (Belgium) approach to building peace probably dominate, and this includes a tendency towards the broader liberal peacebuilding model, electoral democracy and an emphasis on criminal prosecutions as the way to deal with ‘impunity’ and the violence from the past. However, by-and-large, the external actors in Burundi seem to have been cautious and sensitive in their engagements with national and local Burundian actors. The For example, Dutch government, in their engagement with security sector development, have made it clear that ‘local ownership’ is their driving interest in terms of engagement with Burundi. During the mediation process, it was perhaps a South African vision of peace that dominated, which is perhaps evident in the power-sharing agreement that was negotiated, the inclusion of rich reconciliation language, and the inclusion of a truth and reconciliation commission much in the same line as South Africa’s TRC. The conflict in peace ‘visions’ is perhaps most evident in the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms which has remained a contentious issue since the Hajayandi, Patrick (forthcoming). “The case of Burundi” in Wielenga, C. and Nshimbi, C. Transitional justice, regionalism and policy in Africa. CODESRIA. 45
20
signing of the agreement. To date neither the TRC, nor the suggested commissions of inquiry have been established. According to some sources, the UN and EU have been pushing for criminal prosecutions, whereas the Burundian government has wanted a more reconciliatory, restorative approach to transitional justice46. Rubli47, in interviews with key figures in the dominant political parties in Burundi, found that several of these leaders were against the establishment of the commission of inquiry and criminal tribunal, saying that significant progress in ethnic relations had already occurred and that a tribunal which emphasized ethnic conflict that occurred in the past might reignite ethnic divisions. “Justice promoted by the tribunal would risk reframing the conflict once more in ethnic terms by opposing (Hutu) perpetrators to (Tutsi) victims”48. In an article that brings some nuance to the polarisation of the Burundian government versus ‘the rest’, Taylor49 (2013) brings attention to the ways in which both the Burundian government and the international community have instrumentalised transitional justice in Burundi in different ways. He also shows how allegations either that the international community has almost no influence, or that it has complete influence, are both inaccurate and that the influence it has is complex and varied. Although he quotes one policymaker as stating, “donors have the leverage, especially those providing budget support” (2013: 6), he also discusses how the Burundian government has been able to use the lack of coherence and fragmentation of the international community’s approach to transitional justice to their own advantage. Taylor 50also reminds us that the international community in Burundi is very aware of the growing discourse that calls for limits to international influence, which may in part be the cause of the fragmentation in their approach to transitional justice. In the same article, Taylor51 argues that insisting on a truth-telling process (as facilitated by a TRC) in Burundi would not be an imposition from the outside (as some claim it is) as it is in line with AU principles, and imperative for the establishment of universal norms such as human rights, justice and democracy (although the link between a TRC and these ‘universal norms’ has yet to be established). However, Ingelaere and Kohlhagen found that members of Burundian communities made it clear that they were not interested in either a TRC or a special tribunal, as will be discussed in section 3.6.
Sandra Rubli, “Remaking the social world: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi”, Africa Spectrum 48 no 1, (2013), 3–24. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 David Taylor, “We have no influence’: International discourse and the Instrumentalisation of Transitional Justice in Burundi”, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2 no 3, (2013), 1–10. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 46
21
At the local society level, the bashingantahe, in some communities, remain very influential with regard to shaping the ‘vision of peace’, whereas in others local and international NGOs have more influence. The churches in Burundi also have a role to play. 2.5. Institutions directing peace efforts The bashingantahe remain the institution most responsive to local demands for peace in some regions, whereas, as mentioned before, in other regions, they have become corrupt and destructive. The National Commission on Land and other Properties (CNTB): The land commission (Commission National Terres et Autres Biens - CNTB), was formed in 2006, and is in charge of resettling returnees and tackling land grievances and disputes. Its 50 members, appointed by presidential decree, are 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi as required by the 2000 Arusha Agreement. Those looking to recover their land, file a case with CNTB's provincial offices whose officials then conduct field visits and hearings before making a decision. At the provincial level, the CNTB assists both parties in reaching an agreement through mediation. At the national level, decisions are taken by an ad hoc committee and implemented by the provincial delegation, however there is an appeal process for both levels. As land is a contentious issue for a country with a 90% agrarian population, the CNTB’s role as mediators has been particularly important in the issue of land disputes In March of this year however, the president suspended the CNTB, amidst claims that it favoured returnees and Hutus.52 The National Independent Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH): is an independent state institution. The Commission is composed of seven individuals elected by the National Assembly and mandated by presidential decree for a period of four years. On the 23rd of November this year, the CNIDH disseminated a Press Release advocating for freedom of the Press in the wake of the failed coup attempt of May 13th. In the statement, the CNIDH plead with public officials for leniency, tolerance and understanding in dealing with the human rights defenders and activists that had been detained. There was also an appeal to human rights defenders to conform to the policy and statutes of their organizations, while remaining neutral and independent with regards to politics. The CNIDH also created a human rights telephone hotline for those
52
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/01/burundi-land-displacement-conflict-
22
in peril. Perhaps more so than the now hobbled civil society organisations, the CNIDH is responsive to the immediate needs of the people. The National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI), was created by presidential decree on September 2015. In light of international pressure and demands for foreign intervention, the Commission was designed to be an internal national peacebuilding response, to address the conflict arising from Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term. The security sector has been responsive to local demands for peace. The strength of the security sector seems to lie in the fact that they are so representative of the local society, and that reforms in this sector have had the support from the “Burundian population”53. Civil disarmament has been a major focus of the security sector. Although this seems to have been going well, albeit slowly over the past decade, the recent attempts by government to remove arms by force across Burundi in the midst of current instability has resulted in an escalation of the conflict between the government security forces and the local society. 2.6. Funders of peace efforts and services According to the OECD, in 2005, the top ten bilateral donors were the United States ($54.7m), the Netherlands ($22.9m), Belgium ($21.3m), the United Kingdom ($14.8m), France ($14.5m), Germany ($11.4m), Norway ($10.3m), Sweden ($5.3m), Denmark ($5.2m) and Canada ($5.1m)54. The US Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) developed a priority plan together with the Government of Burundi and the UN (BINUB at the time the plan was developed, in 2006), which identified four priority areas for funding, namely, governance, strengthening the rule of law and the security sector, strengthening the rule of law and human rights, and property/land issues55. Funding was also given for humanitarian activities to address the root causes of poverty. Global Humanitarian Assistance reports that where funding in this area was around $176m in 2004 it was at $35m in 2013. However, official development assistance increased from $211m in 2004 to $510m in 2013.
