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Maturana’s Theory and Interpersonal Ethics Hugh Gash • St Patrick’s College, Ireland • hugh.gash/at/spd.dcu.ie > Context • Maturana’s views on cognitive processes and explaining have ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to link ethics and epistemology to facilitate thinking about how to promote respect between different viewpoints through mutual understanding. > Method • Maturana’s views on ethics are outlined in three domains: the personal, the interpersonal, and the societal. > Results • The ethical implications that emerge around the notion of reality with or without parenthesis, the concept of the legitimate other, and Maturana’s conjectures about the origins of human social groups. Social groups in which cooperation is more important than competition are based on love in the sense that others are accepted as legitimate members of the community. An epistemology that responds to the biological origins of human cognition is one that is more open to cooperation, honesty, responsibility, and respect than an epistemology that takes reality as given and the task of human cognition to represent truth. > Implications • This framework for thinking about cognitive processes provides a way of approaching disagreements so they become opportunities for discussion rather than for power assertion of one reality over another. In a world where strongly held viewpoints on ethics and reality lead to conflict, promoting viable models of cognitive process that link cognition and ethics may lead to insights that promote tolerance. Ideas from attribution theory in social psychology are presented as a means of facilitating the emergence of the concept of the legitimate other in discussion about disagreements. > Key words • Ethics, constructivist epistemology, legitimate other, reality in parenthesis.
Introduction The purpose of this paper is to consider aspects of Maturana’s writings that have profound implications for the ways we live together on this planet. His biologically based theory offers a singular perspective on how we can think about cognitive differences. My aim is to link the epistemological considerations with their implications for interpersonal relations. Ethical relationships with other people, in Maturana’s theory, are closely related to his ideas about objectivities: about ways we deal with our varying interpretations of our experiences of the world. One view of objectivity places reality as experienced apart from us, and in this case the problem of knowledge is presented as a problem concerning how we can be sure that knowledge matches what is in our environment. Another constructivist view presents “reality” as being a result of our cognition. The epistemological problem here is to describe and explain what we observe, recognising that we cannot match what we know with something outside our experience. Explaining works only when a listener accepts the explanation according to criteria that vary depending on the domain
of the phenomenon. In this paper I discuss the ethical implications resulting from this constructivist formulation. Implications arise in three domains: the epistemological domain of explaining realities; the interpersonal domain of the legitimacy of the other in discussions; and the societal domain, where implicit social values need to be made explicit to avoid escalating conflict or environmental damage.
Language and what it conceals, and Maturana’s theory Understanding epistemologies requires appreciating their beginnings and what they assume about how knowledge comes about and how personal knowing is related to experience. René Descartes introduces his philosophy with his “cogito ergo sum,” which emphasises personal thinking but does not immediately deal with the relation between thought and reality. Humberto Maturana begins with observation that is immediately placed in a social context of description and explanation (1988). In approaching Maturana’s work I am reminded of a comment
Silvio Ceccato (1961) made about cognition. Ceccato pointed out that understanding what it is to know was distorted because the activities involved in observation are acquired early in infancy and so it is difficult for adults to observe these activities. Closely associated with this observation he made another, that philosophy first began to ask questions about observation when the tradition of speculative philosophy was firmly established. Under these conditions observation was studied as the observation of objects, which were assumed to exist prior to their observation. So questioning the independent existence of reality or the relation between ideas and reality was not possible. While considerable progress has been made in understanding observation since Ceccato made these comments, the comments illustrate for me two central issues in working with Maturana’s theory. First, they highlight Maturana’s recognition that once objects are created, the process of creating them is obscured. There are times when the process is vitally important, especially in those essential moments when people come to understand something in a new way. Wonder and reflective moments provide access to processing as does the activity of problem