Derks, Frencken, and More, “ Keeping Post-Conflict Peacebuilding on Track: The role of security sector development in the case of Burundi”, (2010). 54 See Brachet, J. & Wolpe, H. 2005. ‘Conflict sensitive development assistance: The case of Burundi’. Social Development Papers: Conflict prevention and reconstruction. Paper No. 27. 55 See Internal UN Peacebuilding Support Office Paper, 2007, ‘Mapping External Resource Flows to Burundi’ - NB 53
23
According to Jason Braganza56, in 2013, total gross aid to Burundi stood at US$552 million, up from US$ 514 million, in 2006. Currently, Belgium is the largest donor at US$63 million or 11% of total bilateral aid; Netherlands at US$31 million or 6% of bilateral aid; France at US$16 million or 3% of bilateral aid; and the EU at US$72 million or 13% of bilateral aid. In terms of sector allocation, over 50% of the aid received goes towards the health, governance and security, and infrastructure sectors. DI’s comprehensive Development Data Hub statistics reveals that approximately 55.9% of Burundi’s domestic revenue comes from external grants in the form of aid. Since the announcement of Nkurunziza’s third term in May 2015, various donors, such as the EU and Belgium, halted aid earmarked for supporting elections. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France have halted some aid intended for the police and defence services57. USAID has funded Democracy and Governance programs in Burundi. Most of the funding for security sector reform has come from the Dutch government. Most of the funding for establishing a truth commission has come from DFID, through the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in South Africa58. 2.7. Actors providing key services and support Belgium as the former coloniser has a strong interest in Burundi. They have been heavily involved in the mediation process, governance, transitional justice, elections and so on. As previously mentioned, the Dutch government has been involved in security sector development, and the European Commission US and UK in leadership training. Democracy and governance: Africare, working with funding from USAID, has been working with civil society organisations to develop a culture of democracy. Africare has focused on building and strengthening local NGOs in the belief that democracy begins with a strong civil society. The Canadian Centre d’Etude et Cooperation Internationale has also been working in this area. Humanitarian assistance: The UNOCH has developed a map which depicts the areas of most urgent humanitarian need in Burundi, and the organisations responding to this in the areas of education, health, protection, food security and livelihood, logistics, shelter, frontline services to refugees, and nutrition. This map includes nine UN agencies, 46 international NGOs, and 11 national NGOs.