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solving. However, at times it is important not to concentrate on the process in all sorts of activities, because to do so will interfere with the smooth execution of these activities. At the level of speech, stuttering will occur if one focuses on the process inappropriately. Tightrope walkers need to avoid focussing on aspects of what they are doing so as to stay on the rope. Process is also obscured in language use as we tend to take the meanings of words for granted. Second, there is a difficulty that is central for readers coming to any well-formed theory for the first time. Many groundbreaking theorists, it seems to me, develop a form of linguistic expression in order to be as precise as possible with their ground-breakingly novel ways of describing and explaining experience. As a student I remember struggling with John Dewey and Jean Piaget, and later as a young academic in Dublin I read and met Maturana. Each of these thinkers was concerned with similar topics and saying similar things but with very different forms of language that incorporated important theoretical insights. However, understanding and exploring these differences in forms of language is crucial to grasping the insights that are special to the theorist. While part of this paper on Maturana’s work refers to his constructivist epistemology and to other constructivist thinkers, I want to focus on some of the implications of his writings on epistemology for our relations with each other. This is because I have felt that this is a central recurring theme in his work and indeed one that has potential implications for conflict resolution at the interpersonal level and for the development of ecological responsibility at the level of society. Constructivism has varied meanings, so to be consistent I am following Piaget (1970) and present cognitive processes and products in constructivist terms as (1) developing systems that (2) seek to identify regularities in experience using existing ideas in an iterative manner; and where (3) these emerging regularities are constrained by intra-individual and perceived inter-individual consistencies that are central to two of the domains I am concerned with here. Then, following Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995), it is important to note that all cognitive products are constructions and are built from experience and cannot be compared with “reality;”
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rather their constraints are wholly dependent on internal comparisons with previously constructed ideas. Like von Glasersfeld in his article on Maturana (Glasersfeld 1991), I want to state that I am presenting my own interpretations in what follows. While this general account of how thinking works appears similar in different constructivist thinkers, including Maturana, there are the nuances I mentioned in the phrasing and emphasis of different writers. In addition, Maturana’s writing is often difficult when it is first read and for this reason I place his work in the context of other thinkers who have similarly constructivist theories. Dewey’s account of cognitive process was essentially one where thinking was described as a form of experiment. One plans an action to assess the result and this result informs about the adequacy of the planned action. The iterative nature of cognition in Dewey is very apparent and this type of circularity is also apparent in Maturana’s theory. At times Dewey (e.g., 1960) also expressed the radical idea that knowledge is always changing and that knowledge is assessed by the results of experiments rather than being matched with reality. In Piaget’s (1970) account of process, the emphasis is more biological: it is one of assimilation and accommodation under the guidance of an equilibration process. Some recent criticisms of this account in Piaget have their origins in the difficulties encountered in modelling this process. In such modelling it becomes difficult to decide which aspect of the problem to focus on (Mareschal & Westermann 2009). Humberto Maturana’s constructivist epistemology also is influenced by his biological background. In Maturana’s case the internal circularity of the reasoning is very much part of his style of writing and thinking. For example, in discussing how experience comes from “nowhere,” Maturana writes: “We do not usually realise that because we normally collapse the experience upon the explanation of the experience in the explanation of the experience” (1988: 27). In addition, Maturana (1997) emphasises that living systems are structuredetermined systems and learning has a secondary place. For example, “Living systems have a plastic structure, and the course that their structural changes follows while they stay alive is contingent to their own internal
dynamics of structural change modulated by the structural changes triggered in them by their interactions in the medium they exist as such” (Maturana 1997, part 1). So the emphasis here is principally on intra-individual consistencies even though we exist in the flow of recursive coordinations of language, which is naturally social. This quality of connection and interconnection is central to the theory and its implications. Importantly, both initial and later accounts of this theory refer to the ethical implications of the theory. I will focus on the iterative nature of knowing in Maturana, then move to his account of explanations and ways this prioritises the ethical implications of his constructivist epistemology. The ideas we have about individual identities, that is, both our own and that of others, are central to this discussion. So it is important to notice how the idea of self might be understood in a constructivist sense. Self is a conservation or a constant with some variation from time to time or according to changing context. Von Glasersfeld wrote about the self concept as a construction that “..resides in no place at all, but merely manifests itself in the continuity of our acts of differentiating and relating and in the intuitive certainty we have that our experience is truly ours” (Glasersfeld 1979: 113). Significantly, our perception of discontinuity in another person’s acts of continuity may lead to the immediate realisation that this other self is not the self we anticipated. How we consider self and other is vitally important in disagreements. In what follows I allude to the difficulties in changing ones’ view on different others and the important role of discussion in facilitating the emergence of awareness and respect.
Cognitive processes, mistakes, and different points of view Ethics often arises when people encounter different points of view or different accounts of experiences that are shared. Such differences invite discussion but the basis of discussion may or may not be respectful. In my view the ethical quality of the discussion depends on the extent that the hidden assumptions made in the accounts of thinking
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differ and whether these assumptions can be shared. Each of the writers mentioned above – Dewey, Piaget, Glasersfeld and Maturana – have emphasised process in their epistemology and their account of thinking. In the main they have been concerned with the generation of correct rather than incorrect knowledge. However, cognitive processes are not immune to error generation because the items that are used in the process may not necessarily be viable, and also cognitive processes take shortcuts. These shortcuts account for some of the ways in which people construe their worlds differently and these differences may be focal points for interpersonal conflict. In explaining the processing and origins of these differences, Shweder (1977) has argued that faulty thinking arises from the limitations of the mind. Central to the success and failure of the cognitive system are its processes or “heuristics.” Errors may arise from intra-individual activity such as shortcuts or from previous knowledge structures. These may be inaccurate or inappropriate. Nemeroff and Rozin (2000) show that in children’s thinking, moral and physical causes may be confused so allowing the emergence of the idea of magical contagion, for example the idea that I might be made holy by wearing a religious relic. Indeed, the belief in the power of religious relics depends on this confusion. While identifying errors and mistakes may facilitate the emergence of novel ways of thinking, they remain potential sources of disagreement between people. We learn not just from creative interaction with our experiences, but also from what we hear from other people. In the educational domain the constructivist epistemology is closely associated with facilitating the emergence of new viable knowledge in students and pupils. So much so that direct instruction has tended to be viewed as a form of pedagogy that is in opposition to constructivist instruction (Tobias & Duffy 2009). This neglect of the role of providing information was highlighted by Harris and Koenig (2006), who wrote about the ways children learn from testimony about all sorts of things from germs to God. In their analysis of learning in all its complexity it is shown that children learn from what is not said as well as from what is said via nonverbal messages.
However, what can we say about “error”? Error, whether it arises from intra-individual or inter-individual sources is often noticed in the inter-individual context after actions or thoughts are made public. And it is in the public domain that ethics arises. In what follows, Maturana’s account of realities in parenthesis provides a framework for analysing the differences in assumptions or reasoning that often arise when people disagree, whether or not this be in a domain where there are agreed procedures for deciding which view is viable. In today’s world we are aware of many conflicts. Some arise on account of differences that are matters that are decidable through investigation. Others are differences that depend on religious texts or views and these may remain differences after discussion but discussion about the basis for these differences implies the possibility of respect for the different views. So having insight into ways to examine differences in points of view is an epistemological contribution with enormous importance. The challenge is to persuade people with different views that there is value in discussion! As Maturana (1997) put it, ways of emotioning are configured early in our development in childhood and cannot be imposed but he would like to contribute to a form of living in which love, mutual respect, honesty, and social responsibility arise spontaneously in our coexistence. Comments made by Humberto Maturana with direct implications for ethical relations between people are considered for three domains: (1) his discussion of explanation in the domain of the individual’s thinking; (2) in the domain of interpersonal behaviour there is the concept of the “legitimate other;” and then (3) in the societal domain his comments about matristic societies resonate with comments made recently about the need in contemporary society for more cooperation and the need for what is termed “social capital.”
1. Ethics and intra-individual-level explaining
Maturana’s 1988 article raises issues of ethics in the context of the quest for a compelling argument that is linked to objectivity and reality. Maturana’s account of epistemology here and elsewhere begins with observation. Humans observe and make distinc-
tions in language and we make descriptions and explanations that are secondary to this observation. Further, and importantly, he remarks that: “whatever happens to us, happens to us as an experience that we live as coming from nowhere” (1988: 27). Given that observation is primary, Maturana (1988) has discussed explanations of what is observed in terms of two forms of objectivity: objectivity “in parenthesis” or without “parenthesis,” depending on the attitude of the person who is observing or explaining. Traditional philosophical discussion of epistemological issues was about the grounds and validity of knowledge, and reality was assumed and without parenthesis. In constructivist writings it is argued that this traditional approach assumed that truth was a question of matching or comparing what one knows with reality. So constructivist knowing is about reality in parenthesis. Indeed the idea that knowledge is the result of a process of learning was ignored