Jason Braganza, “Burundi At a Crossroads: the money matters”, Development ,http://devinit.org/#!/post/burundi-at-a-crossroads-the-money-matters, 3 June 2015. 57 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKBN0NW0WJ20150511, 11 May. 56
Initiatives
24
The Inter-agency Joint Monitoring Mechanism is the coordinating body currently managing what is called the ‘slow’ humanitarian crises in Burundi. The main partners of this Mechanism include World Vision, Red Cross, Caritas, the International Organisation for Migration and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCH), along with an array of smaller organisations. The Burundian Hotline has been established by this Mechanism to increase communication between people in need and humanitarian organisations. This is particularly necessary with the closing down of some of the key radio stations, and a general lack of information about where crises are taking place. Much of the current international humanitarian assistance is centred on the current refugee crises as close to 200 000 Burundians have fled to neighbouring countries since May 2015. 2.8. Actors writing about the conflict and peace efforts Academic scholarship There are relatively few academic scholars writing about Burundi. However, those that are writing about Burundi seem to be engaged in sensitive and thoughtful research. Unlike in Rwanda, where the scholarly community has quickly become polarised (into pro- and anti- Kagame camps) and has fixated on ethnicity as the central causal explanation for conflict and the central solution, in Burundi a far more nuanced understanding of identity and the conflict dynamic has been engaged in. Academic articles on Burundi are published in a wide variety of internationally recognised and respected journals in the US, Europe and Africa by scholars on all three continents, although it has perhaps been somewhat dominated by Belgian scholars, and even in more recent times, the Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes in Africa, based in Antwerp, plays an influential role in the production of academic scholarship on Burundi. The media By-and-large the media reporting on Burundi’s recent crises has been simplistic, muddled and alarmist. In many cases, the Burundian context has been equated with that of Rwanda, and it is suggested that Burundi is on the brink of an ethnic genocide. The evidence in Burundi clearly points to the fact that the conflict is not around ethnicity. It also points to the fact that the local society is ‘war weary’ and not on the point of picking up arms at all. An exception to this simplistic, alarmist reporting has been articles by Patrick Hajayandi where he warns that continuing to call Burundi’s conflict an ethnic genocide will result
25
in the wrong kind of intervention by external forces. Another exception has been the report by Jeff Drumtra bringing attention to Rwanda’s involvement, which immediately makes evident that this is not simply an ethnic conflict between Burundian ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ and that a far larger political (not ethnic) agenda is at play here. The English Media reporting on Burundi, is mainly comprised of international British and American media outfits such as: The Guardian, The Washington Post, The New York Times and the Daily Maverick. Regional coverage of the occurrences in Burundi is also often sensationalistic and alarmist, and a result of its regional source, overemphasizes the roles of Uganda, Tanzania and the East African Community. This is done by: The East African, the Mail and Guardian, and also compiled by the news aggregator AllAfrica.com. The coverage by the international French media is primarily done by: Radio France Internationale, Le Monde, and the German news agency Deutsche Welle. Much of this coverage appears to rely on analysis and commentary by human rights defenders as well as by regional experts such as Filip Reyntjens, director of the Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes in Africa. In the wake of the attempted coup of May 14th, many of Burundi’s media houses were attacked, burned, or forcibly shut down by the government. Forty eight hours after the media crackdown, journalists began broadcasting on Sos Medias Burundi. Streaming on the internet through the Soundcloud platform, Sos Medias Burundi broadcasts stories that have been verified, fact-checked and written by legitimate journalists on the ground. Using smart phones, journalists report what they see in their neighbourhoods and communities. In print form, Iwacu, is another news publication that survived the crackdown. NGO reports The NGOs on the ground in Burundi, engaging in the reporting and analysis of the situation include: the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, and Impunity Watch. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the French International Federation for Human Rights have detailed the human rights abuses, arrests and detention of human rights defenders. The International Centre for Transitional Justice, has reported on the failure of the transitional justice process. The International Crisis Group, and IRIN the humanitarian news agency, have detailed the country’s descent into conflict, while Refugees International has produced an in-depth report on the current humanitarian crisis faced by Burundi. 2.9. Visible evidence of reconciliation emerging across society Reconciliation is a difficult and rich concept, and difficult to find evidence for. It can be defined thinly as ‘peaceful co-existence’ or more thickly in terms of deep healing and 26
forgiveness59 (Abu-Nimer 2001; Lederach 1997; Kriesberg 2001). It can be understood as a concept that applies nationally, where it is perhaps best understood as ‘social cohesion’ or national unity, or a concept that applies interpersonally, and has to do with restoring relationships at the individual or community level. Peaceful coexistence and social cohesion at the national level If understood as peaceful coexistence and social cohesion at the national level, then evidence for this kind of reconciliation can be found in the successful application of the ethnic quota system in the government and military, the relatively successful reintegration of the military and generally security sector reform. It is also evident in the ways in which ethnicity no longer seems to be the central divisive issue (or issue around which leaders could manipulate people). With the conflict now being primarily between political elites, there is the suggestion that there is a degree of social cohesion amongst the local society beyond ethnicity or other divisions. Although the country is now becoming divided between those who support the president’s third term and those that don’t, this still seems to be primarily centered in the capital. ‘Upcountry’ there seems to be a greater interest in simply rebuilding lives and communities, and resolving the more pressing issues related to survival, such as those around livelihood and land. Of the various transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms that have been debated about by the Burundian government and external actors, the truth and reconciliation commission has had the most resonance with the Burundian government, and towards the end of 2015 work was underway to establish this commission. Healing and restoring relationships at the interpersonal level Through organisations such as The Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS) and the Organization for Reconciliation and Forgiveness, which were described in the section on ‘actors seeking to build and sustain peace’, large scale healing and reconciliation at an interpersonal and community level is taking place. The greatest obstacle to this seems to be the land disputes, but beyond this there seems to be a high level of willingness to engage in healing processes, reintegrate ex-combatants and child soldiers and become involved in peace and development work throughout the country.
Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 59
John Paul, Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, (1997) .
27
Significantly, Ingelaere and Kohlhagen60 found that those they interviewed in local society were not interested in truth-seeking (in the form of a TRC) or perpetrators being held accountable for their crimes (in the form of a tribunal), with several saying that they should 'not dig up what has been buried'. Instead they found their respondents expressing was a desire for dialogue (which they argue, in the way in which respondents described it was substantially different from truth-telling), and that dealing with the past would involve the facilitation of ‘a change of heart’ (2012: 55). In Kirundi, respondents explained how violence had changed the heart (umutima – which Ingelaere and Kohlhagen describe as encapsulating more than the translation ‘heart’ allows for, and includes reason, will, virtue and emotions; it is related to what makes us ‘essentially’ human). This ‘heart’ may be changed through dialogue and a reintegration of those whose ‘hearts’ have been affected into the ‘humanity’ of the community. Ingelaere and Kholhagen suggest that the facilitator of this kind of process were identified by members of the community as not the bashingantahe council but the principle of bushingantahe and they see this as a potential way forward in terms of rehabilitating this institution.