by traditional epistemology, as was the critical issue of how to compare what one knows with anything other than experience. In addition, while presumably philosophers realised that childhood involves considerable learning, the key epistemological questions about knowledge were about completed knowledge rather than knowledge in process (Hamlyn 1978). Objects were assumed to be there and whatever gaps there might be between what we know and reality were not considered a fundamental problem as they were in constructivist approaches. The idea that how knowledge is acquired over time in, for example, childhood has any relevance to epistemology was referred to as the “genetic fallacy” and this was not important to what many considered mainstream epistemology (Hamlyn 1978). This strong view of the rigid distinction between the construction of knowledge and the justification of knowledge began to change in the following years. Kitchener (1987) has argued that this strong position was based on a mistaken view that psychology was irrelevant for genetic epistemology. Further, he argues that knowledge may be based on temporal, causal or rational-logical sequences, and that the genetic fallacy depends on the failure to distinguish between two ways one comes to hold knowledge ( causal sequences without understanding and sequences that
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are rationally understood). He argues that only the third sort of genetic sequence, the rational-logical, is relevant to epistemological issues. On this basis some of the criticisms of mainstream epistemology argued in Glasersfeld (1974) are less applicable to more recent philosophical writings on genetic epistemology. The absence or presence of the assumption that observation is observation of reality is linked to Maturana’s two notions of objectivity. As pointed out below, this is important for the ethics implicit in constructivist epistemology. Maturana (1988) has argued that it is possible to choose a position where we accept that what we know is not a representation of reality but rather a model of our human and limited experience of reality. It is based on what we knew when we came to (or made) our understanding. All this implies that we are aware that our understandings are our own generated models. Accepting these limits and taking personal responsibility for this process has implications for ethical relationships with others. So where there are differences between what we understand and what others understand, these differences present opportunities to think about how these differences arise and how we may talk about them and understand them. Differences become opportunities to discuss and to search for the origins of these differences. The ethical implications are that differences present an opportunity to understand different points of view in a context of mutual respect. So adopting the constructivist epistemology entails a way of relating to the world and to others. This becomes even clearer when we notice that if we forget that what we know is an interpretive model, differences imply that someone is wrong. One position then is illegitimate, is invalid – is wrong! Differences become an opportunity for power assertion. So appreciation of the mystery of what we know and its approximate nature is an invitation to a sort of spiritual awareness that allows consideration of other interpretations. Maturana emphasized that our greatest spiritual danger was to believe we had a truth, which made us blind to our circumstances and led us to fanaticism, and our next greatest danger was to forget our responsibility for our acts or for desiring/ not desiring their consequences.
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I consider that the greatest spiritual danger “ that a person faces in his or her life is to believe that he or she is the owner of a truth, or the legitimate defender of some principle […] because he or she immediately becomes blind to his or her circumstance, and enters into the closed alley of fanaticism. (Maturana 1990: 34)
”
In a similar vein Bertrand Russell (1950) emphasised the difficulties that arise when people rely on authority rather than on reason.
2. Ethics and the inter-individual level – the legitimate other
When two people discuss a particular issue, how might one examine such differences in understanding that might arise between them? Maturana’s writings deal with this issue in a number of ways, including his views on explanations about realities and the concept of the legitimate other. Explanations are part of our culture of conversation. When a person explains, the explanation only works as an explanation when it is accepted by the listener, and this acceptance depends on certain criteria. Maturana (1988) provides these criteria in the case of scientific explanations, but explains that other criteria apply in other domains such as religions, philosophical systems, and ideologies. Here the ethical considerations are approached in two ways: first on the basis of the explanations and second in terms of the criteria in the different domains. Maturana presents two types of explanations as introduced above: one based on reality in parenthesis and the other based on reality without parenthesis. When we consider how two people are going to discuss a topic, another key concept of Maturana’s plays an important role: that is, the notion of the legitimate other. In Maturana’s theory, love is a way of relating with others who are considered legitimate and so do not have to justify themselves to us. In this sense the word “love” is not a virtue but rather it refers to the behaviours by which social behaviour is conserved (Maturana & VerdenZöller 2008). Maturana does not explicitly associate these two views on reality with the notion of love and of the legitimate other, but there is a link because explaining based on reality in parenthesis requires cooperation and respect.
From a psychological point of view it is important to try to understand how one switches from one position on reality to another. To my knowledge this is not an issue that Maturana has written about. It seems central to an understanding of the dynamics of attitude change. What do we know about the conditions favouring the emergence of a switch from one position to another? Knowing how to approach this is critical to any educational or psychological plans to facilitate a respectful and ethical resolution of disagreements. As far back as 1954, Gordon Allport put forward four conditions that need to be filled to reduce prejudice in contact between different groups : (1) that the groups have relatively equal status in the contact; (2) that the groups have common goals; (3) that there be little or no competition between the groups; and (4) that their meeting be supported by those in authority. These conditions for reducing prejudice appear consistent with the development or emergence of the concept of the legitimate other. There are many research studies supporting the importance of Allport’s conditions. A number of studies have been published showing how it is possible to invite children to reconsider their prejudices concerning children who are “different” (Gash 1993, 1996; Gash & Coffey 1995). These studies were designed to provide experiences in class to children to facilitate the emergence of mutual respect and positive attitudes towards children with different types of learning disabilities based on constructivist considerations (Gash 1992). As part of this work in Dublin I observed contact between primary school children from two schools: a regular primary school and a school for children with learning difficulties. The school staff involved in planning these encounters were meticulous in seeking to avoid any possibility of negative attitudes emerging. For example, I was interested at the time in assessing the attitudes of the primary children in the regular school to see to what extent their experience in these joint sessions facilitated the emergence of positive attitudes towards children with learning difficulties. I was not permitted to do this. I understood later that this was not possible because the assessment questionnaire might allow the emergence
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of negative attitudes that were perhaps just below the surface. At the time I felt frustrated. However, looking back at this years later, and following the research studies I cite here, I am aware of the difficulty of changing pupils’ attitudes towards children who are different and so appreciate more fully how difficult this process is to achieve. There were, however, at the time some moments of changed awareness that illustrate well how the notion of legitimate other may emerge. In one instance a teenager played table football with a boy with Down syndrome who was very good at table football. In discussion later the teenager said that during the game he realised how specific the difficulties of the boy with Down syndrome were, how good he was at table football, and indeed how similar we all are one to another. The concept of the legitimate other cannot be considered in isolation from its context. As Maturana puts it, humans are social animals so we are naturally inclined to feel sympathy for others. However, in some circumstances we reject others and do not consider them legitimate. Therefore, understanding how to approach disagreements with other people seems enmeshed with acceptance of the other as a person. Again social psychological research is relevant to understanding the conditions in which acceptance or rejection of people occurs. The research on attribution theory has a direct bearing on this issue. In this case, it is the attribution of the concept of legitimate other. Fritz Heider (1958), often regarded as the originator of attribution theory, showed that people tend to focus on the person (internal attribution) and ignore the circumstances in which the person acted (external attribution). This developed to incorporate context in Kelley’s (1973) co-variation model concerned with variation of behaviour across situations in terms of the relative importance of internal and external attributions. For example, to explain how a child is unkind one refers to consensus (how do other people behave in this situation?), distinctiveness (how does this person behave in other situations), and consistency (how does the same person act in similar situations across time?). Internal attributions tend to be made when consistency is high (child is mean regularly) and consensus (other children don’t) and distinctiveness (child isn’t mean with
classmates) are low. People make external attributions when they are all high. Redirecting attention through questioning about consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency may be a useful or effective way to facilitate attitude change. In the context of Maturana’s views on the legitimate other, these considerations originating in the domain of social psychology provide ways to think about how to promote ideas of mutual respect and how we may understand our human differences. If discussions can be encouraged to examine contexts and to understand why people make the choices they make in particular situations, then it is possible to hope that empathy may emerge and the other may be considered as a legitimate other, in Maturana’s phrasing.
3. Ethics at the societal level: Matristic societies
Bearing in mind that the main aim of this paper is to invite a reflection on social relationships, the most important part of this reflection concerns the implications of this reflection on society. Maturana’s (1997) comments about society arise in his considerations about early human societies from his biological point of view. These ideas relate closely to Putnam’s (2000) work emphasising the importance of human groups in the maintenance of the social fabric. For many people in western society today, life is so focussed on work that it is hard to find time to devote to important societal dimensions of living. Maturana’s views on how conflicts arise, and how they may be resolved, have implications for group conflicts. His work invites us to reflect on what it means to be human and on the significance of respect in human relationships, and indeed on the need for relationships. Ethics must be more than philosophical discussions about human relationships, it arises in the ways we view each other and whether we care or we do not care for each other. Ethics is about taking responsibility for our actions and being aware of the ways we treat each other. Maturana’s discussions on the origins of human societies are also associated with his views on human relationships and on relationships of mutual respect or support. He viewed early hunter gatherer societies as matristic. There is a nostalgia, I think, in the way Maturana described these