60
Ingelaere, Bert, and Dominik Kohlhagen. "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bushingantahe in Burundi." International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 40-59.
28
3. Outcomes From the evidence gathered through the mapping in b, c, and d above, what tangible and intangible outcomes emerged from the efforts to make and sustain peace in this particular conflict situation and terrain? What is the potential for sustaining peace in this conflict context? (Approximately 3,000 words)
3.1. Tangible and intangible dividends of peace One of the most tangible dividends of peace in Burundi is the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and the different structures and peacebuilding mechanisms it enshrined within various levels of government and society. As a result of Protocol 2 of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which addresses Democracy and Good Governance, a Constitution was ratified in 2005.The 2005 Burundian Constitution is a direct result of the Arusha Agreements, and this made provisions for power sharing within the government, security and defence forces. The 2005 Constitution also made allowances for ethnic quotas across different levels of public office. Protocol 3 of the Accord addresses Peace and Security, and was the impetus for the Security Sector Reform process that was undertaken in the country. One of the intangible dividends of peace is demonstrated in the emergence of a highly engaged, vocal and active civil society in Burundi. Heavily involved in peacebuilding initiatives and vociferous opponents to human rights abuses in the country, the active civil society in Burundi is evidence of efforts to carve out democratic space, ensure government accountability and transparency, and bring an end to state-instigated violence. Another intangible dividend of peace, is the overwhelming impression in Bujumbura and the countryside, that the current conflict is nothing more than a power struggle amongst political elite, resulting in the deaths of ordinary Burundians. There is a generalized feeling of fatigue surrounding the constant violence, and in light of this, the everyday Burundian would like to see an end to the fighting and a peaceful resolution. Lastly, what becomes quite clear, and has been reiterated throughout this paper, is that the current conflict is not split so neatly along ethnic lines, as often commonly assumed. Thus, any future peacebuilding efforts should take into account the complex nature of the various social and political fissures, which are less about ethnic differences and more about access to power and resources.
29
3.2. Evidence that the elements of peace secured can be sustained As mentioned previously, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement provided an institutional framework, across various levels of society, which endeavoured to sustain peace. This included Protocol 2 of the Agreement addressing Democracy and Good Governance, resulting in the creation of the Burundian Constitution which sets forth various power- sharing agreements and ethnic quotas. Protocol 3 deals with Peace and Security, and was mainly concerned with the Security Sector Reform, which integrated the different warring factions into the security and defines forces and stipulated that the national police force should not exceed more than 15,000 people, and the new National Defence Forces (FDN) no more than 25,00061. The current defunct status of a number peacebuilding institutions, paints a bleak picture of the future and longevity of sustained peace in the country. The CNTB, the body in charge of adjudicating land disputes, a highly contested topic of conflict, was disbanded by the president in April 2015. Additionally, there have been reports of corruption, distrust and a lack of faith in the bashingatahe. Added to this is the fact that the bashingatahe has been awarded no formal powers of adjudication by the government. The Independent Burundian Human Rights Commission as well as the Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue still remain standing. What seems evident is that much of the challenges that have plagued the country at a macro level, such as corruption and disproportionate access to power and resources, seem to be replicated within these peacekeeping institutions. What remains a strong framework for peacekeeping in the country and regionally are the Arusha Accords. It would seem that any efforts for sustaining peace in Burundi should be structured around building and re-framing institutions, mechanisms and policies that adhere to the spirit and tenets of the Arusha Accords.
3.3. Visible indicators that conflicting parties and the rest of the local society are pursuing a common destiny Clearly, between the opposition and the current government, there is not the sense of pursuing a common goal. The opposition also does not seem to be pursuing a common goal with the local society. To some extent, the current government and the local society may be pursuing a common goal, in that both have as their primary focus the rebuilding and development of society.
Stephane Mora, « La Reforme du Secteur de la Sécurité au Burundi: Coordination des auteurs internationaux, prose en compte en besoins et des préoccupations des communautés au sein de leurs programmes et liens avec d’autres processus » IFP Groupe Sectoriel Sur la Sécurité : Burundi, Nov. 2008. 61
30
The local society in Burundi is unusually homogenous in that people speak the same language and share the same culture. Burundi is a country with a rich and dynamic cultural heritage, where large parts of local society actively engage in dance, drama, and the reciting of poetry as a means of bringing people together. This rich cultural heritage has been harnessed by various grassroots organisations across rural Burundi to facilitate healing and reconciliation. In many communities, the bashingantahe continue to have a positive role in mediating conflicts. Members of local society have been described as being war weary and more interested in rebuilding their communities than becoming involved in political conflicts. As mentioned before, the greatest divisions in local society are between returnees and those who have always lived in Burundi, around the issue of land and livelihood. In rural Burundi, this is where the focus needs to be in terms of reconciliation and the resolution of conflict. 3.4. Are emerging leaders and new actors altering the terrain in significant ways? The opposition leaders are altering political and peace dynamics in Burundi. It is in their favour to paint a picture of Burundi as being on the verge of collapse and in need of external intervention. The opposition is currently largely in the diaspora and working closely with the international media and international NGOs to influence the international image of Burundi as a country on the verge of an ethnic genocide, even though this is far from the truth. The opposition leaders seem short sighted and primarily interested in ousting Nkurunziza without giving any further thought as to what they will do were they to be successful, or to consider the consequences of an external intervention on sustained peace in Burundi. The one opposition leader who has remained engaged in Burundian politics ‘from within’ is Rwasa, leader of the FNL, who now holds a position in the national parliament. He is strategically planning to be in place when Nkurunziza does get ousted, or when his term comes to an end in 2019. His party is very popular in Burundi, and he has a very good chance of being the next president after Nkurunziza. Currently, he is consistently keeping to his own agenda and challenging the CNDD in parliament. Unlike the other opposition leaders, he and his party have not been associated with the violence that has occurred over the past year. His party has been described as being very disciplined and has been carefully kept in line during the conflict. Civil society organisations, although vocal and active, have increasingly compromised themselves by siding largely with the opposition, and barely represent their constituencies outside of Bujumbura. There are few leaders from this sector who have really stood out or have played any significant role in bringing about peace, mediating 31
between conflicting parties or trying to bring an alternative voice into the increasingly polarised political space. Few are making an effort to be the voice of the rural majority who, thus far, have maintained a disinterest in the conflict.
3.5. Overall conclusions on what peace means and how peace is approached by different actors The local society in Burundi is relatively homogenous in terms of speaking the same language and broadly sharing the same culture. Burundi is also almost entirely rural, with a very small urban centre in the capital. Throughout the country, research seems to point to the fact that local society understands peace primarily in terms of ‘healing the heart’ and that the reintegration of communities through healing and dialogue is more important that digging up the past. There is a sense that insisting on any form of accountability for elite actors in the conflict may simply reignite the conflict, and that the priority is rebuilding communities and lives. In the current conflict that is emerging, it seems that many of the majority rural poor of Burundi are war weary and are not interested in participating in what seems to be largely an elite conflict about power sharing. Even though civil society organisations in Bujumbura are taking an active position alongside opposition parties in the conflict, this does not seem to reflect the interests of the majority of Burundians. To elite actors within Burundi, peace seems to mean a share in the power pie. Of issue, more than anything else, is to what extent each party or political actor can have access to power. This is evident in the fact that a political actor such as Rwasa, leader of the FNL, was prepared to give up his alliance with the opposition to align himself with UPRONA, his former enemy, and then was prepared to disregard his alliance with UPRONA for a seat in the national assembly. Having said this, the current government has seemed to reflect the understanding of peace as expressed by local Burundian society. For example, the Burundian government has argued against implementing a special tribunal or truth commission saying that these would reignite the conflict (although they eventually conceded to a truth commission). The president has also seemed to have resonance with the majority of local society outside of Bujumbura, and has seemed to understand the particular ways of doing things that are pervasive ‘up country’ in Burundi in terms of how communities function. To the broad international community, peace seems to mean an end of direct conflict, an end to impunity through criminal prosecutions, and security sector reform. The holding of elections have also been important to these actors. Although the members of the international community active in Burundi have shown an awareness of the growing 32
critique of the liberal peacebuilding model and its many limitations, this largely remains the predominant approach of this group of actors. These positions on what peace means and how to achieve peace are pretty far apart and it could be argued that the current presidents’ consistent resistance to the ‘interference’ of the international community, and even the regional actors such as the African Union (which the Burundian government sees as an extension of the European Union) is in part due to the gap that exists between the ways in which the current government understands and approaches peace and the way in which the international community does. The opposition parties are learning to ‘play the game’ in the way in which the international community prefers, particularly with the support of the Bujumbura-based civil society. But there is no evidence that this opposition reflects the desires of the majority of the population. The major problem in Burundi remains the tensions between various political actors/parties that all want a share in power. But politics in Burundi, as is the case in many African contexts, in large part due to the problematic models of peacebuilding and democracy on the continent, has become a zero-sum game. 3.6. The danger of conflict relapse The conflict has already relapsed, although not to the extent of being a civil war or genocide as some of the alarmist suggest. The problem seems to lie with the political elite and the ways in which power is shared. Although this report has indicated that the local society has not been interested in transitional justice and holding people accountable, perhaps in part due to fear that this would reignite the conflict, some analysts in Burundi argue that it is the lack of accountability of political and military elite that is in part to blame for the current violence. The argument is put forward that it is the military elite who committed acts of violence in 1993 and 1994 who are the instigators of the current violence as well. The tensions between the political and military elite were starkly evident during the 2010 elections and remained unresolved. The fact that these elections were intended to be held without having resolved the problems that arose during the previous elections points to the problematic model that electoral democracy presents. The problem is perhaps less Nkurunziza’s insistence on a third term, than the continued fragile relations between political elites which make any real progress in terms of peacebuilding and institutional reform a challenge. Amidst this, the effects of regional and international dynamics pose a challenge to Burundi, which remains weak and vulnerable to outside influences. The conflict between, for example, China, Russia and the US in terms of mining nickle and possibly also coltan in Burundi, and Rwanda’s increased interest in Burundi (which is likely to be 33
related to this) places Burundi in the midst of an international conflict is it poorly equipped to handle. In addition, it is so heavily dependent on aid that the donor community has almost complete power in Burundi. Yet according to some African analysts (particularly those from Burundi and South Africa), this donor community byand-large fails to understand the Burundian context and its unique socio-cultural and political dynamics.