societies and the way he viewed the ways people related one to another. Key features of such societies were their mutual interdependence with each other and nature. People killed the animals they needed to eat. There was a particular type of harmony between people, animals, and plants. Once societies began to keep herds this harmony was broken. People now wanted to protect “their flocks” from predators. In such a society, relationships between people were also altered as some groups had flocks to meet their needs and others didn’t and so were in danger of starvation. So power and war emerged in societies where hierarchy, leadership, and associated values were important. Acquisition was a key feature of these emerging patristic societies. Maturana (1997) deplores the ways we relate with each other in relations of domination, mistrust, dishonesty, greed, appropriation, and manipulation. In a similar vein, Putnam (2000) has shown that there have been declines in civic and political engagement, in the informal ties people have with other (whether we are talking about being in choirs or bowling), and people trust each other less. All these issues are vital to the ways people relate to each other at the local and global level. Putnam has attributed this decline in our human interconnections to changes in family structure, suburban sprawl, and electronic entertainment. A key issue in Putnam’s work is the documentation of the importance of human groups to the maintenance of civic behaviour in society. In Maturana’s writings, matristic societies were ones where people lived in harmony with nature and where people in the group were dependent on each other. In such societies, cooperation was more significant than competition. Maturana (1997) hoped that his work would facilitate the reemergence of this type of society, one where patterns of social co-existence allow relations of love, mutual respect, honesty, and social responsibility to flourish. This is what we desire when we desire spiritual well-being, that is, life as we learned to live it when we were children. This links to the idea of social capital, which can be accounted for by the connections between social networks in society (Putnam 2000). Putnam has demonstrated the positive consequences for civic life in communities where social network-
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ing is vibrant, particularly networks fostering relationships of engagement, trust, and equality. In this special issue of Constructivist Foundations dedicated to Maturana’s work, it is reasonable to hope that greater awareness of the interconnectedness of people and nature is timely in today’s society. This particular vision of being human in Maturana’s work is one that may facilitate the emergence of such types of community associations that support greater social engagement and responsibility. I hope this article will draw attention to these social implications of his work.
Conclusion We live in a time when competitive procedures in banking practices have created financial disasters in a number of countries, when differences in religious positions lead to terrorism, when industrial procedures from mining to hydroelectric schemes have enormous ecological consequences, and where considering people as apart from nature appears more and more irresponsible. Maturana’s biological viewpoint with its epistemological implications shows in a number of ways how awareness of our connectedness with our past and with our communities may provide a way towards cooperation. The choice is ours. Maturana’s influence seems to this writer to be somewhat muted through the systemic prose that is characteristic of his writing. Even so there are signs that his work or parts of it are being taken up and used more and more broadly. However, as the theory is adopted it is inevitably adapted and thus the message is less clear. This is a consequence Matu-
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Hugh Gash
has worked at St Patrick’s College Dublin for many years. He is interested in constructivism and its applications in psychology and education and has published in these areas. He met Ernst von Glasersfeld in 1973 when he went as a post-doc to the University of Georgia to work with Charlie Smock. Ernst’s thinking had a major influence on Hugh’s work, details of which may be found on his website, http://staff.spd.dcu.ie/gashh/
rana is clearly anxious to avoid. My own hope is that ways can be found to develop his discourses about objectivities that may be helpful in conflict resolution. Ideas about realities and about how the emergence of the concept of the legitimate other could be facilitated seem very hopeful in a world where extreme viewpoints demanding obedience are enforced with violence.
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The Creation of Reality
A Constructivist Epistemology of Journalism and Journalism Education
Bernhard Poerksen
ISBN 9781845402099 (Paperback), 250pp. In this book, Bernhard Poerksen draws up a new rationale for constructivist thinking and charts out directions for the imaginative examination of personal certainties and the certainties of others, of ideologies great and small. The focus of the debate is on the author’s thesis that our understanding of journalism and, in particular, the education and training of journalists, would profit substantially from constructivist insights. These insights instigate, the claim is, an original kind of scepticism. “This is the right way to present constructivism to a critical scientific community as well as to a broader critical public.” Armin Scholl, Professor at the Institute for Communication Science in Münster, Germany, in: Constructivist Foundations, Volume 6 Number 2 March 2011 p. 277.
The Certainty of Uncertainty Dialogues Introducing Constructivism
Bernhard Poerksen
ISBN 9780907845812 (Paperback), 200pp. This book presents the views of the founders of constructivism and modern systems theory, who are still providing stimulating cues for international scientific debate. The conversations of Heinz von Foerster, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto R. Maturana, Francisco J. Varela, Gerhard Roth, Siegfried J. Schmidt, Helm Stierlin, and Paul Watzlawick with Bernhard Poerksen, display a kind of thinking that steers clear of rigid fixation and reveals the ideal of objectivity to be a myth. “The Certainty of Uncertainty introduces us to a breadth of debate and unpacks for us the paradoxes that might result from acknowledging the observer.” Leonardo – Volume 40, Number 1, February 2007, p. 93.
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Bernhard Poerksen is professor of media studies at the University of Tübingen http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/6/3/363.gash
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