34
Bibliography Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. Ayebare, A, 2010. Peacemaking in Burundi: A case study of regional diplomacy backed by regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Paper presented at 39th International Peace Institute Seminar, UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process and Practice, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Published as International Peace Institute Favorita Paper (1), 81–6. Arnault, J, 2000. Good Agreement, Bad Agreement? An Implementation Perspective. UN Peacemaker, Mediation Resources. http://peacemaker.un.org/resources/mediationlibrary/section?term_node_tid_depth=Implementation%20and%20Monitoring (accessed 29 March 2014). Banderembako, Deo. The Link between Land, Environment, Employment, and Conflict in Burundi. USAID Working Paper. May/June 2006. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadg059.pdf. Curtis, Devon. South Africa: Exporting Peace to the Great Lakes Region in South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era. Edited by Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007. Curtis, Devon. "South Africa: Exporting Peace to the Great Lakes Region." In South Africa in Africa: The Post-apartheid Era, edited by Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007. Bentley, Kristina A., and Roger Southall. An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa, and Burundi. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2005. Braganza, Jason. "Burundi at a Crossroads: The Money Matters." Development Initiatives. July/August, 2015. http://devinit.org/#!/post/burundi-at-acrossroads-the-money-matters. "Burundi: Political System and History." Burundi. February 2005. http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/burundi/Politics.html. Chretien, Jean-Pierre. "Burundi: Social Sciences Facing Ethnic Violence." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 19, no. 1 (1990): 38. Curtis, Devon. "The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention?" Issue 24 (September/October 2003): 1-5. http://www.igd.org.za/jdownloads/Global Insight/gi_24.pdf. Curtis, Devon, and Gwinyayi Albert. Dzinesa. Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012. Daley, Patricia. "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa." Third World Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2006): 303-19.
35
Daley, Patricia. "Ethnicity and Political Violence in Africa: The Challenge to the Burundi State." Political Geography 25, no. 6 (2006): 657-79. Daley, Patricia. "The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace– making." Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 112 (2007): 333-52. Daley, Patricia O. Gender and Genocide in Burundi: The Search for Spaces of Peace in the Great Lakes Region. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. Daley, Patricia. Gender & Genocide in Burundi: The Search for Spaces of Peace in the Great Lakes Region. Oxford: James Currey, 2008. Derks, Maria, Niki Frencken, and Sylvie More. Seminar Report Cligendael Institute. Dupont, Patrick. "La Crise Politique Au Burundi Et Les Efforts De Médiation De La Communauté Internationale." Edited by Filip Reytjens and Stefaan Maryse. L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs : Annuaire 1997-1998, 1998. Gahama, Joseph. "Les Causes Des Violences Ethniques Contemporaines Dans L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs: Une Analyse Historique Et Sociopolitique." CODESRIA Afrika Zamani 13 & 14 (2006): 101-15. Hatcher, Jessica. "'If I Go, Someone Else Will Claim My Land': The Stark Reality of Real Estate in Burundi." The Guardian, July/August, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/01/burundi-landdisplacement-conflict-. Hatungimana, Adelin, Jenyy Theron, and Anton Popic. "Hatungimana, A, Theron, J & Popic, A, 2007. Peace Agreements in Burundi: Assessing the Impact." Conflict Trends 3 (2007). Hajayandi, Patrick (forthcoming). “The case of Burundi” in Wielenga, C. and Nshimbi, C. Transitional justice, regionalism and policy in Africa. CODESRIA. Hendricks, Cheryl, and Amanda Lucey. Burundi: Missed Opportunities for South African Post-conflict Development and Peacebuilding? Issue brief. Vol. 48. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies Africa, 2013. "Closing Doors? The Narrowing of Democratic Space in Burundi." Human Rights Watch. November 23, 2010. https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/11/23/closingdoors/narrowing-democratic-space-burundi. "Burundi: From Electoral Boycott to Political Impasse." - International Crisis Group. 2015. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/centralafrica/burundi/169-burundi-from-electoral-boycott-to-political-impasse.aspx. "Policy Brief: Burundi’s Draft Law on the Proposed TRC - Impunity Watch." Impunity Watch. January 2013. http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Policy_Brief_Burundi_TRC1.pdf. "Burundi: TRC Law Passed - Impunity Watch." Impunity Watch. May 14, 2014. http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/IW_Press_Release_TRC.pdf. Ingelaere, Bert, and Dominik Kohlhagen. "Situating Social Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bushingantahe in Burundi." International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 40-59. Kriesberg, Louis. "Changing Forms of Coexistence." In Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, edited by Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Oxford: 36
Lexington Books. Laely, Thomas. "Peasants, Local Communities, and Central Power in Burundi." The Journal of Modern African Studies J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 35, no. 4 (1997): 695-716. Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. Lemarchand, R. "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." African Affairs 106, no. 422 (2006): 1-20. Lemarchand, Rene. "Burundi: The Killing Fields Revisited." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 18, no. 1 (1989): 22. Lemarchand, Rene. Burundi: Genocide Forgotten, Invented and Anticipated’. Occasional Paper. Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 1996. Lemarchand, Rene. Rwanda and Burundi. London: Pall Mall Press, 1970. Lemarchand, Rene. Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ; Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996. Lemarchand, René. "The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa." 2009. Centre D’Alerte Et De Prévention Des Conflits. Major Challenges and Potential Points of Leverage in the Drive to Encourage Political Parties in Burundi to Formulate Policies and Carry Out Programs. Report. February 2010. http://www.interpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/03/2010_Bur_Interpeace_CENAP_WGElections_ENG.pdf . Internal UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) Paper. Mapping External Resource Flows to Burundi. Report. October 3, 2007. http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/bur/key_docs/mapping_resource_fl ows_bur.pdf. Mcclintock, Elizabeth, and Térence Nahimana. "Managing the Tension between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi." International Negotiation 13, no. 1 (2008): 73-91. Ndikumana, Léonce. "Distributional Conflict, the State and Peace Building in Burundi." The Round Table 94, no. 381 (2005): 413-27. Ngaruko, Floribert, Janvier Nkurunziza, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi." In Understanding Civil War in Africa, edited by Paul Collier. World Bank Publications, 2005. Nibigara, Concilie, and Helen Scanlon. Gender, Peace and Security: The Challenges Facing Transitional Justice Processes in Burundi. Country Case Study: Burundi. International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2010. Nindorera, Agnes. "Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi." Working Paper 102, Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights. http://genderandsecurity.org/projects-resources/working-papers. Prunier, Gerard. Burundi: Descent Into Chaos or a Manageable Crisis? Report. WRITENET, 1995. Http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c00.html. 37
Reyntjens, F. "Briefing: Burundi: A Peaceful Transition after a Decade of War?" African Affairs 105, no. 418 (2005): 117-35. Reyntjens, Filip. "Again at the Crossroads: Rwanda and Burundi 2000-2001." Current African Issues 24 (2001): 1-26. Richter, Roxane. "Waging Peace:Mediation Opportunities & Obstacles in Burundi." University of Texas Librairies. May 2005. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4770/3858.pdf?se quence=1. Rubli, Sandra. "(Re)making the Social World: The Politics of Transitional Justice in Burundi." Africa Spectrum 18, no. 1, 3-24. http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/597. "“We Have No Influence”: International Discourse and the Instrumentalisation of Transitional Justice in Burundi." Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2, no. 3 (2013): 47. Theron, Jenny. "Resolving Land Disputes." Conflict Trends, no. 1 (2009). Turner, Simon. "‘The Tutsi Are Afraid We Will Discover Their Secrets’—On Secrecy and Sovereign Power in Burundi." Social Identities 11, no. 1 (2005): 37-54. Turner, Simon. "The Precarious Position of Politics in Popular Imagination: The Burundian Case." Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 1 (2007): 93-106. Turner, Simon. "Burundians in Belgium: Constructing, Performing and Contesting Diaspora." In Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement, edited by Nina Sorensen. Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2007. Turner, Simon. "The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and Its Diaspora." Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 4 (2008): 742-65. Turner, Simon. "Corruption, Conspiracy and the Power of Concealment in Burundi’s Political Landscape." In ) Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective, edited by Monique Nuijten and Gerhard Anders. Ashgate, 2009. Uvin, Peter. A Brief Discussion of Donor Support to Local Governance in Burundi. Report. Uvin, Peter. Structural Causes, Development Cooperation and Conflict Prevention in Burundi and Rwanda: A Country Case Study’. Report. http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/conferences/WP889/participants/ participants.aspx. Uvin, Peter. "Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence." Comparative Politics 31, no. 3 (1999): 253. Uvin, Peter. Life after Violence: A People's Story of Burundi. London: Zed Books, 2009. Vandeginste, S. "Burundi's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: How to Shed Light on the Past While Standing in the Dark Shadow of Politics?" International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 2 (2012): 355-65. Vandeginste, Stef. Transitional Justice for Burundi: A Long and Winding Road. Study Workshop 10 – Alternative Approaches to Dealing with the Past. Nuremberg: Crisis Management Initiative, 2009. 38
Vandeginste, Stef. "Power-sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections." The Journal of Modern African Studies J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 49, no. 02 (2011): 315-35. Wolpe, Howard, Steve Mcdonald, Eugene Nindorera, Elizabeth Mcclintock, Alain Lempereur, Fabien Nsengimana, Nicole Rumeau, and Alli Blair *. "Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War‐torn Burundi." The Round Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 457-67. Wolpe, Howard, Steve Mcdonald, Eugene Nindorera, Elizabeth Mcclintock, Alain Lempereur, Fabien Nsengimana, Nicole Rumeau, and Alli Blair *. "Rebuilding Peace and State Capacity in War‐torn Burundi." The Round Table 93, no. 375 (2004): 457-67.
39
Appendix A TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN BURUNDI: 1951- 2016 Timeline 1951-56
1962 1963 1965
1966 November 1972
1976 1987 1988 1993 June
1993 October
1994 January 1994 April
Event/s Independence drive led by crosscommunal UPRONA party of Prince Louis Rwagasore, which wins 1961 legislative elections. Prince Louis becomes prime minister but is assassinated shortly afterwards Urundi is separated from Ruanda-Urundi and becomes independent kingdom of Burundi under King Mwambutsa IV. Thousands of Hutus flee to Rwanda following ethnic violence. King Mwambutsa refuses to appoint a Hutu prime minister after Hutus win a majority in parliamentary elections; attempted coup put down by army chief Michel Micombero. Michel Micombero ousts king, declares himself president. About 120,000 Hutus are massacred by government forces and their supporters in the wake of a Hutu-led uprising in the south. President Micombero is deposed in a military coup by Jean-Baptiste Bagaza. President Bagaza is deposed in a coup led by Pierre Buyoya. Thousands of Hutus are massacred by Tutsis and thousands more flee to Rwanda. Melchior Ndadaye's Frodebu wins multiparty polls, ending military rule and leading to the installation of a pro-Hutu government. Tutsi soldiers assassinate President Ndadaye. In revenge, some Frodebu members massacre Tutsis and the army begins reprisals. Burundi is plunged into an ethnic conflict which claims some 300,000 lives. Parliament appoints Cyprien Ntaryamira - a Hutu - as president. Plane carrying Ntaryamira and his 40
1994 October 1995 1996 2001 October
2003 April
2003 July 2003 November
2005 August
2006 September
2008 April
2008 May 2009 April
Rwandan counterpart is shot down over the Rwandan capital Kigali, killing both and triggering genocide in Rwanda in which 800,000 are killed. Parliament speaker Sylvestre Ntibantunganya appointed president. Massacre of Hutu refugees leads to renewed ethnic violence in the capital, Bujumbura. Ex-president Buyoya seizes power. Talks brokered by South African President Nelson Mandela lead to installation of transitional government, but main Hutu rebel groups refuse to sign and fighting intensifies. Domitien Ndayizeye - a Hutu - succeeds Pierre Buyoya as president, under terms of three-year, power-sharing transitional government inaugurated in 2001. Major rebel assault on Bujumbura. Some 300 rebels and 15 government soldiers are killed. Thousands flee their homes. President Ndayizeye and Hutu rebel group Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD) leader Pierre Nkurunziza sign agreement to end civil war at summit of African leaders in Tanzania. Smaller Hutu rebel group, Forces for National Liberation (FNL), remains active. Pierre Nkurunziza, from the Hutu FDD group, is elected as president by the two houses of parliament. The FDD won parliamentary elections in June. The last major rebel group, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), and the government sign a ceasefire at talks in Tanzania. Former head of governing party, Hussein Radjabu, is sentenced to 13 years in prison for undermining state security. Radjabu was accused of plotting armed rebellion and insulting President Nkurunziza. Government and FNL rebels sign ceasefire. FNL leader Agathon Rwasa returns home from exile in Tanzania. Ex-rebel Godefroid Niyombare becomes first ever Hutu chief of general staff of the 41
army. FNL lays down arms and officially becomes a political party in a ceremony supervised by the African Union. 2010 June
2011 November
2013 June
2013 August
2014 March
2014 April
2014 October
2015 May
Presidential election. Nkurunziza reelected in uncontested poll after main opposition parties boycott the vote and parliamentary polls. They say earlier district elections were rigged, and form a new civil opposition Alliance of Democrats for Change (ADC-Ikibiri). FNL leader Agathon Rwasa goes into hiding. Rights group says more than 300 people killed in past five months, including opposition party members or members of former rebel FNL; accuse the government of restricting media and political freedom. President Nkurunziza approves new media law which critics condemn as an attack on press freedom. Law forbids reporting on matters that could undermine national security, public order or the economy. The leader of the former rebel FML, Agathon Rwasa, resurfaces after three years in hiding and says he will stand in the 2015 presidential election Parliament blocks a government attempt to introduce changes to the constitution seen as threatening the balance of power between the country's main ethnic groups. Burundi orders a senior UN official to leave the country after a UN report warns that the government is arming its young supporters ahead of next year's elections, a claim which the government denies. Burundian opposition leader Leonce Ngendakumana is sentenced to a year in prison for slander, in what he describes as a political trial ahead of next year's presidential election. Constitutional Court rules in favour of President Nkurunziza's decision to stand for a third term, amid reports of judges being intimidated. Protestors take to the 42
2015 June
2015 July
2016 January
2016 January-March
streets and tens of thousands flee the violence. An army officer's coup attempt fails. Electoral commission announces presidential elections will be postponed until July and parliamentary polls until the end of June, following month of protests. Vice-President Gervais Rufyikiri leaves country after opposing President Nkurunziza's plans for a third term. President Nkurunziza wins a third term in the presidential election with 70% of the vote Opposition leader Agathon Rwasa describes the polls as a "joke". President Nkurunziza threatens to counter the deployment of external peacekeepers after the African Union announces plans to send in 5,000 troops to protect civilians from escalating violence between government and rebel forces. After petitions submitted by PALU and the East African Citizens to the East African Community, hearings were held on the political and humanitarian crisis in Burundi.
43
